Legal Developments: Fourth Quarter, 2020

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Legal Developments: Fourth Quarter, 2020 February 2021 Vol. 107, No. 1 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System www.federalreserve.gov Legal Developments: Fourth Quarter, 2020 Orders Issued Under Bank Holding Company Act Orders Issued Under Section 3 of the Bank Holding Company Act Cidade de Deus Cia. Comercial de Participações Nova Cidade de Deus Participações S.A. BBD Participações S.A. Fundação Bradesco Lecce Holdings S.A. Banco Bradesco S.A. Osasco, Brazil Order Approving the Acquisition of a Bank FRB Order No. 2020-06 (October 7, 2020) Banco Bradesco S.A. (“Bradesco”), a foreign banking organization subject to the provi- sions of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (“BHC Act”);1 Bradesco’s parent companies, Cidade de Deus Cia. Comercial de Participações (“Cidade”), Nova Cidade de Deus Participações S.A. (“Nova Cidade”), BBD Participações S.A. (“BBD”), and Fundação Bradesco (“Fundação”); and a direct subsidiary of Bradesco, Lecce Holdings S.A. (“Lecce”) (collectively, “Applicants”), all of Osasco, Brazil, have requested the Board’s approval to become bank holding companies under section 3 of the BHC Act,2 by acquiring all of the voting shares of BAC Florida Bank (“BAC Bank”), Coral Gables, Florida, a state nonmember bank.3 Notice of the proposal, affording interested persons an opportunity to submit comments, has been published (84 Federal Register 34395 (July 18, 2019)). The time for submitting comments has expired, and the Board has considered the proposal and all comments received in light of the factors set forth in section 3 of the BHC Act. Bradesco, with consolidated assets of approximately $276.5 billion, is the third largest bank in Brazil based on asset size.4 Bradesco engages in retail and commercial banking and other financial activities throughout Brazil, including wealth management, insurance, and invest- ment banking activities. Outside of Brazil, Bradesco operates in Argentina, the Cayman 1 12 U.S.C. § 1841 et seq. 2 12 U.S.C. § 1842. 3 Under the proposal, Applicants would initially acquire approximately 99 percent of the voting shares of BAC Bank, and shortly thereafter, an interim-bank subsidiary of Applicants (“Interim Bank”) would merge with and into BAC Bank, with BAC Bank as the surviving entity. Upon consummation of the transaction, BAC Bank would operate as Lecce’s direct, wholly owned subsidiary. The merger of Interim Bank into BAC Bank is subject to approval by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), pursuant to section 18(c) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c). The FDIC approved the bank merger on June 16, 2020. 4 Asset and ranking data for Bradesco are as of June 30, 2020, and are based on the exchange ratio on that date. 2 Federal Reserve Bulletin | February 2021 Islands, Hong Kong, Luxembourg, Mexico, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Bradesco operates in the United States primarily through an uninsured, federally licensed branch in New York, New York; a representative office in Miami, Florida; and a licensed broker-dealer, Bradesco Securities, Inc. (“Bradesco Securities”), New York, New York. Bradesco’s four parent companies (collectively, “Parent Companies”) together own, directly or indirectly, approximately 74 percent of the voting shares of Bradesco.5 Cidade, Nova Cidade, and BBD are non-operating companies, and their sole corporate purpose is to hold equity investments for their shareholders. Fundação is a private foundation that operates schools for students in Brazil. Bradesco and its Parent Companies are and would remain qualifying foreign banking organizations under the Board’s Regulation K and are treated as financial holding companies under section 4(l) of the BHC Act.6 BAC Bank, with consolidated assets of approximately $2.3 billion, is the 423rd largest insured depository institution in the United States, controlling deposits of approximately $1.9 billion, which represent less than 1 percent of the total amount of deposits of insured depository institutions7 in the United States.8 BAC Bank operates one deposit-taking office, which is located in Florida. BAC Bank is the 35th largest insured depository institu- tion in Florida, with approximately $1.9 billion in deposits, which represent 0.3 percent of the total amount of deposits of insured depository institutions in that state.9 On consum- mation of this proposal, Applicants’ U.S. operations would have assets that represent less than 1 percent of the total assets of insured depository institutions in the United States. Competitive Considerations Section 3 of the BHC Act prohibits the Board from approving a proposal that would result in a monopoly or would be in furtherance of an attempt to monopolize the business of banking in any relevant market.10 The BHC Act also prohibits the Board from