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Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 00 (2010) 000–000 Sciences Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 32 (2012) 82 – 88 www.elsevier.com/locate/procedia

4th International Conference of Cognitive Science (ICCS 2011) Self as a social cue: Evidence for reading mind from eyes test Vhid Nejatia,, Abbas Zabihzadeha, Mohammd Reza Nikfarjamb, Ali Pournaghdalic, Zohreh Naderib, Maryam Tajmir Riyahia

aDepartment of , Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran bDepartment of Psychology, Allameh Tabatabaee University, Tehran, Iran cInstitute for Cognitive Science Studies, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

Perception of self and others' mental states has attracted vast attention in social . The purpose of the present study is to compare the ability of perceiving self and others' mental states and mindfulness. “Reading the Mind from Eyes” test, with pictures of self and others' eyes, and Mindful Attention Scale were used to evaluate the participants’ ability of “mentalizing” and “mindfulness”. Findings have shown that there is a correlation between self and others' mind-reading abilities, and between self-mind-reading ability and mindfulness. Based on our findings, we can consider self as a part of social environment. © 2011 PublishedPublished by by Elsevier Elsevier Ltd. Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the 4th International Conference of Cognitive Science Keywords: Mind reading; mindfulness; of self mental states; perception of other’s mental states;

1. Introduction

An important part of our mental and cognitive lives relies on effective interaction with others in our social world. Human being is born in society and needs social interactions. These social transactions are the foundation of our happiness and social well-being. Perception of self and other mental states is an important factor of success in social interactions. The main question in this domain is whether we use similar processes in inferring self and other mental states. This sort of questions have led to the emergence of a distinct intradiscipline named social cognitive neuroscience, which combines theories and methods of its parent disciplines, namely, and cognitive neuroscience, to understand the ability of effectively navigating the social world (Ochsner & Lieberman, 2001). This field probes social phenomena in three levels: social communications level (experience and behaviour), cognitive level (information process mechanisms), and neural level (brain imaging) (Ochsner, 2004). Several factors contribute to its development: research equipments, which make unobtrusive measurements of brain activities possible (such as functional methods); evidence about the role of social power in brain development;

 Corresponding author. Tel. 009821 22431569; fax: 009821 22431688 E-mail address: [email protected]

