DOCSLIB.ORG

In Defence of the British Nation State: the Australian Case for Brexit

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
In Defence of the British Nation State: the Australian Case for Brexit In Defence of the British Nation State: The Australian Case for Brexit Georgina Downer Adjunct Fellow June, 2016 Institute of Public Aairs THE VOICE FOR FREEDOM ESTABLISHED− 1943 From the Executive Director Brexit represents an opportunity for Britain to take back their political sovereignty, democracy and freedom from an unaccountable, unelected European bureaucracy. Since the end of World War Two, the European Union has boiled the frog of British political sovereignty. Gradually taking legislative power from Westminster and putting it in the hands of unelected Eurocrats. In 2013, Prime Minister David Cameron signalled his intent to hold an in-out vote on Britain’s membership of the EU. Last year, to mark 800 years since its signing, IPA Senior Fellow Chris Berg and I launched Magna Carta: The Tax Revolt That Gave Us Liberty. At its core, the Magna Carta established the principle of ‘no taxation without representation’. This same principle is at stake in the upcoming vote. The Institute of Public Affairs commissioned this research paper from foreign policy expert, Georgina Downer, to examine Brexit; and its consequences for Australia, and for democracy and freedom. This research explores the Australian benefits of Brexit, as well as what a vote to leave would mean for western democracy and freedom. John Roskam IN DEFENCE OF THE BRITISH NATION STATE: THE AUSTRALIAN CASE FOR BREXIT | 2 Introduction Not too long ago, the Oxford Dictionaries noted a newfangled noun, ‘Brexit’. Describing the potential departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union, Brexit has been the buzzword for the British media, the political plaything of British politicians, and will soon be the focus for Britons. On 23 June, Britons will be asked, Brexit or not? The answer will have seismic ramifications for the future of democracy, sovereignty and freedom. No lesser advocates than Boris Johnson and Prime Minister David Cameron have prosecuted the affirmative and negative cases for Brexit. Why then, should an upstart Australian enter the fray in the Brexit debate? Because Brexit is not merely important for Britain; it is also fundamental for Australia. Notwithstanding the potentially significant short term transaction costs of Brexit, there is a strong case for Brexit, both for Britons and for Australians. The case for Brexit in this essay follows two paths. The first begins with history. Brexit is about righting a wrong that was done to the British people. Britons have never given their consent to a political union with Europe. There is no social contract between Britons and the European superstate; rather, European bureaucrats have conquered Britain by stealth. Britons have, without their consent, been roped into the EU and its web of institutions and extraordinary breadth of competencies including customs, competition, monetary policy for Eurozone members, fisheries, agriculture, trade, environment, consumer protection, immigration, social policy and employment, transport, trans-European networks, energy, the areas of freedom, security and justice, public health, culture, tourism, education, and youth.1 The EU has its own foreign minister with embassies around the world, and is developing its own defence policy, with plans for a European Army down the track if Germany gets its way. In an understated way so typically British, Prime Minister David Cameron in 2013 said Britons ‘feel that the EU is heading in a direction that they never signed up to.’2 Now, faced with the opportunity to express their views about Brexit, Britons have a choice. The second part of this essay argues they should vote for Brexit and reject the continued advancement of the European project on British shores. The case for Brexit is principally a case for reasserting the primacy of the great British institutions of British parliamentary sovereignty, the rule of British 1 Articles 2-6 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 2 D. Cameron, EU Speech at Bloomberg, 23 January 2013. IN DEFENCE OF THE BRITISH NATION STATE: THE AUSTRALIAN CASE FOR BREXIT | 3 law and an independent British judiciary, small government, and economic liberalism. Remaining part of the EU will condemn Britain to further integration into what has become an anti-democratic and illiberal federation. Brexit would be a clarion call against statism and big government, a reclaiming of the British nation state and its centuries old institutions, a win for democracy over bureaucracy, and a reassertion of sovereignty. It should, after all, be for the British people to decide whether they want small or big government, high taxes or low, strong borders or weak, high immigration or low. It should be the British who have the final say over whether their government has overstretched into people’s freedoms, not European courts, applying European laws. In addition to encroaching on British parliamentary democracy, the British judiciary and the British system of common law, Europe has failed to deliver on its promised prosperity with a near-decade long crisis in the Eurozone and sluggish economic growth. Instead, European red tape abounds, stifling growth and job creation. Over fifty percent of UK legislation is now derived from EU law, laws which Britain must apply and over which it does not have a veto. European courts dictate who Britain can deport. EU citizens and their families can live and work freely in Britain, without limitation. Britain’s net contribution to the EU is in the order of £10 billion which angers Britons who query what benefit they get from such a significant investment of taxpayer funds. The ‘Remain’ camp in Britain invoke the good that Europe has done in bringing peace to the continent, and the dangers