Evaluating the Effectiveness of Regulatory Growth Management Programs an Analytic Framework

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CarruthersRegulatory Growth Management Programs Evaluating the Effectiveness of Regulatory Growth Management Programs An Analytic Framework

John I. Carruthers

Abstract

This article develops an analytic frame- ecent years have witnessed widespread expansion of state and regional growth work for evaluating the effectiveness of Rmanagement programs in the United States (Godschalk and Brower 1989; Kelly regulatory growth management pro- 1993; Nelson et al. 1995; Burby and May 1997; Porter 1997). By 1999, there were four- grams. First, the literature review assem- bles a large body of recent research teen states with substantive land use legislation, and regional planning, spurred for- examining the evolution of growth man- ward by federal transportation policy, now plays a significant role in most metropolitan agement programs, the role of govern- areas. But while the realization of comprehensive land use policies is widely viewed as a ment institutions, and evidence of major step forward by members of the planning discipline, much progress remains to policies’ effectiveness. Second, working from the findings of the literature review, be made because program evaluation has not kept pace with implementation. As a con- the article inductively develops a concep- sequence, there is little evidence that growth management fulfils its intended objec- tual model identifying the relationships tives and even less evidence to counter criticisms suggesting that strict regulation may between program implementation, land seriously disrupt local and regional land markets (see, e.g., Fischel 1990; Richardson market processes, and land use outcomes. Finally, the conceptual model is used to and Gordon 1993). In short, growth management remains surrounded by uncertainty derive a set of principles that may be used even as it continues to gain momentum and political support. to inform future research. This dilemma is compounded by the disembodied structure of scholarly research on the topic. Within the planning literature, there is an overall lack of systematic analyses and agreed-upon measures for evaluating the outcome of growth management programs (Blanco 1998). Moreover, few studies have produced results that are generalizable to other cases (Bollens 1993), leaving little in the way of established theory for new research to build upon. Each of these issues is tied to the multilayered structure of planning in the United States, which has led researchers to investigate “growth management” variously at the local, regional, and state levels of implementation. Knowledge of program effects has been built in a piecemeal way, often without explicit recognition of the relevant institutional setting. For example, local and regional urban growth boundaries may fulfill similar functions, but from a political standpoint, the two represent very different policies—in this case, scale clearly makes a difference. Without a clear understanding of this relationship, supporters are left to defend against criticisms that are more a problem of political organization than of specific growth management policies. Responding to the need for a more unified research strategy, this article develops an John I. Carruthers is an assistant professor integrated framework for evaluating the effectiveness of regulatory growth manage- in the School of Planning at the University ment programs. The core argument is that analyses should take a more holistic of Arizona, in Tucson. His research inter- ests include land use, growth management, and regional development; jcarruth@ Journal of Planning Education and Research 21:391-405 u.arizona.edu. © 2002 Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning

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approach to examining the effects of land use policies. In par- State Land Use ticular, the organization of government institutions, which Local Growth Legislation: Control: Late 1960s - 1970s affects the type of policies that get implemented and the con- “Quiet “Slow Growth” sistency of regulation across metropolitan regions, often Revolution” remains unrecognized. Working from this premise, the objectives of the article are threefold. First, the literature review Early 1980s: Subsidence brings together a large body of recent research examining the evolution of growth management programs and evidence of Late 1980s: Expansion of State Planning Frameworks policies’ effectiveness. Second, the review inductively develops an analytic framework establishing linkages between program implementation, land market processes, and land use out- 1990s: Expansion of Regional Planning Organizations comes. Third, the framework is used to derive a set of principles that may be used to inform future research. In addition to “Second Generation:” taking a more integrated approach, these principles suggest State and Regional Growth Management that future evaluations should draw on a consistent set of outcome measures, account for the determinants of metropolitan Figure 1. The evolution of regulatory growth management in the United growth, and recognize the complex set of factors that lead to States. the adoption of growth management policies. Following the introduction, the article is organized into Second, emerging at the same time, the so-called quiet rev- five sections. The first provides an overview of regulatory olution in land use policy initiated state involvement in local growth management in the United States. The second exam- and regional planning efforts. With its roots in environmental- ines the role of government institutions. The third section ism, this movement sought extensive land use reform through identifies the rationale for growth management and reviews a sharing of regulatory authority between state and local gov- empirical evaluations of land use regulation. The fourth pres- ernments. This redistribution of power was targeted primarily ents the analytic framework and outlines its implications for at critical environmental areas and developments of regional future research. Finally, the article concludes with a summary impact, leading some to criticize state intervention as being of the research findings. unbalanced and overly restrictive of regionally beneficial growth (Fischel 1989). Even still, early land use reform efforts succeeded in establishing a strong foundation for state-level ᭤ Regulatory Growth Management involvement in regional planning and growth management in the United States (Popper 1988). And by the end of the 1970s, several states had adopted comprehensive land use legislation, and many others had enacted more narrow mandates aimed at specific regions The Evolution of Practice and environmental concerns (Healy and Rosenberg 1979; Popper 1981; DeGrove 1984). Two parallel paths trace the evolution of regulatory growth More recently, local growth control and state land use plan- management programs in the United States (see Figure 1). ning legislation have converged in the form of state-based First, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, individual commu- growth management programs and regional planning organi- nities began developing policies in direct response to the pres- zations. After subsiding briefly in the early 1980s, state-level sures of rapid population growth and land development. land use reforms went through a period of rapid expansion Examples of early programs include the adequate-public- and have since been broadened to include a wide range of facilities requirement of Ramapo, New York (1969) and the quality-of-life issues. As an extension, regional planning orga- rate of growth programs implemented in Petaluma, California nizations have also expanded during the past decade. (1972) and Boulder, Colorado (1976). Centered on quality-of- Although the actual degree of authority varies, federal policy life issues, the emphasis of these and other local programs was (especially the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency on growth control or slow growth; they reflect the desire of individ- Act [ISTEA] and subsequent Transportation Equity Act ual communities to limit their participation in regional devel- [TEA21]) and renewed state interest have served to broaden opment patterns (Glickfield and Levine 1992; Landis 1992; the powers of regional planning organizations considerably. Kelly 1993; Porter 1997). The growth management programs implemented through Regulatory Growth Management Programs 393

