Cisco SD-WAN Security
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Cisco SD-WAN Security Kureli Sankar, Technical Marketing Manager BRKRST-2720 #CiscoLiveAPJC About Kureli Sankar BS in Electrical and Electronics Engineering 2006 – 2013 TAC Engineer CCIE Security #35505 2013 – 2018 TME 2019 – Present TME Manager Areas of expertise IOS and IOS-XE security features SD-WAN Security solutions 2018 - Distinguished Speaker Cisco Live (EUR and ANZ) # 35505 #CiscoLiveAPJC BRKRST-2720 © 2020 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 3 Agenda • Introduction • Secure Infrastructure • Device Identity • Secure Control Plane • Secure Data Plane • Secure Branch • Ent Firewall App Aware • Intrusion Prevention • URL - Filtering • DNS/Web-layer Security • Advanced Malware Protection + Threat Grid • Secure Management • Demo #CiscoLiveAPJC BRKRST-2720 © 2020 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 4 Introduction #CiscoLiveAPJC BRKRST-2720 © 2020 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 5 SD-WAN Exposes New Security Challenges DEFENDPOLICYDIRECT ANDINTERNET AGAINST ACCESS BADACCESS GAPS DESTINATIONS EXPOSESEXPAND ATTACKINGRESS & DATA SURFACE POINTS BREACHES SaaS IaaS Outside-in threats Internet • ExposedUnauthorized ingress access points as traffic is no longer backhauled to the data • Denial of service attacks center NOCLOUD SECURITY EDGE • Ransomware Remote Corporate Inside-out threats Software BASIC/NO SECURITY BASIC/NO BASIC/NO SECURITY BASIC/NO BASIC/NO SECURITY EXISTING SECURITY EXISTING EXISTING SECURITY EXISTING SECURITY • UsersMalware and infection devices request access Users Devices WAN EDGE WAN EDGE • toCommand infrastructure & control and applications Critical InfrastructureInfrastructure • Phishing attacks Branch • Untrusted users/devices SD-WAN Fabric IOTIOT Users Mobile (guests)(guests) devices Internal threats DataData CenterCenter && Campus • TrafficUntrusted must access be encrypted and Campus • Lateralaccess mustmovement be segmented end to • Complianceend • Man-in-the-Middle #CiscoLiveAPJC BRKRST-2720 © 2020 Cisco and/or its affiliates. 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Cisco Public 6 Comprehensive SD-WAN Security SIMPLIFIEDSECUREENTERPRISE INTERNAL CLOUD-GRADE CONNECTIONSSECURITY SECURITY EMBEDDED SaaS IaaSIaaS OutsideInsideFullInternal edge-out-in Internet Internet SDsecurity-WAN security stack • Mitigate external security risks SECURE CLOUD EDGE • EndUmbrella’sFirewallwith to integrated end and segmentationSecure intrusion threat Internet preventiondefense to stop breachGatewayembeddedfrom the propagation, WANprotects plus to URL cloudusers filteringenforce edgeand and Remote regulatorydevicesmalware and sandboxing compliance, protects datafor and inside -out promotesent to and network from the (and cloud Corporate • Single console to manage routing Software application) layer security SECURE WAN EDGE SECURE SECURE WAN EDGE SECURE WAN EDGE SECURE WAN EDGE SECURE WAN EDGE SECURE WAN EDGE SECURE WAN EDGE SECURE WAN EDGE • Duo’sand security Multi-Factor Authentication • Zeroverifies-trustThin, that authentication only rich trusted or users and full and Users Devices • Shortest time to threat detection Critical payloaddevices accessencryption cloud between & on-prem edge Critical poweredfull- stackby Talos router Infrastructure BranchBranch routersapps • Mitigate internal security risks with SD-WANSecure Fabric IOTIOT Users Mobile a secure SD-WAN fabric with (guests)(guests) devices SD-WAN Fabric simple or flexible routing configurations DataDataData Center CenterCenter &&& CampusCampus Campus #CiscoLiveAPJC BRKRST-2720 © 2020 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 7 Cisco SD-WAN Holistic Approach Multitenant/ Rich Highly Cloud-Delivered Analytics Automated USERS Cloud IoT SD-WAN .… OnRamp Edge Computing DC DEVICES APPLICATIONS Fabric IaaS SaaS THINGS SECURE SCALABLE APP AWARE vDC #CiscoLiveAPJC BRKRST-2720 © 2020 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 8 Secure Infrastructure #CiscoLiveAPJC BRKRST-2720 © 2020 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 9 Cisco SD-WAN Architecture Orchestration Plane Management Plane vManage • First point of authentication • Single pane of glass for Day0, Day1 and • Distributes list of vSmarts/ Day2 operations vManage to all vEdge routers APIs • Multitenant or single-tenant • Facilitates NAT traversal 3rd Party • Centralized provisioning, vBond Automation troubleshooting and monitoring • RBAC and APIs vAnalytics Data Plane Control Plane • Physical or virtual vSmart Controllers • Dissimilates control plane information • Zero Touch Provisioning between vEdges • Distributes data plane policies • Establishes secure fabric MPLS 4G • Implements control plane policies • Implements data plane