Gagliardone, I and Golooba-Mutebi, F 2016 The Evolution of the Internet in Ethiopia and Rwanda: Towards a “Developmental” Model? Stability: stability International Journal of Security & Development, 5(1): 8, pp. 1–24, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.344

RESEARCH ARTICLE The Evolution of the Internet in Ethiopia and Rwanda: Towards a “Developmental” Model? Iginio Gagliardone* and Frederick Golooba-Mutebi†

The Internet in Africa has become an increasingly contested space, where com- peting ideas of development and society battle for hegemony. By comparing the evolution of the Internet in Ethiopia and Rwanda, we question whether policies and projects emerging from two of Africa’s fastest growing, but also most tightly controlled countries, can be understood as part of a relatively cohesive model of the ‘developmental’ Internet, which challenges mainstream conceptions. Our answer is a qualified yes. Ethiopia and Rwanda have shared an overarching strategy which places the state as the prime mover in the development of Internet policy and large-scale ICT projects. Rwanda, however, appears to have developed a more open model which can accommodate a greater variety of actors and opinions, and incorporate them within a relatively coherent vision that emanates from the centre. Ethiopia, in contrast, has developed a more closed model, where all powers rest firmly in the hands of a government that has refused (so far) to entertain and engage with alternative ideas of the Internet. In the case of Rwanda, we argue, this approach reflects broader strategies adopted by the government in the economic domain but appears to counter the prevailing political approach of the government, allowing for a greater degree of freedom on the Internet as compared to traditional media. While in the case of Ethiopia, the opposite is true; Ethio- pia’s Internet policies appear to run counter to prevailing economic policies but fit tightly with the government’s approach to politics and governance.

Ethiopia and Rwanda are often paired in a love-hate relationship with donor countries, debates about development and democra- receiving substantial amounts of aid while tization in Africa. Both countries emerged advocating distinctive ideas of development from violent civil wars led by ideologically that partially challenge mainstream poli- driven guerrilla groups; they have developed cies; they have achieved sustained economic

† Honorary Fellow, School of Environment, Educa- * Lecturer in Media Studies, University of the tion and Development (SEED) and Research Witwatersrand, and Associate Research Fellow Associate, Effective States in Development in New Media and Human Rights, University of Research Consortium, University of Mancheste, Oxford, United Kingdom UK and Professor Extraordinarius, Archie Mafeje Corresponding author: Iginio Gagliardone Research Institute, University of South Africa ([email protected]) (UNISA), South Africa Art. 8, page 2 of 24 Gagliardone and Golooba-Mutebi: The Evolution of the Internet in Ethiopia and Rwanda growth in the past decade and their ruling rather than drawing inspiration directly elites have succeeded at staying in power from China? Given the greater success some through multiple electoral contests, main- African countries are enjoying, is it becoming taining a relatively high level of legitimacy. easier for some to learn from one another Despite this rich basis for comparison, how- rather than from more distant, old and new, ever, only a few studies have attempted to donors? How does this practically play out? systematically analyse their developmental trajectories (Kelsall 2013; Serneels et al 2010). Research frameworks and tools In this article, through the analysis of key To answer these questions we build upon our aspects of how the information societies own work on the political economy of devel- have evolved in Ethiopia and Rwanda, we opment in Rwanda (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi aim to contribute to this endeavour, seeing 2012) and on the relationship between com- the Internet also as a lens through which the munication technology and development in emergence of distinctive ideas of develop- Ethiopia (Gagliardone 2014b), as well as on ment and progress can be understood. Two key studies that have interrogated the nature specular questions drive our research: 1) How of developmental state projects (Evans 1995; have the – increasingly vocal – aspirations to Leftwich 1995; Mkandawire 2001). In particu- turn Ethiopia and Rwanda into developmental lar, combining Adrian Leftwich’s framework, states influenced the evolution of the Internet which identifies six dimensions that have in the two countries? 2) To what extent have come to characterize developmental states – Internet policy and state-driven Information and which are further illustrated below – with and Communications Technology (ICT) pro- the analysis of how large-scale technological jects contributed to this development? projects contribute to processes of state and The comparison between the evolution of nation building (Hecht 1998; Hughes 1987), the Internet in Ethiopia and Rwanda does not we examine to which extent the Internet has simply offer the opportunity to understand become instrumental in the realization of similarities and differences in the develop- the political projects envisioned by leaders in ment projects of the two countries. It also both countries. The two approaches build on highlights fundamental contradictions in the assumption that both development and the current development agenda. Western technological adoption in these countries donors, the US and UK in particular, for need to be understood politically, rather than example have increasingly emphasized secu- technocratically. rity, stability, and service delivery – includ- ing the use of the Internet to achieve these Developmental states goals – but they have been unable to ade- Leftwich, together with numerous other quately acknowledge and address how pur- scholars who have analysed the emergence suing this agenda may pose a challenge to and consolidation of developmental states other key principles they support, namely (see, for example, Booth 2009; Evans 1995; promoting democratic change, human rights, Kelsall 2013; Mkandawire 2001), has under- and freedom of expression. We also examine lined how whether new donors, including China and South Korea, are moving into gaps created by political factors have always shaped these contradictions, and to what ends. Also, the thrust and pace of their develop- we ask whether and how new ideas on the mental strategies through the struc- Internet travel through new agents. If China tures of the state. [Developmental is shaping information societies in Ethiopia, states] have concentrated sufficient does this make it easier for other countries, power, autonomy and capacity at the such as Rwanda, to adopt elements of the centre to shape, pursue and encour- emerging Ethiopian model of the Internet age the achievement of explicit Gagliardone and Golooba-Mutebi: The Evolution of the Internet in Ethiopia Art. 8, page 3 of 24 and Rwanda

developmental objectives, whether important to understand the relationship by establishing and promoting the between information technologies and conditions and direction of economic development because it shifts attention from growth, or by organising it directly, individual inventions to the system of rela- or a varying combination of both tions in which technology is immersed. As (Leftwich 1995: 401). we explained elsewhere (Gagliardone 2014a: 6), the concept of technopolitics In particular, Leftwich identified six major components that have come to characterise allows one to take into greater the model of developmental states: account the ways that political ideolo- gies can influence technological shap- 1. A determined developmental elite; ing and reshaping and challenges 2. Relative autonomy; the supposed neutrality of technical 3. A powerful, competent and insulated artefacts, opening to the possibil- economic bureaucracy; ity that a particular technology can 4. A weak and subordinated civil become part of a national discourse, society; and its elements can be captured by 5. The effective management of non- the “thickness” of a specific political state economic interests; and culture. 6. Repression, legitimacy and performance. This conception accounts for how policy makers often perceive technology as an Through our research of how the Internet extension of their plans and ambitions, has evolved in Ethiopia and Rwanda, we rather than as a neutral tool that responds have employed these components as guides to functional imperatives. It places greater to understand whether and to what extent emphasis on governments’ roles in shaping the Internet has become part of the devel- technology. Studies in information systems opmental project, and to compare how have challenged the liberal pluralist notion each country has performed along dif- that a government is merely one ‘actant’ ferent dimensions. We have also adapted among many. These studies have advanced Leftwich’s framework to the specific cases the idea that governments have the interest under scrutiny, combining his fourth and and ability to use policies and technologies sixth categories to better account for the to challenge other dominant groups (Brown role technology can play both in promoting 2001; Wynne 1996). This emphasis is par- and containing alternative views of the state ticularly important in developing countries emerging from civil society and opposi- where the state, while not always able to tional groups; and connecting it to similarly perform its stated functions in terms of the political readings of technological adoption delivery of public services and goods, still and adaptation. does tend to occupy a position of promi- nence among other actors involved in policy Technopolitics making and implementation in the ICT sec- The notion of technopolitics, originally devel- tor (Gagliardone 2014a). oped by Gabrielle Hecht to study the evolu- Considering these dimensions in the pro- tion of nuclear technology in post-war France cess of technological adoption and adap- (Hecht 1998) and later applied to a broad vari- tation means not only focusing on what ety of large-scale technology from biometrics technology does and the effects it produces (Donovan 2015) to ICTs (Gagliardone 