Africa Briefing, Nr. 51: Negotiating Zimbabwe's Transition

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Africa Briefing, Nr. 51: Negotiating Zimbabwe's Transition Policy Briefing Africa Briefing N°51 Pretoria/Brussels, 21 May 2008 Negotiating Zimbabwe’s Transition I. OVERVIEW tensify, with more Zimbabweans fleeing across bor- ders, while inflation, unemployment and the resulting massive suffering increase. The 29 March 2008 elections have dramatically changed Zimbabwe’s political landscape. For the first There has been a chorus of condemnation from West- time since independence in 1980, Robert Mugabe ran ern leaders and international and African civil society second in the presidential voting, and the opposition – over the withholding of the results and the rising vio- the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) – won lence. The UN Security Council discussed Zimbabwe, control of parliament. The MDC went to the polls while the African Union (AU) and Southern African deeply divided, but Morgan Tsvangirai and his party Development Community (SADC) called for release regained their authority by winning despite an uneven of the results and criticised the violence. However, playing field. Instead of allowing democracy to run its South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki has continued course, Mugabe has fought back by withholding the to shield Mugabe, not backing away from his 12 April presidential results for five weeks and launching a statement that there was no crisis in the country. countrywide crackdown. Zimbabwe is in constitutional Other African leaders, led by SADC Chairman Levy limbo: it has no elected president or legally constituted Mwanawasa and AU Chairman Jikaya Kikwete, seem cabinet, parliament has not been convened, and prepared to take a more robust line. Since the impact ZANU-PF and the MDC are challenging half the par- of outspoken, Western-driven diplomacy is likely to be liamentary results in court. African leaders, with support limited, African-led mediation, with concerted, wider from the wider international community, must step in international backing, gives the best chance for a to stop the violence and resolve the deepening political peaceful and definitive resolution to the crisis. crisis, ideally by facilitating an agreement establishing President Mbeki negotiated SADC-backed talks be- an MDC-led transitional government that avoids the tween ZANU-PF and the MDC through January 2008, need for the run-off now scheduled for 27 June. and he remains the regionally appointed mediator. But While there is wide agreement in ZANU-PF that its his reluctance to criticise Mugabe or condemn the survival now depends on Mugabe’s immediate exit, escalating violence has badly undermined his credibil- influential hardliners in the party and military will not ity, particularly in the eyes of the opposition. Further, simply hand over power to the MDC. They and Mug- his inability to turn a ZANU-PF/MDC agreement in abe likely manipulated the presidential results to show September 2007 into a lasting accord to resolve the a run-off was necessary and have put in place a strat- crisis casts doubts upon his effectiveness in the current egy to retain power through force. Since the elections, environment. Nonetheless, South Africa cannot simply there has been a sharp increase in state-sponsored vio- be sidelined. A formula is needed that broadens the lence, as the security services and ZANU-PF militia South African-led SADC mediation, adding strong have unleashed a campaign of intimidation, torture and accountability and oversight measures. murder against opposition activists, journalists, poll- That broadened mediation, supported by additional ing agents, public servants, civic leaders and ordinary international actors, should focus on two immediate citizens suspected of voting for the MDC. The opposi- objectives, which are not mutually exclusive, as the tion says that at least 43 of its members have been killed end objective of each should be some form of govern- and thousands displaced in the violence. Zimbabwe’s ment of national unity, under MDC leadership: transition to democracy is being held hostage. A negotiated settlement on a Tsvangirai-led If Mugabe manages to cling to the presidency through transitional government. The current levels of political repression and manipulation, he will face a violence and intimidation preclude the possibility hostile parliament, growing public discontent, mount- of holding a credible run-off. The holding of a run- ing international pressure and increased isolation. The off by the Mugabe camp is a ploy to stay in power, consequences of his staying in office would be catas- and it is highly unlikely that Mugabe would accept trophic, not least that the economic decline would in- Negotiating Zimbabwe’s Transition Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°51, 21 May 2008 Page 2 the conditions for a free and fair run-off in which the modalities for ensuring military loyalty to a he would be humiliatingly defeated. As ZANU-PF new civilian government. Failure to do so would prepares for a second election, violence is likely to risk a Tsvangirai victory leading to a military coup escalate, prolonging the suffering of Zimbabwe’s or martial law, and