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June 1927 July 1927
June 1927 SUN MON TUE WED THU FRI SAT 29 30 31 1 2 3 4 Memorial Day 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Father's Day 26 27 28 29 30 1 2 Calendar 411 - www.calendar411.com July 1927 SUN MON TUE WED THU FRI SAT 26 27 28 29 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Independence Day 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 Calendar 411 - www.calendar411.com August 1927 SUN MON TUE WED THU FRI SAT 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 1 2 3 Calendar 411 - www.calendar411.com September 1927 SUN MON TUE WED THU FRI SAT 28 29 30 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Labour Day 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 1 Calendar 411 - www.calendar411.com October 1927 SUN MON TUE WED THU FRI SAT 25 26 27 28 29 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Columbus Day 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 1 2 3 4 5 Halloween Calendar 411 - www.calendar411.com November 1927 SUN MON TUE WED THU FRI SAT 30 31 1 2 3 4 5 Halloween 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 DST End Veterans' Day 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 Thanksgiving Day 27 28 29 30 1 2 3 Calendar 411 - www.calendar411.com . -
Amerithrax Investigative Summary
The United States Department of Justice AMERITHRAX INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY Released Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act Friday, February 19, 2010 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. THE ANTHRAX LETTER ATTACKS . .1 II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . 4 A. Overview of the Amerithrax Investigation . .4 B. The Elimination of Dr. Steven J. Hatfill as a Suspect . .6 C. Summary of the Investigation of Dr. Bruce E. Ivins . 6 D. Summary of Evidence from the Investigation Implicating Dr. Ivins . .8 III. THE AMERITHRAX INVESTIGATION . 11 A. Introduction . .11 B. The Investigation Prior to the Scientific Conclusions in 2007 . 12 1. Early investigation of the letters and envelopes . .12 2. Preliminary scientific testing of the Bacillus anthracis spore powder . .13 3. Early scientific findings and conclusions . .14 4. Continuing investigative efforts . 16 5. Assessing individual suspects . .17 6. Dr. Steven J. Hatfill . .19 7. Simultaneous investigative initiatives . .21 C. The Genetic Analysis . .23 IV. THE EVIDENCE AGAINST DR. BRUCE E. IVINS . 25 A. Introduction . .25 B. Background of Dr. Ivins . .25 C. Opportunity, Access and Ability . 26 1. The creation of RMR-1029 – Dr. Ivins’s flask . .26 2. RMR-1029 is the source of the murder weapon . 28 3. Dr. Ivins’s suspicious lab hours just before each mailing . .29 4. Others with access to RMR-1029 have been ruled out . .33 5. Dr. Ivins’s considerable skill and familiarity with the necessary equipment . 36 D. Motive . .38 1. Dr. Ivins’s life’s work appeared destined for failure, absent an unexpected event . .39 2. Dr. Ivins was being subjected to increasing public criticism for his work . -
Investigation of Anthrax Associated with Intentional Exposure
October 19, 2001 / Vol. 50 / No. 41 889 Update: Investigation of Anthrax Associated with Intentional Exposure and Interim Public Health Guidelines, October 2001 893 Recognition of Illness Associated with the Intentional Release of a Biologic Agent 897 Weekly Update: West Nile Virus Activity — United States, October 10–16, 2001 Update: Investigation of Anthrax Associated with Intentional Exposure and Interim Public Health Guidelines, October 2001 On October 4, 2001, CDC and state and local public health authorities reported a case of inhalational anthrax in Florida (1 ). Additional cases of anthrax subsequently have been reported from Florida and New York City. This report updates the findings of these case investigations, which indicate that infections were caused by the intentional release of Bacillus anthracis. This report also includes interim guidelines for postexposure pro- phylaxis for prevention of inhalational anthrax and other information to assist epidemi- ologists, clinicians, and laboratorians responding to intentional anthrax exposures. For these