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The Bali Bombings Monument: Ceremonial Cosmopolis

Jeff Lewis, Belinda Lewis and I Nyoman Darma Putra

The Journal of Asian Studies / Volume 72 / Issue 01 / February 2013, pp 21 43 DOI: 10.1017/S0021911812001799, Published online: 18 March 2013

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0021911812001799

How to cite this article: Jeff Lewis, Belinda Lewis and I Nyoman Darma Putra (2013). The Bali Bombings Monument: Ceremonial Cosmopolis. The Journal of Asian Studies, 72, pp 2143 doi:10.1017/ S0021911812001799

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The Bali Bombings Monument: Ceremonial Cosmopolis

JEFF LEWIS, BELINDA LEWIS, AND I NYOMAN DARMA PUTRA

In 2003 a monument was erected at the site of the 2002 Islamist militant attacks in Kuta, Bali. Government and other official discourses, including the design brief, represent the monument as an integrated and culturally harmonious public testimony to the victims. However, the monument is also a discordant association of ideas, meanings, and political claims. While originally designed to subdue insecurity, the Bali bombings monument, in fact, constitutes a site of powerful “language wars” around its rendering of memory and its presence in Bali’s integration into the globalizing economy of pleasure. This paper examines the ways in which the monument is being articulated and “consumed” as a social and cultural marker for the island’s tourism geography. The paper pays particular attention to the increasing diversity of Bali’s visitors and the ways in which a precarious “cosmopolization” of the Kuta-Legian area is being experienced and expressed at the monument site.

INTRODUCTION HE BALI BOMBINGS MEMORIAL commemorates the first of two Islamist attacks that took Tplace in 2002 and 2005. On October 12, 2002, a van loaded with explosives was detonated outside the Sari nightclub in Legian Street, Kuta. At about the same time, and just across the street, a pedestrian bomber detonated his backpack in Paddy’s Bar. At Paddy’s the explosion ignited propane gas bottles, creating an intense fireball that burned alive many of the nightclub patrons who had survived the initial blast. The official death toll for the Sari Club and Paddy’s Bar bombings was around 202, though the actual figure may have been higher as many non-Balinese Indonesians were personae non gratae and were never counted in the official figures. Around eighty-eight Australians were killed; the other major nationalities included Indonesian, British, American, Japanese, Brazilian, German, and French. The 2002 bombings critically damaged Bali’s reputation as a safe, peaceful, and harmonious tourist destination and had a devastating effect on the tourism industry and local livelihoods. These events triggered an unprecedented social and economic crisis. For local Balinese, the bombings were also associated with a deeper cosmological imbalance. The notion of “Bali harmony” that had for several decades underpinned the exponential

Jeff Lewis ([email protected]) is Professor of Cultural Politics in the Global Cities Institute, School of Media and Communication at RMIT University, Melbourne. Belinda Lewis ([email protected]) is Senior Lecturer in Health Promotion, School of Primary Health Care, Monash University, Melbourne. I Nyoman Darma Putra ([email protected]) is Professor of Language and Culture, Faculty of Letters, Udayana University, Bali, Indonesia. 22 Jeff Lewis et al. growth in Bali’s tourism economy was called into question. In the wake of the tragedy, there was considerable reflection amongst the Balinese themselves about rapid sociocul- tural change associated with rampant and uncontrolled tourism development; serious environmental degradation; uneven distribution of wealth; growing social inequalities; and increasing economic, ethnic, and religious tensions between the Hindu Balinese and “outsider” migrants from other parts of predominantly Muslim Indonesia. Within this context, the Bali Tourism Authority and religious leaders conducted extensive interfaith, ritual cleansing ceremonies designed to restore a sense of harmony and focus on the unique characteristics of traditional Balinese culture that would contribute to Bali’s capacity to deal effectively with the tragedy. The unresolved social and cultural contentions that had inevitably been generated by Bali’s modernization, increasing cosmopolitanism, and engagement with a globalizing economy were largely played down (Lewis and Lewis 2009b). The Bali bombings memorial was constructed in 2003 during the three months before the first commemoration service for the 2002 attacks. Both the memorial and first commemoration were conceived in terms of broader processes of cosmological cleansing, economic recovery, and restoration of a social harmony. Set within the teeming tourist cosmopolis of Kuta, the Bali memorial was designed to reconcile the underpinning violence, contentiousness, and impact of the attacks, creating an authorized homology that would contribute to spiritual, social, and cultural healing. The diverse design elements and historical-cultural references of the memorial were drawn together to create a homogenizing narrative, or “homology,” which aimed to give a sense of cohe- sion and unity.1 This communion of aesthetic and cultural elements would transform the horrors of the past into a comprehensible but powerful narrative that distinguishes right from wrong, order from calumny, and pluralism from sectarianism. As Spiro Kostof (1987) has noted, such memorials are generally designed to transform the diverse and complex details of conflict events into a more integrated vision of history (see also Logan and Reeves 2009; Mare 2002). There is a long scholarly lineage of critique focused on this privileging of a particular perspective of the past as “official history” (Fou- cault 1977b).2 In many respects, this is precisely the “official” objective of the Bali bombings monument. For those who commissioned and designed the monument, the site would not simply commemorate the victims of the attacks; it would advance a common narrative of peace and reconciliation against the ideological discord and violence that had precipi- tated the atrocity of the bombings. Thus, the Badung Regency, which presides over the Kuta district, commissioned a memorial that subscribed to national government aspira- tions on security-building, unified pluralism (espoused in Pancasila, the ideological