1877-0428 © 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the 4th International Conference of Cognitive Science doi:10.1016/j.sbspro.2012.01.015 VhidVahid Nejati Nejati/ et al. Procedia / Procedia – Social- Social and and Behavioral Behavioral Sciences Sciences 00 32 (2011) (2012) 000–000 82 – 88 83 and, finally, the emergence of research interdisciplinary centres for cognitive neuroscientists and social (Ochsner & Lieberman, 2001). Social cognition is an important domain in the field of social cognitive neuroscience. It’s the ability to represent self and other’s mental states, relationship between self and other and relationship among other individuals in social context. Overall, social cognition consists of cognitive processes that help us navigate the social world. First component of social cognition is processes needed to perceive others. On the other hand, self is the second component of social cognition. In other words, perception of self is a vital part of social cognition (Adolphs, Tranel, & Damasio, 2001; Bar-On, Tranel, Denburg, & Bechara, 2003). In fact, the individual use “self” as a cognitive mediate to effectively perceive others. As an example, in many cases, we consciously or unconsciously use our own experience and introspection to probe into emotions and intentions of others (Meltzoff & Brooks, 2001). Social cognitive neuroscience examines neural mechanisms underlying social cognition processes (Adolphs, 2003). According to Tomasello (2000), human evolve a special kind of social cognition which helps them to consider other specifics as beings that have mental lives like themselves (Ochsner, 2004). The ability of social cognition enables individuals to imagine themselves in “others shoes”. Therefore, considering our own mental status is a powerful source of information to interpret others mental status. Self- awareness considered as an anchor to perceive the other in social interactions. On the other hand, vast evidence from neurological, social psychology and support the view of common but not exactly identical representation networks between self and other (Ochsner & Lieberman, 2001). Representation of self and other activate brain regions responsible for processing information regarding emotions, traits and intentions. Furthermore, self-perception and other-presentation involve brain regions including superior temporal sulci (STS), anterior insula (AI), amygdale and posterior cingulated cortex (PCC) that are responsible for emotion and social cognition (Pelphrey, Morris, & McCarthy, 2004). On the other hand, inferior parietal cortex and in the right hemisphere are involved in intrapersonal awareness (Ochsner & Lieberman, 2001). Mindfulness is a kind of self-regulation that includes emphasizing a non-judgmental, non- discursive awareness of one’s , sensations, thoughts, and emotions. Mindfulness is different from self- awareness and it influences on behaviour on a different way. Self-awareness prepares one’s status that automatically leads to comparison of the self against standards (Silvia & Duval, 2001) and efforts to change behaviour. In contrast, mindful awareness involves acceptance of whatever is observed, even discrepancies (Evans, Baer, Segerstrom, 2009). Fundamentals of this concept can be traced back to ancient Buddhist texts (Falkenstrom, 2010). Some researchers define mindfulness as “a receptive attention to and awareness of present event and experience” (Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007). Mindful individuals perceive internal and external realities freely and without distortion and have great ability to face with a wide range of thoughts, emotions and experiences (pleasant or unpleasant) (Ryan & Brown, 2003; Brown et al., 2007). This cognitive construct should be differentiated from self-awareness and self-focused attention. Similarity of these constructs is increased attention to mental experiences but the difference lies on their cognitive aspect. It means that attention in self-awareness is affected with biases of self- focused thinking and is accompanied with self- judgment but mindfulness is an attention without bias and judgment of self. Mindfulness has a positive relationship with mental and psychological wellbeing and mental health but self- awareness is related to lower level of psychological wellbeing (Brown & Kasser, 2005; Brown et al., 2007; Falkenstrom, 2010). One of the reasons for increasing medical and psychological research about mindfulness is its ability to identify new dimensions of mind and body relationship. Research is mostly focused on assessing effectiveness of mindfulness based interventions. There are different mindfulness based interventions that are used in practice but two principal strategies are mindfulness based reduction (MBSR) (Kabat-zinn, 2003) and mindfulness based cognitive therapy (MBCT) (Mars & Abbey, 2010). Mindfulness based stress reduction programme increases mindfulness and wellbeing and decreases stress and its physical and psychological symptoms significantly. MBCT is an integration of cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) and MBSR and is designed to empower patients in remission from recurrent periods of major depression (Segal, Williams & Teasdale, 2002). Time consumed in formal meditation exercises like Yoga is related to enhancement of mindfulness and wellbeing. So mindfulness is considered as a mediating factor to increase psychological functioning and decrease stress symptoms that are due to meditation exercises. This treatment had a positive effect in individuals with eating disorder especially Bulimia and mood change of patients with cancer (Carmody & Baer, 2008). Mindfulness based cognitive therapy is a programme to prevent relapse of depression symptoms (especially unipolar depression) and combines cognitive therapy with 84 VahidVhid Nejati Nejati / Procedia et al. / Procedia – Social - andSocial Behavioral and Behavioral Sciences Sciences 00 (2011) 32 000–000(2012) 82 – 88 meditation (with emphasis on mindfulness) (Segal et al., 2002). Effectiveness of this therapeutic approach is confirmed in individuals with bipolar disorder (Weber et al., 2010).

The purpose of present study was to compare the ability of perceiving self and other mental states and to examine relationship of these abilities with mindfulness.

2. Method

2.1. Participants Static population is this study is all psychology students in Tehran University. Forty undergraduate students (20 female, 20 male) participated in the present study. Participants age range was 18-25 (mean = 21.5). All participants gave informed consent prior to participate in the study.

2.2. Instrument The following methods were used:

2.2.1. Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET) “Reading the mind in the eyes” task is a neurocognitive test to evaluate participant’s ability of “mind-reading”. This test was developed by Baron-Cohen in 2001 (Baron-Cohen Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001) and consists of 36 photographs of the eye-region of actors and actresses in different mental statuses. For each photograph, 4 mental states correspond with the mental status (figure 1). Only one of these 4 words is the correct one which best describe what the person in the photograph is thinking or feeling. This test had been designed to assess the ability to attribute the mental states of self and another person (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). The participants were asked to choose the best answer based on the visual information of the photograph. Maximum point for each participant is 36 and minimum point is 0. This neuropsychological test has been used in many studies of mind reading in patients and healthy individuals (Wang, Wang, Chen, Zhu, & Wang, 2008). In order to effectively translate the mental statues attributes from English to Persian, the authors consulted and used advices of some linguists.

