Final Letter to Zondo Commission Corporations 16.12.20

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Final Letter to Zondo Commission Corporations 16.12.20 Second Floor | Community House | 41 Salt River Road | Cape Town 7925 www.opensecrets.org.za | +27 21 447 2701 NPC 2017/078276/08 | PBO 930059106 Re: Urgent call to hold corporations accountable for state capture Date: 16 December 2020 To: Deputy Chief Justice Raymond Zondo The Chairperson Commission of Inquiry into allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud ‘The Zondo Commission’ c/o Secretariat of the Commission Prof. Itumeleng Mosala Per email: [email protected]/ [email protected]; Dear Justice Zondo, We the undersigned organisations, whistleblowers and human rights activists, co-ordinated by Open Secrets, write to you as the Commission of Inquiry into allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud enters its important final phase of work. We write to you today concerning a glaring gap in your work to date: framing the accountability of those corporations complicit in state capture. There is an urgent need to call corporations to provide detailed evidence of their alleged complicity in state capture to the Commission. We recognise that the Commission is under significant pressure and believe that recent legal steps taken by the Commission to compel former President Jacob Zuma to appear in a public forum to account before the Commission is to be lauded and is a step in the right direction. However, impunity thrives on a culture of silence and inaction. We believe that it is important to remind individuals such as Jacob Zuma that we are all equal before the law and that he is not beyond being held accountable for his alleged actions and that his appearance before the Zondo Commission is fundamental to ensuring the public’s right to know. We also write to you as South Africans commemorate the National Day of Reconciliation on 16 December, one week after International Anti-Corruption Day (09 December) and International Human Rights Day (10 December). We believe these dates represent three themes that are central to challenging issues of state capture, corruption and fraud in South Africa. They are that: • Corruption, fraud and state capture are a global phenomenon, not unique to South Africa, enabled by a global architecture which privileges corrupt corporations who profit from these crimes and who largely go unpunished. While corrupt politicians and state officials have committed serious crimes, they have have been aided in committing these crimes by the enabling and complicity of numerous domestic and global companies. We believe that their actions are systemic and unless these are adequately investigated, exposed and prosecuted, impunity will prevail. In short: unless we tackle the system which enables state capture, it will recur even as one corrupt political class is displaced by another as the infrastructure and institutions remain intact • There can be no reconciliation and justice without full truth telling. We have learnt as a nation from our apartheid past – and from the work of the TRC - that there can be no justice without the acknowledgement of wrongdoing, and the full understanding of accountability which includes truth recovery, criminal accountability, reparations and institutional reform. This is the cornerstone of reconciliation. We are deeply concerned that your Commission is yet to call corporations to fully account for their complicity in state capture. While we note the intention of corporations like McKinsey & Company to repay a small portion of the funds owed to South Africans, we fear that the manner in which this has been trumpeted by the Commission in a recent press statement suggests that justice is traded at a discount for the very rich and powerful. We have not yet seen any corporation forced to meaningfully account for their complicity in state capture before your Commission. Where representatives appeared most have only shown the vaguest amount of contrition and evidence leaders have not adequately cross-examined them about their complicity. We fear this creates an impression detrimental to the Commission: that they are being treated with ‘kid-gloves’. The public has a right to know the truth regarding the complicity of corporations in state capture. The Commission, a public forum that has extensive inquisitorial powers, has a unique opportunity to arrive at the truth which it has thus far failed to fully utilise. • State capture, fraud and corruption are violations of human rights. Corruption, especially grand corruption, has enormous implications, both direct and indirect, for the enjoyment of human rights. In the case of South Africa, the impact of state capture has been dire. It has deepened already desperate inequality and poverty in our country, stunted opportunities and cost the country hundreds of thousands of jobs which should have been created. It has meant that sick people have died in under-resourced hospitals, children have failed at school when they have not received textbooks, small businesses have shut as a result of power cuts, and people have gone hungry. It has also led to a trust deficit in state institutions and the private sector eroding our hard-won democracy. These crimes must lead to prosecutions, which demands evidence of criminal conduct by corporations and political elites. As such, the Commission has the responsibility to deeply probe the conduct of all players in state capture – including corporations. We fear that an impression is being created that powerful multinational corporations and their local business networks were somehow the unwitting participants or even ‘victims’ of crimes perpetrated by scheming politicians. The evidence which we