1We are using the term “homology” to describe these homogenizing narratives. As indicated, the term refers to an attempt to homogenize cultural pluralism and diversity, drawing various discourses and narratives into a form that subsumes the parts within a more unitary “sameness.” The term is the reciprocate of what Georges Bataille ([1957] 2001) describes as “heterology,” which is an assembly of narratives that maintain a degree of independence and autonomy. 2The privileging of a particular perspective of the past as “official history” has been variously defined as “ideology” (Benjamin [1940] 2005), “discourse” (Foucault 1977b), “writing” (de Certeau 1988), and the “imaginary” (Taylor 2004). Each of these scholars has undertaken critical analysis of the ideological dimensions of “official history” and its political and social implications. The Bali Bombings Monument 23 framework of the Indonesian state), and Bali’s community and economic restoration (Hitchcock and Putra 2007; ICG 2003; Lewis 2006). The memorial’s homologous narrative conceptualized the atrocity in terms of an official ideology and memory that would (re)synthesize the disparate parts of Indonesia that had succumbed to the force of global- local contentions and political violence. Bali’s own frequently cited disposition to “harmony” was therefore to be mobilized for national reconciliation and local recovery; the official memory of the events would fortify Bali’s own radical “cosmopolization” and integration into the global tourist economy.3 This conception of official memory and the conciliatory force of Bali harmony, however, remains problematic (Allen and Palemo 2005; Hitchcock and Putra 2007; Lewis and Lewis 2009b; Robinson 1995). Indeed, the symbolic ordering that seeks to organize and homologize the meaning of the Bali bombings monument has neither obscured nor reconciled the complex cultural elements that comprise “the bombings” as memory and representation, specifically within the peculiarly disjunctive spatial and cultural context of Kuta, Bali. Indeed, the monument’s primary narrative of unity, harmony, and reconciliation is perpetually subverted by counter-narratives that invoke the very contentious issues and cultural tensions that the monument is designed to over- come. Thus, the diversity and complexity of cultural threads, memories, and practices that constitute the Kuta ethnoscape and its plethora of political dispositions continually challenge and destabilize the ideological and cultural homology that brands the island’s tourist economy of pleasure. At their most acute, these language wars are expressed in the formidable apprehensions of purist Islamists who regard the memorial and the Bali pleasure zones as a profound offense against Islam and evidence of Western moral infamy and violent political hegemony (Barton 2004, 2010; Eliraz 2007; Ramak- rishna and Tan 2003; Sidel 2006, 2008).4 Within the shadows of these more spectacular contentions, however, there exists a broad range of alternative narratives, cultural perspectives, and counter-memories— the sort of fragmentation and counter-forces that Michel Foucault (1977a, 1977b, 1980) describes in terms of a resistant microphysics in opposition to hegemonic power itself. In this context, this paper has two principal and related objectives. First, the paper examines the ways in which the homology and authorized memory of the Bali

3By “cosmopolization” we are referring, in particular, to the urbanization of Bali’s southern, Badung region. Since the inception of mass tourism in the 1960s, this rich agricultural region has become densely urbanized through tourism infrastructure, and various forms of housing, retail, and indus- trial development. It is now a sprawling urban space that is a “cosmopolis” of transient peoples, including international tourists and Indonesians from many parts of the archipelago, including Muslim Java and Lombok. 4We distinguish in this paper between “purist” and “militant” Islamism. By “purist” we are describ- ing that group of Muslims who share a strong religious affiliation with Salafi and Wahabbi traditions, who have a literalist interpretation of the Qu’ran, and who are committed to the broad imposition of Islamic or sh’ariah law over Muslim communities and territories. While there are clear theological and cultural variations within this group (see Hassan 2006; ICG 2004), they share a general rejec- tion of secularism, democratic politics, Western liberalism, and any form of state authority that is not based on Islamic theocracy. Among this group are those who adopt militant strategies for the imposition of sh’ariah; however, only a small proportion of Islamic purists are violent or militant. 24 Jeff Lewis et al. bombings are being shaped within an overriding ideology and economy of pleasure (see Lewis and Lewis 2009a, 2010). Secondly, the paper examines the ways in which this homology is being challenged and subverted through the multiplication of counter-narratives that are being generated through various mechanisms and processes. These mechanisms and processes are themselves the predicate of Bali’s own cultural instability and transi- tional disposition, including the increasing complexity of its tourist ethnoscape and its increasingly discordant contiguity of cultural practices. This study, thereby, contributes to broader speculations about the nature of Bali’s engagement in the global economy of pleasure and the countervailing conditions of global language wars and political violence. The paper concludes by raising important questions about Indonesian and global pluralism, social harmony, and cosmopolitanization. Inevitably, this paper situates its discussions within the broader context of “the war on terror” or what Jeff Lewis calls “the 9/11 wars” (Lewis 2005; Lewis and Lewis 2009a, 2010). However, these wars and their related contentions are not of themselves the central focus of the paper. Rather, the paper focuses on the ways in which these contentions are implicated in the formation and “deconstruction” of the Bali monument homology. Thus, the paper problematizes the notion of cosmopolitanism and its assump- tions within the specific context of the Bali bombings monument. The paper seeks to elu- cidate the cosmopolization of the Kuta region, and the bombings site in particular, through the analysis of cultural narratives and practices. To this end, the paper examines the ways in which narratives have been inscribed into the monument site through its design; it also examines the shaping of alternative narratives and meanings, specifically as they are evinced by the site’s visitors and users. To achieve these heuristic objectives, the researchers employed a combination of methods, including textual and empirical analyses. While these will be more fully outlined in the discussions below, the purpose of their use in this research can be summarized in the following terms—

1. Textual analysis The monument is a text whose meanings can only be accessed through analysis of the political and cultural conditions in which it is set. These conditions are framed through the application of specific concepts and a theoretical model that engages with various forms of historical, textual, and cultural artifacts. While this part of the essay focuses prin- cipally on the ways in which the homologous narrative and memory were formed, it also outlines the ways in which this congregation of meanings is subverted by an alternative narrative volition and the disposition of what Foucault (1977b) calls “counter-memory,” that is, the gaps by which meanings falter and subside, even through the very process of self-assertion.

2. Interviews The study also examines the ways in which people engage with and derive meanings from the monument and its attempt to impose a specific memory and narrative. Inter- views were conducted with a range of visitors to the site over selected periods between 2008 and 2010. These interviews, conducted in English and/or Bahasa Indonesia, were designed to access people’s perceptions and experience of the Bali monument and explore the range of ways in which visitors were generating their own narratives and The Bali Bombings Monument 25 understandings. The interviews provided valuable insights into the formation and character of the Kuta monument’s totemic cosmopolitanism.