Despondent Relieved Shy Excited

Figure 1. An example of a (male) stimulus Used. The correct word choice is despondent

2.2.2 “Reading the Mind in the Own Eyes” Test Another version of “Reading the mind from eyes” was prepared for this study. In this version, instead of using the photographs of actors and actresses, 45 photographs of the person’s eye-region in different mental states were prepared and presented to them based on the original version (figure 2). Vhid Nejati et al. / Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 32 (2012) 82 – 88 85 Vahid Nejati/ Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences 00 (2011) 000–000

Embarrassed Fantasizing Confused Panicked

Figure 2. An example of a (male) stimulus Used. The correct word choice was fantasizing

2.2.3. Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS) Ryan and Brown (2003) made this scale. It has 15 questions to assess levels of awareness and attention to events and experiences of daily life. Construct of mindfulness is assessed with a six graded scale of Likert. This scale gives an overall score for mindfulness with a range of 15 to 90. Higher score indicates more mindfulness. Internal consistency of questions is reported from 0.80 to 0.87 in some researches (Ryan & Brown, 2003; Carlson & Brown, 2005; Ghorbani, Watson, & Weathington, 2009). Reliability coefficient of retest in this scale in one month period is reported to be stable (Ryan & Brown, 2003). Alpha coefficient for Persian questions of this scale in a sample of 723 students is 0.81 (Ghorbani et al., 2009).

2.3. Procedure Participants had given written consent to participate in this study. A series of 45 attributes describing different mental states were presented to them. The researcher explained the semantic of each adjective to the participant, induced the related mental states and asked participants to show it in their faces. After being prepared, photographs were taken from the eye-region of the participant. 45 photographs were prepared for each participant and a version of “mind reading in the own eyes test” (corresponding with the original version) was designed using 36 photographs of his/her own. After two weeks, the researchers administrated the made version on the participants. They were asked to judge which of the 4 adjectives best describe their own mental states. Correlation was evaluated with Pearson's correlation test.

3. Results

Forty students of psychology in Tehran University (mean age = 21.55, SD = 2.15) were recruited in this study. Participants’ demographic data are shown in table 1.

Table 1. Participants’ demographic data

variable n Percent sex female 20 50 male 20 50 Educational level undergraduate 34 85 Postgraduate 6 15 Marital Status single 39 97.5 married 1 2.5 Average (mean-SD) 17.21 0.91 Age (mean-SD) 21.55 2.15 Vahid Nejati / Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences 00 (2011) 000–000 86 Vhid Nejati et al. / Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 32 (2012) 82 – 88

Table 2 shows the correlation between variables. The findings show correlation between perception of self and others mental states.

Table 2. Correlation between variables

Variables Pearson r Number p

Self Mind Reading Grade-Others Mind Reading Grade 0.353 40 0.025 Mindfulness Grade- Self Mind Reading Grade 0.386 40 0.014 Mindfulness Grade-Others Mind Reading Grade 0.278 40 0.09

