Global 'Rightist Revolt': Trumpism and Its Foundations

VALDAI DISCUSSION CLUB REPORT

www.valdaiclub.com

GLOBAL ‘RIGHTIST REVOLT’: TRUMPISM AND ITS FOUNDATIONS

Oleg Barabanov, Dmitry Efremenko, Boris Kagarlitsky, Vasily Koltashov, Kirill Telin

MOSCOW, SEPTEMBER 2017 Authors

Oleg BARABANOV Ph.D. (Habiltation), Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club; Professor at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; Professor of the Russian Academy of Sciences Dmitry EFREMENKO Ph.D. (Habilitation), Deputy Director for Research at the Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences Boris KAGARLITSKY Ph.D. of Political Sciences, Director of the Institute of Globalisation and Social Movements Vasily KOLTASHOV Head of the Economic Research Centre at the Institute of Globalisation and Social Movements Kirill TELIN Ph.D. of Political Sciences, Research Fellow of the Faculty of Political Science at the Lomonosov Moscow State University Edited by Oleg BARABANOV

The authors of the report acknowledge the contribution of the participants of the situational analysis devoted to the “Trumpism and ‘Rightist Revolt’” held by the Valdai Discussion Club on 16 March 2017: Vladimir Vasilyev, Ph.D. (Habilitation), Chief Research Fellow of the Institute for the U.S. and Canadian Studies Russian Academy of Science; Daniil Grigoryev, expert from the Center of Economic Research at the Institute of Globalisation and Social Movements; Kirill Koktysh, Ph.D. of Political Sciences, Associate Professor of the Department of Political Theory at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; Boris Mezhuev, Ph.D. of Philosophical Sciences, Editor-in-Chief of Politanalitika.ru; Maria Shibkova, Lecturer of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

The views and opinions expressed in this Report are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Valdai Discussion Club, unless explicitly stated otherwise. Contents

From ‘Globalization of Elites’ to ‘Globalization for all’: ‘Rightist Revolt’ Phenomenon ...... 3

“Their Triumphs Have Not Been Your Triumphs”: Trumpism and ‘Redneck Values’ ...... 4

Social-Ideological Nature of Trumpism ...... 6

Public Support for Trumpism ...... 8

Who Is Mr Trump: Socio-Political Analogues ...... 12

The Economy of Trumpism ...... 15

Reaction of Trump’s Opponents: the Eschatology of Trumpism ...... 19

Trumpism and Europe: Is Replication Possible? ...... 20

Trumpism and Russia ...... 24 GLOBAL ‘RIGHTIST REVOLT’: TRUMPISM AND ITS FOUNDATIONS

From ‘Globalization of Elites’ to ‘Globalization for all’: ‘Rightist Revolt’ Phenomenon

Starting in 2015, one of the prioritized of the Club1, and discussed at the 13th Annual expert topics chosen by the Valdai Discussion meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club in 2016 Club has been studying global alternatives that was attended by the Russian President to the traditional neoliberal mainstream and Vladimir Putin as well as by ex-presidents their impact on the world’s transformation. of Finland, Austria and South Africa. Originally, the main focus was on various The key interest in the global revolt non-western projects (Chinese, Turkish, concept lies in analyzing the divergent pace Arabic, Latin American, BRICS and others). As of globalization in different parts of the world. regards the intra-West alternatives, the main It is important to note that earlier this term emphasis was ﬁ rst placed on leftist movements was traditionally used to designate the gap in Europe – both by virtue of the historical between the developed nations of the golden tradition in the last couple of decades (anti- billion and the rest of the world, when wealthy globalists, Occupy Wall Street, etc.) and nations, became richer while poor nations lived due to the then ongoing political processes in worsening poverty. Accordingly, the problem in this part of the world (for instance, SYRIZA of overcoming the unevenness in globalization coming to power in Greece, the uprise of leftist processes was seen above all as the need progressivist civil movements in other parts to accelerate the development of the ‘rest of Southern Europe, Jeremy Corbin being elected of the world.’ The concept of ‘three silver billions’ a new Labor leader in UK). that formed an ideological foundation for However, the events of 2016–2017 sharply the political activity of BRICS emerged in that changed the political balance in the West and particular context. It is based on the assumption across the world. The Brexit success, sensational that the middle layer of contemporary world victory of Donald Trump at the U.S. presidential has more rights to represent the interests elections, the atmosphere of ‘the last of the entire humanity on a global scale, from battle’ ‘on the brink of a precipice’ during justice perspectives, than the elite of the golden the presidential elections in France, a dramatic billion nations and ﬁ nancial-economic institutes turn to right wing nationalism in Poland, under their control. The most radical versions Hungary and some other countries of Central of this paradigm called upon “fair redistribution” Europe – the whole of it brought the ‘rightist of global wealth and capital in favor of poorer revolt’ against the established mainstream (and nations as one way of overcoming the global response to it) into the global focus. Serious divide. Such an approach characterized most challenges to the domestic security of western of ideological manifestations of the anti- nations (migrants, terrorist attacks, racial globalist movement. tensions in USA (Ferguson), etc.) also enhanced The events of 2016 showed that now this the social base of the rightist turn, bringing issue can be differently formulated. The main a visible tilt towards violence. collision in the march of globalization is being In this context, the Valdai Discussion Club shifted from the international and civilizational came up with a new concept of global revolt at the turn of 2017, characterizing those trends 1 ‘Global Revolt and Global Order. The Revolutionary Situation in as “a revolutionary situation in the world”. Condition of the World and What to Do about It’, 2017, Valdai Discus- sion Club Report, Moscow, February. Available from: http://valdaiclub. The same problems were highlighted in the report com/files/13306/

VALDAI DISCUSSION CLUB REPORT, SEPTEMBER 2017 3 GLOBAL ‘RIGHTIST REVOLT’: TRUMPISM AND ITS FOUNDATIONS

aspect to domestic conflicts inside the West meeting, also paid attention to the uncertainty with growing antagonism between the western of society about the future: “We really have a lot elites and civil society. It is this conﬂ ict that of challenges. And what I have seen this in different poses a conceptual challenge to the status quo forums I’ve been to during the last years, especially of global economy and politics. after being free from being the president In his speech at the 13th Plenary Meeting of the Republic of Finland. People always say that of the Valdai Discussion Club Vladimir Putin this world is a world of uncertainty, and that’s pointed out: “Essentially, the entire globalization true. People feel everywhere that they have doubts project is in crisis today … But it is very clear in the future. And it is sometimes very paradoxical, that there is a lack of strategy and ideas for as we have still advanced so much.”3 the future. This creates a climate of uncertainty Eventually we arrive at the conclusion that has a direct impact on the public mood. that ‘globalization of elites and globalization Sociological studies conducted around the world for the elect’ is at odds with ‘globalization show that people in different countries and for all’. The ever increasing intensity on different continents tend to see the future of this conflict makes the possible future as murky and bleak. This is sad. The future does transformation of the West of the relevant not entice them, but frightens them. At the same agenda. It is this transformation attempt, time, people see no real opportunities or means the current establishment resistance to it, for changing anything, inﬂ uencing events and as well as the struggle for its continuation shaping policy.”2 that will most probably be the main political The former president of Finland Tarja intrigue not only in the years to come, but also Halonen, who participated in the aforementioned in the longer run.

