Faith and Reason in the First Vatican Council’s Dei Filius and the Writings of Bernard Lonergan by Jeffrey A. Allen A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Theology of St. Michael’s College and the Department of Theology of the Toronto School of Theology in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Theology awarded by the University of St. Michael’s College © Copyright by Jeffrey A. Allen 2012 Faith and Reason in the First Vatican Council’s Dei Filius and the Writings of Bernard Lonergan Jeffrey A. Allen Doctor of Philosophy in Theology University of St. Michael’s College 2012 Abstract This study explores the ways in which presuppositions about human knowing influence stances on faith, reason, and the relationship between them. Such a topic is important not only to scholars in theology, religious studies, and philosophy, but to anyone who wishes to develop a greater awareness of the philosophic assumptions that underlie disputes. The catalyst for this study is an under-investigated connection between the German philosopher Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, the Roman Catholic thinkers Louis- Eugène-Marie Bautain and Anton Günther, and the First Vatican Council’s 1870 constitution Dei Filius. In an effort to refine Immanuel Kant’s account of human knowing such that it will permit knowledge of God’s existence, Jacobi reconceptualizes the cognitive faculty Vernunft (reason) and its relation to Verstand (understanding). Bautain and Günther find appeal in Jacobi’s project and integrate his view of these faculties into their stances on faith, reason, and the relationship between them. The resulting stances are sufficiently unorthodox that they elicit ecclesial responses. The responses anticipate the structure and content of Dei Filius. Such are the topics of interest in chapter one. Chapter two unpacks passages in Dei Filius that pertain to Bautain and Günther, most of ii which treat natural knowledge of God, the acts that lead to faith, and faith itself. Chapter three introduces Bernard Lonergan, whose critique of knowing-as-taking-a-look refutes Jacobi’s account of human knowing. Insofar as this undermines the views of Bautain and Günther, Lonergan supplements a venture of the authors of Dei Filius. Yet Lonergan is a thinker with his own stances on natural knowledge of God, the acts that lead to faith, and faith itself, each of which can be tested for compatibility with Dei Filius. Chapter four shows that Lonergan’s stance on natural knowledge of God is wholly compatible with Dei Filius. Chapter five shows that Lonergan’s early stances on the acts that lead to faith and faith itself are wholly compatible with Dei Filius, whereas his later stances are narrowly compatible with it. The narrow compatibility results from a heightened emphasis on the modern differentiations of consciousness and the fourth level of consciousness. iii Table of Contents Introduction 1 Chapter 1. Louis Bautain and Anton Günther on Faith and Reason 8 1.1 The Schwerpunkt Thesis 1.2 Immanuel Kant on Vernunft and Verstand 1.3 Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi on Vernunft and Verstand 1.4 Joseph Kleutgen on Vernunft and Verstand 1.5 Louis Bautain on Faith and Reason 1.6 Ecclesial Declarations Pertaining to Bautain before the First Vatican Council 1.7 Anton Günther on Faith and Reason 1.8 Ecclesial Declarations Pertaining to Günther before the First Vatican Council Chapter 2. Faith and Reason in the First Vatican Council’s Dei Filius 40 2.1 Key Passages in Chapter One and its Respective Canons 2.2 Key Passages in Chapter Two and its Respective Canons 2.3 Key Passages in Chapter Three and its Respective Canons 2.4 Key Passages in Chapter Four and its Respective Canons Chapter 3. Bernard Lonergan on Human Knowing 66 3.1 Human Knowing 3.2 A Concrete Example 3.3 Retortion and the Foundations of Knowledge 3.4 The Critique of Knowing as Taking a Look 3.5 Knowing as Taking a Look in Kant 3.6 Knowing as Taking a Look in Jacobi Chapter 4. Bernard Lonergan on Natural Knowledge of God 96 4.1 Georges Van Riet and the Schwerpunkt Thesis 4.2 Natural Knowledge of God in Insight 4.3 Natural Knowledge of God in “Natural Knowledge of God” 4.4 Natural Knowledge of God in Method in Theology Chapter 5. Bernard Lonergan on the Acts that Lead to Faith and Faith Itself 117 5.1 Belief in General 5.2 Early Views on the Acts that Lead to Faith 5.3 Early Views on Faith Itself 5.4 Two New Points of Emphasis in the Later Lonergan 5.5 Later Views on the Acts that Lead to Faith 5.6 Later Views on Faith Itself iv Conclusion 150 Bibliography 161 v 1 Introduction In the course of this study I defend five theses: (1) Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi’s (1743-1819) epistemology heavily influences the way Louis-Eugène-Marie Bautain (1796-1867) and Anton Günther (1783-1863) characterize faith, reason, and the relationship between them; (2) Bautain and Günther’s characterizations are implicitly