to regional and global peace that Brexit would bring. But is this really the case? It is NATO, led by the United States of America, and not the EU, that has underwritten post-war peace in Europe and beyond. As a 28 member bloc, the EU is simply unable to make effective decisions when confronted with important and difficult issues like the Russian invasion of Ukraine or the flood of migrants from the Middle East. It is incredibly difficult to get 28 countries to agree to any policy, and when it does, it is very often weak and incredibly compromised – a policy of the lowest common denominator. If Britain continues to subject itself to a process of European decision- making, then its positions will by definition be diluted. That doesn’t make Britain stronger in unity with Europe. It makes Britain weaker. Beyond Britain, there is no doubt its decision on 23 June will be felt globally, including in Australia. The case for Brexit remains strong on the international stage. Freed from the EU, Britain could reassert its global leadership position as an independent liberal democracy. Brexit would have tangible benefits for Australian international relations. Beginning with a free trade deal with Australia which Britain currently can’t negotiate independently of the EU, the benefits would be considerable for Australian and British exporters alike. Moreover, Brexit would restore for Australia an independent peer and sibling sharing many of the same values and systems, including parliamentary democracy and classical liberal values, as well as buttressing Australia’s interests in a range of bilateral and multilateral issues including defence and trade. Indeed, Australia, as a former British colony, has inherited and developed the very best of Britain. IN DEFENCE OF THE BRITISH NATION STATE: THE AUSTRALIAN CASE FOR BREXIT | 4 The English language, British institutions, the values of Western Civilization – the rule of law, personal liberty and representative government – and the common law. The decline of the British nation state and the sovereignty of its Parliament under EU overlords should be something that we, in Australia, mourn. Britain’s freedom and sovereignty should not be the sacrificial lamb for the preservation of the EU as it is and will become. Let Britain’s departure be a catalyst for reform of the EU and a reclaiming of democracy, sovereignty and individual freedoms. Let it also be a reminder to Australia of the importance of liberal values for a successful and prosperous nation state. IN DEFENCE OF THE BRITISH NATION STATE: THE AUSTRALIAN CASE FOR BREXIT | 5 The British case for Brexit On 23 June, Britons will vote on whether or not to Brexit. The decision to vote yes or no is critical and is the focus of this essay. However, it cannot be resolved without first understanding how Britain came to be entangled in the EU. The first part of this section accounts for Britain’s relatively recent entry into the institutions of the EU. It demonstrates that Britons have never had a fully informed vote on membership of the EU. Rather, the EU and its bureaucratic trappings have encroached on British parliamentary and judicial institutions. Europe’s takeover of Britain without Britons’ consent is a disgraceful tale. Not only is it a historical lesson, it highlights the risk of remaining a part of the ever-encroaching EU which, as an unaccountable supra-national body, disrespects national sovereignty and the free-will of the British people. Now faced with a decision of whether to stay or leave the EU, Britons should vote for Brexit to save the fundamental institutions that have served it so well for centuries. The remainder of this section will argue that those fundamental institutions – a sovereign Westminster parliamentary system and a robust rule of British law – must be reinstated in the face of bureaucratic and anti-democratic European alternatives. The EU’s negative impact on Britain - its economy, immigration policies and foreign policy – does not offer a bright future. Brexit, on the other hand, as the last great battle of liberalism, offers a return to strong democratic institutions, a liberal economy, and an independent values driven British foreign policy which once again matches the interests of the British people.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Discussing What Prime Ministers Are For
    Discussing what Prime Ministers are for PETER HENNESSY New Labour has a lot to answer for on this front. They On 13 October 2014, Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield FBA, had seen what the press was doing to John Major from Attlee Professor of Contemporary British History at Queen Black Wednesday onwards – relentless attacks on him, Mary, University of London, delivered the first British which bothered him deeply.1 And they were determined Academy Lecture in Politics and Government, on ‘What that this wouldn’t happen to them. So they went into are Prime Ministers for?’ A video recording of the lecture the business of creating permanent rebuttal capabilities. and an article published in the Journal of the British Academy If somebody said something offensive about the can be found via www.britishacademy.ac.uk/events/2014/ Government on the Today programme, they would make every effort to put it right by the World at One. They went The following article contains edited extracts from the into this kind of mania of permanent rebuttal, which question and answer session that followed the lecture. means that you don’t have time to reflect before reacting to events. It’s arguable now that, if the Government doesn’t Do we expect Prime Ministers to do too much? react to events immediately, other people’s versions of breaking stories (circulating through social media etc.) I think it was 1977 when the Procedure Committee in will make the pace, and it won’t be able to get back on the House of Commons wanted the Prime Minister to be top of an issue.
