Bergamaschi, I 2013 French Military Intervention in : Inevitable, stability Consensual yet Insufficient.Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 2(2): 20, pp. 1-11, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.bb

PRACTICE NOTE French Military Intervention in Mali: Inevitable, Consensual yet Insufficient Isaline Bergamaschi*

This practice note offers an account of ’s military intervention in Mali1 launched on 11 January 2013. Firstly, it provides an analysis of the events that led up to the dual crisis in the country’s northern and southern regions and to a new wave of armed conflict between government and rebel forces. Then, it is argued that although the French military intervention was framed as inevitable and based on a broad consensus, it will nevertheless be insufficient to address the root sociopolitical causes of Mali´s multidimensional crisis.

How It All Started in Bamako: A Malian soldiers marched to the Presidential Counterproductive Coup palace demanding additional resources and Despite the focus of media coverage on its support for the troops from the government northern territories, Mali´s current politi- led by President Amadou Toumani Touré cal crisis began in Bamako with a counter- (hereafter referred to as ATT, as is common productive coup aimed at restoring State in Mali). In hindsight, this event appears to authority which had been lost to “rebel” have been an attempted wake-up call to the groups in the North. Paradoxically, this led President, as well as an early forewarning of to a further loss of sovereign State control in the coup. the region and ultimately to the country’s de On 21 March, the Minister of Defence facto partition. visited the military barracks in Kati, located Despite the somewhat unexpected nature 15 km away from the capital city, to discuss of the coup, it occurred in a context of great the situation at hand. The enraged soldiers uncertainty and deterioration of governance. threw rocks at the Minister and his team, and By the end of 2011, the Malian army had their bodyguards were forced to fire shots been attacked by Tuareg fighters in several in the air in order to secure the Minister´s locations and cities in the North (Tinzawa- exit from the barracks. A modest number of ten, Tessalit). Some Malian soldiers were kid- disaffected soldiers then marched from the napped or killed in Aguel’hoc, and the army nearby barracks of Kita to the highest seats of was forced to leave. In an attempt to mask State power in Bamako, on Koulouba hill. The this series of defeats, the government opted soldiers were able to make their way into the for a “strategic retreat” from the area. On 2 palace at around 9:00 pm, due to the weak- February, a group of mothers and wives of ness of the President´s response and that of State institutions more generally (Siméant and Traoré 2012). However, ATT, protected * Universidad de los Andes, Colombia by his presidential guard, known as the Red [email protected] Berets, had already fled. The mutineers pro- Art. 20, page 2 of 11 Bergamaschi: French Military Intervention in Mali ceeded to take control of the State television The Root Causes of the Conflict service, arrest several personalities from the in the North: Beyond the Islamist former regime, announce the suspension Threat of the Constitution and the dissolution of To understand the origins of this crisis, it is the government and create the National important to go beyond the media’s focus on Committee for the Reestablishment of the recent “Islamist threat” in the Sahel. The Democracy and the Restoration of the State MNLA is the product of the movements that (NCRDRS) with the objective of “saving what have been leading Tuareg revolts against the is left of the Republic”. As is often the case, central government since Mali’s independ- the military junta was initially welcomed by ence in 1960. The French colonial policy con- the population. The capture and imprison- sisted of strictly distinguishing between and ment of several politicians widely regarded applying differential rule to nomadic and as corrupt – in addition to their promises sedentary, black and lighter-skinned popula- to deal more firmly with the situation in the tions (Grémont 2012). Gregory Mann (2012) North – earned Captain Sanogo and his crew has shown that at independence, the Tuareg of Green Berets a certain degree of respect were disappointed that the French did not from Malian civil society. keep their promise to create a separate Saha- But in the aftermath of the March 2012 ran territory for them where, as they wished, military coup, the Mouvement National they would not be ruled by Blacks. In postco- pour la Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) – an lonial Mali, disputes over access to resources insurgent movement led by Tuareg leaders and land distribution became increasingly – took advantage of the political vacuum