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French Military Intervention in Mali: Inevitable, Stability Consensual Yet Insufficient.Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 2(2): 20, Pp

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French Military Intervention in Mali: Inevitable, Stability Consensual Yet Insufficient.Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 2(2): 20, Pp Bergamaschi, I 2013 French Military Intervention in Mali: Inevitable, stability Consensual yet Insufficient. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 2(2): 20, pp. 1-11, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.bb PRACTICE NOTE French Military Intervention in Mali: Inevitable, Consensual yet Insufficient Isaline Bergamaschi* This practice note offers an account of France’s military intervention in Mali1 launched on 11 January 2013. Firstly, it provides an analysis of the events that led up to the dual crisis in the country’s northern and southern regions and to a new wave of armed conflict between government and rebel forces. Then, it is argued that although the French military intervention was framed as inevitable and based on a broad consensus, it will nevertheless be insufficient to address the root sociopolitical causes of Mali´s multidimensional crisis. How It All Started in Bamako: A Malian soldiers marched to the Presidential Counterproductive Coup palace demanding additional resources and Despite the focus of media coverage on its support for the troops from the government northern territories, Mali´s current politi- led by President Amadou Toumani Touré cal crisis began in Bamako with a counter- (hereafter referred to as ATT, as is common productive coup aimed at restoring State in Mali). In hindsight, this event appears to authority which had been lost to “rebel” have been an attempted wake-up call to the groups in the North. Paradoxically, this led President, as well as an early forewarning of to a further loss of sovereign State control in the coup. the region and ultimately to the country’s de On 21 March, the Minister of Defence facto partition. visited the military barracks in Kati, located Despite the somewhat unexpected nature 15 km away from the capital city, to discuss of the coup, it occurred in a context of great the situation at hand. The enraged soldiers uncertainty and deterioration of governance. threw rocks at the Minister and his team, and By the end of 2011, the Malian army had their bodyguards were forced to fire shots been attacked by Tuareg fighters in several in the air in order to secure the Minister´s locations and cities in the North (Tinzawa- exit from the barracks. A modest number of ten, Tessalit). Some Malian soldiers were kid- disaffected soldiers then marched from the napped or killed in Aguel’hoc, and the army nearby barracks of Kita to the highest seats of was forced to leave. In an attempt to mask State power in Bamako, on Koulouba hill. The this series of defeats, the government opted soldiers were able to make their way into the for a “strategic retreat” from the area. On 2 palace at around 9:00 pm, due to the weak- February, a group of mothers and wives of ness of the President´s response and that of State institutions more generally (Siméant and Traoré 2012). However, ATT, protected * Universidad de los Andes, Colombia by his presidential guard, known as the Red [email protected] Berets, had already fled. The mutineers pro- Art. 20, page 2 of 11 Bergamaschi: French Military Intervention in Mali ceeded to take control of the State television The Root Causes of the Conflict service, arrest several personalities from the in the North: Beyond the Islamist former regime, announce the suspension Threat of the Constitution and the dissolution of To understand the origins of this crisis, it is the government and create the National important to go beyond the media’s focus on Committee for the Reestablishment of the recent “Islamist threat” in the Sahel. The Democracy and the Restoration of the State MNLA is the product of the movements that (NCRDRS) with the objective of “saving what have been leading Tuareg revolts against the is left of the Republic”. As is often the case, central government since Mali’s independ- the military junta was initially welcomed by ence in 1960. The French colonial policy con- the population. The capture and imprison- sisted of strictly distinguishing between and ment of several politicians widely regarded applying differential rule to nomadic and as corrupt – in addition to their promises sedentary, black and lighter-skinned popula- to deal more firmly with the situation in the tions (Grémont 2012). Gregory Mann (2012) North – earned Captain Sanogo and his crew has shown that at independence, the Tuareg of Green Berets a certain degree of respect were disappointed that the French did not from Malian civil society. keep their promise to create a separate Saha- But in the aftermath of the March 2012 ran territory for them where, as they wished, military coup, the Mouvement National they would not be ruled by Blacks. In postco- pour la Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) – an