Collision on the Elbe Off Brunsbüttel Lock
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KIN ED GD IT O N M DWE ST U • E A M IT N • N D U N A D L O I R V L I I A I D F T T E D W E A I SPRING 2007 No.289 M I E C P SO The official organ of the United Kingdom Maritime Pilots’Association ILOTS AS Editorial MAIB Report: Collision on the Elbe off Brunsbüttel Lock For this month’s feature I have chosen the Last December the MAIB released a report into a collision, subsequent sinking followed MAIB report into a collision, grounding by another collision of the entrance to the Kiel Kanal off Brunsbüttel, all under the Elbe and sinking on the Elbe at the entrance to VTS control tower. In my opinion this particular MAIB report is of interest to pilots in Brunsbuttel locks which subsequently that I believe that it is the first report to examine the roles of a vessel excluded from resulted in a further collision with the pilotage, a vessel with a PEC holder, VTS and subsequently a piloted vessel. As mentioned wreck of the earlier incident. With all this in my editorial neither the Master of the British vessel involved nor the VTS authority happening within site of the relevant VTS participated in the enquiry and the report has some interesting comments on that policy. tower it serves to highlight the risks involved in what are “routine” operations in ports. Whilst the P&I Clubs are becoming increasingly vociferous over claims resulting from what they term as “pilot error”, the very nature of our job means that we handle ships in an environment for which they were never really designed with a Master and bridge team (if such a thing actually exists) who are usually totally unfamiliar with the district being navigated. It is in these conditions that the pilot, having the conduct of the vessel, is basically operating alone and thus has the awesome responsibility for assessing and constantly reassessing the risks as elements such as MV Arctic Ocean – Routine Departure? other vessels manoeuvring, a cut in the predicted tide or a deterioration of the SYNOPSIS report states that “Both masters were weather combine to place the vessel at the attempting to carry out the duties of pilot limit of its operating parameters. In such At 1955 on 5 December 2005, the UK and watchkeeping officer. This caused circumstances one relatively minor element registered 6,326gt container feeder vessel, them both to be overloaded at a critical can easily result in a reportable incident as Arctic Ocean, was leaving Brunsbüttel stage of their vessel’s passage, leading to was the case on the Elbe. The initial Lock to turn east across the westbound misjudgements”. incident off Brunsbuttel resulted from a fairway of the Elbe River to head for The capsized wreck of Maritime Lady collision between a vessel excluded from Hamburg. At the same time, the Gibraltar drifted until it came to rest in a position pilotage requirements and a vessel under registered 1,857gt general cargo vessel 0.75miles south-west of the exit basin of conduct of a PEC holder which has raised Maritime Lady was in the westbound Brunsbüttel Locks. relevant comment about watchkeeper fairway heading for the North Sea. The After the collision, Brunsbüttel Locks manning and overload in the report. The two vessels collided at 1957, with the were closed until 2100. The first vessel to piloted vessel collided with the wreckage of result that Maritime Lady capsized. The then leave the locks was the 11,598gt the original incident as a result of an master of Arctic Ocean held a Pilotage chemical tanker, Sunny Blossom. She had a undeclared defect on the vessel which Exemption certificate and Maritime Lady pilot on board and was to head west, to the raises other relevant points. From the P&I was below the size where regulation North Sea, after leaving the lock’s exit viewpoint although only one vessel was required a pilot to be carried. The MAIB basin. under the conduct of an authorised pilot it is probable that because the incident occurred within port limits the P&I Clubs involved will statistically classify the claims In This Issue New Technology Radar JCB for all three vessels as “pilot error”. This Elbe report is also topical in that neither Editorial: John Clandillon-Baker Techncal & Training Gareth Rees the Elbe VTS authority nor the Master of MAIB report Edited JCB UKMPA – The Future? Avald Wymark Maritime Lady the agreed to participate in Chairman’s Report Joe Wilson Obituaries the investigation. Incident Reporting! Important Notice – GMDSS Certificate John Clandillon-Baker FNI Pension News Debbie Marten New Pilotmag Website Email: [email protected] Spring 2007 2 The Pilot Buoy 58a New locks Old locks Wreck of Maritime Lady at 2104 on 05/12/05 Position of collision X between Arctic Ocean X and Maritime Lady After leaving the lock basin, Sunny BETVTS until after the collision! the