common within the increasingly sedentary created in Bamako in order to conquer the Tuareg community, which faced chronic North. In an alliance with Ansar Dine and Al- drought (Bouhlel-Hardy 2009). Tuareg lead- Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), they ers have increasingly demanded greater took control of , Gao and Timbuktu by development of the North and the region’s April 1st. Rivalries between the various rebel effective inclusion in the national agenda. groups soon began to show. By 2 April 2012, In 2012, the MNLA demanded regional self- the MNLA had been driven from Timbuktu determination and the organisation of a ref- by Ansar Dine and AQIM, and later from erendum for the independence of Azawad. Gao, Timbuktu (22 and 28 June respectively) Since independence, the approach of the and Menaka (16 November) by the Mouve- Malian State in the face of the successive ment pour l’Unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de Tuareg uprisings has been three-fold. In l’Ouest (MUJAO) after intense fighting. Yet 1963 it boiled down to the use of force and the resulting declaration of an independent repression. In the early 1990s, the govern- Azawad by the MNLA on April 6th is related ment attempted to co-opt the Tuareg (Seely to a longstanding predicament in the North. 2001) and to improve their integration and Geographically, Azawad as understood representation within the State through by Tuareg leaders includes the Septentri- decentralisation, demobilisation and devel- onal parts of Mali lying beyond the Niger opment programs. After 2006, ATT was per- river: the whole administrative regions of ceived to have tacitly adopted a “laissez faire” Kidal, Gao, Timbuktu and a piece of Mopti approach to the management of the North, region). French historian Pierre Boilley and but all of these measures appear to have Roland Marchal have shown that Azawad is aggravated tensions in the long run. Indeed, “a purely political creation” and is not based traditional Tuareg figures or “Big Men” (those on cultural or linguistic factors (the Tuareg of noble lineage and/or combat experience are not the majority in the area, which is in the rebellions of the early 1990s) success- also home to Arabs, Songhai and Peuls) or a fully capitalised on the dividends of peace, historical precedent. including: electoral mandates in the new Bergamaschi: French Military Intervention in Mali Art. 20, page 3 of 11 local communes (after 1998), resources for extremism but rather disagreements con- development projects and arrangements for cerning the concrete manner of implement- the integration of Tuareg fighters into the ing Sharia law and the composition of their Malian army (Bøås 2012, Grémont 2012). potential joint bureau. She also asserts that Many frustrated youths left Mali, but some the MNLA and Ansar-Dine are very close in continued the struggle under new modali- terms of their membership, which has been ties, seizing new opportunities offered by a construed by family bonds and local alliances changing regional context. These include, (Meddeb 2012). for instance, connections with AQIM and/ The complexity of the alliances between or with transnational criminal networks the various rebel groups and their shift- (e.g., the smuggling of bootleg cigarettes, ing agendas partly explains the difficulty migrants and drugs to Europe (Marchal 2012, in finding a political solution to the crisis. Bøås 2012, Grémont 2012). Another reason is the weakness of political The proliferation of insurgent movements power in Bamako since the coup. The coup in northern Mali in the 2000s – and the pres- has indeed left Mali deeply divided, but not ence of Islamists amongst them, be they amongst the cleavages usually mentioned Malian or foreign – is a consequence of these (i.e., North and South, democrats and oth- recent developments. Ansar-Dine’s leader- ers, or secular and extreme Muslims). The ship is mainly Tuareg but the movement´s nature of these Malian political divisions is rank and file includes many local Arabs. It is explored below. headed by Iyad Ag Ghaly, a nobleman from Kidal whom, following a stay in Saudi Arabia, Military Cast Shadow Power over became a “born-again Salafist” and played Transitional Authorities the “Islamic law and order” card in northern Soon after 22 March, clashes broke out Mali upon his return (Grémont 2012). His between demonstrators opposing the junta religious credentials made his movement and those supporting it. The pro-putsch appear more predictable than the MNLA, camp assembled within the Coordination des whose fighters had mistreated and pillaged organisations patriotiques du Mali and the the northern populations – especially the association Yèrèwolo Ton, both of which had non-Tuareg ones – over the past decade (Mar- been excluded from the political system dur- chal 2012). Gao-based MUJAO has specialised ing ATT’s rule. Conversely, the