and many other organisations have presented to the Commission shows that this is simply not true: these corporations have enabled serious crimes, all for the sake of profit. They are likely to do so again if their conduct is not properly interrogated or uncovered. This call for accountability is motivated by the generational damage caused to the lives of millions of people in South Africa. To be clear, we are not interested in factional political disputes and only the accountability of politicians but rather the full understanding of the institutional framework which must be dismantle. We believe that under the Constitution equality before the law demands accountability without fear or favour; even of the corporations given the constitution’s horizontal and vertical applicability. We thus write to you with a request that you urgently exercise use your powers under The Commissions Act of 1947 to summon private actors implicated in state capture to appear before the Commission and respond to questions regarding their conduct in the cases in which they are implicated. This will empower the Commission to make rigorous and effective recommendations to law enforcement authorities regarding further legal action to be taken against private actors implicated in wrongdoing. These questions should include: • Were they knowing participants in the illicit and illegal activities in question? • If not, did they satisfy the duties required by the law and their professions including due diligence to safeguard against unwitting accomplices to criminal activity? • Why did they not identify the obviously suspicious nature of many of the transactions sooner, and if they did, why did they not act to stop them sooner? • Do they acknowledge that a reasonable and responsible professional in their position should have done more to identify the criminal intentions behind many of the transactions and deals that they facilitated? • How much have they profited from these transactions, and how much of this illicit gain has been repaid, if any? • What punitive action have they taken against individual board members executives and employees (whether current or former) identified as being complicit in illegal activity? • What structural reforms have they enacted at their firms to prevent similar conduct in the future? • Are they willing to contribute to a reparations fund and if so are they willing to make a substantial commitment to such a fund? We urge you to use your powers to compel the following corporations (this list is not exhaustive) to appear before the Commission. We recognise that in some instances, representatives of corporations such as McKinsey & Co. and the major South African banks have appeared. However, we believe that the Commission has to date failed to fully probe their alleged complicity. They are: 2 LIST OF PRIVATE SECTOR WITNESSES TO BE COMPELLED TO APPEAR AT THE ZONDO COMMISSION Name of witness Context of information to be shared with the State Capture Commission • Provided banking facilities to Eskom. ABSA • Provided banking services for Albatime • Enabled state capture and corruption at SARS Bain & Company • Met with Zuma and possibly others. • Provided banking facilities for Guptas, Gupta front companies, Trillian, and Bank of Baroda Albatime. Combined Private • Transnet and Eskom contracts – kickbacks paid to several Essa companies like Investigations (CPI) Homix, Chivita etc. CRRC Corporation • Locomotive acquisitions and BEE contracts. Limited (China) • Implicated in dubious contracts with Eskom. Deloitte First National bank • Provided essential banking services for Estina. (FNb) • Providing banking services for recipients of Regiments money such as Maher Habib Bank Strategy Consultants & Ismer Consultants. • Implicated by Agrizzi testimony and alleged to have assisted with various Hogan Lovells financial transactions related to Guptas. HSBC • Handled numerous payments linked to Transnet
Recommended publications
  • South Africa's State-Owned Enterprises Model Is Due for Reform
    South Africa’s State-Owned Enterprises model is due for reform By Erik Marais MP – DA Deputy Shadow Minister of Public Enterprises Speaker/Chairperson The National Development Plan aims to eliminate poverty and reduce inequality by 2030. To achieve that, the economy must grow faster and in ways that benefits all South Africans. The Democratic Alliance (DA) is particularly concerned about the welfare of young people who have borne the brunt of an underperforming economy. Their circumstances will not change unless deliberate policy steps are taken to offer them better educational and economic opportunities, underpinned by sustained investment in the economy. To achieve this, “reform” should be the byword informing all our actions. Honourable Minister, the Department of Public Enterprises should move with haste to stabilise and revitalize state-owned entities (SOEs) through a review of board appointments, possible privatisation, barring board members from procurement decisions and adopting a no-nonsense approach to corruption. At this point, chairperson, let me take this opportunity to congratulate members of the Portfolio committee on Public Enterprises in the 5th Parliament for their sterling work in addressing state capture and corruption. I am sure I speak the mind of my fellow committee members when I say, we are all looking forward to the outcomes of the Zondo Commission. SOEs remain key drivers of investment in infrastructure development and as such, there should be an acceleration of investments in key infrastructure such as rail and energy. This will ensure that we increase the proportion of people with access to the electricity grid to 90% by 2030, while encouraging non-grid options to those who can afford it.