the security services splitting people. For this reason, the first objective of the along factional lines. mediation should be to secure a political agree- On 16 May, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission ment between the MDC and ZANU-PF that avoids (ZEC) announced that the run-off will take place on the need for a run-off and the accompanying risks 27 June. This means that the AU and SADC must of even greater violence. A negotiated settlement start preparing immediately to dispatch large election could establish a Tsvangirai-led transitional gov- observation missions by no later than 1 June. ernment with substantial participation by ZANU- PF stalwarts to implement agreed upon constitu- In the event that a run-off is held and Tsvangirai wins, tional reforms and hold free and fair elections under he should assume the presidency but move to form a an agreed timeframe. unity government for at least the initial period of his Senior military commanders strongly opposed to the term. While his party controls parliament, ZANU-PF MDC have been instrumental in preventing a demo- has a near stranglehold over the security sector and cratic transition following the 29 March election, and state institutions and has a strong influence over eco- there is growing risk of a coup either before a run-off nomic and social life. Tsvangirai and the MDC will (in a pre-emptive move to deny Tsvangirai victory) or need to include ZANU-PF in their government if they after a Tsvangirai win. Indeed, this is one reason why are to govern effectively. priority should be given to a negotiated settlement ahead of a run-off. The mediation must accordingly In short, with or without a run-off, third-party Afri- address the loyalty of the security services as a prior- can-led negotiations are essential to help gain accep- ity, including the handover of military power in a tance from the military for a handover of power and transitional government arrangement. establish the parameters for a transitional or unity government. Some MDC supporters may consider the Zimbabwe will need a transitional justice mechanism compromises involved an affront to democracy, but at some stage to come to terms fully with and move they are necessary if the country’s democracy is to be beyond its long nightmare. Both national reconcilia- stable and secure. tion and the practical necessities of pulling the coun- try out of its immediate crisis require, however, that If Mugabe succeeds in retaining power by winning an the agreement on a transitional government contain election through fraud and/or intimidation, appropriate guarantees for present political leaders and the secu- regional and other international action must be taken to rity forces. These would extend to Mugabe himself, deal with what would be a rogue regime. Examples of but it is difficult to see him having any formal role in such action would be declaring his government illegiti- the new political dispensation. The agreement will mate; tightening existing targeted sanctions on known need to be complemented by the regional and wider hardliners; and establishing a Security Council com- international community’s strong commitment to pro- mission of inquiry to investigate reports of torture, vide resources for reconstruction and recovery. murder and widespread violations of human rights and to recommend appropriate accountability mecha- A credible run-off. Even as it works to facilitate a nisms, perhaps including referral to international legal negotiated settlement on a transitional govern- authorities. ment, SADC mediators must work with ZANU-PF and the MDC to delineate the basic requirements for a credible run-off in the event the effort fails. Urgent steps would be needed to guarantee a free II. THE ELECTORAL STALEMATE and fair vote – even one in conditions as imperfect as for the 29 March election. These include imme- Polling day itself was relatively peaceful and orderly. diate cessation of violence and intimidation; strong A critical improvement on past elections was the monitoring and organisational roles for SADC, the counting of ballots at the polling station where they AU and the UN; and massive deployment no later were cast, with the results posted publicly outside. than roughly a month before the poll of independ- President Mbeki had succeeded at the last round of ent national and international observers, who must ZANU-PF/MDC talks in persuading the ruling party remain on the ground until the results are an- to accept this measure, which was probably the single nounced. As with negotiations for a transitional government, the mediation would need to address Negotiating Zimbabwe’s Transition Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°51, 21 May 2008 Page 3 most significant achievement of an otherwise failed while the MDC made unprecedented inroads into mediation process.1 ZANU-PF’s rural strongholds. The Senate results, re- leased on 6 April, showed an even split between ZANU-PF underestimated the resilience of the oppo- ZANU-PF and the combined opposition with 30 seats sition, the unpopularity of the regime, the impact of each.7 That the MDC is now the majority party in par- the economic collapse and the desperation for change.
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