The impact of joint custody laws on family and child outcomes: evidence from Spain

Daniel Fernández Kranz IE Business School

Natalia Nollenberger IE University

First draft: April 2018

(Very preliminary. Do not cite without the permission of authors)

Abstract

We study the effects of joint custody on family and youth outcomes in Spain, a country with socio-economic and family characteristics very different from the U.S., the focus of most of the existing literature. Our identification relies on the variation in the timing of legal reforms across Spanish regions. We find that JC laws increase the marriage rate and the divorce rate of couples without kids, reduces non-marital fertility and increases the employment rate of divorced mothers. We also find that JC laws reduce the suicide rate of divorced men and divorced women and increase the suicide rate of married women. Finally, we find that joint custody is associated with riskier behavior by adolescents, including binge drinking, and a worse relationship with their parents, who are perceived to set less clear norms on their children. These results tend to be stronger with time and in reform provinces where the traditional family model was predominant and that passed more ambitious joint custody laws. Key words: joint custody, divorce, marriage, female labor force participation, health behavior.

JEL classification: J12, J13, J22, I12, K36 ______This paper has benefitted from comments and discussion with Montserrat Solsona and Marc Ajenjo. We acknowledge financial support from FUNCAS.

Corresponding author: Daniel Fernández Kranz, IE Business School – María de Molina 12, 4-B, Madrid 28006, Spain. Email: [email protected] I. Introduction

In recent years, many European countries have changed their family law in an effort to promote shared parenting after divorce.1 Pro joint custody laws (JC laws, hereafter2) now exist in almost every European country, although they vary in intensity and emphasis, especially related to situations in which parents disagree about the custody of their children. Despite this growth in JC laws, little is known about their effects on family and child outcomes, as most research has focused on the U.S., with little or no attention to other geographies.3

In this paper we study the impact of custody laws in Spain on several family and youth outcomes. Ours is the first attempt to analyze this topic in the context of a Southern Mediterranean country, Spain, with socio-economic and family characteristics very different from the U.S.4 As is standard in this literature we take advantage of the different timing of reforms in different regions (diff-in-diff) in order to identify the effect of the new laws. We also exploit the fact that some provinces within the reform regions had initial conditions that favored the adoption of joint custody even before the new laws came to place, whereas others, with a more traditional family model, didn’t.5 Furthermore, the regions that concentrate the provinces with a more traditional family model passed more ambitious pro-joint custody

1 For example, Germany passed new legislation promoting joint physical custody in 2013, after social and political discussion that started in 2010; Belgium’s reform was passed in 2006; France reformed its family law in 2002 and again in 2004, although with limited impact on the incidence of joint custody. Italy passed a pro-joint custody law in 2006, which appears to have had limited impact. In the UK several legislative initiatives trying to promote shared parenting were approved in 2010 and 2011. Sweden introduces the notion of shared parenting in 1977 and defines it as the preferred option in 1992 and again in 1998, even when there is disagreement between the parents on the issue of child custody. The law was again reformed in 2006, with a stronger emphasis on the ability of parents to cooperate as a pre-condition for joint custody. Austria’s law was approved in 2001 and Denmark’s in 2007. Finally, Spain’s legal system first considers the concept of joint custody in the 2005 reform, but the law imposes the condition that both parents must agree on that type of custody. It’s not until 2009-2010 that some regions pass specific reforms defining joint custody as the preferred type of custody even when one parent opposes it. 2 Throughout the paper we refer to joint physical custody. It is important to remember that joint physical custody is different from joint legal custody. In the second case, the father and the mother share the decision-making regarding issues of importance to the children, such as, for example, the choice of a school. In the case of joint physical custody, we are talking about a more or less equal distribution of the time that children spend with each parent after separation or divorce. 3 The only exception we are aware of is Böheim et al. (2012), analyzing this topic in the context of Austria. 4 Böheim et al. (2012) analyze this topic in the context of Austria. 5 Spain is formed by 17 regions (or Autonomous Communities), which embed 52 provinces.

2 laws. We use these geographical differences in initial conditions to test whether the impact of the reforms has been larger in provinces where the traditional family model was more predominant and the push for joint custody more intense.

In addition to the standard analysis of the relationship between joint custody and family outcomes (e.g., divorce, marriage and fertility), our study is the first to analyze the relationship between joint custody and certain aspects of adolescents’ behavior, such as the consumption of alcohol and drugs as well as issues related to their leisure activities and the relationship with their parents. For this purpose, we use a survey on approximately 25,000 adolescents aged 14 to 18, and covering the period 2006 to 2014 (ESTUDES).

The Spanish case is an example of a dramatic increase in the incidence of joint custody since some regions passed JC laws in 2009-2010. Compared to the U.S., the focus of the existing literature, the increase in joint custody in Spain is quite astonishing, with a threefold rise in just nine years, going from 9.6% of all divorces in 2007 to 28.3% in 2016.6 Furthermore, this nation-wide increase in joint custody hides important differences across regions. Regions that passed legislation favoring the adoption of joint custody, have experienced a 300% to 400% per cent increase in the incidence of joint custody in less than six years, with rates in some cases above 40%, whereas those without legal reforms still rely in sole mother custody in the vast majority of cases.

There is a growing literature analyzing the impact of shared custody on the welfare of children, family relationships or even aspects related to the labor market, such as female labor participation. In most cases, these studies analyze the context of United States and use the different timing of reforms across states as an identification strategy (for example, Halla (2013), Maiti (2015)). Halla (2015) summarizes the results of this literature. In general, the studies find that an exogenous increase in the incidence of joint custody increases the marriage rate, increases fertility and reduces the suicide rate among men and women and reduces domestic violence. The results on the divorce rate are more ambiguous, with effects that vary according to the age of the individuals. Likewise, the literature has identified effects

6 Halla (2013) estimates an increase of 7.5 percentage points in JC in the U.S. 4-5 years after the approval of the law.

3 on children of both divorced and non-divorced couples. Evidence suggests that increasing joint custody rises the educational level of minors affected by a divorce but reduces that of minors in intact (non-divorced) families. Regarding the female labor participation rate, the results are not conclusive, with some studies finding a reduction (Halla, 2013) and others an increase, especially in the case of married women (Nguyen et al., 2017 and Nunley and Seals, 2011).

From a theoretical point of view, the impact of joint custody on many of these family and child outcomes is ambiguous. Halla (2013) describes three channels: the behavioral effect, the redistributive effect and the cost effect. On the premise that fathers prefer joint custody to sole mother custody, but mothers don’t, joint custody laws are seen as increasing the bargaining power of men over women. This means that joint custody often has opposed effects on men compared to women. For example, joint custody may increase the desire to marry and to have children by men, but this effect may not hold in the case of women. Joint custody reduces the cost for the husband of dissolving a marriage since it helps the father to continue a relationship with their children. Consequently men may be more willing to marry and have children. But because the opposite is true in the case of women, the overall effect of JC laws on marriage, divorce and fertility is a priori ambiguous. The effect of JC laws on the division of labor within the household is also ambiguous (Roff, 2017). On the one hand, JC laws may increase the incentives of men to invest in marriage-specific assets, including children, which may translate into fathers (mothers) devoting more (less) of their time caring for children and less (more) time in labor market activities. On the other hand, if as a result of JC laws, couples have more children, women may end up participating less from the labor market. Finally, in its more ambitious interpretation, JC laws that define joint custody as the default type of custody may discourage fathers from spending time with their children, as they foresee that in the event of a divorce they will get joint custody regardless of their pre- divorce effort in child care activities.

We find that joint custody increases the turnover in the marriage market, increasing the marriage rate and also the divorce rate of couples without kids. We view this result as consistent with a model in which men, the short side in the marriage market, are more willing

4 to marry (the JC law lowers the men’s cost of marriage dissolution) but women are more cautious about having children (the JC law increases the cost of dissolution for mothers). Consistent with this we find that the JC law is associated with a lower fertility rate (mainly non-marital fertility) and increases in the employment rate of divorced mothers. Our results are also consistent with the widespread view that JC laws increase (decrease) the bargaining power of men (women). Linked to this idea, we find a decrease (increase) of suicide rates of divorced men (married women).

We also find that joint custody is associated with riskier behavior by adolescents, including binge drinking and the consumption of illegal drugs and the perception that their parents impose less strict norms on them. These results tend to be stronger with time and in reform provinces where the traditional family model was predominant and that passed more ambitious joint custody laws.

Given the timing of the reforms, we can only study the short to medium term effects of joint custody laws, ranging from five to six years after their implementation. Because the incidence of joint custody tends to grow progressively after the approval of legal reforms, one should expect the impact of JC laws on family and child outcomes to grow over time. However, our study of the short to medium term effects is still interesting considering that joint custody increased in Spain with dramatic intensity in the first 5-6 years after the legal reforms.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the regulation of joint custody in Spain and the legal changes since 2009. The data is described in section III. Section IV shows the results and section V concludes.

II. The Spanish Regulation of Joint Custody and the socio-economic context

2.1. The legal framework

In the original formulation of the Spanish Civil Code (CC) the attribution of the custody of children in situations of nullity or separation of parents was granted exclusively to one of them. It was not until the Law 15/2005 of July 8 (the so-called law of divorce

5 express), which modifies the Civil Code and the Civil Procedure Law on separation and divorce, when the possibility of regulating the so-called joint custody model opens up.

Although the 2005 Law opens the door to joint custody, it establishes that this will be granted if it is requested by mutual agreement by both parents and after a favorable report from the General Attorney (Article 92 of CC, sections 5 and 6). Otherwise (that is, when one of the parents opposes), the judge may grant it only in an extraordinary manner and, once again, after a favorable report from the General Attorney (Article 92 of the CC, section 8). This formulation has caused that in practice the opposition of one of the parents has been sufficient reason to deny joint custody, thus restricting its implementation. In this process, the figure of the General Attorney has been key, and probably continues to be important despite the ruling of the Spanish Constitutional Court 185/2012, of October 17, 2012, declaring unconstitutional the requirement for a favorable report from the General Attorney.

It is in this context that five Spanish regions have approved their own laws to promote joint custody, moving away from the rather restrictive criteria of the Spanish CC. The list of the reform-regions and the dates of reform are: Aragón (2010), Catalunya (2010), Comunidad Valenciana (2011), Navarra (2011) and the Basque Country (2015). These norms vary in their content and emphasis, being those of Aragón and Comunidad Valenciana those that more clearly push for joint custody as the by default model. At the other extreme would be Navarra, whose norm is often seen as a simple declaration of intentions that does not depart much from the original approach of the Spanish CC (Solsona et al., 2017).