2014a; or may produce in a specific context, but also Rydhagen & Trojer 2003), can be particularly investigating how technology is perceived Art. 8, page 4 of 24 Gagliardone and Golooba-Mutebi: The Evolution of the Internet in Ethiopia and Rwanda and how different actors succeed or fail in have been extended to the online sphere turning their conceptualisations into con- through the Telecom Fraud Proclamation crete assemblages. This requires mapping in 2012, has been used more often to jus- those discursive and material elements that tify measures against Ethiopian journalists are intervening in the process of technologi- and bloggers than against foreign terrorists. cal adoption, linking them and understand- While Rwanda could have employed similar ing how a specific distribution of power, both measures rationalized by the media’s role in as exercised through artefacts and as held by the genocide in 1994, it has so far done so social actors, makes certain applications pos- only to a limited extent despite indications sible while marginalising alternative uses. that the Internet and social media platforms are increasingly becoming avenues of choice Methods for communication among exiled armed Using this conceptual framework in both and unarmed opponents and their agents countries, data have been collected at three inside the country.1 Finally, at the technical levels, focusing on the key actors, discourses level the focus was twofold: first on restric- and large-scale projects. At the discursive tive and reactive measures (how are they level, semi-structured interviews were con- implemented, through technology offered ducted with national and international by which countries/companies); second actors. In Ethiopia, interviews took place with on pro-active measures (e.g. realization of officials in Ministries of Communication and large e-government projects, improvement Information Technologies, media lawyers and of service delivery through the use of ICTs). Internet activists. Interviews were also car- The project developed a typology of state- ried out with individuals working for foreign sponsored projects or projects developed by organizations that have been particularly actors other than the state but still within involved in the shaping of the local informa- the context of the vision highlighted by the tion societies. They included USAID, German respective governments to understand how Development Cooperation, the Chinese the state prioritises certain projects over oth- Embassy and Chinese companies (Huawei/ ers and why. ZTE). A similar strategy was followed for We are aware that our analysis privileges Rwanda, interviewing first officials in the top-down initiatives and powerful actors Ministry of Youth and ICT and then USAID, rather than reading Internet evolution DFID, the South Korean Embassy, South through the eyes of the end-users. In this Korean companies and Chinese companies. respect, this study does little to counterbal- At the legal level, policies related to Internet ance the prevalent tendency to focus on how development and regulation were analysed, ICT projects emanate from the centre rather focusing in particular on external influ- than understanding how they are actually ences in shaping these particular policies. appropriated by end-users in the Global The combined analyses at the discursive and South. At the same time, it has to be reck- legal levels facilitated understanding of how oned that even studies that have adopted different influences played out at different a more user-focused approach to the study times and how different narratives were used of ICTs in Ethiopia and Rwanda (Mann & to justify specific decisions, laws and policies. Nzayisenga 2015) have revealed how the For example, the government of Ethiopia has state in these countries features in most con- been skilful in ‘hijacking’ the global anti-ter- siderations about uses of technology and in rorism narrative and agenda and using it to the shape of communication, due to the per- justify measures to contain internal dissent. vasive role it has played in shaping not just The anti-terrorism proclamation that entered the politics but also the bio-politics of every- into force in 2009, and whose provisions day life (Purdeková 2011). Gagliardone and Golooba-Mutebi: The Evolution of the Internet in Ethiopia Art. 8, page 5 of 24 and Rwanda

Findings and Structured Comparison do with facing the challenges of pov- This section illustrates the main findings that erty that kills. Now I think we know emerged from our structured comparison of better. Now we believe we are too the evolution of the Internet in Ethiopia and poor not to save everything we can Rwanda, along the lines of the categorisation and invest as much of it as possible on elaborated by Leftwich (1995) to analyse the ICT. We recognize that while ICT may emergence of developmental states in Africa be a luxury for the rich, for us – the and Asia. They highlight some critical junc- poor countries – it is a vital and essen- tures, explaining why things went the way tial tool for fighting poverty.2 they did, and focus on some large-scale pro- jects, some remarkably similar, that exem- Similarly, Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame plify the approach towards the Internet in asserted that, ‘In Africa, we have missed both Ethiopia and Rwanda. the agricultural and industrial revolutions and in Rwanda we are determined to take 1. The Developmental Elite full advantage of the digital revolution. This Ethiopia and Rwanda have been increas- revolution is summed up by the fact that it ingly portrayed as significant contemporary no longer is of utmost importance where you examples of African states ruled by elites are but rather what you can do’ (Government who have been able to combine centralised of Rwanda, 2010). The commitment shown authority, long-horizon planning and neo- towards making use of the Internet, and patrimonial and clientelist practices in ways ICTs in general, to support the developmen- that facilitate long-term investment and the tal project, has taken, however, significantly use of rents for growth-generating activities different forms in Ethiopia and Rwanda. (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi 2012; Vaughan & The intimacy and linkage of bureaucratic Gebremichael 2011). It can be argued that and political components of developmental the power accumulated by the state has been states described by Leftwich as characteristic ‘invested’ in projects that could buy legiti- of developmental states, for example, have macy and a longer time-horizon for the rul- been significantly more marked in Rwanda ing elite to implement its political ambitions. than in Ethiopia. In Rwanda technocrats Over time, Internet-based projects – for have been given more room to decide how to example e-government platforms enhanc- realise the visions articulated by the top lead- ing the accountability of local leaders – have ership and have been entrusted the power begun to play an increasingly important role to implement projects without continu- in this scheme. As has been the case in other ously seeking political approval. In Ethiopia, developmental states, especially Malaysia instead, politics has largely prevailed over and South Korea (Avgerou 2003), the deci- technical expertise. In the case of some of sion of investing in ICTs as symbol of progress the large-scale projects described below, ICTs and a source of legitimacy within a context have been embraced as a tool that could where political competition is limited came ensure policies developed by the top leader- from the very top. As the late Prime Minister ship could be streamlined down to the low- of Ethiopia Meles Zenawi remarked, est levels of the administration, minimising room for interpretation and localisation. Not long ago, many of us felt that we were too poor to afford to invest Ethiopia seriously in ICT. We assumed that ICT After it seized power in 1991, the Ethiopian was a luxury that only the rich could People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front afford […] We did not believe that seri- (EPRDF) went on to develop a series of bold ous investment in ICT had anything to strategies to transform a military victory into Art. 8, page 6 of 24 Gagliardone and Golooba-Mutebi: The Evolution of the Internet in Ethiopia and Rwanda a legitimate mandate to rule over a vast and of subjects, from mathematics to civics, to diverse country. After a period of initial indif- all secondary schools in the country while ference and resistance, the Internet, together also offering political education to school with other ICTs, became an important build- teachers and other government officials ing block of the government’s complex (Gagliardone 2014a). strategy. A turning point in the Ethiopian In its first rollout, Woredanet was intended government’s determination to use the to link the central government with the Internet as part of its state and nation build- eleven regional and 550 district administra- ing strategies can be traced to 2001, when tions so that through a 42-inch plasma TV Prime Minister Meles Zenawi emerged victo- screen installed in the Bureau of Capacity rious from the split within his party that fol- Building at the regional and woreda level, lowed the two-year long war with Eritrea. The local officials could receive training and measures that were taken in the aftermath instructions from the Prime Minister him- of this political battle included ambitious self, as well as from other ministers, high projects to reinforce the state. The institu- level civil servants and trainers in the capital. tional connections between the centre and In the case of Schoolnet, 16,686 plasma TV the peripheries were strengthened and the screens were initially deployed to allow 775 state was reformed to function as a more secondary schools in the country to receive active player in social and economic renewal. broadcasted lessons, from mathematics to The Internet came to play a central role in civic education. In the most remote areas this strategy of transformation and capacity of Ethiopia, which were without electric- building (Gagliardone 2009). ity and were not served by the main roads, This was the period when some of the petrol generators were installed and the mili- most ambitious projects in the history tary was employed to airlift in some of the of e-government in Africa