    [Show full text]
  • From Corruption to State Capture: a New Analytical Framework With
    PRQXXX10.1177/1065912916639137Political Research QuarterlyFazekas and Tóth 639137research-article2016 Article Political Research Quarterly 2016, Vol. 69(2) 320 –334 From Corruption to State Capture: © 2016 University of Utah Reprints and permissions: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav A New Analytical Framework with DOI: 10.1177/1065912916639137 Empirical Applications from Hungary prq.sagepub.com Mihály Fazekas1,2 and István János Tóth3 Abstract State capture and corruption are widespread phenomena across the globe, but their empirical study still lacks sufficient analytical tools. This paper develops a new conceptual and analytical framework for gauging state capture based on microlevel contractual networks in public procurement. To this end, it establishes a novel measure of corruption risk in government contracting focusing on the behavior of individual organizations. Then, it identifies clusters of high- corruption-risk organizations in the full contractual network of procuring authorities and their suppliers using formal social network analysis. Densely connected clusters of high-corruption-risk organizations are denoted as the domain of state capture. The paper demonstrates the power of the new analytical framework by exploring how the radical centralization of the governing elite following the 2010 elections in Hungary affected centralization of state capture. Findings indicate the feasibility and usefulness of such microlevel approach to corruption and state capture. Better understanding the network structure of corruption and
    [Show full text]
  • Corruption and Oversight in Latin America
    Corruption and Oversight in Latin America Juan Manuel Galán Pachón Senator - Colombia 0. Introduction. It is clear that corruption has gradually come to the forefront in the global public agenda due to the extent of the phenomenon, similar conducts in other countries and the transnational character that the problem has gradually acquired. The seriousness of the issue is underscored by the establishment of GOPAC and by meetings such as these. The intuitive strategy to address corruption is to be found in aggressive enforcement policies (new definitions of criminal offences, longer sentences and the elimination of subrogees), as well as in the introduction of greater controls over the activities of civil servants and state contractors. Oversight, as a strategy, plays a specific preventative role since the accompanying mechanisms dissuade corrupt individuals and make corruption increasingly complex and costly. Oversight also helps detect operations, i.e. it helps identify signs that may underlie instances of corruption and therefore undertake more efficient investigations. In this context, we will offer a summary of the reports prepared on corruption in Latin America, identify the incentives that lead to corruption and briefly report on the current status of congressional or parliamentary oversight in the region. 1. Reports on Corruption in Latin America 1.1 Transparency International – Corruption Perceptions Index1 The 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) prepared by Transparency International attributed a high risk of corruption to
    [Show full text]
  • State Capture Assessment Diagnostics in the Western Balkans 2020: Risks and Policy Options Policy Brief No
    State Capture Assessment Diagnostics in the Western Balkans 2020: Risks and Policy Options Policy Brief No. 10, July 2020 State Capture Assessment Diagnostics in the Western Balkans 2020: Risks and Policy Options SELDI policy brief no. 10, July 2020 State Capture Assessment Diagnostics in the Western Balkans 2020: Risks and Policy Options 3 State Capture Assessment Diagnostics in the Western Balkans 2020: Risks and Policy Options SELDI policy brief no. 10, July 2020 z As noted in the European Commission progress reports, despite continuous advancement of good governance, state capture mechanisms remain at unacceptable levels in the Western Balkans. Developing effective methods to address them before EU accession is an essential prerequisite to successful enlargement. z In 2019 - 2020 SELDI has piloted for the first time in the region a reliable metric for monitoring state capture. The State Capture Assessment Diagnostics (SCAD) provides insights into state capture enablers, key affected economic sectors and risks of monopolisation across the region. z The pilot SCAD assessment in the Western Balkans has shown that although none of the countries is close to full state capture, i.e. authoritarian rule, they exhibit critical impairments in democratic and economic checks and balances. Some economic sectors require particular attention, as they are likely sources of concentration of power and capture. z SCAD data suggests that the main challenge for the countries in the region remains in the form of state capture enablers, such as media control, corruption in the judiciary, lack of integrity of public organisations, lack KEY POINTS: KEY of impartiality and inadequate anti-corruption procedures.