investigations, a confirmed case of anthrax was defined as 1) a clinically compatible case of cutaneous, inhalational, or gastrointestinal illness* that is laboratory confirmed by isolation of B. anthracis from an affected tissue or site or 2) other labora- tory evidence of B. anthracis infection based on at least two supportive laboratory tests. A suspected case was defined as 1) a clinically compatible case of illness without isola- tion of B. anthracis and no alternative diagnosis, but with laboratory evidence of B. anthracis by one supportive laboratory test or 2) a clinically compatible case of an- thrax epidemiologically linked to a confirmed environmental exposure, but without cor- roborative laboratory evidence of B. -
Invasive Group a Streptococcal Disease Communicable Disease Control Unit
Public Health and Primary Health Care Communicable Disease Control 4th Floor, 300 Carlton St, Winnipeg, MB R3B 3M9 T 204 788-6737 F 204 948-2040 www.manitoba.ca November, 2015 Re: Streptococcal Invasive Disease (Group A) Reporting and Case Investigation Reporting of Streptococcal invasive disease (Group A) (Streptococcus pyogenes) is as follows: Laboratory: All specimens isolated from sterile sites (refer to list below) that are positive for S. pyogenes are reportable to the Public Health Surveillance Unit by secure fax (204-948-3044). Health Care Professional: Probable (clinical) cases of Streptococcal invasive disease (Group A) are reportable to the Public Health Surveillance Unit using the Clinical Notification of Reportable Diseases and Conditions form (http://www.gov.mb.ca/health/publichealth/cdc/protocol/form13.pdf) ONLY if a positive lab result is not anticipated (e.g., poor or no specimen taken, person has recovered). Cooperation in Public Health investigation (when required) is appreciated. Regional Public Health or First Nations Inuit Health Branch (FNIHB): Cases will be referred to Regional Public Health or FNIHB. Completion and return of the Communicable Disease Control Investigation Form is generally not required, unless otherwise directed by a Medical Officer of Health. Sincerely, “Original Signed By” “Original Signed By” Richard Baydack, PhD Carla Ens, PhD Director, Communicable Disease Control Director, Epidemiology & Surveillance Public Health and Primary Health Care Public Health and Primary Health Care Manitoba Health, Healthy Living and Seniors Manitoba Health, Healthy Living and Seniors The sterile and non-sterile sites listed below represent commonly sampled body sites for the purposes of diagnosis, but the list is not exhaustive. -
Toxic Shock-Like Syndrome Associated with Necrotizing Streptococcus Pyogenes Infection
Henry Ford Hospital Medical Journal Volume 37 Number 2 Article 5 6-1989 Toxic Shock-like Syndrome Associated with Necrotizing Streptococcus Pyogenes Infection Thomas J. Connolly Donald J. Pavelka Eugene F. Lanspa Thomas L. Connolly Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.henryford.com/hfhmedjournal Part of the Life Sciences Commons, Medical Specialties Commons, and the Public Health Commons Recommended Citation Connolly, Thomas J.; Pavelka, Donald J.; Lanspa, Eugene F.; and Connolly, Thomas L. (1989) "Toxic Shock- like Syndrome Associated with Necrotizing Streptococcus Pyogenes Infection," Henry Ford Hospital Medical Journal : Vol. 37 : No. 2 , 69-72. Available at: https://scholarlycommons.henryford.com/hfhmedjournal/vol37/iss2/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Henry Ford Health System Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Henry Ford Hospital Medical Journal by an authorized editor of Henry Ford Health System Scholarly Commons. Toxic Shock-like Syndrome Associated with Necrotizing Streptococcus Pyogenes Infection Thomas J. Connolly,* Donald J. Pavelka, MD,^ Eugene F. Lanspa, MD, and Thomas L. Connolly, MD' Two patients with toxic shock-like syndrome are presented. Bolh patients had necrotizing cellulitis due to Streptococcus pyogenes, and both patients required extensive surgical debridement. The association of Streptococcus pyogenes infection and toxic shock-like syndrome is discussed. (Henry Ford Hosp MedJ 1989:37:69-72) ince 1978, toxin-producing strains of Staphylococcus brought to the emergency room where a physical examination revealed S aureus have been implicated as the cause of the toxic shock a temperature of 40.9°C (I05.6°F), blood pressure of 98/72 mm Hg, syndrome (TSS), which is characterized by fever and rash and respiration of 36 breaths/min, and a pulse of 72 beats/min. -
