Muslim Immigration in France: an Interdisciplinary Exploration

Muslim Immigration in France: An Interdisciplinary Exploration

A thesis submitted to the Miami University Honors Program in partial fulfillment of the requirements for University Honors with Distinction

Kathleen Joelle Guiler

May 2007 Oxford, Ohio

Abstract

Muslim Immigration in France: An Interdisciplinary Exploration

By Kathleen J. Guiler

In November 2005, the world watched in shock as protests and riots broke out in the outskirts of many of France’s cities. Although many groups were involved in the riots, they were closely linked to France’s Muslim community. Many of young people involved in the riots, though not devout themselves, came from families that have emigrated from traditionally Muslim countries. This is just one is a long series of clashes between French Muslims and France’s majority. For example, in 2004 young Muslim women in France found themselves in the international spotlight when they insisted on their right to adopt the hijab and wear headscarves in public schools. While these conflicts have varied in terms of severity, they all set forth a similar set of questions, particularly ones that examine underlying issues in an attempt to stop violent confrontations. These questions are so broad and complicated that they necessitate a similarly wide-ranging approach. Therefore, this paper is not traditional in the sense that it does not have a single guiding thesis statement followed by a review of existing literature, a presentation of new evidence, and a conclusion. Rather, it is divided into three parts that address the issue of Muslim immigration from a variety of angles. Each of these sections has a slightly different focus with related conclusions; however when read as a whole, this paper will give the reader a broad but thorough understanding of the recent conflicts in France. The first part will consider the causes and effects of immigration from an interdisciplinary perspective, including geographic, historic, economic, political, and cultural standpoints. This section should provide the reader with a good background of the Muslim community in France and a sense of its current status. The second part is an in-depth examination of the 2005 riots. Certainly, these were the longest and most violent of the conflicts and thus warrant special consideration. The final section of the paper offers a straightforward model to understand the conflicts. The model is based on the ideas and comments of French university students interviewed by the author.

Muslim Immigration in France: An Interdisciplinary Exploration

by Kathleen J. Guiler

Approved by:

______, Advisor Dr. Ellen Adams

______, Advisor Dr. Patricia Reynaud

______, Reader Dr. Sheldon Anderson

______, Reader Dr. Mark McKinney

Accepted by:

______, Director, University Honors Program

Acknowledgments

First and foremost, I would like to thank Miami University’s Honors and Scholars Program. Throughout this process, the dedicated faculty and staff encouraged and supported me in my efforts. Furthermore, the financial support of this office made my research in France possible.

I also would like to thank all the members of my thesis committee, particularly Dr. Mark McKinney; without his expertise and thorough readings, this project would remain unfinished.

Finally, I thank my parents, Zach, and Lauren, for their unwavering

support and love. This project is a tribute to your confidence in me.

Thank you!

Table of Contents

Part One: Causes and Effects of Muslim Immigration 9

Part Two: A Discussion of the November 2005 Riots 32

Part Three: A Model for Understanding Conflicts

With the Muslim Community 47

References 57

Appendix A 63

Part One:

Causes and Effects of Muslim Immigration

Introduction

Since France’s colonial days, Muslims have poured into the country from former French states, such as Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. The U.S.

Department of State estimates that around five million Muslims live in France, representing roughly eight percent of the total population ("International Religious

Freedom Report 2003"). Therefore, the French Muslim population has surpassed the other two minorities, Protestants and Jews, and is second only to

Roman Catholics. According to the U.S. Department of State’s report, the “vast majority” of French citizens consider themselves to be Roman Catholic; however, the report estimates that only about eight percent of them are practicing

Catholics. Therefore, this paper will simply use the word “majority” to denote the

French population at large, since “Roman Catholic majority” would misrepresent the population. The French government has been struggling to assimilate the

Muslims into French culture over the past few decades, in hopes of creating a

French Islam. The state has found it difficult to exert power over its greatest minority, mostly because French law adheres to the principles of the separation of church and state. It forbids even the collection of religious information, making it impossible to gather exact demographic statistics.

This section will use an interdisciplinary approach to explore the causes and effects of Muslim immigration in France. The first section will contemplate the Muslim population from a geographic perspective, considering immigration patterns along with the distribution of the Muslim population within France. The

second section will contemplate how Muslim immigration plays a role in French history. French policies in the twentieth century made it difficult for Muslims to pass on the opportunity to emigrate. In more recent times, France has become a harsh environment for Muslims. Discrimination is on the rise, leaving some

Muslims feeling like foreigners in their own country. Next, this paper will consider how economic policies have contributed to Muslim immigration. During the colonial period, French investors essentially destroyed local markets. Local economies were left in ruins once colonies became independent states, and they have yet to recover. Finally, the section will look at the cultural and political implications of immigration. In France, Muslims struggle to assimilate while maintaining some form of an Islamic identity. Meanwhile, the government enacts policies to maintain the separation of church and state. Muslims see these policies as a direct attack on their beliefs. Not surprisingly, conflicts, sometimes violent, ensue.

Ethnicity and Geography

Defining the Muslim population in France is nearly impossible for a variety of complex reasons. First, in everyday conversation, the terms “Muslim,” “Arab,” and sometimes even “immigrant” are used interchangeably to denote any brown- skinned individual, regardless of that person’s actual nationality or religion. This nomenclature is complicated by the French system of citizenship; those born in

France are simply French—the government does not keep statistics on citizens’ ethnic origins. Therefore, by law, immigrants’ children and grandchildren are

French, despite often being termed (and treated) as foreigners by the general public. To eliminate confusion, French government calls naturalized immigrants and the children of immigrants français issus de l’immigration or FII. Because

French Muslims are often grouped together, this paper considers France’s

Muslim community as a whole, including those only loosely tied to Islam by family or country of origin. After all, even those who do not practice Islam have faced the same alienation, struggles, and conflicts.

All persons of Muslim faith, or even those who physically appear to be

Muslim, are often assumed to be of the Maghreb region, which includes Algeria,

Morocco, and Tunisia. Indeed, the vast majority of French Muslims originate from these countries. A 1989 survey estimated that Maghrebis in France numbered 1,900,000. The numbers of Turks and West Africans, by contrast, numbered only 200,000 and 100,000 people respectively (Nielson, 11). During

France’s colonial period, Muslim people most often emigrated from Maghreb countries because of the relative proximity between these northern African colonies and the mainland. For example, the distance between Algiers and Paris is only a little over eight hundred miles. When compared to other cities of the former French empire, such as Antananarivo, Madagascar (approximately 5,400 miles from Paris), cities found in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia seem like near neighbors of France.

In reality, Muslims in France are of all origins and include Maghrebis,

Turks, sub-Saharan Africans, Pakistanis, and a few French converts (Roy, 55).

Politically, Maghreb Muslims tend to be the main focus of the media. However, other groups, such as the sub-Saharan Muslims, are also an important part of the

Islamic presence in France. Their numbers are low compared to Maghrebis, so

Sahelians are not associated with the feared fundamentalist Islamic groups.

Rather, people associate them with the sans papiers movement, which is made up of illegal immigrants who are demanding naturalization. They also are recognized as a group because some Sahelians practice polygamy and excision

(Diouf, 145).

The existence of a cohesive Islamic community within France is a myth, according to Oliver Roy, an expert on the French Muslim population. He explains that most discourse within France tries “to project a sense of community onto a

Muslim population that does not see itself as such” (Roy, 56). That is to say, many Muslims self-identify with their country of origin (i.e., Algeria, Tunisia, etc.), not with the general Islamic community in France. This condition results from the pattern of self-imposed segregation by nationality. Muslims of all nationalities concentrate near Marseilles, Lyon, Lille, and Paris. Immigrants, who are generally uneducated, tend to migrate towards these industrial regions where there is more opportunity for unskilled labor (Nielsen, 12). But, interestingly,

Moroccans are more widespread in those regions than either Algerians or

Tunisians. Black Africans have formed smaller groupings near industrial regions, mainly near Paris, Lille, and along the Channel coast. Turks tend to live in Paris and in the Alsace-Lorraine regions (Nielson, 11).