    [Show full text]
  • The Case of Hungary Introd
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Corvinus Research Archive CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY VOL.8 (2017)3S, 255-281. DOI: 10.14267/CJSSP.2017.3S.11 CONTINUITY OR DISRUPTION? CHANGING ELITES AND THE EMERGENCE OF CRONYISM AFTER THE GREAT RECESSION – THE CASE OF HUNGARY JÓZSEF PÉTER MARTIN1 ABSTRACT After a short theoretical overview about the interplay between institutions and elites, the paper analyses the economic performance operationalized by the GDP and the quality of governance in Hungary in comparative perspective, considering two milestones, namely, the impact of the Great Recession, and the change of government in 2010. The role of elites and elite moves are revealed in these developments. In Hungary, the local crisis started before the Great Recession as the slide of the quality of governance and mismanagement of the economic policy can be observed since the accession to the EU. The paper elaborates the disruptive nature of the system built after 2010 with a special focus to the schemes of corruption and cronyism. Finally, the paper confronts the political elite’s endeavors with some perceptions of the population. KEYWORDS: institutionalism, elites, corruption, cronyism, economic development, quality of governance INTRODUCTION Democratic backsliding and the rise of populism throughout Central and Eastern Europe have been subject to vast academic and policy research in the past years (e.g. Kornai 2015, Pappas 2014, Freedom House 2014, Transparency International Hungary 2017). The surge of populism and the impact of the global crisis have put at stake the democratic polity and institutions established in 1 József Péter Martin PhD, is executive director of Transparency International Hungary and senior lecturer at Corvinus University of Budapest (CUB).
    [Show full text]
  • Take 286 Starts at 14:05
    UNREVISED HANSARD NATIONAL ASSEMBLY THURSDAY, 29 NOVEMBER 2018 Page: 1 THURSDAY, 29 NOVEMBER 2018 ____ PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ____ The House met at 14:02. The House Chairperson Ms M G Boroto took the Chair and requested members to observe a moment of silence for prayer or meditation. DEBATE ON 16 DAYS OF ACTIVISM OF NO VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND CHILDREN: #HEARMETOO – A WOMAN OF FORTITUDE The MINISTER OF SMALL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT: Hon Chairperson, hon Members of Parliament, representatives of Civil Society and Women’s Movements, ladies and gentlemen, I stand here before you to talk about one of the most and highly emotive issues in South Africa and the world. This scourge knows no colour, knows no religion, knows no race, knows no class and knows no political UNREVISED HANSARD NATIONAL ASSEMBLY THURSDAY, 29 NOVEMBER 2018 Page: 2 affiliations. It ravages communities and families across class and the colour line. It is a societal challenge which requires a societal responses. IsiZulu: Ngicela nje ukuthi namhlanje ngingahlushwa uma ngikhuluma ngento ebuhlungu kakhulu kubantu baseNingizimu Afrika. Ngikhuluma ngento engakhethi ukuthi ungubani, unjani, unemali engakanani nokuthi ungubani emphakathini. English: Let us just for a moment put ourselves in the shoes of those who suffer in the hands of abusers. Let us even if it is for a minute feel their pain and trauma. As we do that, let us call upon for those who believe on our almighty and those who believe on ancestors to get into the hearts and minds of these heartless abusers so that they can understand and feel the suffering and the pain that they caused to their victims.