country’s polit- in the kidnapping of Algerians and Western- ical class and its main trade unions, which ers, and in drug smuggling. According to merged within the Front uni pour la sauve- Roland Marchal (2012), it is a splinter group garde de la démocratie et la République (FDR), from AQIM; MUJAO became frustrated with condemned the coup and demanded the AQIM’s efforts to take root in the Sahel and immediate recovery of Mali’s “constitutional of its doctrine of centralised decision making order” and “territorial integrity”. Their posi- and decentralised execution. tion was supported by the country’s interna- Despite the aforementioned distinctive tional partners. It should be noted that the features, membership within these groups coup did not confront “democrats” with “non is fluid; frontiers between them are porous, democrats”. It was welcomed, amongst oth- and the alliances between them are con- ers, by alter-globalisation activist Aminata stantly changing. In late May, the MNLA Dramane Traoré, and also by Oumar Mariko, and Ansar-Dine failed to join forces or har- a former leader of the student movement monise their agendas in order to establish (which was instrumental in the toppling of an “Islamic State of Azawad” in northern Moussa Traoré’s military dictatorship), and Mali. Ferdaous Bouhlel-Hardy has argued the head of the far-left Parti pour la Solidarité that what separated the two organisations Africaine, la Démocratie et l’Indépendance. were not debates over secularism or Islamic All of these public figures believed the coup Art. 20, page 4 of 11 Bergamaschi: French Military Intervention in Mali offered an opportunity to end ATT’s regime seemed able to deal with Mali’s international and establish a “genuine” democracy in Mali. partners. His being the son-in-law of ex-presi- The Government has remained deeply dent General Moussa Traoré also contributed fragmented and fragile, too. As a result of the to his appointment by the military leader- occupation of the North and of the pressure ship. But his refusal to appoint many career applied by the Economic Community of West politicians to ministerial positions, favouring African States (ECOWAS), the NCRDRS agreed figures close to himself and Captain Sanogo to transfer power to an interim, civilian gov- instead, soon left Diarra in a vulnerable posi- ernment on 6 April 2012. But since then, the tion in the corridors of power in Bamako. interim authorities have faced many chal- Despite the formal transfer of power to lenges, including weak legitimacy and the the civilian authorities, Captain Sanogo and shadow cast over them by the powerful Cap- his Kati-based Green Berets have since main- tain Sanogo. tained shadow power over the transitional Some contextualisation is necessary. A authorities and have interfered in the politi- presidential election had been due to take cal arena, thus limiting the authority of the place in Mali in April 2012. It therefore latter and leaving little room to maneuver proved difficult to appoint a consensual in dealing with the country’s complex and interim authority in the aftermath of the unstable situation. On 21 May 2012, Traoré coup. Dioncounda Traoré, former Minister was assaulted in his office by pro-putsch of Foreign Affairs (1994–1997) and Presi- protesters. He was treated for his injuries dent of the National Assembly (2007–2012), in Paris and only agreed to return to Mali was appointed as interim President. Since on 27 July, after the junta firmly commit- 2000, he had been heading ADEMA (Alliance ted to guaranteeing his physical safety. The pour la Démocratie au Mali), the party that Captain also acted autonomously from the was largely responsible for the fall of mili- executive branch, promoting his supporters tary dictator Moussa Traoré and fundamen- to positions of high rank within the military tal in the democratic transition. The party institution, and extra-judicially arresting, has since been accused by many Malians of torturing or killing dozens of Red Berets mismanagement and corruption (Coulou- (members of the presidential guard who baly 2004, Doumbi-Fakoly 2004), and has supported President ATT throughout the become increasingly divided by various lead- coup and staged an unsuccessful “counter- ership battles. For all these reasons, Traoré coup” on 30 April). was not perceived as being substantially For several months, the question of how different from the previous regime, and to regain control of the North remained certainly was not considered a consensual a major point of disagreement. The junta figure in the post-coup scenario; however, a rejected the idea of receiving any external recent survey of 384 people in the district support or intervention, asserting notions of Bamako conducted by the Friedrich Ebert of sovereignty and non-interference. Hence, Foundation between 13 and 20 February Diarra’s invitation in September to all those