“Their Triumphs Have Not Been Your Triumphs”: Trumpism and ‘Redneck Values’

“Today’s ceremony, however, has Washington ﬂ ourished – but the people did not very special meaning. Because today we share in its wealth. Politicians prospered – but are not merely transferring power from one the jobs left, and the factories closed. administration to another, or from one party The establishment protected itself, but to another – but we are transferring power from not the citizens of our country. Their victories Washington, D.C. and giving it back to you, have not been your victories; their triumphs the American People. have not been your triumphs; and while they For too long, a small group in our nation’s celebrated in our nation’s capital, there was Capital has reaped the rewards of government little to celebrate for struggling families all while the people have borne the cost. across our land.

2 ‘Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club’, 2016, official 3 ‘Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club’, 2016, official site of the President of the Russian Federation, October 27. Available site of the President of the Russian Federation, October 27. Available from: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53151 from: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53151

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That all changes – starting right here, and name you choose for this stratum, it is this lower right now, because this moment is your moment: social layer of working people that was deliberately it belongs to you.”4 chosen by Trump as the key target group of his Some may think that this is a quote election strategy. Is this populism? Of course, of a certain prominent revolutionary. It might it is. But, at the same time, this is a natural well be uttered, say, by Fidel Castro, should populism and perhaps the long-awaited response the Communist Cuba have somehow seized to the growing establishment estrangement from Washington, or by Leon Trotsky who could launch masses, which did not elicit any electorate reaction a Marxist revolution in the United States 100 under a rigid bipartisan system in the United years ago in early 1917, when he still lived there, States, unlike many European countries with their or may be by a Communist candidate who would more nuanced multiparty systems, where new somehow win the U.S. presidential elections. parties are easier to start and promote. Yet, this speech has no fantasy background: Such a sharp rebuff of traditional it is absolutely real, since this is a quotation mainstream rhetoric and its deliberate of the inaugural address delivered by U.S. dismantling in the course of Trump’s President Elect Donald Trump on 20 January 2017. election campaign (as well as the very fact America has never heard anything like that of his sensational victory) resulted, among other in the inaugural addresses of its presidents. This things, in the rightist national non-systemic led to shock waves and criticism. One of the most radicalism being associated with the name widespread (and perhaps mildest) characteristics of Donald Trump, even though it had existed was “populist”. This opinion was also shared by in many countries before. This is how the new leading experts of the Valdai Discussion Club who term of ‘Trumpism’ came into being. formulated their vision hot on the trail.5 It should be straight off noted that Nevertheless, Trump’s inaugural address Trumpism as an ideology and a system of values was totally in tune with the logic of his is much broader than the political ﬁ gure of Trump election campaign, its ideological climax being and is not directly tied to his current political the Gettysburg Address on October 22.6 Trump’s activities. This being said, the question of whether victory in the context of establishment break- Donald Trump will be able to stem the onslaught up and a direct appeal to the needs of masses of the old Washington establishment, rather brought to life the ‘redneck revolution’ concept. than walking away from his election platform, All these generally denigrating catchphrases is not that important for the given discourse. Much of the American slang (‘rednecks’, ‘Rust Belt’ and more important is the fact that a global political others) correspond to such Soviet stock phrases as wave caused by Trump’s electoral success formed ‘common folks’ and ‘working masses’. Whatever a fundamentally new ideology and even a system of values which could conventionally be described as ‘Trumpist’ (once again, without any tight 4 ‘The Inaugural Address. Remarks of President Donald J. Trump – As Prepared for Delivery’, 2017, the White House, January 20. Available conjunction with the future evolution of Donald from: https://www.whitehouse.gov/inaugural-address Trump himself). Following this logic, Marine 5 Sherr, J, Treisman, D, Wohlforth, W, Remington, T & Weitz, R, 2017, ‘‘Mobi- Le Pen was repeatedly called a “French Trump”, lizing’, ‘Populist’, ‘Rebellious’: Valdai Experts Assess Trump’s Inauguration Speech’, Valdai Discussion Club, January 21. Available from: http://valdai- Viktor Orban – a “Hungarian Trump”, Jaroslaw club.com/a/highlights/mobilizing-populist-rebellious-valdai-experts/ Kaczynski – a “Polish Trump”, etc. Using a not 6 ‘Donald Trump Foreign Policy Speech in Gettysburg, PA. First 100 really correct comparison with the Soviet history, Day Plan’, 2016, October 22. Available from: https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=_R4L-Os2LSI it can be stated that far from all the so-called

VALDAI DISCUSSION CLUB REPORT, SEPTEMBER 2017 5 GLOBAL ‘RIGHTIST REVOLT’: TRUMPISM AND ITS FOUNDATIONS

Trotskyists had any actual connections with Leon remarks about Mexico and China). This was also Trotsky. And now, several months after Trump’s one of the most important emotional-ideological inauguration it is already obvious that ‘Trumpists’ paradigms of his call upon the American society in other countries and Donald Trump are not exactly in the Gettysburg speech. the same phenomenon. Nevertheless, Trumpism as The given set of socio-economic values a label denoting the rightist national agenda has entails no less important political values taken root and can now be used in a broader sense. of Trumpism. The main of them (and the fifth Therefore, the key component of thus in a row) is the value of protection of sovereignty. construed Trumpism is a set of new values which “Make America Great Again” – the key motto should appropriately be described as ‘redneck of Trump’s election campaign – explicitly refl ects values’. It is important to determine what constitutes this value. The sixth political value of Trumpism their ‘positive basis’, apart from protesting against is the value of protecting the national identity the elite. The very term ‘redneck’ makes it clear that and historical-cultural identity of society, which most of them are of social and economic nature. is also topical not only in the United States, but First of all, it is the value of productive economy in other countries as well. Finally, the seventh value as the foundation for the sustainable well-being of Trumpism that was noticeable during and after of the society. From the standpoint of Trumpism the U.S. election campaign is the value of abstaining this base has been pushed out by services and from political correctness, the willingness to speak the financial sector, which leads to growing directly about the society’s pressure points and, broader public dissatisfaction. The second in this connection, the rejection of mainstream socio-economic value of Trumpism related media stereotypes and agenda. to the fi rst one is the value of reindustrialization Such is the set of the key values identifi ed and, in broader terms, the value of modernization with Trumpism. None of them is a personal of economic and social development. The third invention of Donald Trump, as they have value (which is, understandably, more often in full always been an integral part of the rightist view) is the value of of nation’s own labor force discourse in various countries. But the ‘magic’ labor force (and the resulting migration policy). of Trump’s victory has abruptly raised this set Hence the fourth value: the value of protecting of ideas to the level of the real agenda and key the domestic market or sound protectionism. Not to electoral success, so it can be tempting for in vain did it form the basis of Trump’s pre-election other political forces to repeat this Trumpist economic programme (it is suffi cient to recall his strategy of the ‘rightist revolt’ in other countries.

Social-Ideological Nature of Trumpism

Trumpism is definitely a new nationalist populism. Jacksonianism phenomenon, but it is rather deeply rooted implies a vision of America and its role in the American political history. As was in the world that substantially differs from rightly noted by Walter Russel Mead, Trump the vision of the Founding Fathers, for and Trumpism demonstrate good compliance whom the top priority was nation-building with the Jacksonian paradigm, i.e. American based on the totality of political principles.

