Garissa Market in Nairobi suburb Eastleigh (Dan Kori/Wikipedia)
Islamic Radicalization in Kenya
By William R. Patterson
n September 2013, an attack carried of Eastleigh, known for its large Somali threat to its national interests in Kenya out by the al Qaeda–affiliated terror- ex-patriot population. Four other specifically and in the Horn of Africa I ist group al-Shabaab on the Westgate Somalis have been charged with helping more generally. shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya, drew to plan the operation, two of whom had The first major terrorist attack to hit renewed attention to the extremist Kenyan citizenship and identification Kenya occurred at the U.S. Embassy in threat facing that country. At least four cards.1 This attack was only the latest in Nairobi on August 7, 1998. This attack attackers left more than 65 people dead a string of terrorist incidents stretching was carried out with a truck bomb, kill- after a multiday rampage. All four of back to the late 1990s. It should serve ing 214 people and injuring more than the known assailants were Somalis who as a stark reminder to the United States 5,000. On November 22, 2002, another had been living in the Nairobi suburb that terrorism remains a significant set of attacks included the detonation of a truck bomb at an Israeli-owned resort and the launching of missiles at an Israeli- chartered aircraft leaving the airport in Dr. William R. Patterson is a former Social Scientist with the Human Terrain System who served in Mombasa. Sixteen Israelis and Kenyans Afghanistan and has been selected to be a Foreign Service Officer with the Department of State. This article is a modified version that the author originally published while serving with the Human were killed in the blast at the hotel, Terrain System. though no one was killed in the attack on
16 Forum / Islamic Radicalization in Kenya JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 the plane. Al Qaeda was responsible for hood of Eastleigh. Ethnically, Kenya’s authority within the Muslim community, each of these attacks.2 Muslims are primarily Swahili or Somali, that authority came to be challenged Since those early attacks, the gov- although there are also sizable Arab and during the 20th century and remains an ernment of Kenya has become an Asian (predominantly Indian and Paki- area of contention between different important strategic partner in the U.S. stani) groups.5 Muslim groups today. Government’s counterterrorism efforts In addition to ethnic divisions among During the end of the 19th and in the broader Horn of Africa region. Kenya’s Muslims, there are also key dif- beginning of the 20th centuries, the ter- In October 2011, the Kenyan Defense ferences in the types of Islam practiced. ritories that make up Kenya today were Forces launched an offensive against Scholar Bjørn Møller writes that the colonized by the British Empire. The al-Shabaab called Operation Linda Nchi Kenyan Muslim community can be cate- interior of the country was chartered to (OLN)—Swahili for “protect the na- gorized as follows: the Imperial British East Africa Company tion”—in Somalia. While OLN enjoyed in 1888, became a formal protectorate in a majority of indigenous Kenyan the approval of most Kenyans, it also •• 1895, and a colony in 1920. The Muslim Muslims belong to Sufi orders, espe- prompted criticism from Kenyan Muslim coastal area remained a protectorate but cially in rural areas communities. was administered in the same fashion as reformists, more conservative Isla- In 2012, Kenya passed a tough an- •• was the colony, meaning there was little mists, are another primary grouping, titerrorism bill called the Prevention of practical difference.11 mainly in the cities and among Arabs Terrorism Act 2012. Though the passage Administratively, the British catego- a small sect called the Ahmadiya, of this bill was not as controversial as •• rized people as either native or nonnative, which was responsible for the first some earlier iterations, it still elicited providing different privileges to each, with translation of the Koran into Kiswa- criticism from Kenyan human rights and nonnative receiving preferential treatment. hili, probably numbers no more than Muslim groups. In addition, riots blam- Swahilis did not fit easily into either of a few thousand ing the Kenyan police for the extrajudicial those categories. As Jeremy Prestholdt mainstream Sunni Muslims, mainly killing of al-Shabaab–linked Muslim •• points out, “most occupied the awkward among Asians Youth Center (MYC) cleric Aboud Rogo3 position of having neither a recognized a small number of Shi’ites, also and the growing activity of the MYC are •• African ‘tribal’ identity nor the higher mainly among Asians.6 indicative of increased Islamic radicalism legal status of Non-Native. By the end of in Kenya. This presents a substantial risk Muslims settled on Pate Island the colonial era, this nebulous position of terrorism against the Kenyan gov- (part of the Lamu archipelago in Coast contributed to perceptions of Swahilis ernment, Western targets in Kenya, and Province) as early as the 8th century. This as neither completely African nor, by neighboring countries in the region. presence grew considerably during the extension, Kenyan.”12 The legacy of that This article explores the development 12th century as trade increased in the