shows that he has gained greater trust by who were willing and able to contribute to Malian citizens in the past months (Friedrich restoring Mali´s territorial integrity was met Ebert Stiftung 2013). with great disapproval. By refusing to with- Dr. Cheick Modibo Diarra, a former NASA draw his candidacy from the upcoming presi- astrophysicist and Microsoft Africa execu- dential elections, the interim prime minister tive, was appointed Prime minister. Due to gave the ex-junta the excuse it needed to the international nature of his career, Diar- drive him out of office (i.e., on the grounds ra’s reputation had not been tainted by the that he was using the transition as a spring- rampant corruption of ATT´s regime, and he board for his own political ambitions). On Bergamaschi: French Military Intervention in Mali Art. 20, page 5 of 11

11 December, he abandoned his mandate ferences over the nature (constitutive or con- on national television, having been arrested sultative) of the conference and who would the night before by soldiers acting under the participate in it. The government was unable orders of Captain Sanogo. to draw up a consensual list of participants, Diango Cissoko replaced Diarra as of and influential opposition groups in Bamako December 2012. He had enjoyed a long and threatened to boycott the process since they successful career as both a civil servant and a did not deem it transparent or inclusive politician in the successive political regimes, enough (United Nations 2012). including the military one. He served as Gen- More importantly, discussions between the eral Secretary of dictator Moussa Traoré´s conflicting parties could not take place since presidency during the particularly violent the coup had left the transitional authorities and repressive years, as a director of the unable to act – both militarily and politically. Prime Minister´s cabinet after the democratic The army was unable to “liberate the North” transition, and then as the General Secretary on its own, and yet the ex-junta continued of the Presidency and as National Mediator to refuse any form of foreign support. Mean- under ATT. The ex-junta maintained three while, the political impasse in Bamako pre- key ministers in the reshuffled government: vented the discussion of the core elements those of Home Security, Justice and Territo- of the rebel groups’ agendas – the secular rial Administration. nature of the Malian State, its composition, By the beginning of 2013, the situation had etc. – leaving little room for trade-offs. The not yet been clarified or completely stabi- sincerity of the rebels’ pledges to reach a lised. The divisions within the army appeared peaceful solution to the crisis was also called to have been resolved when 28 detained Red into question. Berets were released (30 January). However, Talks with the armed groups produced poor the Green Berets launched a violent raid outcomes. The civilian government was una- upon the Red Berets at their Djicoroni camp ble to effectively negotiate with them since eight days later. Traoré appointed Sanogo it did not have the political backing needed as President of the Military Committee for to make concessions, and the mediations the Monitoring and Reform of the Armed offered by ECOWAS and the United Nations Forces on 15 February, in an attempt to offer also failed. The legitimacy of ECOWAS´s offi- him an honourable political exit whilst also cial mediator in the Malian crisis, President removing him from the military barracks in Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso, was chal- Kati and limiting his role to a military one. lenged by many Malians, who argued that a Sanogo promised not to run for in the July dictator that has been in power since 1987 is 2013 elections. unqualified to promote the reestablishment of democracy in Mali. They also accused him The Failure to Reach a Political of hijacking his role in the conflict to consoli- Solution date his power in Burkina Faso and improve In the context of escalating tensions, the his relationship with France. By the spring potential for a political solution to the con- of 2012, he was suspected of supporting the flict in the North was discarded, and combat rebels and was later reproached for holding operations began again in early January 2013. discussions with the rebel groups without In late 2012, plans for a national confer- involving the Malian government. Mali’s ence that would address the pressing issues neighbour, Algeria, which is not a member of the day – the elaboration of a roadmap of ECOWAS but a key regional power, tried for the political transition, the liberation of unsuccessfully to negotiate with Ansar-Dine the North and the organisation of elections and refused any external intervention until – became deadlocked due to profound dif- early 2013. Art. 20, page 6 of 11 Bergamaschi: French Military Intervention in Mali