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THE DIVIDE OVER AMERICA’S FUTURE (2016) Nostalgia for the 1950s Since the 1950s, do you think American culture and way of life has mostly changed for the better, or has it mostly changed for the worse? Mostly changed for the worse Mostly changed for the better Likely voters Likely voters % supporting supporting Hillary Clinton Donald Trump 100 34 34 34 39 43 43 51 56 70% 72% 90 36 57 59 57 65 68 74 80 70 60 50 Things have American society and 40 changed way of life has changed 30 for the better for the worse 20 10 66 66 65 62 60 57 56 48 43 42 41 41 34 31 25 56% 65% 0 White White college- working- ted educated Black White class Age 65+ Democrat Hispanic Americans Americans 8QDIʳOLD Age 18-29 Republican All Americans White Catholic Hispanic Catholic White working class American society Things are White college educated is generally now worse White mainline Protestant better now White evangelical Protestant White Men Most Averse to Politically Correct Language Which of the following statements comes closest to your own view - even if neither is exactly right? Even if certain people are offended it is important to speak It’s important to avoid using language that is hurtful and frankly about sensitive issues and problems facing the country offensive to some people when discussing sensitive issues % 70 69 60 57 56 50 52 52 40 44 46 39 38 30 27 20

0 All Americans White men White women Non-white men Non-white women

White Working-Class Americans More Likely Large Class Divides Among White Americans on Free Trade to Express Cultural Protectionism Which of the following statements comes closest to your own view - even if neither is exactly right? All Americans White working White college Free trade agreements with other Free trade agreements with class educated countries are mostly helpful other countries are mostly because they open markets for U.S. harmful because they send % companies and allow Americans jobs overseas and drive 70 % to buy goods more cheaply down wages 60 68 60 60 50 55 50 54 50 49 40 48 44 40 41 43 39 42 30 30 33 20 26 20 10 10 0 0 Things have changed The American way of life All Americans All white White working White college so much that I often feel like needs to be protected Americans class educated a stranger in my own country from fRUHLJQLQʴXHQce

Source: Public Religion Research Institute.

VALDAI DISCUSSION CLUB REPORT, SEPTEMBER 2017 7 GLOBAL ‘RIGHTIST REVOLT’: TRUMPISM AND ITS FOUNDATIONS

Jacksonian nationalism, on the contrary, is based determined to topple the order symbolized by on the vision of America as the Promised Land Clintons and Obama. American conservatism conquered, seasoned and sanctifi ed with sweat is a heterogeneous phenomenon, to be sure, and blood. Sovereignty is one of the most uniting polar movements – from libertarians important categories for Jacksonians. In case to paleoconservatists. Trumpism became of Andrew Jackson protecting or spreading a reality by virtue of the high demand for a fi gure the American sovereignty was not only about capable of consolidating protest sentiments and the territory, but also about restoration expressing the hopes of numerous electorally of the federal government’s sovereign control signifi cant interests. over the financial system. In this sense, Yet, the success of the rightist populism the Jacksonian “I killed the Bank” is tantamount personified by Trump does not boil down to Trump’s escapades against supranational to the figure of an establishment-rejecting financial structures stripping Americans rebel. The electorate and stakeholder groups of control over their own national economy. who brought Trump to the White House Jacksonianism in America has gone voice a broader demand for transformation through ups and downs, but it never died. of the American political system, the model In the evolution of American conservatism, of social mobility and access to resources. the Jacksonian paradigm was obviously The fact that this model was turning increasingly on the rise during the two recent decades until closed for millions of Americans, generated it led to the temporary consolidation of forces Trumpism.

Public Support for Trumpism

Talking about the social nature have no choice anyway, and we will press for of Trumpism, it is closely related to American our own agenda, which was moving towards conservatism. Therefore, it is not by chance the consensus of elites with slight cultural that Trump, who was in contact with both variations”. The left politicians were actively Republicans and Democrats at one time, after involved in this game as well. Moreover, at some all decided to run for office for Republicans point they even formed the vanguard by touting because his philosophy corresponds cultural difference as their key narrative. a lot more with the sentiments and interests What does all this imply? It is connected of the Republican masses, as opposed with transformation of the left-of-center to the interests of the Republican elite. mainstream, which had lost ties with its A characteristic trend in the western electorate and no longer represented any politics of the recent 30 years or so has been that serious mass forces, having degenerated into political party elites used their traditional social a radical wing of liberalism. Quite typically, support as some sort of a guaranteed resource, the left played more ardent liberals than almost as their private property. According liberals themselves in many cultural issues. to their logic, “regardless of what the electorate In other words, the left turned from anti- wants and thinks, they will vote for us as they liberals into radical liberals.

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This trend can explain the popularity often have absolutely different interests – not of Bernie Sanders in the course of the past election only because of racial stratifi cation, but of labor campaign, since he tried to revive the authentic realm as well. Thus, workers of parochial leftist agenda understandable to masses. From enterprises with low productivity of labor, this perspective, it is extremely important lack of advanced technologies and patriarchal that Trumpism included not only rightist, but labor relations are socially alien to workers partly also leftist sentiments. In this context of transnational corporations. one of Trumpism’s possible populist analogues This is why Latin America with its social is Argentinian Peronism. What do Peronism instability and messy social structures might well and other similar populist movements in Latin be a breeding ground for populist movements. America originate from? Why did they seem They were diffi cult to be defi ned in accordance very specifi c and almost unique from the point with the European traditions as left or right, of view of European political scientists? Because since they shaped some conglomeration. It in sociological terms, there are no established should be focused on a charismatic leader classes in Latin America, while social structures who is not a populist in the traditional are vague and heterogeneous. sense – a demagogue promising everything to all. Latin American sociologists also noted The leader’s fi gure is rather important in this that there are several working classes, which structure: on the one hand, this person should

SHRINKING AMERICAN MIDDLE CLASS

% of adults in each income tier

Lowest Lower middle Middle Upper middle Highest

2015 20 950 12 9

2011 20 9 51 12 8

2001 18 9 54 11 7

1991 18 9 56 12 5

1981 17 9 59 12 3

1971 16 9 61 10 4

Note: Figures may not add to 100% due to rounding. Source: Pew Research Center.

VALDAI DISCUSSION CLUB REPORT, SEPTEMBER 2017 9 GLOBAL ‘RIGHTIST REVOLT’: TRUMPISM AND ITS FOUNDATIONS

epitomize certain cultural and psychological majority – not necessarily a really existing idiosyncrasies, but also put together and majority, as a matter of fact, but a certain cement these highly heterogeneous, motley and visional majority yet to be created. contradictory forces, given that these people, Thus, Trumpism not only while having some common interests, quite amalgamates leftist and rightist elements, often pursue conflicting agendas. As long as but also relies on a bloc of extremely a strong leader is capable of keeping them aﬂ oat, contradictory interests. One of the elements such movements exist. It is for this reason that is what can be characterized as middle- they are given personal names. Thus, it is clear class bourgeoisie, which is, as a matter why we refer to Trumpism or Peronism, rather of fact, a very conventional category. It than to a new republicanism or conservatism is important that mega-bourgeoisie, being of the XXI century, or something like that. very different from the above-mentioned, The question is why this has all is extremely impersonated. These are not been transported to Western Europe or sole entrepreneurs, but an impersonal United States? The answer should also techno structure (in the words of Galbraith) be sought in sociology; the paradox under control of the top management. This is that under the impact of neoliberalism impersonated management is opposed western societies increasingly resemble to personified bourgeoisie; this is very Latin American communities, at least important culturally and even socially. By outwardly. In other words, we witness virtue of its personified nature, this devolution and fragmentation of their social bourgeoisie is not some abstract structure structure. The neoliberal discourse and oriented towards the global market, but neoliberal economic and social policy led towards the domestic market instead. This to fragmentation of lower strata of the society, is a matter of principle. with elite being the only consolidated The second group is the working class. element. In this environment identity politics, When the white working class is said to support affirmative discrimination, targeted assistance Trump, this is not quite correct. He was backed by and other policies are both ideological and the working class in its original interpretation, institutional factors of fragmentation. This and this is very important. When they say that made the western society a lot more variegated, Trump was elected by white population, this thereby creating the very breeding ground is only part of the truth. The paradox is that for new populist movements being neither Trump was also elected by Afro-Americans leftist, nor rightist. But on the other hand, and Latin Americans, because it is in the swing this fragmentation paradoxically generated northern states, like Wisconsin, the choice the need for reconsolidation and overcoming made by black people in favor of Trump (albeit the rampant fragmentation. Trump’s call statistically insignificant) tipped the scale. “Make America Great Again” is not about Therefore, a very small part of non-white white men, whatever liberals might say, but electorate drifting towards Trump was a very about overcoming fragmentation and revival important factor that changed the situation of integrated society in place of numerous quality-wise. The point is that they voted like minorities. The paradox is that in this context other workers, but not like their racial peers. conservatism serves as an ideology oriented Sociologically, we clearly see what the non- towards the majority, or towards creating this whites who voted for Trump and the non-whites