In all these regions there is a strong increase in joint custody after the approval of the respective laws. For example, Aragón and Valencia doubled the percentage of shared custody in just two years since the law was introduced (from 10.2% and 9.1%, respectively, to 19.4% and 18.9%). In contrast, Madrid, which does not have its own law, maintained a constant percentage of joint custody of around 12% between 2010 and 2012 (figure 1).

In two other cases, the Balearic Islands and the Basque Country - before its 2015 law - there is also a strong increase in shared custody, which coincides in time with the reforms of neighboring regions, but without the approval of a law on shared custody. This coincidence in time suggests that there could have been a contagion effect that could have influenced the

6 decisions of the judges and General Attorney in those regions. For example, in May 2011, the General Attorney of the Basque Country declared that he was determined to promote joint custody within that autonomous community. Also, during those years there were legislative initiatives in favor of joint custody in both regions. Those initiatives did not pass the status of recommendations, but could have had an impact on the judicial process. For example, the Basque Parliament approved a non-binding proposition, Law 3/2011 on April 12, 2011, regarding the custody of children in situations of separation and divorce, which showed the support of that Parliament to joint custody as the preferential model and urged the Government of Spain to present a bill that would reflect this preference. In the Balearic Islands, the preference for joint custody was widely discussed and defended by various political and social groups but was finally excluded on the law on family mediation that was approved by the Balearic Parliament on November 30, 2010.

Unfortunately, we are not aware of public memorandums or other communications from the General Attorney's office that could serve as guidelines for their decision-making, in order to check whether in the Balearic Islands and in the Basque Country there was a change in the decisions of judges and the General Attorney as a result of these discussions. The annual reports on the activities of the General Attorney simply make an account of the actions carried out in different areas. With the objective of collecting alternative evidence, we have reviewed the content of several rulings of the Provincial Appeal Courts in these regions during the years immediately before and after the change of trend that is observed in the shared custody data. We have also analyzed, in a comparative way, the rulings in the region of Madrid. In total, we have reviewed 188 sentences, which represent approximately one third of the total of decisions of these appellate bodies regarding the custody of children in the context of a contentious divorce. It is important to bear in mind that if there is a change of orientation in the decisions of judges and General Attorneys, this will be reflected in the sentences corresponding to contentious divorces in which one of the parents opposes joint custody.

The analysis of these sentences shows a strong contrast between the Balearic Islands and the Basque Country on the one hand, and Madrid on the other. While the existence of

7 disagreement between the parents is often sufficient reason to deny joint custody in Madrid (in many cases it is alleged that the mere existence of contentious divorce evidences the lack of agreement and that therefore joint custody does not proceed) and only 5-10% of these decisions granted joint custody, in the case of the Balearic Islands and the Basque Country there is, as of 2009 and 2011, respectively, an increasing number of decisions (close to 50%) that minimize the importance of these disagreements and grant joint custody as the most favorable custody regime for the minor (figure 2).

In addition, as Figure 3 shows, this increase in pro joint custody judgments in the Balearic Islands and in the Basque Country has occurred in a context of increasing litigation, suggesting that changes in the criteria of judges and the General Attorney have not simply been a reflection of a growing demand and social consensus for joint custody. Figure 3 shows how this increase in litigation associated with joint custody is found in all regions that passed their own law, in addition to the Balearic Islands and the Basque Country, although this is not the case in the Community of Madrid, which presents percentages of litigation that are rather low and constant, or even decreasing.

2.2.Joint Custody and the Socio-Economic Context

Solsona et al. (2017) find that in Spanish provinces with a higher divorce rate by mutual agreement and where there is a higher percentage of double income couples with a high educational level, joint custody is more frequent, even after controlling for the existence or not of a pro-joint custody law. There are, therefore, socio-economic factors that are contrary to the more conservative family model and that seem to be positively correlated with the incentives for both parents to agree on joint custody. This result is intuitive. For example, it is logical to think that double-earners couples will be more inclined to agree on joint custody as this will allow them both to continue participating in the labor market.

An implication of this relationship between the socio-economic environment and the incidence of joint custody is that pro-joint custody laws will probably have a greater impact in those territories where the family model was more traditional, and in which consequently, the incidence of joint custody was lower. Figure 4 provides evidence consistent with this hypothesis. In the chart we have grouped the Spanish provinces into two types. In blue, the

8 provinces belonging to the Regions that have not passed pro-joint custody laws, and in orange, those that have passed reforms (including the Balearic Islands and the Basque Country). The graph shows the increase, in percentage points, in the incidence of joint custody between the years immediately before and immediately after the approval of the new laws (2009-2013) and in relation to the initial level of joint custody. As can be observed, the provinces with reform have not only experienced a greater increase in joint custody between 2009 and 2013, but that increase is more pronounced the lower the starting level. In contrast, the provinces without reform have experienced a lower increase without a clear relationship between the magnitude of this increase and the initial level of shared custody.

In conclusion, although joint custody is being implemented as the model of preferred custody in some territories of Spain, this formula is still little used in other regions that lack a legal framework that promotes it. Moreover, the impact of pro-joint custody laws that have been approved by some regions varies within their own territory depending on the socio- economic characteristics of departure. As a consequence, there is great territorial variability, at the provincial level, both in the level and in the change fostered by the new legality. Our intention is to exploit this geographical variability to estimate the effects of pro-joint custody laws on various aspects of family relationships, the well-being of children and the labor market.

III. Data

3.1. Marriage, divorce, fertility and female employment

To measure the impact of the JC law on marriages, divorces and fertility we use the corresponding official records and combine this information with province-level population data. The official records of marriages and births are part of the Spanish Vital Statistics and are collected by the local Civil Registries. These records contain basic socio-demographic information of people involved in the event (marriage or birth) in addition to the date of the event, the province where the event is recorded and the province in which each spouse (parent) resides. Annual records of nullity, divorces and separations are collected by the General Council of the Judiciary and compiled by the Spanish National Statistical Institute. To estimate the population at province level we use the Spanish Labour Force Survey (LFS)

9 microdata (second quarter). This is a quarterly survey representative to the Spanish population at province level. It contains detailed socio-demographic information, which allow us estimate the relevant subpopulation group in each case (total, married, non-married, female population, subpopulations by age, etc).

In the case of marriages, we calculate the number of marriages per 1,000 of the non- married adult population by year and province from 2000 to 2016. This leaves us with 850 observations (16 years times 50 provinces) and with 9 years before and 7 years after the starting of legal changes in custody. We restrict the analysis to opposite-sex marriages among the population between 15 and 45 years old. The reason to focus on marriages among people younger than 45 is that this would be the subpopulation more affected by a change in custody arrangements. We also calculate bride’s (groom’s) age-specific marriage rates, which is defined as the absolute number of marriages of brides in the specified age-group per 1,000 non-married female (male) population of this age-group.

To test the effect on divorces, we calculate the province-level marital dissolution rate (hereafter referred as divorce rate) as the number of divorces and legal separations per 1,000 of the total married or cohabitating population. In the case of Spain, we include legal separations because the same legal custody rules apply also to cohabitating couples with dependent children. We use province-level data from 2007 to 2016 (500 observations) due to micro data are only available from 2007. Microdata allow us to calculate group-specific divorce rates, that are relevant for our analysis (for example, by presence of dependent kids, by husband (wife)’s age, by who was the plaintiff, etc).

To estimate the effect on fertility, we calculate the total, marital, and non-marital fertility rates for all provinces from 2000 to 2016 (850 observations). They are defined as the absolute number of births to all, married and non-married mothers per 1,000 female, married and non-married population, respectively. The age-specific (marital, non-marital) fertility rate is defined as the absolute number of births to married (non-married) mothers from a certain age-group per 1,000 married (non-married) female population of this age-group.

To test how the custody reform affected female employment we use the Spanish LFS microdata (second quarter). As we already mentioned, this survey is representative of the

10 Spanish population at province level and contain detailed socio-demographic information. Based on micro-level data we estimate the probability that a woman is currently working. One drawback of the female employment analysis is that in contrast with the analysis of marriages, divorces and births (which rely on the annual records of new marriages, divorces and births, that is, flows) it relies on the stock of women employed in each province and year. Because stocks change more slowly than flows, it will be more difficult to identify the effects of the custody reform. For this reason, we focus the analysis on women aged 30 to 44 and split the sample depending on whether the women have dependent children or not, and within the group of women with dependent children, according to the women's civil status (married or divorced).

3.2.Youth outcomes (ESTUDES)

To assess the effect of joint custody on youth outcomes, we use ESTUDES (The Spanish Survey on Drug Use in Secondary Education), a biannual cross-sectional survey on individuals age 14 to 18, which focuses on the habits of adolescents related to the consumption of alcohol and other drugs. The survey sample size varies, but averages 25,000 individuals each wave. In addition to the questions about alcohol and drugs, the questionnaire asks individuals about whether they have been expelled from school last year, whether they repeated course, their relationship with their parents, whether norms are clearly established by parents and their frequency and timing of going out at night. We use all available waves, from 2006 to 2014.

IV. Results

We assess the effect of joint custody laws in the context of the following specification:

' Yit = α0 +α1YPostti +α 2Trendt +α3 (Trendt * JCi) + β1 X it + Y +ϕi + uit

where Yit is the outcome of interest for province i in year t, YPostti is the number of years since the reform took place in province i (hence, α1 is the coefficient of interest), Trendt

11 is a linear time trend, Trendt*JCi is the interaction between the linear time trend and ϕ treatment, Xit is a vector of covariates, Y are year fixed effects and i are province fixed effects. We present the results with two variants of the above specification, one with the linear time trend and its interaction with treatment, and the other without the linear time trends but keeping the year fixed effects.