Writing Home from Around the World, 1926–1927
Writing Home from Around the World, 1926–1927 A keen and amused observer, Tom Johnson is an articulate and conscien- tious letter writer. The reader has the feeling he was writing for himself as much as his family as he makes sentences and paragraphs of his impressions of the world at the height of colonialism. By THOMAS H. JOHNSON Edited with an introduction by LAURA JOHNSON WATERMAN y father, Thomas H. Johnson, the writer of these letters, was born in 1902 on the Connecticut River Valley farm known as Stone Cliff, located one mile north of the vil- Mlage of Bradford. In 1926, upon his graduation from Williams College, Tom Johnson embarked on a world cruise that was to last the length of a school year—September to May. He had been invited to teach Eliza- bethan Drama and American Literature (subjects he soon found to be not particularly relevant) on the fi rst ever student travel experiment. This was launched on a large scale with over fi fty faculty and four hun- dred and fi fty students, one hundred and twenty of them women. A. J. McIntosh, president of the University Travel Association, saw this as an opportunity to combine formal education with travel, and orga- nized the adventure by reaching out to colleges across the country. The project became known as the Floating University and was considered . LAURA JOHNSON WATERMAN is the author of Losing the Garden (2005), a memoir of thirty years of homesteading in East Corinth, Vermont. She co-authored with her late husband, Guy Waterman, fi ve books on the history of climbing the moun- tains of the Northeast and related environmental issues, among them, Forest and Crag (1989), Backwoods Ethics (1993), and Wilderness Ethics (1993). -
Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1891-1957, Record Group 85 New Orleans, Louisiana Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New Orleans, LA, 1910-1945
Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1891-1957, Record Group 85 New Orleans, Louisiana Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New Orleans, LA, 1910-1945. T939. 311 rolls. (~A complete list of rolls has been added.) Roll Volumes Dates 1 1-3 January-June, 1910 2 4-5 July-October, 1910 3 6-7 November, 1910-February, 1911 4 8-9 March-June, 1911 5 10-11 July-October, 1911 6 12-13 November, 1911-February, 1912 7 14-15 March-June, 1912 8 16-17 July-October, 1912 9 18-19 November, 1912-February, 1913 10 20-21 March-June, 1913 11 22-23 July-October, 1913 12 24-25 November, 1913-February, 1914 13 26 March-April, 1914 14 27 May-June, 1914 15 28-29 July-October, 1914 16 30-31 November, 1914-February, 1915 17 32 March-April, 1915 18 33 May-June, 1915 19 34-35 July-October, 1915 20 36-37 November, 1915-February, 1916 21 38-39 March-June, 1916 22 40-41 July-October, 1916 23 42-43 November, 1916-February, 1917 24 44 March-April, 1917 25 45 May-June, 1917 26 46 July-August, 1917 27 47 September-October, 1917 28 48 November-December, 1917 29 49-50 Jan. 1-Mar. 15, 1918 30 51-53 Mar. 16-Apr. 30, 1918 31 56-59 June 1-Aug. 15, 1918 32 60-64 Aug. 16-0ct. 31, 1918 33 65-69 Nov. 1', 1918-Jan. 15, 1919 34 70-73 Jan. 16-Mar. 31, 1919 35 74-77 April-May, 1919 36 78-79 June-July, 1919 37 80-81 August-September, 1919 38 82-83 October-November, 1919 39 84-85 December, 1919-January, 1920 40 86-87 February-March, 1920 41 88-89 April-May, 1920 42 90 June, 1920 43 91 July, 1920 44 92 August, 1920 45 93 September, 1920 46 94 October, 1920 47 95-96 November, 1920 48 97-98 December, 1920 49 99-100 Jan. -
VENEREAL DISEASES in ETHIOPIA Survey and Recommendations THORSTEIN GUTHE, M.D., M.P.H