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who voted for Hillary Clinton represent. They the armed leftist rebels in Argentina, were are sociologically different groups, because also Peronists. There was even a famous non-whites voting for Trump are basically slogan: “Should Evita be alive – she would be people who worked in the manufacturing a Montanera”. In other words, there is a wide industry, while non-whites voting for Clinton range from the extreme right to the ultra-left were mostly people living on unemployment within peronism. This bloc began crumbling beneﬁ t and dependent on community leaders; and falling apart while Peron was alive. therefore, this in fact was a clientele voting. The leader can seldom keep the balance for They voted for Clinton because this is what too long. they were told to do by community leaders The second conclusion is that this bloc distributing social assistance. will not fall apart in the near future. It will Another important part in the working remain until its objectives, which brought segment of Trumpism’s social base is what can them together, are reached. These are be described as ‘engineering proletariat’. These absolutely real objectives that do not reflect are not blue collars in the original meaning – any particular sentiments or result from they are ‘grey collars’. It was the engineering populist demagoguery, but reflect deeply proletariat that incurred greatest losses rooted interests. One of them is certainly in the course of deindustrialization consolidation of the American domestic in the United States. The point is that while market. This is one of the key issues uniting a low-skilled worker losing one job can a significant part of industrial bourgeoisie find another of the same level, engineering and the working class, including by means proletariat has to downgrade its social status of trade unions – a stable domestic market and give up the earlier acquired professional means stable wages and stable wages mean and technical competences, even if their strong unions. That is why it is no coincidence wages are not lowered significantly, when that Trump became one of the first U.S. they change for unskilled work. In other words, presidents who immediately called Union most advanced workers suffered highest leaders to the White House. The left as meant losses. This is why the reindustrialization by the mainstream quickly tagged these Union demanded by Trumpists actually means leaders as corrupt ones, whose corruption remodernization following the actual was only in the attempt to make a deal with demodernization (with regard to the technical Trump. Not that they were corrupt before: production competences, not modernization they are labelled corrupt, because they are of consumption, gadgets, etc.) that resulted disliked by the left. The left press came up from the neoliberal mainstream policy. with headlines like “Workers Betray the Left”. What is all this leading up to? The first But in this case a reverse question would be conclusion is that the social support for more pertinent: what if the left were the first Trumpism is extremely heterogeneous, and to betray workers? in the long run it can, even almost inevitably, It is important to emphasize that fall apart into the conditionally leftist sociologically (talking about different and rightist components, as it happened tints of Conservatism) Trumpism is not to Peronism. which gave rise to such opposing a paternalistic movement. One of the most political figures as Carlos Menem and Néstor exciting perspectives opening in connection Kirchner. As a matter of fact, Montaneros, with Trump is the end of paternalism.

VALDAI DISCUSSION CLUB REPORT, SEPTEMBER 2017 11 GLOBAL ‘RIGHTIST REVOLT’: TRUMPISM AND ITS FOUNDATIONS

Interestingly enough, the right keep bashing Trumpism every which way. This contradiction the left for paternalism; in reality, however, is seen in the fi rst practical decisions, because it is neoliberals who created paternalistic in each particular case there is a leading systems on an unprecedented scale. When group defending a certain decision that leads accusing the left of paternalism, they really to opposite ends. On the one hand, the bloc will mean a social safety net, which has nothing certainly be preserved, but on the other hand, it to do with paternalism, because the safety will be so much on the verge of disintegration, net treats everyone on an equal footing. rather remaining consistently ineffective, Paternalism presumes personified approach because of the said contradictions. The liberal in providing social support. Policies such as resistance and Trump’s personal downgrade positive discrimination is paternalism per se, may, on the one hand, amplify the disunity transforming into clientelism. of his social basis, but on the other hand, Trump tries to pursue a policy that will it is this forceful liberal resistance that may be eroding the clientelist logic. For now, he has withhold this bloc in the pro-Trump fi eld. achieved moderate success, but the beginning The British political vocabulary has an has been set. Moreover, this will be a growing interesting term: ‘Red Tory’ – a trend largely trend. And in the future the success of Trump, associated with the name of Winston Churchill, if he wants to stay in the White House which was suppressed by Margaret Thatcher. in 2020 or promote his candidate, who will Churchill was a typical ‘Red Tory,’ especially not necessarily be a Republican, will depend in his youth. Later he joined the liberal camp, on whether he will be able to ultimately but then came back to the conservatives. dissolve this system. Churchill could productively interact with Labor So until the problem of strengthening ministers in the coalition cabinet and actually of the domestic market and a number of urgent implement their agenda in 1941–1944. What was social problems are solved – the two tasks supressed in England and what may resurface being somehow interrelated, the social basis again at present, will be clearly associated with of Trumpism won’t fall apart. But given Trumpism in America. If this raises a wave the diverse nature of Trumpism, this policy of pro-Trump activism, we will then deal with will be extremely ineffective at fi rst stages, and a revolutionary situation, because the current this is the third conclusion. Despite certain anti-Trump campaign may sooner or later cause common interests, a number of aspects pull an increase of his electorate activity.