The above specification is written with variables at the province level (52 provinces), although, as explained, the reforms took place at the regional level (17 regions). The reason is that we will present estimates of the above specification in subgroup analyses in which we want to test whether the effect of the joint custody laws is different in provinces with a more traditional family model compared to the rest. According to Solsona et al. (2017) provinces with a more traditional family model have a lower incidence of joint custody. These are the provinces with a relative low incidence of divorce, a low incidence of dual earners couples, a low incidence of divorces by mutual consent and a relatively low incidence of couples unmarried under cohabitation. Of all these variables, the one that shows a stronger association with the incidence of joint custody is the number of dual earner couples. The hypothesis is that in these provinces, the incentives, mainly by the mother, to voluntarily accept a joint custody regime are low compared to provinces where the mother is strongly attached to the labor market since in the latter provinces, joint custody helps the mother balance her work and family responsibilities after the divorce. This evidence is also consistent with the pattern described in Halla (2015) for the US. Given this, we would expect the new laws to have had a greater impact on the provinces with more traditional values than in the rest, where joint custody was already chosen voluntarily by many couples. Hence, in our estimates of equation (1) we will be interested in subgroup analyses where we will distinguish between provinces of a low, versus high, level of female participation rate (we use this variable as the proxy for dual earner couples). When we grouped treated provinces according to this criteria, we labelled as more traditional the provinces of Alicante, Castellón, Huesca, Teruel and Valencia. Coincidentally, these are all the provinces of the two regions that passed the more intense new legislation (Aragón and Comunidad Valenciana), with the exception of the

12 province of Zaragoza. Therefore, in a sense, our test is also a test of whether the more intense new legislation has had a greater impact over the outcomes of interest.

4.1. The effect of joint custody laws on the incidence of joint custody

We start by looking at the effect of joint custody laws on the incidence of joint custody. We estimate equation (1), where the dependent variable is the percentage of sentences granting joint custody over all divorce and separation sentences to which custody applies (approximately 55,000 divorces every year from 2007 to 2016). The results are shown in Table 1. We present results in two different formats. One, where the policy variable is defined as the number of years after the reform (we call this specification throughout the text as the static specification), and the other one in which the policy variable is a set of dummies for each of the years after the reform (we call this the dynamic specification). Additionally, the difference between column 1 and 2 is that in the second column we control for linear trends interacted with treatment. The results are quite similar under both specifications and hence we will discuss those of our preferred specification, with linear trends interacted with treatment.

The results show a clear positive impact of the pro-joint custody laws on the incidence of joint custody. According to the results in Table 1 (second column, with the linear trend interacted with treatment), each year after the approval of the JC law the incidence of joint custody increases by 2.8 percentage points. The specification with dummies for each year after the implementation of the law gives a stronger effect. The year of the approval of the new law, joint custody increases by 4.2 percentage points and the incidence of joint custody continues to rise with time, reaching an increase of 20.8 percentage points five years after the reform. As expected, the effect is larger (twice as large) in provinces that have a pre- reform low female employment rate, where the law increases the incidence of joint custody by 23.0 percentage points five years after the reform (4.6*5), compared to 10.5 percentage points (2.1*5) in the other provinces. The dynamic specification, with dummies for each year after the reform, shows the expected pattern of effects that increase with time. Halla (2013) finds a similar pattern in the US. This may be explained by the fact that the new legal framework causes a progressive change in judges’ decisions and is also progressively

13 accepted by society in which the effects of joint custody become more evident as time passes by.

Compared to Halla (2013), we find a much stronger effect of JC laws on the incidence of joint custody. In its dynamic specification, Halla (2013) finds that 4-5 years after the reform, the incidence of joint custody in the US has increased by 7.5 percentage points, compared to 20.8 percentage points in our case. Also, the increase we observe in Spain occurs in the context of a relatively low pre-reform incidence of joint custody, of 9.5% (or 15.3% considering the entire period), compared to 25% in the case of the US.7 The fact that the incidence of joint custody increased so rapidly is important in the context of our study, since we can only analyze the short-term effects of the reform.

4.2. The effect of joint custody on marriage

We turn now to the analysis of the effects of JC laws on family outcomes. We start by looking at the effects of JC laws on the rate of marriages in tables 2 and 3. As discussed earlier, form a theoretical point of view, the effect of JC laws on marriage rates is ambiguous. On the one hand, JC laws decrease the cost of marriage dissolution for fathers, which makes men more willing to marry. However, the opposite is true for mothers. Furthermore, JC laws affect the value of marriage through their effect on fertility, but here the impact of JC laws is also ambiguous, with men more willing to invest in marriage-specific assets but women less. Finally, if marriage, contrary to cohabitation, is seen as a commitment device and a sign of a good relationship (Cigno, 2012; Masters, 2008; Brown and Booth, 1996), women may be more inclined to resort to this formula in an environment in which, due to JC laws, the value of men’s commitment to a stable relationship is increasingly important.

In the second column of Table 2 (with treated-specific linear time trends), we find that JC laws increase marriage rates by 1.08% every year since the reform. The effect, however, is not statistically significant at standard levels. The specification with year dummies, shows that it takes three years for the effect to show up. Two years after the reform

7 The higher incidence of joint custody in the US, as described by Halla (2013), could be due to the fact that there joint custody is defined as the child spending at least 30% of the time with each parent, whereas in our case a sentence granting joint custody usually entails a 50-50 split with each parent.

14 there is an increase in the marriage rate of 3.33%, which grows up to 6.49% 5+ years after the implementation of the JC laws. All these effects are statistically significant at standard levels. The sequence of the effects is quite similar to the one found by Halla (2013) in the US. In his case, the effects starts becoming visible 5 years after the reform and grow to 9.2% at the end of the period, 17 years after the JC law. In our case the impact is faster and more intense, which may be explained by the fact that the reforms had a larger effect on the incidence of joint custody than in the US.

The results by group of provinces show a bigger impact in the case of provinces with a low female employment rate (2.05% per year vs. 0.44% in the case of provinces of a high female employment rate), although the dynamic specification is somewhat noisy, particularly in the case of provinces of a high female employment rate, with a non-monotonic increase in marriage rates. In the static specification, the coefficient of the group of provinces with low female employment rate is statistically significant at the 5% level.

A breakdown of the results by the age of the bride (Table 3) reveals that most of the effect is concentrated in the group of women aged 25-29 (+10.05% five years after the reform) although there is also a significant positive effect for women aged 35-44 in ‘traditional’ provinces (+21.10%). The results by the age of the groom show large and significant effects for those aged 30-34 (+12.60% five years after the reform; +22.30% in the case of ‘traditional provinces’). The positive effects for women aged 25-29 are consistent with the hypothesis of JC laws increasing the value of marriage as a commitment device before having children, given that the average age at which women in Spain have their first child is 29-30 years old. They are also consistent with the common believe that the positive effect of joint custody on men’s willingness to marry is more important than the potentially negative response by women. This rests on the assumption that men are typically more reluctant to marry and hence they are the short side in the marriage market (Halla, 2013). The positive effect that we find on the group of women older than 35 is similar to the one found by Halla (2013) in the US. As he discusses, this could be due to the fact that JC reduces divorced mothers’ parental duties and gives them more opportunities to remarry.

15 It’s important to note that all our specifications control for year fixed effects and state fixed effects. Therefore, there is no room for nation-wide legal changes to play a role. For example, the effect of the 2005 unilateral divorce law in Spain is captured by the year fixed effects, under the assumption that this law had similar effects across treated and non-treated provinces. In a series of robustness tests, we find our results robust to the inclusion of a dummy for the 2005 law, interacted with treatment. Also, differences in the division of property regime play no role here, since the period under analysis is one with no changes in this respect, and the differences across regions are capture by the province fixed effects.

4.3. The effect of joint custody on divorce

The evidence about divorce rates is presented in Tables 4 to 6. The dependent variable is the divorce rate expressed as the number of divorces and separations per 1000 married or cohabitating adults. We use data from 2007 through 2016, as these are the only years of available microdata, which is necessary for the subgroup analyses in Tables 5 and 6. Furthermore, using data from 2007 onwards helps to rule out any confounding effects of the 2005 divorce law. The second column of table 4 shows how JC laws are associated with a higher incidence of divorce. In the static specification, the effect is a 1.17% increase per year, albeit not statistically significant. In the dynamic specification we can see how the effect kicks in the year of the implementation of the law, then falls slightly and starts increasing monotonically to reach +14.81% 5+ after the implementation of the law. All the coefficients in the dynamic specification are statistically significant at standard confidence levels. The relatively large effect in the year of the implementation of the law (+5.75%) could be explained by a concentration of divorces the year of the reform in anticipation of the legal change. The bottom panel of the table shows the dynamic specifications for provinces of high and low female employment rate. The effects are again larger in the case of ‘traditional’ provinces. For example, 5+ years after the implementation of the law the divorce rate has increased 20.29% in ‘traditional’ provinces as opposed to 12.70% in the rest.

The results by the presence of children and by age are shown in Table 5. In that table we see that the increase of the divorce rate is mainly driven by couples without dependent kids. According to the static specification, the divorce rate of couples without kids increases

16 by 3.26% per year, the effect being statistically significant at the 10% level. The effects are statistically significant across most age groups, although slightly higher for younger couples. In that table there is no clear difference between provinces of high and low female employment rate.

The results in Table 5 contradict the hypothesis that JC laws increase the divorce rate because of the reduced the cost of divorce for fathers. Instead they suggest that in anticipation of the high cost of divorce to mothers when children are present, some women may decide to dissolve a relationship, which they perceive as being of low quality, before children are born. This hypothesis would also be consistent with the increase of marriage rates that we saw in Table 2, if the marginal marriages are of a lower quality. Table 6 provides additional support for this hypothesis, as the increase in the divorce rate is not driven by divorces initiated by the husband, instead it’s driven by divorces under mutual consent (+8.03% per year, statistically significant at the 5% level) and with both, the husband and the wife acting as plaintiff (+5.50% per year, statistically significant at the 5% level).

4.4. The effect of joint custody laws on fertility

If joint custody increases the commitment value of marriages, one would expect a decrease in non-marital fertility rates. However, the effect of JC on marital fertility is a priori more ambiguous. As discussed earlier, it’s possible that in anticipation of the high costs of divorce for mothers, some women may decide to postpone the fertility decision if they are unsure about the quality of the relationship. On the other hand, because the cost of divorce in the presence of children is now lower for men they may be more inclined to have children. Here, again, there are opposed effects on men and women and the overall effect will depend on who, husband or wife, have a more influential role in the decision to have children.

To test these hypotheses we use province level births data from 2000 to 2016 and estimate the relationship between the fertility rate and JC laws, where the fertility rate is expressed as the number of births per 1000 total, married or non-married female population of each age group. Table 7 shows the results for total fertility, marital and non-marital fertility. We see a decrease in total fertility (of -4.30% 5+ years after the law, albeit not statistically significant), which is mainly driven by the decrease in non-marital fertility. In

17 this latter case, there is a 2.51% decrease in the fertility rate per year, which becomes -3.37% in the case of more ‘traditional’ provinces, statistically significant at the 10% level. The pattern in the dynamic specifications are not clear cut although the effects tends to grow with time, reaching -20.15% 5+ years after the law in more ‘traditional’ provinces (statistically significant), compared to -15.05% in provinces with a higher female employment rate.