approving a proposal that would substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any banking market, unless the anticompetitive effects of the proposal are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the proposal in meeting the convenience and needs of the communities to be served.11 Applicants do not currently control a commercial bank in the United States, and Applicants and BAC Bank do not compete directly in any retail banking market. The Department of Justice has advised the Board that consumma- tion of the proposal would not likely have a significantly adverse effect on competition in any relevant banking market. In addition, the appropriate banking agencies have been afforded an opportunity to comment and have not objected to the proposal. Based on all of the facts of record, the Board concludes that consummation of the proposal would not have a significantly adverse effect on competition or on the concentra- tion of resources in any relevant banking market. Accordingly, the Board determines that competitive considerations are consistent with approval. 5 The remaining 26 percent of Bradesco’s voting shares are publicly traded, and none of those shareholders own 5 percent or more of Bradesco’s voting shares. The Parent Companies also control Bradespar S.A., São Paulo, Brazil, a holding company with a non-controlling equity interest in a large mining company. 6 12 CFR 211.23(a); 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l). 7 In this context, insured depository institutions include commercial banks, savings banks, and savings associations. 8 National asset and deposit data are as of June 30, 2020, unless otherwise noted. 9 State deposit data are as of June 30, 2019, unless otherwise noted. 10 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(1)(A). 11 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(1)(B). Legal Developments: Fourth Quarter, 2020 3 Financial, Managerial, and Other Supervisory Considerations In reviewing a proposal under section 3 of the BHC Act, the Board considers the financial and managerial resources and the future prospects of the institutions involved, as well as the effectiveness of the institutions in combatting money laundering.12 In its evaluation of financial factors, the Board reviews information regarding the financial condition of the organizations involved on both parent-only and consolidated bases, as well as information regarding the financial condition of the subsidiary depository institutions and the organi- zations’ significant nonbanking operations, if applicable. In this evaluation, the Board considers a variety of information regarding capital adequacy, asset quality, liquidity, and earnings performance, as well as public comments on the proposal. The Board evaluates the financial condition of the combined organization, including its capital position, asset quality, liquidity, earnings prospects, and the impact of the proposed funding of the trans- action. The Board also considers the ability of the organization to absorb the costs of the proposal and to complete effectively the proposed integration of the operations of the insti- tutions. In assessing financial factors, the Board considers capital adequacy to be especially important. The Board considers the future prospects of the organizations involved in the proposal in light of their financial and managerial resources and the proposed business plan. The capital levels of Applicants exceed the minimum levels that would be required under the Basel Capital Accord and are considered to be equivalent to the capital levels that would be required of a U.S. banking organization.13 Applicants appear to have adequate resources to absorb the costs of the proposal and complete the integration of the institu- tions’ operations. In addition, future prospects are consistent with approval.14 The Board also has considered the managerial resources of the organizations involved and of the proposed combined organization. The Board has reviewed the examination records of Applicants’ U.S. operations and BAC Bank, including assessments of their manage- ment, risk-management systems, and operations. In addition, the Board has considered information provided by Applicants; the Board’s supervisory experience and those of the other relevant bank supervisory agencies with the organizations; and the organizations’ records of compliance with applicable banking, consumer protection, and anti-money- laundering (“AML”) laws, as well as information provided by a commenter. The Board also has consulted with Banco Central do Brasil (“Central Bank”), the agency with primary responsibility for the supervision of Brazilian banks and other financial institutions, including Bradesco. The Board also has considered Applicants’ plans for implementing the proposal. Appli- cants have conducted comprehensive due diligence
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