Who Is Mr Trump: Socio-Political Analogues

We should reiterate that the victory attack on Trump from his adversaries. This of Donald Trump was a stunning surprise definitely led to pejorative labels, comparing for the ‘old’ elite, mainstream media and Trump with Hitler, etc. The origin of these expert community. His calls “to drain stereotyped clichés is understandable and the Washington swamp” provoked a slashing does not require any analysis. What really

12 VALDAI DISCUSSION CLUB REPORT, SEPTEMBER 2017 GLOBAL ‘RIGHTIST REVOLT’: TRUMPISM AND ITS FOUNDATIONS

matters, is that despite the marked uniqueness to the President (some even compare Steve of Trump in the U.S. contemporary politics, Bannon with Henry Kissinger). An allusion many compared him with other American to impeachment is also used. presidents (or presidential candidates), both Whenever Trump is positioned as Republican and Democratic. In particular, a ‘frantic’ and ‘fiery’ conservative crusader, Trump was compared with Ronald Reagan, rather than a ‘classical’ conservative, he Richard Nixon, Barry Goldwater, Franklin D. is often compared with Goldwater. Many see Roosevelt, John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, quite a few thematic and stylistic parallels Jimmy Carter and even Barak Obama. between the presidential campaign of Barry This phenomenon seems very interesting. Goldwater in 1964 and Trump’s campaign. On the one hand, it is psychologically As regards the sociological particulars, many important as a defensive posture against remind of Goldwater’s famous phrase that absolute novelty and an absolute stranger. America’s main foe is the younger generation, The attempt to pigeonhole this stranger who are easily converted to communism, in the already established political landscape betraying the American ideals and values. in the United States, outlined by political Trump never said anything like that, to be sure, scientists and sociologists, makes the reaction but senior and middle-aged people prevail to novelty and erosion of this landscape among his proponents. Trump’s opponents less painful. On the other hand, given also give themselves a treat, hinting that the aforementioned broad and non-uniform a group of American psychiatrists came social base of Trumpism, comparing the new to the conclusion that Goldwater was insane, president to some of his predecessors allows unable to be responsible for his actions and drawing upon the historical experience while absolutely unfit for the presidential office. building a real strategic policy of Trump (if he The conservative crusade makes Trump can and will carry out his election campaign somewhat similar to Reagan as well. Both are promises). In any case, this patchwork-style charismatic leaders prioritizing the swelling attempt to compare Trump with a number military budget. There are some similarities of his predecessors with their different policies between Reaganomics and Trump’s economic and personalities has no analogues in U.S. program. The main difference between the two politics and reflects more significant in-depth is that Reaganomics actually ruled out public processes going on in the American society. regulation, while Trump needed tougher public Comparing Trump with Nixon implies regulation of both tariffs and industries for his above all the perception of Trump as election economic agenda to be implemented. a ‘classical’, ‘old-fashioned’ conservative This brings us to yet another without neoliberal ideologically charged comparison between Trump and Franklin overtones. This is how Nixon is typically Roosevelt. The need for stiffer public control represented. Another factor of their similarity, of ‘Trumponomics’ evokes direct parallels besides conservatism, is political pragmatism with Roosevelt’s New Deal. From social and (especially in foreign policies) purged from any emotional perspectives, the social contract ideology. The third factor is the staff rotation, with the electorate proclaimed by Trump inviting to leading offices of some individuals, in his Gettysburg speech also echoes the New who had never been a part of the political Deal. Other similarities between the models establishment, but are ideologically close of Trump and Roosevelt proceed from

VALDAI DISCUSSION CLUB REPORT, SEPTEMBER 2017 13 GLOBAL ‘RIGHTIST REVOLT’: TRUMPISM AND ITS FOUNDATIONS

the significance of the leftist component to the electorate. Opinion polls reveal that on the grassroots level for building up four out of five positive qualities of Obama the social support. and Trump that appealed to voters in 2008 Yet, Roosevelt is not the last Democratic and 2016, respectively, coincide. president compared to Trump. Another As estimated by Pew Research,7 comparison is Trump and Johnson. Indeed, Trump’s strongest qualities, in the opinion the radical transformation of the American of respondents, were his ability to keep society, Trump called upon in his Gettysburg promises (60%), “make everything work” speech, and in the very slogan “Make (54%) and strong leadership (49%). America Great Again”, stylistically and often Likewise, Obama’s leadership and effective essentially is similar to Lyndon Johnson’s management were also rated very high Great Society program. The matter does in 2008.8 Based on these data, it can be not only regard “greatness” or the scope surmised that those changes (“Yes, We of ambitions, but also allusions to the possible Can”) and electoral demand that brought results of such programs. the Democrat to power in 2008, also brought Another comparison stems above all Donald Trump to the White House in the last from the novelty effect: Trump as Kennedy. campaign, as he epitomized the same social The bright star of Kennedy, his rapid ascent demand that, alas, remained unmet during to the political Olympus is very similar the Democrat’s two tenures. to the quick rise of Donald Trump, despite In both cases we see the effect of novelty their generational and other differences. and expectations (maybe overstated) from Furthermore, it is Kennedy and Trump the “new and historically unprecedented” who did not shy away from appointing image of the President. The only thing that their close relatives to the key posts makes Obama different from Trump in terms in the administration. Finally, it is also of sociological anticipation, is that Obama, true that Trump’s opponents, talking about according to the respondents, understands the system repelling any novice and stranger, the daily problems experienced by common also cannot help hinting at the fate of John Americans, while Trump does not. All the rest Kennedy. is more or less the same. Respondents never The next comparison is Trump like mentioned similar values of the President Carter. For all their dissimilarity, they are and their own as the key factor that attracts similar in that Carter was the only president them. As for management and public prior to Trump who came to “cleanse administration, both Obama and Trump were the Washington swamp”. If we remember positively rated by voters. the post-Watergate context, alienation of the broad layers of society from the old Washington elite and demand for reforms, the whole of it made the Carter election 7 ‘In First Month, Views of Trump Are Already Strongly Felt, situation similar to Trump’s election. Deeply Polarized’, 2017, Pew Research Center, February 16. Available from: http://www.people-press.org/2017/02/16/in- And finally, the most unexpected first-month-views-of-trump-are-already-strongly-felt-deeply- comparison: Trump like Obama. While polarized/1_6-8/ fighting Obama’s heritage and being his 8 Jones, J, 2009, ‘Obama Gets High Marks on Leadership, Empathy’, Gallup, July 24. Available from: http://www.gallup.com/poll/121880/ direct opponent, Trump had a similar appeal obama-gets-high-marks-leadership-empathy.aspx

14 VALDAI DISCUSSION CLUB REPORT, SEPTEMBER 2017 GLOBAL ‘RIGHTIST REVOLT’: TRUMPISM AND ITS FOUNDATIONS

The Economy of Trumpism

Talking about the economic foundations upon under Obama. The growing corporate of Trumpism, it draws on the classical debt made Deutsche Bank announce in the fall Republican political logic, i.e. on economic of 2016 that a recession is inevitable in the U.S., protectionism, which was normal for the USA since the debt of common Americans has grown. of the XIX century. This protectionism further In other words, people’s income does not cover converges with economic regulation which even their current expenses and people pay cannot be dispensed within modern-day interest to banks even on their daily spending, economy, especially in America where it not only on home or car loans. is necessary to implement such programs as This largely ensured Trump’s political development of high-speed railway transport. success, but also sparked a general movement Social and health expenditures also need among Americans that helped to lay to be rationally administered that they might the foundations of Trumpism as a new approach be effective both for people and the U.S. to the settlement of old issues. In recent decades economy, to disable parasitic forms of business. Americans saw enough of the target solution The government must steer the financial of general problems, the aforementioned mechanism by taking the Federal Reserve affi rmative action, and opted for an alternative. System (FRS) under its control instead of it This is the difference between the classical being at nod. Republican approach to problem solution and Trump only dropped a hint at a new neoliberal democratic approaches. economic policy, but it can be presumed that this Nevertheless, we see how the current hint has yet to be disclosed, resulting in a triune political and partly economic crisis in the United system: protectionism, regulation and welfare States differs from a similar situation in the times state; the conservative nature of Trumpism of the Great Depression. Economists are fond is on hand here. We see an appeal to America’s of comparing the current crisis, especially its fi rst Golden Age of the 1950s–1960s. And when we wave of 2008–2009, with the Great Depression see Trump surrounded by many aged people, in the U.S. back in 1929–1933. Two developments occasionally called “Trump’s old folks”, this in times of the Great Depression spared is not accidental. They are more classic Nixonian President Franklin Roosevelt many problems or maybe even Eisenhower-era Republicans, who and enabled him to pursue the economic policy participated in building the prosperous America he planned. The first one was a revolution and remember the economic boom. In those days in the Democratic Party. Throughout the 1920s it was the income, not bank loans, that made any new Democrats were counteracting corrupt old person part of the middle class. Democrats “lining their pockets”, according One of the problems faced by modern- to their critics. Roosevelt stood at the helm day United States is that quite often the middle of the already renewed party; in other words, class live on tick. For Americans, this is an there was a well-organized political system outgrowth of both the social and political crisis. backed by millions of American voters who And while U.S. Democrats argue that it is normal believed that this political force would make and loans are fi ne, Trump’s election showed that a difference. most Americans prefer income growth to debt The second fact was that Roosevelt won growth, especially because the debt has been in the wake of the crisis exacerbation. Trump swelling recently. Moreover, it is on the debt entered the White House before the fi nancial growth that economic stabilization was built bubble burst. Trump kept talking about