r = .353 353 Others Mind Self Mind Reading p = .025 Reading

r = .386 r= .278 p = .014 p= .09 Mindfulness

Figure 3. Correlation between variables

4. Conclusion

Results show that there is a significant correlation between perception of self and other’s mental states. Previous findings reveals that similar behavioural neural pathway is engaged when doing, watching someone else doing or even imagining a kind of behaviour (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004; Grimshaw, Sitarenios, & Finegan, 1995; Hess & Pickett, 2010). Imaging studies show that some cortical areas including the medial prefrontal cortex, the anterior cingulate cortex and the are involved in self-processing (Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004) and social cognition (Schilbach, 2006). Furthermore, a right- lateralized frontoparietal network that overlaps with mirror-neuron areas is involved in self recognition (Uddin, 2005) and social understanding (Gallese et al., 2004). Activities of midline structures of brain are related to social or psychological aspects of the self, such as self- referential judgments (Gusnard et al., 2001), self-appraisal (Ochsner et al., 2005) and judgments of personality traits (Lou et al., 2004; Kelley, Macrae, Wyland, Inati, & Heatherton, 2002). In addition cortical midline structures are also involved in the processing of social relationships (Schilbach, 2006; Iacoboni et al., 2005) and recognizing personally familiar others (Gobbini, Leibenluft, Santiago, & Haxby, 2004). Studies that show midline activations during understanding of social interactions between others (Iacoboni et al., 2005) or ascribing social traits to others (impression formation) (Mitchell, Heatherton, & Macrea, 2002) typically require subjects to reference the mental state of others. Medial prefrontal cortex is involved in or mental-state attribution (Frith & Frith, 1999). Therefore, these midline structures are involved in representing both self and others and processing information about the mental states of others (Mitchell, Banaji, & Macrae, 2005). Some researchers show that internally oriented processes that focus on one’s own or others’ mental states mediate by cortical midline structures, whereas externally focused processes based on one’s own or others’ visible features and actions mediate by lateral VhidVahid Nejati Nejati/ et al. Procedia / Procedia – Social- Social and and Behavioral Behavioral Sciences Sciences 00 32 (2011) (2012) 000–000 82 – 88 87 frontoparietal networks (Lieberman, 2007). As a result, we can conclude that the self is used as an anchorage to perceive meaningful others. Behavioral research suggests that individuals use themselves as template or anchor to infer others mental states. This overlap is attested by people’s amazing ability to quickly infer and learn from others intentions and mental states in social interactions (Adolphs et al., 2001; Bar-On et al., 2003). This kind of inferring and learning would be possible when we consider others operate in the same way we do (Tomasello, 2000). Also, neuroimaging research has shown that individuals use overlapping mechanisms when mediating self-perception and other-perception to understand what other people feel or intend in social context. (Todorov, Fiske, & Prentice, 2011). On the other hand, by discovering mirror neuron, studies show that observing and doing activity trigger same brain regions in monkeys (Adolphs, 2003). Furthermore, human neuroimaging studies show that observing motor activity activates parietal and premotor cortex (Buccino et al., 2001, Iacoboni et al., 2005; Iacoboni, 2006). Mirror neuron study shows that similar structures are involved in doing and observing activity. These mechanisms explain different social cognitive activity such as and imitation (Buccino, 2001). Based on the literature, the brain regions responsive to motor representation of self and other are overlapping. Motor theories of social cognition and empathy based on the concept of motor neurons shows that social cognitive abilities are mediated by the fast, automatic, bottom-up activation of the representation of the mental states that perceivers see in others. When one is engaged in an action or sees someone else doing that, these representations are overlapping or shared (Gallese et al., 2004). Our findings show that mindfulness is correlated to self mind reading but not to other mind reading. Mindfulness entails self-regulation of attention to concentrate on the present (Bishop et al., 2004). Thoughts, feelings, and bodily sensations are considered to be objects which one should observe but not something on which one should elaborate (i.e., direct attention toward thinking about the thought, feeling, or sensation) (Giluk, 2009). Mindfulness also involves one’s orientation to experience (Bishop et al., 2004). Mindfulness is a non-judging, non-identifying attitude, thoughts, feelings, and sensations are observed as they follow a natural course in experience. In other words, mindfulness is a passive observation of one’s inner experience. Therefore, mindfulness prepares an opportunity for insight to self experience and allows first-hand experiences on how the mind functions. (Hollis- Walker & Colosimo, 2011) Thus mindfulness is self-centred and is correlated to self mind reading. One factor that should be considered in the present study is the cultural identities of the participants. East Asians emphasize on the interconnectedness of human beings along with contingencies between the individual’s behaviour and the thoughts and actions of others in the relationship (the interdependent self). In contrast, Westerners (North Americans and Europeans) tend to view the self as an autonomous entity separated from others, who behave according to their own internal attributes and thoughts (the independent self) (Heine, 2001). Therefore, we propose conducting similar study in a Western culture to see whether the results correlate with the above findings.

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