policies INET • Exports performance statistics WAN Edge Routers Cloud Data Center Campus Branch CoLo #CiscoLiveAPJC BRKRST-2720 © 2020 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 10 High Level View of Ordering and On-Boarding vManage Smart Account or Virtual Account details specified on order used for Overlay Sync Smart Account Push Device List creation Smart Account Automation PnP Cloud Service vBond Device list is passed to PnP Cisco Commerce Workspace Add a vBond Controller Profile and Associate with Org-Name WAN Edge Customer Service Provider End Customer #CiscoLiveAPJC BRKRST-2720 © 2020 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 11 Device Identity and Integrity #CiscoLiveAPJC BRKRST-2720 © 2020 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 16 History of Malware Found on Cisco IOS Devices Incident 0 Incident 1 Incident 2 Incident 3 Incident 4 Incident 5 “SYNful Knock” Date Discovered 2011 2012 2013 2013 2014 2015 Device(s) Affected Cisco 2800 and Cisco 2800 and Cisco Cisco Cisco 1800,3800, Cisco 1841, 2811, 3800 Families 3800 Families 7600 IOS & line 7600 IOS & line 7200 IOS & 3825 cards cards ROMMON Infection Method Modifications to Modifications to Modification of in- Modification of in- Modification to Modifications to IOS IOS binary IOS binary memory IOS memory IOS both ROMMON, binary and in-memory code Remote Via crypto analysis Via crypto analysis C2 protocol C2 protocol Not Directly Yes Detectability Preventions To Be Trust Anchor Trust Anchor Strong admin Strong admin Secure Boot, Trust Strong admin Taken Technology, Secure Technology, Secure credentials & credentials & Anchor credentials, Secure Boot, & Image Boot, & Image authorization authorization Technologies + Boot, Image Signing Signing Signing Image Signing Complexity Level Low Low Medium Medium High Low #CiscoLiveAPJC BRKRST-2720 © 2020 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 17 Key Trustworthy Technologies Secure Boot of Signed Images Trust Anchor module (TAm) Runtime Defenses (RTD) ▪ Prevents malicious code from booting ▪ Tamper-resistant chip with X.509 cert ▪ Protects against injection of malicious on a Cisco platform installed at manufacturing code into running software ▪ Automated integrity checks ▪ Provides unique device identity and anti- ▪ Makes it harder for attackers to exploit ▪ Monitors startup process and shuts counterfeit protections vulnerabilities in running software down if compromised ▪ Secure, non-volatile on-board storage and ▪ Runtime technologies include ASLR, ▪ Faster identification of threats RNG/crypto services BOSC, and X-Space ▪ Enables zero-touch provisioning and minimizes deployment costs Trustworthy technologies enhance the security and resilience of Cisco solutions #CiscoLiveAPJC BRKRST-2720 © 2020 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 18 Secure Unique Device Identification (Secure – UDI) • Tamperproof ID for the device • Binds the hardware identity to a key pair in a cryptographically secure X.509 certificate PID during manufacturing • Connections with the device can be authenticated by the SUDI credential • IEEE 802.1AR Compliant #CiscoLiveAPJC BRKRST-2720 © 2020 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 19 Image Signing: Integrity & Non Repudiation Validation Check at Customer Site Software 1 5 Image SHA-512 = Cisco’s public key stored Image is hashed to a on the router is used to unique 64 byte object decrypt digital signature SHA512 (Cisco’s PUBLIC key ) 2 (Encrypted with Cisco’s PRIVATE key) Digital signature with 3 the hash appended to Hash is encrypted final image 4 Customer downloads WWW image onto + device BRKRST-2720 © 2020© 2020 Cisco Cisco and/or and/or its itsaffiliates. affiliates. All Allrights rights reserved. reserved. Cisco Cisco Public Public 20 20 Cisco Secure Boot Software and Hardware Integrity Checks Hardware authenticity check Step 5 Step 6 Software authenticity checks Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 FPGA Hardware CPU CPU CPU CPU CPU Anchor Microloader Bootloader OS OS OS Microloader (root of trust) Microloader Bootloader OS launched Authenticity and Trust Anchor Microloader checks Bootloader checks OS license checks module provides stored in FPGA critical services First instructions run on CPU stored in tamper-resistant hardware TAm = Trust Anchor module Secure boot checks images and verifies that software is authentic and unmodified before it is allowed to boot BRKRST-2720 © 2020© 2020 Cisco Cisco and/or and/or its itsaffiliates. affiliates. All Allrights rights reserved. reserved. Cisco Cisco Public Public 21 21 Secure Control Plane #CiscoLiveAPJC BRKRST-2720 © 2020 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 30 Transport Locators (TLOCs) vSmarts advertise TLOCs to all vSmart WAN Edges*