The United Nations pursued a two-track received a great deal of approach – both political and military – support, both nationally – even Captain aimed at pressuring the Malian authorities to Sanogo immediately approved it – and inter- address the long-standing grievances of the nationally. Mahamadou Issoufou, President northern communities before taking military of Niger, argued that the operation in Mali action. The United Nations also attempted to was “the most popular of all French inter- offer a diplomatic option to those willing to ventions in Africa”. This consensus can be distance themselves from terrorist acts. In a explained by the recent dramatic turn of report published in late November, UN Sec- events, and the way in which the interven- retary-General Ban Ki-Moon warned of the tion was legitimised. The consensus was risks associated with launching a poorly pre- reached by means of legal and political pared intervention in Mali (United Nations arguments, and communication strategies 2012). The report was met with indignation deployed both in Mali and in France. and misunderstanding in Bamako. But on 20 The interim authorities were successful in December 2012, the UN adopted Resolution framing the military intervention of Mali’s 2085, which approved the deployment of an former colonial power as an inevitable option African military force in Mali. and the “least bad” scenario, and justified it The announcement that African troops on behalf of national sovereignty, unity and would logistically not be prepared for battle “territorial integrity”. Since Mopti harbours until September 2013 certainly encouraged the last military post up North, it was argued the rebels to take action as soon as possible. that if the rebels breached it, they would then In early January 2013, Ansar-Dine broke the face few obstacles should they want to head ceasefire, on the grounds that the govern- towards Bamako and establish an Islamic ment was not committed to the negotia- Republic of Mali. According to Roland Mar- tions and was instead committing violence chal, the will and capacities of armed groups and employing mercenaries in the North. to do so were clearly over-stated.2 Interim They subsequently attacked army bases in authorities clearly capitalised on a wide- Konna and attempted to attack the military spread perception of an Islamist threat, and airport of Sevaré and the city of Mopti. The it effectively garnered international support Malian army escaped from harm once again, for the Malian government at a time when whilst demonstrating their flaws (i.e., the its domestic standing was doubtful. Indeed, lack of training, organisation, resources, in the days prior to Operation Serval, Bam- leadership and unity). These latest events ako was shaken by large scale marches, and were what finally made a military interven- the mission temporarily silenced the voices tion by the French possible. Its commence- of those who were demanding the organisa- ment was officially announced on 11 Janu- tion of the continuously postponed “concer- ary 2013, two days after an official visit to tations nationales” (national consultations). Paris by Traoré. Interim authorities and the Malian media were careful to speak of a Malian-French The French Intervention: Inevitable, operation when it was clear that French sol- Consensual, yet Insufficient diers were leading the combat operations. Considering that the African force could On the French side, the reference to an not be ready before September 2013, and “Islamist threat” was determinant in motivat- that NATO had refused to intervene in Mali, ing, shaping and legitimising intervention. Traoré visited his French counterpart in Paris Its first official rationale was to protect the on 9 January. Two days later, President Fran- existence of an African partner. Only later çois Hollande announced the start of Opera- did the French authorities used somehow tion Serval. uncritically the terrorism terminology of US Bergamaschi: French Military Intervention in Mali Art. 20, page 7 of 11 former President George W. Bush. The pres- consensual intervention seemed guaranteed ence of Islamists allied with Tuareg rebels by the fact that Traoré had asked the French was instrumental in framing the crisis in Mali for their support. Finally, Hollande cau- as a threat for European and African secu- tiously avoided justifying the intervention rity while at the same time denying French on the grounds of the defense agreements support to President Bozizé against armed signed between France and some of her Afri- groups in the Central African Republic3. can ex-colonies at independence, in order to When fighting started, an image of the avoid being accused of neo-colonialism (Rou- consensus surrounding the intervention caute 2012). was displayed by means of a cautious mise Employing a combination of aerial bomb- en scène of people waving French flags in ings and