started to take equipment. shape, as an instantiation of the core prin- At a practical level, Woredanet was ciples that guided state renewal. Known as intended to build the capacity of the periph- Woredanet and Schoolnet, these projects eral nodes of the state by training and constituted an unprecedented endeavour for instructing individuals, some of whom had an African government to sustain a process little formal education, to enable them to of state and nation building through ICTs. provide better services. This was to benefit Woredanet in particular offered a powerful the whole community but at the same time example of how investments in technology it symbolised the commitment of the gov- could be motivated by the need to signal ernment to the rural population. Conveying to the population the commitment of the a unified message was intended to bond the central state to improve service delivery and entire country around similar principles, improve the responsiveness of its bureau- despite its diversity. Through Woredanet, cracy. Woredanet stands for ‘network of dis- the EPRDF leaders at the centre could reach trict (woreda) administrations’ and employs the grassroots in a mediated way, by turn- the same protocol that the Internet is based ing the members of the state apparatus in upon, but rather than allowing individuals to the peripheries into messengers of ideas and independently seek information and express policies formulated in the capital. their opinion, it enables ministers and cad- Over time, the infrastructure created by res in Addis Ababa to videoconference with Woredanet also began to serve as an incen- the regional and district offices and instruct tive for developing other projects that could them on what they should be doing and rely on the existing infrastructure. TeleCourt, how. Schoolnet uses a similar architecture to for example, built on Woredanet to allow broadcast pre-recorded classes on a variety trials to take place between remote areas Gagliardone and Golooba-Mutebi: The Evolution of the Internet in Ethiopia Art. 8, page 7 of 24 and Rwanda and regional and federal courts. This new without support from traditional donors.3 mode of dispensing justice at a distance has While President Kagame has a reputation allowed the state to reduce costs and the as a ‘visionary’, there have also been many time citizens had to wait to obtain a verdict. questions about the source of his inspiration The response from those who have used the and conviction in the field of technology.4 system seems to have been largely positive Nonetheless, Rwanda’s cadre of young ICT (Beyene et al 2015). professionals seem to drive inspiration from Overall these systems offer an example him: of the commitment of the central govern- ment in proactively using ICTs and not It became a priority because he simply resisting uses that could challenge believed that it was. He played an the EPRDF political project. At the same important role in always bringing time, differently from the case of Rwanda, clarity. But he let us young people these projects developed entirely within do what had to be done. He was the the remit of the government, which refused driver in cabinet amidst scepticism to develop partnership with other actors, and lack of resources. His steadfast even with loyal figures in the bureaucracy commitment made all the difference. and the private sector, to realise its plans. He believes in the power of technol- Rather than creating a system of incentives ogy to help Rwanda advance. Without for political and bureaucratic elites to work him Rwanda would not be where it together for the realisation of a shared ideal, is. He made sure things happened. the EPRDF-led government actually used Where there were blockages, he technology to reinforce the dependency of intervened to remove them. We drew the bureaucracy from political power, offer- strength from knowing that his sup- ing greater opportunities for bureaucrats port was total. He was the fuel that to receive trainings and be updated on the kept us going.5 most recent policies, but also reducing the freedom to interpret and localise decisions Kagame’s inspirational effect on the govern- taken at the centre. ment’s technocrats did have spin-off effects, as they in turn worked to recruit Diaspora Rwanda: From the ‘Digital President’ to the Rwandan ICT professionals into the govern- Ambition of a Service-Based Economy ment: ‘I can’t pay you what they can pay Rwanda’s ambitions for developing the you. But I will give you something bigger: Internet have been driven and facilitated to the opportunity to shape the future of your a great extent by commitment at the high- country.’6 These were the words of a young est levels of the state. President Kagame, professional heading a government depart- described by some as ‘the digital president’ ment to a Diaspora Rwandan working for a (Basaninyenzi 2014) was, according to an ICT large American enterprise. It was enough to specialist formerly working with the govern- convince the would-be returnee to leave their ment, ‘already talking about the importance job in the US and move to Rwanda. More of the Internet even as we were still clearing than a decade down the road, the returnee up bodies from the street’ after the geno- reflected on their situation since moving to cide. President Kagame was not only pivotal Rwanda: ‘I wouldn’t trade being in Rwanda in envisioning the importance and role of right now, being part of this transformation, ICTs in Rwanda’s future development; he has for any job… The good thing is that in this been unrelenting in his efforts to pursue the country the leadership will do everything vision and to convince sceptics within his that needs to happen. If things get tough, we own government that it is achievable even know where we have to go.’7 Art. 8, page 8 of 24 Gagliardone and Golooba-Mutebi: The Evolution of the Internet in Ethiopia and Rwanda

The commitment of Rwanda’s elite com- interests (whether class, regional or sectoral) prising politicians, technocrats and techno- and [the ability to] override these interests logical innovators to promoting technology in the putative national interest’ (Leftwich in general and to using ICTs in their state 1995: 408) has been guaranteed by the over- building efforts has been central to the pro- whelming military victory over national and gress Rwanda has made over the last 20 years. regional opponents. In 1994, the Rwandan These state actions have sometimes served as Patriotic Front (RPF) led by Kagame estab- ends in themselves or as means to ends such lished itself as the only legitimate force as improving service delivery or strengthen- among the desolation that characterised ing their own legitimacy to govern. almost all other actors that had been either Nonetheless, even with the progress made implicated in or unable to respond to the so far, Rwanda’s efforts face stark challenges. genocide. In Ethiopia, the EPRDF could rely For one thing, popularising the Internet and on the strength it had accumulated dur- persuading 95 per cent of Rwandans to use it, ing almost two decades of civil war over one of the key ambitions entailed in the pro- the many other movements that similarly motion of 4G technology, must reckon with tried to oppose the military dictatorship the reality that digital literacy remains abys- of Mengitsu Halelmariam, but in dramati- mally low, at only five per cent of the popula- cally less successful ways. In both countries, tion. Also, despite the government’s massive political leaders made use of their posi- efforts to expand access, Internet penetration tion to initiate a series of reforms from the remains at only 22 per cent. This is largely the centre, without having to compromise too outcome of still-limited access to hardware. much with other political and social forces. Telephone penetration remains at only 67 However, the degree to which some of these per cent and handheld devices such as smart policies and strategies later translated to the phones are well beyond the capacity of most ICT sector varied significantly. Rwandans to purchase. Over 40 per cent of In Rwanda, the government extended the population live below the poverty line. strategies that had been used in other sec- Despite the relatively low numbers charting tors, mixing a direct intervention in shaping Rwanda’s information society, the Rwandan projects that were seen as instrumental in the political leadership seems to have created a process of state and nation building with the solid structure, through alliances between entrusting to private actors and civil society political and bureaucratic power, on which to organisations that it had brought into that build the next phases of the country’s infor- process with other tasks. Cases in point are mation revolution. Progress in the ICT sectors the relationship with Korea Telecom, which is taking place within a shared framework has been engaged in a credible public-private where different actors have been given the partnership for the completion of the optic opportunity to play complementary roles. As fibre network, and the entrusting of rural call the next sections illustrate, however, this has centres to civil society. In the case of Ethiopia, come at the cost of reducing opportunities on the contrary, the EPRDF seems to have for bringing innovation from outside of this been unable to extend some key principles framework, possibly limiting the likelihood that have guided its actions in the economic of more radical innovations. domain to the shaping of Internet policies and projects. The government has placed 2. Relative Autonomy of the considerable stress on the need to central- Developmental State ise state rents so that a committed leader- In Ethiopia, and to an even larger degree in ship interested in promoting development Rwanda, the ‘independence [of the state] in the long term, rather than obtaining pri- from the demanding clamour of special vate advantages in the short term, could use Gagliardone and Golooba-Mutebi: The Evolution of the Internet in Ethiopia Art. 8, page 9 of 24 and Rwanda them. This measure has been justified by the the Internet effectively. The debate initially need to prevent rent seekers from compet- benefited from the active participation of ing for positions that would allow them to representatives from NGOs and professional thrive but in ways that would exploit existing