THE LOGIC of the DIETARY LAWS ACCORDING to PHILO One Of

Notae et Miscellanea

DIET AND DESIRE: THE LOGIC OF THE DIETARY LAWS ACCORDING TO PHILO

One of Philo’s recurring ethical themes is the argument that luxury and soft- ness are morally corrupting. This makes an abundance even of good things morally dangerous, or at least potentially so1. For example, gluttony, according to Philo, often leads to debauchery because the passions that reign over the belly in- flame the passions that reign over “the parts below the belly”2. In this way, sati- ety ultimately leads to impiety and insolence3. Philo’s treatment of the Jewish dietary laws is one part of his work that must be seen against the background of this larger ethical topos. This essay will address Philo’s exposition of the dietary laws pertaining to clean and unclean creatures, explore the techniques and possible sources of his allegorism, and assess the ultimate consistency of his interpretive framework4. Philo addresses Jewish dietary prescriptions directly in the fourth book of The Special Laws. Other treatises which contribute to an overall description of Philo’s views include On the Creation (Opif. 163-164), the second and third books of Al- legorical Interpretation (Leg. 2,105-108; 3,138-139), The Posterity of Cain (Post. 148-151), On Agriculture (Agr. 131-145), The Migration of Abraham (Migr. 64-69) and Who Is the Heir of Divine Things? (Her. 239)5. The comments made in this latter group of treatises tend to be more tangential in nature, deviat- ing from Philo’s primary subject matter or appealing to a creature’s clean or unclean status primarily for illustrative purposes. For this reason it is methodologi- cally proper to focus on The Special Laws and to introduce corroboration from the other works as Philo’s own exegesis dictates.

1. Food and Desire Philo’s four books on The Special Laws are a systematic treatment of a variety of pentateuchal laws under rubrics defined by each of the Ten Commandments6. * An earlier form of this study was presented at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature. I would like to express my gratitude to the Philo of Alexan- dria Group for their helpful comments. 1. E.g., Somn. 1,121-123; Mos. 2,58.184; Spec. 1,176; Virt. 161-163. 2. E.g., Agr. 36-38; Somn. 1,122; Abr. 133-136; Spec. 3,43. 3. E.g., Agr. 32.48; Abr. 228; Mos. 2,12-13. 4. Previous surveys of the theme include S. STEIN, The Dietary Laws in Rabbinic and Patristic Literature, in StPatr 2 [TU 64] (1957) 141-154; R.D. HECHT, Patterns of Ex- egesis in Philo’s Interpretation of Leviticus, in SPhilo 6 (1979/80) 77-155, esp. 108-115; and R.M. GRANT, Dietary Laws Among Pythagoreans, Jews, and Christians, in HTR 73 (1980) 299-310. Of these treatments, Hecht’s is the only one which gives focused attention to Philo’s own agenda, though it is highly condensed. While sympathetic to most of Hecht’s conclusions, the present study differs by focusing more closely on the progression of Philo’s argument and the specific exegetical techniques he uses to develop it. 5. Surprisingly, HECHT, Patterns (n. 4), fails to mention Migr. 64-69 and Her. 239. 6. Cf. e.g., Spec. 1,1; 2,1; 3,7; 4,1. THE LOGIC OF THE DIETARY LAWS ACCORDING TO PHILO 123

