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Copyrighted Material Index A anti-money-laundering (AML), 5, 194, Aalen, Niels, 126 198, 201 ABC Learning Centres, 172 antitrust, 124, 125, 184 Aberdeen Asset Management, 186 ANZ, 174 ABN AMRO, 181, 199, 206 Aon, 199 ABP, 63 Apollo Management, 283 Abu Dhabi, 66 Apple, 24, 125 Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, 202 ArcelorMittal, 162 Accounting and Auditing Organization Arculli, Ronald, xxviii for Islamic Financial Institutions Arthur Andersen, xxvii (AAOIFI), 65, 66 Arvedlund, Erin, 197 accumulator, 144 Asean Corporate Governance Fund, 63 activist, xxi, xlii, 42, 63, 136, 160, 177, 186 Asean Syariah Corporate Governance Aderans, 178 Fund, 63 adidas-Salomon, 74 Ashton, Guy, 70 Ahold, xxvii, 159 Asia Risk, 144, 191, 192 AIG, xxiii, 167 Asia Standard Hotel Group, 30 Airbus, 175 Asia Technicals, 236 Alcan, 55 Asiamoney, 68, 90, 160, 227 Alcatel-Lucent, 51 Asian Corporate Governance Association Allen, Woody, 95, 196 (ACGA), 186 Alliance Data Systems, 86, 135 asset-backed securities, 17, 156 Allied Capital, 135 Aston Martin Lagonda, 66 Altedia, 63 auction-rate securities, xxiii, 139, 140, 206, Altria, 67 216, 217 Aluminum Corp. of China (Chinalco), Australia, xxiii, xxix, 142, 146, 172, 173, 174, 158, 184, 185 202, 254 Amazon.com, 132, 133 Australian, 158 Ambac, xxiii Australian, 184, 185, 189, 272 American Banker, 199 Australian Broadcasting Corporation American Capital Strategies, 206 (ABC), 172, 202 American Criminal Law Review, 215 Australian Foreign Investment Review American InternationalCOPYRIGHTED Group Board,MATERIAL 189 (AIG), xxiii, 167 Australian Securities and American Society of Clinical Oncology Investments Commission (ASIC), (ASCO), 76, 77, 79 4, 172, 226 America’s Prophet, 198 Australian Securities Exchange analyst certifi cation, see Regulation (ASX), 172 Analyst Certifi cation Authers, John, 69, 154 analyst surveys, 67–71, 242 authors, 26, 58, 94, 103, 142 Anderson, Jenny, 84 Autorité des Marchés Financiers, 175 Anglo Irish Bank, 84, 85, 86, 117, 135 Axesstel, 206 Anheuser-Busch, 55 Axsys Technologies, 206 287 bbindex.inddindex.indd 228787 77/2/10/2/10 77:32:12:32:12 AAMM 288 Index B Blodget, Henry, xxxvii, 69, 90, 132, 133, 212, BAE Systems, xxxvi, 153, 187, 207 213, 214, 215, 217, 257 Bajaj, Vikas, 127 blogs, 89, 116 Banca Italease, 38 bloggers, xix, xxxvi, xxxviii, 21, 22, 23, Bangkok Post, 21 25, 31, 43, 77 Bangladesh, 199, 283 Bloomberg, xxiv, xxxvi, xliii, 17, 25, 46, Bank of America, xxiii, xxxvi, xlii, 37, 47, 53, 57, 69, 70, 71, 79, 80, 88, 89, 92, 82, 162, 168, 169, 266 107, 125, 131, 136, 153, 155, 190, 200, Banc of America Securities, 36, 37, 259 207, 208, 215, 240, 246, 279, 283 Bank of China, 144, 166, 206, 285 Blount Parrish, 17 Bank of Communications, 206 Body Shop, The, 17, 44, 49 Bank of East Asia, 87, 176, 195, 206 Bolivia, 188 Bank of New York, 199 Bolton, Anthony, 8, 70, 243 BankAtlantic, 137, 138 Bombay Stock Exchange, 65 Bankers Trust New York Corp., 82 Bond Market Association, 14, 115 Bapepam, 175, 176 bonds, xix, xxiii, xxvii, xxxii, 2, 8, 12–13, Barclays, xxiii, 12, 13, 82, 85, 162, 164, 169, 14, 15, 45, 56, 57, 65–66, 104, 143, 144, 173, 236 203, 211, 215, 216, 246, 247, 272 Baring Securities bounty, 