bodies, who were trying to strike a balance resources rather than produce new value. Yet between the hype coming from the West similar steps have not been taken to extend and the initial scepticism and conservatism the logic of this argument into the ICT field. shown by the EPRDF. As Dawit Bekele, one The ‘embedded autonomy’ ensuring the state of the most active advocates for an open does not have to respond to private interests, and inclusive use of ICTs, described his own but that at the same time is part of a broader involvement in BITE: process of development benefiting other economic actors, described by Evans (1989), At the time nobody knew about the has actually resulted in isolation. The state Internet. From Ethiopia we did not has commissioned its largest ICT projects to even have access to the Internet, so (largely foreign) private companies, trying to we could not have access to relevant ensure it could exercise a tight control over information for the BITE commission. them, rather than sharing the risks and prof- But we made a series of recommen- its with a growing entrepreneurial class. dations anyways. […] We had realized that the government would have not Ethiopia: State as Monopolist, Circumscribing accepted a privately owned Internet the Space for Action provider, so we proposed to have a The strategy elaborated by the EPRDF-led flexible system under ETC.9 government to shape the Internet in Ethiopia has been fairly distinctive in Africa. While ETC, the system Dawit refers to, was a pub- most countries on the continent slowly over- lic network service provider, a ‘not-for-profit came their scepticism towards liberalising service organisation with the main objective Internet provision, only to later introduce of serving the public and developing ser- regulatory or technical mechanisms to con- vices’ (Furzey 1995), independent from any tain the tensions these measures introduced, actor in particular and accessible to all. The the Ethiopian government decided from the Ethiopian government rejected the idea and very beginning to sacrifice access for con- decided instead to place service provision trol and security.8 In the 1990s, when the under its direct control.10 This was only the first initiatives to promote Internet access first of a series of frustrations the private sec- in Africa began to take shape, in Ethiopia, as tor and the civil society faced in its attempt elsewhere on the continent, there were great to import tools, regulatory norms and best expectations regarding the Internet’s poten- practices emerging at the international level. tial. Eventually, however, it was the govern- The efforts made by actors other than the ment’s concerns that prevailed in defining government to develop a more dynamic the initial and future steps that the Internet information environment were strongly would take in the country. opposed. This reaction was motivated by the The initiative launched to structure need to slow down the pace of transforma- Ethiopia’s first moves in the Internet era, aptly tion in order to exert more control over it called BITE – Bringing Internet to Ethiopia – and by the desire to occupy the new politi- is a vivid example of this approach. Initiated cal space that was created by the Internet in in 1995 by Dawit Yohannes, the speaker of ways that would primarily benefit the gov- the House of People’s Representatives, BITE ernment and its national project. was aimed at producing concrete recommen- Despite repeated efforts, none of the activ- dations on how policy makers could handle ities promoted by individuals and groups Art. 8, page 10 of 24 Gagliardone and Golooba-Mutebi: The Evolution of the Internet in Ethiopia and Rwanda outside the government had real influence even reached an agreement for the licensing in shaping the development of the Internet of private Internet Service Providers (ISPs), in Ethiopia, leaving many at the margins and but this proved to be only a mirage and forcing others to be co-opted into the gov- none of the licensed companies ever started ernment’s ranks. These failures, especially operations.12 when combined with the expectations that Differently from the case of Rwanda, inter- the discourses about the transformative national companies in Ethiopia were not power of the Internet had created, left many called in to share a vision of how the Internet with a strong sense of disillusionment. This should develop in the country and have a feeling is captured by Dawit who, after his stake in its evolution, but rather to simply initial experience with BITE, initiated many execute plans elaborated by the center of other ICT projects in the country, which left power. him profoundly pessimistic about the pos- sibility of creating an inclusive information Rwanda: State as the Prime Mover, Encouraging society in Ethiopia. Bold Moves The state in Rwanda is at the centre of shap- We understood that the government ing policies and implementing projects of works alone. Everybody tried to work national relevance and scale. This is captured with the government, NGOs, aca- by the term ‘developmental patrimonialism’, demia, etc. But they have not been a reference to business-politics relations effective. The UNECA [United Nations whereby despite blending impersonal/ Economic Commission for Africa] was bureaucratic and personal/clientelistic fea- instrumental in activating the civil tures, the ruling elite manages economic society but was not enough.11 rents in a centralized way ‘with a view to enhancing their own and others’ incomes in Private initiatives have only been allowed the long run rather than maximizing them in areas that could produce an incremental in the short run’ (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi and predictable increase in productivity and 2014: 8). in sectors that were considered safe by the In the information section, there have government. Following the approach pur- been two key drivers of this. One is the lim- sued by different political elites in the past, ited size of the country’s private sector and newer ICTs were adopted and supported the related lack of experience, expertise and when they emerged as simple enhancers of resources, unlike in countries such as Kenya tasks already defined at the centre, when where the much larger private sector has they could act as sustaining, rather than dis- been the leading actor. Related to this is the ruptive, innovations (Wu 2010). While the small size of the Rwandan market for Internet number of private companies operating in services, itself linked to high levels of pov- sectors such as sales and maintenance or in erty13 which limit Internet access to a small software development sharply increased over percentage of people who can afford to pay the years, no private firms were allowed to not only for the services but also for the nec- operate in the telecommunications sector essary hardware. This second factor accounts (Adam 2007; EICTDA 2005; EICTDA 2009). for the reluctance by the large telecom com- Numerous international organisations panies already established in the country to exercised pressure over the years on the put up the necessary investment. Given the Ethiopian government to initiate the liber- small market and the scale of the govern- alisation of the Internet provisions, but with ment’s ambitions to expand access as quickly no success. The World Bank, as part of its ICT as possible, the required investments did not Assisted Development (ICTAD) programme, make commercial sense. Consequently, the Gagliardone and Golooba-Mutebi: The Evolution of the Internet in Ethiopia Art. 8, page 11 of 24 and Rwanda government had to step in and find the nec- among other things, led to the establishment essary capital to invest in critical infrastruc- in the country of the very first international ture, in this case the fibre optic cable, with telecoms company, MTN of South Africa a view to connecting all parts of the country, (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi 2012). starting with government institutions. Luring MTN to Rwanda was no easy task. Also, the centrality of the state is in many The company was approached after efforts ways derived from the early realisation by the to attract other international telecoms such RPF, the party that took over the country after as Vodacom and a smaller regional player the genocide against the Tutsi in 1994, that to based in former Zaire, now the Democratic prosper the landlocked and natural-resource- Republic of Congo, Telecel, had failed. The poor country had to develop a knowledge- majority of the initial capital MTN used based service economy. During the war, the came from Rwandan sources, including the RPF leadership held several meetings to dis- government and the ruling RPF party. MTN cuss the country’s economic prospects and therefore came in as a minority investor, the limitations imposed by structural factors. bringing in mainly new technology, while The broad outlines of the thinking and the the Rwandans bore the bulk of the risk of drivers behind it are evident in the following investing. As the majority shareholder, MTN statement by President Kagame: reckoned that with the country’s small mar- ket, it would take years before it would turn For a landlocked country you want a profit. The prediction was proved wrong first of all to address the infrastruc- only two years after it set up shop, with ture problems, which is logistics, early success propelling it to venture into transport, communication and so on neighbouring Uganda as well. The Rwandan and so forth… But you also want to government’s pioneering role remains signif- get involved in high value products icant and is currently evident via the Rwanda and in services because these are not Development Board (RDB), the state’s invest- directly affected by the position we’re ment sourcing and facilitation arm. More in of being landlocked, or they are not recently the RDB has been at the forefront as affected as much. So some of the of negotiations with and incentivising ICT things are just dictated by the nature companies to invest in Rwanda. Key recent of our economy, of our country (As investors include Korea Telecom and Positivo quoted in Collins 2013). BGH, a Latin American manufacturer of lap- tops, computers, tablets and other electronic After the war, given the devastation wrought gadgets which has already set up a produc- by the violence and the heavy