    [Show full text]
  • A Framework for All Seasons?
    A Framework for All Seasons? Speech given by Mark Carney Governor of the Bank of England Bank of England Research Workshop on The Future of Inflation Targeting 9 January 2020 I am grateful to Clare Macallan for her assistance in drafting these remarks and to Nishat Anjum, Jack Meaning and Alexis Tessier for background research and analysis. 1 All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches Introduction Following a chequered history of high and volatile inflation in the post-war era, the UK finally found monetary success as an early adopter of inflation targeting in 1992. The UK’s current regime, launched in 1997, delegated operational independence for setting monetary policy to the Bank of England and included many institutional innovations that have stood the test of time – most notably a Monetary Policy Committee with a mix of internal and external members; transparent, independent voting; and a clear accountability framework. Since operational independence for inflation targeting was delegated to the MPC, there have been a raft of improvements, both large and small. Transparency has steadily increased with initiatives ranging from publishing detailed assumptions underlying forecasts ex ante to assessing forecast accuracy ex post as well as the simultaneous release of Monetary Policy Summaries, Minutes, and Inflation Reports. More recently, the MPC has introduced layered communications, with simpler, more accessible language and graphics to reach the broadest possible audience, and we have launched the Monetary Policy Report in order to give greater prominence to the most pressing issues shaping each monetary policy decision. A major improvement to the inflation targeting framework itself was to confirm explicitly beginning with the 2013 remit that the MPC is required to have regard to trade-offs between keeping inflation at the target and avoiding undesirably volatility in output.
    [Show full text]
  • A Critical History of the Labour Party
    Labouring in vain - a critical history of the Labour Party An account of the foundation and development of the Labour Party and how it has acted in power and in opposition, effectively countering many of the claims for Labour having once been a working class, socialist party. The Origins of the Labour Party Unlike most of its European counterparts, the British Labour Party was not created by people calling themselves socialists. It was set up by the Trade Unions, to act in the interest of those unions. In fact in its early days it made no claim to being a socialist party at all. We would claim that in fact it has never been a socialist party. To understand just why Labour has never been a socialist party, it is a good idea to go right back to its roots. The Labour Party was officially formed in 1906, but its origins really lie back in the 1850s, with the creation of the first successful trade unions in Britain. Britain was the first capitalist society. From the earliest days of capitalism there has been a fierce struggle between the bosses and the workers. At times this struggle was industrial, with workers trying to set up types of unions (the first we know of was in the middle of the 17th century), at times it was political, with workers struggling for "democratic rights", at times direct action was used, with workers destroying machines, blowing up factories and burning hayricks. Until the 1850s the responses of the ruling class was always the same.
    [Show full text]
  • The Political Economy of Brexit and the UK's National Business Model
    SPERI Paper No. 41 The Political Economy of Brexit and the UK’s National Business Model. Edited by Scott Lavery, Lucia Quaglia and Charlie Dannreuther About SPERI The Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute (SPERI) at the University of Sheffield brings together leading international researchers, policy-makers, journalists and opinion formers to develop new ways of thinking about the economic and political challenges by the current combination of financial crisis, shifting economic power and environmental threat. SPERI’s goal is to shape and lead the debate on how to build a sustainable recovery and a sustainable political economy for the long-term. ISSN 2052-000X Published in May 2017 SPERI Paper No. 41 – The Political Economy of Brexit and the UK’s National Business Model 1 Content Author details 2 Introduction 4 Scott Lavery, Lucia Quaglia and Charlie Dannreuther The political economy of finance in the UK and Brexit 6 Scott James and Lucia Quaglia Taking back control? The discursive constraints on post-Brexit 11 trade policy Gabriel Siles-Brügge Paying Our Way in the World? Visible and Invisible Dangers of 17 Brexit Jonathan Perraton Brexit Aesthetic and the politics of infrastructure investment 24 Charlie Dannreuther What’s left for ‘Social Europe’? Regulating transnational la- 33 bour markets in the UK-1 and the EU-27 after Brexit Nicole Lindstrom Will Brexit deepen the UK’s ‘North-South’ divide? 40 Scott Lavery Putting the EU’s crises into perspective 46 Ben Rosamond SPERI Paper No. 41 – The Political Economy of Brexit and the UK’s National Business Model 2 Authors Scott Lavery is a Research Fellow at the Sheffield Political Economy Research In- stitute (SPERI) at the University of Sheffield.