Many Muslims live in poverty on the outskirts of France’s largest cities, creating the equivalent of American ghettos (Economist, “The Melting-Pot That

Isn’t,” 50). These banlieues are plagued by disease, crime, and gangs. These gangs are often associated with beurs, or North Africans born in France, but members may be from diverse ethnic backgrounds. Some members claim to act in the name of Islam but, in reality, have little association with the religion. They embrace violence, theft, and drugs as a means of rebellion under the guise of

“Islamic fundamentalism” (Roy, 65). The history and nature of the banlieues will be further explained in Part Two.

Exclusive neighborhoods form within these regions, allowing each group of French Muslims to form their own organizations and places of worship

(Nielson,16). This arrangement leads to divisions between Muslims and prevents them from forming a central Islamic grouping in France. Without a central organization to represent the common interests of French Muslims, they have very little bargaining power. A few of these fundamentalist groups draw a great deal of media attention and have contributed to the negative stereotype of all Muslims in France. If Muslims in France want to improve their situation, it is imperative that the different groups learn to cross the ethnicity boundary and form a national organization. Only then will Muslims be able to effect change by using their status as the greatest minority.

History

In the 1830s, Muslims began immigrating to France in substantial

numbers from French colonies, the most important of which are Algeria,

Morocco, and Tunisia. French colonies contributed manpower and tax revenue

to the World War I effort. The 24,762 colonial troops from West Africa who died

while fighting for France exemplify the extent to which France depended upon

the resources of its colonies (Evans, 19). Despite the support they provided, the

natives strongly objected to foreign rule. Groups in opposition to colonial

governance led open rebellions in Morocco and Syria throughout the 1920s

(Evans, 20). These groups protested the infringements on their lifestyle. French authorities forced indigenous people to live in labor camps and work for meager wages. The forced labor camps stole the workforce from local economies, many of which were based on “non-cash systems of rural production” (Evans, 19). Due to the loss of manpower, these economies fell apart, allowing French investors to buy up huge plots of land and cultivate them. Colonial companies experienced extensive success, while native people suffered.

After World War I, France celebrated its growing empire. France held an exhibition in 1931 to promote and highlight the importance of its colonies. This exhibition celebrated France’s role as an Islamic power and emphasized the colonies’ importance to the home country. Prior to this, the French built the first mosque in France. The Mosque of Paris opened in 1926 to honor the Muslim soldiers’ contributions during World War I. The French government controlled

the mosque until 1957 and then chose an Algerian named Si Hamza Boubaker as director. Upon his retirement in 1982, Boubaker ensured that the mosque fell into the hands of the Algerian government. This mosque has attempted to serve as the voice for Islam in France but has lacked the support of Moroccan,

Tunisians, and Turkish Muslims.

In World War II, France again called upon its colonies as a source of manpower. French employers recruited from Muslim countries in an effort to replace France’s lost labor force (Fetzer, 63). The Second World War proved to be telling, for the humiliating defeat of France indicated the end of France’s superpower status (Evans, 21). Indeed, France’s quick loss to Germany, which led to a four year occupation, allowed the people living in France’s colonies to see weakness in the country that was oppressing them.

The Algerian War was one of the main conflicts leading to the demise of

France’s empire. In 1954, Algeria’s National Liberation Front (FLN) began a guerrilla war against France with the goal of gaining international recognition as an independent state. The FLN primarily worked from the countryside, but the most spectacular fighting took place in and around Algiers, where the FLN ruthlessly attacked the city. French forces eventually were able to maintain control, but only after resorting to brutal measures, including torture. Lacking the political will to continue fighting, France’s Prime Minister Charles de Gaulle declared in 1959 that the colonists had the right to determine their own future.

Algeria gained its independence in 1962. After the war, Algerians who fought for

the French,called Harkis, fled to France in order to avoid persecution. The government placed the Harkis in refugee camps immediately after the war. By

1975, riots within these camps forced the government to release the Harkis and

France’s general welfare authorities took responsibility for them. Most of these immigrants moved to slums on the outskirts of large cities where they could find manufacturing jobs (Nielson,10).

France had a very open immigration policy until the 1970s, allowing immigrants from its former colonies to pass freely into the county. During the late

1950s and early 1960s, men came to France in search of work, and eventually, their families joined them (Nielson, 10). However, the world-wide oil crisis of the

1970s pushed France into recession, so France severely limited immigration, and eventually suspended legal immigration in 1974 (Amselle, 108). However, these restrictions had an unanticipated effect. Many immigrants came to France after the Algerian War as temporary residents to work to support families at home.

Now, these “temporary” residents became permanent, and many utilized the

Family Reunification Act, which allowed French residents to bring family members to France (Fetzer, 64).

In the 1980s, anti-immigrant sentiments rose. Jean Marie Le Pen and his far-right political party, the National Front, gained strength. The 2002 presidential election demonstrated his power, when Le Pen gained a surprising eighteen percent of the vote (Fetzer, 66). The National Front blamed immigrants and

Muslims, for “lynchings, rapes, theft of all kinds...racketeering, drug dealing,

prostitution [and] pedophilia” (Crumley, 31). Le Pen said that if elected, he hoped to add more prisons, reinstitute the death penalty, end legal immigration, banish illegal immigrants, and limit French citizenship to the children of French citizens

(Economist, “Why He Has His Admirers,” 49). The growing anti-Muslim sentiment in France, led by Le Pen, threatened French Muslims, leaving them estranged from their adopted country.

French immigration policies contributed to Muslims’ desire to emigrate from their countries of origin. Recruitment programs during the world wars offered people living in the colonies jobs and the opportunity for a better life.

Following the wars, these programs continued in order to rebuild the French economy. Algerian Muslims who had been loyal to France were forced to leave their home country after the fall of the empire. However, as soon as France’s economy went into recession, France was quick to place the blame on the immigrants and restrict immigration. This policy has contributed to the anti- immigrant sentiments today, which is a major factor in the conflicts between the

Muslim minority and the majority.

Economics

French economic policies historically contributed to Muslim immigration to

France. Between 1830 and 1962, France depended upon all the colonies, including the Islamic ones, to help the country have economic power on par with larger nations. The French looked at the “empire as a huge trading bloc, a bulwark insulating France from the depression” (Evans, 9) after Wall Street

crashed and the Great Depression began in 1929. Local economies disintegrated as they became more dependent on French interests, forcing many native people to find new ways to make a living. Therefore, during the world wars, many of them responded to French labor and military recruiters who offered them a chance at a larger paycheck and a better standard of living in

France.

Many of the economic factors that contributed to immigration in the past continue to cause immigration today. For example, France ranked sixteenth in

2006 on the United Nation’s human development index

(http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/). This scale measures a country’s quality of life by combining factors such as GDP per capita, literacy rate, education, and life expectancy. By contrast, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco ranked eighty- seventh, one hundred-second, and one hundred twenty-third, respectively

(http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/). Additionally, wage remittances are vital to these economies. Remittances are the earnings that immigrants to France send back to their home countries. Remittances account for a huge portion of

Maghribi economies. For example, in Morocco wage remittances are equal to about nine percent of GDP or about $3,500,000 (Bouhga-Hagbe, 8-9). Because of the dependence on remittances, Maghribi officials are not likely to limit emigration. Also, as satellite dishes become more affordable in Northern Africa,

European television stations broadcast programs in France’s former colonies.

The media reinforces the idea that life is better in Europe. Finally, an increased

demand for cheap labor in construction, seasonal agriculture, and domestic service encourages legal and illegal immigration (White, 842).

Recently, the European Union (EU) has designed economic policies to encourage development in North Africa. Although these policies were intended to discourage migration, Gregory White, a scholar at Smith College, asserts that they have had the opposite effect (White, 839). One of the major problems, he says, is that the aid provided by the EU is not enough to constitute any real change; therefore, Maghribi economies are not prepared for the impact of free trade. The liberalization of North African economies causes the devaluation of their currencies, and foreign firms destroy local companies. Furthermore, the EU has not reformed its Common Agricultural Policy, which uses subsidies to protect

European farmers. This policy went into effect after World War II in to order restore Europe’s agricultural sector. Maghribi countries once had a flourishing agricultural market, but because of Europe’s agricultural growth, they can no longer feed themselves and must import from Europe. Protectionist practices in

Europe exclude Mediterranean products, such as citrus fruits, wine, tomatoes, and olive oil, from European markets. In short, if France hopes to lessen immigration from these countries, it must pressure the EU to provide more aid to

Maghribi economies. Secondly, France must insist that the EU open up its own agricultural markets to allow Maghribi countries to rebuild its agricultural exports.