human toll tion plant in the country and is expected to that wiped out or forced to flee a large sec- be the main supplier of ICT equipment to tion of the country’s business and other the Ministry of Education and the govern- elites, relying on the private sector to kick- ment in general, and of laptops for the One start and drive the economy was a luxury Laptop per Child programme as it grows and that the new government, keen to establish expands access to the Internet by children its authority and legitimacy, could not afford. in primary schools across the entire country The imperative to re-equip looted govern- (Collins 2014). ment offices and restore communications services presented it with a huge challenge 3. The Economic Bureaucracy: Power, but also the opportunity to introduce new Competence, Insulation and Penetration technology, including replacing looted ana- A third element Leftwich identified as char- logue equipment with its digital variant. acteristic of developmental states is the It was the pursuit of new technology that, creation of specific institutions whose task Art. 8, page 12 of 24 Gagliardone and Golooba-Mutebi: The Evolution of the Internet in Ethiopia and Rwanda it is to organise the critical interactions including maize, coffee, sesame and wheat. between state and economy. ‘What differ- Launched in 2008, and framed as the brain- entiates these economic high commands child of Ethiopian economist Eleni Gabre- in developmental states from the generality Madhin, the Ethiopia Commodity Exchange of planning institutions in so many devel- (ECX) uses the Internet to connect a trading oping countries appears to be their real floor in Addis Ababa with grading centres, power, authority, technical competence and warehouses and display sites all around the insulation in shaping development policy’ country. Its mission is to ‘connect all buyers (Leftwich 1995: 412). As Leftwich continues, and sellers in an efficient, reliable and trans- this has varied from state to state and this parent market by harnessing innovation and is another area where Ethiopia and Rwanda technology’ (Ethiopia Commodity Exchange). have diverged significantly. In Ethiopia, Already in the planning stages the team while new institutions were indeed created tasked by the Ethiopian government to real- for the development of ICTs – the Ethiopia ise the new project decided that an in-house ICT Development Agency, which later trans- suite of applications had to be developed formed into the Ministry of Communications to connect all nodes of the ECX and that a and Information Technology – these closely variety of means had to be used both to col- remained within the remit of state control. lect and disseminate information through- As we describe below, however, over time out the country (Gabre-Madhin 2012). some level of experimentation did emerge Inventories are now updated in real time and some new initiatives, such as the through electronic receipts sent from ware- development of an ICT-based Commodity houses to Addis Ababa. Thanks to the coor- Exchange, began to offer new opportunities dination allowed by the electronic system for the development of a stronger economic between the clearinghouse and the banks elite. In the case of Rwanda, the model of partnering with the ECX, sellers can be paid developmental patrimonialism led to the on the day following the trade. Information creation of stronger ties between state and is transmitted using a combination of tech- economy that left greater room for manoeu- nologies that can match the needs of the vring to the business elite. different actors involved in the trade. The ECX website hosts the most comprehensive Ethiopia: Innovation from Above? set of data, while outdoor electronic ticker In Ethiopia, the aspiration to use ICTs to pro- boards located in dozens of rural towns mote economic growth has been tainted by present essential information to local farm- the reluctance to let the monopoly over tele- ers and traders. Prices are also broadcast by communications go, but it has not prevented radio and television. Mobile phones were the government from selectively investing later added to the mix. Instant messages are in ambitious projects that could symbolise sent to subscribers and a toll-free phone ser- the government’s commitment to innovate. vice has been set up for those who prefer to Woredanet, Schoolnet and TeleCourt have call in. Unsurprisingly, given the low literacy already been examined. It is another large- level in Ethiopia, radio broadcasts appear as scale project, however, that more clearly the most popular channel to get updated exemplifies how the Ethiopian government information (Tsega 2010) but subscribers to selectively emphasised some of the possibili- phone services have been rapidly rising in ties offered by the Internet, while marginalis- number.14 ing others. Ethiopia was the first country in The ECX exemplifies the EPRDF’s determi- Africa to create a commodity exchange to nation to embrace new technology when it trade a variety of products that constitute can act as a modernising tool; a construc- the core of Ethiopia’s agricultural output, tive, rather than disruptive force that can be Gagliardone and Golooba-Mutebi: The Evolution of the Internet in Ethiopia Art. 8, page 13 of 24 and Rwanda channelled to support centralised develop- previously determined in everyday informal ment processes. interactions. Framed as an example of how technol- ogy can be leveraged to help the poor, the Rwanda: Enhancing Prosperity and Learning ECX fits squarely in the hyped concep- from your Neighbours tion of Information and Communication As already noted, the government of Rwanda Technologies for Development (ICT4D) has long been pre-occupied by the impera- embodied by many initiatives launched in tive to overcome the country’s structural dis- the US and Europe to use technology to advantages related to being landlocked and fight poverty. It is perfectly adapted to the without significant endowment in natural prevailing narrative, the dream of technol- resources. Building a service-based economy ogy, removing middlemen and empower- has been identified as a viable route to pros- ing farmers to directly reap the benefits perity and a decision has been made that its of the most recent innovations. And while viability is highly dependent on the develop- comprehensive evaluations of the ECX are ment of information and communications missing, its numbers already chart a success technology. This explains the emphasis on story (Gabre-Madhin 2012).15 ICT as a priority and why its enabling role has Most celebratory accounts, however, over- been made visible across a range of domains, look how the ECX’s success is not only the through ensuring that each sector could result of an effective application of ICTs to have its own a flagship initiative. This led, for transform value chains, but was dependent example, to Rwanda embracing initiatives on the emphasis the Ethiopian government such as Negroponte’s One Laptop per Child has put behind the project as it fit within its programme, which aims at providing tailor- overarching state-building project. Similar made portable devices to students in elemen- to Woredanet and Schoolnet, the ECX tary schools; or the creation of knowledge allowed expanding state control over areas repositories such as Rwandapedia, a tailor- that had previously been difficult to bring made Wiki which collects key information within the government remits. Especially in about the country, including informational remote areas, trade in commodities used to that can help visitors and tourist navigate be regulated by informal institutions, based the country’s attractions. Even a version of on kin, reciprocity and status. As one of the commodity exchange pioneered in Ethiopia few systematic studies on the impact of the was created in Rwanda, with the ambition ECX has shown (Meijerink, Bulte & Alemu of serving not just the Rwandan market, but 2014), the ECX has progressively substituted also servicing other countries in East Africa. these informal governance mechanisms. This has had the advantage of allowing 4. Developmental States and Economic traders to operate beyond their traditional Interest networks. However, it has also eroded social Similarly to other developmental states, the capital within networks, as individuals are leaders in Ethiopia and Rwanda sought to less likely to invest in ‘social relations’ with ensure state power and autonomy were con- their trading partners (Meijerink, Bulte & solidated before national or foreign capital Alemu 2014). The ECX has centralised the became influential. Leftwich uses the exam- power not only to trade a grain of coffee, ple of China, Taiwan and Korea to make this but also the nodes and links of the complex point clear. networks that have grown around its pro- duction and sale, formalising relationships In their formative years, private whose quality and worthiness have been economic interests were either Art. 8, page 14 of 24 Gagliardone and Golooba-Mutebi: The Evolution of the Internet in Ethiopia and Rwanda

