Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Sudan
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The Failure of Education in Combating Corruption in Sudan: the Impact on Sustainable Development
THE FAILURE OF EDUCATION IN COMBATING CORRUPTION IN SUDAN: THE IMPACT ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT Omer Hashim Ismail a a Educational Foundations and Administration, Faculty of Education a Sultan Qaboos University, Muscat, Sultanate of Oman. a Corresponding author: [email protected] ©Ontario International Development Agency ISSN: 1923-6654 (print) ISSN 1923-6662 (online). Available at http://www.ssrn.com/link/OIDA-Intl-Journal-Sustainable-Dev.html education programs and raising public awareness are Abstract: The major question this paper addresses is stated as important solutions to the problem. why education has failed in combating corruption in Sudan and, as a consequence, obstructs sustainable Keywords: corruption, education, Sudan, development. Corruption is considered a threat to sustainable development. development in all countries. Education is key factor INTRODUCTION in curbing corruption. However, looking into the situation in the Sudan, corruption has become a orruption has become a worldwide phenomenon characterizing the public sector. It phenomenon. It exists in both rich and poor pervades almost in all aspect of life. In fact, Sudan is Ccountries. Basu (2006) states: “The problem among the five top corrupted countries in the world. of corruption is neither new nor it is restricted to A major role of educational institutions is to provide developing countries only”. Transparency the nation with knowledgeable and skilled manpower International (TI) reports show that corruption is a needed to contribute to the socio-economic and serious challenge to governments in both developed political developments. Educated government and developing countries. A World Bank report officials, who are the graduates of educational estimated that public officials worldwide received institutions, are expected to fight the abuse of public more than $ one trillion in bribe each year. -
Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Sudan
OVERVIEW OF CORRUPTION AND ANTI-CORRUPTION IN AZERBAIJAN QUERY SUMMARY Can you provide an overview of corruption and anti- With a context characterised by limited independent corruption in Azerbaijan? media, a marginalised political opposition and a poor human rights records, Azerbaijan faces major CONTENT challenges of endemic corruption. Deeply 1. Overview of corruption in Azerbaijan entrenched patronage networks permeate all 2. Anti-corruption efforts in Azerbaijan spheres of public life and hamper the long term economic and social development prospects of the 3. References country. Economic and political powers are largely concentrated in the ruling elite, creating a blurred line between political and business interests. While the country’s natural resource wealth has largely contributed to economic growth and political stability in the last decade, it is also considered a major source of corruption and driver for political patronage networks. Public financial management, political processes, the judiciary and the police count among the sectors considered to be most \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ vulnerable to corruption. Author(s) In recent years, the government has been credited Marie Chêne, Transparency International, internationally for taking important steps against [email protected], with contribution from corruption. In 2009, Azerbaijan became the first Transparency International Azerbaijan compliant country in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Other important legal and institutional developments have taken place in the Reviewer(s) areas of public sector reform and money laundering, Dieter Zinnbauer, Ph.D., Transparency International among others. These efforts have started to pay off, Date translating in a significant decrease in citizens’ Responded: July 2013 perceptions of corruption in many sectors, as reflected by the recently launched Global Corruption © 2013 Transparency International. -
Sudan's Deep State
Violent Kleptocracy Series: East and Central Africa Sudan’s Deep State How Insiders Violently Privatized Sudan’s Wealth, and How to Respond By The Enough Project April 2017 REUTERS / Alamy Stock Photo Sudan’s Deep State Violent Kleptocracy Series: East & Central Africa Executive Summary Sudan’s government is a violent kleptocracy, a system of misrule characterized by state capture and co-opted institutions, where a small ruling group maintains power indefinitely through various forms of corruption and violence. Throughout his reign, President Omar al-Bashir has overseen the entrenchment of systemic looting, widespread impunity, political repression, and state violence so that he and his inner circle can maintain absolute authority and continue looting the state. The result of this process, on the one hand, has been the amassment of fortunes for the president and a number of elites, enablers, and facilitators, and on the other hand crushing poverty and underdevelopment for most Sudanese people.* A Failed State? For nearly three decades, President al-Bashir has maintained his position at the pinnacle of Sudan’s political order after seizing power through a military coup in 1989. During his rule, the government of Sudan has perhaps been best known for providing safe haven to Osama bin Laden and other Islamic militants in the 1990s, for committing genocide1 and mass atrocities against its citizens in Darfur, for the secession of South Sudan in 2011, and for ongoing armed conflict—marked by the regime’s aerial bombardment of civilian targets and humanitarian aid blockade—in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. Often portrayed as a country wracked by intractable violence and hampered by racial, religious, ethnic and social cleavages, Sudan ranks consistently among the most fragile or failed states.2 At the same time, Sudan has considerable natural resource wealth and significant economic potential. -