He addresses the dietary legislation of the Torah in the fourth book, under the rubric of the tenth command, the prohibition of covetousness. Throughout his work, Philo frequently trumpets the dangers of irrational passion and argues that covetous desire (êpi‡umía) is the most grievous of passions (Spec. 4,79-80). Covetous desire tortures a person with the fate of Tantalus, and like a rapidly spreading skin disease, soon infects the entire soul (Spec. 4,81.83). It is the source of all evils, and spawns innumerable vices in the form of thefts and frauds, narcissistic dispositions, tyrannical ambitions, sexual license, and overindulgence in food and drink (Spec. 4,84-91). And as Philo has emphasized elsewhere, the latter is particularly dangerous because it is often the precursor of more serious vices. This is the exegete’s segue into a discussion of the dietary laws. According to Philo, Moses introduced laws pertaining to food and drink precisely to bridle the passion incited by desire. Moses sought to discipline the desires of the belly “as the first step, holding that the other forms [of desire] will cease to run riot” by observing the restraint imposed upon that most notorious source of desires. The restraint imposed by Moses took two forms: first, by re- quiring a person to offer the first fruits of his produce to God; and second, by restricting the kinds of food permitted to the nation (Spec. 4,95-99). Philo’s account of clean and unclean animals begins as follows7: All the animals of the land (xersaíwn), sea (ênúdrwn) or air (ptjn¬n) whose flesh is the finest and fattest, thus titillating and exciting the malig- nant foe pleasure, he sternly forbade them to eat, knowing that they set a trap for the most slavish of the senses, the taste, and produce gluttony (âpljstían), an evil very dangerous both to soul and body. … Now among the different kinds of land animals there is none whose flesh is so delicious as the pig’s (tò su¬n génov), as all who eat it agree, and among the aquatic animals the same may be said of such species as are scaleless (tà génj t¬n âlepídwn)8 … Having special gifts for inciting to self-control (êgkrá- teian) those who have a natural tendency to virtue, he trains and drills them by frugality and simple contentedness and endeavors to get rid of extrava- gance (polutéleian) (Spec. 4,100-101). According to Philo, because gluttony is so dangerous a vice, it must be replaced with the virtue of self-control (êgkráteia); this, in turn produces contentedness (eûkolía), the opposite of covetous desire (êpi‡umía). Philo assures his audience that Moses ordained this legislation with careful forethought, seeking a middle path between Spartan austerity and Sybaritic excess (Spec. 4,102). The “golden mean” is a philosophical ideal that Philo frequently finds at work in the Law of Moses9.

2. The Logic behind Forbidden Carnivores

As he develops his exegesis, Philo advances an allegorical argument that explains why no carnivores are among those animals permitted for food. He finds a moral analogy between the nature of certain animals as wild or tame, and a corre- sponding disposition in the human soul:

7. The translation followed throughout is that of F.H. COLSON, G.H. WHITAKER, and R. MARCUS, Philo of Alexandria in Ten Volumes (and Two Supplementary Volumes) (Loeb Classical Library), Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1929-1962. 8. Cf. the discussion in Plutarch, “Table-Talk”, 4,4,4 – 4,5,1 (Moralia 669C-F). 9. Cf. Spec. 4,168; Post. 101-102; Migr. 147; Abr. 257. 124 J.N. RHODES

Possibly it might be thought just that all wild beasts (‡jría) that feed on human flesh (ºsa sark¬n ân‡rwpínwn †ptetai) should suffer from men what men have suffered from them. But Moses would have us abstain from the enjoyment of such, even though they provide a very appetizing and de- lectable repast. He was considering what is suitable to a gentle-mannered soul (™mérwç cux±Ç), for though it is fitting enough that one should suffer for what one has done, it is not fitting conduct for the sufferers to retaliate it on the wrongdoers, lest the savage (âgríou) passion of anger should turn them unawares into beasts (‡jriw‡éntev) … [H]e also strictly forbade them to eat the other carnivorous (sarkobórwn) animals. He distinguished between them and the graminivorous which he grouped with the gentle (™mérouv) kind since indeed they are naturally tame and live on the gentle fruits (trofa⁄v ™méroiv) which the earth produces and do nothing by way of at- tempting the life of others (Spec. 4,103-104). Philo’s argument is based on word-play between the antonyms ãgriov / Ømerov (“wild”, “savage” / “tame”, “gentle”) and the cognate noun-verb com- bination ‡jríon / ‡jriów. Philo argues that, in a manner of speaking, to prey upon predatory animals is to engage in retaliation, and retaliation is an act that turns men into beasts, because they succumb to the “savage” (âgríou) passion of anger. By contrast, it is “gentle creatures” (™mérouv âgélav), which themselves feed upon the “gentle fruits” (trofa⁄v ™méroiv) of nature, that are suitable food for the “gentle-mannered soul” (™mérwç cux±Ç). Philo’s argument is reminiscent of the high priest Eleazar’s explanation of clean and unclean birds in the Letter of Aristeas (Let. Arist. 145-149)10: For of the winged creatures of which we make use all are gentle (Ømera) and distinguished by cleanliness and they feed on grain and pulse, such as pigeons, doves, ‘locusts’, partridges, and also geese and all similar fowl. But of the winged creatures which are forbidden you will find that they are wild and carnivorous (ãgriá te kaì sarkofága) and with their strength oppress (katadunasteúonta) the rest and procure their food with injustice (metà âdikíav) at the expense of the tame (™mérwn) fowl mentioned above. And not only these, but they also seize lambs and kids, and they do violence (âdikoÕsi) to men too, both the dead and the living. Through these creatures then, by calling them ‘unclean’, he set up a symbol that those for whom the legislation was drawn up must practise righteousness (dikaiosúnjÇ) in spirit and oppress no one (mjdéna katadunasteúein), … just as the gentle creatures (Ømera h¬ça) among the birds above mentioned consume pulses that grow upon the earth and do not tyrannize to the destruc- tion of their kindred (Let. Arist. 145-147). Eleazar infers from this moral analogy that Moses has laid down a general principle: God desires that people be just (e¤nai dikaíouv) and refrain from op- pressing others (ëtérouv katadunasteúein) (Let. Arist. 148). Despite the obvious difference that the Letter of Aristeas focuses for the moment on birds rather

