The Varieties of Religious Purpose James A. Montanye
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Essays in the Philosophy of Humanism 25.2 (2017) 141–170 ISSN 1522-7340 (print) ISSN 2052-8388 (online) https://doi.org/10.1558/eph.34335 The Varieties of Religious Purpose James A. Montanye Independent Scholar [email protected] Abstract This essay argues thateconomic scarcity, along with mankind’s evolved pro- pensity for reciprocity, are keys to understanding the origins and evolution of Western religion in all its varieties and purposes. Scarcity is religion’s first cause uncaused. Eusocial cooperation and productive efficiency, which are mobilized by religion, are shown to be inherent and rational responses to scarcity. The reformation that began around 1500 CE represents the substi- tution of efficient secular (civil) religions for traditional theological varieties. The balance between traditional and secular religions is determined by cost, benefits, and the structure of economic payoffs. Keywords religion, metaphysics, spirituality, secularization, sociology, reciprocity, economics, entrepreneurship, markets, faction Introduction Plato’s eponymous Euthyphro dialogue recounts a colloquy between Socrates and the title character regarding mankind’s curious relationship with its gods. Socrates inquired about the nature of piety. Euthyphro smugly professed expertise in the matter, averring that “it is a considerable task to acquire any precise knowledge of these things, but, to put it simply, I say that if a man knows how to say and do what is pleasing to the gods at prayer and sacrifice, those are pious actions such as preserve both private houses and [the] public affairs of state” (Plato 1997a, 14). Socrates interpreted Euthyphro as claiming that piety is “knowledge of how to give to, and to beg from, the gods […] And to beg correctly would be to ask from them things that we need […] And to give correctly is to give them what they need from us, for it would not be skilful to bring gifts to anyone that are in no way needed” (14). These interpretations prompted correlative questions: “piety would then be a sort of trading skill between gods and men? […] There is for us no good that we do not receive from [the gods], but how are they benefited by what they receive from us? […] Or do we have such an advantage over them in the trade that © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2017, Office 415, The Workstation, 15 Paternoster Row, Sheffield, S1 2BX 142 TheVarieties of Religious Purpose we receive all our blessings from them and they receive nothing from us?” (14–15). Euthyphro ultimately asserted that the essence of piety is “honour, reverence, and […] gratitude” (15). Perhaps, Socrates suggested in Plato’s Apology, piety entails merely acting as morally good and virtuous individuals. Two veiled insights within this dialogue ground a comprehensive under- standing of ancient, traditional, and modern religious forms. The dialogue first casts religion as a natural human response—partly inherent, and partly rational—to the natural scarcity of economic resources. Piety would be unnecessary in the absence of scarcity: in an environment of superabundance, piety would exist (if at all) merely as an affectation. The purpose of religious piety, in all its varieties, is to mobilize efficient behavioural responses to scar- city. As a product of rational choice, religion is economics all the way down. Lionel Robbins canonically defined the nature of economics as “the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses” (Robbins 1962 [1935], 16). The biologist Richard Dawkins observes more broadly that “[n]atural selection is a miserly economist […] It’s economics everywhere you look: unconscious calcula- tions, ‘as if’ deliberately weighing up the costs and benefits” (Dawkins 2015, 53; 55). Religion, like economic science and evolution, is applied economics, and scarcity is its first cause uncaused. Euthyphro’s second insight regards the significance of mankind’s inherent sense of reciprocity; that is, the moral and pragmatic obligation “to return good in proportion to the good we receive, and to make reparation for the harm we have done” (L. Becker 1990, 3). Piety, which is reciprocity occa- sioned by mankind’s awareness of scarcity, presumes to compensate Nature and Nature’s gods for their benevolence. From these two obvious, yet profound insights flows not only a compre- hensive understanding of religion’s origins, but also the basis for its evolution and spread, for its diversification away from saving individual souls, and for the trend of secularization. This essay begins by unpacking Euthyphro’s insights. The next two sections characterize religion, as broadly conceived, from an economics perspective that transcends conventional philosophical, sociological, and “religion and economics” analytics (see, for example, Ekelund et al. 1996; Stark and Finke 2000; Witham 2010). The following section visualizes the varieties of reli- gious purpose in the “private houses and public affairs” of human existence. The essay concludes in the final section. Unpacking Euthyphro Piety in the face of scarcity is the foundation of traditional religious beliefs and practices. We beg and bargain with the gods for the scarce resources that support life. The gods’ indulgence imposes reciprocal obligations upon us, © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2017 James A. Montanye 143 which we satisfy through worship and sacrifice. QED. Euthyphro exposes the weakness of this conventional thinking. The universality of religion’s anthropomorphic exchange relationship richly suggests that traditional religion is an aspect of mankind’s evolved propensity for eusocial (highly social) behaviour (Wilson 2012). Reciprocal eusociability is both an inherent, and a rational response to the adverse consequences of resource scarcity. Reciprocity is logically prior to the eusocial propensities for cooperation and exchange. Cooperation without reciprocity would amount to pure altruism, which would be deleterious to individual welfare, and so could not have survived natural selection. Logical order notwithstanding, mankind’s bundle of eusocial propensities most likely co-evolved in parallel with changes to the oxytocin (trust) system (Ridley 2010, 7). Results from brain imaging studies establish that gods are anthropomorphic projections of mankind’s eusocial nature. One study concludes that “praying to God is an intersubjective experience comparable to ‘normal’ interpersonal interaction” (Schjoedt and others 2009). Another study concludes that “the brain areas identified in […] fMRI studies are not unique to processing reli- gion, but [also] play major roles in social cognition. [This] implies that reli- gious beliefs emerged, not as sui generis evolutionary adaptations, but rather as an extension […] of social […] behaviour” (Kapogiannis and others 2009). The gods are invisible, but otherwise they are all too human. Eusocial cooperation, reciprocity, and exchange constitute universal “pas- sions” that represent both efficient adaptations and rational behavioural responses to scarcity constraints. Gods are imagined as being perfect cooper- ating partners that appear not only to provide for our essential needs, but also to accept whatever payment we choose to offer in return. Elementary eco- nomic theory provides an insight regarding the appropriate level of reciprocal payment (but not necessarily the appropriate level of “honour, reverence, and […] gratitude” to which Euthyphro referred). Within an economically efficient cosmos, prices (payment) would equal the marginal cost of produc- tion. Accordingly, omnipotent gods that satisfy mankind’s needs and wants ex nihilo—at zero marginal cost—would neither require nor demand payment for their services. More perfect exchange partners cannot be imagined. Faith in such perfection, Anselm argued, is the gods’ defining characteristic: “a being than which nothing greater can be conceived. […] And it assuredly exists so truly, that it cannot be conceived not to exist” (Anselm 1939 [1078], 8). This faith rests upon “assurances of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen” (Hebrews 18:1), but it also corresponds with the experience of scarcity and reciprocity. Mankind’s fundamental propensity is reciprocity, which Euthyprho asso- ciated with piety. Experience teaches that few, if any, good things in life are free, apart from Nature’s raw bounty. Most good things must be acquired © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2017 144 TheVarieties of Religious Purpose through individual effort, sacrifice, and exchange. (One exception issuffering , which some Catholic sects revere as a gift from God. Christians more typi- cally imagine suffering as a duty owed to God, for which divine reciprocity is an afterlife reward.) Nothing comes from nothing where scarcity and com- petition prevail. The Nobel economist Milton Friedman (1975) labeled this the “TANSTAAFL Principle: “There Ain’t No Such Thing As A Free Lunch,” contrary claims by hucksters and demagogues notwithtanding. Friedman argued from a rational economics perspective. Evolutionists and sociobiologists argue instead that Darwinian natural selection internalized reciprocity as an aspect of mankind’s inherently eusocial nature. Instinct and reason together instruct individuals that something of value must be surren- dered as the price for acquiring highly valued things. The sense that reciprocal exchange is fair arises partly from a cluster of cortical spindle cells that is ded- icated to judging conditions of fairness (Newberg and Waldman 2006, 118).