Bull. World Hlth Org. 1949, 2, 85-137 10 VENEREAL DISEASES IN ETHIOPIA Survey and Recommendations THORSTEIN GUTHE, M.D., M.P.H. Section on Venereal Diseases World Health Organization Page 1. Prevalent diseases . 87 1.1 Historical .............. 87 1.2 Distribution.............. 88 2. Syphilis and related infections . 89 2.1 Spread factors . 89 2.2 Nature of syphilis . 91 2.3 Extent of syphilis problem . 98 2.4 Other considerations . 110 3. Treatment methods and medicaments . 114 3.1 Ancient methods of treatment . 114 3.2 Therapy and drugs . 115 4. Public-health organization. 116 4.1 Hospital facilities . 117 4.2 Laboratory facilities . 120 4.3 Personnel .............. 121 4.4 Organizational structure . 122 4.5 Legislation.............. 124 5. Recommendations for a venereal-disease programme . 124 5.1 General measures. ........... 125 5.2 Personnel, organization and administration . 126 5.3 Collection of data . 127 5.4 Diagnostic and laboratory facilities . 129 5.5 Treatment facilities . 130 5.6 Case-finding, treatment and follow-up . 131 5.7 Budget. ......... ... 134 6. Summary and conclusions . 134 References . 136 In spite of considerable handicaps, valuable developments in health took place in Ethiopia during the last two decades. This work was abruptly arrested by the war, and the fresh start necessary on the liberation of the country emphasized that much health work still remains to be done. A realistic approach to certain disease-problems and the necessity for compe- tent outside assistance to tackle such problems form the basis for future work. The accomplishments of the Ethiopian Government in the limited time since the war bode well for the future. -
2001 Anthrax Letters
Chapter Five: 2001 Anthrax Letters Author’s Note: The analysis and comments regarding the communication efforts described in this case study are solely those of the authors; this analysis does not represent the official position of the FDA. This case was selected because it is one of the few major federal efforts to distribute medical countermeasures in response to an acute biological incident. These events occurred more than a decade ago and represent the early stages of US biosecurity preparedness and response; however, this incident serves as an excellent illustration of the types of communication challenges expected in these scenarios. Due in part to the extended time since these events and the limited accessibility of individual communications and messages, this case study does not provide a comprehensive assessment of all communication efforts. In contrast to the previous case studies in this casebook, the FDA’s role in the 2001 anthrax response was relatively small, and as such, this analysis focuses principally on the communication efforts of the CDC and state and local public health agencies. The 2001 anthrax attacks have been studied extensively, and the myriad of internal and external assessments led to numerous changes to response and communications policies and protocols. The authors intend to use this case study as a means of highlighting communication challenges strictly within the context of this incident, not to evaluate the success or merit of changes made as a result of these events. Abstract The dissemination of Bacillus anthracis via the US Postal Service (USPS) in 2001 represented a new public health threat, the first intentional exposure to anthrax in the United States. -
WO 2014/134709 Al 12 September 2014 (12.09.2014) P O P C T
(12) INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION PUBLISHED UNDER THE PATENT COOPERATION TREATY (PCT) (19) World Intellectual Property Organization International Bureau (10) International Publication Number (43) International Publication Date WO 2014/134709 Al 12 September 2014 (12.09.2014) P O P C T (51) International Patent Classification: (81) Designated States (unless otherwise indicated, for every A61K 31/05 (2006.01) A61P 31/02 (2006.01) kind of national protection available): AE, AG, AL, AM, AO, AT, AU, AZ, BA, BB, BG, BH, BN, BR, BW, BY, (21) International Application Number: BZ, CA, CH, CL, CN, CO, CR, CU, CZ, DE, DK, DM, PCT/CA20 14/000 174 DO, DZ, EC, EE, EG, ES, FI, GB, GD, GE, GH, GM, GT, (22) International Filing Date: HN, HR, HU, ID, IL, IN, IR, IS, JP, KE, KG, KN, KP, KR, 4 March 2014 (04.03.2014) KZ, LA, LC, LK, LR, LS, LT, LU, LY, MA, MD, ME, MG, MK, MN, MW, MX, MY, MZ, NA, NG, NI, NO, NZ, (25) Filing Language: English OM, PA, PE, PG, PH, PL, PT, QA, RO, RS, RU, RW, SA, (26) Publication