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The Evolution of Economic Institutions The Evolution of Economic Institutions HHodgsonodgson 0000 pprelimsrelims i 224/5/074/5/07 111:35:021:35:02 HHodgsonodgson 0000 pprelimsrelims iiii 224/5/074/5/07 111:35:021:35:02 The Evolution of Economic Institutions A Critical Reader Edited by Geoffrey M. Hodgson Research Professor in Business Studies, University of Hertfordshire, UK IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE EUROPEAN ASSOCIATION FOR EVOLUTIONARY POLITICAL ECONOMY Edward Elgar Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA HHodgsonodgson 0000 pprelimsrelims iiiiii 224/5/074/5/07 111:35:021:35:02 © The European Association for Evolutionary Political Economy 2007 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, either electronic, mechanical or photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Published by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited Glensanda House Montpellier Parade Cheltenham Glos GL50 1UA UK Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. William Pratt House 9 Dewey Court Northampton Massachusetts 01060 USA A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data The evolution of economic institutions : a critical reader / edited by Geoffrey M. Hodgson. p. cm. “In Association with The European Association for Evolutionary Political Economy.” Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Evolutionary economics. 2. Institutional economics. I. Hodgson, Geoffrey Martin, 1946– HB97.3.E896 2007 330.01–dc22 2006102452 ISBN 978 1 84720 083 9 (cased) ISBN 978 1 84720 087 7 (paperback) Printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin, Cornwall HHodgsonodgson 0000 pprelimsrelims iivv 224/5/074/5/07 111:35:021:35:02 Contents List of fi gures vii List of tables viii List of contributors ix Preface xii 1. Introduction 1 Geoffrey M. Hodgson PART I INDIVIDUALS, INTERACTIONS AND INSTITUTIONS 2. Bounded rationality and institutionalism 19 Ugo Pagano 3. Individual and aggregate behaviour: of ants and men 34 Alan P. Kirman 4. Governance of transactions: a strategic process model 53 Bart Nooteboom PART II ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND PATH DEPENDENCE 5. The political economy of the long wave 75 Christopher Freeman 6. Instituted economic processes, increasing returns and endogenous growth 98 J. Stanley Metcalfe 7. Path dependence, its critics and the quest for ‘historical economics’ 120 Paul A. David PART III THE MARKET IN ECONOMIC THOUGHT 8. Financial markets and economic development: myth and institutional reality 145 Jan Kregel v HHodgsonodgson 0000 pprelimsrelims v 224/5/074/5/07 111:35:021:35:02 vi Contents 9. The meaning of the market: comparing Austrian and institutional economics 160 Philippe Dulbecco and Véronique Dutraive PART IV COMPARATIVE EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES 10. Uncertainty, intelligence and imagination: George Shackle’s guide to human progress 183 Brian J. Loasby 11. Evolutionary themes in the Austrian tradition: Menger, von Wieser and Schumpeter on institutions and rationality 198 Richard Arena and Sandye Gloria-Palermo 12. The relevance today of Edith Penrose’s Theory of the Growth of the Firm 211 Margherita Turvani 13. The Naturalist view of Universal Darwinism: an application to the evolutionary theory of the fi rm 233 J.W. Stoelhorst Bibliography 252 Index 289 HHodgsonodgson 0000 pprelimsrelims vvii 224/5/074/5/07 111:35:021:35:02 Figures 1.1 Mapping the domain of economic theory 11 3.1a Buying after shopping around 49 3.1b Buying with loyalty developing 49 3.2 A mixed population of local buyers and buyers who shop around 50 4.1 Inclination towards opportunism in Y 58 4.2 Interaction between X and Y 60 4.3 Situation A: VXY > 0, VYX > 0 67 4.4 Situation B: VXY < 0, VYX < 0, CAPX > 0 68 4.5 Situation C: VXY > 0, VYX < 0, CAPX > 0 68 6.1 Growth in a two-sector model 115 vii HHodgsonodgson 0000 pprelimsrelims vviiii 224/5/074/5/07 111:35:021:35:02 Tables 4.1 Sources of cooperation 56 4.2 Instruments 64 4.3 Typology of strategy (for X) 65 5.1 OECD standardized unemployment rates, 1959–98 77 5.2 A change of techno-economic paradigm 85 5.3 Details of change of techno-economic paradigm in OECD countries 88 viii HHodgsonodgson 0000 pprelimsrelims vviiiiii 224/5/074/5/07 111:35:031:35:03 Contributors Richard Arena is a Professor at LATAPSES (CNRS) at the University of Nice-Sophia Antipolis in France. He has published widely on the history of economic thought and he specializes in authors from the Austrian School. Paul A. David is Professor Emeritus of Economics at Stanford University, where for half the year he lectures on the economics of science and technology and participates in the training of graduate students in economics. As a Senior Fellow of the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, he is responsible for their Knowledge, Networks and Institutions for Innovation Program. During the second half of his year he is based in Oxford, where he is an Emeritus Fellow