Lightweight Block Ciphers for Iot Based Applications: a Review
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The First Biclique Cryptanalysis of Serpent-256
The First Biclique Cryptanalysis of Serpent-256 Gabriel C. de Carvalho1, Luis A. B. Kowada1 1Instituto de Computac¸ao˜ – Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF) – Niteroi´ – RJ – Brazil Abstract. The Serpent cipher was one of the finalists of the AES process and as of today there is no method for finding the key with fewer attempts than that of an exhaustive search of all possible keys, even when using known or chosen plaintexts for an attack. This work presents the first two biclique attacks for the full-round Serpent-256. The first uses a dimension 4 biclique while the second uses a dimension 8 biclique. The one with lower dimension covers nearly 4 complete rounds of the cipher, which is the reason for the lower time complex- ity when compared with the other attack (which covers nearly 3 rounds of the cipher). On the other hand, the second attack needs a lot less pairs of plain- texts for it to be done. The attacks require 2255:21 and 2255:45 full computations of Serpent-256 using 288 and 260 chosen ciphertexts respectively with negligible memory. 1. Introduction The Serpent cipher is, along with MARS, RC6, Twofish and Rijindael, one of the AES process finalists [Nechvatal et al. 2001] and has not had, since its proposal, its full round versions attacked. It is a Substitution Permutation Network (SPN) with 32 rounds, 128 bit block size and accepts keys of sizes 128, 192 and 256 bits. Serpent has been targeted by several cryptanalysis [Kelsey et al. 2000, Biham et al. 2001b, Biham et al. -
Zero Correlation Linear Cryptanalysis on LEA Family Ciphers
Journal of Communications Vol. 11, No. 7, July 2016 Zero Correlation Linear Cryptanalysis on LEA Family Ciphers Kai Zhang, Jie Guan, and Bin Hu Information Science and Technology Institute, Zhengzhou 450000, China Email: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected] Abstract—In recent two years, zero correlation linear Zero correlation linear cryptanalysis was firstly cryptanalysis has shown its great potential in cryptanalysis and proposed by Andrey Bogdanov and Vicent Rijmen in it has proven to be effective against massive ciphers. LEA is a 2011 [2], [3]. Generally speaking, this cryptanalytic block cipher proposed by Deukjo Hong, who is the designer of method can be concluded as “use linear approximation of an ISO standard block cipher - HIGHT. This paper evaluates the probability 1/2 to eliminate the wrong key candidates”. security level on LEA family ciphers against zero correlation linear cryptanalysis. Firstly, we identify some 9-round zero However, in this basic model of zero correlation linear correlation linear hulls for LEA. Accordingly, we propose a cryptanalysis, the data complexity is about half of the full distinguishing attack on all variants of 9-round LEA family code book. The high data complexity greatly limits the ciphers. Then we propose the first zero correlation linear application of this new method. In FSE 2012, multiple cryptanalysis on 13-round LEA-192 and 14-round LEA-256. zero correlation linear cryptanalysis [4] was proposed For 13-round LEA-192, we propose a key recovery attack with which use multiple zero correlation linear approximations time complexity of 2131.30 13-round LEA encryptions, data to reduce the data complexity. -
Chapter 3 – Block Ciphers and the Data Encryption Standard
Chapter 3 –Block Ciphers and the Data Cryptography and Network Encryption Standard Security All the afternoon Mungo had been working on Stern's Chapter 3 code, principally with the aid of the latest messages which he had copied down at the Nevin Square drop. Stern was very confident. He must be well aware London Central knew about that drop. It was obvious Fifth Edition that they didn't care how often Mungo read their messages, so confident were they in the by William Stallings impenetrability of the code. —Talking to Strange Men, Ruth Rendell Lecture slides by Lawrie Brown Modern Block Ciphers Block vs Stream Ciphers now look at modern block ciphers • block ciphers process messages in blocks, each one of the most widely used types of of which is then en/decrypted cryptographic algorithms • like a substitution on very big characters provide secrecy /hii/authentication services – 64‐bits or more focus on DES (Data Encryption Standard) • stream ciphers process messages a bit or byte at a time when en/decrypting to illustrate block cipher design principles • many current ciphers are block ciphers – better analysed – broader range of applications Block vs Stream Ciphers Block Cipher Principles • most symmetric block ciphers are based on a Feistel Cipher Structure • needed since must be able to decrypt ciphertext to recover messages efficiently • bloc k cihiphers lklook like an extremely large substitution • would need table of 264 entries for a 64‐bit block • instead create from smaller building blocks • using idea of a product cipher 1 Claude -
Feistel Like Construction of Involutory Binary Matrices with High Branch Number