these frameworks emphasize the links between local and adequate-public-facilities requirements, development permit- regional concerns and are aimed at achieving a balance ting caps, development phasing programs, minimum and between the competing land use objectives of individual juris- maximum density requirements, and urban growth bound- dictions (Bollens 1992, 1993; Porter 1992; Orfield 1997). In aries (Godschalk and Brower 1989; Glickfield and Levine this way, contemporary growth management programs are 1992; Knaap and Nelson 1992; Kelly 1993; Nelson et al. 1995, qualitatively distinct from more narrowly conceived local Porter 1986, 1997). More flexible nonregulatory techniques growth control efforts. Most state and regional planning pro- include development impact fees, open-space acquisition, per- grams focus on containing urban sprawl but recognize the formance standards, and the transfer of development rights need to accommodate growth through coordinated, well- (Mantell, Harper, and Propst 1990; DeGrove and Metzger planned land use (DeGrove 1992; Gale 1992; Nelson et al. 1991; Nelson et al. 1995; Porter 1996). Most of these tech- 1995; Burby and May 1997; Porter 1997; Nelson and Peterman niques were developed to correct for “imperfections” in land 2000). markets and/or to create new markets for such “intangible” commodities such as development rights. The two-dimensional structure of growth management is Program Implementation important to recognize because the outcome of a particular program depends heavily on both characteristics, although Given this history, it is necessary to characterize growth the relationship is often transparent. State and regional poli- management programs in at least two dimensions: institu- cies are usually aimed at creating a more even regulatory land- tional framework and regulatory technique(s). First, land use scape by setting standards and prescribing the use of specific policies may flow from the state, regional, and local levels. But policy instruments. Meanwhile, individual policies—imple- because specific regulations are typically carried out at the mented and enforced at the local level—act as the workhorses local level—even within statewide planning frameworks—the of growth management. This distinction has led researchers to cohesiveness of government institutions has a significant focus on evaluations of specific techniques while giving little impact on the outcome of growth management efforts. This attention to the impact of the relevant institutional setting. In issue is especially important in multijurisdictional metropoli- short, the level of government that growth management programs orig- tan areas where political fragmentation produces a large num- inate frommakesa difference . The following section develops this ber of locations subject to alternative combinations of land use idea further by contrasting local and extralocal growth man- constraints (Knaap 1998). When communities fail to cooper- agement frameworks. The fourth section returns to individual ate, the result is a “porous” land market where land developers regulatory techniques, first outlining the rationale behind and households are able to seek out areas that remain compar- growth management and then reviewing evidence of policies’ atively free from regulation (Landis 1992). In this way, strict effectiveness. regulation at the local level often produces spillover effects— especially increased growth and congestion—in adjacent communities (Fischel 1985, 1990; Kelly 1993; Downs 1994, 1999). ᭤ The Role of Government Institutions For example, there is significant evidence that locally enacted growth controls in the San Francisco Bay area displaced a large percentage of new residents between 1980 and 1990, leading Local Growth Management Programs to undesirable impacts on the spatial structure of the region as a whole (Shen 1996). It is likely that this process has shaped Local efforts to manage growth have a long history of being many other regions as well because there is a strong relation- savaged by critics for distorting real estate prices, creating ship between metropolitan fragmentation and urban sprawl exclusionary housing markets, and contributing to urban (Lewis 1996; Carruthers and Ulfarsson 2002). sprawl. Even still, it is important to recognize that local govern- Second, growth management programs consist of policies ments hold an important and enduring place in the growth aimed at controlling the location, quality, rate, and timing of management sphere because, as mentioned above, they are new development (Porter 1997). The most straightforward responsible for carrying out most forms of land use regulation. way of accomplishing this is through conventional zoning and This authority has its roots in the federal government’s 1928 subdivision regulations and the planning of capital improve- Standard Zoning Enabling Act (Advisory Commission on Zoning ments. But because these traditional mechanisms have often 1928), which continues to serve as a model for most states’ proved insufficient, a host of other, more innovative, mecha- enabling legislation (Kelly 1993). Through the police power, nisms have been developed. Among the most common are local governments are endowed with the ability to regulate 394 Carruthers