ground troops, the operation was Bamako and cheering upon the arrival of spectacularly quick in chasing the Islam- Malian and French soldiers in the liberated ists out of the northern cities. The rebels northern cities. This mise en scène was facili- opposed little resistance, preferring to tated by the declaration of a “state of emer- escape and avoid direct combat with the gency” on 11 January 2013 in Mali. Addition- French troops in the cities. Since January ally, both Malian and French journalists were 2013, troops from Niger, Nigeria, Togo and denied free access to the North. In late May Senegal have been posted in Bamako. Chad- 2013, the most vocal critics of the interven- ian soldiers patrol Kidal, since the MNLA tion in Mali, alter-globalist Aminata Traoré did not let the Malian army in, and killed and Oumar Dicko, head of far-left party several chiefs of AQIM. During the “libera- Solidarité Africaine pour la Démocratie et tion” process, many thefts perpetrated by the l’Indépendance, who had supported the 2012 army – and civilian assaults on alleged rebel putsch, were denied a visa to France and Ger- supporters and lighter skinned individuals many - where they had been invited to talk – have been reported. The government has about the situation in their country - by a finally adopted a roadmap for the political French diplomatic initiative. transition, and elections are supposed to Regardless of the carefully crafted com- be held in July 2013. On 28 February 2013, munication strategies, the majority of Mali- during a summit held in Abidjan, ECOWAS ans truly welcomed the French troops, and decided that the interim authorities would 97 per cent of those consulted in a poll car- stay in power until then. The second phase ried out in Southern Mali in February 2013 has involved chasing out the remaining approved French intervention (Friedrich insurgents from the freed cities (especially Ebert Stiftung 2013). This can be explained Gao) and from the mountains of Adrar where by the fact that populations were trauma- they have retreated. tised and exhausted after months of parti- tion and occupation of the North, and disap- • The military operation supported by pointed by their political leaders and their 4,000 French soldiers and 2,000 Chad- management of the crisis. ian troops was spectacularly quick in From a legal perspective, the French justi- freeing Northern cities. Some analysts or fied their intervention in virtue of UN resolu- members of the French military milieu tion 2085 and Article 51 of the UN Charter further consider that the French opera- (the principle of legitimate defense). This is tion may serve as “a blueprint for future ambiguous since the UN allowed the deploy- operations”, i.e. launched upon African ment of an African force in Mali. Although demand and approved by the interna- the interim authorities did not enjoy full tional community (especially the UN), democratic legitimacy – precisely because targeted and quick thanks to sophisti- they had not been elected – the notion of a cated technological means to combat Art. 20, page 8 of 11 Bergamaschi: French Military Intervention in Mali

new security threats like terrorism, and neo-colonial and sometimes mafiaesque based on a political and operational practices of françafrique. “partnership” with African governments • However, I argue that Opération Serval and troops (Bryant 2013). Serval also will not suffice to successfully resolve served to send a message to the French the Malian crisis. Previous experiences army that, despite announced budget related to the “war on terror” in other cuts, “Africa would remain a defense countries usually proved more com- priority for France” and that France plex than initially estimated and were was meant and legitimate to lead direct even counterproductive in some cases. operations on the continent due to its Indeed, many obstacles and sources bases and unique deployment capaci- of uncertainty remain. Armed groups ties. North Africa and the Sahel were have apparently avoided direct con- identified as a “key geographic priority” frontation with the French army and in France’s Livre blanc 2013 de la défense may be re-organising in other countries. et de la sécurité nationale released on 29 French authorities claim that hundreds April (Bryant 2013). of rebels have died in the past months; • Political authorities are eager to present but Kidal is still under partial control of the operation in Mali as a turning point the MNLA and its new branch, the MIA, in French-Malian, and more broadly and other cities are not fully secured. French-African relationships, too. Dur- In the past months, insurgent elements ing a joint speech delivered in Bamako’s have launched gun attacks in Timbuktu Independence Square on 3 February and Gao and have carried out suicide 2013, Presidents Traoré and Hollande bombings – a novelty in Malian history. warned that