Summary Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Sudan
www.transparency.org www.cmi.no Corruption and anti-corruption in Sudan Query Could you please provide an overview of the nature and impact of corruption in Sudan? Does it affect SMEs significantly? Do foreign investors incur additional costs? Are basic services impacted by large diversions? Purpose challenges that affect both conflict torn and resource rich countries, including fragile state institutions, low The agency is currently undertaking a piece of work to administrative capacity, weak systems of checks and design our response to corruption in the new (post- balance, and blurred distinctions between the state and secession) Sudan. ruling party. The secession of South Sudan in July 2011 brings new economic and political challenges. Content Corruption permeates all sectors, and manifests itself 1. Overview of corruption in Sudan through various forms, including petty and grand 2. Anti-corruption efforts in Sudan corruption, embezzlement of public funds, and a system 3. References of political patronage well entrenched within the fabrics of society. Evidence of the impact of corruption is scarce and concealed by the country’s economic and Caveat political instability. Nevertheless, there is evidence that There is little data and research available on the patronage has a negative impact on small and medium country’s state of governance and on corruption, sized enterprises. Also, corruption in the police and particularly on its impact. The majority of recent studies security forces undermines internal security and allows have focused on the challenges faced by South Sudan, abuses of civil and political rights. The lack of so are not helpful in looking at Sudan. -
Opinion on Laws Regulating the Funding
Warsaw, 30 October 2017 Opinion-Nr.: POLIT-ESP/310/2017[JGe] www.legislationline.org OPINION ON LAWS REGULATING THE FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN SPAIN based on unofficial English translations of the Law on the Funding of Political Parties, the Law on the General Electoral Regime, as well as the Law on Political Parties This Opinion has benefited from contributions made by Ingrid van Biezen (OSCE/ODIHR Core Group of Experts on Political Parties) Fernando Casal Bértoa (OSCE/ODIHR Core Group of Experts on Political Parties) Ömer Faruk Genckaya (OSCE/ODIHR Core Group of Experts on Political Parties) Barbara Jouan-Stonestreet (OSCE/ODIHR Core Group of Experts on Political Parties) Richard Katz (OSCE/ODIHR Core Group of Experts on Political Parties) Lisa Klein (Campaign Finance Expert) Alice Thomas (International Human Rights Expert) OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Ulica Miodowa 10 PL-00-251 Warsaw ph. +48 22 520 06 00 fax. +48 22 520 0605 This Opinion is based on unofficial English translations of the laws submitted for review, which are annexed to this Opinion. Errors from translation may result. The Opinion is also available in Spanish. However, the English version remains the only official version of the document. OSCE/ODIHR Opinion on Laws Regulating the Funding of Political Parties in Spain TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 3 II. SCOPE OF REVIEW .................................................................................. -
Ti Policy Position
TI POLICY POSITION No. 01/2005 STANDARDS ON POLITICAL FUNDING AND FAVOURS The need to clean up political finance Corruption in political party and campaign consider the importance of vigilance by civil finance damages democracy because it society and the media and of internal political undermines elections and distorts political party and business controls. The development of competition. But the damage is not confined to the Standards reflects the importance of the the electoral process. The quality of issue to the Transparency International (TI) government is marred when subsequent movement and responds to the body of decisions by elected politicians are taken to knowledge built up by TI’s National Chapters. pay back those who funded their ascent to power, rather than for the benefit of the Transparency: cornerstone of regulation population as a whole. Equally, when a In order for any political finance regulation to be political party resorts to paying for votes rather implemented, there has to be a way of checking than focusing on the quality of its campaign parties’ and candidates’ finances. Transparency message, democracy suffers. of political finance, via disclosure, is therefore the Corruption in political finance erodes trust in the institutions of democracy, when scandal after scandal reveals politicians sharing the spoils of power with their financial KEY RECOMMENDATIONS backers. Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer 2004 found that in 36 • Detailed disclosure by political parties and out of 62 countries polled, political parties candidates of assets, income and were considered to be the most corrupt expenditure institution, followed by parliaments. Faced with evidence that voters do care • Limits on the duration and cost of election about the ways in which electoral politics is campaigns, and on large private donations. -
Political Party Funding in Georgia: Encouraging Competition and Improving Accountability