    [Show full text]
  • A Winter of Discontent
    12-15 whatnext may08.qxd 16/4/08 6:23 pm Page 12 marketwatch WHAT NEXT? A winter of discontent KRISTIAN RATHBONE AND JOHN WALKER DESCRIBE HOW THE DISLOCATION IN THE INTERBANK LENDING MARKETS AND A FULL DOSE OF PESSIMISM CAN QUICKLY GIVE RISE TO COLLECTIVE PARALYSIS IN THE MARKETS. However, with banks remaining unwilling to lend to each other, a Executive summary third wave of dislocation began and the base rate/Libor spread reverted to a widening trend. At the point of writing, three-month I At the advent of the credit crisis in July last year, few would have Libor is over 70bp above the base rate. It seems that this third phase predicted that its impact would be so great or that the bank debt of the credit crunch is as much to do with an erosion of the value of market would still be crippled eight months later. The world’s big assets that may be pledged as it is with the withdrawal of interbank banks and broking houses have written off over $200bn since the credit lines. collapse of Northern Rock last summer, Bear Stearns has fallen and we’ve seen the demise of IKB in Germany. Add to that the derailing BANK OF ENGLAND INACTION The way in which the credit crunch of a number of high-profile hedge funds and the extent of the has been dealt with by the central banks has played an interesting problem for the global economy becomes clear. and crucial role, with the Federal Reserve Bank, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of England all taking a very different stance.
    [Show full text]
  • Thatcherism and the Origins of the 2007 Crisis
    This is a repository copy of Thatcherism and the origins of the 2007 crisis. White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/84300/ Version: Accepted Version Article: Kirkland, C. (2015) Thatcherism and the origins of the 2007 crisis. British Politics, 10 (4). pp. 514-535. ISSN 1746-918X https://doi.org/10.1057/bp.2015.12 This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in British Politics. The definitive publisher-authenticated version [Kirkland, C. (2015) Thatcherism and the origins of the 2007 crisis. British Politics, 10 (4). pp. 514-535. doi:10.1057/bp.2015.12] is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/bp.2015.12 Reuse Unless indicated otherwise, fulltext items are protected by copyright with all rights reserved. The copyright exception in section 29 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 allows the making of a single copy solely for the purpose of non-commercial research or private study within the limits of fair dealing. The publisher or other rights-holder may allow further reproduction and re-use of this version - refer to the White Rose Research Online record for this item. Where records identify the publisher as the copyright holder, users can verify any specific terms of use on the publisher’s website. Takedown If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing [email protected] including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. [email protected] https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ 1 Thatcherism and the origins of the 2007 Crisis The existing literature on and debates around the origins of the 2007 crisis broadly fit into three categories.
    [Show full text]
  • Revue Française De Civilisation Britannique, XXII- Hors Série | 2017 Britain in the Seventies – Our Unfinest Hour? 2
    Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique French Journal of British Studies XXII- Hors série | 2017 The United Kingdom and the Crisis in the 1970s Britain in the Seventies – Our Unfinest Hour? Les années 1970- le pire moment de l'histoire britannique? Kenneth O. Morgan Electronic version URL: https://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/1662 DOI: 10.4000/rfcb.1662 ISSN: 2429-4373 Publisher CRECIB - Centre de recherche et d'études en civilisation britannique Electronic reference Kenneth O. Morgan, “Britain in the Seventies – Our Unfinest Hour?”, Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique [Online], XXII- Hors série | 2017, Online since 30 December 2017, connection on 21 September 2021. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/1662 ; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/rfcb. 1662 This text was automatically generated on 21 September 2021. Revue française de civilisation britannique est mis à disposition selon les termes de la licence Creative Commons Attribution - Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale - Pas de Modification 4.0 International. Britain in the Seventies – Our Unfinest Hour? 1 Britain in the Seventies – Our Unfinest Hour? Les années 1970- le pire moment de l'histoire britannique? Kenneth O. Morgan 1 In popular recollection, the 1970s have gone down as the dark ages, Britain’s gloomiest period since the Second World War. It may be that the aftermath of the Brexit vote in 2016 will herald a period of even greater crisis, but for the moment the sombre seventies, set between Harold Wilson’s ‘swinging sixties’ and Margaret Thatcher’s divisive eighties, stand alone. They began with massive trade union stoppages against Heath’s Industrial Relations Act.