division remains today as many contem- of radicalization in Kenya in recent Indian Ocean in general and along the porary Kenyans continue to see Muslims decades and the sociocultural and po- coast of East Africa in particular. The more as foreigners than as true Kenyans. litical factors that have undergirded it. earliest Muslim settlers came primarily Another colonial practice that Additionally, it highlights four general from what are now Oman, Yemen, and served to split Muslims from the larger factors influencing the rising threat of Iran, establishing communities along the society was the introduction and spe- Islamic radicalism in Kenya: institutional Somali coast, Lamu, Mombasa, Zanzibar, cial treatment of Christianity. Abdalla weaknesses; increasingly acute grievances and other coastal areas of East Africa. Bujra explains that Christianity came by the Muslim minority; the establish- As these settlers intermarried with each to predominate in Kenya, and Western ment of Wahhabi and other extremist other and with local people, Swahili cul- culture generally developed preeminence forms of Islam in Kenya, along with at- ture evolved over time. Islam became the through the school system and through tendant jihadi ideology and propaganda; core of Swahili culture, but the culture was examples set by colonial officials and and Kenya’s foreign and military policy, also influenced by many traditional aspects British settlers. Kenya’s Muslims became particularly as it pertains to Somalia. of indigenous African religious beliefs.7 culturally isolated as the Christian Church Lamu and Mombasa became the primary and Western educational system became Islam in Kenya areas of Islamic learning and scholarship established in the rest of the country.13 Approximately 4.3 million Muslims in Kenya.8 Swahili culture and Islam Not only was Christianity privileged, comprise a little more than 10 percent remained largely confined to the coastal but Islam was also denigrated. Bujra of the overall Kenyan population and areas where trade flourished, though Islam notes that “through Church activities about 30 percent of the coastal popula- eventually established a foothold in the and education, and later through the tion.4 Large concentrations of Kenyan capital city of Nairobi as well.9 Among colonial education and media, both Muslims live in Coast Province, North some of the settlers, particularly in Lamu, Church, Colonial Administration, and East Province, and the capital city of were sayyids, descendants of the Prophet the European settler communities Nairobi, particularly in the neighbor- Mohammad.10 Traditionally granted great propagated very strong anti-Arab and
JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Patterson 17 anti-Islamic misinformation and pro- for themselves in Kenya, many Muslims sayyid (also called masharifu), whose paganda. Hence Swahili/Arab political traveled abroad to the Middle East, par- power base remained centered in Lamu. influences essentially came to a halt in ticularly Saudi Arabia, for work. Authors Kresse explains that the conflict between [Kenya].”14 This political disenfran- Esha Faki Mwinyihaji and Frederick O. Khasim and the masharifu chisement has never been remedied and Wanyama note that: remains a major grievance of Kenya’s centered on the social and religious status of Muslims to this day. The employment sector was seen as closed to the masharifu, the descendants of Prophet The political disenfranchisement many Muslims. As a result of the oil boom Muhammad. In popular perception the of Kenya’s Muslims continued after in the 1970s and 1980s, many young masharifu, as holy persons with special Kenya’s independence in 1963. The Muslims went to work as expatriates in blessings, fulfilled an important religious Kenyan African National Union Saudi Arabia where the remuneration function of mediating between Muslim (KANU) immediately came to power was good with the minimal education commoners and God, via the Prophet and instituted one-party rule. KANU, they had. For almost two decades Saudi Muhammad, to whom they were said to strongly linked to Christian ethnic Arabia and the Persian Gulf served as a be especially close. But Sheikh Muhammed groups, was perceived as benefiting safe haven for some Kenyan Muslims to Khasim insisted, with reference to the those groups disproportionately while work and progress economically.18 Qur’an, that they did not have any such largely ignoring problems specific to special powers and, furthermore, it was up Muslims.15 Due to their marginalization One of the impacts of greater ex- to each individual to establish a direct con- in the political process and conse- posure to the Middle East—and Saudi tact to God through special prayers (dua), quential lack of influence in Kenyan Arabia in particular—was the introduc- independently.23 politics, dissent grew among Muslims. tion of stricter interpretations of Islam Immediately upon Kenyan indepen- by Kenyan Muslims returning home. Khasim distributed his teachings dence, the Mwambao United Front This provoked a conflict between older through pamphlets and educational movement emerged in Kenya’s coastal Swahili interpretations of Islam that books. This served to threaten the au- communities calling for the autonomy of incorporated elements of indigenous thority of the masharifu and represented the coastal strip of