POLITICAL PARTY FUNDING IN GEORGIA: ENCOURAGING COMPETITION AND IMPROVING ACCOUNTABILITY MARCH 2011 Political Party Funding in Georgia: Encouraging Competition and Improving Accountability DISCUSSION PAPER ♦ MARCH 2011 Robert Dahl, IFES Legal Policy Advisor This paper has been prepared by an independent elections consultant with extensive international experience. All opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author and not necessarily endorsed by any organization. Introduction The role of money in politics has a profound effect upon the legitimacy of elections and the quality of democracy, governance and development.1 All countries, including advanced democracies, struggle with political finance issues. Every country has unique circumstances that resist simple or borrowed solutions. Nevertheless, international experience suggests ways to encourage competition among political parties and to improve financial accountability within political parties with regard to their funding: Election laws can serve the public’s interest in encouraging vigorous public debate and political competition by providing sufficient basic funding of political parties and candidates. In a free society, government cannot impose an absolute ‘level playing field’ of funding or advocacy among political parties, but it may reduce disparities by offering a ‘floor’ of funds and additional supplements. Effective regulation of political finance activity includes requirements for genuine financial reporting by electoral participants. Comprehensive financial reporting by parties and candidates allows transparency in political funding, facilitates enforcement of the rules and restrictions upon such funding, and provides useful information to the public about the extent and sources of funds received by political parties and candidates. Political parties, civil society organizations and other groups in Georgia are currently discussing potential reforms in several election policy areas, including funding of electoral participants (political parties and candidates). -
FIGHTING CORRUPTION Political Funding
FIGHTING CORRUPTION Political Funding by Mr Yves-Marie DOUBLET Deputy Director at the National Assembly, France Thematic Review of GRECO’s Third Evaluation Round For further information, GRECO Secretariat Directorate General I - Human Rights and Rule of Law Council of Europe F-67075 Strasbourg Cedex Tel.: + 33 (0)3 88 41 30 43 Fax: + 33 (0)3 88 41 39 55 www.coe.int/greco www.coe.int PREMS 57212 FIGHTING CORRUPTION Political funding by Mr Yves-Marie DOUBLET* Deputy Director at the National Assembly, France Thematic review of GRECO’s Third Evaluation Round * Yves-Marie Doublet is Deputy Director at the French National Assembly. He assists GRECO as technical expert on issues relating to political party funding. Contents 1. Introduction ........................................................ 5 2. The transparency of political funding .................. 7 2.1. The status of those involved in political activities ........................................................ 7 2.1.1. Similar obligations for political parties and candidates for election ............ 7 2.1.2. Applying the legal status of political parties to bodies performing the same functions .................................. 8 2.2. Donations ....................................................... 9 2.2.1. Anonymous donations ............................. 9 2.2.2. Threshold effects ...................................11 2.2.3. Donations in kind ...................................12 2.2.4. Sponsorship ..........................................15 2.2.5. Loans ...................................................16 2.2.6. Rewards for public contracts ....................18 2.2.7. Rules on donations which differ from one election to another....................18 2.2.8. Membership fees ....................................18 2.3. Party accounts ...............................................19 2.3.1. Maintaining accounts ..............................19 2.3.2. Standardised presentation of accounts ...........................................20 2.3.3. Content of accounts ...............................21 2.3.4. -
Guidelines on Political Party Regulation 2Nd Edition
Strasbourg, 14 December 2020 CDL-AD(2020)032 Study No. 881/2017 Or. Engl. EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW (VENICE COMMISSION) OSCE OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (OSCE/ODIHR) GUIDELINES ON POLITICAL PARTY REGULATION 2ND EDITION Approved by the Council of Democratic Elections at its 69th online meeting (7 October 2020) and Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 125th online Plenary Session (11-12 December 2020) on the basis of comments by OSCE/ODIHR Core Group of Experts on Political Parties Mr Josep Maria CASTELLA ANDREU (Member, Spain) Mr Pieter van DIJK (Expert, Former Member, the Netherlands) Mr Nicolae ESANU (Substitute Member, Republic of Moldova) Mr Ben VERMEULEN (Member, the Netherlands) This document will not be distributed at the meeting. Please bring this copy. www.venice.coe.int CDL-AD(2020)032 - 2 - Table of contents I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 5 II. POLITICAL PARTIES: THEIR IMPORTANCE, FUNCTIONS AND REGULATION ............ 7 1. The classification and importance of political parties and their functions ........................ 7 2. Three dimensions ........................................................................................................... 8 3. Two models ..................................................................................................................... 9 III. PRINCIPLES ................................................................................................................... -
Overview of the Sudan Uprising