argued against in the First Vatican Council’s 1870 constitution, Dei Filius, especially in its declarations on natural knowledge of God, the acts that lead to faith, and faith itself; (3) the philosophical writings of Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984) refute Jacobi’s epistemology, and, by extension, Bautain and Günther’s characterizations; (4) Lonergan’s stance on natural knowledge of God is wholly compatible with the constitution; (5) the early Lonergan’s stance on the acts that lead to faith and faith itself is wholly compatible with the constitution, whereas the later Lonergan’s stance is narrowly compatible with it. Before I elaborate on these highly specific theses, I want to step back and explain in more general terms why a study of the constitution is relevant and desirable—and why a study putting Lonergan in contact with the constitution is warranted and productive. A study of the constitution is relevant only to the extent that the constitution itself is relevant. A passage in Pope John Paul II’s 1998 encyclical, Fides et Ratio, attests to the latter. It reads, If the Magisterium has spoken out more frequently since the middle of the last century, it is because in that period not a few Catholics felt it their duty to counter various streams of modern thought with a philosophy of their own. At this point, the Magisterium of the Church was obliged to be vigilant lest these philosophies developed in ways which were themselves erroneous and negative. The censures were delivered even-handedly: on the one hand, fideism and radical traditionalism, for their distrust of reason’s natural capacities, and, on the other, rationalism and ontologism because they attributed to natural reason a knowledge which only the light of faith could confer. The positive elements of this debate were assembled in the Dogmatic Constitution Dei Filius, in which for the first 2 time an Ecumenical Council—in this case, the First Vatican Council— pronounced solemnly on the relationship between reason and faith. The teaching contained in this document strongly and positively marked the philosophical research of many believers and remains today a standard reference-point for correct and coherent Christian thinking in this regard.1 This passage is significant, first and foremost, for its explicit attribution of contemporary relevance to the constitution. The passage also renders relevant the nineteenth-century Roman Catholic debates over faith and reason, not only by virtue of the fact that they receive mention in a 1998 encyclical, but also because they are described as engendering the constitution. What is more, Pope John Paul II affixes a footnote to each of the four censured views. Two of the footnotes are of special import to this study. The footnote affixed to “fideism” refers to an ecclesial document pertaining to Bautain; the footnote affixed to “rationalism” refers to an ecclesial document pertaining to Günther. In a moment, I will supply my rationale for selecting Bautain and Günther as representatives of the nineteenth-century debates over faith and reason. At present, suffice it to say that a study of Bautain, Günther and the constitution is relevant. It remains for me to explain why a study treating Bautain, Günther, and the constitution is desirable. Let me begin with the constitution. Lengthy examinations of the constitution are extant in French and German,2 but not in English. The English-language examinations of the document that are available do not span beyond the length of an 1 Pope John Paul II, On the Relationship Between Faith and Reason (Fides et Ratio) (Boston: Pauline Books & Media, 1998), 69-70 [§52]. Italics in the original. 2 Jean-Michael-Alfred Vacant, Études théologiques sur les constitutions du concile du Vatican d’après les actes du concile, 2 vols. (Paris: Delhomme et Briguet, 1895); Roger Aubert, “La constitution Dei Filius du concile du Vatican,” in Le problème de l’acte de foi: Données traditionnelles et résultats des controverses récentes (Louvain: E. Warny, 1958), 131-219; Hermann-Josef Pottmeyer, Der Glaube vor dem Anspruch der Wissenschaft: Die Konstitution über den katholischen Glauben “Dei Filius” des Ersten Vatikanischen Konzils und die unveröffentlichten theologischen Voten der vorbereitenden Kommission (Freiburg: Herder, 1968); Klaus Schatz, Von der Eröffnung bis zur Konstitution “Dei Filius,” vol. 2 of Vaticanum I, 1869- 1870 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1993). 3 article or chapter and invest little or no time unpacking its schematic development.3 Roughly the same situation is found with respect to studies of Bautain and Günther. Lengthy studies of these two thinkers are extant in French and German,4 whereas English-language treatments are—with one exception—no more than a chapter or two in length.5 I take all of the above as evincing the desirability of an English-language study treating Bautain, Günther, and the constitution.