Distinguishing now by age groups in Table 8, we see that the decrease in marital fertility is concentrated in the group of older women, aged 35-39, possibly a reflection of the fertility postponement that we discussed before. The effect there is of -2.83% per year, statistically significant at the 5% level. Instead, the decrease in non-marital fertility occurs at earlier ages (25-29), consistent with the commitment effect of marriages hypothesis (-2.90% per year overall, and -3.75% per year in ‘traditional’ provinces, the latter one statistically significant at the 10% level).

Our results of non-marital fertility are similar to those found in the US by Halla (2013). Not so for our results of marital fertility. Whereas he finds an increase in marital fertility, we find a decrease. The difference between our results and his could be due to cultural factors, if women in Spain have a more crucial role in the fertility decision than men and compared to the US. Also, our result of a decrease in total fertility is also consistent with Nunley and Seals (2011) who find that joint custody reduces the investment in children by married couples, which they proxy with private school attendance.

All in all, the results in Tables 2 to 8 describe a context in which JC laws have increased the turnover in the marriage market, with more marriages followed by more divorces, all this occurring before the decision to have children. The results are consistent with men being the short side in the marriage market. In this case, the reduction in the cost of divorce for them, explains the increase in marriages. For the same reason, JC laws increase the value of marriages as a commitment device. The results are also consistent with women having a predominant role in the fertility decision. The high cost of divorce for them when

18 children are present would explain the drop in fertility and the increase in divorce rates of couples without children.8

4.5. The effect of joint custody laws on female employment

In light of the results that we have found so far, the effect of JC laws on female employment is a priori ambiguous. On the one hand, and from the point of view of the increase in marriage rates, moving from cohabitation to marriage has been shown to increase the specialization within the household, reducing female labor supply (El Lahga and Moreau, 2007). This result is consistent with the idea of marriage as a commitment device. On the other hand, several studies have found that an increase in the probability of divorce leads to an increase in female labor supply, as a way to secure women’s outside options in the event of marital dissolution (Bargain et al., 2012; Lundberg, 2002; Papps, 2006). Also, a decrease in the fertility rate, everything else equal, would lead to an increase in the female employment rate. Finally, as discussed earlier, JC laws are usually seen as decreasing (increasing) the bargaining power of women (men) within marriage. Whether this leads to an increase or a decrease of female employment is unsettled empirically, with some studies finding a positive effect (Chiappori et al., 2002), whereas others a negative one (Gray, 1998).

To test the effect of JC laws on female employment we estimate equation 1 using the Spanish Labor Force Survey microdata from 2000 through 2016, where the dependent variable is a dummy taking value one if the woman is employed and zero otherwise. The results are shown in table 9. In that table we show results for all women and across groups defined by age, the presence or not of children and marital status. We find no effect of JC laws on employment for all groups of women, except divorced women with dependent kids, in which case JC laws are associated to a 1.87% increase in the female employment rate per year since the implementation of the law (+9.70% 5+ years after the reform, in the dynamic specification). The increase in the rate of employment of divorced mothers is larger in

8 As discussed in Böheim et al. (2012), the decrease in non-marital fertility could be explained by an increase in marriage rates and by the fact that some couples who married and had children would have had children outside of marriage had joint custody not been introduced.

19 ‘traditional’ provinces (+2.12% per year) than in non-traditional ones (+1.82%per year). In the case of divorced mothers, all coefficients are statistically significant at standard levels.

Our results are different from those for the US (Halla, 2013) and Austria (Böheim et al., 2012) where the authors find a significant decrease in employment for all women, regardless of their family status. However, and as discussed before, the evidence in this issue is inconclusive, with Nguyen et al. (2017) and Nunley and Seals (2011), finding an increase in employment and labor force participation of married mothers in the U.S., and Vuri (2017), also for the U.S., finding a decrease of earnings of divorced women due to joint custody.

There are several interpretations to our finding of an increase in female employment of divorced women. One interpretation is that under joint custody divorced women spend less time parenting and more time in labor market activities. Another possibility is that joint custody has negative economic consequences for divorced women, pushing them towards paid work. Consistent with the Becker-Coase theorem (Becker, 1993), these negative economic consequences would result from the lower bargaining power of women in the context of a contentious divorce when joint custody is the norm.9 Finally, since joint custody affects the probability of divorce, there could be compositional effects that explain this result.10

It’s also important to note that in the context of our analysis we can only see the impact of joint custody in the short-term, covering a maximum of five to six years after the implementation of the law. It’s not surprising that the short term effect of joint custody laws becomes visible for the group more directly affected, i.e., divorced women.

9 For example, in most jurisdictions, the mandated amount of child support decreases with joint custody. Also, it’s common that in contentious divorces the father and mother fight over important economic and child custody aspects simultaneously and that the bargaining power over one aspect influences the result on the other. However, there is some evidence that joint custody increases the amount of resources received by women in the context of a divorce. For example, Böheim et al. (2012) find, contrary to the Becker-Coase theorem, that the introduction of pro joint custody laws in Austria led to a substantial increase in the total money transfer received by divorced mothers. They interpret that result as the consequence of joint custody giving men greater incentives to invest in marriage-specific capital. Also, Allen et al. (2011) find that in the U.S. joint custody increases the probability that the mother receives child support from the father. 10 Ideally, one would use longitudinal data to estimate the effect of JC on the labor supply of divorced women, by comparing their work status before and after divorce. Unfortunately, we lack this type of data.

20 4.6. The effect of joint custody laws on child outcomes

In this section we exploit ESTUDES, a cross-sectional survey to approximately 25,000 adolescents aged 14 to 18 in Spain every two years, between 2006 and 2014. The questionnaire asks individuals questions about their habits regarding the consumption of alcohol, drugs, and smoking behavior. The survey also asks them a set of questions about norms, freedom in their leisure activities and the quality of the relationship with their parents.

We want to test whether there is an association between the new context created by the joint custody laws and these behavioral outcomes. Unfortunately, the survey does not ask individuals the marital status of their parents. It asks, however, whether the individual cohabits with the father, the mother or both and whether the father or the mother (in case of cohabitation) have a partner. We can therefore proxy the marital status of the parents using this variable, but with an obvious degree of imprecision. For example, individuals under joint custody will most probably respond that they share the household with both, the mother and the father, in which case we would incorrectly label them as belonging to an intact family. And the same could apply to youth with divorced parents when the father has generous visitation rights. In addition to these measurement errors, we know that the introduction of JC laws changes the formation and dissolution of families, hence any analysis of the impact of the new laws on child outcomes will be affected by compositional effects. For all these reasons, in the analysis that follows we are more interested in the effects of joint custody laws on the entire population of youth, regardless of the martial status of their parents. However, and for illustrative purposes, we will also provide a breakdown of the results by family status, keeping in mind the important limitations of those results both in terms of data and interpretation.

There are several channels through which JC laws can affect the outcomes of children of intact and non-intact families. To the extent that JC laws increase the bargaining power of men, one should expect a more predominant role of male preferences in relation to the allocation of resources devoted to children, both in intact and non-intact families. Whether this leads to better or worse outcomes for children is not clear. Also, JC laws tend to increase (decrease) the incentives of men (women) to invest in children. Finally, the effects of JC laws

21 on the division of labor within the household and on the labor supply of married mothers can have consequences for the outcomes of children of both intact and non-intact families. A reduced number of studies have investigated the effects of JC laws on child outcomes, mainly educational and labor market outcomes. Nunley and Seals (2011) and Maiti (2015) find that JC laws are associated with worse educational and labor market outcomes of children that grew up in US states that had passed JC laws. The effects are stronger for boys. These two studies don’t make a distinction between children of intact and non-intact families. Leo (2006) analyzes the educational outcomes of children of intact and non-intact families separately and finds negative effects for the former and positive effects for the latter.

We turn now to the results of our analysis, shown in Tables 11 and 12. Because we have only two data points post reform (2012 and 2014), in those tables we present the results with the variable of interest (the post reform dummy) interacted with 2012 and with 2014. We also show the results disaggregated by gender and family status of the parents and by age of the individual. Odd columns show the results for all individuals (aged 14 to 18), whereas even columns show the results for individuals aged 16 to 18. Finally, we distinguish between provinces of high versus low female employment rate.

In Table 11 we analyze four outcomes related to the behavior of adolescents: binge drinking, smoking marihuana, going out at night and whether the individual has ever repeated course.11 With the exception of smoking marihuana, the results show a clear pattern with JC laws being associated with worse outcomes. The negative effect grows with time (2014 vs. 2012), tends to be larger for adolescents aged 16-18 and for girls. There is, however, no clear differences between children of divorced and not-divorced parents and between high and low female employment provinces. For example, considering the effect in 2014, the passing of a JC law is associated with a 27.02% increase in the probability of binge drinking (+33.36% for girls aged 16-18), a 9.20% increase in how late individuals go out at night (+10.18% for girls) and a 23.45% increase in the probability of having repeated a course (+47.26% for girls aged 16-18). All these effects are statistically significant at standard intervals. The similarity

11 ESTUDES provides information about other outcomes, such as consumption of hard drugs. The frequency of many of these outcomes is rather low and the results were not significant and noisy, for which reason we decided to drop them from the Table.

22 of the results between adolescents of divorced and not-divorced parents has two possible explanations. One, that JC laws have effects on individuals of intact and non-intact families. Two, that we are measuring the marital status of the parents of these adolescents with a high degree of imprecision.

We turn now to Table 12. That table shows the results of four outcomes that describe the type of relationship that adolescents have with their parents. Although the direction of the effects is a priori unclear, we would expect its magnitude to be stronger in the case of adolescents of divorced parents. This is precisely what we find in Table 12. We find that JC laws are associated with a worse relationship between adolescents and their mother and father. The magnitude of these effects grows with time and tends to be bigger in the case of adolescents of divorced parents, aged 16 to 18 and in more ‘traditional’ provinces. For example, and again looking at the effects in 2014, we find that JC laws are associated to a 3.90% decrease in the quality of the relationship with the mother (-5.88% in the case of adolescents of divorced parents and -4.51% in ‘traditional’ provinces) and to a 5.20% decrease in the quality of the relationship with the father (-14.99% in the case of adolescents of divorced parents and -6.25% in ‘traditional’ provinces). All these coefficients are statistically significant at standard intervals. Interestingly, the worse relationship between parent and children doesn’t seem to be driven by a higher degree of conflict between them or stricter norms. Just to the contrary, we find that JC laws are associated with a perception among adolescents of less conflict (-10.68%) and less strict norms (-3.62%). Again, the effects are stronger in the case of adolescents of divorced parents (conflict: -13.83%; norms: -3.69%) and in ‘traditional’ provinces (conflict: -12.69%; norms: -4.10%). All the previous coefficients, except one, are statistically significant at standard intervals.