Kenya. This was seen African religions and practices imported an opening salvo in the dispute between by some Kenyan Muslims as the only from the Middle East. This schism was Islam as traditionally practiced in Kenya way to achieve a political system that also generated by Kenyan students who and stricter interpretations of Islam more honored their religious beliefs.16 Today completed their studies in the Middle recently imported from the Middle East. the Mombasa Republican Council has East. In so doing, they adopted stricter An illustrative case study of this rift taken up this cause and has attracted religious practices, which they brought is provided by Susan Beckerleg in her significant support. back with them to their communities.19 anthropological work in the coastal city Other Swahilis attempted to use the According to Kai Kresse: of Watamu. A reformist movement called more traditional political route by estab- Halali Sunna took root there, which lishing the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) Proficient in Arabic, the graduates re- stood in opposition to the traditional in 1992. However, explicitly religious turned with university degrees and the masharifu. The adherents of this move- parties are illegal in Kenya, and the IPK reformist doctrines of their respective host ment followed a stricter form of Islam was denied formal political participation. institutions, which were more radical and and criticized the power of the masharifu The IPK complained that all existent combative in tone and content. They ap- as well as the indigenous elements that Kenyan political parties are, if not in name plied these ideas to the East African context had long been established in their form at least in fact, Christian oriented and led in their teachings and public speeches, thus of Islam. They also stressed participation by Christians.17 The rejection of the IPK radicalizing reformist discourse and polar- in traditional Islamic observances such as as a legitimate political party has been per- izing Islamic debate more and more.20 prayer and the duty to imitate the life of ceived by many Muslims as another form Mohammed. The men grew their beards of political alienation and as a deliberate An individual named Sheikh and wore traditional Islamic garb and the suppression of Muslims’ ability to express Muhammed Khasim was especially influ- women also dressed more conservatively their views through the political process. ential along the Swahili coast.21 Khasim than did the typical Muslim women of In addition, many of Kenya’s Muslims was most active during the 1960s and Watamu. This sect was highly influenced perceived themselves as being excluded 1970s and argued that traditional Swahili by the conservative Tabligh Islamic from employment opportunities available Islam included impermissible bid’a (in- movement, which originated in India in to other Kenyans. This was especially novation in religious matters) and shirk the early 20th century and which reached the case as Kenyans from the interior (violating the principle of the unity of Watamu in 1990 by way of migrants.24 of the country began to buy property God) due to the influences of indigenous The adherents of this movement were along the coast during the burgeoning religions.22 He sought to purify Kenyan also evangelical and worked vigorously to tourist industry. Seeing little opportunity Islam and to eliminate the power of the spread their ideas.25
18 Forum / Islamic Radicalization in Kenya JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Much of the local impetus for this reversion to a more conservative form of Islam sprang from social changes being imposed on the community by outside pressures. As Watamu became a popular tourist destination for Westerners, the young people of Watamu became increasingly exposed to the use of alcohol and drugs; im- modest dress at the beach, especially by women; and other behaviors that con- tradicted traditional Islamic precepts and rules of behavior. The adoption of a stricter interpretation of Islam was one way to push back against these dis- orienting cultural and social changes.26 This phenomenon was not limited to Watamu and was in fact occurring in Muslim communities in popular tourist destinations throughout coastal Kenya in particular. This push for the adoption of a more conservative “pure” form of Smoke rises above Westgate Mall in Nairobi, September 23, 2013 (Anne Knight/Wikipedia) Islam, as opposed to the more tra- ditional form of Islam influenced by Forces of Radicalization in the region. It is far easier to operate a cell indigenous African religion, created a There are four main factors that have in Kenya than in any of the Horn coun- space for the development of radicaliza- served to intensify the country’s vulner- tries.”30 Radical and terrorist groups require tion in Kenya. The reform movement ability to radicalization and terrorism: resources to thrive. Infrastructure and some can in retrospect be seen as a first step structural and institutional factors, degree of economic stability allow for ease toward a more radicalized and militant grievances, foreign and military policy, of travel, faster communications, and access form of Islam establishing roots in and jihadist ideology. to resources. the country. The rift created between Structural and Institutional Factors. In terms of