Working Paper Series #2020-017 Overview of the Sudan Uprising Samia Satti Osman Mohamed Nour Published: 21 April 2020 Maastricht Economic and social Research institute on Innovation and Technology (UNU‐MERIT) email: [email protected] | website: http://www.merit.unu.edu Boschstraat 24, 6211 AX Maastricht, The Netherlands Tel: (31) (43) 388 44 00 UNU-MERIT Working Papers ISSN 1871-9872 Maastricht Economic and social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology UNU-MERIT UNU-MERIT Working Papers intend to disseminate preliminary results of research carried out at UNU-MERIT to stimulate discussion on the issues raised. Overview of the Sudan Uprising By Prof. Dr. Samia Satti Osman Mohamed Nour (February 20, 2020) Overview of the Sudan Uprising Prof. Dr. Samia Satti Osman Mohamed Nour1 (February 20, 2020) Abstract This paper provides an overview of the Sudan Uprising and discusses the major causes, factors that contributed to the success of Sudan Uprising and potential opportunities and major challenges following the Sudan Uprising. We improve understanding, fill the gaps in the literature and provide an extremely valuable contribution to the literature by presenting a new and more comprehensive analysis and investigation of the factors that caused and those contributed to the success of Sudan uprising and potential opportunities and major challenges following Sudan uprising. A novel element in our analysis is that we investigate the various causes including economic causes, social and human development causes, political causes, institutional causes and the causes related to the lack of freedoms that caused the Sudan uprising, we examine the dynamic interaction between the internal factors (youth, women, ICT, the Sudanese Professional Association, and University of Khartoum Teaching Staff Initiative), and external factors (diaspora) that contributed to supporting Sudan uprising and we explain potential opportunities and major challenges following Sudan Uprising. -
Sudan: Overview of Corruption and Anti -Corruption
U4 Helpdesk Answer Sudan: Overview of corruption and anti -corruption Author(s): Iñaki Albisu Ardigo Reviewer(s): Matthew Jenkins, Transparency International Date: 22 January 2020 Sudan is a fragile state, emerging from the brutal dictatorship of Omar al-Bashir, which ended in April 2019 after he was ousted by a military coup following prolonged popular protests. The new administration has inherited a deplorable governance situation. Moulded by years of kleptocratic rule, the civil service is plagued by rampant graft, while the extractive industries sector and land management are similarly rife with corruption. In fact, much of the national economy is exposed to extensive rent- seeking by the security forces, which run large swaths of the country as personal fiefdoms. The new regime will be forced to address corruption at all levels and sectors of the country and will need to reinforce a legal and institutional anti-corruption framework that is largely failing to prevent, investigate or sanction corruption. U4 Anti-Corruption Helpdesk A free service for staff from U4 partner agencies Query Please provide an overview the current situation regarding corruption and anti- corruption in Sudan Contents Main points 1. Overview of corruption in Sudan 2. Corruption by sector — After 30 years of authoritarian rule, Omar 3. Legal and institutional anti-corruption al-Bashir was deposed in 2019 and a new framework transitional government was established 4. References between civilians and the military. Caveat — Sudan under al-Bashir was considered to Pro-democracy uprisings in Sudan during the latter be a kleptocracy, in which corrupt actors part of 2018 and early 2019 have generated serious had effectively captured all aspects of changes to the political system of the country, and policymaking and all areas of the public the political climate is evolving on a daily basis. -
Strategies for Combating Corruption: a Case Study of Four (4) Zimbabwean Public Secondary Schools
STRATEGIES FOR COMBATING CORRUPTION: A CASE STUDY OF FOUR (4) ZIMBABWEAN PUBLIC SECONDARY SCHOOLS by NYAUDE ONESMUS submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN EDUCATION in the subject SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION at the UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA SUPERVISOR: DR H.J. KRIEK July 2018 i DECLARATION Name: Onesmus Nyaude Student number: 57641501 Degree: Doctor of Philosophy in Education (Socio-Education) STRATEGIES FOR COMBATING CORRUPTION: A CASE STUDY OF FOUR (4) ZIMBABWEAN PUBLIC SECONDARY SCHOOLS I declare that the above thesis is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references. references. I further declare that I submitted the thesis to originality checking software. ________________________ _____________________ SIGNATURE DATE ii DEDICATION I dedicate this dissertation to my wives, Prisca and Vimbai. Thank you so much for the unwavering support, unconditional love and the encouragement during my doctoral studies. I also dedicate this dissertation to my late grandmother, Lianah Matongorere (nee Miriyoga), and my two uncles, Peter (Baba Kuda) and Joseph Matongorere (Baba Florence), for creating the intrinsic academic and intellectual motivation by unconditionally financing my secondary school education despite multiple responsibilities they were shouldering at the time. I thank you very much for this created a solid base for the birth and sustenance of my intellectual vision to pursue tertiary and university education. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to express my appreciation and gratitude to the following people for supporting me throughout the course of my doctoral studies: Firstly, I would wholeheartedly want to register my profound gratitude to my supervisor, Dr H.J.