of All Souls College, and Senior Fellow of the Oxford Internet Institute. Philippe Dulbecco is a Professor of Economics at the University of the Auvergne at Clermont Ferrand, France. He is presently Scientifi c Advisor for Economics for the Minister for Higher Education. His research is in the fi elds of the economic analysis of institutions, market process, theory of the fi rm and economic development. Véronique Dutraive is an Assistant Professor of Economics at University ‘Lumière’ in Lyon, France. Her research is in the fi elds of old institutional economics, evolutionary economics, epistemology, theory of the fi rm and of the market. Christopher Freeman is Professor Emeritus of Science Policy at the University of Sussex, UK, where he was the founder and fi rst director of the Science Policy and Research Unit (SPRU). His publications include As Time Goes By: From the Industrial Revolutions to the Information Revolution (with Francisco Louçã, 2001) and The Economics of Industrial Innovation (with Luc Soete, 1997). He holds honorary doctorates from the Universities of Linköping, Sussex, Middlesex, Birmingham and Brighton. Sandye Gloria-Palermo is Professor of Economics at the University of the French West Indies. She is the author of The Evolution of Austrian ix HHodgsonodgson 0000 pprelimsrelims iixx 224/5/074/5/07 111:35:031:35:03 x Contributors Economics: from Menger to Lachmann (1999) and general editor of an anthology, Modern Austrian Economics: Archaeology of a Revival (2002). Geoffrey M. Hodgson is a Research Professor at the University of Hertfordshire, UK. His books include Economics in the Shadows of Darwin and Marx (2006), The Evolution of Institutional Economics (2004), How Economics Forgot History (2001), Economics and Utopia (1999), Economics and Evolution (1993) and Economics and Institutions (1988). He has published widely in the academic journals and he is an Academician of the Academy of Learned Sciences for the Social Sciences. His website is http://www.geoffrey-hodgson.info/. Alan P. Kirman is Professor of Economics at GREQAM at the University of Aix-Marseille. He has held a number of visiting professorships and has published widely in leading journals in economics. With Mark Salmon he edited Learning and Rationality in Economics (1995), with Mauro Gallegati he edited Beyond the Representative Agent (1999) and with Louis-André Gérard-Varet he edited Economics Beyond the Millennium (1999). His website is http://www.vcharite.univ-mrs.fr/PP/kirman/index.html. Jan Kregel, former Chief of the Policy Analysis and Development Branch of the United Nations Financing for Development Offi ce, is currently Distinguished Research Professor at the University of Missouri at Kansas City. Before joining the UN he was Professor of Economics in the Università degli Studi di Bologna, Italy as well as Professor of International Economics in the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies where he has also served as Associate Director of its Bologna Center from 1987–90. Brian J. Loasby is Honorary and Emeritus Professor at the University of Stirling, Scotland. He is author of fi ve books, including Choice, Complexity and Ignorance (1976) and Knowledge, Institutions and Evolution in Economics (1999 – joint winner of the Schumpeter Prize 2000) and 100 articles. His principal interest is the organization and development of knowledge, in economics and in economic systems. J. Stanley Metcalfe is Stanley Jevons Professor of Political Economy and Cobden Lecturer at the University of Manchester. He is the author of Evolutionary Economics and Creative Destruction (1998). His research interests are currently focused upon evolutionary economics and the modelling of evolutionary processes in relation to innovation, competition and economic growth. HHodgsonodgson 0000 pprelimsrelims x 224/5/074/5/07 111:35:031:35:03 Contributors xi Bart Nooteboom is Professor of Innovation Policy at Tilburg University, the Netherlands. His research interests include: innovation, entrepreneurship, organizational learning, inter-fi rm collaboration and networks, and trust. He has published six books and 200 papers on these and related topics. He is a member of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences. Ugo Pagano is Professor of Economics at the University of Siena and the Central European University, Budapest. He is the author of Work and Welfare in Economic Theory (1985) and several articles in academic journals. With Robert E. Rowthorn he edited Democracy and Effi ciency in Economic Enterprises (1996), with Samuel Bowles and Maurizio Franzini he edited The Politics and Economics of Power (1999) and with Antonio Nicita he edited The Evolution of Economic Diversity (2001). J.W. Stoelhorst is Assistant Professor at the Amsterdam Business School of the University of Amsterdam, where he teaches strategy and organization. He is one of the coordinators of the EAEPE research area ‘The Ontological Foundations of Evolutionary Economics’.
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