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Expert Report of Carl Shapiro ------ Public Version ------ Redacted ------ UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Case. No. 1:17-cv-02511 (RJL) Plaintiff, v. AT&T INC., DIRECTV GROUP HOLDINGS, LLC, and TIME WARNER INC., Defendants. EXPERT REPORT OF CARL SHAPIRO 2 February 2018 ------ Public Version ------ Redacted ------ CONFIDENTIAL – SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER Table of Contents 1. Qualifications and Assignment ......................................................................... 1 Qualifications .................................................................................................................... 1 Assignment ......................................................................................................................... 2 Materials Relied Upon ....................................................................................................... 2 2. Summary of Opinions ........................................................................................ 2 3. The Merging Parties .......................................................................................... 4 AT&T ................................................................................................................................. 4 Time Warner ...................................................................................................................... 6 4. The Structure of the Video Programming Industry ....................................12 Video Content Creators ................................................................................................... 15 Video Content Aggregators ............................................................................................. 15 Video Content Distributors .............................................................................................. 21 Competition Among Video Content Distributors ............................................................. 28 5. Market Definition ............................................................................................29 Relevant Product Market ................................................................................................. 29 Relevant Geographic Markets ......................................................................................... 34 6. Antitrust Concerns with the Proposed Transaction .....................................37 7. Negotiations Between Video Content Aggregators and MVPDs ................39 Video Content Aggregators and MVPDs Bargain over Affiliate Fees ............................ 40 The Nash Bargaining Model ............................................................................................ 40 The Nash Bargaining Model Is Appropriate Here .......................................................... 45 Bargaining Outcomes and Vertical Integration .............................................................. 46 Two Additional Incentives to Raise Turner Fees ............................................................. 48 8. Key Input Variables for the Turner Bargaining Model ..............................48 The Turner Subscriber Loss Rate .................................................................................... 50 The DTV Diversion Ratios ............................................................................................... 56 DTV’s Contribution Margin ............................................................................................ 58 9. Results from the Bargaining Model: Turner Fees to Rival MVPDs ..........59 10. Elimination of Double Marginalization and Opportunity Cost ..............62 11. Net Impact on MVPD Costs .......................................................................64 12. Impact on Consumers .................................................................................65 ------ Public Version ------ Redacted ------ CONFIDENTIAL – SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER 13. Impact on Consumers in Local Areas .......................................................68 14. Lessening Competition Through Control of HBO ...................................72 MVPDs Use HBO to Attract and Retain Subscribers .................................................... 72 HBO Controls How MVPDs Use HBO for Promotional Purposes ............................... 76 MVPDs Compete Against Each Other Using HBO ....................................................... 78 AT&T Will Have an Incentive to Limit Rival MVPDs’ Use of HBO ............................. 79 15. Anti-Competitive Coordination Between AT&T and Comcast ..............80 Virtual MVPDs Pose a Growing Threat to MVPDs ...................................................... 81 The MVPD Industry Is Vulnerable to Anti-Competitive Coordination ......................... 83 The Merger Would Create a Danger That AT&T and Comcast Will Coordinate to Withhold or Restrict Content from Rival Virtual MVPDs ..................................................... 86 16. Entry .............................................................................................................89 Entry by New Video Content Aggregators..................................................................... 89 Entry by New Video Content Distributors ..................................................................... 91 17. Merger Synergies .........................................................................................95 18. Arbitration Does Not Eliminate the Incentives Created by the Merger 96 Appendix A. Curriculum Vitae ............................................................................99 Appendix B. Testimony of Carl Shapiro During the Past Four Years ...........112 Appendix C. Materials Relied Upon ..................................................................114 Appendix D. Long-Term Subscriber Loss .........................................................126 Appendix E. Turner Penetration Rate by Network .........................................129 Appendix F. Subscriber Loss Rate and New Subscriber Cumulative Loss Rate: Evidence from Suddenlink Loss of Viacom Content .............................130 Appendix G. The Turner Bargaining Model.....................................................132 Appendix H. Data .................................................................................................138 Appendix I. Contribution Margins ....................................................................142 Appendix J. Diversion Ratios..............................................................................145 Appendix K. Efficiency Gains from Elimination of Double Marginalization147 Appendix L. Merger Simulation Model .............................................................150 ------ Public Version ------ Redacted ------ CONFIDENTIAL – SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER Appendix M. Post-Merger Upward Offer Pressure Under Arbitration ........185 ------ Public Version ------ Redacted ------ CONFIDENTIAL – SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER Table of Figures Figure 1: Proportion of AT&T’s Content Expenditure by Programmer (2017) ................... 9 Figure 2. Structure of the Video Programming Industry ....................................................... 14 Figure 3. Basic Cable Networks Owned by Large Content Aggregators ............................. 18 Figure 4. Growth in Programming Fees vs. Growth of the Consumer Price Index: 2009– 2016....................................................................................................................................... 19 Figure 5. Subscriber Counts for Leadings MVPDs ................................................................. 23 Figure 6. Growth in Video ARPU vs. Growth of the Consumer Price Index: 2000–2016 .. 25 Figure 7. Pay-TV Options by Local Footprint Overlap Zone Washington DC Designated Market Area ........................................................................................................................ 37 Figure 8. The Nash Bargaining Solution for Price .................................................................. 43 Figure 9. An Increase in the Seller’s Minimum Price Causes the Negotiated Price to Rise 44 Figure 10. Continuing Subscriber Loss at Suddenlink Due to Loss of Viacom Content ..... 54 Figure 11: Diversion Ratios by MVPD and Virtual MVPD (Before Adjustment for Outside Good) .................................................................................................................................... 58 Figure 12. Contribution Margins (Net of Acquisition Costs) U-verse and DTV, By Video Bundle .................................................................................................................................. 59 Figure 13: Predicted Turner Monthly Fee Increases for Rival MVPDs ............................... 61 Figure 14. Predicted Net Change in MVPD Monthly Costs for Turner Content Due to the Merger .................................................................................................................................. 65 Figure 15. Predicted Impact of Merger on Consumers Using Merger Simulation Model... 68 Figure 16. Predicted Increase in Annual Costs to Consumers in Major DMAs Using Merger Simulation Model .................................................................................................. 69 Figure 17. Merger Effects by Local Footprint Overlap Zone ................................................. 70 Figure 18. Merger Effects by Local Footprint Overlap Zone and Number of Competing MVPDs ................................................................................................................................
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