land use and have traditionally had wide latitude to adopt and control and growth management. Although the two concepts implement laws aimed at controlling growth and land develop- are often used interchangeably, growth controls are measures ment within their boundaries. As a result, local officials have aimed specifically at regulating the pace and amount of growth become accustomed to thinking of these powers as being that takes place, generally at the local level. By way of contrast, theirs by right (Porter 1997), a perspective that is often mir- growth management encompasses a broader perspective, rec- rored by residents, who view their involvement in local land ognizing the need to channel growth in a way that promotes use issues as a form of political activism (Gottdiener and compact development and minimizes its negative impacts Neiman 1981; Deakin 1989). (Nelson et al. 1995; Weitz 1999; Nelson and Peterman 2000). These sentiments are reasonable given the U.S. system of But this is difficult to accomplish on a broad scale from the home rule authority, but they give way to serious problems local level, so effective growth management increasingly when parochialism is advanced in the name of growth manage- involves extralocal implementation frameworks. ment. The most common way that this occurs is through low- density zoning and other mechanisms, such as development permitting caps, aimed strictly at limiting the amount and/or Extralocal Growth Management pace of growth. On the surface, these policies espouse many of the basic principles that growth management seeks to pro- Since the problems associated with local land use controls mote, especially with respect to quality-of-life and public- hinge largely on the scale at which planning takes place, finance issues, but less worthy objectives often lie beneath. extralocal frameworks, in the form of regional planning and Local land use laws represent a “classic example of self regula- state land use legislation, have emerged as fundamental mech- tion” (Altshuler and Gomes-Ibanez 1993, 10), where the net anisms for implementing growth management agendas. The benefits fall on the regulated parties—residents who gain from overarching purpose of these efforts is to reduce urban sprawl the enduring property values, quality public services, and by promoting regulatory consistency and jurisdictional coop- other amenities that socioeconomic homogeneity helps to eration across metropolitan areas (Burby and May 1997). ensure. So, in many communities, the result of growth man- Toward this end, regional planning organizations, which agement has been a reduced supply of housing with respect to serve nearly 90 percent of the nation’s local governments, demand and an exclusionary real estate market that bars entry broaden the focus of planning activities by creating regional to low-income households and ethnic minorities (Fischel land use and transportation plans, providing local govern- 1985; Niebanck 1989; Pendall 2000). ments with technical assistance, and acting as forums for inter- These problems are compounded in large metropolitan governmental communication (National Association of areas where home rule contributes to urban sprawl by estab- Regional Councils [NARC] 2000). For example, the San Diego lishing low residential densities and creating inconsistencies Association of Governments (SANDAG) produces a Regional between the land use plans of adjacent jurisdictions. While Growth Management Strategy (adopted in 1990) that includes some communities freely cooperate with their neighbors, oth- elements that coincide with local comprehensive plans. ers may be unable—or unwilling—to address growth-related Although SANDAG has no preemptive authority over local problems that extend beyond their borders (Bollens 1992). governments, it has developed a self-certification process pro- Adding to the dilemma, when communities remain focused on viding specific guidelines for helping communities ensure that their own well-being, they often adopt exclusionary land use their plans comply with regionwide land use objectives policies in reaction to regionwide growth patterns (see Glick- (SANDAG 2000). Other notable examples of regional plan- field and Levine 1992). Ultimately, such responses do little to ning organizations include Portland, Oregon’s Metro and manage growth but, instead, have been shown to spread devel- Minneapolis-Saint Paul’s Metropolitan Council, both of which opment out by forcing it to other locations in the metropolitan have a substantive influence on local planning activities (Por- area (Downs 1994; Shen 1996; Pendall 1999). Even in the ter 1997). absence of parochialism, such undesirable outcomes can easily Meanwhile, a growing number of states have become arise because of the mismatch between the scale of regulation involved in growth management through legislation mandat- (local) and impacts of growth (regional) that occurs under a ing comprehensive standards and objectives for local planning decentralized system of growth management (Bollens 1993; activities. This involves spelling out specific elements required Downs 1999). for land use plans and, often, prescribing the use of specific Finally, because local planning agendas tend to be narrowly types of policy instruments that are carried out at the local focused, a clear distinction can be drawn between growth level. In Florida, for example, communities use concurrency Regulatory Growth Management Programs 395

requirements to regulate the pace of their outward expansion; weaker and may have a limited ability to produce its intended similarly, Oregon’s program requires that all urban areas estab- effects. What emerges, therefore, is a trade-off between the lish urban growth boundaries (Nelson et al. 1995). A key fea- strength of the mandate and the complexity of enforcing it. ture of these and other contemporary statewide frameworks is While research examining the effectiveness of growth man- that they seek to achieve a balance between growth-restricting agement remains underdeveloped, existing evidence suggests and growth-accommodating policies (DeGrove 1992; Nelson that more rigorous frameworks may be worth the time and and Peterman 2000); the central goal is to create a more even effort it takes to enforce them. The vast majority of this work regulatory landscape by coordinating local governments’ focuses on Oregon, which has realized clear changes in land planning practices and responses to growth. use patterns consistent with the expectations of growth man- This objective is generally met through one of two models agement (Knaap and Nelson 1992). Even though some cities of implementation: conjoint or cooperative (Bollens 1992). In a have shown shortcomings relative to Oregon’s expectations conjoint framework (such as those found in Florida, Oregon, (see Weitz and Moore 1998), the overall outcome has been and Washington), local governments are required by state law more compact development patterns and the preservation of to prepare land use plans and are subject to strict penalties if natural open space and resource lands (Nelson 1992; Kline their plans do not meet prescribed standards. In a more flexi- and Alig 1999). The effects have been particularly striking in ble cooperative framework (such as those found in Georgia, Portland, where Metro, the nation’s only directly elected Maryland, and Vermont), planning is voluntary, and incentives regional government, has extensive control over land use and are the primary means of ensuring that plans live up to pre- transportation planning. The organization also maintains the scribed standards. Both models are relatively new, only having region’s primary growth management mechanism—the urban come into widespread use during the mid-1980s, when they growth boundary—ensuring that it remains at an appropriate began to replace the more draconian regulatory, or preemptive, scale for containing metropolitan growth. In short, Metro has method of obtaining compliance from local governments. been instrumental in promoting cohesiveness among local This approach had been met with considerable criticism for governments’ planning efforts and is the reason that growth creating a “double veto” system where a proposed project management performs better in Portland than anywhere else could be dismissed, even if it had already been approved at the in the state (Lewis 1996). local level (Healy and Rosenberg 1979; Popper 1981; Fischel Given the difficulty of implementing any statewide plan- 1989; Bollens 1992). ning framework, these findings illustrate that strict require- Evaluations reveal that state planning mandates have a sub- ments are likely to be worthwhile, if controlling urban sprawl is stantive influence on local land use planning activities (Burby truly a goal. Although Oregon’s program has been time- and May 1997). But even within well-established frameworks, consuming and expensive, it has achieved a degree of success local inconsistencies remain a major problem because greater than any other in the country, making a strong case for enforcement is a difficult and time-consuming task that grows fully committing to statewide growth management. increasingly complicated as mandates become more strict In sum, the organization of government institutions plays a (Burby, May, and Paterson 1998; Deyle and Smith 1998). Ore- significant role in shaping growth management activities. gon, for example, specifically requires that all cities, counties, Local governments are fundamental to the process because and regional planning authorities develop comprehensive they represent the outlet for land use regulation; however, left plans that are consistent with statewide goals. Plans must be to their own devices, they can easily produce outcomes that are vertically consistent (between state, regional, and local levels) negative for metropolitan regions on the whole. This dichot- and, once completed, are subject to review and approval by the omy raises important questions about how best to achieve state Department of Land Conservation and Development effective growth management growth under the American sys- (Knaap and Nelson 1992). This has produced what is arguably tem of land use governance. A response that continues to gain the strongest planning framework in the country, but the pro- currency is for state and regional governments to play a stron- cess took twelve years to complete (Porter 1997). In Georgia, ger role in defining local planning practices. Far from stifling where incentives encourage local governments to develop growth, these extralocal programs focus on the need to accom- plans voluntarily, near-universal compliance was achieved in a modate new development and have even been shown to pro- much shorter amount of time. Vertical consistency is encour- mote economic expansion (Nelson and Peterman 2000). aged but not enforced, and, unlike Oregon, communities are While there is clear evidence that state land use legislation has not required to carry out their land use plans (Weitz 1999). So, a substantive impact on local plans, little is known about the while Georgia’s mandate is easier to meet and enforce, it is also eventual impact that mandates have on land use outcomes. 396 Carruthers