10. Unless otherwise specified, the translation is that of M. HADAS (ed.), Aristeas to Philocrates (Letter of Aristeas), New York, Harper, 1951; repr. Ktav, 1973. Whether or not Philo knew the Letter of Aristeas or simply inherited a similar exegetical tradition is difficult to determine with certainty. The situation is analogous to the famous crux of whether Philo derives his story of the origin of the LXX (Mos. 2,25-44) from Aristeas or an independent tradition. On balance, the wide circulation eventually attained by the Letter of Aristeas favors Philo’s knowledge of that document. THE LOGIC OF THE DIETARY LAWS ACCORDING TO PHILO 125 than quadrupeds, both Philo and Aristeas discern a similar logic operative in the dietary legislation. Creatures that may be eaten are all tame (Ømera) and herbivorous; those that are forbidden are wild (ãgria), carnivorous (sarkofága / sarkobórwn), and aggressive toward other species and even toward humans. For Aristeas the moral lesson is that of justice and the rejection of the idea that “might makes right”; for Philo it is a rejection of vengeance-taking, or plotting against the lives of others11.

3. The Logic in the Criteria for Clean and Unclean Quadrupeds

After explaining why wild, carnivorous beasts are not to be eaten, Philo identifies those quadrupeds that may be eaten, reproducing the list of ten species from Deut 14,4-5 (LXX)12. The fact that precisely ten are named is significant for Philo, and this is in keeping with his interest in numerical speculation generally13. Philo first indulges in a brief digression on the number ten and then offers an explanation of cloven hooves and rumination (tó te dixjle⁄n kaì tò mjru- k¢s‡ai), the criteria by which clean and unclean are distinguished (Spec. 4,106). Philo’s explanation of these criteria is tedious and verbose, but may be summa- rized as follows. Both criteria are symbols (súmbola) by which one learns to distinguish the better things from their opposites (tà beltíw t¬n ênantíwn diakrínetai). The cud-chewing animal, which draws its food up to chew it further, may be compared to the pupil who uses memory (mnßmjÇ) to recall what he has heard, and so gains a firmer grasp of the wisdom imparted by his teacher. The divided hoof, for its part, is a symbol (súmbolon) of that necessary faculty of discriminating (diastolß) and distinguishing (diaíresiv) between what is suitable and what should be rejected. Philo sees an additional symbolism in the divided hoof which reinforces his emphasis on moral discrimination. “For the way of life”, he adds, “is twofold, one branch leading to vice (kakían), the other to virtue (âretßn)” (Spec. 4,106-108). Creatures whose hooves are uniform or multiform are unclean for the following reason: the former signify (aîníttetai) a confused conception of the nature of good and evil; the latter set before us a multitude of paths and fail to point out the best way (Spec. 4,109). Philo’s argument relies on a principal of lexical substitution. The cloven hoof is allegorized by means of terms belonging to the semantic domain of “separation” / “discrimination” (diakrínw, diastolß, diaíresiv). Rumination is mor- alized by treating it as a metaphor for memory (mnßmj). Here again there is some precedent for Philo’s argument in the Letter of Aristeas. The high priest Eleazar