lonial Mali, disputes over access to resources insurgent movement led by Tuareg leaders and land distribution became increasingly – took advantage of the political vacuum common within the increasingly sedentary created in Bamako in order to conquer the Tuareg community, which faced chronic North. In an alliance with Ansar Dine and Al- drought (Bouhlel-Hardy 2009). Tuareg lead- Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), they ers have increasingly demanded greater took control of Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu by development of the North and the region’s April 1st. Rivalries between the various rebel effective inclusion in the national agenda. groups soon began to show. By 2 April 2012, In 2012, the MNLA demanded regional self- the MNLA had been driven from Timbuktu determination and the organisation of a ref- by Ansar Dine and AQIM, and later from erendum for the independence of Azawad. Gao, Timbuktu (22 and 28 June respectively) Since independence, the approach of the and Menaka (16 November) by the Mouve- Malian State in the face of the successive ment pour l’Unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de Tuareg uprisings has been three-fold. In l’Ouest (MUJAO) after intense fighting. Yet 1963 it boiled down to the use of force and the resulting declaration of an independent repression. In the early 1990s, the govern- Azawad by the MNLA on April 6th is related ment attempted to co-opt the Tuareg (Seely to a longstanding predicament in the North. 2001) and to improve their integration and Geographically, Azawad as understood representation within the State through by Tuareg leaders includes the Septentri- decentralisation, demobilisation and devel- onal parts of Mali lying beyond the Niger opment programs. After 2006, ATT was per- river: the whole administrative regions of ceived to have tacitly adopted a “laissez faire” Kidal, Gao, Timbuktu and a piece of Mopti approach to the management of the North, region). French historian Pierre Boilley and but all of these measures appear to have Roland Marchal have shown that Azawad is aggravated tensions in the long run. Indeed, “a purely political creation” and is not based traditional Tuareg figures or “Big Men” (those on cultural or linguistic factors (the Tuareg of noble lineage and/or combat experience are not the majority in the area, which is in the rebellions of the early 1990s) success- also home to Arabs, Songhai and Peuls) or a fully capitalised on the dividends of peace, historical precedent. including: electoral mandates in the new Bergamaschi: French Military Intervention in Mali Art. 20, page 3 of 11 local communes (after 1998), resources for extremism but rather disagreements con- development projects and arrangements for cerning the concrete manner of implement- the integration of Tuareg fighters into the ing Sharia law and the composition of their Malian army (Bøås 2012, Grémont 2012). potential joint bureau. She also asserts that Many frustrated youths left Mali, but some the MNLA and Ansar-Dine are very close in continued the struggle under new modali- terms of their membership, which has been ties, seizing new opportunities offered by a construed by family bonds and local alliances changing regional context. These include, (Meddeb 2012). for instance, connections with AQIM and/ The complexity of the alliances between or with transnational criminal networks the various rebel groups and their shift- (e.g., the smuggling of bootleg cigarettes, ing agendas partly explains the difficulty migrants and drugs to Europe (Marchal 2012, in finding a political solution to the crisis. Bøås 2012, Grémont 2012). Another reason is the weakness of political The proliferation of insurgent movements power in Bamako since the coup. The coup in northern Mali in the 2000s – and the pres- has indeed left Mali deeply divided, but not ence of Islamists amongst them, be they amongst the cleavages usually mentioned Malian or foreign – is a consequence of these (i.e., North and South, democrats and oth- recent developments. Ansar-Dine’s leader- ers, or secular and extreme Muslims). The ship is mainly Tuareg but the movement´s nature of these Malian political divisions is rank and file includes many local Arabs. It is explored below. headed by Iyad Ag Ghaly, a nobleman from Kidal whom, following a stay in Saudi Arabia, Military Cast Shadow Power over became a “born-again Salafist” and played Transitional Authorities the “Islamic law and order” card in northern Soon after 22 March, clashes broke out Mali upon his return (Grémont 2012). His between demonstrators opposing the junta religious credentials made his movement and those supporting it. The pro-putsch appear more predictable than the MNLA, camp assembled within the Coordination des whose fighters had mistreated and pillaged organisations patriotiques du Mali and the the northern populations – especially the association Yèrèwolo Ton, both of which had non-Tuareg ones – over the past decade (Mar- been excluded from the political system dur- chal 2012). Gao-based MUJAO has specialised ing ATT’s rule.
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