communications, traditional and reform Islam became There are several structural and institu- Mwinyihaji and Wanyama point to the more adversarial over time, especially as tional factors that make Kenya vulnerable Internet as being particularly important: outside actors, most prominently from to radicalization: the Middle East and South Asia, began Rapid internet diffusion has led to a the relatively advanced economy and to increasingly influence the movement. •• mushrooming of cyber-cafes charging users infrastructure allows for freedom Kresse writes that: less than a dollar per hour. These units have of movement and an abundance of become crucial sites of Kenyan Muslims’ en- targets Differences in practice and understanding gagement with the global Muslim ummah, weak governance in key areas such as of Islam, which were once tolerated, turned •• enhancing their knowledge of Islam through security, criminal justice system, and to spark off strong animosities, and the cyber-literacy, and networking within and rule of law impede effective action intellectual center of reformist ideology between (cyber)-communities with shared against terrorist groups28 shifted from an internal to an external interests.31 geographical proximity to unstable position, as a multitude of Islamic groups •• states, particularly Somalia, in con- from around the world have sought to in- Such communication is much more junction with porous borders.29 crease their influence and support.27 difficult to achieve in a failed state such Economy and Infrastructure. It seems as Somalia. The trend toward radicalization catalyzed counterintuitive that a relatively robust The infrastructure also offers entic- by the reform movement soon combined economy and infrastructural system—com- ing targets for terrorist groups. Airports, with other forces and only grew stronger pared to neighboring countries—would hotels, resorts, restaurants, and night- during the 1990s and 2000s. make Kenya vulnerable. But as Raymond clubs, as well as government buildings Muhula puts it, “Kenya’s attractiveness to such as the U.S. Embassy, are easily terrorists is exacerbated by the fact that it accessible to terrorists. Furthermore, also boasts the best infrastructural facilities tourists themselves are possible targets
JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Patterson 19 either while they are in the country or marginalized. For most of this period the Ahmad Iman dissuaded Kenyan Muslims during their transit to and from, as the KANU held power in a one-party system. from engaging in national politics, urging 2002 attacks on the Israeli hotel and However, even after Kenyan politics them instead to “Chinja” (cut), “Chonga” charter plane demonstrate. became more democratic, the interests (peel) and “Fiyeka” (slash) the throats of Weak Governance. Weak governance, of the Muslim minority have been largely the [Kenyan] infidels and “to hit back especially in critical areas such as criminal ignored in political circles. and cause blasts [in Kenya]” similar to the justice, border security, and the provision The government established an Kampala bombings.36 of essential services, also increases Kenya’s official Muslim organization—the vulnerability to radicalism and terror. Supreme Council of Muslims of Kenya Alienation from legitimate political Widespread corruption, unguarded (SUPKEM)—in 1973. It was the only institutions may continue to increase borders, and ineffective security and organization authorized to represent the appeal of violent attacks. police organizations allow terrorist or- all of Kenya’s Muslims, and SUPKEM Discrimination and Lack of ganizations freedom of movement, the leaders were closely allied with the polit- Opportunity. Lack of opportunity, in establishment of safe havens, and the abil- ical establishment.34 Being a tool of the some cases as the result of discriminatory ity to coordinate logistical needs.32 government, however, many Muslims policies, contributes to widely held griev- A weak criminal justice system can viewed it more as a way to control them ances in coastal Muslim communities. also result in impunity for terrorists. than to meet their unique interests. The Fathima Badurdeen argues: When suspects are caught, they are organization was not seen as useful for frequently able to evade justice through expressing any political ideas, opinions, or The root cause of youth radicalization in bribery or as a result of sheer incompe- needs that were not already acceptable to Coast stems from the region’s desperate tence in the system. This weakness not the government. economic, social, and political conditions. only allows terror suspects to unjustly The situation has marginally improved Ineffective decentralization of development go free but also fosters police abuses since the end of one-party rule. There plans and governance issues since indepen- due to their inability to use the legal are now several national-level Muslim dence form the backbone of this situation, system successfully. entities with some degree of indepen- which is taken advantage of by an infra- Geography. Kenya’s close proximity dent political influence. These include, structure of social networks or religious and to unstable states (Somalia, Uganda, among others, the National Muslim political groups that provide communities South Sudan, and Ethiopia), along