Feistel Like Construction of Involutory Binary Matrices With High Branch Number Adnan Baysal1,2, Mustafa C¸oban3, and Mehmet Ozen¨ 3 1TUB¨ ITAK_ - BILGEM,_ PK 74, 41470, Gebze, Kocaeli, Turkey, [email protected] 2Kocaeli University, Department of Computer Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, Institute of Science, 41380, Umuttepe, Kocaeli, Turkey 3Sakarya University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Department of Mathematics, Sakarya, Turkey, [email protected], [email protected] August 4, 2016 Abstract In this paper, we propose a generic method to construct involutory binary matrices from a three round Feistel scheme with a linear round function. We prove bounds on the maximum achievable branch number (BN) and the number of fixed points of our construction. We also define two families of efficiently implementable round functions to be used in our method. The usage of these families in the proposed method produces matrices achieving the proven bounds on branch numbers and fixed points. Moreover, we show that BN of the transpose matrix is the same with the original matrix for the function families we defined. Some of the generated matrices are Maximum Distance Binary Linear (MDBL), i.e. matrices with the highest achievable BN. The number of fixed points of the generated matrices are close to the expected value for a random involution. Generated matrices are especially suitable for utilising in bitslice block ciphers and hash functions. They can be implemented efficiently in many platforms, from low cost CPUs to dedicated hardware. Keywords: Diffusion layer, bitslice cipher, hash function, involution, MDBL matrices, Fixed points. 1 Introduction Modern block ciphers and hash functions use two basic layers iteratively to provide security: confusion and diffusion. -
Block Ciphers
Block Ciphers Chester Rebeiro IIT Madras CR STINSON : chapters 3 Block Cipher KE KD untrusted communication link Alice E D Bob #%AR3Xf34^$ “Attack at Dawn!!” message encryption (ciphertext) decryption “Attack at Dawn!!” Encryption key is the same as the decryption key (KE = K D) CR 2 Block Cipher : Encryption Key Length Secret Key Plaintext Ciphertext Block Cipher (Encryption) Block Length • A block cipher encryption algorithm encrypts n bits of plaintext at a time • May need to pad the plaintext if necessary • y = ek(x) CR 3 Block Cipher : Decryption Key Length Secret Key Ciphertext Plaintext Block Cipher (Decryption) Block Length • A block cipher decryption algorithm recovers the plaintext from the ciphertext. • x = dk(y) CR 4 Inside the Block Cipher PlaintextBlock (an iterative cipher) Key Whitening Round 1 key1 Round 2 key2 Round 3 key3 Round n keyn Ciphertext Block • Each round has the same endomorphic cryptosystem, which takes a key and produces an intermediate ouput • Size of the key is huge… much larger than the block size. CR 5 Inside the Block Cipher (the key schedule) PlaintextBlock Secret Key Key Whitening Round 1 Round Key 1 Round 2 Round Key 2 Round 3 Round Key 3 Key Expansion Expansion Key Key Round n Round Key n Ciphertext Block • A single secret key of fixed size used to generate ‘round keys’ for each round CR 6 Inside the Round Function Round Input • Add Round key : Add Round Key Mixing operation between the round input and the round key. typically, an ex-or operation Confusion Layer • Confusion layer : Makes the relationship between round Diffusion Layer input and output complex. -
On the NIST Lightweight Cryptography Standardization
On the NIST Lightweight Cryptography Standardization Meltem S¨onmez Turan NIST Lightweight Cryptography Team ECC 2019: 23rd Workshop on Elliptic Curve Cryptography December 2, 2019 Outline • NIST's Cryptography Standards • Overview - Lightweight Cryptography • NIST Lightweight Cryptography Standardization Process • Announcements 1 NIST's Cryptography Standards National Institute of Standards and Technology • Non-regulatory federal agency within U.S. Department of Commerce. • Founded in 1901, known as the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) prior to 1988. • Headquarters in Gaithersburg, Maryland, and laboratories in Boulder, Colorado. • Employs around 6,000 employees and associates. NIST's Mission to promote U.S. innovation and industrial competitiveness by advancing measurement science, standards, and technology in ways that enhance economic security and improve our quality of life. 2 NIST Organization Chart Laboratory Programs Computer Security Division • Center for Nanoscale Science and • Cryptographic Technology Technology • Secure Systems and Applications • Communications Technology Lab. • Security Outreach and Integration • Engineering Lab. • Security Components and Mechanisms • Information Technology Lab. • Security Test, Validation and • Material Measurement Lab. Measurements • NIST Center for Neutron Research • Physical Measurement Lab. Information Technology Lab. • Advanced Network Technologies • Applied and Computational Mathematics • Applied Cybersecurity • Computer Security • Information Access • Software and Systems • Statistical -