Nearly all evaluations of growth management come from Ore- Urban Form: gon or from analyses focusing on individual techniques without explicit recognition of the relevant institutional setting. Property Urban Value Density ᭤ Evidence of Policies’ Effectiveness

Rationale for Land Use Regulation

The rationale behind land use regulation consists of three Public Land basic objectives: maintaining residential property values, shap- Services Area ing a compact urban form, and promoting efficient public service provision. It should be clear that these goals are interde- Figure 2. Interdependency in the objectives of land use regulation and pendent (see Figure 2); for example, land value has a direct growth management. effect on urban density, which defines urban form and helps determine government expenditures on public services. These quality-of-life issues represent the fundamental motiva- tion behind most growth management programs (Nelson et al. 1995; Ding, Knaap, and Hopkins 1999; Brueckner 2000). They so-called spatial mismatch—that has divided many metropoli- also represent the main criteria on which programs have been tan areas in recent decades. The latter two aspects are evaluated. particularly significant because they are closely linked to the First, land use regulations are implemented with the expec- expansion of regional planning efforts during recent years. As tation that they will raise real estate prices as they work to cre- high-capacity road networks are extended further into ate more desirable communities. Specifically, they are exurban areas, they expose large amounts of new land to devel- intended to enhance property values by protecting against opment, depleting reserves of open space and farmland (Nel- negative externalities such as congestion and incompatible son 1992; Daniels 1999). At the same time, the increased need land uses (Lee 1981; Lillydahl and Singell 1987; Pogodzinski to travel leads to greater automobile use and, ultimately, addi- and Sass 1994). Increased prices therefore represent a desir- tional congestion in downtown areas (Downs 1992). Public able outcome of land use planning—an anticipated by- transportation can rarely help to relieve the problem since low product of regulation. Even so, there is some debate about densities do not support frequent service and rapid travel whether this is a worthwhile planning goal; in many suburban times. communities, for example, land use controls are used to create Finally, for many public services, the cost per unit of devel- monopolies that lower urban densities and exclude low- opment increases as densities decrease (Nelson et al. 1995; income people (Fischel 1985; Landis 1986). On the other Porter 1997). At issue here is the location of growth relative to hand, increased land prices can be offset by dense multifamily existing development and capital facilities; since most facilities housing developments (Miller 1986; Neibank 1989). And are immobile, the cost of provision varies from customer to since urban density is a direct function of land value (Alonso customer, with the closest being the least expensive to serve 1964), removing restrictive zoning regulations can help to cre- (Frank 1989). Far-flung development patterns therefore ate opportunities for affordable housing while at the same increase average costs due to the large investments required to time reducing urban sprawl (Knaap and Nelson 1992). extend roadways and other infrastructure that transmits water, Second, a compact urban form is viewed as beneficial wastewater, electricity, and other services long distances to because it increases regional equity, preserves outlying reach relatively few numbers of people (Knaap and Nelson resource lands, and makes public transit possible (Downs 1992; Kelly 1993). For this reason, compact urban areas can be 1994; Nelson et al. 1995; Ewing 1997; Orfield 1997). Continu- provided with high-quality services at relatively lower costs ous, high-density urban development promotes equity than scattered, low-density development. This relationship is because it helps to ensure that residents living in centralized explicitly recognized in Florida’s statewide growth manage- areas do not bear disproportionate costs as public services are ment program, which seeks to promote contiguous, high- extended to remote developments in outlying areas. It can also density development patterns through concurrency require- reduce the effects of residential segregation—especially the ments (DeGrove 1992). Regulatory Growth Management Programs 397

