Impediments and Enhancements to the Flow of Capital and Information Through Financial Markets
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- Impediments and enhancements to the flow of capital and information through financial markets Hamilton, Dennis https://iro.uiowa.edu/discovery/delivery/01IOWA_INST:ResearchRepository/12788582970002771?l#13788582960002771 Hamilton, D. (2020). Impediments and enhancements to the flow of capital and information through financial markets [University of Iowa]. https://doi.org/10.17077/etd.005602 https://iro.uiowa.edu Copyright 2020 Dennis Hamilton Downloaded on 2021/09/26 04:52:45 -0500 - Impediments and Enhancements to the Flow of Capital and Information Through Financial Markets by Dennis Hamilton A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in Business Administration in the Graduate College of The University of Iowa August 2020 Thesis Committee: Jarjisu Sa-Aadu, Thesis Supervisor Artem Durnev Jon Garfinkel Erik Lie Ashish Tiwari ABSTRACT In the first chapter, I examine the capital market consequences of a post-crisis banking regulation. Banks increased held-to-maturity (HTM) classifications by more than $600 billion between 2010 and 2016 despite binding sale restrictions that render HTM securities illiquid. They accepted this friction in order to protect regulatory capital ratios from Basel III’s expanded marking to market of fixed income security portfolios. I find the unprecedented rise in restrictive HTM classifications crowds out dealer inventories, resulting in constrained market making capacity and reduced liquidity provisions by banks. Ultimately, market liquidity worsens for securities most frequently classified as HTM. Contemporaneous regulations are ruled out through analyses of treated and control banks, dealers, asset classes and mortgage-backed securities. In the second chapter, I examine NBA betting markets, a potentially cleaner laboratory for testing theories regarding insider trading and market quality. Disgraced referee Tim Donaghy, who was indicted following the 2006-2007 season for betting on his own games, provides exogenous variation in insider trading as he was assigned to referee games involving every team in the league. Abnormal price behavior begins as soon as Donaghy’s information network expands, and market makers provide less liquidity once the insiders’ presence becomes apparent, as theory would predict. Market efficiency increases in price movements, suggesting that insider trading improves price discovery. In the final chapter, my co-authors and I study why creditors simultaneously hold debt and equity in the same firm. We posit that holding both debt and equity can protect the value of debt which may be at risk for expropriation by stockholders. Using a regression discontinuity design and exogenous events that increase the probability of a wealth transfer, we find that ii creditors respond by purchasing equity. Importantly, this effect is true for bondholders but not for lenders who are already protected via control rights. iii PUBLIC ABSTRACT I examine frictions and enhancements to the flow of capital and information through markets. In the first chapter, I identify a post-crisis regulation and its unintended consequence. Banks are incentivized to lock bonds away on their balance sheets and discouraged from serving as a conduit through which those bonds trade between more natural buyers and sellers. In the second chapter, I examine betting prices for NBA games officiated by a crooked referee to test theories relating insider trading to market quality. I find such insider trading leads to abnormal price movement and less liquid markets but also contributes to more accurate market prices. In the final chapter, I show investors rebalance their holdings of debt and equity in firms to mitigate value-destroying conflicts between shareholders and creditors. These results provide evidence of investors, acting in their own self-interests, catalyzing a self-correcting mechanism that smooths market frictions. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................................ vii LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... ix CHAPTER 1: WHICH POST-CRISIS REGULATIONS ARE CONSTRAINING BANKS MARKET MAKING? EVIDENCE FROM STRATEGICE ACCOUNTING CLASSIFICATIONS .......................................................................................................................1 1.1. Introduction .........................................................................................................................1 1.2. Background and Hypothesis Development .........................................................................7 1.2.1. Strategic Classification Decisions ............................................................................. 7 1.2.2. Consequences for Fixed Income Securities ............................................................ 10 1.3. Identification Strategy .......................................................................................................12 1.4. Data ...................................................................................................................................14 1.5. Empirical Results ..............................................................................................................17 1.5.1. Rising Held-to-Maturity Classifications ................................................................. 17 1.5.2. Rising Held-to-Maturity Classifications ................................................................. 20 1.5.3. Less Liquid Capital Markets ................................................................................... 27 1.6. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................34 CHAPTER 2: ON THE MARKET EFFECTS OF INSIDER TRADING: EVIDENCE FROM THE NBA’S MOST NOTORIOUS REFEREE ............................................................................61 2.1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................61 2.2. Literature Review..............................................................................................................67 2.2.1. Liquidity Provisions ................................................................................................ 67 2.2.2. Price Discovery ....................................................................................................... 70 2.2.3. Sports Betting Markets ........................................................................................... 71 2.3. Empirical Setting ..............................................................................................................72 2.4. Data ...................................................................................................................................74 v 2.5. Empirical Results ..............................................................................................................76 2.5.1. Trading Behavior .................................................................................................... 76 2.5.2. Price Volatility ........................................................................................................ 79 2.5.3. Liquidity Provisions ................................................................................................ 81 2.5.4. Market Efficiency ................................................................................................... 83 2.6. Discussion .........................................................................................................................88 2.7. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................90 CHAPTER 3: DUAL OWNERSHIP AS A MARKET SOLUTION TO RISK SHIFTING: EVIDENCE FROM LOAN COVENANT VIOLATIONS .........................................................110 3.1. Introduction .....................................................................................................................110 3.2. Literature .........................................................................................................................114 3.3. Identification Strategy .....................................................................................................117 3.4. Data .................................................................................................................................119 3.4.1. Calculating Dual Ownership ................................................................................. 119 3.4.2. Loan Covenant Violations .................................................................................... 121 3.5. Empirical Results ............................................................................................................124 3.5.1. Model .................................................................................................................... 124 3.5.2. Results Discussion ................................................................................................ 125 3.6. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................129 REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................151 APPENDIX