with Leaders Forum, Majlis Ulamaa Kenya, with what the government does not and are its inability to protect its borders, are Kenya Council of Imams and Ulamaas, in some instances extremist.37 other risk factors. This is especially true and Council of Imams and Preachers of Somalia and even more so in the af- of Kenya.35 These are primarily interest Unemployment is rife in the Muslim termath of Operation Linda Nchi. The groups and councils, however, and do population. North East Province, Nairobi, al-Shabaab terrorist group in Somalia not wield any direct power or authority. and Coast Province, all three with high sends adherents back and forth across the While they give the Muslim community Muslim populations, had the highest border.33 Additionally, Kenya’s proximity an outlet to express itself, they have not levels of unemployment in the country to the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, and the led to sufficient representation within as of 2005–2006,38 as well as the highest Middle East more broadly has allowed for government itself or to remedies for the rates of youth unemployment in 2008.39 the steady penetration of jihadist ideol- unique problems and interests of Kenya’s Furthermore, economic development in ogies as travel between Kenya and these Muslim communities. the tourism industry, particularly in Coast areas is relatively easy. Without political power, Muslims Province, has generally advanced without Grievances. Kenyan Muslims have sev- have not been able to advocate success- input from the local Muslim population eral grievances, many of which have their fully for the needs of their communities and has also largely excluded them from its roots in colonial history. The structural and have largely been left behind in terms benefits. Fatima Azmiya Badurdeen writes, and institutional vulnerabilities discussed of economic and educational opportuni- “The government’s attitude toward and above exacerbate these grievances: ties. Lacking a legitimate political path to plans for the coastal communities have led address grievances, some Muslims turn citizens in Coast to feel that their resources lack of representation in politics •• to religious extremism to affect change. are being used for the benefit of others.”40 discrimination and lack of economic, •• A report prepared by the United Nations She provides the example of a port devel- educational, and other opportunities Monitoring Group responsible for East opment project in Lamu. Locals believed heavy-handedness and human rights •• Africa noted that: that the project was being forced on them abuses by the police and antiterror- and complained that they have had little ism legislation and tactics. During a 13 September 2010 lecture, input regarding decisionmaking. This lack Political Representation. Since Kenya’s addressing [Muslim Youth Center, an of local representation is typical of the independence from Britain in 1963, the offshoot of al-Shabaab] combatants and types of interactions that have led to high country’s Muslims have been politically other Swahili-speaking fighters in Somalia, levels of resentment.
20 Forum / Islamic Radicalization in Kenya JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Disparities in educational opportuni- in Mombasa in 2002 brought terrorism was reintroduced in 2006, only to be ties have also been a problem, and with to the forefront in Kenya. The United defeated again. less access to government-run schools, States pressured the government to enact In October 2012, the Prevention many Muslim families have turned to various legislation and policies to fight of Terrorism Act was passed. This law madrassas and to foreign education. terrorism in Kenya to prevent the coun- prescribes stiff punishments for people According to the International Crisis try’s use as a base for al Qaeda or other engaged in terrorist attacks, planning, Group (ICG), since the late 1970s radical groups. However, some of these recruiting, or other activities. It also al- Kenya’s madrassas have been domi- efforts have had the unintended conse- lows terrorism suspects to be extradited nated by wealthy Wahhabi charities and quence of further radicalizing elements of to other countries for prosecution. Most foundations. Madrassas at the primary the population. Since the terrorist attacks of the issues that Muslims objected to and secondary level have been prevalent in 2002, some Kenyan Muslims have in earlier versions of the bill have been throughout urban areas for decades and complained of being unfairly targeted ameliorated through amendments and have frequently focused on teaching and of being the victims of human rights this version garnered some support in the Arabic and Wahhabi theology. In fact, abuses, including arbitrary arrest and tor- Muslim community.47 Other Muslims con- religious inculcation rather than an em- ture during interrogations.44 tinue to complain about the bill, however, ployable education has often been the Muslim human rights groups oper- again arguing that it is aimed at them.48 primary aim of these institutions. The ating in Kenya document government It is important to view these legisla- brightest of the students would then be abuse. Al-Amin Kimathi, chair of the tive initiatives and alleged human rights granted scholarships to Wahhabi-oriented Muslim Human Rights Forum, claimed abuses in