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08-09-15 Prosecutor V. Delic Judgement FINAL Without Maps.… UNITED NATIONS International Tribunal for the Case No. IT-04-83-T Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Date: 15 September 2008 International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 Original: English IN TRIAL CHAMBER I Before: Judge Bakone Justice Moloto, Presiding Judge Frederik Harhoff Judge Flavia Lattanzi Registrar: Mr. Hans Holthuis Judgement of: 15 September 2008 PROSECUTOR v. RASIM DELI] PUBLIC JUDGEMENT The Office of the Prosecutor: Mr. Daryl Mundis Ms. Laurie Sartorio Mr. Matthias Neuner Mr. Kyle Wood Mr. Aditya Menon Counsel for the Accused: Ms. Vasvija Vidovi} Mr. Nicholas Robson Case No. IT-04-83-T 15September 2008 CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................................................1 A. THE ACCUSED RASIM DELIĆ ........................................................................................................1 B. THE CASE AGAINST RASIM DELIĆ ................................................................................................2 1. Alleged Crimes at Maline/Bikoši (June 1993).........................................................................2 2. Alleged Crimes at Livade and Kamenica Camp (July - August 1995) ...................................3 3. Alleged Crimes at Kesten and Kamenica Camp (September 1995)........................................4 C. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE ..................................6 II. APPLICABLE LAW ..................................................................................................................10 A. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE STATUTE ........................................................10 1. The Crimes Must be Linked to the Armed Conflict ..............................................................10 2. The Four Tadi} Conditions ....................................................................................................11 3. Status of the Victims..............................................................................................................11 B. MURDER .....................................................................................................................................11 C. CRUEL TREATMENT ....................................................................................................................12 D. SUPERIOR RESPONSIBILITY PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 7(3) ...........................................................13 1. Introduction............................................................................................................................13 2. The Elements of Superior Responsibility ..............................................................................14 (a) Superior-Subordinate Relationship ........................................................................................ 14 (b) Mental Element: “Knew or Had Reason to Know” ............................................................... 17 (i) Actual Knowledge .............................................................................................................. 17 (ii) “Had Reason to Know” ..................................................................................................... 18 (c) Failure to Prevent or Punish ................................................................................................... 19 (i) Duty to Prevent ................................................................................................................... 20 (ii) Duty to Punish ................................................................................................................... 21 (iii) Necessary and Reasonable Measures ............................................................................... 22 III. GENERAL OVERVIEW .........................................................................................................23 A. INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................23 B. THE EMERGENCE OF THE AB IH..................................................................................................23 C. THE CONFLICT IN CENTRAL BOSNIA ..........................................................................................24 D. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................26 IV. STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONING OF THE ARMY OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA.......................................................................................................................27 A. INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................27 B. THE PRESIDENCY ........................................................................................................................27 C. THE AB IH MAIN STAFF .............................................................................................................28 1. Introduction............................................................................................................................28 2. The Commander of the Main Staff ........................................................................................29 3. Deputy Commanders .............................................................................................................30 4. Chief of Staff..........................................................................................................................31 5. Operations Centre ..................................................................................................................31 6. Security Administration.........................................................................................................32 7. Intelligence Administration ...................................................................................................33 D. PRESENCE OF NON -RB IH CITIZENS IN THE RANKS OF THE AB IH...............................................33 E. AB IH UNITS RELEVANT TO THE INDICTMENT ............................................................................34 1. The 2 nd Corps .........................................................................................................................34 2. The 3 rd Corps..........................................................................................................................34 3. The 35 th Division ...................................................................................................................35 Case No. IT-04-83-T i 15September 2008 4. The 328 th Mountain Brigade..................................................................................................36 5. The 306 th Brigade...................................................................................................................36 6. The 7 th Muslim Mountain Brigade.........................................................................................37 7. The El Mujahed Detachment .................................................................................................37 F. DIFFICULTIES FACED BY THE AB IH............................................................................................37 (a) Lack of Trained Personnel and Equipment ............................................................................ 37 (b) Command and Control........................................................................................................... 39 (c) Communications..................................................................................................................... 40 (d) Influence of Civilian Authorities ........................................................................................... 41 G. REPORTING .................................................................................................................................41 1. General Principles..................................................................................................................41 2. Types of Reports Received by the Main Staff.......................................................................42 (a) Combat Reports...................................................................................................................... 42 (b) Security Reports..................................................................................................................... 42 3. Information Processing and Incorrect Reporting...................................................................43 4. Rasim Deli}’s Knowledge of Documents..............................................................................44 5. Meetings of Rasim Deli} .......................................................................................................45 H. MILITARY JUSTICE IN THE AB IH................................................................................................46 V. MUJAHEDIN FORCES.............................................................................................................49 A. THE TERM “M UJAHEDIN ”...........................................................................................................49 B. GROUPS OF MUJAHEDIN IN CENTRAL BOSNIA ............................................................................49 C. THE “EL MUJAHED ” DETACHMENT (“EMD”).............................................................................51
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