Overall, our results about adolescents’ behavior are consistent with previous studies that find a negative impact of JC laws on child outcomes. We provide additional evidence suggesting that the negative effects of JC laws extend to some types of risky behavior. Our results also suggest that one contributing factor to these negative effects is the fact that adolescents have a worse relationship with their parents and suffer from a less clear set or rules.

23 4.7.The effect on suicide rates

We turn now to the results on suicide rates in Table 10. To the extent JC laws improved the bargaining power of men, one should expect an increase of men’s wellbeing and a decrease of suicide rates, both when married and divorced. If anything, the effect should be larger in the case of divorced men, since it is there where the positive effects of JC laws on men’s wellbeing are expected to be stronger. In the case of women on would expect, a priori, the opposite result.

To assess the effects of JC laws on suicide rates we estimate equation 1 using annual data at the regional (Comunidad Autónoma) level from 2007 through 2016. The reason of aggregating the data at the regional level is to minimize the number of cases with a value of zero in the dependent variable, since we have a very low frequency of positives.12 The dependent variable is the male (female) suicide rate (number of suicides per 100,000 male (female) adults). Since we use microdata, we are able to distinguish between married and divorced individuals. Our results in Table 10 are quite inconclusive. Due to high standard errors many coefficients are not significant, even though the magnitude of some of the effects is large. It should be noted, that the analysis that we try to conduct is quite demanding in terms of data requirements, since the event we are analyzing is rather infrequent with rates ranging from 2.2 to 38.8 per 100,000 population, depending on the group of individuals. In general, the results suggest no effect on married men, an increase of suicide rates among married women and a decrease of suicide rates among divorced men and divorced women. In the static specification, JC laws are associated to a 4.09% decrease of suicide rates among divorced men per year (-23.70% 3+ years after the law), a 10.05% decrease per year for divorced women (-55.78% 3+ years after the law) and a 7.11% increase per year for married women (+18.69% 3+ years after the law). Despite the large magnitude of the effects, none of the coefficients is statistically significant at standard confidence intervals, except the coefficient of the static specification for married women.

12 Tobit estimates are very similar to the ones from the OLS regressions that we show in the table.

24 Halla (2013) finds a decrease of suicide rates among men and women for the United States, although he does not distinguish by marital status of the individual due to data limitations. Our finding of a decrease of suicide rates among divorced men and an increase among married women is easier to reconcile with theoretical predictions, however the observed decrease of suicide rates among divorced women is rather surprising. A possible explanation of the lower suicide rate among divorced women is the observed decrease of divorce rates of couples with kids. If a divorce is less harmful, psychologically, when no children are present, then the changing nature of divorces that we observe in the data (with a decrease when children are present and an increase when they are not) could explain the lower rate of suicides among divorced women. The decrease (increase) of suicide rates among divorced men (married women) could be caused by the gain (loss) of bargaining power due to the JC laws.

V. Conclusions

In this paper we investigate the effects of JC laws on a range of family outcomes and the wellbeing of adolescents in Spain, a country with very different socio-economic characteristics compared to the US, the focus of the existing literature. Given the ambiguous theoretical predictions of most of the literature, there is value on additional empirical tests, in a different geography, such as ours, in order to check the generality of earlier findings.

Our results resemble many, although not all, of the findings of Halla (2013) for the US. We find that JC laws increase the marriage rate and the divorce rate of couples without kids, reduces non-marital fertility and increases the employment rate of divorced mothers. We also find that JC laws reduce the suicide rate of divorced men and divorced women and increase the suicide rate of married women. Finally, we find that joint custody is associated with riskier behavior by adolescents, including binge drinking, and a worse relationship with their parents, who are perceived to set less clear norms on their children.

Our results are consistent with JC laws increasing the bargaining power of men. We view our results as portraying a situation in which JC laws have increased the turnover in the marriage market, with more marriages followed by more divorces, all this occurring before the decision to have children. In such context, the role of marriages as a commitment device

25 increases and women become more cautious about the decision to have children. The results are consistent with men being the short side in the marriage market and with women having a predominant role in the fertility decision.

We also find unintended effects of the policy, mainly with respect to the wellbeing of adolescents. Our results suggest that adolescents growing up in a JC environment engage in riskier behavior and feel their parents impose a less clear set of norms on them. Ultimately, JC laws do not improve the relationship between parents and their offspring.

Our study is limited to the analysis of the short term effects of JC laws. As for future research, it would interesting to test whether the effects that we find are confirmed in the longer term. Also, there is room for improvement in the analysis of the effects of JC laws on female labor market outcomes. A more rigorous analysis requires the use of longitudinal data. Finally, it will be interesting to expand the analysis about the wellbeing of children, focusing on the channels through which children are negatively affected by JC laws.

26 References Allen, Brandeanna D., John M. Nunley, and Alan Seals. “The Effect of Joint Child-Custody Legislation on the Child-Support Receipt of Single Mothers.” Journal of Family and Economic Issues, 32(1): 124–39, 2011. Bargain, Olivier, Libertad Gonzalez, Claire Keane, Berkay Ozcan, “Female Labor Supply and Divorce: New Evidence from Ireland”, European Economic Review, Vol. 56, No. 8, 2012. Becker, Gary S. 1993. A Treatise on the Family. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Enlarged Edition. Böheim, R., M. Francesconi, and M. Halla. “Does Custody Law Affect Family Behavior In and Out of Marriage?” IZA Discussion Paper No. 7064, December 2012. Brown, Susan L., and Alan Booth. "Cohabitation versus marriage: A comparison of relationship quality." Journal of Marriage and the Family (1996): 668-678. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, Bernard Fortin, and Guy Lacroix (2002). “Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation, and Household Labor Supply.” Journal of Political Economy, 110, 37–72. Cigno, Alessandro. "Marriage as a commitment device." Review of Economics of the Household 10, no. 2 (2012): 193-213. El Lahga A., Moreau N. (2007). “The Effects of Marriage on Couples Allocation of Time Between Market and Non-Market Hours”. IZA Discussion Paper No. 2619 Gray, Jeffrey S. (1998). “Divorce-LawChanges, Household Bargaining, and Married Women’s Labor Supply.” American Economic Review, 88(3), 628–642. Halla, M. “The effect of joint custody on family outcomes.” Journal of the European Economic Association 11:2 (2013): 278–315. Halla, Martin. "Do joint custody laws improve family well-being?." IZA World of Labor (2015). Leo, T. W. From Maternal Preference to Joint Custody: The Impact of Changes in Custody Law on Child Educational Attainment. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2006. Lundberg S.J (2002): "Limits to specialization: Family Policy and Economic Efficiency", Working Paper, University of Washington. Maiti, Abhradeep. "Effect of joint custody laws on children's future labor market outcomes." International Review of Law and Economics 43 (2015): 22-31. Masters, Adrian. "Marriage, commitment and divorce in a matching model with differential aging." Review of Economic Dynamics 11, no. 3 (2008): 614-628.

27 Nguyen, Dung Kieu, Anh Tran Thi Van, and Trang Phan. "Child Custody and Family Labour Supply: Evidence from the United States." LABOUR (2017). Nunley, J. and R.A. Seals. “Child-custody reform, marital investment in children, and the labor supply of married mothers.” Labour Economics 18 (2011): 14-24. Papps K. (2006). “The Effects of Divorce Risk on the labor Supply of Married Couples,” IZA Discussion Paper No. 2395. Roff, Jennifer. "Cleaning in the Shadow of the Law? Bargaining, Marital Investment, and the Impact of Divorce Law on Husbands’ Intrahousehold Work." The Journal of Law and Economics 60, no. 1 (2017): 115-134. Solsona, M. and J. Spijker. “Effects of the 2010 Civil Code on trends in joint physical custody in Catalonia. A comparison with the rest of Spain.” INED Population 71 (2016): 313-341 Solsona, Montserrat, Jeroen Spijker, and Marc Ajenjo. "Calidoscopio de la custodia compartida en España." In La custodia compartida en España, pp. 45-72. Dykinson, 2017. Vuri, Daniela. "Joint custody law and mothers’ labor market outcomes: evidence from the USA." Journal of Population Economics (2017): 1-35.

28 Tables and Figures

Figure 1. Sentences granting Joint Custody as % of all divorce sentences

Ara+Cat+Cval Bal+PV Non-reform Madrid

45.0%

40.0%

35.0%

30.0%

25.0%

20.0%

JOINT CUSTODY 15.0% % OVER ALL DIVORCES 10.0%

5.0%

0.0% - 3 - 2 - 1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 YEARS BEFORE (-) / AFTER (+) THE REFORM

Source: own elaboration based on INE data. Notes: the year of the reform for the regions with 'reform' is: Aragón (2010), Baleares (2009), Catalunya (2010), Comunidad Valenciana (2011) and País Vasco (2011). For the Bal + PV group, the year (-3) has only the Basque Country data since there is no information prior to 2007 for the Balearic Islands. The year of the 'reform' for the Basque Country is 2011, and not 2015, for the reasons explained in the section about the regulatory context. For the regions without reform, year 0 is 2010. The data is weighted by the population of each Region, taking as reference the data for the year 2015.

29

Figure 2. Sentences favorable to joint custody as % of all divorce sentences by Appeal Courts in contentious divorces

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0 1 year before "reform" "Reform" 1 year after "reform"

Baleares Madrid País Vasco

Source: own elaboration based on the sentences published in the CENDOJ. Analysis of 188 sentences, which correspond to one third of all the judgments of the respective Provincial Appeal Court in relation to the custody of the children in the context of a contentious divorce.

30 Figure 3. Sentences of the Provincial Appeal Court relative to the custody of children as % of all sentences by that Appeal Court.

3.50%

3.00%

2.50%

2.00%

1.50%

1.00%

0.50%

0.00% Baleares Madrid Catalunya Valencia País Vasco Aragón

Two years before One year before Reform year One year after

Source: own elaboration based on the sentences published in the CENDOJ.

