BRAINWASHING Edgar H. Schein C/6O-16

BRAINWASHING Edgar H. Schein c/6o-16 BRAINWASHING Edgar H. Schein Center for International Studies Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, Massachusetts 3 CE6/6es e / 6 0. BRAINWASHING Edgar H. Schein Brainwashing is a colloquial term which has been used in reference to the systematic efforts of the Chinese Communists (and by implication the Soviets) to persuade non-believers to accept Communist allegiance, commands, and/or doc- trine by coercive means. More generally, the term has been applied to any technique designed to manipulate human thought or action against the desire, will, or knowledge of the individual. The word brainwashing derives from the Chinese phrase Hsi Nao (Hunter, 1951) and is most appropriately used in reference to Chinese Communist "thought reform" or "ideological remolding" (Szu Hsing Kao Tsao), a program of political indoctrination based on the conception that people who have not been educated in a Communist society have, by definition, incorrect bourgeois attitudes and beliefs, and must therefore be re- educated before they can take their place in a Communist society (Lifton, 1956). Interest in brainwashing on the part of Western observers and scientists derives from the seemingly successful attempts by the Sovit and Chinese Communist secret police and army to convert Western military and civilian prisoners. Of equal interest, however, has been the seeming success of the Soviet secret police in getting confessions from former high officials of the Communist party as in the purge trials of the 1930's (Leites & Bernaut, 1954); and of the Chinese Com- munists in indoctrinating their entire population in the remarkably short time of 3 to 5 years. Because of the close connections between Chinese and Soviet Communism and because of the importance which Soviet psychology seems to attach to the works * Much of the material in this review is from a forthcoming publication, Coercive Persuasion (Schein, 1961). I wish to thank Inge Schneier and Curtis Barker who were my collaborators in preparing that volume and who therefore contributed importantly to this paper. This material was prepared for the 1961 World Affairs Yearbook and will appear there in slightly condensed form. 2. of Pavlov, the assumption has frequently been made that brainwashing is a highly refined adaptation of Pavlovian psychology. From this assumption and the image of scientific mental destruction which it stimulates has come the conception that brainwashing is a highly dangerous and possibly irresistible weapon against the mind of man. Studies of Chinese Communist and Soviet methods of confession extraction and indoctrination have shown that they do have some common roots in the secret police methods of the pre-Communist autocracies in both countries and that both are heavily influenced by basic principles of Party organization, but also that they diverge in important respects from each other, and that the common connections to Pavlovian psychology are very doubtful (Kinkle & Wolff, 1956; Lifton, 1956; Bauer, 1957; Schein, 1959). Where the Soviets have put emphasis on confession extraction to justify public trials prior to eliminating the victim, the Chinese have from the beginning emphasized the role of confession extraction as only one step in the rehabilitation and reform of the prisoner; where the Soviets have traditionally isolated the prisoner and undermined his resistance by depriving him of any social contact, the crux of the Chinese approach has been to immerse the prisoner in a small group of other prisoners who are as or more advanced in their reform than he; where Soviet methods have suggested scientific and Machiavellian approaches to interrogation and confession extraction, the Chinese methods have suggested the image of a zealous enthusiastic mass movement sweeping converts into its ranks by virtue of its intrinsic * There is some evidence that Pavlov was especially revered during Stalin's later years because of Stalin's personal desires to advance Pavlovian psychology, but that following Stalin's death there has been a steady decline of interest in Pavlov among Soviet psychologists. However, they often find it expedient to translate work which has only remote connections to Pavlovian psychology into Pavlovian terminology or to preface their work with praise of Pavlov, thus giving the impression of a steady monolithic growth of Pavlovianism (Tucker, 1956; Mintz, 1958). 