Distributed Forward Presence Reexamining Marine Deployment Concepts by Ltcol G.J

IDEAS & ISSUES (InnoVATion) Distributed Forward Presence Reexamining Marine deployment concepts by LtCol G.J. David he proliferation of anti-access/ area denial (A2/AD) technol- >At the time of writing in 2015, LtCol David was the Division Chief for the Executive ogy, coupled with evolving Support Division of Intelligence Department, Headquarters Marine Corps. He was international politics, re- since promoted and served a tour at USCENTCOM before assuming command of Tquires a reexamination of the way the Marine Corps Cyberspace Warfare Group at Fort Meade, MD, in July 2019. Marine Corps provides forward presence—especially in the Pacific. Adver- sarial technologies are rapidly closing rine forward presence and confound should never rotate alone because doing the advantage previously enjoyed by potential adversary reactions before they so does not provide the forward presence the United States to the extent that occur. of a unit organized in the same way that access to littoral crises is becoming in- From the moment Marine units de- it will fight. After arriving in theater, creasingly problematic. Furthermore, part home bases in the United States, for instance in Japan, they would not global politics do not currently favor they must move forward as a MAGTF, need to reconstitute and composite into large, protective bases in the model of tactically deploying with all the logistics follow-on elements with a command the Cold War. The strategic rebalance and aviation necessary. A MAGTF is element placed on top as with the cur- toward the Pacific should instead be by its nature scalable above and below rent 31st MEU;1 they would already be met with a conceptual advance in how the MEU level. Scalability provides the a MAGTF ready for that command ele- Marines achieve presence in the region. greatest flexibility, utility, and attraction ment to employ. Furthermore, all scal- Although long investment experience for combatant commanders; it is time to able detachments would appear only as makes the Pacific a good place to begin, exercise that utility in fact. Individual a MAGTF as well, going everywhere this basing concept can then also be ground, aviation, or logistics elements with ground, aviation, and the logistics applied in other theaters. To achieve effective presence, Ma- rines must rotate into the Pacific as a combined arms task force that is ready from the moment they arrive. Further, they should deploy into theater activities that immediately posture them to respond to crises while fulfilling the theater security cooperation (TSC) campaign and exercise requirements. Finally, Marines require smaller, more widely distributed locations to deploy; must accentuate temporary basing arrangements; and need to more rapidly advance seabasing and sea-enabled concepts. Marines will execute TSC, exercises, and transit within the context of a broader contingency response plan that ties the specific activity to forward posture and presence. Whenever they are required, these forces can swing into real-world action. These measures, ef- Marines must deploy as combined arms forces prepared to participate in theater activities. fectively applied, will transform Ma- (Photo by LCpl Kyle Bunyi.) Marine Corps Gazette • February 2020 www.mca-marines.org/gazette WE17 IDEAS & ISSUES (InnoVATion) to support them down to the smallest about the theater in the same form that or political dilemmas associated with detachment participating in the most they would in a crisis or contingency; long-term presence, even if Marines are rudimentary security cooperation (SC). they are training as they fight. scheduled to return. Alongside the small In this fashion, Marine forward pres- Finally, the Marine Corps must Camp Mujukthat reflects the benefits ence will send an instant message of change its forward basing concepts, em- of a light footprint, nearby facilities are readiness to execute operations—the phasizing shared bases for mutual sup- often used as Marines move in and out fact of Marines on the ground or in the port and advantage. Smaller dispersed in support of exercises with the Republic air in a given place implies a MAGTF bases, especially when shared with the of Korea Marine Corps annually near that can strike immediately. The first host nation, are always more acceptable Pohang.7 The Republic of Korea Ma- fundamental paradigm shift must adjust and often provide better training. Camp rines handle domestic public relations Marines from a 1977 model of deploy- Fuji, for example, provides a shared and gain the benefit of both training ing in non-MAGTF elements to deploy- training area for both Japanese and U.S. and minor facilities improvements while ing into a combined arms team ready forces and is maintained for Marines by the United States shows unambiguous to fight.2 a small, focused, and professional cadre force presence.8 Secondly, these scalable MAGTFs that assists units in achieving training The best bases, however, are those should move straight