    [Show full text]
  • State Capture Analysis: How to Quantitatively Analyze The
    DISCUSSION PAPER No. 2 June 2019 Governance Global Practice State Capture Analysis: Public Disclosure Authorized How to Quantitatively Analyze the Regulatory Abuse by Business-State Relationships Andreas Fiebelkorn Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized This series is produced by Governance Global Practice of the World Bank. The papers in this series aim to provide a vehicle for publishing preliminary results on Governance topics to encourage discussion and debate. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author(s) and should not be attributed in any manner to the World Bank, to its affiliated organizations, or to members of its Board of Executive Directors or the countries they represent. Citation and the use of material presented in this series should take into account this provisional character. For information regarding the Governance Discussion Paper Series, please contact contact: Ayse Boybeyi, at aboybeyi@ worldbank.org © 2019 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433 All rights reserved ABSTRACT Abundant qualitative evidence reveals how public and private actors abuse regulations to seek rents, impede reforms, and distort the economy. However, empirical evidence of such behavior, including its economic costs, remains limited. For that reason, the objective of this paper is to help practitioners who seek to quantitatively analyze state capture make better use of experience, methodologies, and potential data sources. Based on a comprehensive body of existing empirical studies, it provides guidance to analyze state capture and its impact on the economy. Chapter 1 discusses the concept of state capture and its relevance for economic development.
    [Show full text]
  • Corruption Perceptions Index 2020
    CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2020 Transparency International is a global movement with one vision: a world in which government, business, civil society and the daily lives of people are free of corruption. With more than 100 chapters worldwide and an international secretariat in Berlin, we are leading the fight against corruption to turn this vision into reality. #cpi2020 www.transparency.org/cpi Every effort has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in this report. All information was believed to be correct as of January 2021. Nevertheless, Transparency International cannot accept responsibility for the consequences of its use for other purposes or in other contexts. ISBN: 978-3-96076-157-0 2021 Transparency International. Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under CC BY-ND 4.0 DE. Quotation permitted. Please contact Transparency International – [email protected] – regarding derivatives requests. CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2020 2-3 12-13 20-21 Map and results Americas Sub-Saharan Africa Peru Malawi 4-5 Honduras Zambia Executive summary Recommendations 14-15 22-23 Asia Pacific Western Europe and TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE European Union 6-7 Vanuatu Myanmar Malta Global highlights Poland 8-10 16-17 Eastern Europe & 24 COVID-19 and Central Asia Methodology corruption Serbia Health expenditure Belarus Democratic backsliding 25 Endnotes 11 18-19 Middle East & North Regional highlights Africa Lebanon Morocco TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL 180 COUNTRIES. 180 SCORES. HOW DOES YOUR COUNTRY MEASURE UP?
    [Show full text]
  • Elements of State Capture in Serbia
    Elements of State Capture in Serbia Case studies in two sectors Executive summary Within Transparency International’s research project on possible state capture in several South-East European countries, Transparency Serbia investigated elements and patterns of this worrying phenomenon in two specific sectors: urban planning in the capital city of Belgrade and the functioning of public enterprises in the energy sector. Urban planning in the capital city of Belgrade based on private and political interests Urban city planning in Belgrade, Serbia’s capital city, is being captured by the interests of private investors – and more precisely by the interests of those that are closely linked with the ruling political elite. Although Serbia has rules and regulations on urban planning that envisage the preparation of expert studies, public consultation and approval of plans in the city council, in reality those plans are in most significant cases adapted or even adopted in the first place with major purpose being to serve particular interests. While Belgrade city has a long history of abuse as regards construction permits, changing of land purposes and unifying of parcels, and non-transparent urban planning in general, participants in such corruptive arrangements have usually tried to stay hidden when violating the rules or abusing legal loopholes. Since 2012, the promotion and support of private interests has been presented by the political leaders of Serbia and of the city of Belgrade as a matter of prime national interest. For the purpose of the “Belgrade Waterfront” project (with a size of approximately 900,000 square metres), Serbia violated its own rules on expropriation, public–private partnerships, taxation and public procurements, through “one-time” legal mechanisms such are “lex specialis”, adopted by the Parliament in April 2015, and the wide provisions of an inter-state agreement between Serbia and the United Arab Emirates (where the private partner for this project is registered).