suppressed (as in China), or were gen- ZTE added $US 0.4 billion for engineering) to erally politically weak, if not insignifi- overhaul and expand Ethiopia’s telecommu- cant, relative to state power. Where nications system. The loan, to be repaid over landed power existed, it was destroyed thirteen years, was disbursed in three phases. through direct political attack and The first phase had a particularly symbolic programmes of land reform, classi- value. Branded the ‘Millennium Plan’, it cally in China, but also in Taiwan and was expected to produce its results – laying Korea. Local bourgeois classes were down more than two thousand kilometres of insignificant and private foreign capi- fibre optic cable connecting Ethiopia’s thir- tal barely existed as an important eco- teen largest cities – by 11 September 2007, nomic or political factor at the time of the day marking the beginning of the new the formation of the developmental millennium on the Ethiopian calendar. The states (Leftwich 1995: 417). second and third phases similarly focused on infrastructure development, expanding Only once state supremacy was ensured was coverage to rural areas and building the private (national or foreign) capital allowed capacity of the system to support 20 million to enter into key sectors of the economy. mobile users (from the initial 1.2 million) Differently from countries such as China and more than a million Internet broad- and South Korea, however, which were able band users (Gagliardone 2014c). Resources to use foreign investments as a temporary also went towards upgrading Woredanet measure to later build a strong national and Schoolnet, allowing some of the sites industry, Rwanda, and especially Ethiopia, to progressively switch from expensive and relied more substantially on foreign invest- inefficient satellite connections to terrestrial ment and capacity, with limited ability of broadband. using foreign investment to progressively China’s support has allowed the Ethiopian build local capacity. In the case of Ethiopia, government to reach goals no other African this materialised in the form of conces- country had achieved before, dramatically sionary loans provided by the Chinese gov- expanding access in a regime of monopoly.16 ernment to realize ambitious ICT projects, Elsewhere in Africa the liberalisation of the implemented by Chinese companies them- market was what drove expansion in cover- selves. This strategy ensured the Ethiopian age and lowering costs. Countries that opted government could have greater control on for a system tightly controlled by the state, the direction of Internet development, but such as neighbouring Eritrea, have severely also meant high costs for the treasury and lagged behind in developing information keeping a very weak private sector nationally. infrastructure and services. By providing cap- Rwanda, instead, sought to follow the Asian ital, equipment and the expertise, all with no developmental model a bit more closely but strings attached in terms of policy changes the lack of skills within the country still tied (e.g. liberalising the market), ZTE, which is the government to a position of dependence partially state-owned, has not only brought on foreign capital and expertise. the Ethiopian government out of the cul-de- sac in which it had put itself by stubbornly Ethiopia: China as the Supporter defending monopoly, it has also helped it On 8 November 2006, Chinese telecom giant realise its vision of a tightly controlled but ZTE and the Ethiopian Telecommunication developmentally oriented national informa- Corporation signed the largest agreement in tion society. the history of telecommunications in Africa. On 7 June 2011, the now re-branded Ethio- Backed by China Development Bank, ZTE Telecom issued a tender to further boost offered a loan of $US 1.5 billion (to which the capacity of Ethiopia’s mobile-phone Gagliardone and Golooba-Mutebi: The Evolution of the Internet in Ethiopia Art. 8, page 15 of 24 and Rwanda network to 50 million subscribers by 2015 proactivity on China’s part, however, has and to introduce 4G connectivity in selected not prevented these strategies from gaining areas. The tender was similarly based on a appeal among African partners. vendor-financing scheme, as had previously In a Wikileaks cable reporting a meet- been the case with ZTE. However, in contrast ing between Sebhat Nega, a founder of the to 2006, the tender was public and various Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) companies competed. As the Wall Street and one of the most influential ideologues of Journal put it, however, ‘again, financing the Ethiopian government, and US ambassa- won the day, with the two [ZTE and Huawei] dor Donald Yamamoto, Sebhat was reported pledging a total of $US 1.6 billion. Western to have openly declared his admiration for equipment suppliers, such as Ericsson China and stressed that Ethiopia ‘needs the and Alcatel Lucent SA, couldn’t match the China model to inform the Ethiopian peo- Chinese offer’ (Dalton 2014). With the sign- ple’ (US Embassy in Addis Ababa 2009). ing of two separate contracts of $US 800 Arguments like these are still confined to million each with Huawei and ZTE, competi- informal conversations and, while China tion was introduced in the shape of a rivalry has been publicly praised for the commit- between two Chinese companies that have ment shown towards the Ethiopian people, been contending for shares of the Chinese it has still not been hailed as a model to market for a long time. As a representative shape Ethiopia’s information society. This of Huawei in Ethiopia who requested to may change in the near future but the pat- speak on condition of anonymity argued, tern that has emerged in the decade follow- ‘It is normal that Huawei and ZTE compete ing the 2005 election seems to indicate that for resources. ZTE in Ethiopia did not do the Ethiopian government has preferred to a good job. It did not have enough incen- exploit the ambiguities of the dominant tives. So the government asked Huawei to discourses advanced by Western donors, the come, because we have a better reputation US in particular, when it needed to support in Africa.’17 unpopular decisions (e.g. the censoring of Despite the different outcomes, both the critical voices and jailing of journalists and first and the second deals which together bloggers), rather than publicly aligning with surpass $US 3 billion, are indicative of the measures, such as those adopted by the different approach the Chinese government Chinese government to police its own infor- and Chinese telecoms have brought forward mation space, that are still unpopular among to enter the increasingly crowded ICT mar- the international community. ket in Africa and acquire greater influence. China has been aggressive when providing Rwanda: Testing New Types of Partnership financial resources to governments strug- Thirty-eight per cent of Rwanda’s budget is gling to expand ICT infrastructure and ser- donor funded. And yet the government of vices and has relied on state owned banks Rwanda has opted to dedicate vast resources (China Development Bank and the Export- to the ICT sector, specifically to the deploy- Import Bank of China) to offer export credit ment of infrastructure for guaranteeing to Chinese companies willing to expand their Internet access. As indicated earlier, Western operations abroad. Despite this increasingly donors have questioned the wisdom of dedi- outward exposure, however, the Chinese cating millions of dollars to ICT ahead of government has avoided publicly indicating sectors of more direct relevance to the lives its willingness to export the strategies it has of ordinary Rwandans. While some were adopted to develop its domestic ICT sector or prepared to assist with reducing the cost of indicate them as superior to those suggested Internet access as provided by the private sec- by Western donors or partners. The lack of tor, and while some have provided funding Art. 8, page 16 of 24 Gagliardone and Golooba-Mutebi: The Evolution of the Internet in Ethiopia and Rwanda to help reduce the cost of broadband access, based to service based. It is also good they have been unwilling to provide funding for this society to brand itself as a for infrastructure development. smart society. In this market they are Initial attempts by the government to get looking forward to the 4G. There are the private sector to invest in infrastructure big expectations. If I can use a sin- resulted in limited and disjointed efforts, gle word I would say this is the ‘right with each investor, driven by the profit shortcut’ to reach Vision 2020. But we motive, seeking to build their own infra- have also to admit that we have not structure. Subsequently, the government seen the returns yet. privatised the former state-owned telecoms company Rwandatel and injected the pro- Rwanda also represented an opportunity, for ceeds into laying the fibre-optic backbone a country like South Korea, which is relatively across the country. The backbone established small but has been at the forefront of innova- the foundation for further development for tion in the digital domain, to test new pos- which the government had no resources. sibilities in Africa. As ORN’s CEO’s continued, Leveraging the backbone, the government ‘We want to expand to other countries. Other was able to source the necessary resources countries in Africa are looking at Rwanda as from Korea Telecom and to attract assistance an example. And the fact that we have local- from the other non-traditional donors, the ized a solution in Rwanda can help us then Chinese, Korean and Japanese governments. tailoring for another African country.’ The partnership with Korea Telecom, which However, for South Korea as a whole, had initially come into Rwanda simply as a investing in Africa seemed to represent an contractor to lay down part of the backbone, opportunity to display its increased role inter- since 2013 took the form of two joint ven- nationally, experimenting in an area – new tures with the government of Rwanda, one communication technology – that appeared aimed to roll out 4G connectivity reach- relatively familiar. It is worth noting that ing 95 per cent of the population by the South Korea decided to open an embassy in end of 2018, the other leading to the crea- Kigali after Korea Telecom became a major tion of Olleh Rwanda Networks (ORN). ORN partner of the Rwandan government, show- launched operations in March 2014, provid- ing an interesting example of business driv- ing IP-based services to public and private ing diplomacy. As a Korean diplomat in Kigali institutions. explained: As Pansik Shin Ngenzi, ORN’s CEO explained, the joint venture was an indi- South Korea does not have a strong cation of how KT and the government of presence here in Africa. But right now Rwanda shared a similar vision and were in SK many more people recognize ready to take some risks to see it realised. In the importance of Africa. We have his own words: opened a new emphasis. Rwanda for us is a very good target country also Rwanda took the right approach. The to show to our own people in Korea quicker the better. It is true, you have that both private investment and aid problems like electricity. You have to can have good results. get the right balance between short- term needs and long-term vision. But technology does not represent the only Something can be a luxury now, but factor tying the two countries together. The in the long run we need skills. The ICT perceived similarity of the development development is important to trans- model used in Asia to lift their populations form this country from agricultural out of poverty and promote prosperity also Gagliardone and