A Novel and Highly Efficient AES Implementation Robust Against Differential Power Analysis Massoud Masoumi K
A Novel and Highly Efficient AES Implementation Robust against Differential Power Analysis Massoud Masoumi K. N. Toosi University of Tech., Tehran, Iran [email protected] ABSTRACT been proposed. Unfortunately, most of these techniques are Developed by Paul Kocher, Joshua Jaffe, and Benjamin Jun inefficient or costly or vulnerable to higher-order attacks in 1999, Differential Power Analysis (DPA) represents a [6]. They include randomized clocks, memory unique and powerful cryptanalysis technique. Insight into encryption/decryption schemes [7], power consumption the encryption and decryption behavior of a cryptographic randomization [8], and decorrelating the external power device can be determined by examining its electrical power supply from the internal power consumed by the chip. signature. This paper describes a novel approach for Moreover, the use of different hardware logic, such as implementation of the AES algorithm which provides a complementary logic, sense amplifier based logic (SABL), significantly improved strength against differential power and asynchronous logic [9, 10] have been also proposed. analysis with a minimal additional hardware overhead. Our Some of these techniques require about twice as much area method is based on randomization in composite field and will consume twice as much power as an arithmetic which entails an area penalty of only 7% while implementation that is not protected against power attacks. does not decrease the working frequency, does not alter the For example, the technique proposed in [10] adds area 3 algorithm and keeps perfect compatibility with the times and reduces throughput by a factor of 4. Another published standard. The efficiency of the proposed method is masking which involves ensuring the attacker technique was verified by practical results obtained from cannot predict any full registers in the system without real implementation on a Xilinx Spartan-II FPGA. -
The EAX Mode of Operation
A preliminary version of this papers appears in Fast Software Encryption ’04, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. ?? , R. Bimal and W. Meier ed., Springer-Verlag, 2004. This is the full version. The EAX Mode of Operation (A Two-Pass Authenticated-Encryption Scheme Optimized for Simplicity and Efficiency) ∗ † ‡ M. BELLARE P. ROGAWAY D. WAGNER January 18, 2004 Abstract We propose a block-cipher mode of operation, EAX, for solving the problem of authenticated-encryption with associated-data (AEAD). Given a nonce N, a message M, and a header H, our mode protects the privacy of M and the authenticity of both M and H. Strings N, M, and H are arbitrary bit strings, and the mode uses 2|M|/n + |H|/n + |N|/n block-cipher calls when these strings are nonempty and n is the block length of the underlying block cipher. Among EAX’s characteristics are that it is on-line (the length of a message isn’t needed to begin processing it) and a fixed header can be pre-processed, effectively removing the per-message cost of binding it to the ciphertext. EAX is obtained by first creating a generic-composition method, EAX2, and then collapsing its two keys into one. EAX is provably secure under a standard complexity-theoretic assumption. The proof of this fact is novel and involved. EAX is an alternative to CCM [26], which was created to answer the wish within standards bodies for a fully-specified and patent-free AEAD mode. As such, CCM and EAX are two-pass schemes, with one pass for achieving privacy and one for authenticity. -
Lecture Four
Lecture Four Today’s Topics . Historic Symmetric ciphers . Modern symmetric ciphers . DES, AES . Asymmetric ciphers . RSA . Next class: Protocols Example Ciphers . Shift cipher: each plaintext characters is replaced by a character k to the right. (When k=3, it’s a Caesar cipher). “Watch out for Brutus!” => “Jngpu bhg sbe Oehghf!” . Only 25 choices! Not hard to break by brute force. Substitution Cipher: each character in plaintext is replaced by a corresponding character of ciphertext. E.g., cryptograms in newspapers. plaintext code: a b c d e f g h i f k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z ciphertext code: m n b v c x z a s d f g h j k l p o i u y t r e w q . 26! Possible pairs. Is is really that hard to break? Substitution ciphers . The Caesar cipher has a small key space, but doesn’t create a statistical independence between the plaintext and the ciphertext. The best ciphers allow no statistical attacks, thereby forcing a brute force, exhaustive search; all the security lies with the key space. As cryptographic algorithms matured, the statistical independence between the plaintext and cipher text increased. Ciphers . The caesar cipher, hill cipher, and playfair cipher all work with a single alphabet for doing substitutions . They are monoalphabetic substitutions. A more complex (and more robust) alternative is to use different substitution mappings on various portions of the plaintext. Polyalphabetic substitutions. More ciphers . Vigenère cipher: each character of plaintext is encrypted with a different a cipher key. -