11. The application of strict logic would suggest that the killing of herbivorous animals for food makes human beings not avengers but aggressors. Neither author addresses this obvious problem. It is probable that both authors simply take for granted the use of animals for food (Gen 9,2-3) when they view the animal kingdom as an analogy of human society. Nevertheless, it is worth remembering that allegorical arguments are often arguments of convenience whose logic is loose and imagistic, rather than syllogistic. 12. That is, mósxov, âmnóv, xímarov, ∂lafov, dorkáv, boúbalov, tragélafov, púgargov, ∫ruz, and kamjlopárdaliv. The only appreciable difference between Philo’s list and Deut 14,4-5 (LXX) is that the latter uses the compound expressions mósxon êk bo¬n, âmnòn êk probátwn, and xímaron êz aîg¬n. 13. Philo is especially interested in the number ten. Cf. Decal. 20-31; Post. 48.173. 126 J.N. RHODES highlights the significance of cloven hooves by using the more generic verb diastéllw (“to divide”, “to separate”, “to discriminate”) to explain the more specific dixjléw / dixjleúw (“to part the hoof”). He finds at least two symbolic meanings, which he expounds with the repeated use of diastéllw and its cognate noun diastolß. For the parting, i.e., the ‘dividing’ of the cloven hoof (tò gàr dixjleúein kaì diastéllein öpl±v ∫nuxav)14 is a symbol (sjme⁄on) to discriminate in each of our actions (toÕ diastéllein ∏kasta t¬n prázewn) with a view to what is right … He constrains us, by taking note through these symbols, to do all things with discrimination (metà diastol±v) and with a view to righteousness. An additional signification is that we are set apart (diestálme‡a) from all men. For most of the rest of mankind defile themselves by their promiscuous unions, … But we have been kept apart (diestálme‡a) from such things (Let. Arist. 150b-152). In addition to sharing a similar hermeneutical tactic, it is a curious fact that both writers find two symbolic meanings for the cloven hoof. Eleazar speaks of discrimination in one’s actions (∏kasta t¬n prázewn); this may be compared with Philo’s discriminating and distinguishing between what is appropriate (˜n xrß) and what is not (t¬n ênantíwn). The additional symbolism each one finds is different. In seeing the cloven hoof as a token of Israel’s separation from the nations, Eleazar’s reading moves toward a traditional interpretation of the dietary laws as boundary markers between the chosen people and their pagan neighbors15. However, Philo’s symbolism is no less ingenious: the topos of the “two ways” cleverly complements his emphasis on moral discrimination. Eleazar’s symbolic treatment of rumination may also be seen as a precursor of the argument developed in Philo. His argument progresses as follows: Further, men who possess the aforementioned trait of separation (diastol±v) the lawgiver has characterized as possessing the trait of memory (mnßmjv) also. For whatsoever ‘parteth the hoof and cheweth the cud’ to thinking men clearly signifies memory (mnßmjv). For the chewing of the cud is nothing else than recalling (êpímnjsiv) life and its subsistence, since life appears to subsist through taking food (Let. Arist. 153-154). Eleazar argues, in essence, that to recall one’s food is to recall one’s life, for food is the basis of life. Once Eleazar has established this equation, he points to other commandments or customs, all of which illustrate the remembrance of God in one’s daily life. These include the offering of sacrifice, the use of fringes,

14. I have modified Hadas’ translation of the first sentence. HADAS, Aristeas (n. 10), p. 161, renders: “For the ‘parting of the hoof’ and the ‘cloven foot’…”. However, the ab- sence of the definite article before the second infinitive suggests that an epexegetic reading of kaì diastéllein is preferable. Hadas is eager to show similarities to LXX language, but Aristeas is not as close to Lev 11,3 and Deut 14,6 here as he suggests. 15. Eleazar quickly elaborates this principle of separation in ethical (i.e., sexual) terms: The majority of other nations indulge in many defiling sexual practices; the Jews do not. Even this specification was probably derived from the Torah itself. The sexual perversions highlighted suggests that this exegesis was inspired by Leviticus 20, where a list of sexual prohibitions (Lev 20,10-21) precedes an injunction to be separate from other nations (Lev 20,22-24) and to observe the distinctions between clean and unclean in one’s diet (Lev 20,25). THE LOGIC OF THE DIETARY LAWS ACCORDING TO PHILO 127 tefillin, and mezuzot, and the injunction to remember God upon one’s rising and lying down16. His discourse is littered with vocabulary expressing the idea of “recollection” or “memory” (mimnßskw, §155; mnjmoneúw, §157; mnßmj, §§153[2x].159; êpímnjsiv, §154; mneía, §§155.157.158[2x].161). Despite the similarity of some of their hermeneutical tactics, there remain some noticeable differences between the explanations found in Aristeas and those in Philo. For Philo, both “discrimination” and “memory” are more abstract and philosophical, and apply not only to one’s ethical life, but as much or more to one’s intellectual life, the process by which a “lover of learning” (filoma‡ßv) gains an education in virtue. Philo’s frame of reference is quite far from that of Aristeas when he argues, for example, that creatures whose hooves are uniform or multiform represent confused notions about God or the nature of good and evil (Spec. 4,109). Philo takes up these notions again in Agr. 131-145 and Post. 148- 151, two passages that draw him into symbolic explanations of the camel17. One cannot help but think that in his discussion of rumination and cloven hooves, Philo has wandered from his initial theme of desire and self-control.