into TSC with objectives that can no longer be accom- provided by mobility within the global an eye to providing a ready force for plished on Okinawa such as artillery commons: seabasing. Marine sea-basing follow-on contingencies. In other words, fire.4 Space at Fuji is not consumed to concepts must be more rapidly advanced exercises and theater security events provide gigantic fixed infrastructure to and also shed the tight limits of vision would not be an end in themselves,3 support long-term presence complete on what an amphibious ship must be. The “surface connectors,” like the joint high-speed vessel often used to move Marines to and from huge bases on The best bases, however, are those provided by mo- Okinawa to training events,9 must be bility within the global commons: seabasing. Marine viewed as that MAGTF’s temporary platform that could be diverted mid- seabasing concepts must be more rapidly advanced course to contingency. Basing ideas in- and must shed the tight limits of vision on what an cluding Maritime Prepositioning Ships, Military Sealift Command, National amphibious ship must be. Defense Reserve Fleet, and allies and partners with capable platforms must be explored.10 Use of all such platforms but rather a means of achieving dis- with families, government civilians, and will then comprise a part of the forward tributed presence for potential crises, contractors. The Northern Training area presence of Marine forces which could contingencies, or theater operations of Okinawa, as the name suggests, is also be rapidly concentrated from disparate plans. Marines who are training allies a place to acquire better jungle warfare activities or transit across a portion of one day can expect to be applied to the- skills but would be more acceptable to the theater to address crises and con- ater contingencies not just the next day the Japanese if it were a shared training tingencies. but even that same day. Any battalion- space.5 Sharing the facilities with the Marines should further explore more sized unit, for example, deploying to host nation enables upgrades and im- unmanned systems in the air, on land, the Pacific would first constitute into provements due to mutual benefit; the and at sea to accompany these MAGT- a MAGTF with a squadron and logis- Air Force’s Misawa Air Base reflects this Fs. The distributed concept implies a tics. Then, if undertaking an exercise mutual benefit calculus as the Japanese level of self-sufficiency with small num- in country A, a theater security event Air Self-Defense Force reaps rewards bers of Marines. Manned-unmanned in country B, and a small amphibious every time the U.S. Air Force makes an teaming coupled with reachback and mission off country C on ships, it would improvement and has consequent incen- enterprise capabilities that generate self- deploy sub-MAGTFs to those coun- tive to facilitate it.6 Simultaneously, the sufficiency, when necessary, in denied tries or ships with their logistics for war, Japanese Air Self-Defense Force flies out spaces will soon be essential to the A2/ maintaining C2. In the event of a crisis of the same airfield and is much more AD environment for any Service seeking in country X, the overarching MAGTF adept at managing local popular percep- to retain relevance and credibility. Small would then apply its sub-MAGTFs from tions. numbers augmented with unmanned A, B, and C immediately to the crisis Temporary basing arrangements systems to the extent that their com- because they need not be returned to are often even better because Marines bat power is greater than the sum of some other forward base and reconsti- come and improve shared facilities for the boots on the ground are the future. tuted with supplies and aviation—it is the period of their use such that host- Controlled lethal systems must become all there with the subordinate MAGTFs, nation forces can employ them after- a part of the every-day life of the junior- ready to go. These Marines are moving ward without implication of occupation most Marines in the smallest units, as WE18 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • February 2020 they must be overcome immediately. The hour grows late. The Marine Corps must act quickly and discover new ways to increase our presence or lose relevance. Luckily, distributed concepts are not as novel as it might seem at first glance. Not unlike the island-hopping campaign of the Second World War, there is no need to be everywhere, but to be pres- ent in multiple, overlapping, usable locations. Moreover, some units are beginning to work this way out of ne- cessity. The distributed operations of the special purpose MAGTFs in Spain and the Middle East are not just popular with geographic combatant commanders, they have set a precedent in the ability to operate from distributed locations that—through the MAGTF Distributed operations provide Marines to support combatant commanders without the need presence—can provide mutual support for a large operational footprint.

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