the context of social separation universities in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, or in media accounts that at least seven that has historically existed between other Middle Eastern countries.41 Muslims, most with alleged ties to al- Muslims and the government. Jeremy Finally, many Kenyan Muslims also Shabaab, disappeared in 2013. He also Prestholdt points out that “counterter- say they are discriminated against by the surmised that inefficiencies within the rorism has alienated Muslim communities government overall. They complain of criminal justice system had hampered legal who for nearly three decades have voiced being treated as foreigners, about the investigations and caused security officers feelings of economic and political mar- inability to get documents such as IDs to act outside of the law. According to ginalization.”49 These counterterrorism and passports, and harassment of citizens Kimathi, “They [police] reach a point actions, or the perceptions that they from Arab countries coming to Kenya.42 where they get frustrated by the law and have created, have had the unintended This has been particularly difficult since the court process and they have realized consequence of exacerbating preexisting the strict enforcement of passport regu- that the only way to deal with these people grievances and social cleavages. They lations implemented in 2001. After the is to ‘disappear’ them.”45 have deepened an attitude of mistrust and terrorist attacks of 9/11, the United Additionally, various legislative ini- have possibly had the opposite of their States pressured the Kenyan government tiatives, particularly the Suppression of desired effect by further radicalizing ag- to more scrupulously examine the pass- Terrorism Bill first introduced in 2002, grieved segments of the population. The ports of citizens of Asian or Arab descent. have been viewed by many Kenyan International Crisis Group argues that In response, the government has required Muslims as specifically targeting them. while the threat posed by groups such that to obtain a new passport or renew a The bill was drafted with little or no input as al-Shabaab is real, overreaction and previously held one, citizens of Asian or from the Muslim community, and it was human rights abuses by police and other Arab ancestry, including Swahilis, must criticized for having an overly broad security actors may be counterproductive. present their grandfather’s birth certif- definition of terrorism, extensive police The group warns that “reckless police icate—a requirement that few Kenyans powers to detain people, and providing action has become a deepening concern of any group can comply with. Many the minister for internal security with the and could radicalize Kenyan Somalis, Kenyan Muslims consider the enforce- power to label any group as a terrorist as well as Muslims in general. Kenya ment of these restrictive passport laws to organization. The most controversial urgently needs to reform its internal secu- be openly discriminatory against them aspect, however, was the power granted rity services; what is presently on display “at the behest of the United States.”43 to police to arrest any person “who, in is an incoherent system that weakens As seen below, many grievances held by a public place wears an item of clothing national security.”50 Kenyan Muslims stem from such coun- . . . in such a way or in such circum- Kenya has taken several steps to terterrorism efforts. stances as to arouse suspicion that he strengthen terrorism legislation, investigate Counterterrorism and Human is a member or supporter of a declared terrorist organizations operating in Kenya, Rights Abuses. The bombing of the U.S. terrorist organization.”46 Muslims feared and arrest suspected terrorist operatives. Embassy in Nairobi in 1998, the attacks that this would allow members of their These steps are crucial to inhibiting the on New York City and the Pentagon community to be targeted merely be- ability of terrorist groups to operate there. in 2001, and the attacks against an cause of their appearance. Due to these They may backfire, however, if they are Israeli-owned hotel and charter plane complaints, the bill was withdrawn. It viewed as targeting the entire Muslim
JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Patterson 21 community or as relying on draconian Foreign and Military Policies. government and heightened their sense of tactics contrary to human rights. The unin- Kenyan foreign and military policies victimization.56 tended second-order effects of these efforts anger many Kenyan Muslims and More recently, Operation Linda Nchi may be to increase radicalization and re- serve as a powerful ideological tool for has led to protests and outright violence ceptivity to the messages being propagated radicalization. They complain that the in Kenya. In October 2011, the Kenyan by terrorist groups. Closer engagement government’s relationships with the Defense Forces joined Somali, Ethiopian, between government representatives and United States and Israel are too close and and French troops in an operation to Muslim leaders over pending legislation, that Kenya’s multiple military interven- drive al Qaeda–affiliate al-Shabaab from even-handed application of the law, and tions in Somalia targeted Muslims at the Somalia. That intervention led to a back- thorough