4. The Logic of Clean and Unclean Aquatic Creatures

Upon returning to Spec. 4,110-112, we find that Philo follows the legislation in both Leviticus and Deuteronomy by considering aquatic creatures next. He re- peats the criteria laid down in the Law (Lev 11,9-12; Deut 14,9-10), namely, that only those creatures with both fins and scales (ptéruzi kaì lepísi) may be considered clean, but he suggests these criteria demand further clarification. I must state the reason for this which is appropriate enough. Any that fail to possess both or one of these marks are swept away by the current unable to resist the force of the stream; those who possess both throw it aside, front and stem it and pertinaciously exercise themselves (gumnáhetai) against the antagonist (ântípalon) with an invincible ardour and audacity. When they

16. §155, cf. Deut 7,18; 10,21; §158, cf. Num 15,38; Deut 22,12; §§158-159, cf. Deut 6,4-9; 11,13-21. 17. In Agr. 131-145 Philo points to the uncleanness of the camel as an analogy to the kind of theological confusion that could attribute both good and evil to God. Philo argues that the memory of what one has learned (symbolized by rumination) is of little value to the learner who lacks the capacity to distinguish between good and evil (symbolized by the divided hoof). The camel is unclean not because of any obvious logic contained in the criteria if they are literally understood, but because the camel symbolizes this most important principle. The opposite deficiency, however, is no better. Philo sees sophists as the perfect illustration of those who make ultrafine distinctions and yet retain no lasting moral benefit. They are thus like swine, who divide the hoof, but fail to chew the cud. In Post. 148-151, Philo offers an interpretation of Genesis 24 that makes Rebecca’s act of drawing water an allegory of a teacher (Rebecca) imparting wisdom (water) to a pupil (Abraham’s servant). Philo goes on to explain Rebecca’s offer to draw water for the camels by treating the camels as symbols of memory, a faculty most necessary if a pupil is to benefit from his lessons. However, in this passage, his interest in the moral symbolism of rumination and his eagerness to exploit other images (e.g., the water, the well) allow him to overlook the obvious fact that the camel is unclean. Thus, Philo’s main point in Agr. 131- 145, that memory (rumination) is insufficient without discrimination (the cloven hoof), here falls by the wayside. 128 J.N. RHODES

are pushed they push back, when pursued they hasten to assail, where their passage is hampered they open up broad roads (ödoùv eûreíav) and obtain easy thoroughfares (diezódouv eûmare⁄v). These two kinds of fish are sym- bolical (súmbola dè kaì taÕtˆ êstí), the first of a pleasure-loving soul (filjdónou cux±v), the latter of one to which endurance (karterían) and self-control (êgkráteian) are dear (Spec. 4,110-112). Philo’s exegesis thus equates clean and unclean fish with two types of people, the pleasure-lover and the moral athlete. He also suggests an equation between the anatomical criteria of fins and scales and the moral virtues of endurance and self-control. Persons who possess both these virtues are able, like certain fish, to swim against the current; by contrast, pleasure-lovers are simply swept away. Philo’s imagery jumps quickly from the aquatic to the athletic; the latter is typi- cal of Philo’s descriptions of the moral life18. Speaking of the moral athlete’s ability to open up broad roads (ödoùv eûreíav) and easy thoroughfares (diezódouv eûmare⁄v) allows Philo to reprise the topos of the “two ways”, something he had previously found symbolized in the cloven hoof. Philo continues: For the road that leads to pleasure (™donßn) is downhill and very easy, with the result that one does not walk but is dragged along; the other which leads to self-control (êgkráteian) is uphill, toilsome no doubt but profitable ex- ceedingly. The one carries us away, forced lower and lower as it drives us down its steep incline, till it flings us off on to the level ground at its foot; the other leads heavenwards and immortalizes those19 who have not fainted on the way and have had the strength to endure the roughness of the hard ascent (Spec. 4,112). Earlier, Philo had spoken of a twofold path leading either to vice or to virtue. Here the genera “vice” and “virtue” are replaced by the species “pleasure” and “self-control”. The “two ways” imagery works equally well whether one imag- ines roads or rivers. The road that leads to pleasure is downhill and ultimately overpowers the one who chooses that path, just as a fish without scales and fins is unable to resist the force of a downstream current. By contrast, the road leading to self-control is an uphill climb, not unlike swimming against the current. Such is the moral lesson Philo finds symbolized by clean and unclean fish.