Language: English SC, SD, SE, SG, SK, SL, SM, ST, SV, SY, TH, TJ, TM, TN, TR, TT, TZ, UA, UG, US, UZ, VC, VN, ZA, ZM, (30) Priority Data: ZW. 13/790,91 1 8 March 2013 (08.03.2013) US (84) Designated States (unless otherwise indicated, for every (71) Applicant: LABORATOIRE M2 [CA/CA]; 4005-A, rue kind of regional protection available): ARIPO (BW, GH, de la Garlock, Sherbrooke, Quebec J1L 1W9 (CA). GM, KE, LR, LS, MW, MZ, NA, RW, SD, SL, SZ, TZ, UG, ZM, ZW), Eurasian (AM, AZ, BY, KG, KZ, RU, TJ, (72) Inventors: LEMIRE, Gaetan; 6505, rue de la fougere, TM), European (AL, AT, BE, BG, CH, CY, CZ, DE, DK, Sherbrooke, Quebec JIN 3W3 (CA). -
Scarlet Fever Fact Sheet
Scarlet Fever Fact Sheet Scarlet fever is a rash illness caused by a bacterium called Group A Streptococcus (GAS) The disease most commonly occurs with GAS pharyngitis (“strep throat”) [See also Strep Throat fact sheet]. Scarlet fever can occur at any age, but it is most frequent among school-aged children. Symptoms usually start 1 to 5 days after exposure and include: . Sandpaper-like rash, most often on the neck, chest, elbows, and on inner surfaces of the thighs . High fever . Sore throat . Red tongue . Tender and swollen neck glands . Sometimes nausea and vomiting Scarlet fever is usually spread from person to person by direct contact The strep bacterium is found in the nose and/or throat of persons with strep throat, and can be spread to the next person through the air with sneezing or coughing. People with scarlet fever can spread the disease to others until 24 hours after treatment. Treatment of scarlet fever is important Persons with scarlet fever can be treated with antibiotics. Treatment is important to prevent serious complications such as rheumatic fever and kidney disease. Infected children should be excluded from child care or school until 24 hours after starting treatment. Scarlet fever and strep throat can be prevented . Cover the mouth when coughing or sneezing. Wash hands after wiping or blowing nose, coughing, and sneezing. Wash hands before preparing food. See your doctor if you or your child have symptoms of scarlet fever. Maryland Department of Health Infectious Disease Epidemiology and Outbreak Response Bureau Prevention and Health Promotion Administration Web: http://health.maryland.gov February 2013 . -
Lessons from the Anthrax Attacks Implications for US
Lessons from the Anthrax Attacks Implications for US. Bioterrorism Preparedness A Report on a National Forum on Biodefense Author David Heymart Research Assistants Srusha Ac h terb erg, L Joelle Laszld Organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency --CFr”V? --.....a DlSTRf BUTION This report ISfor official use only; distribution authorized to U S. government agencies, designated contractors, and those with an official need Contains information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act. exemption number 2 (5 USC 552); exemption number 3 (’lo USC 130).Approvalof the Defense Threat Reduction Agency prior to public release is requrred Contract Number OTRAM-02-C-0013 For Official Use Only About CSIS For four decades, the Center for Stravgic and Internahonal Studies (CSIS)has been dedicated 10 providing world leaders with strategic insights on-and pohcy solubons tcurrentand emergtng global lssues CSIS IS led by John J Hamre, former L S deputy secretary of defense It is guided by a board of trustees chaired by former U S senator Sam Nunn and consistlng of prominent individuals horn both the public and private sectors The CSIS staff of 190 researchers and support staff focus pnrnardy on three subjecr areas First, CSIS addresses the fuU spectrum of new challenges to national and mternabonal security Second, it maintains resident experts on all of the world's myor geographical regions Third, it IS committed to helping to develop new methods of governance for the global age, to this end, CSIS has programs on technology and pubhc policy, International trade and finance, and energy Headquartered in Washington, D-C ,CSIS IS pnvate, bipartlsan, and tax-exempt CSIS docs not take specific policy positions, accordygly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those ofthe author Spousor.