despite quick military vic- During the ‘liberation’ process, many tory, more efforts will be needed to come acts of extortion and illegal killing were to terms with “extremism” and “obscu- reported. Tensions between communi- rantism”. The Malian president thanked ties are also on the rise (International the French army for their quick assis- Crisis Group 2013). tance to Malian soldiers and praised the • For many, the organisation of elections grandeur of France, the land of human in July 2013, as envisaged in the road- rights and the 1789 revolution. He also map for the transition adopted by the said his “brother” Hollande was at home government in July 2012, is unrealistic, in Mali. The latter encouraged Malians since the electoral register is outdated to fight terrorism, which he associated and contested, and since the 500,000 to a “second independence”, thus com- Malians who have fled to neighbouring paring today’s djihad with yesterday’s countries may not be able to cast their colonialism. But applauds in the audi- vote. A National Commission for Dia- ence reached their climax when the logue and Reconciliation has been set French President said: “I remember that up but its cost, mandate and composi- when France was attacked, when she tion are contested both in Bamako and was looking for assistance and allies, in the North. when she was threatened, when her ter- ritorial unity was at stake, who came to While France and Chad announced the support her then? Africa did, Mali did, progressive retreat of their troops, the thank to Mali. Today we are reimburs- deployment of a UN mission to Mali called ing our debt to Mali”. Here Hollande MINUSMA was authorised by Resolution claimed to put an end to the Sarkozy era 2100 on 25 April. Placed under Chapter 7 while foster reconciliation4 and to the of the UN Charter, it will seek to “stabilise Bergamaschi: French Military Intervention in Mali Art. 20, page 9 of 11 the key population centres”, especially in been unsuccessful in guiding and supervis- the North of Mali, to “deter threats and take ing the reform of the cotton sector, which active steps to prevent the return of armed had affected producers in the Sikasso area. elements to those areas” and to facilitate the It had also adjudicated vast areas of fertile “reestablishment of State authority through- land near the Office du Niger to interna- out the country”. tional companies in uneven and opaque cir- Despite the unprecedented consensus that cumstances. Pressured by European donors, has sustained the resolution at the Security the President decided to reform the family Council, experts and the UN Secretary-Gen- code in 2009, in order to provide more rights eral himself have warned that it would be the to women (amongst other things) but was first time that the blue helmets would con- forced to back off after a fierce, two-year bat- front terrorists like members of Al-Qaeda. tle against thousands of civil society organi- In addition, MINUSMA is supposed to count sations mobilised by reformist Imams. The on 11,000 blue helmets, which means that corruption of high-ranking generals – sus- 5,000 troops are missing. Integrating the pected of having “eaten” the millions of dol- 6,000 African troops already posted in Mali lars provided to them by the United States into a multilateral mission with a new man- in the context of military cooperation in the date, and finding 5,000 well-trained soldiers Sahel – was a central grievance of the putsch- to complement it will not be easy. Moreover, ists and their supporters. Another issue of in every UN mission, coordinating troops complaint was ATT’s “weak” management of from various countries with distinct experi- the northern predicament, which culminated ences, professional cultures and working with the repatriation of Qaddafi’s Malian ex- languages is a difficult task, especially as the mercenaries without being disarmed upon Malian army remains poorly equipped and their arrival. The President and his “clan” were trained to efficiently lead operations. Euro- accused of having connections with and pro- pean and German training to the Malian mil- tecting drug traffickers. Finally, the political itary have started in April but add to the risk system of “consensus” established by Touré of proliferation of ill-coordinated initiatives. in 2002, which was based on a coalition of Finally, it is interesting to note that, accord- all the political parties and some civil soci- ing to the opinion survey carried out by the ety representatives, dramatically reduced the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (2013), blue hel- possibility of any meaningful political oppo- mets are a priori less welcome than French or sition. Most of the candidates competing in American soldiers. the 2012 presidential elections had at some On the non-military front, it must be point worked in ATT’s successive govern- recalled that