LEA 192: High Speed Architecture of Lightweight Block Cipher
International Journal of Innovative Technology and Exploring Engineering (IJITEE) ISSN: 2278-3075, Volume-9 Issue-2S, December 2019 LEA 192: High Speed Architecture of Lightweight Block Cipher Zeesha Mishra, Shubham Mishra, Bibhudendra Acharya The communication among connected things must be secure Abstract: High-throughput lightweight cryptography and fast while processing confidential data. Due to a calculation is the need of the present world to convey between two substantial amount of sensitive and valuable data and low asset obliged devices Pipelining is the technique have been used computational resources in the network, it has become to achieve high throughput. In this paper we have target to cumbersome to provide security in the IoT[2]. lightweight block cipher LEA. Block size of LEA is 128 and key Resource-constrained applications comprising of sensor size 128, 192, and 256 bit. In this paper we have focus on LEA architecture for 192- bit key size and achieve very good nodes in wireless sensor networks, RFID tags require smaller throughput. This method has a higher capability of throughput as footprint with minimum battery consumption. compared to previous LEA ciphers. Proposed work is 56% LEA[3] is a lightweight block cipher. LEA has 128-bit improved version of compared paper for respective Speed and block size with 128, 192, 256-bit key sizes and rounds 24, 28 area also less than previous architecture. Graph representation and 32 respectively. LEA supports simple ARX (addition have been shown of different matrices and comparison. rotation XOR ) operation, LEA is not using complex S-box Keywords : ARX, Block Cipher, Cryptography, LEA, structure like AES [4] hence it will give high-speed Lightweight, Pipeline, Throughput. -
Bicliques for Preimages: Attacks on Skein-512 and the SHA-2 Family
Bicliques for Preimages: Attacks on Skein-512 and the SHA-2 family Dmitry Khovratovich1 and Christian Rechberger2 and Alexandra Savelieva3 1Microsoft Research Redmond, USA 2DTU MAT, Denmark 3National Research University Higher School of Economics, Russia Abstract. We present the new concept of biclique as a tool for preimage attacks, which employs many powerful techniques from differential cryptanalysis of block ciphers and hash functions. The new tool has proved to be widely applicable by inspiring many authors to publish new re- sults of the full versions of AES, KASUMI, IDEA, and Square. In this paper, we demonstrate how our concept results in the first cryptanalysis of the Skein hash function, and describe an attack on the SHA-2 hash function with more rounds than before. Keywords: SHA-2, SHA-256, SHA-512, Skein, SHA-3, hash function, meet-in-the-middle attack, splice-and-cut, preimage attack, initial structure, biclique. 1 Introduction The last years saw an exciting progress in preimage attacks on hash functions. In contrast to collision search [29, 26], where differential cryptanalysis has been in use since 90s, there had been no similarly powerful tool for preimages. The situation changed dramatically in 2008, when the so-called splice-and-cut framework has been applied to MD4 and MD5 [2, 24], and later to SHA-0/1/2 [1, 3], Tiger [10], and other primitives. Despite amazing results on MD5, the applications to SHA-x primitives seemed to be limited by the internal properties of the message schedule procedures. The only promising element, the so-called initial structure tool, remained very informal and complicated. -
Optimization of Core Components of Block Ciphers Baptiste Lambin
Optimization of core components of block ciphers Baptiste Lambin To cite this version: Baptiste Lambin. Optimization of core components of block ciphers. Cryptography and Security [cs.CR]. Université Rennes 1, 2019. English. NNT : 2019REN1S036. tel-02380098 HAL Id: tel-02380098 https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-02380098 Submitted on 26 Nov 2019 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. THÈSE DE DOCTORAT DE L’UNIVERSITE DE RENNES 1 COMUE UNIVERSITE BRETAGNE LOIRE Ecole Doctorale N°601 Mathématique et Sciences et Technologies de l’Information et de la Communication Spécialité : Informatique Par Baptiste LAMBIN Optimization of Core Components of Block Ciphers Thèse présentée et soutenue à RENNES, le 22/10/2019 Unité de recherche : IRISA Rapporteurs avant soutenance : Marine Minier, Professeur, LORIA, Université de Lorraine Jacques Patarin, Professeur, PRiSM, Université de Versailles Composition du jury : Examinateurs : Marine Minier, Professeur, LORIA, Université de Lorraine Jacques Patarin, Professeur, PRiSM, Université de Versailles Jean-Louis Lanet, INRIA Rennes Virginie Lallemand, Chargée de Recherche, LORIA, CNRS Jérémy Jean, ANSSI Dir. de thèse : Pierre-Alain Fouque, IRISA, Université de Rennes 1 Co-dir. de thèse : Patrick Derbez, IRISA, Université de Rennes 1 Remerciements Je tiens à remercier en premier lieu mes directeurs de thèse, Pierre-Alain et Patrick.