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Social Theories of Reasoning Social Theories of Reasoning Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Paul David Robinson, M.Sc. Graduate Program in Philosophy The Ohio State University 2020 Dissertation Committee Richard Samuels, Advisor Neil Tennant Declan Smithies Copyrighted by Paul David Robinson 2020 2 Abstract This dissertation consists of four independent papers that address topics concerning the nature and function of reasoning. Together, they draw on a wide range of paleontological, archaeological, and ethnographic evidence, to constrain evolutionary theorizing about reasoning. Further, they draw on empirical results from literatures on persuasion and reasoning, to evaluate hypotheses about the characteristic features of reasoning. On these foundations, I argue against the increasingly influential view that the capacity for reasoning evolved in a social context, for public practices of persuasion and self- justification. The principal thesis of this dissertation is that the capacity for reasoning evolved for the private practice of generating true beliefs from rule-like cultural knowledge transmitted through stories, to solve novel problems in the natural environment. ii Dedication To Alan Weir iii Acknowledgments I wish to thank the following people. My advisor, Richard Samuels, who provided invaluable feedback. He is the second author of the fourth chapter in this dissertation, which was published in the Routledge Series in Philosophy of Mathematics and Physics, and I am grateful to him and to Routledge for permission to include it here. Dan Sperber and Tania Lombrozo, both of whose research I draw on, provided encouragement during the critical early stages of the project. Neil Tennant, Declan Smithies, and Kevin Scharp, helped structure the project, and ensured I didn’t lose sight of the big picture. I am fortunate that Neil Tennant is also my academic grandfather, having mentored my first philosophy teacher, Alan Weir, to whom this dissertation is dedicated. Alan has supported me throughout my studies, which have taken me all over the globe (though, thankfully, not yet to an Independent Scotland). I am grateful to all my teachers, who helped me draw from multiple disciplines: the archaeologists, Aren Maeir and Amit Dagan; the cognitive scientists, Nick Chater, Dave Lagnado, and Tom Lawson; the social psychologists, Duane Wegener, Kentaro Fujita, and Russ Fazio. I have been shaped by many philosophical discussions with Gonga, Billy, Geezer, Jackie, Rab, Marty, Big Gilbert, and Wee Jim. I have had constant support from my parents, David and Brenda, and my American family, Akram and Monda. Finally, I am most grateful to Lydia, who “deserves a medal”. iv Vita 2001 ……………………………….. A-level Mathematics, Physics, Biology Portora Royal School 2005 ……………………………….. B.A. Philosophy Department of Philosophy Queen’s University Belfast 2008 ……………………………….. M.Sc. History and Philosophy of Science Department of Logic and Scientific Method London School of Economics 2009 ……………………………….. M.Sc. Cognitive and Decision Sciences Department of Psychology and Language Sciences University College London 2012 to present …………............... Graduate Teaching Associate Department of Philosophy The Ohio State University Publications Robinson, P. D. & Samuels, R. (2018). Reasoning, rules, and representation. In S. Bangu (ed.) Naturalizing Logico-Mathematical Knowledge: Approaches from Psychology and Cognitive Science (Routledge Series in Philosophy of Mathematics and Physics), pp. 30-51. Fields of Study Major Field: Philosophy Interdisciplinary Specialization: Cognitive and Brain Sciences v Table of Contents Abstract .................................................................................................................................................ii Dedication ............................................................................................................................................ iii Acknowledgments ................................................................................................................................ iv Vita......................................................................................................................................................... v List of Tables ........................................................................................................................................ ix List of Figures ....................................................................................................................................... x Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 1 1. Theoretical Background .................................................................................................... 2 2. Overview ............................................................................................................................ 7 Chapter 1 ........................................................................................................................... 8 Chapter 2 ........................................................................................................................... 9 Chapter 3 ......................................................................................................................... 10 Chapter 4 ......................................................................................................................... 11 3. Methodology ..................................................................................................................... 12 Chapter 1. The Evidence is Not on My Side: Reason, Evolution, and Bias ..................................... 13 1. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 13 vi 2. The Rationalization-First View ...................................................................................... 18 2.1 The Theory ................................................................................................................ 19 2.2 The Empirical Case................................................................................................... 21 3. Does the Rationalization-First View Explain Myside Bias?.......................................... 26 3.1 Persuasion ................................................................................................................. 26 3.2 Information-Gain ...................................................................................................... 34 3.3 Deception................................................................................................................... 37 4. From Persuasion to Justification ................................................................................... 39 5. The Inquiry-First View ................................................................................................... 43 6. Concluding Remarks ...................................................................................................... 49 Chapter 2. Cracking the Enigma: Cultural Knowledge, Social Learning, and Private Reason ..... 51 1. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 51 2. The Rationalization-First View of Reason ..................................................................... 55 2.1 Exposition of the Theory ........................................................................................... 55 2.2 Criticism 1: The Paleo-Anthropological Context ...................................................... 59 2.3 Criticism 2: The Scope of Reason ............................................................................. 66 3. A New Inquiry-First View of Reason ............................................................................. 69 4. Empirical Characteristics of Reason .............................................................................. 80 5. Concluding Remarks ...................................................................................................... 84 Chapter 3. Wason Confirmed: Why Confirmation Bias is Not Myside Bias in Disguise ................ 86 1. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 86 2. Confirmation Bias .......................................................................................................... 90 2.1 The Four Card Selection Task .................................................................................. 90 2.2 The 2-4-6 task ......................................................................................................... 105 vii 3. Myside Bias................................................................................................................... 113 4. Concluding Remarks .................................................................................................... 121 Chapter 4. Reasoning, Rules, and Representation ......................................................................... 123 1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 123 2. The Virtues of Intentional Rule-Following Accounts of Inference .............................. 128 3. The Regress
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