despite their recent transforma- ments, which means that there is very little tion and criminalisation, the Tuareg rebel- chance for a real change in the political tide. lions have historically been due to problems For this reason, political parties as a whole of marginalisation and representation. And are deemed opportunistic, and they have beyond the armed Tuareg movements, many been deeply discredited. Polls show a drop northern citizens (including non-Tuareg) in citizen patience and satisfaction with the do not feel adequately represented or inte- way democracy works in Mali since 2001 (for grated into the nation – starting with its a synthesis, see Coulibaly and Bratton 2013). South-oriented official history. The critical assessment of ATT’s regime has, The crisis is deep, multi-dimensional and to a great extent, been temporarily brushed is not limited to the North. When Captain aside due to the implementation of Opération Sanogo orchestrated the coup in March Serval, but it must not be forgotten if Mali’s 2012, President ATT had by then lost most unity, stability and democracy are to be estab- of his support country-wide. The regime had lished on solid grounds in the near future. A Art. 20, page 10 of 11 Bergamaschi: French Military Intervention in Mali critical assessment of aid is needed, too, for source=OpenNetworksCRM&utm_ the current crisis is also one of “donor-driven medium=Email&utm_ ownership” (Bergamaschi 2008). That is, how campaign=OpenNetworksCRM. have international efforts to build a State – to Bergamaschi, I 2009 “Mali: Patterns and counter poverty and promote aid effective- Limits of Donor-driven Ownership”. In ness – feed into the current situation? One Whitfield Lindsay (ed.), The Politics of must recall that Mali was long a “darling” Aid: African strategies for dealing with of the Western aid establishment and a key donors. Oxford: Oxford University Press. success story. Such a critique is necessary to pp. 217–45. better equip donors be able to create the con- Bøås M 2012 ‘Castles in the sand’: Infor- ditions under which all Malians will feel rep- mal networks and power brokers in the resented in their nation, protected by their Northern Mali periphery. In: Utas M (ed.), State and better able to counter Big Men all African Conflicts and Informal Power: Big around the country in the post-intervention Men and Networks. London: Zed Books. scenario (Bergamaschi 2013). pp. 119–13. Bouhlel-Hardy F 2009 Understanding of the Notes natural resource conflict dynamics: the 1 The author thanks her research assistant, case of Tuareg in North Africa and the Sa- Louisa Clow Fernández and the anony- hel. Tshwane: Institute for Security Stud- mous reviewers of the journal Stability. ies. Available at http://www.iss.co.za/ 2 During a conference called « Interven- uploads/PAPER194.PDF. tions au Mali et enjeux régionaux » held at Bryant L 2013 Leaner French Defense Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Interna- Strategy Focuses on Africa. Voice of tionales, Paris, 11 February 2013 : http:// America, 30 April. Available at: http:// www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/fr/content/inter- www.voanews.com/content/leaner- ventions-au-mali-et-enjeux-regionaux french-defense-strategy-focuses-on-afri- 3 President Hollande justified this differ- ca/1651821.html. entiated treatment by arguing that Presi- Coulibaly, M and Bratton, M 2013 Crisis in dent Bozizé was facing an internal politi- Mali: ambivalent popular attitudes on the cal threat and that, as far as France was way forward. Accra: Afrobarometer. Avail- concerned, influence was preferable to able at http://www.afrobarometer.org/ old habits of direct intervention. files/documents/briefing_papers/afro- 4 The President’s controversial discourse briefno113en.pdf. in Dakar in 2007 had created turmoil Couloubaly, P B 2004 Le Mali d’Alpha Ou- and indignation amongst French and mar Konaré : Ombres et lumières d’une dé- African leaders, civil societies and intel- mocratie en gestation. Paris: L’Harmattan. lectuals. Also, French-Malian diplomatic Doumbi-Fakoly 2004 Le Mali sous Alpha relations had deteriorated in the late Oumar Konaré. Ivry-sur-Seine: Editions 2000s, after ATT’s constant refusal to Silex/Nouvelles du Sud. sign “re-admission” agreements with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 2013 Mali-Mètre French government for the joint man- Enquête d’opinion: Que pensent les Ma- agement of migration. liens? Bamako : Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 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How to cite this article: Bergamaschi, I 2013 French Military Intervention in Mali: Inevitable, Consensual yet Insufficient.Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 2(2): 20, pp. 1-11, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.bb

Published: 12 June 2013

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