Certainly, Muslim immigration has had an enormous impact on France’s economy. It is impossible to exact how great of an impact since laïcité policies

prevent the collection of census information regarding religious affiliation. It is plain that many French blame current high unemployment rates on Muslims and immigrants in general. However, some experts say that even if immigrants left, unemployment rates would show little improvement. The immigrants supply the base of the workforce, taking the jobs that most French laborers will not (Braudel,

206).

FII Muslims tend to remain at the low end of the economic spectrum because many of them fail to pass the baccalaureate, which is a certificate awarded to qualified high school graduates. In essence, it is a passport into universities and better paying jobs. The baccalaureate is difficult to pass, and the French education system is very competitive. Muslim students, many of whom come from poor, non-French speaking backgrounds, struggle to succeed in this environment (Economist, “The Melting-Pot That Isn’t,” 50). The government designates certain public funds to allow religious communities to run

“free schools,” i.e., privates ones (Nielsen, 21). Although Catholics, Protestants, and Jews take advantage of this allowance, few Islamic schools have been founded. In 2003, Amar Lasfar founded the first Muslim high school on the

French mainland in Lille. Few of these schools exist because Muslims cannot meet the requirements for public funding. According a BBC News report, Lasfar was turned down three times before getting approval (“France gets first private

Muslim lycée”). These requirements necessitate that the proposed school has been operating for at least five years, has well-qualified teachers, has relatively

large number of students enrolled, and has clean school facilities. Additionally, such a school must accept students of any religious background and any in- school religious instruction must be voluntary (Fetzer, 86). Due to the lack of private schools, most Muslim students attend state schools, which provide little, if any, remedial instruction for students lacking a French background, and do not teach Muslim students about their own religion or culture (Nielsen, 22).

Anthropology and Politics

It is impossible to discuss the Muslims’ cultural situation in France without also talking about the political climate there. France became an officially secular state in 1905, and its commitment to secularization helps to fuel the conflicts.

Unfortunately, practicing Muslims see the laws of laïcité, or secularization, as an affront to their beliefs (Kramer, 60). Milton Viorst, senior scholar at the Middle

East Institute, explains:

“France’s Muslim community is probably the first in history that has contemplated integration into a Christian society. Its proclaimed objective is to become French while keeping faith with Islam, but France’s Muslims find few precedents for cultural adaptation” (Viorst, 79).

Many of the traditions of Islam are lost as members of the Muslim community integrate into French society. According to Le Figaro, a prominent

French newspaper, a 2005 study found that 35% of French Muslims (in the broad sense of the term) do not consider themselves religious (“Les musulmans restent très attachés aux rites collectifs”). This same article also reports that 71% of

French Muslims do not see a contradiction between practicing Islam and living in

a modern society.1 Some Muslims renounce the traditions of abstaining from alcohol, eating halal food, praying five times a day, paying the alms tax, and going on the pilgrimage. According to Oliver Roy, a research director at the

Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique and consultant to the French

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, many practice a reduced form of Islam and only observe the traditions of circumcision, marriage, and burial (59). Of course, practicing Islam in France is not easy because there are not enough places in which to practice it. A 2003 study found that there are only 1,554 mosques in

France, and most of them are too small to accommodate the congregation, leaving some to pray in the streets (Yahmid).

As fewer people maintain strict adherence to the Islamic faith, Muslim FIIs are more open to adopting the ways of French youth culture. Roy asserts that

Muslim youths act like any other French teenager—eating fast food, listening to rap music, and speaking French. All that remains, he says, are a few important religious and cultural celebrations within the family “and the sense, confirmed by the attitude of others, that one is an ‘Arab’” (Roy, 60). However, it is this same sense of Arabic and/or Muslim identity, along with the belief that the government is forcing the diminishment of Islam, which has led the youth to reassert their religious and ethnic roots. Herein lays the groundwork for cultural and political conflict.

1 « le fait de vivre dans une société moderne »

The aforementioned hijab debate is a good example of such a conflict. It

began in 1989 when a middle school principal expelled three girls who refused to

remove their headscarves. He later explained that these scarves served as a

religious symbol and were not allowable under the French laws separating

church and state. Many Muslims say the hijab is an indicator of culture, not of

religion, and have fought for a girl’s right to adopt it. Throughout the 1990s, the

headscarf debate raged on in France. President Jacques Chirac appointed a

commission in August of 2003 to investigate the French concept of laïcité. The commission, which included three Muslims, came to the conclusion that the current laws were somewhat ambiguous and wrote Article 141-5-1 of Law

Number 2004-228, which bans conspicuous religious symbols. Signed by

President Chirac on March 15, 2004, this law took effect in the fall of 2004

(Kramer, 60). This law also outlawed Jewish skullcaps and large crosses, but it was primarily aimed at Muslim girls who chose to adopt the hijab. About one hundred girls refused to obey and several were expelled at the beginning of the school year (Guimbert, 14).

As a result of this ban, the Islamic Army of Iraq kidnapped French journalists Georges Malbrunot of Le Figaro and Christian Chesnot of Radio

France. The Islamic Army demanded that the headscarf law be repealed in exchange for the men’s lives. Ironically, this act seemed to unite all of France, including Muslim groups, in support of Malbrunot and Chesnot (Economist, “A

Tragic Twist of the Scarf,” 49-51). Finally, on December 21, 2004, the reporters

were released. There is still opposition to this law, but educators like it because the decision to permit or forbid the headscarves no longer falls within their jurisdiction. Some young Muslim women feel that it frees them from deciding whether or not to take the veil.

The ban on headscarves is only one form of discrimination facing French

Muslims. The general public has spoken out against their presence in France.

In a recent survey, almost two-thirds of French adults said that there are too many “Arabs” in France (Economist, “The Melting Pot that Isn’t,” 50). One

Algerian woman explains that although the French may have accepted the

Muslim immigrant to fulfill labor needs, “today there are his children and in some cases having the same diplomas as their children…and thus other occupations than that of a labourer” (Leveau, 107). Discrimination within France is not the only prejudice Muslims face. People in their home countries also discriminate against them. French Muslims find themselves to be foreigners in both France and their countries of origin because they are neither entirely French, since they maintain some traditions of their own culture, or entirely Algerian, or Moroccan, or of whatever origin, because they have adapted some ways of French society.

This sense of alienation among French Muslims led some of them to respond with violence. Much of the violence comes from the FII Muslims who are the children of immigrants from the former colonies. Many of them do not practice their religion, but some radical youths embrace the methods of fundamentalist Islam as a means to define their identity. Recently, the

Palestinian-Israeli conflict spawned some French Muslim youths to commit Anti-

Semitic acts, such as burning synagogues, desecrating Jewish cemeteries, and stoning Jewish school buses. Radical French Muslims view these attacks as a way to support Palestinians, but members of both the Jewish and Muslim communities in France say these attacks result from extremists who manipulate the minds of France’s Muslim youths (Williamson, 22-24).

The French government has taken some steps to prevent violence committed by Muslims. In addition to increasing police protection in Jewish communities, the government is working to educate French imams. The government blames foreign imams for preaching fundamentalism and hindering

Muslim assimilation into France’s culture, citing the fact that approximately three- fourths of them are not French citizens and only about one-third speak French

(Carreyrou, A15). Indeed, there does seem to be some truth to this accusation.

Imams in French mosques campaign against the diluted version of Islam that is practiced in France. They target Muslims who have lapsed in religious observance and incite anger against Western values (Roy, 63). These converted

Muslims often subscribe to the tenets of fundamentalist Islam. In an effort to end this movement, the government proposed the development of a new state- supervised foundation that would handle donations from Muslims overseas and use the monies to fund programs that will educate imams in the ways of French society, including France’s language and history, in addition to traditional religious schooling. Some Muslim groups oppose this measure, saying that it is

in conflict with France’s laws of secularization, but the government denies this claim (Carreyrou, A15).