3. Participant Observation In addition to the textual analysis and interviews, the research used participant observation to provide a more complete picture of people’s perceptions and practices as they engaged with the monument and its surroundings, and with each other. Participant observation enables researchers to observe people’s natural behavior, interactions, and practices without the disruption of the researchers and their institutional interpellation. It provides a context for understanding data collected through other methods and can strengthen the analysis by providing a complement to participants’ subjective reporting about what they believe and do (Family Health International 2005; Liamputtong 2007). Extensive participant observation was conducted at the monument site over selected periods between 2008 and 2010. These detailed observations about the presence and practices of different national and ethno-religious groups provided valuable insights and also helped to refine the interview process.

BALI’S COSMOPOLIZATION IN THE ECONOMY OF PLEASURE

The Bali bombing attacks occurred as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia were preparing to invade Iraq and extend the parameters of the global war on terror. The perpetrators, members of the Islamist militant organization Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), explained their actions in terms of U.S. incursions into holy Muslim lands, especially the Middle East and Indonesia itself. The JI leadership viewed America and its allies, including Australia, as moral contaminants and infidels, whose cultural values and practices were deeply offensive to the purity of the Muslim faith (Barton 2004; Hitchcock and Putra 2007; ICG 2003, 2004; Lewis and Lewis 2009a; Sidel 2006; UNDP 2003). In this context, the militants regarded the Balinese as collusive and treacherous allies of the West and its imperial disposition (Lewis and Lewis 2009a; Nordholt 2007). However, purist Islamist groups like JI tend to view Bali’s cosmopolization as merely the apex of an ongoing, historical betrayal. This betrayal began in 1949 when Sukarno’s new nationalist government rejected the Jakarta Charter, the precepts of sh’ariah law, and Islam as the official national religion. In order to maintain the integrity of the new state and support non-Muslim territories like Bali, the national government’s pluralist principles inevitably incited a range of violent secessionist movements from Darul Islam to Jemaah Islamiyah itself (Intan 2006; Nordholt 2007; Robinson 1995). Bali’s engagement with global tourism, which has brought vast numbers of non- Muslim peoples into Indonesia, has clearly served to intensify these political passions. The aggregate number of mostly Western international tourists grew from a few hundred in 1970 to around sixty thousand by 1980. From this period, with the inception of Suharto’s own personal investment strategy, the numbers and accompanying tourism infrastructure grew exponentially. By 2002, tourist arrivals had grown to a record 1.2 million but the militant attacks in 2002 decimated visitor numbers in the following year; while not as dramatic, the 2005 attacks also contributed to a significant decline in visitor numbers. A snapshot of the impact of the attacks is illustrated in figure 1 below. 26 Jeff Lewis et al.

Figure 1. Annual direct foreign tourist arrivals (Bali Provincial Government, 2009).

While originally attracting travelers from the advanced Western states of Europe, the United States, and Australia, Bali’s tourist cosmopolis has evolved to include visitors from Japan, Eastern Europe, East and Southeast Asia, and various parts of Indonesia itself. This diversification in recent years is related, at least in part, to the bombing attacks. In response to the sudden downturn in tourism numbers after the 2002 bombings, especially from Australia, the Indonesian government embarked on an extensive recovery and tourism promotion campaign (Hitchcock and Putra 2007; Pambudi, McCaughey, and Smyth 2009; UNDP 2003). With money provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, government agencies developed a new strategy that sought to stimulate domestic tourism and diversify the source of international visitors. This diversification was accelerated even further after the 2005 bombings, as the number of Aus- tralian visitors declined again and travel warnings in the United States and Europe were reiterated. The execution of three of the Bali bombers late in 2008 provoked another dip in Anglophonic arrivals, as Americans, Australians, and Britons heeded their governments’ travel warnings about the likelihood of Islamist reprisal attacks. While some of this rela- tive decline in Anglophonic visitors might also be explained in terms of the emergence of alternative, developing world tourism destinations, it is also very clear that a new wave of non-Western visitors (both Muslim and non-Muslim) are now arriving in Bali. Figure 2 shows a 76 percent increase in foreign tourist arrivals between 2006 (the year following the second bombings) and 2009. The figure also presents a breakdown of the top nine national groups arriving in Bali over the past few years. During this period, tourist arrivals from Australia gradually recovered and by 2009 this country was ranked first, followed by Japan.5 The balance of other nationalities is also changing quite markedly. The pro- portional increase is far greater from non-Western countries such as China (390 percent) and Malaysia (83 percent) than for the United Kingdom and Europe (average of 58 percent). In a peculiar way, the increase in non-Western tourism in Bali might seem to approximate one of the primary objectives of the Bali bombers and purist Islam more generally, that is, the diminution of Euro-American imperialism and influence in Indonesia and the (re)colonization of Hindu Bali by Muslims from Java, Malaysia, and beyond. It is certainly clear that domestic tourists are increasingly dominating the shopping malls and main beach areas of Kuta, especially during peak Indonesian holiday periods and outside peak Australian holiday periods. The number of Indonesian tourist visits to Bali each

5The murder and sexual assault of several Japanese tourists in 2009 and 2010 led to further dramatic falls in Japanese visitor numbers. Political unrest in Fiji and Thailand also contributed to an increase in the number of Australians choosing to holiday in Bali and other parts of Indonesia. The Bali Bombings Monument 27

Figure 2. Direct foreign tourist arrivals and market rank 2006 and 2009 (Bali Provincial Government, 2009). year is now estimated to be approximately three times that of international visitors. Indeed, Asian peoples are outnumbering European-based peoples and cultures across much of Badung, including the new developments from Dreamlands through Kuta, Seminyak, and Tanah Lot. With the accelerating integration of the Chinese middle classes into the global economy of pleasure, the exponential increase in PRC tourists to Bali is likely to continue, even in the face of the global financial crisis. Along with new arrivals from places like Belarus and Russia, the domestic and other Asian tourists who now come to Bali have radically altered the island’s cosmopolitan mix and cultural ethnoscape. Not surprisingly, this cosmopolization of Bali is having a direct effect on the spatial and cultural vista of Bali, and the ways in which the Bali monument is being used and understood, that is, the ways in which the meaning of the site is being ideologically fostered.