    [Show full text]
  • Food Security and the UK: an Evidence and Analysis Paper
    Food Security and the UK: An Evidence and Analysis Paper ******* Food Chain Analysis Group Defra December 2006 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Introduction (section 1) E.1 In the overall context of a shift to a more open, and less subsidy-dependent, trading environment, the issue of the nation’s food security policy is often raised. E.2 The Strategy for Sustainable Farming and Food (SFFS) does not define a particular structure of farming that the Government wants to promote. Its emphasis has been on a competitive and environmentally sensitive farming sector that is responsive to the market; in which profitability matters more than production; sustainability more than size; efficiency more than self-sufficiency. Besides its strategic priorities on sustainable farming and food, a significant part of Defra’s work is concerned with preparedness for emergencies and contingencies, including those impacting food supplies. E.3 In recent years, food security has become increasingly discussed as a matter of concern in some developed countries, including in the UK. Two main triggers appear to be at work: ¾ In the UK, the self-sufficiency ratio of domestic production to consumption has been in noticeable decline over the last decade. The ‘decoupling’ reforms of the CAP, together with the prospect of trade liberalisation in agricultural products, are expected to reduce domestic agricultural production in the UK and Europe. ¾ In the context of climate change, international energy concerns, geopolitical tensions and international terrorism, a growing sense of the potential for disruption to domestic food supplies in an uncertain world. E.4 Within the UK, other factors have emerged, which, coinciding with the falling self-sufficiency ratio, have contributed to a sense of growing unease: the power of globally-sourcing supermarkets; a sharp decline in farm incomes; public health concerns with food safety; growing awareness of environmental issues; the potential for short-term interruptions to fuel supply, and longer-term concerns over energy security and climate change.
    [Show full text]
  • 1978-1979: Winter of Discontent
    1978-1979: Winter of discontent A short history of the of the widespread strike movement that occurred during the winter of 1978-1979 in Britain. The 'Winter of Discontent' marked the largest stoppage of labour since the 1926 General Strike. The factors that provoked the widespread stoppage of work by thousands of British workers in the winter of 1978-79 began with the Labour government of James Callaghan's attempt to enforce limits on pay rises to curb inflation. Inflation had reached a height of nearly 26.9% in August 1975. In the same year Harold Wilson's Labour government, wanting to avoid increasingly large levels of unemployment agreed a voluntary incomes policy with the TUC that would cap pay increases for workers at limits set by the government. The government announced a limit on wage rises of £6 per week for all workers earning under £8,500 a year on July 11 and the TUC general council soon voted in favour of the proposals. Further limits on pay increases were proposed by the government through 1976 and in July of 1977 it was announced that free collective bargaining between employers and unions would be slowly phased back in. Wishing to avoid a "free-for-all" rush for pay increases by the unions, the government allowed the return of collective bargaining to happen only with the agreement of the unions to continue with wage increase limits agreed in 1976 and a promise not to reopen any increase agreements made from previous policy, which the TUC agreed to. Inflation had more than halved by 1978, however, the government continued its policy and in July 1978 introduced a new limit of 5% on wage increases.