Despite the conflicts, there is evidence that Muslims are integrating into

French society. The government does make some accommodations for people of the Muslim faith. It provides Muslim chaplains and serves rations in accord with Islamic dietary law in the military and in prisons. About 30,000 French

Muslims go on a government condoned pilgrimage to Mecca each year (Viorst,

78). In April of 2003, the government and French Muslims worked together to give the Islamic community an official voice in the government. French Muslims voted at mosques throughout the country to elect a council of 137 national delegates. Members of the group work for things such as funding for the building of mosques, increasing the number of Muslim chaplains in prisons, obtaining paid vacation time on Islamic holidays, and bettering training opportunities for

French imams (Sciolino, A4). The appointment of Algerian-born Aissa Dermouch in January 2004 indicates that the government may hand out civil service appointments partially based on what they call “republican voluntarism” or

“positive discrimination” (Sciolino, A9). In practicing “republican voluntarism,” a euphemism for “affirmative action,” the government is making a proactive move towards integrating the Muslim voice into government. This is important, if

France and its Muslims hope to achieve a state of peace within the country.

There are many other efforts to increase integration in France. In 2005, the government set up a few key agencies to work on these issues. The first, the

Ministry of Equal Opportunity, led by Azouz Begag, was designed to promote equality in France. Begag is the son of Algerian immigrants and a renowned scholar on multicultural issues. However, Keelin McDonnell, assistant editor of

The New Republic, calls his response to problems in France “underwhelming” and says that Begag’s success has been limited to a few public relations efforts, such as working to bring more diversity to the media. The second agency, the

High Authority of the Fight against Discrimination and for Equality, aims to work against discrimination in the workplace. But according to Stephanie Giry, senior editor at Foreign Affairs magazine, about 800 complaints have been brought to the agency but only twenty or so went to court. Some private companies and organizations are also making an effort to improve the situation. Business and industry offer Muslim employees time and facilities for prayer. Many companies have adopted diversity charters that promise to make an effort to hire and promote FIIs. Some universities, such as Sciences Po, are creating special admissions processes for disadvantaged students (Giry).

The government points to French-Arabic icons, such as Zinedine Zidane, as proof of integration, saying that citizens of all backgrounds are increasingly more concerned with their patriotic sentiments for France than their identity with a certain ethnic background (i.e., Algerian, Moroccan, etc.). Zinedine Zidane is a

Frenchman of Algerian heritage who was the World Footballer of the year in

1998 and the star of the France’s World Cup soccer team that won the tournament the same year. Philip Dine, a professor of French at the National

University of Ireland, Galway, argues that many people pointed to Zidane as

proof of “a broader shift in the nation’s consciousness, and specifically as

regards the construction of national identity” (Dine, 503). Zidane’s success

prompted France to sponsor youth soccer programs in heavily Muslim-populated

areas (Dine, 503). However, a ‘friendly match’ between France and Algeria in

October of 2001 showed that some Muslim immigrants or their offspring continue

to identify more with their home countries than with France. During the match,

young fans of the Algerian team, many of whom were French citizens, filled le

Stade de France and booed the French national anthem, the Marseillaise. The fans proceeded to jeer and whistle at each French player who touched the ball, including the celebrated Zidane.

The disappointing result of the French-Algerian soccer match is only one indicator of the recent failures to integrate Muslims into French society. The

French government seems to be too anxious to accept band-aid approaches to cultural and political conflicts. The ban on the headscarves is one such example.

Instead of working with the Muslim community to clarify and explain laicite laws,

the government instated a law that was obviously aimed at Muslims and

according to French journalist Christine Ockrent “revealed the basic incapacity of

the system to integrate our immigrants” (Kramer, 62). Additionally, the

government is too quick to claim success, as in the case of Zidane. His success

is not representative of the experience of most French Muslims. If the French

want to resolve the conflicts between Islamic ideals and French laws, they must

take a closer look at the problems yet to be resolved, which include questions of divorce, polygamy, welfare, and genital mutilation (Kramer, 69). The government must continue to work at a grass roots level, as it is doing in the policy to educate

French imams, in order to dissipate the root causes of these conflicts.

Conclusion

The colonial period created geographic, economic, and cultural ties to France that encouraged Muslim immigration. Although French Muslims’ experiences vary widely, particularly depending on their socioeconomic status, many Muslims feel alienated in their own country. One young person explained his frustration by asking “How am I supposed to feel French, when people always describe me as a Frenchman of Algerian origin?” (BBC News, “Ghettos Shackle French

Muslims”). This sense of alienation, combined with the sheer size of the group, has led to cultural and political conflicts between the Muslim minority and the majority. The magnitude of these conflicts is increased by Muslims themselves because they cannot reach a consensus on issues within the Islamic community.

Additionally, the government’s quick-fix solutions have inflamed the clashes. The successful resolution of the political and cultural conflicts plaguing France must involve an effort on both sides to address the roots of the problems. First, the

Islamic community must unite as a community and form a multi-national and multi-ethnic representative body. Secondly, the government must respect and acknowledge this body.

The rector of Paris’s Grand Mosque says that Islam in France has been

passing through several phases: “immigration; adaptation; crisis; especially for

the young; and now, insertion, integration, and normalization” (Economist, “The

Melting-Pot That Isn’t,” 52). Although time is the only way to prove the accuracy

of this statement, it appears that the plight of Muslims will improve if the

government continues to work with its largest minority. Muslims in France may

never become normalized, but there is reason to hope that in time, Muslims will

be able to live more peacefully in France.

Part Two:

A Discussion of the November 2005 Riots

Introduction

On October 27, 2005, two French teenagers from the poor Parisian

suburb of Clichy-sous Bois were electrocuted while hiding from the police in an

electrical sub-station. This night marked the start of three weeks of violent riots

that spread across France and even to a few neighboring countries. Because of

the violence, President Jacques Chirac was forced to declare a state of

emergency and take drastic measures in an attempt to contain the situation. In

the end, a total of some 9,000 cars were burned and nearly 3,000 people were

arrested (BBC News, “French Violence”). The riots cost France millions of euros

in damages along with a public relations nightmare, as people across the world

watched the suburban youth angrily set cars and buildings ablaze.

In the months and years since the riots subsided, a plethora of

explanations, often short-sighted, have emerged. Yet before turning to a

discussion of reasons for the riots, it is first necessary to reflect upon their

backdrop. The suburbs, or les banlieues, have a long history of conflicts and

struggles, and it seems that many people, especially certain French officials,

have been quick to pass judgment on the rioters before trying to understand who

they are or in what conditions they live. Having considered the various causes and effects of Muslim immigration, this section will consider how the November

2005 riots might have been tied, if at all, to the Muslim community. At the start of the riots, many people assumed that they were the result of Islamic fundamentalists; however, it has become evident this was not the case.

However, the riots affected France Muslims, since many Muslim FIIs were

involved in the riots, and because the affected areas have large Muslim

populations. This section will weigh the primary explanations for them, looking at

the riots as a socio-economic revolt, a violent response to state actions, and as a

result of flaws in the French ideological system. Finally, it will consider various

proposals to prevent further violence.

Background

When attempting to understand these riots, one must pay considerable attention to the rioters themselves. Who are they? Where do they live? How do they live? The basic characteristics of the rioters are not surprising. They are predominately male and between the ages of twelve and twenty-five. The rioters almost all live in the impoverished suburbs of France’s larger cities, in areas that have come to be known as quartiers difficiles or zones urbaines sensibles (ZUS)

(Roy). The young men are often high-school drop-outs who are unable to find

work, and they operate in groups to protect their neighborhood. These groups

are headed up by a caïd, a young man who has “street credit,” so to speak, and

has earned the respect of other young men because of his involvement with drug

deals, theft, or other sorts of crime. Because these neighborhoods often lack any

sort of community leader, the caïds have a great deal of power.