In sum, land use regulations seek to strengthen real estate bulk of evidence on the price effects of “growth management” values, promote contiguous urban development, and ensure comes from analyses of local growth controls. Although find- efficient provision of public services. If growth management ings are mixed, research suggests that these policies may have has an impact, evidence of policies’ effectiveness should be exclusionary consequences, displacing potential residents as observed in residential property values, the spatial structure of they seek out the most affordable locations in the region, given metropolitan areas, and public service expenditures. their demands and budgetary constraints (Fischel 1985; Shen 1996; Pendall 1999; 2000). But this outcome is directly linked to the decentralized practice of local growth control; it is inap- Price Effects propriate to extend the same set of expectations to policies that encompass a larger geographic scale. Land use and regulations are hypothesized to create price The most systematic attempt to address a regional growth effects in two interconnected ways. First, as the rationale guid- management policy in a hedonic price framework focuses on ing their use suggests, regulations represent amenities that Oregon’s urban growth boundaries (UGBs). In particular, become capitalized into land values (Fischel 1985). Second, Knaap and Nelson (1992) summarize research showing that, land use regulations affect property values as supply con- in addition to acting as supply constraints, UGBs influence straints (Schwartz and Zorn 1988; Fischel 1990; Pogodzinski property values as timing constraints and impose location- and Sass 1991). Separating out the two types can be very diffi- specific effects. First, UGBs influence expectations about when cult because, ultimately, the effect depends on the particular land will be put to an urban use; the value of land outside is way a community—or region—chooses to manage its growth highly discounted because it will not be available for develop- (Knaap 1991). ment until the boundary is expanded (Knaap 1985). Second, Hedonic price models, which are used to attribute the UGBs impose location-specific price effects by raising the value value of multidimensional commodities to their component of residential property located just inside the boundary. This parts (Rosen 1974), are the main method that has been used to occurs because the undevelopable land on the other side rep- test for the price effects of land use regulations. By using the resents a significant amenity to homeowners—interpreted in price of a house as the dependent variable in a regression equa- the analysis as a greenbelt. At the same time, the value of farm- tion and its characteristics as independent variables, the land on the outside of the UGB is diminished because proxim- implicit market value of each component can be estimated. A ity to urban development is unfavorable to agriculturalists hedonic price model, therefore, takes the following form: (Nelson 1986, 1992). Ultimately, the regionwide effect of a UGB depends on how strictly it constrains the land market. If β β β β ε lnP = 0 + 1 X1 + 2 X2 + 3 X3 + . the boundary includes too much vacant land, the price effects In this equation, lnP measures the natural log of the sales price will be minimal but, on the other hand, if it is drawn too tightly, β it will create excessively high land values (Brueckner 2000). of a house, and the is represent the percentage change in price accounted for by a unit change in each characteristic. For Together, these findings emphasize the importance of interpreting the price effects of land use and growth manage- example, X1 represents a vector of the house’s physical charac- ment policies within an appropriate conceptual framework. teristics, X2 represents its locational characteristics and neigh- Moreover, researchers must be cautious because, even though borhood attributes, X3 represents the land use policies that it is subject to, and ε is the error term. This approach works well hedonic price models are powerful for measuring correlation, because individual land use regulations are operationalized as they say little about the actual cause of the effects they capture dummy variables, so there is no need to create synthetic mea- (Knaap 1991). The findings of the analyses reviewed here are sures to represent them within the model (Fischel 1990; significant because land market prices influence locational Pogodzinski and Sass 1991; DiPasquali and Wheaton 1996; decisions and, by extension, the spatial structure of metropoli- Knaap 1998). tan areas. Analyses using hedonic price models confirm that land use policies have redistributive effects on residential property values. Regulations create amenities, raise the value of land and Spatial Impacts existing housing where development is permitted, and lower the value of land where development is prohibited or severely Analyses dealing with the spatial impacts of land use regula- restricted (for thorough reviews, see Fischel 1990; Pogodzinski tions examine policies’ influence on the location of new devel- and Sass 1991). Even so, it is important to recognize that the opment. Most of these analyses implicitly account for 398 Carruthers

segmentation within regional land markets—an appropriate growth management has led to a spatial outcome that is unde- framework since, in many regions, suburbanization and eco- sirable for the region as a whole (Shen 1996). nomic restructuring have created a polycentric spatial struc- Interregional analysis reinforces these findings. In a study ture with multiple employment centers located well outside of of twenty-five metropolitan areas, Pendall (1999) shows that traditional central business districts (Garreau 1991; Anas, growth management’s ability to limit urban sprawl depends on Arnott, and Small 1998). Hedonic price models reveal that this the combination of techniques employed by jurisdictions transition is reflected in land markets. In the Los Angeles within the region. Policies used explicitly for growth control region, distance from the central business district has little or lead to significantly lower urban densities for regions on the no effect on the value of residential property; instead, it is the whole than others, such as adequate-public-facilities require- surrounding urban subcenters that account for the location- ments. In addition, the analysis reveals that farm productivity is specific price effects once attributed to a single, centralized a significant determinant of whether cities sprawl or not. The downtown area (Heikkila et al. 1989; Richardson et al. 1990). relative worth of resource lands affects urban growth because The presence of multidirectional land value gradients high productivity translates into a competitive market value, underscores the importance of accounting for differentiated offsetting development pressures in outlying areas (Pendall land markets when evaluating the impact of land use regula- 1999). This issue is important because, even in the absence of tions. They represent direct evidence of the locational free- political fragmentation, growth management must contend dom that households and firms enjoy in contemporary metro- with the differences between urban and resource land politan areas. And because political fragmentation contributes markets. to the segmentation of land markets, it is reasonable to expect In Oregon, where urban growth boundaries separate that the cumulative effect of land use regulation has had a urban and rural land, analyses have focused on evaluating major impact on the spatial structure of metropolitan regions. growth management’s ability to restrain urban sprawl and pre- This principle is illustrated by way of research dealing with serve outlying resource areas. Knaap and Nelson (1992) docu- locally implemented growth controls in California. In particu- ment that regional UGBs promote cohesiveness through the lar, case studies (Landis 1986, 1992) show that growth control political processes necessary to establish them. Even so, in Ore- policies affect population growth and housing prices inconsis- gon, UGBs alone have a limited ability to manage growth; tently. Landis (1992) attributes this unevenness to the relative while most urban development remains inside of the bound- openness of the regional land market—the availability of loca- aries, overall densities are much lower than planned, and tions subject to different combinations of land use regulations. development often exhibits patterns characteristic of sprawl Growth controls are most likely to raise the cost of housing— (Knaap and Nelson 1992; Weitz and Moore 1998). Using a and displace potential residents—when they act as barriers to probit model to simulate land market processes, Kline and Alig entry for outside developers. This situation creates a monopo- (1999) confirm that lands located within UGBs and subject to listic market that allows local developers to maximize their state-approved land use plans are more likely to be developed profits by raising prices; growth control communities will grow than those that are not. They find some evidence that develop- slowly, while residents unable to afford entry costs will be dis- ment has “leaked” out of the UGB but remain optimistic about placed to their non-growth-control counterparts. its ability to restrain sprawl. In short, all three of the Oregon These spatial consequences are revealed more explicitly analyses agree that urban growth boundaries are a worthwhile through an analysis that accounts for the cumulative effects of regulatory practice, with the caution that other techniques local growth controls in the San Francisco Bay region. Using an may be required to achieve desired objectives. econometric model that controls for employment, residential Collectively, the evaluations reviewed here provide strong density, and development potential, Shen (1996) estimates evidence in favor of centralized regulatory frameworks. A that locally implemented policies displaced approximately decentralized approach to growth management creates spa- 150,000 people, or 20 percent of the region’s total population tially segmented land markets and promotes urban sprawl. growth, during the 1980-90 time period. In other words, com- Although location-specific amenities, proximity to employ- munities employing slow-growth policies—especially rate of ment centers, housing quality, and other factors will always growth programs and development permitting caps—success- conspire to differentiate land markets (Feitelson 1993), a fully limited their population growth, shifting likely increases more uniform regulatory landscape limits the role that the to jurisdictions located elsewhere in the region. Based in public sector plays in the process. In short, if maintaining a NIMBYism (not in my backyard), this decentralized system of compact urban form is a goal, growth management efforts Regulatory Growth Management Programs 399