31 Figure 4. The change in the incidence of joint custody compared to the incidence of joint custody in 2009.

30

25

20

15 2013

10 2009 -

5

(PERCENTAGE DIFFERENCE) POINTS (PERCENTAGE 0 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% CHANGE IN THE INCIDENCE OF JOINT CUSTODY CUSTODY JOINT OF INCIDENCE IN THE CHANGE -5 % JOINT CUSTODY IN 2009

Non-reform Reform

Source: own elaboration based on INE data. Note: since in the data in the figure is unweighted, five small provinces that had anomalous values in the percentage change of joint custody have been eliminated.

32 Table 1. The effect of joint custody laws on the incidence of joint custody.

(1) (2) Static Years since JC law 0.030*** 0.028*** (0.003) (0.007) Dynamic: Jc reform 0.035*** 0.042*** (0.009) (0.009) 1 year 0.072*** 0.082*** (0.013) (0.016) 2 years 0.113*** 0.127*** (0.016) (0.022) 3 years 0.135*** 0.152*** (0.017) (0.029) 4 years 0.155*** 0.175*** (0.018) (0.034) 5+ years 0.184*** 0.208*** (0.018) (0.040)

By female employment level: Years since JC law x High female empl 0.028*** 0.021** (0.003) (0.010) Years since JC law x Low female empl 0.034*** 0.046*** (0.003) (0.011)

Observations 500 500 Province and year FE yes yes Treated-specific linear trend no yes Mean dep. Var. 0.153 0.153 Notes: Results from estimating equation 1 using divorce annual province-level data from 2007 through 2016. The dependent variable is the percentage of sentences granting joint custody over all divorce and separation sentences to which custody applies. Estimates weighted by province population. In both specifications we include year and province fixed-effects and control for the annual unemployment rate and the adults sex ratio (both at province level). Specification in column (2) also includes a linear trend and its interaction by an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the province has passed a joint custody law and zero otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at province level (50 clusters). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

33 Table 2. The effect of joint custody on marriage rate

(1) (2) Static Years since JC law -0.13% (0.50) 1.08% (0.77) Dynamic: JC reform -0.95% (2.13) 0.43% (1.52) 1 year -2.16% (2.27) -0.30% (1.33) 2 years 1.09% (2.24) 3.33%** (1.38) 3 years 1.87% (2.61) 4.46%** (1.95) 4 years -0.25% (2.14) 2.38%** (1.11) 5+ years 3.60%* (1.88) 6.49%*** (1.52) By Female Employment level: Static Years since JC x High Fem.Empl. 0.07% (0.51) 0.44% (1.02) Years since JC x Low Fem.Empl. -0.65% (0.55) 2.05%** (0.9) Dynamic: JC reform x High Fem. Empl. 2.10% (1.93) 2.65%* (1.42) 1 year x High Fem. Empl. 0.25% (2.5) 1.35% (1.7) 2 years x High Fem. Empl. 2.23% (2.5) 3.65% (2.21) 3 years x High Fem. Empl. 4.00% (2.67) 5.66%* (3.35) 4 years x High Fem. Empl. 0.95% (2.44) 2.74% (2.1) 5+ years x High Fem. Empl. 4.50%** (1.99) 6.51%** (2.67) JC reform x Low Fem. Empl. -6.04%** (2.81) -2.39% (2.41) 1 year x Low Fem. Empl. -6.96%*** (2.01) -2.47%* (1.3) 2 years x Low Fem. Empl. -1.11% (2.46) 4.17%** (1.71) 3 years x Low Fem. Empl. -2.02% (2.26) 4.07%*** (1.35) 4 years x Low Fem. Empl. -2.39% (2.26) 4.23%*** (1.4) 5+ years x Low Fem. Empl. 2.72% (2.11) 4.16%** (1.76) Observations 850 850 Province and year FE yes yes Treated-specific linear trends no yes Mean Dep. Var. 18.34 Mean Dep. Var. High Fem. Empl. 17.63 Mean Dep. Var. Low Fem. Empl. 19.93 Notes: Results from estimating equation 1 using marriages annual province-level data from 2000 through 2016. The dependent variable is the marriage rate (number of marriages per 1000 non-married adults). Estimates weighted by province population. Coefficients are reported as the percent change in the marriage rate, considering the pre-reform mean in treated states (reported in the last rows). In both specifications we include year and province fixed-effects and control for the annual unemployment rate and the adults sex ratio (both at province level). Column (2) also includes a linear trend and its interaction by an indicator variable that takes the value one if the province has passed a Joint Custody law and zero otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at province level (50 clusters). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

34 Table 3. The effect of joint custody on marriage, by bride’s (groom’s) age-specific group

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Bride's age-specific rate Groom's age-specific rate 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-44 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-44

Years since JC law -0.82% 2.01%* 1.07% 1.52% -4.06%** 2.00% 2.64%** 0.13% (1.23) (1.08) (1.21) (1.01) (1.53) (1.24) (1.19) (0.97) By female employment level: Years since JC x High Fem.Empl. -2.17% 1.73% 1.14% 0.97% -6.01%*** 1.33% 1.42% -0.03% (1.64) (1.41) (1.38) (1.24) (0.77) (1.36) (1.74) (1.36) Years since JC x Low Fem.Empl. 0.37% 1.80%** 1.08% 4.22%*** -1.21% 1.86%** 4.46%*** 0.96% (1.18) (0.86) (1.2) (1.45) (0.75) (0.7) (1.33) (2.2) Observations 850 850 850 850 850 850 850 850 Province and year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Treated-specific linear trend yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Mean Dep. Variable 22.73 80.15 72.43 31.95 20.10 59.59 50.40 25.22 Mean Dep. Var. (High Fem. Empl.) 20.74 73.87 70.86 32.94 18.27 55.06 49.33 25.74 Mean Dep. Var. (Low Fem. Empl.) 27.15 94.10 75.92 29.75 24.16 69.67 52.78 24.07 Notes: Results from estimating equation 1 using the annual bride’s (groom’s) age-specific marriage rates (number of marriages per 1000 non- married adults in that specific age) at province-level. We use province population weights. Coefficients are reported as the percent change in the corresponding marriage rate, considering the pre-reform mean in treated states (reported in the last rows). The specification includes year and province fixed-effects, a linear trend and its interaction by an indicator variable that takes the value one if the province has passed a Joint Custody law and zero otherwise, the annual unemployment rate and the adults sex ratio (both at province level). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at province level (50 clusters). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

35 Table 4. The effect of joint custody on divorce rates (1) (2) Static Years since JC law 0.07% (0.37) 1.17% (1.22) Dynamic: JC reform 2.46%** (1.02) 5.75%*** (1.61) 1 year -1.83%* (1.06) 3.27% (2.09) 2 years -1.72% (2.47) 5.06%* (2.85) 3 years -0.99% (1.54) 7.44%** (3.62) 4 years -0.79% (2.24) 9.31%** (4.54) 5+ years 2.59% (2.73) 14.81%** (5.93) By Female Employment level: Static Years since JC x High Fem.Empl. -0.06% (0.44) 1.24% (1.17) Years since JC x Low Fem.Empl. 0.41% (0.45) 1.89% (1.21) Dynamic: JC reform x High Fem. Empl. 1.85%* (1.03) 4.71%*** (1.61) 1 year x High Fem. Empl. -2.15%* (1.03) 2.60% (1.91) 2 years x High Fem. Empl. -2.96% (2.49) 3.44% (2.64) 3 years x High Fem. Empl. -1.68% (1.91) 6.36%* (3.67) 4 years x High Fem. Empl. 0.00% (3.08) 9.68%* (4.84) 5+ years x High Fem. Empl. 0.71% (3.08) 12.70%* (6.45) JC reform x Low Fem. Empl. 3.28%* (1.66) 7.31%*** (2.42) 1 year x Low Fem. Empl. -1.75% (1.51) 4.01% (3.02) 2 years x Low Fem. Empl. 0.52% (4.38) 7.95% (5.44) 3 years x Low Fem. Empl. 0.66% (2.12) 9.78%* (4.99) 4 years x Low Fem. Empl. -3.29% (2.42) 7.57% (5.74) 5+ years x Low Fem. Empl. 7.98%** (3.02) 20.29%*** (6.5) Observations 500 500 Province and year FE yes yes Treated-specific linear trends no yes Mean Dep. Var. 6.7 Mean Dep. Var. High Fem. Empl. 6.8 Mean Dep. Var. Low Fem. Empl. 6.6 Notes: Results from estimating equation 1 using divorce annual province-level data from 2007 through 2016. The dependent variable is the divorce rate (number of divorces and separations per 1000 married or cohabitating adults). We use province population weights. Coefficients are reported as the percent change in the divorce rate, considering the pre-reform mean in treated states (reported in last rows). Both specifications include year and province fixed-effects and control for the annual unemployment rate and the adults sex ratio (both at province level). Column (2) also includes a linear trend and its interaction by an indicator variable that takes the value one if the province has passed a Joint Custody law and zero otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at province level (50 clusters). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

36 Table 5. The effect of joint custody on divorce rates by presence of dependent kids and age-specific groups (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) Couples with dependent kids Couples without dependent kids Husband’s specific-age Wife’s specific-age Husband’s specific-age Wife’s specific-age All All 20-29 30-49 20-29 30-49 20-29 30-49 20-29 30-49

Years since JC law -0.65% -4.26% 0.27% -6.46% -2.19% 3.26%* 4.59% 4.86%** 6.04%* 3.69%* (1.68) (6.98) (1.33) (4.77) (2.37) (1.75) (4.92) (2.01) (3.37) (2.17) By female employment level: Years since JC x High Fem.Empl. -0.40% -5.32% 0.55% -9.11% -1.68% 3.10%* 5.37% 4.22%** 6.24%* 3.31%* (1.59) (8.59) (1.45) (6.59) (2.49) (1.72) (5.56) (1.85) (3.69) (2.01) Years since JC x Low Fem.Empl. 1.12% -4.16% 2.30% -7.17% 1.21% 3.07% 5.16% 3.72% 2.88% 3.58% (1.6) (6.98) (2.31) (4.84) (3.49) (2.21) (4.7) (2.4) (3.74) (2.56)

Observations 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 Province and year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Treated-specific linear trends yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Mean Dep. Variable 8.15 14.18 51.20 14.15 89.26 5.60 10.22 5.394 12.02 5.883 Mean Dep. Var. (High Fem. Empl.) 8.19 11.53 51.88 10.47 91.43 5.82 8.998 5.960 10.84 6.479 Mean Dep. Var. (Low Fem. Empl.) 8.12 16.04 50.73 16.74 87.73 5.44 11.07 4.995 12.85 5.464 Notes: Results from estimating equation 1 using subgroup-specific divorce rates (number of divorces and separations within each group per 1000 married or cohabitating adults in that specific group). Estimates weighted by province population. Coefficients are reported as the percent change in the group-specific divorce rate, considering the pre-reform mean in treated states (reported in last rows). The specification includes year and province fixed-effects, a linear trend and its interaction by an indicator variable that takes the value one if the province has passed a Joint Custody law and zero otherwise, the annual unemployment rate and the adults sex ratio (both at province level). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at province level (50 clusters). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

37

Table 6. The effect of joint custody on divorce rates, by plaintiff and type of divorce (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) Plaintiff Type of divorce Couples with dep. kids Couples without dep. kids Couples with dep. kids Couples without dep. kids Husband Wife Both Husband Wife Both Consen. No Consen. Consen. No Consen.