VALDAI DISCUSSION CLUB REPORT, SEPTEMBER 2017 15 GLOBAL ‘RIGHTIST REVOLT’: TRUMPISM AND ITS FOUNDATIONS

the bubble busting policy throughout 2016. almost 1.5 times exceeds the level of 2007, He said it would be expedient to let the bubble on the eve of the U.S. stock market collapse burst, but it has been infl ated even more than in 2008. In other words, not only did the U.S. in 2007 on the eve of the First wave of the global stock market overcome the fall of 2008–2009, economic crisis. bouncing back from the minimums of 2009; it The following infographics was published also exceeded 1.5 times the level of 2007, i.e. in the report “Donald Trump and Economic the fi nancial bubble is overinfl ated. Context”, released one week before Trump’s Trump understands that this bubble election. must burst, but, to his bad luck, the bubble This report was presented by has not burst yet. Why is it so important for the Laboratory of Plekhanov Russian University the bubble to burst? Until a revolution occurs of Economics and the Institute of Globalization within the Republican party, most Republicans and Social Movements. The data of key will not be pro-Trump. If Trump could barely American market indices were processed, and win the Republican National Convention and it became clear that they are on the level that the entire campaign, at least in economy he

U.S. STOCK INDEX: PRE-CRISIS HIGHS AND CURRENT LEVELS

Dow Jones NASDAQ S&P 500 NYSE AMEX Industrial Composite (XAX) Average

The pre-crisis high of crisis low Post-crisis high The level (October 2007) (2009) on 01.06.2014 on 26 October 2016

13877 18210

7235 5261 2786 1431 2139 1549

735 2530 2789 2234

1332

Source: Report: Donald Trump and Economic Context // Plekhanov Russian University of Economics/IGSO.

16 VALDAI DISCUSSION CLUB REPORT, SEPTEMBER 2017 GLOBAL ‘RIGHTIST REVOLT’: TRUMPISM AND ITS FOUNDATIONS

should have a free hand. When FRS raised the key Yet, for some reasons, American workers do not rate from 0.75 to 1.0%, it limited Trump’s ability see the picture in rosy colors, and sociologists to carry out his economic plans, even timid ones. believe that their discontent is justified. The FRS decision made any efforts almost futile, This contradiction can bring about serious since any potential savings will have to be given upheavals. to FRS as part of the debt service. The interest We have similar historic precedents. on bonds is not high, but the very debt is close In times of the French revolution there was to $20 trillion. a very acute confl ict between big and middle This is how Trump is now entrapped: capital: big capital was interested in close links “you promised people a lot, but we will not give with Britain. In 1786 the king signed a trade you money”. This exacerbates Trump’s blockade agreement with England to the benefi t of French and the political situation in the whole country. big owners: he linked French trade with President is destined to combat FRS and part the English market. These were mainly wine, of the fi nancial elite, but not all of the banks, agricultural products and luxury items exported some of which can behave differently. to the growing English market, to please Trump’s policy is based on the interests the French nobility and large bourgeoisie, of middle capital and aimed at weakening big while others threatened with bankruptcy were capital in favor of the middle capital. This dissatisfied. The revolt of the middle capital is a very important contradiction which will against the big capital led to the French determine the entire dynamics of American revolution. politics. Why? Because big American capital We now see a similar situation has apparently outgrown the U.S. market, in the United States, because big capital has the American nation and has already entered become transnational here. It is interested a sharp collision with the American medium- in the strong dollar and does not care about sized business rooted in the local market, the situation in the home market or that not only the construction market, although the strong dollar means low exports from the fact that Trump comes from this business the United States. It is obvious that when all environment is quite indicative. currencies are weak, including Euro and GBP, and The word ‘profi t’ is very important here. the currencies of the BRICS nations are in fact The Chinese economy is counteracted for devaluated, save for RMB, which is but slightly the sake of profi t redistribution in the American devaluated, it has become very diffi cult to export market. This is fi ghting for the profi t, rather anything from the U.S. With bulky import than net redistribution of product sales or the main source of GDP growth is burgeoning jobs. The profi tability of USA-based companies public outlay due to the debt increase. This has dwindled in recent years. At least several is what happened under Obama, with debt and studies showed that things have gone awry, public expenses growing along with GDP. corporate debt keeps growing, profitability Trump’s economic ‘foes’, if we divide is either zero, negative or very small in case them, include fi nancial capital, FRS, USD and of manufacturing firms. This did not take China, the latter being a collateral adversary. a toll on the stock market, however, with its Trump behaves as a classical Republican upward trend. Judging by the stock market, of the XIX century. Trump said, at least during everything is fi ne in the American economy, pre-election period, that they would trade offi cial unemployment standing at only 5%. with China, but Chinese goods would not be

VALDAI DISCUSSION CLUB REPORT, SEPTEMBER 2017 17 GLOBAL ‘RIGHTIST REVOLT’: TRUMPISM AND ITS FOUNDATIONS

on sale in the USA. They would not be banned, during his second term. The second element but heavy duties would be introduced. Trump is the attempt to implement a protectionist has further increased the already huge tariffs agenda in a broader space, beyond the United on Chinese steel, introduced in times of Obama. States, specifically in Trans-Pacific (TPP) The Chinese leadership makes frequent and Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment statements like “let us sit down and discuss all (TTIP) Partnerships. This was an attempt problems at a table.” The Unites States seems to blend American protectionism with fi nancial to agree, but builds up the support of projects globalization, spreading the protectionist policy deemed dangerous in Beijing. to the zone that can seemingly be kept under The base of Trumpism is the American control and thus ensuring the growth of both domestic market. It is vital that this is a large American economy and the economy of this market, where contradictions accrued during friendly zone. the crisis years and prevalence of neoliberal This policy came to an end, when politics can be settled. Because the American Trump announced the exit from the Trans- economy can grow, then by crowding Chinese Pacifi c Partnership. This was likely just stating goods from the extensive home market, the demise of the TPP as an organization and building new railways, housing as well as project, because the U.S. economy did not the Mexican Wall it is possible to give the U.S. grow. At the time of starting the partnership economy a strong impulse. The U.S. market in 2014 the American economy demonstrated is oversaturated with Chinese merchandise growth and revival that triggered a large infl ow to the extent of stifling U.S. manufacturing of capital to the United States where optimism industries. reigned supreme. Yet, the picture was different Yet, during the first months of his by the time Trump had disbanded the TPP. It presidency Trump was unable to push through comes out that the U.S. failed to implement an his agenda, since he was blocked. This does intermediate pre-Trump protectionist plan or not mean that this blockade will put an end even convince Americans in its usefulness. to Trumpism, since it does not represent an In 2016 Trump won his first accidental historic phenomenon. battle in American politics after Trumpism did not rise from being voted into the White House. dissatisfaction of the American society, but from The second battle is combating the Congress, its protests. The Occupy Wall Street and Tea FRS and implementing at least some parts Party movements refl ected the political crisis of his economic program. This second battle, in the United States. A viable outcome was a new and maybe a third one if it is to happen, are tradeoff between Republicans and Democrats, being prepared for at the moment. Trump which stabilized the budgetary policy but did needs to win interior battles, addressing not pull the economy out of crisis. All hopes American ills. President’s most provocative crumbled by the end of the second presidential initiatives rejected by the Congress may term of Obama. Yet, those hopes were based usher in new dynamics: turning anti-Trump on some elements now cast away by Trump as congressmen into outcasts. The unwillingness well; we should take a note of them. of the Congress to collaborate with Trump The fi rst element is slashing budgetary exasperates the American electorate who wants expenditures. During Obama’s first term the initiatives of the new President to start the public debt was growing faster than working. This is important, given that the hopes