should seek to promote political cohesiveness and regulatory Second, development impact fees, or adequate-public- consistency across metropolitan regions. facilities requirements, are one of the most common growth management techniques (Kelly 1993; Nelson et al. 1995; Por- ter 1997). Acknowledging the costs of growth, these regula- The Economics of Public Services tions shift some or all of the expense of new infrastructure to the private sector. In a study of twenty-nine communities At the heart of the debate over growth management lies the located in DuPage County, Illinois, Skidmore and Peddle question of whether or not land use regulation produces a net (1998) report that during a sixteen-year time period, develop- benefit for the public at large. If not, some argue, growth man- ment impact fees reduced the rate of growth by more than 25 agement unnecessarily interferes with processes better left to percent. The analysis concludes that impact fees are likely to the land market (Richardson and Gordon 1993). On the other increase urban densities by forcing builders to more carefully hand, if the social and economic benefits that policies promise consider the costs of dispersed growth (Skidmore and Peddle are realized, regulation of the land market is justified (Lee 1998). Pendall (1999) advances additional evidence of this, 1981). The tension between these two perspectives is long- finding that development impact fees lead to greater densities standing, and there is a clear need to weigh costs and benefits in metropolitan areas where they are implemented. Still, the of policies when evaluating growth management programs overall impact depends on consistency; impact fees have a lim- (see, e.g., Ewing 1997; Gordon and Richardson 1997). But the ited effect on urban sprawl in regions where few communities relationship between land market processes and government employ them compared with regions where many do (Pendall regulation is complex, and it is nearly impossible for a single 1999). analysis to account for all of the relevant costs and benefits Finally, even if high densities are achieved—through (Fischel 1990). impact fees or otherwise—the relationship between compact As a result, many evaluations focus on more narrow ques- development and public expenditures remains unclear. On tions relating to the connections between urban form and gov- one hand, support for high densities is found in evidence that ernment expenditures on public services. This approach is rea- development is significantly more expensive to accommodate sonable because it remains practical while at the same time at suburban densities (Frank 1989) and that public indebted- responding to important questions regarding the benefits of ness is positively correlated with urban sprawl (Pendall 1999). growth management. In particular, research dealing with the This suggests that growth management policies may produce economics of public services focuses on how the planning of direct benefits by controlling urban sprawl and reducing gov- capital facilities affects development patterns, whether devel- ernment outlays for infrastructure and other services. On the opment impact fees are a worthwhile growth management other hand, a more moderate perspective cites evidence that mechanism, and the relationship between urban density and the aggregate price of public services bears a U-shaped rela- public-service expenditures. tionship to urban density. In particular, Ladd (1992, 1998) First, hedonic price models show that the presence of infra- shows that spending on public services at first declines as den- structure raises the value of unimproved land (Knaap 1985; sity increases but then increases sharply—the cost of services in Knaap and Nelson 1992). In Salem, Oregon, adjacent water very dense counties is estimated to exceed the minimum by up and sewer mains accounted for nearly $2,000 of the total prop- to 43 percent. These findings lend only weak support to plan- erty value at the time the research was conducted (Nelson ners’ claims that high densities are necessary for efficient pro- 1986). Increased real estate prices indicate that public services vision of public services; the U-shaped relationship implies are an important factor in shaping the location and pattern of that if densities become too high, development will place an regional development; since infrastructure is a valued asset, excessive burden on public coffers. growth is more likely to occur in the presence of existing capac- To reconcile these mixed conclusions, it is helpful to con- ity than locations requiring new facilities to be built. From the sider the difference between intermediate and final outputs standpoint of public finance, these price effects are especially (Ewing 1997). The final outputs measured by Ladd (1992, important because they reveal the redistributive effects of 1998) include services, such as police and fire protection, in capital-facilities planning. Since the property taxes of estab- addition to physical infrastructure, which is considered an lished residents pay for new infrastructure investments, the intermediate output. And since capital facilities require large resulting income transfer reinforces concerns about the equity initial investments, marginal costs are much lower than aver- of government-subsidized suburban development—especially age costs—infrastructure is often paid for before it is needed, if it is more expensive to support than comparatively compact while services are not expanded until more are required. development patterns (Orfield 1997). Moreover, because of their greater land values, high-density 400 Carruthers

areas yield greater property taxes than low-density areas, Program Implementation enabling the development to pay for the final outputs that it demands (Ewing 1997). Program Institutional In sum, capital facilities raise property values and “pave the Design: Framework:

Policy1 State way” for development. The costs of new development may be at (Regulatory Policy2 Consistency) least partially offset through impact fees, which have also been Regional found to encourage greater urban densities. Even so, the rela- Policy3 Local tionship between urban form and public spending remains Policyi Regional Land Market: unclear; ultimately; the debate hinges on how expenditures Supply are measured (Frank 1989). In any case, further investigation Constraints is needed to uncover the links between growth management + practices and the economics of public services. Demand Factors

᭤ Analytic Framework and Discussion

Property Urban Land Public + Density + Area + Services Working from the literature review, this section presents a Value conceptual model for evaluating the effectiveness of regulatory growth management programs. The model is inductive— Figure 3. Analytic framework for evaluating regulatory growth manage- its purpose is to integrate the existing body of knowledge into a ment programs. coherent framework for examining the outcome of land use Source: Carruthers (1999). regulation. The relationships that it identifies flow directly from the planning literature and point to several principles that may be used to guide future research. The effects of growth management can be observed through the price effects created by land use regulations, the spatial structure of metropolitan areas, and expenditures on Conceptual Model public services. First, price effects emerge as land use policies become capitalized into land and housing values—either by Three interconnected factors weigh on the effectiveness of creating benefits or denying development opportunities. Sec- growth management programs. First, programs are composed ond, the spatial structure of metropolitan areas is observed in of individual policies that have been designed to fulfill a wide two dimensions: residential density and total urbanized land area. variety of land use objectives. Since many of these are compli- These outcomes are particularly important because they are mentary, the outcome depends on whether the particular com- direct indicators of the degree to which metropolitan areas bination of techniques employed is well suited for accomplish- sprawl. Finally, public service expenditures are tied to urban form ing desired objectives. Second, the effectiveness of growth and, by extension, the policies used to shape it. Their role in management is strongly influenced by the institutional setting the process of shaping regional development is not well under- in which policies are implemented. Political fragmentation stood and merits careful investigation. Collectively, these out- undermines programs’ ability to produce their intended outcome measures speak to the fundamental rationale behind comes but, as described in the section on extralocal growth land use regulation and represent worthwhile markers for eval- management, state and regional planning frameworks can uating the effectiveness of growth management programs. help to improve this by fostering intergovernmental communi- The conceptual model is presented formally in Figure 3. cation and consistency among local land use plans. Finally, the The figure illustrates that the relationship between program effects of program design and institutional structure converge implementation and land use outcomes is straightforward. through the mediating influences of regional land markets. Land First, growth management programs are defined by a set of markets are the keystone of the process because they represent policies and an institutional framework, characterized by the the medium through which the locational decisions of produc- relationship between state, regional, and local land use author- ers (land developers) and consumers (households) shape met- ities. Together, these two elements represent program imple- ropolitan spatial structure. Together with demand factors, the mentation, but they act as separate inputs into the regional supply constraints imposed by land use regulations are a major land market. The distinction is important because the same force in determining the outcome of regional development. combination of policies is likely to produce different results Regulatory Growth Management Programs 401

under an alternative institutional arrangement, that is, to produce misleading results; case studies may misattribute depending on whether state and regional authorities play a the effects of policies, and econometric analyses will almost role in shaping local land use planning activities. Second, land certainly suffer from an omitted variable bias. For this reason, developers and households respond via the regional land mar- analysts seeking to develop and test hypotheses regarding the ket, which is shaped by supply and demand factors. From the impact of growth management should carefully consider the standpoint of planning, this stage represents a large “black set of relationships that influences program success. A more box,” because there is little concrete evidence of how growth holistic approach will add to theories’ explanatory power; pro- management programs interact with land markets to produce duce more realistic results; and, ideally, reach conclusions that their final effects. Nevertheless, substantive outcomes— are generalizable to other cases. observed as price effects, urban density, urbanized land area, Principle 2: Focus on a consistent set of interdependent outcome and public service expenditures—ensue. Finally, through pro- measures. The lack of an agreed-upon set of outcome measures gram evaluation, these outcomes inform future planning pro- is a significant drag on the planning discipline’s understand- cesses as policy makers respond in an ongoing effort to guide ing of growth management (Godschalk and Brower 1989; regional development processes. Blanco 1998). But this problem may not be as severe as it Each individual element of the conceptual model charac- seems; in one way or another, each of the analyses reviewed in terizes either the structure or outcome of a growth manage- the section dealing with evidence of policies’ effectiveness cen- ment program. But none of these should stand alone as an ters on land use policies’ price effects, spatial impacts, and/or indicator of program quality or performance; instead, the relationship to the economics of public services. The concep- framework represents a basis for examining the place-to-place tual model (Figure 3) extends this finding, suggesting that resi- differences that arise from local, regional, and state growth dential property values, residential density, urbanized land management efforts. The question it poses, therefore, is area, and public service expenditures represent reasonable whether outcomes vary along with policies, institutional structure, proxies for the three types of outcomes. These measures flow and land market characteristics. directly from the rationale underpinning land use planning and are well suited for both qualitative and quantitative research. By employing a more consistent set of outcome mea- Principles for Future Research sures, analyses will produce results that are easier to compare to the findings of others. The analytic framework points to several principles that But like the factors influencing them, residential property may be used to inform future research evaluating the effective- values, residential density, urbanized land area, and public ser- ness of growth management programs. The common theme vice expenditures should not be examined in isolation. In among them is that there is a need for a more unified research applied settings, planners recognize the connections between strategy built on systematic analyses that produce the four and often regulate one in an effort to influence the generalizable results. others (see Figure 2). Moreover, accounting for multiple out- Principle 1: Account for the appropriate combination of interven- comes provides a mechanism for examining the effects of alter- ing variables during theory and hypothesis development. The main native growth management policies and regulatory frame- premise of the analytic framework is that the outcome of works within the larger context of planners’ motivations. In growth management is shaped by several interconnected fac- other words, it is a way of examining the effectiveness of growth tors including the combination of policies employed, the insti- management while accounting for each of several factors that tutional framework through which they are implemented, and planning is meant to affect. Ultimately, this is more realistic the mediating influences of regional land markets. Most evalu- than drawing conclusions based on one particular outcome of ations account for at least one of these elements but rarely deal land use regulation such as urban density. If these relation- with all three at once. For example, analyses often focus on the ships—which may vary from place to place—exist and they relationship between policies and land markets while neglect- remain unrecognized, analyses are likely to suffer from an ing the relevant institutional setting. But research examining omitted and/or endogenous variable bias. the role of government institutions shows that they have a sig- Principle 3: Account for the determinants of metropolitan growth. nificant impact on the type of policies that get implemented The conceptual model indicates that little is known about how and the consistency of regulation across metropolitan growth management programs interact with regional land regions—this relationship is indicated by the line marked Reg- markets to produce their final effects. Like all markets, the ulatory Consistency in Figure 3 (Lewis 1996; Burby and May land market is shaped by supply and demand factors, but 1997). Analyses that fail to control for this influence are likely research suggests that the latter—including population and 402 Carruthers

