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Recusal and Abstention from Voting: Guiding Principles by Lester D

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Recusal and Abstention from Voting: Guiding Principles by Lester D Recusal and Abstention from Voting: Guiding Principles By Lester D. Steinman Counsel to planning Failure to vote is not a benign act of neutrality boards are often asked to ad- toward an application. Rather, abstention has signifi - dress whether board mem- cant consequences for the planning board’s decision bers should recuse them- making. Every motion or resolution adopted by the selves from consideration planning board requires the affi rmative vote of a and voting on an application majority of all the members of the board.4 An absten- or abstain from voting on an tion is not an affi rmative vote in favor of the applica- application. Set forth below tion,5 and, to the extent that it cannot be counted as an are general principles which affi rmative vote, its effect is akin to a negative vote for may be helpful in advising purposes of compliance with statutory majority voting planning board members requirements.6 regarding the propriety of recusal or abstention in a II. Recusal Based upon Confl icts of Interest particular case. Where a member of the planning board has a confl ict of interest affecting the consideration of an I. Abstention from Voting application, that member must recuse him or herself Discharging the duties of a planning board mem- from participating in any discussion of the matter ber requires a member to vote on all applications that and from voting on that matter.7 Confl icts of interest come before the board, assuming no confl ict of interest may be defi ned by statute,8 local law [municipal code or appearance of impropriety exists requiring recusal.1 of ethics]9 or common law. Planning board members Indeed, a persistent refusal to vote on applications should familiarize themselves with the provisions of could constitute grounds for removal from offi ce. these rules. Applicants before the planning board have the bur- Courts have held public offi cials to a high standard den of proof to support their applications. Thus, where of conduct and have invalidated certain actions which, a planning board member determines that the record while not violative of the literal provisions of GML contains insuffi cient information to satisfy the legisla- Article 18 or a local code of ethics, are tainted by the tive criteria for granting a permit or approval, that votes of members which “violate the spirit and intent member should vote to deny the application. Where a of the statute, are inconsistent with public policy or member has missed certain meetings on an application, suggest self interest, partiality or economic impropri- the member should review the minutes and/or record- ety.”10 For example, in Zagoreos v. Conklin,11 the court ings of those meetings and discuss the issues with annulled the votes of two zoning board members, who other board members at a public meeting to enable the were employees of the applicant, to grant variances board member to make an informed decision when on a controversial application to convert oil burning voting on the application.2 generating units into coal burning units. In Tuxedo Con- servation and Taxpayers Ass’n v. Town Board of the Town of 3 In Taub v. Pirnie, the board member in question Tuxedo,12 a town board member who was an offi cer of had been a resident of the village for twenty-fi ve years, an advertising fi rm was disqualifi ed from voting on a a zoning board member for twelve years and a village zoning application by a subsidiary of one of the fi rm’s trustee and was fully familiar with the neighborhood clients. Also, in Conrad v. Hinman,13 the Court annulled in question and its zoning problems. Before voting on a village board vote to grant a rezoning application the application, the member had thoroughly discussed where the deciding vote was cast by the co-owner the arguments presented at the public hearing with of the property that was the subject of the rezoning other members. The fact that the member in question petition. neither attended the public hearing nor read the hear- ing minutes was not outcome determinative. Rather, it Whether a member has a disqualifying confl ict of was suffi cient that the member had the opportunity to interest “requires a case-by-case examination of the rel- make an informed decision by virtue of his knowledge evant facts and circumstances.”14 “Public offi cials must of the neighborhood and familiarity with the issues perform their duties solely in the public interest, and raised at the public hearing. avoid circumstances which compromise their ability to make impartial judgments on any basis other than the public good.”15 NYSBA/MLRC Municipal Lawyer | Winter 2008 | Vol. 22 | No. 1 17 MuniLawyerWin08.indd 17 5/5/2008 2:37:54 PM Indeed, where circumstances, viewed objectively, Nor is recusal required where the interest of the could reasonably be deemed to compromise a mem- member in the matter under review is not a personal ber’s impartiality, avoidance of even the appearance or private one, but rather “an interest he has in com- of impropriety is essential to maintaining public mon with all other citizens or owners of property” in confi dence in the integrity of government.16 Thus, the the community.23 Thus, where most of the property Attorney General has opined: in a village met the acreage requirement for reclas- sifi cation to a cluster residence fl oating zone under a ‘It is critical that the public be assured proposed zoning amendment, village board members that their offi cials are free to exercise who owned qualifying property were not disqualifi ed their best judgment without any hint from voting on that zoning amendment.24 Similarly, of self-interest or partiality, especially in Segalla v. Planning Board of the Town of Amenia,25 the if a matter under consideration is court refused to annul the vote of a planning board particularly controversial.’ Matter of member to adopt a new master plan where the value of Byer v. Town of Poestenkill, 232 A.D.2d that member’s property and the value of nearly every 851, 852-53 (3d Dep’t 1996). Thus, other property owner in the town would be similarly where a public offi cial is uncertain affected by the adoption. about whether he should undertake a particular action due to an actual or Where recusal is required, the board member in potential confl ict, he must recuse him- question must refrain from deliberating and voting on self entirely from the matter in ques- the application or matter: tion unless he procures an advisory opinion from a local ethics board that We have stated that members with concludes otherwise. See Op. Atty. confl icts of interests must recuse Gen (Inf.) No. 98-38; see also Op. Atty. themselves from participating in any Gen. (Inf.) No. 99-21 (recusal requires deliberations or votes concerning the the offi cial in question to avoid ‘tak- application creating the confl ict. Op. ing any actions with respect to that Atty. Gen. (Inf.) No. 90-38. The board matter.’)17 member’s participation in delibera- tions has the potential to infl uence Often, confl icts of interest arise out of familial other board members who will exer- relationships [recusal of planning board chairman cise a vote with respect to the matter required where his son had a pending employment in question. Further, we believe that application with the attorney for the applicant before a board member with a confl ict of the planning board];18 prejudgment of the issues at- interests should not sit with his or tendant to a specifi c application;19 opposition to an her fellow board members during the application as a neighbor [often a neighbor acts out deliberations and action regarding of their own self-interest and concerns about their the matter. The mere presence of the own property values and families and may not be board member holds the potential of capable of measuring the merits of an application in infl uencing fellow board members and light of the overall public interest];20 or ongoing busi- additionally, having declared a confl ict ness relationships [where two board members were of interests, there would reasonably be employed by the applicant, the board members must an appearance of impropriety in the recuse themselves because “the likelihood that their eyes of the public should the member employment . could have infl uenced their judgment sit on the board.26 is simply too great to ignore.”].21 However, not every Obviously, this article cannot address every po- private business relationship between an applicant tential situation in which recusal and/or abstention and a board member is suffi cient to require recusal. becomes an issue. However, by adhering to the gen- For example, in Ahearn v. Zoning Board of Appeals of the eral principles which guide those decisions, planning Town of Shawangunk,22 the fact that one zoning board board members will be better able to discharge their member had purchased insurance from an applicant responsibilities. and the spouse of another zoning board member had received a Christmas gift for teaching the applicant’s daughter piano lessons was deemed to be so insub- Endnotes stantial that no common law confl ict or appearance of 1. See Cromarty v. Leonard, 13 A.D.2d 275, 216 N.Y.S.2d 619 (2d impropriety was created when those members voted Dep’t 1961), aff’d. 10 N.Y.2d 915 (1961). to grant the applicant a special use permit to construct 2. See Taub v. Pirnie, 3 N.Y.2d 188 (1957), holding that even where a planned unit development.
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