Master’s unfamiliarity with using a Blossom was attempting to make the turn At about 1950, having let go, the Master Becker rudder rather than a mechanical to the west, when her stern struck the who was alone on the bridge, set the defect. One very relevant point made by wreck of Maritime Lady, causing serious engine to half ahead and proceeded out of the investigators regarding the Maritime propeller damage and a total loss of the lock and commenced swinging to port Lady is the following important propulsion. She then continued south into the river to cross the Westbound observation on the practice of two man across the Elbe River, until she grounded fairway to proceed to Hamburg (see chart). watchkeeping: on the south bank. There was only slight His speed on clearing the lock was Another reason the master was alone on damage to her hull and no pollution. estimated at 8-10 kts. It was at this stage the bridge was that Maritime Lady, was Sunny Blossom’s ability to make the that the master saw the green navigation not required to take a pilot for the river westerly turn and clear the wreck of light and masthead light of an outward passage. Had a pilot been required, then it Maritime Lady was hampered by a strong bound vessel which he identified as is reasonable to suppose that the pilot ebb tide, the effects of shallow water, some Maritime Lady from the AIS, and he would have had either the master or the cropping of her propeller and an effective judged her range as 1.5 miles. This chief officer on the bridge with him. Thus, rudder area being at the lower end of subsequently turned out to be erroneous two qualified navigators would have been acceptable limits. with the actual range being half that on the bridge, offering assurance that As a result of this incident the Federal distance at 7.5 cables. Crossing the neither was overloaded. Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Westbound lane the Master of the Arctic The master of any vessel, carrying only a Affairs has therefore been recommended to Ocean noticed that Maritime Lady was master and one other deck officer, is likely review requirements for bridge manning still showing a green sidelight. A to be faced with a dilemma in pilotage levels on vessels in its pilotage waters, subsequent VHF exchange between the waters where his vessel is not required to emergency procedures, procedures two vessels confirmed red to red passing take a pilot. Either the vessel is navigated, covering the briefing of vessels leaving but shortly afterwards the Maritime Lady often in busy and restricted waters, by just Brunsbüttel Locks and the prioritisation of called again on VHF stating that he had one officer or both officers are on the VTS operators’ tasks. steering problems and requested a green to bridgefor the passage and they risk green passing. Both vessels then attempted exceeding the allowable hours of work. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS to take emergency action but the Arctic Neither is desirable. Ocean collided with the starboard side of At 1941 the Arctic Ocean made a routine Maritime Lady. BETVTS, having observed the collision, call to Brunsbüttel Elbe Traffic VTS Due to the fact that the Master of the sent out a MAYDAY alert and requested (BETVTS) providing vessel details and Maritime Lady didn’t cooperate with the that tugs proceed to the area. The Arctic advising them that upon leaving the lock enquiry the MAIB were unable to obtain Ocean broke clear of the Maritime Lady he would be proceeding inwards to an account of his actions. However, and BETVTS directed her to anchor. An Hamburg. It would appear from the examination of the vessel revealed no inspection revealed minimal damage. narrative that no traffic information was problems with the rudder or steering gear On board the Maritime Lady the provided to the Master and that no further and it was therefore assumed that the situation rapidly became serious as a communication with VTS was held with reported steering problems resulted from starboard list developed as soon as the The Pilot 3 Spring 2007 Arctic Lady drifted clear. Fortunately, all did not advise the pilot of either the imating the distance from the Maritime the crew members had lifejackets and recognised poor steering characteristic or Lady and since he had no assistance on launched two liferafts, one of which failed the cropped propeller blades. The MAIB the bridge the report concluded that to inflate. The Master contacted BETVTS report has determined that if the propeller the workload was unreasonable and and requested a location to berth or blades had been complete then the pilot’s significantly contributed to him misjudging ground the vessel but the list increased so orders would have resulted in the vessel the range of Maritime Lady and since the much that it was decided to abandon the clearing the wreck.