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The development landscape is shifting. China’s emergence as a non-traditional development donor is challenging traditional donor countries that are part of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Development Cooperation (OECD), such as Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. After many years of ambivalence, Beijing is renewing its engagement with its Southeast Asian neighbours in trade and development cooperation, a shift predicated not only upon the need for China to secure its energy supplies as the Chinese economy continues to expand (Renwick 2014), but also on the potential economic growth of Protest against the in these neighbouring countries, with their . Photo: AK Rockefeller (Flickr). cheap labour and growing middle classes. Southeast Asia represents a market of six hundred million people for Chinese goods Burmese and services—a potentially significant boon for the slowing Chinese economy. Among Civil Society these countries, since its transition to a civil government, Myanmar has had one Challenges of the highest growth rates in the region, exceeding seven percent per annum, a China’s development that has been heavily driven by Development foreign direct investment. From a developmental perspective, Assistance in Chinese aid and development assistance are nothing new, but over the years these Myanmar instruments have shifted from being driven by ideology, as during the Maoist era, to a Jennifer Y. J. Hsu much more flexible and pragmatic approach. According to a recent report by the Asia Foundation (2015), Chinese development China and Myanmar have been economic assistance currently focuses on non- partners and allies for a long time. But interference, mutual benefit, infrastructure- this partnership is now being challenged led growth, and demand-driven cooperation. by Myanmar’s democratisation process. In Southeast Asia, China has provided a full Although nascent, Burmese civil society range of assistance, including soft loans, has shown it is ready to actively contest the debt cancellation, and the extension of lines legitimacy of China’s various development of traditional credit. Moreover, the Chinese and commercial interests in this new state has actively assisted and invested democracy. in the infrastructure of Southeast Asian nations. In the case of Myanmar, China has MADE IN CHINA - WINDOW ON ASIA 179 been a long-term economic partner and ally, Mine, and the Gas Pipeline but this partnership is now being challenged have drawn the attention and opposition by Myanmar’s democratisation process of civil society representatives. Chinese (Toshihiro 2014). Based on fieldwork companies, such as the China Power observations conducted in Myanmar in Investment (CPI) have been accused of the summer of 2016, in this article I first not providing enough safeguards against examine the role of Chinese development environmental damage, nor appropriate assistance and investments in the country’s compensation to affected communities. transition, I then move on to consider how The Irrawaddy River, where the dam was this role is perceived and challenged by an to be located, is seen as the birthplace of emerging but active Burmese civil society. the nation. Given the Irrawaddy’s cultural While nascent, Burmese civil society has and historical significance, the lack of indeed shown that it is ready to actively consultation prior to the initiation of the contest the legitimacy of China’s various dam project further strengthened the claims development and commercial interests in against CPI. In addition, accusations of land this new democracy. grabs and contracts that favour the Chinese have increased anti-Chinese sentiments in Myanmar (Walker 2014a). China and Myanmar: A The Chinese are seeking to make amends. Strained Relationship The Chinese Embassy in has instructed all state-owned enterprises China is Myanmar’s most significant and (SOEs) operating in Myanmar to undertake largest investor to date. China’s relationship corporate social responsibility training. The with Myanmar is primarily driven by China National Petroleum Corporation, Beijing’s need to secure resources for its the SOE responsible for the Kyaukphyu own development, as the country offers pipeline, has established a Pipeline China a wealth of natural resources and is Friendship Association in Myanmar to strategically located. Gas and oil routed address local grievances that pertain to through the Indian Ocean into Myanmar the pipeline. These types of actions have and on to China reduce Chinese dependence proved insufficient to address continuing on the Middle East and on the unsafe concerns and the demands of Burmese civil passage through the Malacca Strait. While society. For instance, a 2016 delegation from the expansion of the Chinese economy has CPI that was accompanied by the Chinese slowed considerably, the desire to sustain Ambassador Hong Liang to Myitkyina growth demands that China secure not township, , to meet with local only resources, but also a market for its officials and residents attracted protests goods. The Burmese economy is forecast (Ye 2016); while the restarting of the to grow at 8.6 percent in 2016, with similar Letpadaung mine elicited outcry and further projections for 2017, presenting a significant protests in May 2016 (Chan and Khin 2016). opportunity for Chinese manufacturers The inability of the Chinese to win over (Asian Development Bank 2017). Burmese support is an indication of not For this reason, much of China’s only a failure to address the asymmetry in development assistance remains framed its engagement with Myanmar, but also its as economic cooperation, a situation that failure to recognise the importance of the has failed to win the support of Burmese country’s increasingly active civil society. society. Large-scale projects such as the Myitisone Dam, the Letpadaung Copper 180 MADE IN CHINA - WINDOW ON ASIA