SHAPING THE MONUMENT HOMOLOGY

As indicated in the introduction to this paper, the Bali monument has been imagined and established as a communal totem around which a complex aggregation of beings might find their common humanity. This commonality is constituted not simply through a shared compassion or conceived enemy (terrorists-terrorism), but through a distinctive and powerful imaginary of Bali itself. The core of the homology, that is, is 28 Jeff Lewis et al. an imagining of Bali’s own durable and self-projected conception of tradition, religion, ritual practice, and cultural harmony. These cultural conceptions of tradition are thereby mobilized through the island’s transformation into a global tourist destination and integration into the global economy. In this sense, the homology that is shaped into the monument site is bound to the sense of Balinese tradition and its commodification in the modern tourist economy (Lewis and Lewis 2009b). This is not to suggest that the Balinese rituals and traditional practices are in any way artificial; it is rather to note that the imaginings of the past have been re-rendered into the island’s transformations, including the pleasures and vicissitudes associated with modernization, cosmopolization, and global integration. It is precisely these imaginings that are also central to the conception and design of the bombings monument. In particular, the Balinese notion of harmony-in-contention (duality and balance) was critical to the design. Balinese-Hindu mythology is strongly focused on the spiritual interdependence of good and evil. Within this mythology, the bhuta kala demons are not considered entirely evil, nor are their spiritual nemeses considered entirely wholesome. Rather, the dialectic of evil and good that characterizes Bali- nese Hinduism and the older forms of ritual culture is formed through an eternal contingency; evil is not subjugated, redeemed, or eradicated from the human body or spiritual world more generally since it is the predicate of good. The principle of rwa bhineda or “two in one” conceives of good and evil in terms of a mutual identification that seeks merely to minimize the harm that evil may inflict on the living (and the dead). While many Balinese communities and individuals have been able to sustain this imagining of a rwa bhineda harmony, even through the shock of rapid (post)modernization, the horror of the bombings tested the island people’s theological, ethical, and social resolve. Like the revenge massacres perpetrated in Bali against Chinese and alleged Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI; Communist Party of Indonesia) sympathizers in 1965–66, the Bali bombings left the local people raw and disturbed (Hitchcock and Putra 2007). Since the 1970s, of course, the Balinese had been compelled to marshal the ideal of harmony and its cultural imagining both in support of rapid tourism development and against its excesses. While delivering significant economic benefits to the island and Indonesia more generally (Pambudi, McCaughey, and Smyth 2009), tourism and global integration also challenged Bali’s ecological, social, and cultural sustainability; the bombings, in this sense, were simply the apex of a more enduring and less visible crisis that perpetually destabilized the ideal of harmony and Balinese cosmopolitanism (Howe 2005; Lewis and Lewis 2009a, 2010). Thus, while the Indonesian government and the IMF focused on the social and economic conditions of recovery after the bombings (UNDP 2003), Balinese community leaders sought to restore harmony through the rebalancing of the rwa bhineda. Indeed, as Michael Hitchcock and Darma Putra (2007) have clearly demonstrated, the Balinese themselves were concerned about the outbreak of evil that rapid development and cosmic imbalance had generated. To this end, the Bali Tourism Authority, Hindu priests, and other community leaders embarked on an intense program of ritual cleansing, much of which was constituted around interfaith congregation and religious dialogue. The Bali bombings memorial and the first commemoration service were conceived in terms of these broader processes of economic restoration, social appeasement, and cosmological cleansing. Within a week of the attack, the idea of a memorial at the site The Bali Bombings Monument 29 of Bali’s “Ground Zero” was reported in the Bali Post. An academic from Udayana Uni- versity, Luh Ketut Suryani, argued at a meeting with the Badung Regency that the bombings were a “strong warning” (peringatan keras) and “punishment” (hukuman) from the gods because Bali’s rapid tourism development had deviated radically from religious values (Bali Post 2002). Thus, while the construction of the monument was clearly motiv- ated by “modernist” and secular concerns about the Balinese tourism economy and the circumvention of religious or sectarian violence, the monument was also sanctified in the island’s religious and spiritual aegis. Indeed, for the Badung Regency, which commissioned the project, the secular and religious functions of the memorial were largely indistinguishable; the bombings had critically damaged Bali’s reputation as a safe tourist destination, but this harm was itself inte- grally linked to cosmological imbalance. This interdependence of secular and cosmological conditions was clearly a part of the design brief and the propagation of the monument’s ideological homology—a harmony that collapsed political, ethnic, and religious difference. As illustrated in figure 3 (above), the design is composed of three elements: a memorial wall, a replica of a Balinese-style temple, and a fountain. The structure is set on a raised stage or gallery that has steps on the east and west sides. In the front of the structure at street level is a small, decorative amphitheater that is illuminated at night and appears as a beacon guarding the approach from the nightclub district of Legian Street. While there were minor modifications to the monument in 2010, the design principles have remained constant. These principles have been outlined in various forums by the architect, I Wayan Gormuda:6

• As with most Balinese temples, the shrine is marked as an elevated site, moving the visitor toward a more transcendent perspective of heaven and purity. The monument is therefore set on a raised platform or gallery, with steps approaching from the east and west sides. There is also a small amphitheater set at street level. This marks the symbolic approach to the memorial and the gateway from material to spiritual conditions. • The large “tree of life” (kayon) represents the lives of the bombing victims and the prayers that will guide them to heaven. The tree brings together the material and spiritual conception of life and the peace that returns, even through tragedy. The fearsome Bhoma image, which appears at the base of the tree, is the ubiqui- tous guardian of holy shrines in Bali; the Bhoma drive away evil spirits. • The altar is a hybrid design space. The backdrop is a huge memorial board dis- playing the name and nationality of each of the 202 identified victims. On either side, the altar provides space for flower offerings, messages, and prayers. As with domestic and public shrines and temples, the altar is a significant site for spiritual cleansing and daily libation. • The Balinese compass rose in the pond at the approach to the monument orien- tates the memorial and the visitor toward Mount Agung, the holiest landsite in Bali and the home of the gods.

6Interview with I Wayan Gormuda by Darma Putra, Denpasar, January 12, 2009. 30 Jeff Lewis et al.

Figure 3. The Bali bombings monument prior to modifications in 2010. Photo: Belinda Lewis.

• The triangle connecting the three half circles represents the Hindu trinity of the three most significant deities—Brahma, Visnu, and Siva.