18 VALDAI DISCUSSION CLUB REPORT, SEPTEMBER 2017 GLOBAL ‘RIGHTIST REVOLT’: TRUMPISM AND ITS FOUNDATIONS

of American voters were twice frustrated under it take its ﬁ nal shape. Right now there are too Obama. Trumpism must unlock its potential many promises and allusions, but almost no in the home economic policy; only then will actual work backing them.

Reaction of Trump’s Opponents: the Eschatology of Trumpism

Contemporary moods related on account of the financial and economic to discussing the populist turn in the political crisis, but also by two other circumstances, process are eloquently depicted in the Bible. which still attract insufficient attention The conviction that the victory of Donald of researchers. First of all, radicalization Trump at the U.S. presidential elections will of the political discourse became possible due be followed by a collapse of the old system to the ‘identity shock’, which became a direct is essentially eschatological. This is anticipation consequence of globalization processes. of the imminent Doomsday, the “latter Despite the plentiful praise of the ‘ﬂ at world’, days” of the traditional world as we know it, the population in developed nations proved if not the end of this world: the fall of political unprepared to replace the former national establishment, the end of globalization, and identities with multicultural cosmopolitism. even the Leviathans of integration projects that Even in case of structures that could potentially will not stand the frontal attack of Brexits. emerge as mouthpieces of a new identity, To a certain extent this state as was the case with the European Union, is predetermined by the former actions political mistakes and ‘modernizing’ exclusion of politicians, when the threat of populism, of citizens resulted in the new self-identity especially of the rightist variety, was not taken rooting in the minds of every tenth citizen at seriously following the ‘this can never happen’ best. Overstated expectations are also to blame: logic. Opinion polls repeatedly confirmed as was once noted by Giovanni Sartori, the pertinence of this attitude, stressing the worst enemy of democracy is a demand the marginality of radicalism. Yet, brewing for a better democracy, whereas integration under the shadow of weighty opinions is a large- and globalization projects were traditionally scale discontent with both the political class accompanied by the “faster, better, more and engaged intellectuals. At some point affordable” rhetoric, which for many people was the deprivation of citizens became excessive divorced from reality. so that system-oriented forces (most often, Secondly, the resentment populism centrists) experienced a number of painful proved to have been engendered by tinkering electoral defeats: in Spain the Podemos reforms. After amassing slighted and movement won 20% of the entire electorate disenfranchised citizens, reformers opted off the reel, UKIP raised its head in UK, while 5 for the worst scenario of developing their Stelle marched triumphantly across Italy. policy by reversing it, thus only aggravating This shift was not only caused by the already rampant deprivation. By and migration fears or growing inequality in itself the policy of neoliberalism was an

VALDAI DISCUSSION CLUB REPORT, SEPTEMBER 2017 19 GLOBAL ‘RIGHTIST REVOLT’: TRUMPISM AND ITS FOUNDATIONS

extremely specific initiative that could not success the old status quo will start crumbling but lead to growing inequality. However, in some EU nations. This is why the French when systemic programs are not brought presidential elections should also be assessed to fruition, but transformed again and again, from this eschatological perspective. While this exacerbates the crisis. nobody took Trump seriously in the course Talking populism as a consistent of his election campaign, following his ideological movement in this environment triumph neoliberal forces braced themselves, is futile because: a) populism, being a way as if for the final battle, against Marine Le of thinking rather than an ideology, is organically Pen (and Francois Fillon): when the old status averse to conceptualization or reiﬁ cation, and quo was at stake and on the edge, the victory b) political populists do not need any notional of Le Pen (and maybe also Fillon) would fully austerity, giving preference to more convenient destroy the established political system. murky wording. This eschatological take on events resulted This pronounced eschatological in neoliberals rallying around Emmanuelle implications on the part of Trump’s opponents Macron and in an extremely dirty and rowdy spread from America to Europe. We should nature of the French election campaign. note again that the first months after Trump’s Without these deliberate implications victory passed in anticipation of a ripple of the ‘final battle’, the course of the French effect, when under the influence of his elections could be different.

Trumpism and Europe: Is Replication Possible?

However, Macron’s success in France of populism, it exposes the incapacity to address is not the end of the ‘final battle’ between the existing problems within the former neoliberals and Trumpists. Eschatological structural framework. In other words, it lays bare views on Trump lead in turn to a tempting a serious political crisis of the European space projection of the American scenario as regards its integration and problems speciﬁ c to European politics – not only in a general to each European nation. Is populism a way continental context, but as applied to each out of the crisis? No, because the worst thing of the national cases. With the tide of migrant that may happen to a populist is his victory, flows rising, almost all populist movements Trump’s case convincingly demonstrating in the U.S. and Europe have one thing the truth of this statement. Is populism a chance in common: peculiar nativism. But that to ﬁ nd a way out? Rather yes, than no, however is perhaps almost the only similarity. one additional condition should exist for this Almost – because at least the outcome to be possible: the lack of destabilizing establishment’s impotency and estrangement actions capable of restricting the opposition from the masses make the American problems to populism. In other words, by retaining similar to the predicament of the Old World. a dialogue mode (or initiating such a mode), Irrespective of the left and right orientation populists will indeed play a positive role

