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A Sampling of Blocked Websites in Ethiopia HUMAN RIGHTS “They Know Everything We Do” Telecom and Internet Surveillance in Ethiopia WATCH “They Know Everything We Do” Telecom and Internet Surveillance in Ethiopia Copyright © 2014 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 978-1-62313-1159 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch is dedicated to protecting the human rights of people around the world. We stand with victims and activists to prevent discrimination, to uphold political freedom, to protect people from inhumane conduct in wartime, and to bring offenders to justice. We investigate and expose human rights violations and hold abusers accountable. We challenge governments and those who hold power to end abusive practices and respect international human rights law. We enlist the public and the international community to support the cause of human rights for all. Human Rights Watch is an international organization with staff in more than 40 countries, and offices in Amsterdam, Beirut, Berlin, Brussels, Chicago, Geneva, Goma, Johannesburg, London, Los Angeles, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Paris, San Francisco, Tokyo, Toronto, Tunis, Washington DC, and Zurich. For more information, please visit our website: http://www.Human Rights Watch.org MARCH 2014 978-1-62313-1159 “They Know Everything We Do” Telecom and Internet Surveillance in Ethiopia Summary ........................................................................................................................... 1 Recommendations .............................................................................................................. 5 To the Government of Ethiopia .................................................................................................. 5 To International Technology and Telecom Companies Serving Ethiopia ..................................... 6 To the Governments of China, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Others ............................. 7 To the World Bank, African Development Bank, and other Donors ............................................. 8 Methodology ...................................................................................................................... 9 I. Background ................................................................................................................... 12 Patterns of Repression and Government Control ...................................................................... 12 Targets of Surveillance ........................................................................................................... 14 Fears of Surveillance .............................................................................................................. 19 Telecommunications and Media in Ethiopia ............................................................................ 21 State Monopoly on Telecommunication Services .............................................................. 23 History of Telecommunications in Ethiopia ....................................................................... 24 Institutions of Ethiopia’s Telecommunication and Surveillance Apparatus ............................... 27 History and Background on Communications Surveillance ...................................................... 30 II. Ethiopia’s Control over Information and Communications Technology ........................... 34 Ethiopia’s Growing Telephone Network: More Opportunities for Government Control? .......... 34 “Brute Force” Confiscation ............................................................................................... 35 Unrestricted Access to Phone Call Recordings and Metadata ............................................ 36 Targeting Foreign Communications ................................................................................... 45 Live Interception of Phone Communication ...................................................................... 46 Restricting Access to Phone Network ................................................................................ 47 Network Shutdowns ........................................................................................................ 49 Geotracking of Individual Locations .................................................................................. 51 Controlling the Internet ........................................................................................................... 53 Internet Filtering ............................................................................................................... 53 Internet Filtering Roles and Responsibilities .................................................................... 60 Email Monitoring and Forced Password Disclosure .......................................................... 60 Restricting Access to the Internet .................................................................................... 66 Internet Cafes: Rules for Cafe Operators ........................................................................... 67 Pressure to Censor: Threats to Bloggers and Facebook Users ........................................... 68 Major Internet Companies in Ethiopia: Transparency Reports ............................................ 70 New Technologies and Their Potential: Intrusive Malware ................................................. 70 Other Surveillance Technologies ..................................................................................... 82 Jamming of Radio and Television Signals ............................................................................... 82 III. Legal Context .............................................................................................................. 88 International Law ................................................................................................................... 88 Freedom of Expression .................................................................................................... 88 Right to Privacy ............................................................................................................... 90 Responsibilities of Companies ......................................................................................... 91 Ethiopian Law ......................................................................................................................... 93 Freedom of Expression and Access to Information ............................................................ 93 Right to Privacy ................................................................................................................ 95 IV. The Future of Ethiopia’s Telecommunications Surveillance Capacity ............................ 99 Acknowledgments .......................................................................................................... 100 Appendix 1: A Sampling of Blocked Websites in Ethiopia ................................................. 101 Appendix 2: Correspondence ........................................................................................... 105 GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS BPR Business Process Reengineering CALEA Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act CESCR Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights CITCC China International Telecom Corporation CSO Law Charities and Societies Proclamation CUD Coalition for Unity and Democracy DPI Deep Packet Inspection DW Deutsche Welle EDF Ethiopian Defense Forces EICTDA Ethiopian Information and Communication Technology Development Agency EPRDF Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front EPRP Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party ESAT Ethiopian Satellite Television ETA Ethiopian Telecommunication Agency ETC Ethiopia Telecommunications Corporation GPS Global Positioning System ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ICS Intelligent Charging System ICT Information and Communications Technology IM Instant Message INSA Information Network Security Agency ITU International Telecommunication Union MCIT Ministry of Communications and Information Technology NGO Nongovernmental organization NISS National Intelligence and Security Services OLF Oromo Liberation Front ONC Oromo National Congress ONI Open Network Initiative ONLF Ogaden National Liberation Front OPC Oromo People’s Congress PID Project Information Document PSCAP Public Sector Capacity Building Program SIM Subscriber Identity Module SMS Short Message Service TPLF Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicles UDJ Union for Democracy and Justice VOA Voice of America VOBME Voice of the Broad Masses of Eritrea VoIP Voice over Internet Protocol VSAT Very Small Aperture Terminal WTO World Trade Organization ZTEsec ZTE Special Equipment Company Summary One day they arrested me and they showed me everything. They showed me a list of all my phone calls and they played a conversation I had with my brother. They arrested me because we talked about politics on the phone. It was the first phone I ever owned, and I thought I could finally talk freely. — Former member of an Oromo opposition party, now a refugee in Kenya, May 2013 Since 2010, Ethiopia’s information technology capabilities have grown by leaps and bounds. Although Ethiopia still lags well behind many other countries in Africa, mobile phone coverage is increasing and access to email and social media have opened up opportunities for young Ethiopians—especially those living in urban areas—to communicate with each other and share viewpoints and ideas. The Ethiopian
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