While the kayon, Bhoma, temple, deities, and fountain were conceived and constructed as symbological references within the religious traditions of Bali, the memorial board, gallery, altar, and location of the memorial have connections with Western religious and secular symbology. Moreover, the memorial board and the victims’ names were presented in a distinctly Western style, applying European-derived functional elements; these include the gold lettering set against a polished black background, and the names that are ordered according to nation and alphabetical listing. These rational and lineal structures, in fact, directly challenge the universalism and cyclical nature of the rwa bhineda and the monument’s Vedic elements. Even so, the Regency and the Indonesian government wanted the monument to be ready for the first commemoration ceremony of the bombing in October 2003 when world attention would again be turned toward Bali. As Lewis (2006) notes, this commemoration was particularly important for Australia and the Australia-Indonesia relationship. The Indonesian government and Badung Regency wanted to promote a sense of “restored harmony” that would in turn revivify Bali’s reputation as a safe holiday destination. Along with other things, the Australian government used the commemoration ceremony to promulgate its own sense of nation and validate policies on the “war on terror” (Lewis 2006). With Australian troops engaged in warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan, the sense of national destiny was fortified in 2003 by news video footage of the monument and the commemoration ceremony, which was broadcast directly into Australia. The Bali Bombings Monument 31

These respective national, security, economic, and ideological claims were thereby inscribed into the complex bricolage of design elements and the ceremonial politics of the first commemoration (Lewis 2006). In prescribing an alignment of communal, ethnic, national, secular, and religious claims, the homology of the monument sought to foster a miraculous ideological commonality. Not surprisingly, the precarious convolu- tion of design and cultural elements threatened to fracture as the various meanings of the monument within this secular setting began to struggle for primacy in the cosmopolitan cacophony of the Legian streetscape.

BEYOND THE HOMOLOGY:BALINESE NARRATIVES OF MEMORY AND HARMONY

The Balinese themselves, in fact, identified this volatility. Many in the Balinese community opposed the construction of the memorial, rejecting its claim to universal value and reverence. There was much public debate about the issue through local radio and newspapers, particularly the Bali Post. Among the opponents, some believed that the memorializing of a catastrophe would simply perpetuate the negative spiritual and social impact of the “tragedy” (Asmara 2002).7 In an interview conducted in 2009, Bali’s governor, I Made Mangku Pastika, former head of the Bali bombings investigation team, reflected on the local and transnational value of the monument and its detractors. With the prospect of further developments on the memorial site and the establishment of an international “peace park” on land at the site of the Sari Club bomb blast, Governor Pastika noted:

Some Balinese people think that it is useless to remember bad things that have happened in the past. . . . There are many Balinese who dislike the monument and the remembrances at Ground Zero. But, I also see it from the point of view of the outsiders. On every commemoration, I always come. I want to respect the people from outside.8

In many ways, contentions over the meaning of the site for Balinese and “outsiders” is not surprising since the “traditions” of Vedic-Balinese culture are inscribed by the divine cycle of purity, contamination, and renewal. Within this perspective, “memory” exists within the hierarchy of the ephemeral material world and spiritual eternity; to fix memory beyond the natural or cosmological rhythms of time is to interrupt the inevitabil- ity of life, death, and rebirth. Indeed, this Western notion of “cultural preservation” has always been problematic in Bali since it seeks to create an atavistic relic that resists the necessity of decay. In her discussion of Bali’s colonization, Margaret Wiener (1994) points out that it was the Dutch who imposed concepts of preservation and tradition as they supported the colonizer’s administrative and political interests (see also Lewis and Lewis 2009a). In more recent

7The Bali Film Board gave similar reasons for banning the 2007 Enison Sinaro film Long Road to Heaven. The film details the story of the Bali bombings, which the Board believed would be dis- tressing to many Balinese as it would open old wounds (BBC News 2007). 8Interview with Governor Pastika by Darma Putra, Denpasar, January 1, 2009. 32 Jeff Lewis et al. times and as we intimated above, this idea of an authentic or traditional Bali has been mobilized in tourism discourses in order to identify the island as a distinctive product in the global economy of pleasure. This remodeling of Balinese tradition for consumption by domestic and international tourists represents the integration of “tradition” (as strate- gically conjured elements of the past) with modern economic and cultural practices. Bali’s tourism boom and integration into the global economy of pleasure is neither arbitrary nor ideologically neutral. It is an interpellation within a broad cultural history that is replete with struggle and violence, as much as harmony and cosmological balance. Thus, debates among the Balinese about the meaning and value of the memorial— and its related Peace Park—are clearly influenced by these historico-cultural elements and also by claims to a modern, global cultural politics (Turmakin 2005,21–82). The Bali- nese, quite rightly, contemplate whether the homologous “memory” that the monument is designed to represent is either culturally or morally generative—whether the monument actually speaks for the hosts and host culture, or is simply an extension of the global economy of pleasure and the ambiguous interests of the cosmopolis. In this sense, the monument resembles the hybrid dance forms that have evolved to serve the interests and pleasures of “outsiders,” most particularly as entertainment for the resort guests in Sanur and Nusa Dua. For many Balinese, in fact, the monument has added very little to the cleansing and interfaith rituals that local communities themselves have initiated. The memorial seems more credibly like a gesture of appeasement, or even apology, to those foreign nations whose citizen-consumers have powered the tourism economy.

FRAGILE COSMOPOLITANISM:COUNTER-NARRATIVES OF PLEASURE AND DISPLEASURE

While Balinese traditional conceptions of history and memory are challenged by the presence of the monument, these anxieties are linked to even deeper and more durable concerns about the loss of autonomy associated with global integration—including global geopolitics. As noted above, Jeff Lewis (2006) argues that the Australian government and media used the first commemoration of the 2002 attacks to support national grieving and justify policies associated with the global “war on terror” and the invasion of Iraq. The monument was an ideal backdrop, as it propagated a sense of East-West harmony and a collaborative grieving that inspired an impression of multilateral approaches to transnational terrorism. Through this symbolic amplification of its own national interests and perspective, Australia was able to “imagine” the memorial space as a site of reverence and remembrance, a place in which the holy force of the war on terror could be articulated as a transnational, ideological, and even cosmological mission. Retribution, in this sense, could be reconfigured in terms of a divine purpose that transcended national, ethnic, or religious difference: terrorists are the enemy of all humankind. As Aristotle duly noted, memory is the most powerful faculty in the creation of narrative. In this context, the commemoration service sought to overlay the monument with a moral and political aesthetic, by which the memory of the attacks became ossified as pure ideology and Western knowledge systems were elevated as collective salvation. Thus, the gaps and threads of the design and construction process became sanctified through the public presentation of the monument and the broad discourse of glory. The Bali Bombings Monument 33