It is equally important to consider who is not rioting. Near the start of

these riots, the media, particularly media outside of France, made claims that

these riots were an uprising of the Muslim populations living in the suburbs. For

example, an article published on November 9, 2005, in the Canadian newspaper

Globe and Mail implicated Muslims in the riots in saying that “behind the riots in

France lies a surefire recipe for discontent: a rigid job market and widespread discrimination against young Muslim men.” President Jacques Chirac criticized foreign media and argued that “certain foreign media presented the events in a skewed and exaggerated way” 2 (“Chirac: les médias français ont correctement

couvert les émeutes”). Meanwhile Chirac praised French media for its thorough

and accurate portrayal of the riots. Although the French media surely made its

fair share of assumptions, it seems that French journalists were a bit more

hesitant to make a direct link between the riots and French Muslims. For

example, in an Agence France Presse article, journalist Amer Ouali makes a

more conservative claim than the one in the Canadian newspaper. He says that

the riots are the result of children of immigrants contesting their parents’ authority

and belief systems.

Despite the media attention given to the role of Muslims in the riots, it

has become clear that the riots cannot be attributed to fundamentalist Islam. As

Oliver Roy points out in his article “The Nature of the French Riots,” French

Muslims living beyond les banlieues did not riot, nor did the many Muslim

students attending French universities, despite the fact that these students are

underrepresented and overlooked in the French system of les grandes écoles.

2 « certains médias étrangers ont souvent présenté les événements de façon biaisée et avec démesure »

Furthermore, Muslim organizations, such as the French Council of Muslim

Worship (CFCM) and the Union of Islamic Organizations of France (UIOF), publicly denounced the riots, prayed for peace, and even issued a fatwa, a

Muslim juridical sentence, demanding that the riots end (Kastoryano).

It is important to understand that the riots were not inherently Muslim riots; however, one must not overlook certain connections between the riots and the

Muslim community. Hugues Lagrane, a director of research at France’s National

Center of Scientific Research, and Marco Oberti, a professor of sociology at

Sciences Po, explain that “it seems dangerous to perceive the recent tensions and explosions as the exclusive consequence of the fragmentation of French society on the basis of ethnicity or race”3 (206). Rather, they evaluate the riots as a “complex overlap between those causes associated with social position and those which relate to ethnic and religious dimensions” 4(206). Therefore, though the riots were not exclusively Muslim, there are intricate interconnections between religious aspects and other causes of the conflicts. For example, only seven percent of the rioters arrested were foreigners (Roy), but many of them were FIIs—the children or grandchildren of immigrants from Muslim countries.

Therefore, most of the rioters were French citizens by birthright, although their heritage ties them to the Muslim community. Despite being French citizens, many Muslim FIIs are treated as outsiders in French society. In fact, they face

3 « Il parait dangereux de percevoir les tensions et les explosions récentes comme la conséquence exclusive d’une fragmentation de la société française sur une base ethnique ou raciale » 4 « l’imbrication complexe entre des déterminations associées à la position sociale et celles qui renvoient à des dimensions ethniques ou religieuses »

constant employment discrimination because of their names, which often sound foreign, and their addresses, which reveal that they live in an area populated largely by Muslim immigrants (Wihtol de Wenden). All of these elements—social status, ethnicity, and religion—connect and contribute to the marginalization of suburban youths.

The geographic space of the banlieues has become a concrete form of marginalization; yet, they were not intended to be that way. In the 1950s, urban planners built the suburbs “to de-concentrate white urban poverty from city centers, providing for the possibility of physical and social mobility literally to the greener pastures of the suburbs, and resulting in the emergence of a lower middle class” (Silverstein and Tetreault). These high-rise apartment buildings were not meant to be slums; rather, they were supposed to enable lower class families to have access to all the comforts of modern life and some were designed by the most important French architects of the day, including Le

Corbusier. Those involved in this venture hoped that these communities would become self-sufficient so that shopping centers, schools, and recreational areas were near the residents’ homes, while keeping them in close proximity to the factories where they worked. During the severe economic downturn of the

1970s, however, the county rapidly switched from an economy based on manufacturing and production to one based on services, leaving many industrial workers unemployed. In a span of twenty years, France’s lower middle class, composed primarily of FIIs, plummeted into poverty (Silverstein and Tetreault).

Since the 1970s, the unemployment rate in these areas has continued to

climb, especially for young people. Recent research suggests that approximately

40% of young people living in the suburbs are currently unemployed (Salanié)!

Along with the increasing unemployment rate, incidences of crime have also

gone up in these areas, and much of the local commerce left. The housing

projects have fallen into disrepair. In the 1990s, a study found that about 80% of

the buildings had some combination of water damage, insulation problems, or

broken elevators, making the apartments unsafe for occupancy. Furthermore,

the complexes are often over-crowded making them prone to crime, disease, and

poverty.

Besides the banlieues, the suburban schools contribute to the

marginalization of the youths living in the ZUS. According to Bernard Salanié,

professor of economics at Columbia University, “90% of all children of immigrants

in France study in only 10% of all French schools—a lot of which are in the ZUS.”

France’s education system, which aims to provide all students with equal opportunity for success, is a point of pride for most of its citizens. Critics of this system, however, say that in the suburbs, schools are anything but equal. Paul

A. Silverstein and Chantal Tetreault argue that these schools are over-crowded and have poor facilities. Furthermore, there is a high turnover of teachers, and teachers are “unknowledgeable of or inflexible to the students’ multicultural needs” (Silverstein and Tetreault). Finally, these schools track nearly all students

for vocational degrees, which do not prepare them to go on to a university, nor do these degrees make a student marketable to employers.

While failing schools certainly contribute to unemployment and generally difficult conditions in the suburbs, Silverstein and Tetreault further argue that the socio-economic crisis that serves as the backdrop for the recent riots is the result of a combination of neo-liberal policies and militarization. On one hand, the government has attempted to bring commerce back to the ZUS by providing tax incentives and has started initiatives to hire young people as interns in local associations. Unfortunately, these policies have been undermined by France’s admission into the European Monetary Union, which has necessitated overall budget cuts, particularly in social services. At the same time, there has been a trend towards militarization of the French suburbs probably due to growing public fear, augmented by media coverage that crime in these areas, coupled with the large Muslim population, may lead to acts of jihad (Silverstein and Tetreault).

Therefore, the government has increased the number of riot police, under-cover agents, and military gendarmes in these areas while taking drastic policies against the residents, such as forbidding public assemblies in entryways or basements and deporting many illegal immigrants.

This increased focus on enforcement activities can be added to a long history of tensions between police and residents of the suburbs. Over the past twenty years, several incidents between the police and young, male FIIs, much like the one that spawned the November 2005 riots, have led to violent

confrontations between the two groups. For example, in November of 1990, a

young man died in a motorcycle chase with police. Then in March of 1991, the

police killed a young security guard working in a suburban supermarket. The

following May, a teenager who was being held in police custody died of

asphyxiation because he was denied his asthma medication (Silverstein and

Tetreault). There are many more examples like these, and after each of these

incidents, there were small scale riots, including the hallmark car burning.

Understanding the Riots

With such a long history of confrontation, the November 2005 riots seem

less surprising, yet they were dramatically different than those of the past. These

riots did not stay local. They spread to most of the suburbs of France’s biggest

cities and provoked international attention. Furthermore, these riots were not the

typical two or three nights of chaos—they lasted approximately three weeks.

Lagrane and Oberti characterize the riots by saying, “the young people

concerned addressed themselves to the political powers, as much at the national

level as at the local” (207)5. There are many possible ways to explain why these riots escalated in the way that they did, and while no one explanation can be totally right, each explanation is a step towards a better understanding.

Perhaps the most popular and obvious explanation is to look at the riots as a revolt of the young people against their situation. Given their backdrop, this explanation is very powerful. The combination of poverty, discrimination,

5 « Les jeunes concernés s’adressaient au pouvoir politique, autant au niveau national que local »

unemployment, police violence, and the lack of social mobility is cause enough for these young people to rebel. Some even go so far as to say that difficult social situations that exist are a direct result of colonization—the residents of the

ZUS tend to be immigrants or the descendants of immigrants from former colonies and now “the French authorities have reproduced on the French territory the same kind of ethnic segregation that prevailed in the colonies” (Dufoix). This explanation does not answer the question: why now? The suburbs in France have been in their current state for at least fifteen years, and if one is to understand the riots, it seems that their timing is a very important factor.