    [Show full text]
  • Read an Agenda for Action
    AN AGENDA FOR ACTION A Joint Submission by the Civil Society Working Group on State Capture A SUMMARY OF CIVIL SOCIETY’S RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ZONDO COMMISSION FEBRUARY 2020 AN AGENDA FOR ACTION Joint submission on recommendations by the Civil Society Working Group on State Capture CONTENTS: 1. The purpose of this submission . 03 2. How has corruption impacted the lives of South Africans? . 05 3. The Civil Society Working Group recommendations to the Zondo Commission . 09 3 .1 How do we address the systemic weakening of the criminal justice system? . 09 3 .2 How should the rights of the most vulnerable be protected? . 12 3 .3 How do we protect state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from being used as vehicles for state capture? . 15 3 .4 How do we hold the enablers of state capture to account? . 18 3 .5 How can we limit the corrosive impact of political-party funding? . 20 4. Conclusion . 23 5. Annexure 1: List of CSWG organisations . 25 A joint submission by civil society to The Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture . This joint submission was by the Civil Society Working Group on State Capture to the Zondo Commission in February 2020 . Editors: Naushina Rahim, Zen Mathe and Hennie van Vuuren Copy Editor: Helen Moffett Design: Gaelen Pinnock | www .polygram .co .za Printing: X Mega Digital Copyright of text: Open Secrets The publication of this report has been made possible by Open Secrets’ funders . They are the Open Society Foundation for South Africa, Heinrich Böll Foundation (Southern Africa office), Joffe Charitable Trust, Luminate, Open Society Foundation Human Rights Initiative and individual donors .
    [Show full text]
  • Corruption in Serbia: [email protected]
    U4 Helpdesk Answer U4 Helpdesk Answer 2020 17 April 2020 AUTHOR Overview of corruption and Nieves Zúñiga (TI) anti-corruption in Serbia: [email protected] Changes in the last 10 years REVIEWED BY Guillaume Nicaise (U4) The evolution of corruption and anti-corruption in Serbia has [email protected] followed the transition from a fragile government led by the Democratic Party to an increasingly centralised and authoritarian Transparency Serbia regime led by the Serbian Progressive Party. Even if there is no [email protected] evidence of a significant change in the level of corruption, corruption in the Balkan country shapes political dynamics, resulting in the capture of political decision making and the political control of independent institutions, the judiciary and the legislature. The progress made in anti-corruption has been more RELATED U4 MATERIAL on paper than in practice, with the implementation of those Western Balkans and Turkey: reforms being the main challenge. Overview of Corruption and Anti- Corruption Corruption and doing business in Serbia Helpdesk Answers are tailor-made research briefings compiled in ten working days. The U4 Helpdesk is a free research service run in collaboration with Transparency International. Query How has corruption evolved in the past 10 years in Serbia? To what extent is corruption connected to political dynamics and social norms? Give an overview of anti-corruption initiatives in Serbia. Contents MAIN POINTS — In the last ten years there has not been a 1. Introduction significant change in the level of corruption 2. Evolution of corruption in the last 10 years in Serbia. a. Extent of corruption b.
    [Show full text]
  • State Capture and the Political Manipulation of Criminal Justice Agencies a Joint Submission to the Judicial Commission of Inquiry Into Allegations of State Capture
    State capture and the political manipulation of criminal justice agencies A joint submission to the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture CORRUPTION WATCH AND THE INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES APRIL 2019 State capture and the political manipulation of criminal justice agencies A joint submission by Corruption Watch and the Institute for Security Studies to the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture April 2019 Contents Executive summary ..........................................................................................................................................3 Introduction ...................................................................................................................................................3 Structure and purpose of this submission .....................................................................................................3 Impact of manipulation of criminal justice agencies .......................................................................................4 Recent positive developments .......................................................................................................................4 Recommendations ........................................................................................................................................4 Fixing the legacy of the manipulation of criminal justice agencies..............................................................4 Addressing risk factors for future manipulation
    [Show full text]