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„Nowego Jedwabnego Szlaku”. Retoryka a Rzeczywistość

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„Nowego Jedwabnego Szlaku”. Retoryka a Rzeczywistość Chiński projekt „Nowego Jedwabnego Szlaku”. Retoryka a rzeczywistość Raport Ośrodka Badań Azji Centrum Badań nad Bezpieczeństwem Akademii Sztuki Wojennej sierpień 2017 Autorzy: Alicja Bachulska, Marek Borys, Jan Gaspers, Krzysztof Iwanek, Przemysław Lesiński, Michał Lubina, Dragan Pavlićević, Łukasz Sarek, Siegfried O. Wolf, Chris Zambelis Redakcja: Krzysztof Iwanek, Oskar Pietrewicz Ośrodek Badań Azji Centrum Badań nad Bezpieczeństwem Akademia Sztuki Wojennej al. gen. A. Chruściela „Montera” 103 00-910 Warszawa Tel.: 261-814-484 E-mail: [email protected] Twitter: @osrodekazji Wszelkie opinie i uwagi na temat publikacji proszę przesyłać na ww. adres e-mail. Spis treści Podsumowanie raportu ............................................................................................................................. 5 Podsumowania tekstów ......................................................................................................................... 19 Rosja Michał Lubina ................................................................................................................................................. 31 Kazachstan Łukasz Sarek ................................................................................................................................................... 37 Uzbekistan Łukasz Sarek ................................................................................................................................................... 69 Kirgistan, Tadżykistan, Turkmenistan Marek Borys .................................................................................................................................................... 91 Białoruś Łukasz Sarek .................................................................................................................................................115 Bałkany Dragan Pavlićević ........................................................................................................................................137 Węgry i Czechy Krzysztof Iwanek .........................................................................................................................................147 Polska Alicja Bachulska ...........................................................................................................................................165 Niemcy Jan Gaspers ....................................................................................................................................................181 Afganistan Przemysław Lesiński ..................................................................................................................................189 Pakistan Siegfried O. Wolf...........................................................................................................................................197 Bliski Wschód Chris Zambelis ..............................................................................................................................................203 Iran . ..........................................................................................................................................................................211 | 3 Podsumowanie raportu Cele raportu. Niniejszy raport omawia gospodarcze i polityczne aspekty chińskiej inicjatywy „Nowego Jedwabnego Szlaku” (NJS) względem wybranych państw Europy i Azji. Chociaż ogłoszona w 2013 r. inicjatywa NJS zdobyła w ciągu ostatnich lat ogromną popularność, w jej opisach przeważa warstwa deklaratywna, brak konkretów, skłonność zaliczania do niej niemal wszystkich zagranicznych projektów chińskich i bezkrytyczne powtarzanie retoryki narosłej wokół tego projektu. Raport nie analizuje dość mglistej całości projektu ani nie omawia wszystkich wspominanych w nim państw i wszelkich aspektów ich stosunków z Chińską Republiką Ludową. Ze względu na geograficzną i gospodarczą pozycję Polski pominięto kwestie handlu morskiego i takie regiony jak Azja Południowo-Wschodnia. Wybrano przede wszystkim te państwa, które leżą w geograficznym pasie między Chinami a Polską i jej sąsiedztwem. Są to: Rosja, pięć państw Azji Centralnej, Białoruś, państwa bałkańskie, państwa Grupy Wyszehradzkiej i Niemcy. Do raportu dołączono również teksty o Afganistanie, Pakistanie, Iranie i szerzej: Bliskim Wschodzie. Dzięki temu uzyskano bogatszy materiał porównawczy oraz rozpatrzono działania chińskie w kierunku Bliskiego Wschodu i Azji Południowej. W raporcie próbowano ustalić, czy w stosunkach gospodarczych danego państwa z Chinami warstwa oficjalna i retoryczna (w tym retoryka chińska) przystaje do rzeczywistego stanu stosunków gospodarczych, a także czy w danym państwie