Other critics look more at governmental actions prior to the riots and the state’s reactions once they began. This explanation does a much better job of accounting for the escalation and spread of the violence this time. Prior to the riots, the fiscal reforms that had cut spending on social welfare, neighborhood associations, after-school programs, community police, and internships had frustrated those living in the ZUS (Silverstein and Tetreault). Additionally, there was a considerable amount of controversial discourse concerning immigrants and their offspring in the year or so leading up to the riots. For example, on

March 25, 2005, Le Monde (a prominent French newspaper) printed a story entitled “Colonisation: non à l’enseignment d’une histoire officielle” criticizing a new law that had been passed on February 23, 2005. This law mandated that

“academic research programs award the history of French overseas presence, notably in North Africa, all of the importance it deserves. School programs

recognize in particular the positive role of French overseas presence…” (Dufoix).

Not surprisingly, Le Monde’s article led to heated discussion about France’s colonial policies and incited anger among immigrant families who were negatively impacted by colonialism. Ultimately, President Jacques Chirac repealed the offending article of the law.

Most critics feel that the state’s reaction to the initial events in late October and the solutions that they proposed were much more inflammatory than anything the government did before the riots had begun. The way in which

French officials spoke about the riots was a main contributor to the escalation.

On October 25, 2005, the Minister of the Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy, used the word

“racaille” or “scum” to describe certain young people living in the ZUS and spoke

about power-washing them from the areas, which some people interpreted as a

reference to ethnic cleansings (Dufoix). Then, after the French teenagers where

electrocuted, Sarkozy referred to them as delinquents, despite the fact that none

of them had a police record, and they did not commit any offence that night

(Dufoix). Furthermore, on the eighth of November, the government invoked a

law from 1955 to justify curfews and restrictions. This law had an unfortunate tie

to the Algerian War and led people to criticize the “colonial management of this

crisis” (Dufoix).

Considering the state’s role in the riots is important; however, an analysis

of the riots would be incomplete if one did not look at the situation from an

ideological standpoint and consider the deepest roots of the conflict. To this end,

some critics have pointed out that the ideals of French society may have

contributed to suburban violence. As Ezra Suleiman, a professor of political

sciences at Princeton University, highlights in his article “France: One and

Divisible,” the system of republican ideals, which hopes to equalize all citizens,

has much to its credit. The French social model arose from these ideals and

provides for such things as free childcare and education from infancy to

adulthood as well as healthcare to every citizen. As is evident in earlier sections,

however, the French social system seems to be failing the suburban population.

Academics and politicians are hesitant to challenge these principles because the

French are so dedicated to them. Criticizing the republican model could mean

the end of their careers. Furthermore, many oppose change to the French

system because they are products of it, and any sort of demand for change has

put the French elite in the position of defending “its hold on power, on the

influential and lucrative institutions to which it has access, and on the privileges

that accompany this access” (Suleiman). This explanation is certainly thought-

provoking and perhaps comes closest to exposing the deepest roots of the

conflict.

Solutions: Avoiding Further Violence

Just as there are many possible explanations for the riots of November

2005, there are many different proposed solutions to prevent further violence in

France’s suburbs. During the riots, President Chirac and Prime Minister

Dominique de Villepin offered a few general ideas of ways that things could be

improved in the suburbs. They proposed a five year plan that included elements

to promote social cohesion and equality of opportunity. They also offered to help

students who drop out of school find apprenticeships and to finance community

organizations (Wihtol de Wenden). In April 2006, the French government

attempted to enact a new law that sought to address the youth unemployment

problem by making it easier for employers to hire and fire young people.

However, high school and university students met this legislation with series of

ardent, although nonviolent, protests that closed secondary schools and

universities for several weeks. The students claimed that this was merely a

band-aid solution to the unemployment problem, and they argued that the

government needed to work to stimulate job creation (BBC News,” Q&A: French

Labour”). The government quickly appealed the law, leaving the youth

unemployment problem still unaddressed.

Academics have been equally unimpressed with the solutions offered by

the government. Bernard Salanié suggests that the students are right—job

creation is one way to help those trapped in les banlieues. However, he says

that past programs aimed at creating jobs were ineffective because they attacked the symptoms, not the root causes. Salanié says that any new program “must comprise a tenacious continuation of the policy of subsidizing low-skilled employment, along with policies that give children of immigrants a better chance of getting the diploma that still remains the key to employment in France.”

Furthermore, Salanié thinks that the French should take a cue from the United

States and adopt a more extensive plan for affirmative action. However, he acknowledges that this would be a difficult process, since in France, equality requires that one be blind to race and ethnicity.

Other theorists of this conflict, such as Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, say that the only solution to the difficulties faced by those living in the ZUS is the opportunity to leave them. Social mobility is a huge problem, not only in abstract terms, but in the concrete sense as well. It is very difficult to physically leave the suburbs because “nearly 60 percent of these suburban municipalities lack their own train station” (Silverstein and Tetreault). The suburbs are isolated from each other too, with only the occasional bus to connect them. It seems obvious that if

France wants to end the marginalization of its suburban residents, one of the first objectives should be to connect them with the rest of the country.

Conclusion

Having considered the background of these riots, and then interpretations of them as well as suggested solutions for the conflicts, one can draw certain basic conclusions. Despite the availability of expert opinions on the topic, it is important to remember what Stéphane Dufoix, a professor of sociology at

Nanterre, points out: throughout these riots there was “a complete absence of claim-making by the rioters…In fact, there was no discourse expressed by the rioters except violence itself.” Therefore, no one can really be sure what the rioters wanted to accomplish. Yet, their silence should not be interpreted to mean that they have nothing to say. Rather, the stress of their difficult

circumstances, along with the intolerance of a country not quite ready to acknowledge its own diverse population, has silenced them and stripped them of a voice.

It seems that those who have proposed solutions are not exactly sure what they are trying to solve. Some propose solutions to the unemployment problems or the unequal educational opportunities. These solutions all address aspects of a greater struggle. The rioters are a part of a marginalized population that has no voice. Stéphane Dufoix has suggested that the riots were an attempt to take control over some space to “show their rejection of the order of society and demonstrate violently that their place is not society, but the neighborhood over which they claim some sort of power.” Therefore, the effective solution will work to first acknowledge the rioters as people, not as mere “scum” or

“delinquents” as Sarkozy inappropriately called them. Then, these people must be given a voice, not merely by appointing some of them to a few governmental or other powerful positions, but also throughout French culture. As it stands now, the immigrants living in the ZUS are considered to be an affront to French culture

(Dufoix). The French must come to recognize that these immigrants are French and deserve a place in French culture and communities.

Part Three:

A Model for

Understanding Conflicts with the Muslim Community

Introduction

Thus far, this paper has considered the causes and implications of Muslim

immigration at large and then looked at the 2005 riots as one specific case of

conflict. This section will now turn to the most vital piece—it will propose a model

that seeks to explain the cycle of conflict that exists in France today. Several of

the clashes between French Muslims and the majority have already been

mentioned. Of course, in the 1990s and even recently there was the question of

wearing scarves and other religious symbols at school. Since then, there have

been numerous small scale conflicts between police and the suburban youth that

led up to the nationwide outbreak of riots in 2005. However, as one French

university student pointed out, “the conflicts are not only the big conflicts like the

riots. Rather, there are conflicts everyday, even between children at school.6”

Therefore the model seeks to understand not only the larger, more evident conflicts, but the smaller, daily conflicts facing the people of France.

The previous sections have made use of a variety of source materials, but this section will rely heavily on personal interviews conducted in the summer of

2006. Scholarly analysis, newspaper articles, historical accounts, and the like provide vital information, but they are often distant from the French people, both

Muslim and otherwise, whose lives have been so impacted by these conflicts.

Rather than create a model of understanding far removed from the lives of

6 « Les conflits ne sont pas que des grands conflits comme les émeutes. Plutôt, il y a les conflits chaque jour, même entre les enfants à l’école. » Conversation with the author. 14 June 2006. Dijon, France.

everyday people, it seemed more relevant to create a model based on the thoughts of those who live amidst these clashes. Therefore, the author interviewed four students at the Université de Bourgogne in Dijon, France. The students had some experience with these conflicts, as Dijon was one of the first areas outside of Paris affected by the 2005 riots. Violence broke out there on

November 3, 2005, and lasted approximately two weeks.

I chose to interview students for two key reasons. First, the students I interviewed were about the same age as the young people involved in the 2005 riots. I found it interesting to hear their opinions on the struggles facing their peers living in les banlieues. Second, this generation of students will become political leaders who will have the task of providing a solution to this problem.