46, 54 Barings, xxvii, 101, 157, 191, 192, 266 boxclever, 156 ING Barings, 101, 266 BP, 164 Barr Pharmaceuticals, 153 Bradford & Bingley, xxiv Barron’s, 241, 246 brand, 151, 152–153, 162, 163–164 Baruch, Bernard, 84 bribery, 17, 185, 198, 199–201, 207, 208, 235 Basel Committee on Banking bribes, 234 Supervision, 198 Bridgewater, 202, 246, 247 Batchelor, Roy, 105 Brigham Exploration, 206 Batty, Richard, 105, 131 Bristol-Myers Squibb, 74 Bayer, 153, 163, 164 British Biotech, 75 Bayliss, Paul, 203, 208 British Energy, 187 BBC, xlii Broughton, Philip Delves, 92 BCCI, xxvii Brown, Gordon, xxv, xxix, xxxii, 167 Bear Stearns, xxii, xxv, xxviii, xxxiv, Browning, Candace, 69 xxxix, 19, 53, 71, 84, 85, 87, 135, 137, Brunswick Group, 55 145, 153, 212, 214, 215, 285 BT Pension Scheme, 63 Beconwood Securities, 174 Buitoni Pesto Basilico, 275 behavioral fi nance, 105, 106, 130 Bull-Dog Sauce, 177 Beijing Shoufang Investment Consulting, 24, 32 bullets, key points and executive Belarus, xxv summaries, 267 BellSouth, 145 Bullshit Bingo, 274–276 Bernard L. Madoff Investment Burrough, Bryan, 87 Securities, see Madoff, Bernard Burton, John, 174 Bernard, Paul, 227 Business Ethics Leadership Bernstein, Sanford, 220 Alliance, 166 Betts, Paul, 179 BusinessWeek, 74 Beximco Pharmaceuticals, 66 buy-side, xix, xxxi, xxxiii, xxxvii, xxxviii, BHP Billiton, 98, 158, 185 xl, 5, 9, 12, 16, 58, 70, 73, 134, 157, 194, Big Brother Leader 777, 21, 22, 31 210, 211, 230, 242, 244 Biggs, Barton, 104 Buy Side Risk Managers Forum, 194 Biovail, 239, 240, 241 Black, Keith, 19 C Black–Scholes, 146 Cadbury, 164 Black Swan, xxxii, 146, 154 Cadence Design Systems, 237 BlackBerry, 45 Caisse d’Epargne, 195 Blackstone, 86 Calamari, Andrew, 241 Blair, Tony, 187 California Public Employees’ Retirement Blankfein, Lloyd, 228 System (CalPERS), 63, 186, 202 blasphemy, 280 Cambodia, 188 bbindex.inddindex.indd 228888 77/2/10/2/10 77:32:13:32:13 AAMM Index 289 Canada, 4, 92, 197, 206, 232, 232 145, 162, 166, 168, 169, 179, 201, 206, Canadian, 4, 198, 239, 241 212, 223, 226, 227, 239, 257 Capital Market Authority of Saudi Arabia citizen-journalism, 22, 24 (CMA), 18 citizen journalists, 23 Capital Market Risk Advisors, 194 Clarke, Arthur C., 283 Carphone Warehouse, 172 class action, 143, 174, 190, 207, 213 Casablanca, 93 Clement, Michael, 235 Cass Business School, 105 CLSA, 68, 90, 160 Cazenove, see J.P. Morgan CNBC, 23, 84 Centura Banks, 228 CNN, 24 Chamber of Hong Kong Listed CNOOC, 50, 185 Companies, 165 Coalition Provisional Authority, 208 channel-stuffi ng, 123–124 co-authorship, 108–109, 213 Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA), 9 Coca-Cola, 94, 123, 124, 162, 163, 188 CFA Institute, 8, 15, 105, 112, 181, 207 Coca-Cola Amatil, 94 CFA Center for Financial Market Cochabamba, 188 Integrity, 177, 183, 207 Codebank, 204 Cheyne Finance, 202 Coffee, John C., 53 Chi Mei Optoelectronics, 124 Cohen, Noam, 24 Chicago Tribune, 283 Colchester, Nico, 269 China, xxvi, xxxii, 21, 22, 24, 31–32, 51, 55, Cole, Margaret, 13, 45, 156 90, 150, 151, 164, 165, 167, 185, 187, collateralized debt/mortgage obligation 188, 189, 205, 279, 280, 281, 285 (CDO, CMO), 131, 155, 214–215 China Aviation Oil, 191 Comiskey, Eugene, 128 China Central Television commentators, xix, xxviii, xxxviii, 