income growth—is likely to be more important for shaping met- the practice of growth management. Many readers may point ropolitan housing prices (Potepan 1996). One way of captur- out that the conceptual model (Figure 3) and the variables it ing the effects of demand is to account for the determinants of suggests are gross simplifications of something as complex as metropolitan population and/or employment growth. But growth management; the author wholeheartedly agrees. there are at least two relevant issues here. First, a recent body of Planning is a normative discipline, responsible for developing research focuses on determining whether employment growth policies that shape metropolitan areas into what they “ought to follows population growth or the other way around (Carlino be,” and many land use regulations have evolved because they and Mills 1987; Bornet 1994; Clark and Murphy 1996; Mulli- represent the most practical way of achieving desired out- gan, Vias, and Glavac 1999). The relationship may also be comes. Urban growth boundaries are a good example. Recog- bidirectional; in truth, it probably differs between metropoli- nizing the relationships between the supply of developable tan areas. Second, industrial mix has a significant impact on land, urban form, and public service expenditures, growth metropolitan areas’ population and income growth (Glaeser, boundaries represent a theoretically sound method of manag- Scheinkman, and Shleifer 1995; Drennan 1999). In particular, ing development (Ding, Knaap, and Hopkins 1999). Even so, a large concentration of manufacturing industries slows in the absence of empirical analysis, there is very little evidence growth, while a specialization in high-tech industries provides that these relationships consistently hold true. The purpose of a boost. Both issues are important because they speak to the the conceptual model, therefore, is to simplify “real-world” underlying causes of growth and, by extension, the characteris- processes in a way that enables empirical analyses to respond tics of demand for residential development (DiPasquali and directly to the objectives of land use and growth management Wheaton 1996). It is important to account for these factors to policies. Only after rigorous testing should the implied rela- disentangle the effects of growth management and growth. This is tionships be used to guide actual planning processes. especially true if price effects, urban spatial structure, and public service expenditures continue to be used as markers because they are directly linked to the characteristics of ᭤ Summary and Conclusion demand. Principle 4: Recognize the complex set of factors that lead to the Working from a review of recent empirical research, this implementation of growth management policies. One shortcoming article developed an analytic framework for evaluating the of the conceptual model is that it does not explicitly address effectiveness of regulatory growth management programs. the underlying motivations that determine the presence of First, the literature review revealed that, despite the disembod- growth management policies. As outlined above, land use reg- ied structure of scholarly research on the topic, evaluations of ulations are expected to raise property values by protecting growth management have followed a relatively straightforward against negative externalities and incompatible land uses. path. Empirical research shows that the organization of gov- However, the relationship may not always be so straightfor- ernment institutions affects the consistency of land use regula- ward; in particular, research suggests that local growth control tion across metropolitan areas and that the impact of land use policies are often adopted for exclusionary purposes (Deakin policies is revealed through their price effects, spatial impacts, 1989; Fischel 1990). If this is the case, it is likely that land use and relationship to the economics of public services. Second, regulations “follow the market,” leading to an “endogenous these findings were used to develop an inductive conceptual zoning effect,” where policies have little effect on real estate model establishing relationships between program implemen- prices because they work to maintain—rather than raise— tation, land market processes, and four measurable land use property values (Pogodzinski and Sass 1991, 1994). Moreover, outcomes—property values, urban density, urbanized land because policies are often complementary, the presence of area, and public service expenditures. Finally, the analytic one may be tied to the presence of another. Ultimately, framework was used to derive several principles for future eval- whether or not the endogeneity of land use regulation extends uations of growth management programs. These principles to state and regional planning initiatives remains unclear. The suggest that research should seek to adopt an integrated issue is raised here to point out the need for research aimed at approach to theory and hypothesis development, draw on a uncovering the range of factors that lead to the implementa- consistent set of outcome measures, account for the determi- tion of growth management programs and the relationships nants of metropolitan growth, and recognize the complex set between complementary land use policies. of factors that lead to the adoption of growth management Principle 5: Acknowledge the limitations of conceptual models in policies. the absence of empirical analysis. The final principle hinges on More than ten years have passed since the so-called second how the analytic framework is interpreted and used to inform wave of land use regulation initiated widespread expansion of Regulatory Growth Management Programs 403

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