The students were interviewed in French on a one-on-one basis and were asked the same set of open-ended questions. The discussion started with general questions, such as “what do you think are the roots of the problems between

French Muslims and other French citizens?” Then the interviewer asked the students to relate their own personal reflections and experiences with the riots and demonstrations. Clearly, the opinions voiced by these four students cannot be taken as representative of those of all of France’s youth. However, they provide interesting, personal insights that do not surface in other forms of research.

The Model: Stage One7

The basic idea for this model surfaced during the interviews with the

Université de Bourgogne students. During the conversations, the students cited the three key ideas of the Republic—liberté, égalité,and fraternité— many times and pointed out that, in their opinion, France was not adhering to these principles in its relations with the Muslim community. One student said, “liberty, equality, and brotherhood…now, there is not equality…the French system is very unfair.

And, brotherhood, we don’t have that either. We need to change a little and insist on tolerance and accepting difference.”8 Another student explained why she believes in affirmative action, despite its lack of acceptance in France. She said, “at first, we were against affirmative action in France because of the ideas of the Republic—it’s liberty, equality, and brotherhood. Theoretically, in the eyes of the Republic, everyone is equal, but it’s not true.”9 As these quotations highlight, these three ideals are the pillars of French society and serve as a common denominator among the French people. However, there seems to be a chasm between these ideals and the reality of the conflicts with the Muslim community today.

7 For a visual version of this model, please see Appendix A. 8 « Liberté, égalité, fraternité…maintenant, il n’est pas égalité...le système français est très inégal. Et, fraternité, on n’a pas non plus. Il faut qu’on change un peu et insister plus sur l’idée de tolérance et de différence. ». Conversation with the author. 16 June 2006. Dijon, France. 9 « Au début discrimination positive en France, on était contre parce que les idées de la république—c’est liberté, égalité, et fraternité. Théoriquement, aux yeux de la république, tout le monde est pareil, mais c’est pas vrai. » Conversation with the author. 20 June 2006. Dijon, France.

Stage Two

If one begins with these basic concepts of French society, the next step is

to consider what might have happened that drew France away from these

principles. In the case of the Muslim community, I believe that the group was

perceived to pose a threat to the French people. French Muslims, their children,

and anyone who emigrated from a Muslim country brought with them unique

cultural traditions that sometimes differ from French traditions. One interviewee

feels that there is a basic difference in culture, saying that the difficulties “come

from the fact that we French, we are not religious people; but the Muslims,

religion is a part of their daily life.”10 This quotation is interesting for several

reasons. The student makes the assumption that all Muslims are inherently

religious, despite the fact many members of the French Muslim community do

not practice their faith or else they practice a greatly reduced form of it. This sort

of assumption leads to an “us versus them” mentality, evidenced in this quotation

with the student’s use of the word “we” in opposition with the word “Muslim,” and

paints the Muslim community as an affront to French culture. Mainstream French

society fiercely protects its way of life and fears any challenge to its cultural

patrimony. For example, France has an interesting policy known as l’exception

culturelle. This policy says that in France, cultural goods (i.e., films and music)

are not the same as other products, such as cars or Coca-Cola, in that cultural

10 « les difficultés viennent du fait que nous français, nous ne sommes pas des gens religieux ; mais, les musulmans, la religion fait partie de leur vie quotidienne. » Conversation with the author. 14 June 2006. Dijon, France.

goods are not subject to the same principles of free trade. Using this policy,

France places quotas on foreign cultural goods in order to prevent local culture from being overwhelmed by outsiders, namely the United States.

Stage Three

At this point, French ideals have been challenged by outsiders, in this case, the Muslim community, and fear has propelled the problem forward. In the next stage of this model, one sees that there is some sort of reactive response on the part of the majority. In the case of large, national issues, the French government steps in and creates policy aimed at preserving the French ideals from the challenge of the outsider. While these reactive policies may intend to protect liberty, equality, and brotherhood, it seems that they often weaken them.

Consider, for example, France’s ban on headscarves. Throughout the 1990s, stories circulated in French media about Muslim girls who were expelled from school for wearing a headscarf. This cultural difference challenged the French idea of secularism, leading to a governmental investigation and ultimately a ban on scarves in 2004. Certainly, there were political motivations for this ban— some of the more moderate political parties were losing votes to the Far-Right.

Therefore, the government created a policy to regain these votes by addressing the anti-Islamic fears of mainstream French society.

Stage Four

According to French Muslims, this law infringed upon their right to freedom of religion, leading to the final stage of this model: conflict. In the case of the

headscarf ban, the policy pitted Muslims who opposed it against those who supported the law as “bulwark against Islamist influence” (CNN.com, “Muslims

Protest Headscarf Ban”), leading to nationwide debates and protests.

Unfortunately, it seems that this is a vicious cycle that will repeat until France changes its way of handling challenges to the French norm. This was evident when, in the spring of 2006, the French government tried to respond to the 2005 riots with a law aimed to alleviate unemployment. Yet this policy led to conflict as well. As mentioned in the previous section, this law led to a series of demonstrations at high schools and universities across the nation, forcing some to close for several weeks.

A Historical Application

Although this model is perhaps best applied to the more recent conflicts between Muslims and the majority, a glance backward to history demonstrates that France has struggled with this cycle before. Consider French colonial policy at the turn of the twentieth century. According to Raymond F. Betts, former professor history at the University of Kentucky, anti-colonial sentiments were high prior to the 1890s due to fears that colonies threatened France’s own weak political and economic condition. These concerns were not surprising, given

France’s humiliating 1870s defeat in the Franco-Prussian war, which led to the loss of the Alsace-Lorraine region. Important government officials, especially

Jules Ferry, tried to calm these fears. He argued that colonialism was necessary

for the economic growth of the country, as colonial markets were a vital outlet for

French products (Betts, 3).

Eventually, France turned to reactive policies to stifle these concerns.

First, the government passed the finance law of 1900, which effectively shut off all direct aid to French colonies and appeased isolationists. Then the country pursued a policy of active assimilation, believing that colonies should be “an integral, if noncontiguous part of the mother country, with its society and population made over…in her image” (Betts, 8). Certainly, as French imperialists forced colonies to adapt their ideas of culture, religion, and government, the people native to the colonies lost some of their personal freedoms. However, the early 1900s marked the advent of association, a new colonial policy that aimed to create strategies for each colony based on its geographic and ethnic characteristics and its state of development (Betts, 106). Benevolence for the colonies was not the catalyst for this change; rather, the policy of association stemmed from concerns about the colonies were “largely unsuited to white populations” (Betts, 110).

As the model predicts, these threats to French ideals, augmented by fear, led to conflict. In 1954, the Algerian War broke out, and eight years of horrifying, bloody conflict ensued. Finally, in 1959, Prime Minister Charles de Gaulle declared that the colonies had the right to determine their futures. In 1956,

Tunisia and Morocco voted on and gained their independence from France.

Algeria gained its independence six years later. France’s colonial legacy

continues to fuel conflict even today, as former colonies struggle to survive in the

global marketplace.

Using the Model to Avert Conflict

If one accepts this model as a way of understanding the conflicts between

Muslims and the secular majority, then a solution emerges: change the manner in which France deals with challenges to its republican ideals. Perhaps one way of making this change would be to rethink the meaning and application of liberty, equality, and brotherhood, so that the Muslim community poses less of a challenge to French ideals. Then, if the French people and government created policies that proactively supported a more liberal application of these principles, conflict could be ultimately be avoided. While the premise of this idea is simple, the implications are anything but that. Yet if France wants to avoid future conflict, it is vital that at least some changes are made to the country’s traditional approach to the Muslim community. For example, equality can be defined as providing equal access to opportunity. However, in reality access is not equal for much of the Muslim population in France. Therefore, action must be taken to support this idea of equality, perhaps by changing state policy to include something like affirmative action. Certainly, even slight changes in the country’s ideologies might cause an outcry from the public, particularly among older generations that grew up believing in these definitions of the three main ideals.