Golooba-Mutebi: The Evolution of the Internet in Ethiopia Art. 8, page 17 of 24 and Rwanda played an important role. For example, tra- level: Ethiopia has developed one of the ditional donors have been reluctant to put most pervasive systems of political filtering resources into infrastructure development and surveillance on the continent; while in in technical schools to facilitate technical Rwanda, cases of Internet censorship have and vocational education and training and been limited. At the discursive level, how- to bridge several skills gaps. South Koreans, ever, terrorist threats and the need to guar- on the other hand, have been willing to help antee greater security have increasingly been build, renovate and equip a number of tech- invoked to build a stronger case for the state nical and vocational institutes and technol- to take a more active role in policing online ogy incubation centres across the country spaces. to facilitate the development of second-tier skills still lacking in the country. Ethiopia: No Place to Hide? Despite Ethiopia continuing to score very 5. Civil Society, Civil Rights, low in terms of Internet penetration, it has Performance and Legitimacy developed one of the most ambitious sur- Leftwich’s original model identifies two veillance apparatuses for online commu- dimensions related to the relationship nication in Africa (Marczak et al 2014) and developmental states have developed not routinely filters political content online just with economic actors but with other (Opennet Initiative 2014). The evolution of actors seeking to influence social policy and how the Ethiopian government has been ensure the rights of individuals and groups policing the information space indicates are respected. The first dimension is con- how these measures have been progres- cerned with the relationship with the civil sively asserted as legitimate in the face of society and the media, which tends to be both national and international actors. The weak in developmental states or is actively first cases of online censorship in Ethiopia targeted, controlled or co-opted by govern- date back to 2006, one year after the most ment actors. The second dimension refers contested elections in the country’s history instead to the suppression of civil rights that saw the opposition making very sig- and the trade-off between the promise of nificant gains. At the time the government improvements in service delivery and econ- refused to comment on how some websites omy opportunities on the one hand, and had become inaccessible, claiming techni- the tight control over dissent on the other. cal malfunctioning; however, in the fol- In the case of Internet policy and practice, lowing years it began to assert more clearly these two dimensions are closely related and its sovereign rights over Ethiopia’s infor- we chose to address them together. In both mation space. Initiatives such as the Anti- Ethiopia and Rwanda, emphasising the sym- Terrorism Proclamation, and the Telecom bolic and practical value of the Internet as a Fraud Offences Proclamation, drafted by tool for economic development also meant the Information Network Security Agency de-emphasising its potential as a tool for (INSA), Ethiopia’s equivalent of the US political change. This meant both limiting National Security Agency (NSA), emerged as the power of civil society and the media to central components of this process. A new shape Internet policy and also actively tar- discourse hailing security and stability as geting individuals and organisations seeking fundamental ingredients of Ethiopia’s path to make use of the Internet as a tool for con- towards development started to be articu- testation and mobilisation. lated more widely and visibly. Since coming Against in this case the approach followed into force, the anti-terrorism law has been by the governments in the two countries has used to override existing norms regulating been different, especially at the technical the media in Ethiopia and to silence, attack Art. 8, page 18 of 24 Gagliardone and Golooba-Mutebi: The Evolution of the Internet in Ethiopia and Rwanda or threaten critical journalists inside and in the 2005 elections had won the seat of outside the country (Gagliardone 2014b). mayor of Addis Ababa but was included on Ethiopia has been relatively slow to enact a the country’s terrorist list soon after its estab- domestic anti-terrorism law, as compared to lishment (Eskinder Nega, Abebe Gelaw, Fasil other countries that introduced similar leg- Yenealem and Abebe Belew); two journalists islations in the aftermath of 9/11 to comply working for the newspaper Ye Musilmoch with UN Security Council Resolution 1373, Guday were charged with plotting acts of which requires states to ensure ‘terrorist acts ‘terrorism, intending to advance a political, are established as serious criminal offences religious or ideological cause’, as part of a in domestic laws’ (UN Security Council 2001: broader crackdown on Ethiopian Muslims 2). Coming into force only in August 2009, (Solomon Kebede and Yusuf Getachew); Ethiopia’s Anti-Terrorism Proclamation was two Swedish journalists who had embed- framed nonetheless as a response to the ded themselves with the Ogaden Liberation Resolution passed eight years earlier and to Front to cover the conflict in southern international pressure to combat terrorism. Ethiopia were also charged under the Anti- The Telecom Fraud Offences Proclamation, Terrorism Proclamation and pardoned by passed in 2012, has extended the provisions the president after having served 450 days in of the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation to the prison (Johan Persson and Martin Schibbye). online sphere (Article 6). Since its creation, Some of the journalists have been charged the Information Network Security Agency in absentia; those who were apprehended in (INSA) has taken on the responsibility of ‘pro- Ethiopia are serving sentences of up to 18 tecting’ the national information space, ‘tak- years in prison. ing counter measures against information Numerous international organisa- attacks’, which the law frames as any ‘attack tions, including the Committee to Protect against the national interest, constitutional Journalists, Reporters without Borders, order, and nation’s psychology by using Amnesty International and Human Rights cyber and electromagnetic technologies and Watch, have accused the Ethiopian govern- systems’. ment of taking advantage of a law they label Examining the profiles of the individu- as ‘deeply flawed’ (Human Rights Watch als convicted under the Anti-Terrorism 2013) to persecute and silence critical voices. Proclamation helps to clarify the motiva- The government has responded to this criti- tions behind the law and to understand how, cism by re-asserting the legitimacy of its acts. similar to what had been experienced in Bereket Simon justified his government’s other countries including Colombia, Nepal, decision to detain the two Swedish journal- the Philippines and Uganda (International ists by labelling international pressure to Commission of Jurists 2009), the Ethiopian free the detainees as ‘a very wrong defence government interpreted the global war of foreign journalists who have been caught against terrorism as an opportunity to pur- red-handed assisting terrorists’. (as quoted sue domestic enemies while fending off in Davison 2012). Similarly, in 2014 Prime external pressure and condemnation. Out of Minister Hailemariam Desalegn commented the 33 individuals convicted under the Anti- on the arrest of the Zone9 bloggers (whose Terrorism Proclamation between 2009 and case is discussed in greater detail below) by 2014, thirteen have been journalists. Some alleging their links with terrorist groups. of them have been accused of planning ter- As he remarked, ‘I don’t think becoming a rorist attacks on infrastructure, telecommu- blogger makes somebody immune, if some- nications and power lines (Woubshet Taye one involves into this terrorist network that and Reeyot Alemu); others to support Ginbot destabilizes my country’ (as quoted in Fortin 7, an organisation led by Berhanu Nega, who 2014). Gagliardone and Golooba-Mutebi: The Evolution of the Internet in Ethiopia Art. 8, page 19 of 24 and Rwanda

These assertions were criticised by inter- seems to have allowed greater freedom on national pressure groups but they also indi- the Internet as compared to other media. It is cate how the post-9/11 agenda, primarily as if the Internet had been considered a ‘spe- aimed at combating international terrorism cial political zone’, a term originally used by and the possibility that instability in distant Rebecca Mackinnon (2008) to describe the places could have repercussions ‘back home’, greater freedom allowed by Chinese authori- has created ‘pockets of legitimacy’ that can ties to people posting online, as compared to be, and have been, exploited to pursue a journalists in older media. variety of other ends, including curbing dis- Despite the limitations inherent in ranking sent. When the Ethiopian government has based largely on the perceptions of a limited had to justify measures limiting freedom of number of experts assessing different coun- expression or stifling political debate in the tries, the Freedom of the Press and Freedom country, the discourse on security has been of the Net indices for Ethiopia largely match. privileged over other potentially more con- Both rank Ethiopia as ‘non-free’ on both troversial arguments. As explained in the dimensions. In the case of Rwanda, while the next section, despite financial and technical country is ranked as ‘non-free’ for its press, it support from China enabling the Ethiopian is ranked as ‘partially-free’ when it comes to government to realise its vision of a tightly the Internet. controlled national information society, Kagame himself is also among the most the government has refrained, for exam- active African heads of states on twitter and ple, from publicly referring to China as a has often taken to the medium to engage model to follow in the field of media and with his fans and critics, both nationally and telecommunications. internationally. Kagame has also set a stand- ard for other members of the government, Rwanda: Is the Internet a New Space to who have been encouraged to take to the Experiment? medium to engage with a population that is Since the end of the genocide against growingly increasingly