The discourse of the commemoration, that is, sought to seal or obscure the gaps in an extravagant invocation of a unity that was propagated by the ideals of “Bali harmony,” economic cosmopolitanism, and a politics that transcends national, ethnic, religious, and secular boundaries. History was wound into a perfect and unitary thread that defied, as it mobilized, those excesses of violence upon which it was predicated, that is, the Western model of global domination and hierarchical economic and knowledge systems. The economy of pleasure, upon which the original violence and the site itself were constructed, was thus laminated into the concrete edifice, deflecting the vision of visitors away from the West’s own disposition of violence and toward a more benign transnational and transcendent projection. Through the monument’s homology of cultural elements, the West was able to imagine itself as the progenitor of global pluralism, inno- cence, and universal freedom. Since the first commemoration, however, this claim to ideological purity has been continually tested by the immanent dynamic of culture and Bali’s own intrinsic crisis of transformation. As Henri Lefevbre (1991) continually reminded us, spaces can never be fixed or unified, but are besieged by cultural mutation and the counter-narratives that human groups perpetually generate through social change. In particular, the further cosmopolization of the Kuta-Legian tourist zones of Bali have brought new cultural practices and consumer modes to the area. As noted earlier in this paper, the increasing diversification of the Kuta tourist ethnoscape has contributed further to the island’s complex cultural contiguities and the contentions arising from such transient and intense modes of territorialization. Amidst this assemblage of bodies, desires, practices, and beliefs, the monument’s propagated ideological purity seems extraordinarily discordant; its claims to unity and totemic cosmopolitanism sit in a peculiar disjunction with the swarm of human typol- ogies and their respective claims to primacy and pleasure. These complexities and the fragility of Bali’s cosmopolitanism are evident in the perceptions and practices of visitors to the monument site. In order to examine this complexity in contrast to the monument’s propagated homology, the authors conducted a series of empirical studies from 2008 until 2010. The research included participant observation and open-ended interviews with visitors to the site. While this research does not claim to be exhaustive, it illustrates the ways in which a disjunctive mix of counter-narratives is being generated around the monument and it highlights some important issues that reflect more broadly on new modes of transient territorialization and cultural transition in Bali. While the aims of the research were outlined in the introduction, further detail on participants and methods is provided below. The findings from both the participant observation and interviews have been synthesized and presented as an integrated discussion. In 2008–2009, the research was undertaken at various times across the given year; including local Indonesian school and religious holidays and the peak periods for international visitors. This phasing of the research was designed to connect researchers with the various ethnic and national groups who visit Bali. Thus, while Australians are the most numerous visitor group overall, they only dominate the ethnosphere of Kuta during identified peak holiday periods. Other national groups—including Indonesians themselves—are more numerous at quite different times of the year. A further phase of the research, conducted from June until September 2010, aimed to capture the 34 Jeff Lewis et al. changing nature of people’s perceptions and practices following the implementation of new security measures and modifications to the monument site undertaken by the Badung Regency in April of that year. Discussion of the findings from the 2008–2009 phase illustrates some of the counter-narratives being generated around the monument. This is followed by discussion of the findings from the 2010 phase, which reveal new layers of complexity in the context of official attempts to restrict the practices of local and international visitors.

2008–2009

Most visits to the memorial occurred during the evening (6:00–10:00 p.m.) with up to one thousand visitors per hour during Indonesian school holidays and/or Muslim holiday periods. In the heat of the day, the average was around one hundred per hour. These numbers do not include pedestrians observing the monument from a distance as they passed by. The vast majority of visitors to the monument were Indonesian nationals (around 55 percent), most of whom were from Jakarta, although there were also visitors from other parts of the archipelago. Other major visitor groups included Malaysian, Korean, Taiwanese, and Chinese nationals. In the course of an evening, around four tour buses per hour would bring these visitor groups directly to the monument. At other times of the year when Japanese and Europeans were relatively numerous in Kuta and the surrounding tourist zone, the numbers of these visitors at the monument were relatively low compared with those from Asian countries. At any one time during the evening, Australians would comprise approximately 5 percent of the total visitor numbers, with this increasing to almost 50 percent during peak Australian holiday periods. Visitors would spend an average of twelve minutes at the monument site. Other than the numbers and ethnic derivation of the visitors, perhaps the most significant aspect of the research is the ways different groups use the monument as a public space. As a general observation, the behaviors and identifiable practices of visitors to the site are influenced by the level of ethnic-national presence of the group; behavior is often modified, depending on the numbers of similar and different ethnic-national groups present at the site. Very clearly, the space has become a tourism memento site for the majority of visitors. The design of the site ushers visitors through a form of gallery experience, directing them from one part of the site to another. At each point of interest in the gallery, the majority of visitors would pause and arrange themselves for personalized photographs. The non-Western visitors, in particular those from Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea, Taiwan, and China, would take photos of their various assemblages of family and friends at the fountain, the altar, and the amphitheater at the front of the monument. Only the memorial board, which is raised above head height, was photographed without human interpellation. The two Australian authors were also frequently conscripted as transnational props in the memento photographs, providing further proof of the tourists’ exotic experiences in Bali. For most of these visitors, it is a happy occasion. The monument provides some of the cultural nuance that renders their holiday exotic and memorable. The Balinese cultural elements are well received, though the Bhoma are not particularly recognizable at The Bali Bombings Monument 35 night and they are not as frequently photographed as one might expect. There is virtually no solemnity in the visits by these groups, even though most understand the significance and purpose of the monument.