Yet, as the next generation steps forward, small changes could be made that might lead to a gradual shift in the nation’s conscience. When I asked one of the

students how she would solve the conflicts between Muslims and the secular majority, she responded, “allow the young people to talk more with the rest of the country and have the rest of the country talk more with the young people.”11

11 « Permettre aux jeunes plus de dialoguer avec la population et à la population de dialoguer plus avec les jeunes. » Conversation with the author. 16 June 2006. Dijon, France.

References

Amselle, Jean-Loup. "Multiculturalism in France." Affirmative Exclusion: Cultural Pluralism and the Rule of

Custom in France. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003. 100.

BBC News. "France Gets First Private Muslim Lycee." BBC News Online 11 July 2003 2003 24 Mar 2007

---. "French Violence 'Back to Normal'." BBC News Online 17 Nov 2005 23 Apr 2006

---. "Ghettos Shackle French Muslims." BBC News 31 Oct 2005. 25 Mar 2007

---. "Maps: Riots in France." .

---. "Q&A: French Labour Law Row." BBC News 11 Apr 2006 14 Apr 2006

/2/hi/europe/4816306.stm>.

---. "Timeline: French Riots." BBC News Online 14 Nov 2005. 14 Apr 2006

/2/hi/europe/4413964.stm>.

Betts, Raymond F. Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory 1890-1914. New York: Columbia

University Press, 1961. Questia .

Bouhga-Hagbe, Jacques. "A Theory of Workers' Remittances with Application to Morocco." IMF Working

Paper (2004) . 22 Feb 2007 .

Braudel, Fernand. "Recent Problems: The Triumphs of Medicine; Birth Control; Immigration." The Identity of

France: People and Production. New York: Harper Collins, 1986. 181.

Carreyrou, John, and Iam Johnson. "French Muslims Face More Controls." Wall Street Journal 9 Dec. 2004,

sec. A15:.

Carreyrou, John. "Culture Clash: Muslim Groups may Gain Strength from French Riots." Wall Street Journal

(2005) ProQuest. 7 Apr 2006

Cesari, Jocelyne. "Ethnicity, Islam, and Les Banlieules: Confusing the Issues." Social Science Research

Council. 30 Nov 2005 .

CNN.com. "Muslims Protest at Headscarf Ban." CNN 17 Jan 2004 28 Mar 2007

"Chirac: Les médias français ont correctement couvert les émeutes." Agence France Presse 12 Dec. 2005.

LexisNexis. 3 Apr. 2007.

Crumley, Bruce. "Le Pen Effect." Time Europe 10 June 2002: 30.

Dine, Philip. "France, Algeria, and Sport: From Colonization to Globalisation." Modern and Contemporary

France 10.4 (2002): 495.

Diouf, Sylviane A. "Invisible Muslims: The Sahelians in France." Muslim Minorities in the West: Visible and

Invisible. Ed. Yvonne Yazbeck Hadded and Jane I. Smith. New York: Altamira Press, 2002.

Dufoix, Stephane. "More than Riots: A Question of Spheres." Social Science Research Council. 2 Dec 2005

Evans, Martin. "Projecting a Greater France." History Today 50.2 (200): 18.

Fetzer, Joel, and J. Christopher Soper. "France: Laicite and the Hijab." Muslims and the State in Britain,

France, and Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 62.

Gabizon, Cecilia. "Les Musulmans Restent Très Attachés Aux Rites Collectifs." Le Figaro 28 Dec 2006. 25

Mar 2007

x_rites_collectifs.html>.

Giry, Stephanie. "France and its Muslims." Foreign Affairs 9 Oct 2006. 25 Mar 2007

Guimbert, Claire. ""Girls Expelled in France for Defying Headscarf Ban"." Education Week 27 Oct. 2004

2004: 14.

Horne, Alistair. "Remember Algeria." National Review 13 Dec. 2004: 30.

Kastoryano, Riva. "Territories of Identities in France." Social Science Research Council. 5 Dec 2005

Kramer, Jane. "Taking the Veil: How France's Public Schools Became the Battleground in a Culture War."

The New Yorker 22 Nov 2004: 58.

Krieger-Krynicki, Annie. "The Second-Generation: The Children of Muslim Immigrants in France." The New

Islamic Presence in Western Europe. Ed. Thomas Gerholm and Yngve George Lithman. London:

Mansell Publishing Unlimited, 1988. 123.

Lagrange, Hugues, and Marco Oberti. Emeutes Urbaines Et Protestations: Une Singularite Francaise. Paris:

Presses de Sciences Po, 2006.

Leveau, Remy. "The Islamic Presence in France." The New Islamic Presence in Western Europe. Ed.

Thomas Gerholm and Yngve Geroge Lithman. London: Mansell Publishing Unlimited, 1988. 107.

McDonell, Keelin. "Equal Opportunity Offender." The New Republic 9 Nov 2005. 25 Mar 2007

"The Melting-Pot that Isn't." Economist 360.8231 (2001): 50.

Nielsen, Jorgen S. "France." Muslims in Western Europe. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1992. 8.

Ouali, Amer. "Emeutes En France: Quand Les Enfants D'Immigrés Rejettent Le ModèLe." Agence France

Presse 8 Nov. 2005. LexisNexis. 3 Apr. 2007.

Poupeau, Franck. "French Sociology Under Fire: A Preliminary Diagnosis of the November 2005 'Urban

Riots'." Social Science Research Council. 18 Jan 2006 .

Robinson, David. "France as a Muslim Power in West Africa." Africa Today 46.3/4 (1999): 105.

Rossant, John. "France: Fraying Ties to the Arab World." Business Week 20 Sept. 2004: 52.

Roy, Oliver. "Islam in France: Religion, Ethnic Community Or Social Ghetto?" Muslims in Europe: Social

Change in Western Europe. Ed. Bernard Lewis and Dominique Schnapper. London: Pinter Publishers,

1994. 54.

---. "The Nature of the French Riots." Social Science Research Council. 18 Nov 2005

Salanie, Bernard. "The Riots in France: An Economist's View." Social Science Research Council. 15 Dec

2005 .

Sciolino, Elaine. "France Seems to Try Acting Affirmatively on Muslims." New York Times 15 Jan 2004, sec.

A9:.

---. "French Islam Wins Officially Recognized Voice." New York Times 14 Apr 2003, sec. A4:.

---. "Le Pen Defends Nazis, and Draws Fire." New York Times 14 Jan 2005, sec. A6:.

Silverstein, Paul A. and Chantal Tetreault. "Postcolonial Urban Apartheid." Social Science Research

Council. 29 Nov 2005 .

Suleiman, Ezra. "France: One and Divisible." Social Science Research Council. 18 Nov 2005

"A Tragic Twist of the Scarf." Economist 372.839 (2004): 49.

U.S. Department of State. "International Religious Freedom Report 2003." 18 Dec 2003.

"An Underclass Rebellion." Economist 377.8452 (2005): 24. Academic Search Premier. 7 Apr 2006

United Nations Development Programme. "Statistics in the Human Development Report." 2007.

Viorst, Milton. "The Muslims of France." Foreign Affairs 75.5 (1996): 78.

Walker, Marcus, and John Carreyrou. "Rules Meant to Protect French Workers At Root of Riots by Young

Muslim." The Globe and Mail 9 Nov. 2005, sec. B12. LexisNexis. 3 Apr. 2007.

White, Gregory. "Encouraging Unwanted Immigration: A Political Economy of Europe's Efforts to Discourage

North African Immigration." Third World Quarterly 20.4 (1999): 839.

"Why He has His Admirers." Economist 363.8271 (2002): 49.

Wieviorka, Michel. "Violence in France." Social Science Research Council. 18 Nov 2005

Wihtol de Wenden, Catherine. "Reflections "A Chaud" on the French Suburban Crisis." Social Science

Research Council. 30 Nov 2005 .

Williamson, John. "The Politics of Hate." Current Affairs 2003: 22.

Yahmed, Hadi. Islam Online 5 June 2004. 22 Feb 2007

06/06/article01.shtml>.

Zakaria, Fareed. "Europe Needs a New Identity." Newsweek 146.21 (2005): 41. Academic Search Premier.

7 Apr 2006.

Appendix A

French Ideals: Liberty, Equality, Brotherhood

Challenge to French Ideals

Fear

Reactive Policies

Diminution of French Ideals

Conflict