rather than hiding them and is, therefore, The Resistance of Local hardly acceptable to local Burmese civil Actors society. As mentioned above, the activism of As a long-standing partner of Myanmar Myanmar’s emerging civil society has during its years of international isolation, already had an impact on Chinese economic China’s engagement with the country interests in the country. The has reached a critical juncture. Now government’s decision to shelve the China- more than ever, Beijing needs to re-frame backed Myitsone Dam on the Irrawaddy its partnership to incorporate a new River in late 2011 is generally attributed to development component, one that seeks to opposition from Burmese civil society, based address the existing asymmetry and provides on worries about irreversible environmental opportunities for all stakeholders to be part damage and displacement of communities of the development, notably civil society (International Rivers 2011; Kirchherr et groups and communities that are affected al. 2017). Fieldwork interviews in 2016 by Chinese economic interests. Indeed, with Burmese civil society representatives Chinese involvement in Myanmar must be engaged across a number of fields—from seen in the context of the country’s political corporate social responsibility (CSR) to transition, which is providing new space political transition—suggest that there is and opportunities for local civil society. a tendency to look towards the West, in Burmese civil society stakeholders have particular the United States, for development pushed their country’s new democratic assistance. This is principally out of concern government for accountability and for China’s top-down approach to economic transparency in its deals with the Chinese, development cooperation. Interviews with particularly considering that the Chinese people working in the Burmese NGO sector authorities have in the past supported suggest that the Chinese state—in its various the military dictatorship. Moreover, guises—is perceived as lacking the know- while the Chinese government, NGOs, how and skills to effectively engage with and investors have the capacity to deliver Burmese civil society, a perception that is sustainable development and to be effective also jeopardising China’s legitimacy and development partners with the Burmese, the its status as an economic and development asymmetrical nature of the Sino-Burmese partner. According to an NGO representative partnership—firmly tilted in favour of working in Myanmar’s CSR sector, China’s economic, political, and strategic campaigns to improve the Chinese image interests—is starting to change. In re- and attempts to engage with Burmese civil engaging with the world and re-establishing society in the wake of large-scale protests its international connections, Myanmar is against a number of Chinese-backed projects diversifying its sources of economic, social, have, thus far, proved weak and ineffectual. and political support, thereby reducing its For example, despite providing public dependency on China. In addition, China’s access to its Environment Management Plan own democratic deficits are significant for the Letpadaung Copper Mine, Wanbao, impediments to its overseas development the Chinese mining company that owns the assistance policies, especially considering site, was not able to quell protests from local the fact that the Chinese authorities prefer villagers claiming environmental damage government-to-government development and inadequate compensation (Hammond cooperation. This form of partnership often 2016). illuminates China’s democratic deficiencies MADE IN CHINA - WINDOW ON ASIA 181

Finally, another factor that should not assistance to Myanmar, questions will surely be discounted in the relationship between abound as to the autonomy of Chinese civil the two countries is that Chinese economic society organisations from the Party-state interests in Myanmar are threatened by (Hsu 2016). All of this is likely to continue to the ethnic conflicts taking place across restrain Chinese economic and development the border. For example, the cooperation in Myanmar. conflict between the ethnic Kachin and the Nevertheless, China has started to Burmese army threatens not only Chinese acknowledge the importance of engaging internal security—with some sixty thousand civil society actors to deepen cooperation displaced people entering Yunnan since with its neighbours. As a mechanism for conflict intensified in early 2015 (Agence building trust and cooperation at the France-Presse 2015)—but also China’s regional level, China and the Association strategic oil and gas supply pipelines. for Southeast Asian Nations established a high-level, people-to-people dialogue, involving civil society representatives Looking Forward from across the region. The first meeting was held in 2013 in the Guangxi Zhuang China’s political culture has always Autonomous Region, and was organised by shaped the manner in which Beijing has the China NGO Network for International engaged with other nations. This has Exchange (CNIE), an umbrella organisation entailed a strong preference for state-to- for China’s leading non-profit social state relationships. Myanmar’s reforms organisations (Lee and Fachir 2013). The have opened up new space for local civil second meeting, held in 2015 in Nusa Dua, society actors and the media, all of which Bali, paved the way for the establishment of have become roadblocks for furthering an NGO network responsible for organising Chinese interests in the country. China future rotating dialogues. Moreover, the was slow to recognise the influence of civil China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation, society on domestic politics and Burmese one of China’s largest NGOs, opened its development, and Burmese civil society second international office in Yangon in representatives have grown increasingly August 2016. Such measures suggest that a sceptical regarding Chinese claims of mutual possible re-framing of Chinese development benefit and South-South cooperation. Still, efforts is underway. This, in the future, may although it has little to offer in terms of open up greater space for both Chinese and values associated with development, such Burmese NGOs to cooperate on development as good governance and accountability, projects and, thus, build trust and goodwill China does have a significant development between the two countries. experience to share, having lifted over seven hundred million people out of poverty in just two decades. And yet, in spite of this, both domestic and international civil society activists working in Myanmar question the extent to which the Chinese state and its various stakeholders will be of assistance to their country. Extrapolating further, we can also speculate that, if and when Chinese civil society stakeholders begin to play a bigger role in delivering development This text is taken from Gilded Age: A Year of Chinese Labour, Civil Society, and Rights, Made in China Yearbook 2017, edited by Ivan Franceschini and Nicholas Loubere, published 2018 by ANU Press, The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia.

doi.org/10.22459/MIC.04.2018.32