I am so happy I am here in Bali! This is my first holiday overseas. I want this photo to remember Bali. I want my family at home to see me here. Bali is very nice place. This monument is very nice place for photo. [Chinese woman, aged twenty-eight]

The monument, in fact, is one of Kuta’s few noncommercial public spaces, other than the beach. And it is one of the few spaces in which a visitor feels welcome and comfortable. Virtually every other open space in the Kuta-Legian tourist zone is privately owned, a legacy perhaps of former President Suharto’s appalling indifference to responsible development planning and his government sponsorship of Bali’s rapid and poorly planned tourism development by voracious private developers. As the Balinese were largely excluded from planning and development of the Badung area, community needs were disregarded and public space subsumed by private interests. To this end, the bombings memorial is quite unique. For all its very obvious aesthetic and cultural failings, the space represents a new phase in Balinese autonomy in the after- math of the Reformasi, especially in terms of decentralization and the capacity of Regen- cies to be more active in local planning. While many community members may have objected to the structure and its informing ideas, the memorial has at least stimulated the sorts of civic debate that had for so long been prohibited in Indonesian public life. Moreover, the site manages, miraculously perhaps, to function as a multivalent totem that attracts a diverse range of visitors. Indonesian nationals, in particular, feel as though the memorial is legitimately their own public space (see figure 4).

Yah, this is important place for Indonesian people. Many people come to Bali. Many people die in the Bali bombs, many different countries. Not only people from Indonesia. When we come here to see the names, we are all here together. This is what Bali is now. [Sumatran resident in Bali, man, aged twenty-one]

This monument is a nice place to bring my friends. Everyone is welcome here. Kuta is very exciting place. . . . But I think maybe there are problems in Bali. Look around you . . . too many people ...alotofdrinking and drugs. So, I don’t know....Howcanpeople live together like this? [Javanese woman, aged forty-six]

Australians, on the other hand, seem less comfortable in the site, especially during the local Indonesian holidays and religious festivals, when they become a distinct min- ority group among so many Indonesian nationals. While Australians are often solemn or at least quiet in their demeanor, their informal clothing style (sarongs, thongs, shorts) also marks a cultural distinction from the Asian visitors, especially the Indonesians who are generally far more covered and formal, with many women wearing the Muslim hijab or headscarf (see figure 5). 36 Jeff Lewis et al.

Figure 4. Every day, domestic tourists from across Indonesia gather in droves at the monument to make a photographic record of their visit to Bali, 2010. Photo: Belinda Lewis.

Figure 5. Informally dressed Australian visitors to the monument, 2010. Photo: Belinda Lewis. The Bali Bombings Monument 37

Australians also appear quite bemused by the joyful and happy demeanor of the Asian groups, especially local Indonesians:

I just reckon it’s a bit weird. They turn up in these big groups and start taking photos of each other. Then they have a bit of a look around and take off again. I’m standing here with tears in my eyes and they’re taking photos and laughing. . . . This is a sacred site, isn’t it? [Australian woman, aged forty-three]

I come to the monument every time I’m in Bali. I just think about the tragedy of all those young lives lost. It’s bloody awful. Just kids out having fun with their mates, not hurting anyone. This Muslim thing had nothing to do with them but they’re the ones who cop it. It breaks my heart. . . . I don’t understand how it doesn’t have the same effect on these people [gestures toward a group of Muslim Indonesian visitors]. It’s like they don’t even think about what actually happened. Their own people did this. Maybe they want to forget ...tomoveon or something. ...Is’pose you can understand it. . . . [Australian man, aged sixty-three]

Tensions are also evident in the narratives of monument visitors around recent events like the arrest and conviction of Australian and other Western drug couriers in Bali, the passage of ambiguous anti-pornography bills in the Indonesian national parlia- ment, and the execution of three of the Bali bombers (Lewis and Lewis 2009a; van Liere 2009).9 For some visitors, these new events are linked to the causes of the original “tragedy.” People’s experience at the monument is being reintensified by these events and the ways they represent discordant and at times dangerous claims over pleasure and displeasure:

I don’t get it. They’re still building new bars, new venues open all night. Will they just keep going till it happens again and the whole place collapses . . .? Most of the clubs here are run by Javanese businessmen who have made their fortune from drug-money. And yet those Bali Nine boys are still rotting in jail on death row! It’s a disgrace. . . . [Swedish expat resident, woman, aged thirty-four]

Yah, I can see why Bali provincial government opposed the anti-pornography bills. The economy here would collapse. Everything is open, everything is allowed. Everything is . . . not decent. [Javanese man, aged forty-eight]

Execution of three jihadis? What good did that do? They are now where they want to be. . . . And it is people like me and my friends who are left to build

9After the bombers’ execution in 2008, journalists covering the event reported from Nusa Kamban- gan prison in Java. Several journalists conducted a live broadcast from the monument in Bali, demonstrating its significance in the consciousness of Australian public. 38 Jeff Lewis et al.

the peace. We are Muslim women. I’m really not sure how we can do that.7 [Javanese woman, aged twenty-seven]

When interviewed, several Australians expressed a level of offense at the perceived lack of respect for the meaning of the memorial, though this was generally fortified by a peculiar sort of cultural superiority that regarded the Indonesians as culturally underde- veloped or ignorant. In a moment of acidity, one Australian bemoaned, “Oh my god, what do the Balos [Balinese] think of all this?”— suggesting that the behavior and practices of other Indonesians would somehow offend the Balinese and this notionally “sacred” place. For the Balinese, of course, the monument is not sacred, despite the aggregation of sacred symbology. Few Balinese take an interest in the monument, except as a meeting place or a site to engage with tourists (see figure 6). Drug users and prostitutes often frequent the areas around the site in the hope of attracting the interest of a (usually male) tourist. On several occasions, we observed a young female addict using the monument site as a relatively safe place to sleep among the guides and other local Balinese sitting on the gallery steps. Indeed, the steps themselves appeared to be the most popular part of the site for local Balinese youth, as they gaze at passing traffic and listen to the rising volume of electronic music in the nightclubs preparing for another night of euphoria. Over recent years, the authorities in Bali have become increasingly concerned about the diverse ways in which the homology of the Bali bombings monument is being challenged and subverted. In April 2010, the Badung Regency implemented new security measures and modifications to the monument site that substantially altered public access to the space. A steel fence was erected around the entire perimeter of the