istnieje obecnie korzystny klimat polityczny do współpracy z Chinami. Wzięto pod uwagę z jednej strony oficjalne deklaracje stron i podpisane umowy, a z drugiej dane gospodarcze. Starano się zdefiniować interesy stron i zasygnalizować możliwy kształt współpracy tych państw z Chinami w najbliższej przyszłości. Nie analizowano innych aspektów relacji takich jak kultura, nauka czy bezpieczeństwo, chociaż w niektórych tekstach ten ostatni aspekt został zaznaczony. Przyjęte w raporcie rozumienie „Nowego Jedwabnego Szlaku”. W tekstach posługujemy się skrótem NJS na oznaczenie pojęcia „Nowy Jedwabny Szlak” (New Silk Road; 新丝绸之路, xin sichou zhi lu). Jest to obecnie termin nieformalny. W chińskiej dyplomacji w ostatnich latach używano zwrotu „Jeden Pas, Jedna Droga” (One Belt, One Road; 一带一路, yi dai yi lu), z czego „Jeden Pas” miał opisywać nowe szlaki lądowe, zaś „Jedna Droga” nowe trasy morskie1. Stopniowo jednak w języku angielskim formalnym terminem stała się „Belt and Road Initative”, czyli „Inicjatywa Pasa i Szlaku” (po chińsku nosi jednak tę samą nazwę co wcześniej:一带一路, yi dai yi lu ). Ostatni zorganizowany przez Pekin szczyt (maj 2017) nosił nazwę Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation. Będąc świadomymi formalnych określeń, uważamy jednak, że w polskim obiegu publicystycznym najszerzej przyjął się zwrot „Nowy Jedwabny Szlak” i tego pojęcia będziemy używać. Podsumowanie raportu | 5 Raport Ośrodka Badań Azji | sierpień 2017 Tak w Polsce, jak i wielu innych państwach NJS jest wyobrażany przede wszystkim jako projekt budowy nowej infrastruktury, szczególnie logistycznej2. Niezliczone publikacje na temat NJS oferują wizje tworzenia nowych połączeń kolejowych, zakładania nowych centrów logistycznych, rozbudowy portów itp. Bardzo potoczna wizja NJS zakłada, że dzięki tym połączeniom będzie kwitnąć handel z Chinami, a nowa infrastruktura, po części zbudowana i po części sfinansowana przez chińskie podmioty, służyć będzie wielu krajom. Jednakże w naszym rozumieniu na poziomie gospodarczym projekt NJS jest przede wszystkim budową nowego ładu gospodarczego opartego na sieci łańcuchów wartości, które są tworzone przez Chiny lub zgodne z interesami Chin. Budowa tudzież rozbudowa infrastruktury może stanowić jeden z istotnych elementów tej sieci, ale nie jest to jedyny jej aspekt. Budowa tych łańcuchów wartości odbywa się m.in. poprzez sytuowanie zakładów produkcyjnych na nowych obszarach m.in. po to, aby omijać zewnętrzne obostrzenia (np. unijne), produkować na potrzeby chińskiego rynku lub nowych rynków. Projekty chińskie nie zawsze przebiegają według spójnych geograficznie tras, ale kierują się logiką gospodarczą. W najbardziej stereotypowej wizji (wielkich, tworzących jedną całość połączeń infrastrukturalnych) NJS powstaje w dużo mniejszym stopniu niż wskazywałaby na to retoryka i w sposób znacznie mniej spójny geograficznie niż wskazywałyby na to rozpowszechniane mapy. Nie powstaje np. nowe połączenie kolejowe przez Rosję do Europy, choć chińskie firmy korzystają z już istniejącej infrastruktury. Powstawanie infrastruktury w skali dorównującej retoryce zauważyć można jedynie w Pakistanie; być może do tej kategorii można również zaliczyć Birmę. Te dwa państwa mają jednak kluczowe znaczenie geostrategiczne dla Pekinu. Niewykluczone, że chińska działalność w tych państwach osiągnęłaby ten sam pułap i bez idei NJS. Podobne wnioski można wysnuć względem chińskiej działalności w Azji Centralnej. Chińskie firmy i fundusze przyczyniają się do budowy szeregu projektów infrastrukturalnych na świecie, ale te nowe inicjatywy nie tworzą spójnego łańcucha połączeń3. Rozpowszechniona, „infrastrukturalna” wizja NJS jest bardzo przydatna retorycznie. Orędownicy idei NJS przedstawiają różnym państwom alternatywę wziętą niemalże ze średniowiecznych wyobrażeń o szlakach handlowych. Według nich można albo być częścią Nowego Jedwabnego Szlaku, albo nie. Ten drugi wybór ma grozić gospodarczą marginalizacją. Taka alternatywa jest fałszywa jeśli zauważy się, że NJS nie jest tożsamy z wielkim pasmem połączeń. W związku z tym należy raczej zastanowić się, jak skorzystać z rozmaitych projektów gospodarczych, które pod parasolem NJS oferuje Pekin, a także czy są one realne i korzystne. Istniejące połączenia kolejowe między Europą i Chinami nie są także tak dochodowe jak to się często przedstawia. Szczególnie dla Polski ich obecne znaczenie gospodarcze jest bardzo ograniczone. Rozbudowa transportu kolejowego jest także znacznie droższa niż utrzymanie obecnego transportu morskiego między Chinami a Europą, który na dodatek nie jest dużo wolniejszy od lądowego. Na przykład transport morski z Shenzhen do 6 | Hamburga obectnie trwa ok. 30 dni, zaś transport kolejowy kilkanaście dni. Niewiele jest produktów, dla których taka różnica byłaby istotna. O ile budowa nowej linii kolejowej jest bardzo kosztowna, o tyle
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