23–25, 76, (CCTV), 24 84, 87, 92, 99, 133, 206, 256, 265, 280 China Construction Bank, 166 Commerzbank, 13 China Daily, 22, 149, 150, 151 commission-sharing arrangements, 244 China Galaxy Securities, 32 Committee on Foreign Investment China Huiyuan Juice Group, 188 in the U.S. (CFIUS), 189 China Life Insurance, 166 Commodity Futures Trading Commission China News Service, 278 (CFTC), xlvii, 229 China Petroleum (Sinopec), 162 compliance, 5, 16, 27, 31, 34, 39, 44, 53, 62, China Securities Regulatory Commission 89, 91, 94, 124, 166, 193, 201, 205, 208, (CSRC), 21, 31, 32 210, 213, 218, 219, 220, 221, 223, 224, 225, China Telecom, 51 237, 259 Chinese, xxviii, xxxii, 21, 22, 24, 31, 32, complinet.com, 55 40, 47, 50, 51, 54, 89, 151, 162, 166, confl icts of interest, 30, 62, 210–249 passim 184, 185, 189, 197, 198, 210, 211, 216, Connecticut Capital, 237, 238 224, 230, 272, 278, 279, 280 consensus (estimates), xxxix, 7, 40, 102, Chinese walls, 27, 47, 210, 211, 216, 103, 128, 147, 157, 255, 265, 273 224, 226, 230 constant proportion debt obligation Chinese Warren Buffett, 197 (CPDO), 155, 203 Chiyu Banking Corp., 206 Consumers International, 161, 162 Chong Hing Bank, 206 Continuing Education Program, 10 Chongqing Iron & Steel, 37 contracts for difference (CFDs), xix, Chrysler, xxiv, xli 17, 18, 49 Chung, Joanna, 139, 247 Copernic, 117 Chunghwa Picture Tubes, 124 copyright, xxxv, xxxviii, 2, 56, 71, 91–94, Churchill, Winston, 242 265, 281 Cipla, 152 Core Pacifi c-Yamaichi Capital, 204 Circuit City, xxv corporate governance, xxi, xxxi, xxxv, xxxvii, Cisco Systems, 236 xl, xliii, 8, 62, 63, 67, 83, 88, 107, 124, Citic Ka Wah Bank, 206 127, 138, 139, 150, 158, 159–201, 276 CITIC Pacifi c, 149, 150, 195, 225 Corporate Governance Asia, 202 CITIC Resources, xxxiv, 30, 45, 49, 225 corporate social responsibility (CSR), Citigroup, Citi, xxii, xxiv, xxv, xxxi, xxxiv, see social responsibility xli, 3, 34, 38, 79, 108, 126, 141, 143, 144, Corporate Watch, 56 bbindex.inddindex.indd 228989 77/2/10/2/10 77:32:13:32:13 AAMM 290 Index correcting errors, 27, 281 Davos, xxvi, 189, 247 Corrigan report, see Counterparty Risk de la Villehuchet, René-Thierry Magon, xxv Management Policy Group III de Ramos, Abe, 170, 177, 207 Corston-Smith Asset Management, 63 debt, xxii, xxv, xxxii, xli, 12, 13, 14, 17, 63, 64, Counterparty Risk Management Policy 66, 85, 131, 148, 153, 155, 157, 180, 190, Group III, xxxiii, 142, 194 201, 203, 206, 214–215, 236 coverage, initiations/transfers/terminations defamation, xix, xxxv, xxxviii, xli, 2, 23, 27, of, 106–114 56, 71, 83, 88–91, 137, 138, 270 Cox, Christopher, xxxvi, 84, 246 Dell, 125 Craig, Susanne, 36, 227 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, 204, 280 Cramer, Jim, 23, 84 Delphi Associates, 198 credit, xxii, xxiii, xxvii, xxviii, xxix, xxx, Denmark, 280 xxxiii, xxxv, xxxvi, xxxvii, xl, 8, 9, 10, derivatives, xxix, xxxi, 5, 8, 9, 14, 15, 16–18, 12, 13, 14–15, 16, 17, 18, 28, 71, 83, 126, 28, 46, 150, 191 130, 136, 139–144, 150, 155, 156, 157, Deutsche Bank, 17, 51, 52, 70, 75, 82, 136, 158, 159, 165, 166, 171, 173, 194, 195, 160, 162, 192, 206, 212, 244 201–203, 211, 214, 215, 216, 219, 244, Dharma, 63 246–249, 269 Dickson,
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