Years since JC law -2.55% -1.07% 0.65% -1.69% 0.22% 8.03%** 0.44% -2.44% 5.50%** -0.85% (3.35) (1.96) (1.67) (2.12) (1.86) (3.63) (2.02) (1.70) (2.23) (1.91) By female employment level: Years since JC x High Fem.Empl. -1.88% -0.93% 0.77% -1.04% 0.45% 6.99%** 0.76% -2.74% 4.75%** -0.88% (2.88) (2.05) (1.7) (1.97) (1.88) (2.96) (1.64) (1.85) (1.95) (2.34) Years since JC x Low Fem.Empl. 1.85% 0.18% 1.63% 2.72% 1.83% 4.11% 3.34%* -2.04% 5.21%* -0.19% (3.05) (1.63) (1.76) (2.15) (1.84) (3.73) (1.88) (1.79) (2.74) (1.86)

Observations 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 Province and year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Treated-specific linear trends yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Mean Dep. Variable 1.68 3.01 3.46 1.45 1.62 2.53 5.07 3.08 3.62 1.97 Mean Dep. Var. (High Fem. 1.74 2.92 3.53 1.52 1.60 2.70 5.48 2.71 4.11 1.71 Mean Dep. Var. (Low Fem. Empl.) 1.64 3.07 3.42 1.40 1.63 2.41 4.78 3.34 3.28 2.16 Notes: Results from estimating equation 1 using subgroup-specific divorce rates (number of divorces and separations within each group per 1000 married or cohabitating adults in that specific group). Estimates weighted by province population. Coefficients are reported as the percent change in the group-specific divorce rate, considering the pre-reform mean in treated states (reported in last rows). The specification includes year and province fixed-effects, a linear trend and its interaction by an indicator variable that takes the value one if the province has passed a Joint Custody law and zero otherwise, the annual unemployment rate and the adults sex ratio (both at province level). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at province level (50 clusters). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

38 Table 7. The effect of joint custody laws on fertility (1) (2) (3) Total Fertility Marital Fertility Non-marital Fertility Static Years since JC law -0.76% (0.46) -0.68% (0.72) -2.51% (1.89) Dynamic: JC reform -0.56% (1.11) 0.02% (1.55) -0.31% (3.64) 1 year -0.94% (1.05) 3.36% (2.53) -6.89%* (3.90) 2 years -2.14% (1.30) -4.61% (2.77) 0.94% (6.23) 3 years -2.66%* (1.56) -3.14% (4.26) -4.26% (8.40) 4 years -3.23% (1.95) -3.69% (4.31) -7.52% (9.73) 5+ years -4.30% (2.90) -2.39% (4.03) -16.18% (10.86) By Female Employment level: Static Years since JC x High Fem.Empl. -0.71% (0.48) -0.70% (0.78) -2.29% (1.91) Years since JC x Low Fem.Empl. -0.96%* (0.57) -0.58% (0.76) -3.37%* (1.76) Dynamic: JC reform x High Fem. Empl. 0.44% (1.59) 1.32% (2.38) -0.04% (4.52) 1 year x High Fem. Empl. -0.48% (1.58) 3.98% (3.66) -5.62% (4.55) 2 years x High Fem. Empl. -1.96% (1.56) -4.25% (3.97) 0.97% (7.07) 3 years x High Fem. Empl. -2.26% (2.29) -3.47% (6.29) -2.27% (8.93) 4 years x High Fem. Empl. -2.83% (2.06) -4.62% (5.07) -5.49% (10.21) 5+ years x High Fem. Empl. -4.22% (3.08) -2.84% (4.07) -15.05% (11.24) JC reform x Low Fem. Empl. -2.84% (3.14) -2.92% (3.42) -0.84% (6.09) 1 year x Low Fem. Empl. -2.46% (2.13) 1.28% (3.67) -10.50%* (5.79) 2 years x Low Fem. Empl. -2.92% (2.15) -6.35%** (3.14) 1.14% (6.82) 3 years x Low Fem. Empl. -3.88% (3.22) -3.55% (3.22) -9.41% (8.98) 4 years x Low Fem. Empl. -4.59% (2.83) -2.38% (3.35) -13.90% (8.72) 5+ years x Low Fem. Empl. -4.98% (3.02) -0.95% (4.26) -20.15%* (11.28) Observations 850 850 850 Province and year FE yes yes yes Treated-specific linear trends yes yes yes Mean Dep. Var. 72.15 100.9 35.30 Mean Dep. Var. High Fem. Empl. 72.34 100.5 37.62 Mean Dep. Var. Low Fem. Empl. 71.74 101.9 30.06

39 Notes: Results from estimating equation 1 using births annual province-level data from 2000 through 2016. The dependent variable is the fertility rate for each group (number of births per 1000 total, married or non-married female population, respectively). We report the percent change in the fertility rate, considering the pre-reform mean among treatment provinces (reported in the last rows). We use province population weights and control for the annual unemployment rate and the adults sex ratio (both at province level). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at province level (50 clusters). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 8. The effect on joint custody laws on fertility, by civil status

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Marital Fertility Non-Marital Fertility 25-29 30-34 35-39 25-29 30-34 35-39 Static Years since JC law 0.28% 0.64% -2.83%** -2.90% -2.04% -0.23% (1.62) (1.00) (1.09) (2.02) (2.31) (1.84) By female employment level: Years since JC x High Fem.Empl. 0.18% 0.49% -2.92%*** -2.69% -1.95% -0.35% (1.62) (1.02) (1.06) (2.04) (2.27) (1.81) Years since JC x Low Fem.Empl. 0.74% 1.36% -2.20% -3.75%* -2.13% 0.67% (1.76) (1.27) (1.42) (2.05) (3.11) (2.15) Observations 848 850 850 848 850 850 Province and year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes Treated-specific linear trends yes yes yes yes yes yes Mean Dep. Variable 136.2 134.2 56.30 26.53 47.44 40.95 Mean Dep. Var. High Fem. Empl. 133.2 134.1 57.52 27.47 51.02 44.74 Mean Dep. Var. Low Fem. Empl. 143 134.3 53.57 24.40 39.25 32.49 Notes: Results from estimating equation 1 using births annual province-level data from 2000 through 2016. The dependent variable is the fertility rate (number of births per 1000 either married or non-married female population of each age group). We report the percent change in the fertility rate, considering the pre-reform mean among treatment provinces (reported in the last rows). We use population weights and control for the annual unemployment rate and the adults sex ratio (both at province level). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at province level (50 clusters). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

40 Table 9. The effect of joint custody laws on female employment (LFS)

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) All women 25-34 35-44 All women with Married women with Divorced women Women without dependent kids dependent kids with dependent kids dependent kids Static Years since JC law 0.29% 0.40% 0.24% 0.10% -0.23% 1.87%*** 0.41% (0.24) (0.61) (0.21) (0.22) (0.27) (0.59) (0.38) Dynamic JC reform -0.46% -1.66% 0.83% 0.23% 0.49% 2.42% -0.57% (0.90) (1.62) (0.74) (1.02) (1.00) (4.57) (1.14) 1 year -0.13% 0.73% -0.80% -1.74% -2.06% -0.95% 2.00% (1.26) (2.65) (1.09) (1.69) (1.46) (4.17) (1.31) 2 years -0.44% -0.97% 0.29% -3.43%*** -4.01%*** -3.24% 3.23% (1.37) (2.72) (1.11) (1.04) (1.21) (3.92) (2.36) 3 years -0.41% -1.34% 0.61% -2.74% -2.63% 0.38% 2.32% (1.34) (1.98) (1.74) (1.98) (2.59) (4.06) (1.98) 4 years 1.82% 1.38% 2.40% 2.22% 1.42% 10.37%** 1.18% (1.60) (3.53) (1.54) (1.67) (2.21) (4.67) (3.13) 5+ years 1.19% 1.36% 1.41% -0.00% -2.47% 9.70%* 2.04% (1.93) (4.83) (1.43) (1.54) (1.52) (5.32) (2.83) By Female Employment level: Years since JC High Fem.Empl. 0.33% 0.46% 0.26% 0.07% -0.29% 1.82%*** 0.54%* (0.23) (0.59) (0.2) (0.21) (0.25) (0.51) (0.32) Low Fem.Empl. 0.08% 0.04% 0.12% 0.21% 0.08% 2.12%** -0.34% (0.22) (0.45) (0.29) (0.31) (0.4) (1.04) (0.22) Observations 471,970 176,619 295,351 323,733 280,632 16,023 148,237 Province and year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Treated-specific linear trend yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Mean Dep. Var. 0.800 0.812 0.792 0.761 0.758 0.798 0.870 Mean Dep. Var. High 0.814 0.827 0.805 0.775 0.773 0.799 0.880 Mean Dep. Var. Low 0.771 0.779 0.765 0.733 0.728 0.797 0.847 Notes: Results from estimating equation 1 using the Spanish Labor Force Survey microdata from 2000 through 2016. Sample: women aged 25 to 44. The dependent variable takes the value one if the woman is employed and zero otherwise. Estimates weighted by population weights available in the microdata. Coefficients are reported as the percent change in the female employment rate for each specific group, considering the mean pre-reform level in treated provinces (reported in the last rows). Specification includes year and province fixed-effects and a linear trend and its interaction by an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the

41 province has passed a Joint Custody law and zero otherwise. We also control for the annual unemployment rate and the adults sex ratio (both at province level) as well as woman’s immigration status. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at province level (50 clusters). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 10. The effect of joint custody on suicide rates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Male suicides Female suicides All Married Divorced All Married Divorced Static Years since JC law -1.15% -0.88% -4.09% 0.23% 7.11%*** -11.04% (2.68) (2.58) (3.56) (4.61) (2.81) (8.34) Dynamic 0-2 years 8.41% 19.87% -18.19% 7.54% -0.23% -18.68% (8.33) (14.20) (16.60) (11.55) (11.86) (33.39) 3+ year -0.79% -4.09% -23.70% 0.43% 18.69% -56.96% (14.72) (13.76) (27.50) (21.36) (12.63) (39.88)