Figure 6. Local young women using the memorial as a meeting place, 2010. Photo: Belinda Lewis. The Bali Bombings Monument 39 monument gallery with a single entrance gate placed at the base of one set of steps. The gate is now locked in the evening, preventing visitors to the site from sitting on the steps, gathering on the raised mezzanine, or approaching the memorial board. Numerous flow- ering potted plants have been added to soften the visual impact of the fence and mask this new restriction on public access and people’s practices. According to the Lurah (village head of) Kuta, I Gede Suparta,

The fence was built because of many complaints from visitors and Australian Consulate. The monument has become dirty. They worry that people hang around at night drinking and getting drunk in the space around monument. The space is also used by prostitutes and drug addicts to hang around. Fences were put in to stop this. An entrance is provided for those who come to pray to the monument—which is what the monument is actually for. They thought the fence is a good solution.10

This attempt to impose order over visitors’ experiences and practices—what they see, do, think, and feel in the space surrounding the monument—reflects a new phase in Bali’s cosmopolization. Clearly, the modifications are an official strategy to regulate what might be seen as the “abuses” of the monument. The fence and security measures minimize the mixing of visitors in the gallery and they separate visitors from the activities of locals who had previously been informally using the public space. By substantially reducing access to this public open space, this attempt to marshal the various “uses” of the monument into less diverse and more acceptable modes raises questions about whose freedoms and security are being privileged. As noted by Logan and Reeves (2009), a substantial body of research acknowledges that memorials are critical means of preserving the history of violent events and that they have the potential to affect the ways in which we confront past, present, and future. Our research suggests that the claims and counter-claims on the Bali bombings monument are reshaping this space in ways that reflect a new uncertainty about cultural contiguity, belonging, and territorial legitimacy. Within the context of Bali’s rapidly expanding pleasure economy, the diverse mix of counter-narratives around the monument demonstrates a growing sense that this evolving cosmopolization is both precarious and easily disrupted.

CONCLUSION

The traditional motifs and ceremonial elements that are inscribed into the monument design need to be understood, not only in their own terms, but also in relation to Bali’s modernization processes and integration into the global economy. Quite clearly, these cultural elements are formed through the flows of capital and competition for resources, which are themselves the predicate of increasing human interaction, cultural contiguity, pluralism, and the seemingly inevitable human recourse to aggregation, domination, and violence. These opposing dispositions to communalism on the one hand

10Interview with Lurah (village head of) Kuta, I Gede Suparta by Darma Putra, Denpasar, October 12, 2010. 40 Jeff Lewis et al. and violent segregation on the other are clearly manifest in the monument’s agonistic reverberations of the global war on terror, as well as Indonesia’s own complex history of sectarianism and political violence. The memorial is not just a shrine or a simple expression of indigenous remembrance. It is rather a polyglot of cultural and symbolic elements that never quite approximate the aspiration of aesthetic or politico-cultural harmony; that is, the monument never seems able to liberate itself from the range of narrative claims that inform and surround its guiding ideology. Indeed, even the monument’s location at the nape of the Legian Street nightclub strip seems inevitably to compromise the dignity and unity of its reverential claims. Like the two-faced Roman gatekeeper, Janus, the monument seems more like a sentinel, welcoming visitors to the pleasure zone while warning of its inevitable displeasures and danger. In many respects, our research confirms this perspective, as the new generation of Bali tourists swarm playfully across the memorial site and peer, somewhat timidly, toward the moral ambiguity of the Legian Street pleasurescape. Immersed in the cacophony of the Kuta nightlife, the visitors—Muslim and Western—seem to be circling one another, seeking to read out the script of each other’s mystery—and perhaps fallibility. To this end, the monument stands like a totem within a peculiar and awkward courtship of globalization. For the members of the Coalition of the Willing, especially Australians, the bomb site is marked by heroic survival and a paradoxical form of cultural integration that reas- sures them that this space—the East—is not entirely alien at all—but there is a small space in history that they may now share within the cosmopolis of Kuta. Yet nor is the site a marker in the progress of political Islam, despite the increasing presence of Muslim Indonesians. For all the dangers associated with the new Indonesian anti- pornography laws, this new group of Indonesian tourists are in many ways engaged in the economy of pleasure that is so despised by the Islamist militants who attacked the area. The playfulness and pleasures that the new Muslim tourists are experiencing at the bombing site should not be understood as a victory for the Islamic militants who want to colonize the island and impose sh’ariah law. Rather, the new Muslim tourists might be understood as pioneers within the more general momentum of pleasure-based globalization. And for all its horrors, globalization also represents a more hopeful form of cultural and human exchange; Indonesians have as much claim to a history of pluralism, tolerance, and pleasure-based aesthetics as any Western social group. Thus, the playfulness and bodily delights being experienced by the new tourists should not be interpreted as a victory for the militants or Islamic purism generally—quite the opposite. Indonesia has a very strong tradition of pluralism, tolerance, and pleasure-based aesthetics. This shared space bears the possibility of a better beginning, a more complete and positive globalization that will unite West and East beyond the absurdity of their propagated div- isions. On the gallery floor of the monument, people meet people and discover the falla- ciousness of their monstrous unknowing. By its very nature as “public,” the unfixing of the site from its ideological core has therefore created a new zone of uncertainty—a new “thirdspace” as Henri Lefebvre (1991) calls it. Immersed in the cacophony, sexual energy, and financial desperation of Legian Street, the monument has thus created a new locus for the pleasure zone itself. In the shadows and laneways surrounding the site, prostitutes and drug dealers The Bali Bombings Monument 41 still solicit the interest of tourists who come by the monument and are welcomed into the Janus space. Inevitably, the sub-communities and their clients also subvert the authority and reverence that are inscribed into the site, exposing the elemental counter-narratives of desire that incited the bombing murders in the first instance. More generally, the sub- community members, many of whom are Muslim Javanese, invert the homology that the whole notion of “public” implies. In many respects, the groups who linger in the shadows of the monument are themselves creating a living memorial to those marginalized people —jungkies and kupu-kupu malam—who were also killed in the nightclub attacks but whose names have never appeared on the fatality list and authorized honor board. For these people, the living and the dead, the Legian Street monument is merely a totem to their desperation and to the euphoria that their bodies enshrine for others. It is from this euphoria that the bombings memorial has been cast and ultimately obscured.

Acknowledgment

The authors would like to acknowledge the support of the Australian Research Council.

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