20 VALDAI DISCUSSION CLUB REPORT, SEPTEMBER 2017 GLOBAL ‘RIGHTIST REVOLT’: TRUMPISM AND ITS FOUNDATIONS

in sociopolitical evolution, or else the current which are crucial or considered as such under situation is fraught with daunting conflicts, the current circumstances. rather than a revival of the conservative ‘Europe The revolt against the neoliberal of nations’. political-ideological mainstream of national At any rate, given Brexit and the rise and supranational elites is compound, strangely of Trump, which signify profound upheavals blending seemingly incompatible aspirations for the western world on both sides and interests. Above all, we see a protest against of the Atlantic, there are weighty grounds globalization, for the first time in history to talk about an antisystemic ‘rightist revolt’. supported by signiﬁ cant electoral groups in both Who has revolted against whom or what? And the United States and Europe. It suddenly what are the possible consequences? How dawned upon these groups that the current should we respond? thrust of globalization processes marginalizes In general terms we are witnessing them. The migration threat and fears of cultural a change of eras and a related change in ways identity being undermined just open a list and styles of political thinking. Not in vain did of globalization effects quite unexpected for Zygmunt Bauman, analyzing the civilizational a western man in the street. The erosion dynamics of the early XXI century, applied of national sovereignty is increasingly often the term Interregnum used by Antonio interpreted by many western voters as the loss Gramsci in his ‘Prison Notebooks’ to describe of control over one’s own destiny. the anticipation of radical reforms caused by The revolt against the neoliberal social disruptions of the Great Depression. mainstream is largely turned against its political- Gramsci meant upcoming simultaneous and ideological, discoursive and sometimes even profound changes of the sociopolitical and aesthetic components related to postmodernism. legal order. Today, as at the time of Gramsci’s At least the ‘rightist revolt’ is an organic imprisonment in Torino, many global concepts, reprobation of eclecticism, construing any institutes and mechanisms demonstrate truth as relative and conventional, relegation progressive dysfunctionality, with no full- of the common good principle to something ﬂ edged replacement of these pillars heaving of secondary importance, etc. This is also a revolt in sight for now. against political correctness as a deeply layered Under these conditions the political system of double standards, tabooing and self- scene on various levels, from local to global, censorship. is being entered by forces interested to speed As regards the ‘rightist revolt’ in EU up the demolition of the ineffective order the main difference of the U.S. situation from where too many actors and groups turned the European one is that internal split is not out to be outsiders. Yet, formulating an a surprise. The bipartisan consensus is a thing intelligible alternative is a lot more daunting of the past – at least starting in mid-1990s, challenge which can nevertheless be observed when Newt Gingrich (a close friend of Donald in competitive political systems, where Trump) led the Contract with America resulted electoral procedures enable the mainstream in deeper polarization within the American opponents to make a statement and offer elite. In EU countries (at least in ‘old Europe’ as the electorate a programme, which can be referred to Donald Rumsfeld) the situation was described as creative destruction. It can be different. 1990s and 2000s were characterized situational, focused on one or two problems, by gravitation towards the political center and

VALDAI DISCUSSION CLUB REPORT, SEPTEMBER 2017 21 GLOBAL ‘RIGHTIST REVOLT’: TRUMPISM AND ITS FOUNDATIONS

even partial ideological convergence of political consider the nation state superfluous also mainstream parties. But now the polarization announce the civil rights superfluous, even trend and the demand of voters for a sharply if unintentionally.”9 deﬁ ned stance has reached the ‘old Europe’. In the modern political context this Under greatest pressure are traditional logic provides a strong posture for those conservatives increasingly affected by rightist willing to embrace it, and gathers further conservative populism with its radical ideas momentum, when aversion to Eurocratic gradually transforming the respectable elite is supplemented by disillusionment conservative philosophy. In the meantime, in the national pro-European elites. The latter mainstream conservatives try to keep away are not only willing to assign sovereign rights from ‘non-handshakable’ populists, while to Brussels, but also pursue a common poaching some of their slogans, tactics and thus migration policy (i.e. beyond the pale increasingly distorting the classical ideological of the nation state), a common policy towards matrix of political conservatism. minorities, making a case for special norms In Europe the rightist populism is now and values essentially based on self-censorship equivalent to Euroscepticism, even though and actual renunciation of the cultural- Euroscepticism is not tantamount to rightist historical foundations behind the national populism. Nevertheless, the very existence identity. If it is accompanied by the aggravation of the European Union and its institutes of socioeconomic problems, the electorate is like a gift of heaven for rightist populists changes its perception of globalization turning in Europe, because this gives them a universal its ugly face on the European voter. basis for bashing the political mainstream as What more general conclusions can be the key instrument for stripping European drawn? nations of their sovereign power, stressing that As for the outlook of conservatism and its supranational authorities have no legitimacy transformation under the impact of populism, within the framework of the national state. one should be more cautious here. The ‘rightist The problem of political sovereignty, revolt’ in the United States and Europe is global incidentally serving as a political basis for in terms of its political repercussions. Trump the rapprochement of Eurosceptic activists is a very American story; Marine Le Pen with modern-day U.S. Jacksonians, is coming is a French story. For now, the national context to the fore. retains primacy, so the development of events Ralf Dahrendorf succinctly formulated will vary in different nations. the gist of the problem almost a quarter Somewhere we will see traditional of a century ago: “Constitutions institutionalize conservatives crashing and being replaced the rights, which are legal guarantees, with rightist populists, but in other countries rather than just empty promises and nice conservatives will borrow the populist rhetoric, words… The rights necessitate instruments evolving in this direction, incurring painful losses, of coercion or enforcement bodies. All three but nevertheless retaining stable positions. classical branches of power find their place Britain is quite an indicative case here. But these authorities can function only in this respect. It is obvious that the post-Brexit in a perfect form of the nation state. The ones rejecting the nation state also lose effective 9 Dahrendorf, R, 1993, ‘Die Sache mit der Nation‘, in ‘Grenzfälle: über neuen und alten Nationalismus’, Hrsg.: Jeismann M., Ritter H. Leipzig, guarantees of their main rights. Those who s. 109.

22 VALDAI DISCUSSION CLUB REPORT, SEPTEMBER 2017 GLOBAL ‘RIGHTIST REVOLT’: TRUMPISM AND ITS FOUNDATIONS

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VALDAI DISCUSSION CLUB REPORT, SEPTEMBER 2017 23 GLOBAL ‘RIGHTIST REVOLT’: TRUMPISM AND ITS FOUNDATIONS

conservatives will be different from the pre- On the whole, the red lines will move Brexit ones. The Party of Independence played further away and populist forces will not only its part, but it is the Tory who have to implement grab more seats in European parliaments, but the new agenda. It is next to impossible for will also get involved in government coalitions the British Tory to become pro-European once in some places. And then the liberal West will again. But while implementing the exit program, still become different from what it was a quarter they still try to steer clear of Nigel Farage and of a century ago, at the dawn of the post-history his followers. era that was never ushered.

Trumpism and Russia

What should Russia’s attitude towards western nations back from postmodernist the ‘rightist revolt’ be? The temptation heaven to the earth of national interests, i.e. of simple decisions is difficult to resist: to the frame of reference where an intelligible Russia is interested to revise the post-bipolar dialogue is possible, could be a potential world order, which is perceived as unfair; it partner for Russia. In the meantime, we should criticizes the current globalization model while be aware of potential risks: the language capitalizing on the opening opportunities of national interests can be better understood, to the best of its ability; many in Russia reject but the interests can be antagonistic. the postmodernist value matrix. Consequently, The conflicts of national interests can be a lot those who contribute to the erosion of the world more intensive and dangerous, than conflicts order, weather it is deliberately or not, criticize around values. globalization and question the values prevalent If Moscow suddenly decided that it should in the West can be viewed as our allies. But we align with the rightist populism, this would should be careful not to go too far. mean the narrowing of political opportunities. The western media did their best to place Moreover, Russia would not only share Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump within the success of these forces, but also their failures one symbolic field. This is not to say that (which are inevitable). Therefore, it is important the Russian leadership should thus position to stake on a certain frame of reference for their nation. Rather it is necessary to be always the dialogue, acceptable to Moscow, Europe and open and ready for dialogue with everybody. our overseas partners, rather than on certain In fact, any force or politician trying to get political-ideological forces or movements.

24 VALDAI DISCUSSION CLUB REPORT, SEPTEMBER 2017 #Valdaiclub

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