Observations 289 289 289 289 289 289 Province and year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes Treated-specific linear trend yes no no yes no yes Mean Dep. Var. 11.04 7.015 38.81 3.472 2.202 9.242 Notes: Results from estimating equation 1 using annual data at Comunidad Autónoma level from 2007 through 2016. The dependent variable is the male (female) suicide rate (number of suicides per 100,000 male (female) adults). We use C.A. population weights. Coefficients are reported as the percent change in the suicide rate, considering the pre-reform mean in treated states (reported in last row). The specification include year and province fixed-effects, a linear trend and its interaction by an indicator variable that takes the value one if the province has passed a Joint Custody law and zero otherwise, and control for the annual unemployment rate and the adults sex ratio (both at province level). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at province level (50 clusters). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

42 Table 11. The effect of joint custody laws on youth outcomes (ESTUDES): (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Binge Drinking Smoke Marihuana How late at night Repeated All 16-18 All 16-18 All 16-18 All 16-18

Post JC law (2012) 16.63% 21.05% -15.30% -3.13% 2.33% 3.74% 8.71% 21.75%** (13.36) (15.77) (10.49) (11.39) (2.51) (2.81) (9.60) (9.23) Post JC law (2014) 27.02%* 28.14%* -7.79% 7.65% 9.20%*** 7.48%** 23.45%** 42.84%*** (14.56) (15.25) (17.25) (18.91) (2.78) (3.34) (11.65) (11.64) By whether parents are divorced or not: Post JC law (2012) Divorced 15.73% 30.58% -24.19%*** -9.35% -2.09% 0.18% -2.13% 14.03%* (17.54) (23) (9.1) (10.77) (2.6) (2.8) (7.85) (8.39) Not divorced 16.33% 18.25% -12.82% -1.68% 3.41% 4.63% 11.89% 23.59%** (11.89) (14.62) (11.69) (11.82) (2.47) (2.86) (11.36) (10.44) Post JC law (2014) Divorced 27.25% 33.71%* -5.23% 18.79% 7.77%** 7.37%** 11.73% 34.13%*** (16.19) (19) (13.14) (16.16) (3.75) (3.27) (7.85) (10.07) Not divorced 26.96%* 26.70%* -8.26% 4.82% 9.54%*** 7.52%** 26.44%** 44.73%*** (14.86) (14.62) (18.57) (19.55) (2.77) (3.34) (11.36) (12.53) By gender: Post JC law (2012) Boys 24.08% 26.44% -11.78% 0.26% 1.40% 3.89% 9.08% 19.39%** (15.45) (18.15) (9.2) (11.14) (2.42) (3.07) (9.46) (9.12) Girls 8.99% 14.97% -20.57% -8.12% 3.28% 3.61% 8.16% 24.44%** (12.16) (14.86) (13.61) (13.47) (3.07) (3.34) (11.9) (8.85) Post JC law (2014) Boys 28.12%* 23.91%* -7.12% 5.45% 8.22%*** 7.33%** 21.82%** 38.98%*** (14.04) (13.61) (15.7) (17.82) (3.03) (3.31) (9.46) (10.95) Girls 26.12% 33.36%* -8.89% 10.68% 10.18%*** 7.65%* 25.33%* 47.26%*** (15.2) (18.05) (20.02) (21.01) (3.07) (3.82) (11.9) (11.06) By female employment level: Post JC law (2012) High Female Empl. 6.99% 12.94% -14.62% -2.32% 1.96% 4.55% 8.13% 23.98%*** (8.7) (10.81) (12.55) (13.54) (2.47) (2.9) (10.68) (8.2) Low Female Empl. 36.37% 37.84% -16.79% -4.86% 3.02% 2.14% 9.72% 17.32% (25.26) (29.15) (10.48) (11.67) (3.57) (3.44) (10.34) (11.41) Post JC law (2014) High Female Empl. 24.29% 29.46%* -6.45% 9.05% 8.60%** 8.91%** 21.82% 42.86%*** (15.94) (15.72) (19.46) (20.97) (3.39) (3.62) (14.23) (12.3) Low Female Empl. 31.91%** 25.08% -10.68% 4.68% 10.28%*** 4.63% 26.41%** 42.72%*** (14.86) (16.52) (13.98) (16.61) (2.68) (2.98) (10.34) (11.41) Observations 149,098 78,617 149,098 78,617 148,440 78,315 149,098 78,617 Mean DV (Dep. Var.) 0.68 1.02 1.54 2.27 3.28 4.21 0.28 0.50 Mean DV Div. 0.74 1.00 1.98 2.60 3.47 4.29 0.38 0.60 Mean DV Not Div. 0.67 1.03 1.45 2.20 3.25 4.20 0.26 0.48 Mean DV Boys 0.71 1.10 1.85 2.69 3.30 4.23 0.32 0.55 Mean DV. Girls 0.66 0.94 1.25 1.86 3.26 4.19 0.25 0.45 Mean DV High FemE. 0.69 1.02 1.59 2.29 3.24 4.14 0.28 0.49 Mean DV Low FemE. 0.67 1.03 1.43 2.23 3.36 4.37 0.29 0.53 Notes: All regressions include Province and year fixed-effects and treated-specific linear trends. Standard errors, in parentheses, clustered at province level (50 clusters). “Binge drinking” and “Smoke marihuana” are expressed as the number of days with the specific behavior during the last month. “How late at night” is a categorical variable taking values from 0 to 7, the higher the value the later the individual returns from going out at night. “Repeated” is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the individual has ever repeated course. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

43

Table 12. The effect of joint custody laws on youth outcomes (ESTUDES) – cont.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Rel. with Mom Rel. with Dad Conflict Norms All 16-18 All 16-18 All 16-18 All 16-18

Post JC law (2012) 0.70% -0.93% 0.91% -1.66% -11.22%** 3.68% -1.98% -1.20% (0.69) (0.86) (0.86) (1.21) (4.40) (4.84) (1.43) (1.85) Post JC law (2014) -0.53% -3.90%** -1.36% -5.20%*** -10.68%* 4.14% -3.62% -3.39% (1.48) (1.56) (1.27) (1.68) (5.42) (7.03) (2.26) (2.51) By whether parents are divorced or not: Post JC law (2012) Divorced 1.13% 0.32% 1.00% -0.57% -17.37%*** -2.49% -2.58% -0.46% (0.98) (1.46) (1.1) (1.67) (2.23) (4.47) (1.59) (2.63) Not divorced 0.70% -1.20% 1.21% -1.55% -9.80%** 5.09% -1.71% -1.34% (0.7) (0.71) (0.72) (0.97) (6.15) (5.6) (1.53) (1.76) Post JC law (2014) Divorced -1.45% -5.88%* -10.24%*** -14.99%*** -13.83%** 4.50% -3.69% -3.49% (2.44) (3.41) (1.1) (2.23) (6.68) (6.71) (2.49) (2.83) Not divorced -0.32% -3.41%*** 0.34% -3.06%* -9.94%* 3.49% -3.55% -3.25% (1.17) (1.18) (1.19) (1.45) (6.15) (8.4) (2.2) (2.55) By gender: Post JC law (2012) Boys 0.13% -1.47% 0.88% -1.41% -9.12% 6.81% -2.64%* -1.50% (0.71) (0.95) (0.72) (1.23) (6.64) (6.04) (1.3) (2.07) Girls 1.27% -0.39% 0.97% -1.88% -12.79%*** 1.28% -1.37% -0.91% (0.95) (0.95) (1.24) (1.25) (2.58) (4.84) (1.86) (1.79) Post JC law (2014) Boys -1.01% -4.44%** -1.09% -4.61%*** -11.88%* 5.01% -4.53%** -3.60% (1.65) (1.66) (1.21) (1.72) (6.64) (9.06) (2) (2.48) Girls -0.05% -3.36%** -1.63% -5.75%*** -9.72%* 3.55% -2.78% -3.18% (1.42) (1.66) (1.48) (1.74) (5.15) (7.26) (2.51) (2.64) By female employment level: Post JC law (2012) High Female Empl. 1.13% -0.85% 1.52%** -1.40% -9.56%* 5.57% -2.27% -2.11% (0.71) (0.95) (0.73) (1.24) (5.71) (5.38) (1.54) (1.96) Low Female Empl. -0.13% -1.08% -0.27% -2.19% -14.66%** -0.25% -1.38% 0.74% (0.94) (0.71) (1.45) (1.48) (5.95) (5.36) (1.15) (2.5) Post JC law (2014) High Female Empl. 0.07% -3.62%* -0.88% -4.69%** -9.65%* 6.09% -3.37% -3.51% (1.9) (1.9) (1.47) (1.73) (5.71) (8.06) (2.6) (2.64) Low Female Empl. -1.64% -4.51%*** -2.24%* -6.25%*** -12.69%** 0.11% -4.10%** -3.16% (1.17) (1.18) (1.21) (1.48) (5.95) (8.04) (1.83) (2.69) Observations 148,364 78,185 147,053 77,330 149,098 78,617 149,098 78,617 Mean DV (Dep. Var.) 4.24 4.22 4.10 4.05 0.35 0.37 10.38 10.15 Mean DV Div. 4.10 4.11 3.65 3.59 0.45 0.45 10.05 9.90 Mean DV Not Div. 4.26 4.24 4.19 4.14 0.33 0.36 10.45 10.20 Mean DV Boys 4.25 4.22 4.15 4.08 0.30 0.33 10.01 9.68 Mean DV. Girls 4.22 4.22 4.05 4.02 0.39 0.41 10.74 10.60 Mean DV High FemE 4.22 4.22 4.08 4.04 0.35 0.37 10.38 10.21 Mean DV Low FemE 4.26 4.22 4.13 4.05 0.34 0.37 10.40 10.02 Notes: All regressions include Province and year fixed-effects and treated-specific linear trends. Standard errors, in parentheses, clustered at province level (50 clusters). “Rel. with mom” and “Rel. with dad” are categorical variables taking values from 1 to 5. The higher the value, the better the relationship with mom or dad. “Conflict” is a dummy

44 variable taking value 1 if the individual has had an important with parents or other close family members during the last year. “Norms” is a coded variable taking values from 0 to 16 and aggregates the values across four questions areas related to norms in which the individual is asked whether he/she feels parents set clear norms about specific issues. The higher the number means that norms are set in a clearer manner. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

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