    [Show full text]
  • Winter's Not Yet Gone
    Winter’s not yet gone Construction and Memory of the Winter of Discontent in Popular and Scholarly Discourse Sam Henick Columbia University Undergraduate History Thesis — Spring 2018 Seminar Convener: Professor Blackmar Second Reader: Professor Pedersen Introduction Control over the historiography is as important as control over the history itself. 1 — Donald McCloskey, If You’re So Smart (1990) On 28 March 1979, Margaret Thatcher, the leader of the Opposition, posed a vote of no confidence, declaring that: “The people witnessed the spectacle of a Government abdicating their authority to strike committees. The Prime Minister’s objectives were not achieved, and his strategy failed.”2 The motion passed 311 to 310, leading to the fall of the Labour government, the first administration to leave office because of a Commons division since 1924.3 How did the Labour Government find itself in this position five years after it had been elected? More specifically, how did the Government conduct itself leading up to and during the “Winter of Discontent” and how did the Government’s actions fit into broader narratives of economic decline and ungovernability? The Winter of Discontent is the name the British press assigned to the wave of industrial unrest that gripped the UK beginning at the end of 1978 and continuing through February 1979. January 22, 1979 was the biggest individual day of strike action since the General Strike of 1926, with an estimated 1.5 million public sector workers walking off their jobs. The strikes themselves and their coverage in the press reveal an underlying narrative; Colin Hay’s seminal article “Narrating Crisis” (1996) analyzes the discursive construction of the moment of “crisis” and the Winter of Discontent as “a strategic moment in the transformation of the British state.”4 The “metanarrative” of the crisis of ungovernability was established through the implicit linking of primary narratives of 1 Donald McCloskey, If You’re So Smart (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 50.
    [Show full text]
  • The Rise and Fall of the Europeanisation of British Monetary Policy Over the Last Twenty-Five Years Or So
    ‘THE DISADVANTAGE OF TYING ONE’S HANDS’: TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONTROVERSIAL NATURE OF EUROPEANISATION IN THE AREA OF BRITISH MONETARY POLICY Jim Buller Department of Politics, University of York, Heslington, York. YO10 5DD [email protected] Paper presented to the Conference, ‘Britain in Europe and Europe in Britain: the “Europeanisation” of British Politics’, Sheffield Town Hall, 16th July, 2004. Introduction. What is it about the Europeanisation of British monetary policy that merits attention?1 From a superficial glance at the subject, one might conclude: ‘not a lot’. In policy terms, this Europeanisation process as represented by sterling’s membership of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) appears to have lasted a mere two years. As is often the case, Britain joined late (October 1990), found the experiment an uncomfortable experience before crashing out spectacularly in September 1992. Since then, while paying lip-service to future membership of the euro, the Treasury, first under Lamont, then Clarke and now Brown, has gone about carefully constructing a domestic institutional framework for confronting issues and problems in this particular policy area. Most notable in this context has been the decision to grant operation independence to the Bank of England to control inflation, as well as the 1 The author would like to thank the following for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper: Werner Bonefeld, Neil Carter, David McIver and all those who attended the ESRC seminar series introduction of two fiscal rules designed to place explicit limits on government borrowing and public debt. Commentators who predicted that New Labour would join the Single Currency in its first term, have been forced to revise these arguments.
    [Show full text]
  • Evaluating British Prime Ministerial Performance: David Cameron in Political Time
    Evaluating British Prime Ministerial Performance: David Cameron in Political Time Chris Byrne University of Leeds Nick Randall Newcastle University Kevin Theakston University of Leeds Keywords: prime minister(s), leadership performance, political time, historical institutionalism, David Cameron, Conservative Party 1 Introduction Assessments of prime ministerial performance are ubiquitous in contemporary UK politics. Print, broadcast and increasingly social media provide a running commentary (see for example, Blair 2007). Opinion polls routinely collect popular assessments of prime ministers while the ascendancy of ‘valence politics’ means such evaluations are increasingly salient to electoral choice (Clarke et al. 2009; Whiteley et al. 2013). Biographers find evaluation of prime ministerial performance an irresistible enterprise (Marquand 2011). But all too often such assessments of performance are idiosyncratic. Where evaluation employs any criteria, these are typically implicit and adrift of any underpinning theoretical framework. Comparisons, where offered, tend toward the casual rather than the systematic. This paper makes an early contribution to what will doubtless become a substantial literature evaluating David Cameron's premiership. Its broader contribution is towards the development of theoretically informed but empirically grounded assessments of performance which are explicitly attentive to the structural conditions in which UK prime ministers exercise their agency. The paper begins by reviewing existing models for evaluating the performance of UK prime ministers, principally those based on the approaches of Greenstein (2001) and Bulpitt (1986). The case is then made for an alternative framework which applies to the UK and then, in one of the paper’s original contributions, significantly develops Stephen Skowronek’s historical institutionalist analysis of the US presidency.
    [Show full text]