literate in the digital the Tutsi, the government of Rwanda has domain. remained wary of a resurgence in violence and political upheaval that characterised the Conclusion pre- and immediate post-genocide periods. The analysis of how the Internet has devel- Measures to ensure security and stability oped in Ethiopia and in Rwanda offers some have comprised putting in place a suitable important indications of how new nation- security apparatus, including a countrywide ally relevant conceptions of the Internet are community policing system. As illustrated emerging and consolidating in Africa despite for example by Purdeková (2013), security dominant narratives from the outside. The and surveillance operate both at the formal comparison of the specific ways in which and informal levels and, similar to other ambitions to turn Ethiopia and Rwanda into sectors mentioned above, ICTs act as an developmental states shaped the evolution enabling tool. Differently from the case of of the Internet has highlighted how some Ethiopia, however, the Rwandan government governments in Africa are becoming increas- has maintained a lower profile in terms of fil- ingly assertive in charting their own paths tering and surveilling communication. More towards alternative uses of the Internet, interestingly, while the Ethiopian govern- resisting Western pressures, but also how ment seems to have interpreted the Internet similar strategies can lead to substantially as just another medium, and have extended different outcomes. the treatment applied to print or radio jour- Large-scale research projects investigating nalists also to bloggers and individuals active development strategies and governance in in social media, the Rwandan government Africa, such as the Africa Power and Politics Art. 8, page 20 of 24 Gagliardone and Golooba-Mutebi: The Evolution of the Internet in Ethiopia and Rwanda

Programme (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi Government and Chinese companies ZTE and 2012; Booth & Cammack 2014; Kelsall 2013; Huawei). In contrast to what has been the Vaughan & Gebremichael 2011), have shed case in Rwanda, the repressive measures that light on the many similarities characteris- have characterised the press, especially after ing the developmental projects of Ethiopia the contested electoral competition of 2005, and Rwanda, which combined centralised have been translated to the online sphere, authority, long-horizon planning and neo- with few signals of the desire to offer greater patrimonial and clientelist practices in ways freedom to individuals using he Internet as that facilitate long-term investment and the a new terrain for political competition or to use of rents for growth-generating activities. engage with the arguments put forward by The analysis of the evolution of the Internet oppositional forces. in Ethiopia and Rwanda, however, suggests If we want to sum up the connections the two regimes have reacted differently to between the overarching political and eco- the possibilities offered by the Internet. nomic strategies pursued by the govern- In the case of Rwanda, the ruling elite ments of Ethiopia and Rwanda and the seem to have extended strategies that have development of the Internet in the two guided its economic policies in other sectors countries we could say that: the policies pur- to the development of the Internet. This has sued by the Rwandan government regard- resulted in a commitment toward ICTs articu- ing the Internet have been characterised by lated at the very top of the political hierarchy, continuities in the economic domain (cre- exemplified not only by the extensive use ating credible public-private partnerships made of social media by key political figures, and allowing a certain degree of freedom the president above all, but more significantly to companies that are endorsed by political by a series of bold initiatives meant to create power but allowed to chart their own paths local capacity through credible partnerships towards innovation) and discontinuities at with external funders (the South Korean the political level (by which the Internet Government and Korea Telecom in particular) seems to offer a greater degree of freedom and allowing a certain degree of freedom for than traditional media); on the contrary local innovators and civil society actors who Ethiopia’s policies have shown discontinui- have accepted to operate without the larger ties at the level of economic policy (by which framework developed at the top of political the government seems to have regressed power. On the other hand, some of the more to isolation, shaping Internet policy and coercive measures that have characterised development from the centre while seeking traditional media seem to have been lifted in resources and expertise through unequal the case of the Internet, which has apparently partnerships with foreign governments and been interpreted as a terrain where greater companies) and continuities in the political forms of experimentation are allowed. realm (where the same norms characteris- The Ethiopian government’s approach ing print media have been extended to the towards the Internet seems to have gone in online sphere). the opposite direction. The forms of devel- Balancing between similarities and differ- opmental patrimonialism that have charac- ences between the two countries is a complex terised its strategy in other sectors, leading endeavour; it can however be argued that for example to the creation of private com- while Ethiopia and Rwanda have shared an panies that are closely tied to political power overarching strategy placing the state as the but are managed according to the principles prime mover in the development of Internet of the market, do not seem to have translated policy and (large-scale) projects, Rwanda has to the field of ICTs, which has been managed developed a more open model of a develop- directly by the government and through alli- mental Internet, which could accommodate ances with foreign partners (e.g. the Chinese a greater variety of actors and opinions and Gagliardone and Golooba-Mutebi: The Evolution of the Internet in Ethiopia Art. 8, page 21 of 24 and Rwanda incorporate or tolerate them in the context wide range of domains (business, security, of a relatively coherent vision emanating agriculture, education, etc.). from the centre; Ethiopia on the contrary, 4 There is some speculation that he could has developed a more closed model of the have been inspired by the story of Asian developmental Internet, where all powers Tigers: ‘The Asian Tigers developed via firmly rest in the hand of a government that technology. As someone who is interested has refused (so far) to entertain and engage in technology, he must draw from their with alternative ideas of the Internet. These experience. He didn’t just wake up with distinctions, we believe, have important con- the ideas.’ (interview with a government sequences for how the Internet will evolve ICT expert, 20.10.14). in the two countries. Nonetheless, the fact 5 Interview with a former government that the two countries share important simi- employee who joined the government’s larities could also allow one to learn from the ICT policy team in 2000, now with the pri- other. It could, for example, offer to Ethiopia vate sector (20.10.2014). the means to progressively open up its infor- 6 Interview with a young ICT professional, mation space to greater competition and Kigali: 20.10.14. accommodate a broader political debate. 7 Interview 20.10.14. 8 The Kenyan government, for example, Competing Interests in the aftermath of the violence that The research was made possible by the erupted after the contested elections of support received by the Internet Policy 2007, introduced new measures to curb Observatory (IPO), based at the Centre for hate speech disseminated both on social Global Communication Studies, at the media and through SMS (see for example Annenberg School of Communication, Kagwanja & Southall 2009). University of Pennsylvania. The views 9 Interview: Dawit Bekele, Professor at Addis expressed in this article, however, should be Ababa University and Africa Focal Point for considered as the authors’ and do not repre- the Internet Society ISOC, Addis Ababa, 3 sent the IPO in any way. March 2008. 10 Dawit stressed the risks connected with Notes being too proactive by noting that ‘the 1 For example, there has been a spate of guy who made the recommendations, the arrests of people alleged to be collabo- chair of the technical committee was mar- rators with the DRC-based Democratic ginalised since then. It was bad judgment. Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda The government did not really know what (FDLR), some of whose members stand the Internet was and it did not want to accused of participation in and execution listen. They did not like the Internet’ of the genocide against the Tutsi. Some of (Interview: ibid.). the arrests followed the tracking of com- 11 Interview: Dawit Bekele, Professor at Addis munication between FDLR officials in the Ababa University and Africa Focal Point for DRC and individuals within the country. the Internet Society ISOC, Addis Ababa, 2 This quote by Meles Zenawi was used in 03.01.2012. the inaugural speech made the Minister of 12 According to the contract, the ISPs had Capacity Building Tefera Walua (2006) at to be licensed by September 2005 but e-Learning Africa, the international con- the licences were issued only in March ference on ICT for development, educa- 2007. However, the four companies that tion and training in Africa that took place obtained licences, Millennium Systems, in Addis Ababa on 25–27 May 2006. All-In-One, Symbol Technology and Net 3 One encounters this view among people Computer, never started operations who have worked closely with him across a (EICTDA 2009). Art. 8, page 22 of 24 Gagliardone and Golooba-Mutebi: The Evolution of the Internet in Ethiopia and Rwanda

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How to cite this article: Gagliardone, I and Golooba-Mutebi, F 2016 The Evolution of the Internet in Ethiopia and Rwanda: Towards a “Developmental” Model? Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 5(1): 8, pp. 1–23, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.344

Submitted: 17 November 2014 Accepted: 08 July 2016 Published: 02 August 2016

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