3. message and reliance on practical knowledge of interpersonal manipulation. Because the Chinese methods, best described by the label "coercive persuasion," are relatively less known and because the term "brainwashing" applies most appropriately to them, the remainder of this paper will concern itself with reviewing some of the salient findings about Chinese handling of captive groups -- the history of their methods, the actual methods employed, the kinds of target groups involved, the degree of success of the effort, and some attempt to explain theoretically why some Westerners were influenced. The Persuasion Theme in the Development of the Chinese Communist Party It is the attempt to reform its enemies and prisoners -- to cure the disease and save the man -- which distinguishes the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from other Communist parties. This emphasis on persuasion, rehabilitation, and reform can be related to a number of features in CCP history. Mao's Peasant Base of Support. Because of the absence of a powerful urban proletariat, Mao, as early as 1925, began to organize a revolution based on peasant support. Although a revolution based on peasant origins had been con- sidered by Lenin, it was a major premise of Marxist ideology that proper class consciousness could only be found in the urban proletariat; peasant origins should lead to the antithesis of the desired Communist attitude because of assumed conservatism deriving from the close ties of the peasant to the land. In organizing peasants, therefore, Mao was led to a "total inversion of certain Marxist pre-suppositions. Instead of deducing ideological tendencies from class affiliations, they (the CCP leadership) decided to deduce class affiliations from ideological tendencies." (Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, 1952). If, through the use of specific ideological appeals such as the fanning of the grievances of the peasant toward his landlords, one could persuade the peasant to the acceptance of Communist premises, the peasant would by definition become a Communist regard- less of actual social origins. Mao's success in organizing peasants proved the correctness of the assumption that Communist premises could be learned, an assumption which was of course strongly supported by the experiences of the leaders themselves, most of whom did not qualify by social origin as members of the proletariat (Mao's own origin was on a farm in the province of Hunan). The assumption that even persons with incorrect social origins could learn the Communist ideology, and, on the other hand, that even persons with correct social origins could unlearn what presumably their class status had bestowed upon them, is, of course, at the heart of the Chinest Communist preoccupation with re-education and reform. Replenishing Manpower During the Civil War. The recruitment of converts from initiall y hostile groups was necessary for the CCP's survival and to this end the CCP developed increasingly effective means of coercive persuasion. From Kuomintang (KMT) defectors, prisoners of war, and uneducated rural or urban youth the CCP was able to build up an effectively indoctrinated Red Army and party organization. By treating prisoners lenie tly and emphasizing to them that leniency would continue so long as they were willing to re-educate themselves, the CCP was able to obtain many genuine converts to Communism. The CCP would emphasize that the prisoner was only misguided and that his bourgeois background would not be held against him if he was prepared to confess, accept the "truth" about his criminal past, and learn the truth about the ultimate path to peace and prosperity through Communism. The Exigencies of_ Guerrilla Warfare. The blockade strategy of the KlAT in the early 1930's and of the Japanese in the 1940's forced the Red Army to become primarily a guerrilla operation using hit-and-run tactics. The very nature of 5. these operations required extensive decentralization of administration authority, a wide scattering of forces, and total dependence for basic supplies of food on the local peasantry. "If the masses in any area disliked Communist policy enough to stop giving active support to the local Communist army, that army would be defeated." (Lindsay, 1950, p. 25). To insure active support, the Communists had to rely on persuasion and on constant adaptation of Marxist-Leninist ideology to the local situation. Because of extensive decentralization, even the rank-and-file had to have an adequate working knowledge of Communism and had to learn how to persuade others to it. The growing number of "experts" in the arts of persuasion, of course, proved to be crucial after the take-over when mass indoctrination of the Chinest population became possible. Education in "Liberated" Areas and Coalition Government. The CCP found itself in control of areas of China early in its history, providing the opportunity for the initiation of programs of literacy training and "cultural" education. Such programs made possible effective political tutelage through devices such as teach- ing initially those characters which would make possible the reading of Communist slogans, fanning areas of discontent with the old system, introducing into education the rudiments of Communist ideology, and so on. Such efforts were partly designed to insure Communist victories at the polls if control by force had to be relinquished. In order to aid the defeat of the Japanese and to build the strength of the CCP, Mao chose to enter into a coalition government with the KMT and to adopt a "united front" strategy. Having committed himself to sharing control with other parties, he could not rely on coercion to insure that his party would remain in control.

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