investigations of alleged human behest of the United States. The Islamic lash of attacks in Kenya itself. More than rights violations may ameliorate some of Liberation Army of the People of Kenya, 20 attacks linked to al-Shabaab have been these effects. for example, used Kenya’s close ties with conducted in Kenya since the operation Jihadist Ideology. Jihadist organiza- the United States and Israel as justifica- began. Most of these attacks have tar- tions in Kenya use a variety of ideological tion for the attack on the U.S. Embassy geted nightclubs, bars, and churches.57 tools and radical Islamic teachings to in Nairobi in 1998. After the attack they The ICG warned at the time that: galvanize the Muslim population there released the following statement: toward violence. The grievances, cultural Views within the ethnic Somali and wider ties, and influx of jihadist philosophy The Americans humiliate our people, they Muslim community regarding the war are through the increase of madrassas in occupy the Arabian peninsula, they extract mixed but predominately critical. . . . The Kenya have served to legitimate and our riches, they impose a blockade and, notion that the war is popular within the spread radical ideology. Ethnic heritage besides, they support the Jews of Israel, our Muslim community is wishful thinking, is also an important factor. A report worse [sic] enemies, who occupy the Al-Aqsa and has the potential to exacerbate already prepared for the Combating Terrorism mosque. . . . The attack was justified be- worrying radicalization in the country is Center at West Point notes that “Many cause the government of Kenya recognized very real.58 residents of Mombasa, Malindi, and that the Americans had used the country’s Lamu [all in Coast Province] hold stron- territory to fight against its Moslem neigh- This turned out to be prescient. ger ties with the Arabian Peninsula than bors, in particular Somalia. Besides, Kenya Several historical and current factors with Kenya’s own interior.”51 Raymond cooperated with Israel. In this country one have recently combined to increase the Muhula also argues that ethnic ties make finds the most anti-Islamic Jewish centers potential of terrorist activity in Kenya. some of Kenya’s Muslims particularly in all East Africa. It is from Kenya that Structural and institutional weaknesses, receptive to jihadist ideology emanating the Americans supported the separatist historical grievances, the influx of radical from the Middle East and other parts of war in Southern Sudan, pursued by John ideology, and military intervention in the world.52 Garang’s fighters.55 Somalia have galvanized extremists and As noted earlier, over the past several increased the likelihood of terrorist acts in decades there has been a reformist move- Intervention in Somalia has been a Kenya. Kenyan counterterrorism efforts ment that has sought to “purify” Islam of particularly strong catalyst for radicalism will continue, but attention should be the indigenous elements that it has accrued among some Muslims in Kenya. In 2006, paid to their unintended second-order from traditional African religious practices. for example, the Kenyan government al- effects, as well as the historical and social This movement led to the establishment lowed the United States to use its territory context of these activities, so that nega- of a more conservative—and eventually to support Ethiopian military operations tive effects can be ameliorated. radical—form of Islam in Kenya. Radical against Somalia. The government also Islam is on a track of increasing radical- jihadist ideology has been increasingly cooperated with U.S. efforts to track al ization in the country and groups linked disseminated through mosques, madrassas, Qaeda operatives among the resultant ref- to al Qaeda and al-Shabaab pose a signif- and community development initiatives53 ugees, and Kenyan security forces arrested icant and growing threat to Kenya and as well as through the radical publication at least 150 people from various countries. to Western persons and interests in that Al-Misbah, which is published by the MYC At least 90 of those arrested were later sent country. Recognition of the threat and its and The Weekly Muslim News Update. Both to Somalia and Ethiopia. The government underlying causes is necessary for redress- of these publications have used Koranic denied that any of the deported refugees ing those causes and reducing the threat teachings to foment jihad and have criti- were Kenyan citizens, but Raila Odinga, level posed by radical Islamic groups. JFQ cized the Kenyan government over a variety an opposition candidate for the presi- of issues including economic disparities dency, released the names of 19 Kenyan and discrimination, arbitrary arrests, and Muslims who he claimed were deported. Notes Kenya’s military relationship with the This incident inflamed tensions with the 1 United States.54 Muslim community in Kenya and aroused Lateef Mungin, “Hearing Starts, Ad- journed for 4 Suspects in Kenya Mall Attack,” their deep-seated distrust toward the
22 Forum / Islamic Radicalization in Kenya JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 CNN.com, January 14, 2014, available at Terrorism Center, July 2007), 47, available at 51 Watts, Shapiro, and Brown, 51.
JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Patterson 23