5. The Logic of Clean and Unclean¨Erpetá

Philo next addresses the two classes of creeping creatures (ërpetá), terrestrial creepers (Lev 11,41-42) and winged insects (Lev 11,20-23; Deut 14,19-20), both of which the LXX classifies as ërpetá. In so doing, he departs from the order of Leviticus and Deuteronomy by postponing discussion of the clean and unclean birds20. Philo finds three moral analogies in the legislation pertaining to these 18. E.g., Mut. 81-82; Congr. 164-165; Abr. 48; Spec. 1,38. 19. ™ dˆ eîv oûranòn ãgei toùv m® prokamóntav â‡anatíhousa k.t.l. I have modified the Loeb translation “the other leads heavenwards the immortal who have not fainted”, which is somewhat misleading. 20. J. MILGROM, Leviticus 1-16 (Anchor Bible, 3), New York, Doubleday, 1991, pp. 691- 698, explains the separation of Lev 11,41-42 from 11,20-23 on the grounds that 11,24-40 is a later insertion. Philo has no concept of the text’s incremental development, and so his rearrangement must be motivated by other factors. Why he has skipped over the birds (Lev 11,13-19; Deut 14,11-18) to get to the creeping creatures will be dealt with below. THE LOGIC OF THE DIETARY LAWS ACCORDING TO PHILO 129 creatures, the first of which applies to the ërpetá as a class. “By the reptiles”, says Philo, “he signifies (aînittómenov) persons who devote themselves to their bellies (toùv êpì koilíaiv)”. Such persons are enslaved to their stomach (gastrí), addicted to every imaginable culinary delicacy, “thereby fanning and fostering the flame of the insatiable ever-greedy desires”. A second analogy applies to four-legged (tetraskélwn) and many-footed (polupódwn) creatures. These, Philo argues, symbolize “the base slaves not of one passion only, desire, but of all (toùv m® ënòv pá‡ouv, êpi‡umíav, âllà sumpántwn kakoùv doú- louv)”. How so? “[T]he passions fall under four main heads (téttara) but have a multitude (muría) of species, and while the tyranny of one is cruel the tyranny of many (pleiónwn) cannot but be most harsh and intolerable” (Spec. 4,113). Philo’s exegesis is based on a couple of factors. One of these factors is word- play. Philo teases meaning out of the natural association of the words “belly” and “stomach” (koilía / gastßr); he also exploits numerical association by repeat- ing the number “four” (tetraskélwn, téttara) and using several words that contain the idea of “many” or “all” (polupódwn, sumpántwn, muría, pleió- nwn). The idea that the principal passions are four in number was popularized by the Stoics, though it has earlier antecedents21. Far more significant is the fact that Philo probably considered his exegesis to derive from a close reading of Lev 11,42, “And everything that creeps on its belly (êpì koilíav), and everything that goes on four feet (êpì téssara) continually, which abounds with feet (º poluplj‡e⁄ posín)22 among all the reptiles creeping upon the earth – you shall not eat it, for it is an abomination to you”. The third moral analogy adduced by Philo pertains to the winged insects which are permitted by Lev 11,21-22: Creeping things which have legs above their feet, so that they can leap from the ground (pjd¢n âpò t±v g±v), he classes among the clean as for instance the different kinds of grasshoppers (âkrídwn) and the snake-fighter (ôfio- máxjn) as it is called; and here again by symbols (dià sumbólwn) he searches into the temperaments and ways (trópouv) of a reasonable soul (Spec. 4,114). According to Philo, creatures with this capacity to leap are emblematic of persons able to resist the weight of the flesh and the pull of earthbound things. “To leap from the ground” is interpreted as metaphor for moral effort inspired by set- ting one’s sight on heavenly prizes (Spec. 4,115). Philo achieves this allegory by reading âpó for êpí and exploiting the ambiguity of the word g±v (“ground”, “earth”). Such symbolic interpretations of the class of ërpetá are also found in two other treatises, The Migration of Abraham (Migr. 64-69) and Who Is the Heir of

21. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 7,92-93. Diogenes credits Plato with the idea that there are four cardinal virtues (cf. 3,90-91). Philo often speaks of both virtues and vices as four in number (Leg. 1,63-64; Post. 128; Agr. 83; Abr. 236; Q.G. 1,12). 22. The neuter relative pronoun is an inconcinnity, for all potential antecedents are grammatically masculine. The Hebrew text of Leviticus 11,42 suggests that three sub- (”dià pantóv, “continually) ְל ֵעד or ֵעד as ַעד groups are intended. The LXX’s reading of instead of a sequential connective probably contributed to Philo’s treating this description together with the four-legged animals instead of as a third subgroup. See J.W. WEVERS, Notes on the Greek Text of Leviticus (SBLSCS, 44), Atlanta, Scholars Press, 1997, pp. 160- 161. 130 J.N. RHODES

Divine Things (Her. 239). Speaking with reference to many-footed creatures, Philo asks: Now, is not a soul deserving of hatred which moves over the ground not on one part of itself but on all or most parts, even licking with relish the things of the body (tà sÉmatov), and altogether incapable of lifting its eyes to the holy revolutions of heaven? And … just as that which has many feet is dis- allowed, so is that which has no feet … the latter because it lies its full length sprawling upon the earth, lifted out of it by nothing even to the small- est extent: for it says that all that goeth upon the belly (tòn poreuómenon êpì koilían) is unclean, indicating by this figure (aînittómenov) the man who is in pursuit of the pleasures of the belly (tòn t±v gastròv ™donàv metadiÉkonta) (Migr. 64-65). Once again, Philo exploits the natural association of the words “belly” and “stomach” (koilía / gastßr). In this particular passage, he also draws upon the ethical connotations of the verb poreúomai, one of the most frequent LXX particularly in texts which speak of following , ָה ַלך equivalents for the Hebrew God (or other gods)23 or “walking” in God’s ways24. To “proceed upon the belly” is, in effect, to pursue (metadiÉkw) the desires that reside there. In the same way that persons such as these are rightly abominated, those who set their sights on heaven are rightly praised. “Moses”, he states, “gives high approval to those reptiles which can leap upward … These are symbols (súmbola) of the souls which … have been purified (ka‡ar‡e⁄sai) and have strength to soar on high, exchanging earth for heaven, and corruption for immortality” (Her. 239). These “clean” ërpetá thus represent “cleansed” souls. Philo’s concern with the dangers of pleasure informs his explanation of the permitted ërpetá in two additional passages, Opif. 163-164 and Leg. 2,105-108. In the first of these, Philo identifies the serpent in the Garden of Eden with pleasure. He then continues: It is for this reason, I think, that even in the detailed laws, where the lawgiver writes about animals, laying down which may be eaten and which may not, he especially praises the ‘snake-fighter’ (tòn ôfiomáxjn) as it is called … For the snake-fighter (ö ôfiomáxjv) is, I think, nothing but a symbolic representation of self-control (êgkráteia), waging a fight that never ends and a truceless war against intemperance (âkrasían) and pleasure (™donßn) (Opif. 163-164). Philo’s concern with the dangers of pleasure reaches a crescendo in Leg. 2,105-108, where he argues that the leaping ërpetá like the snake-fighter are most appropriately permitted as food. Philo concludes with an apostrophe full of athletic imagery, summoning all his rhetorical vigor against that serpentine enemy, pleasure: Do thou also contend (máxou dß), O my mind, against all passion (pròv p¢n pá‡ov) and above all against pleasure (pròv ™donßn), for indeed ‘the serpent is the most subtle of all the beasts upon the earth, which the Lord God made’; for pleasure (™donß) is the most cunning of all things. Why is this? Because all things are enthralled to pleasure (pánta ™don±v doÕla),

23. E.g., Deut 4,3; 6,14; 8,19; 11,28; 13,3; 28,14. 24. E.g., Deut 10,12; 26,17; 28,9. THE LOGIC OF THE DIETARY LAWS ACCORDING TO PHILO 131

and the life of bad men is under the dominion of pleasure (despóhetai üfˆ ™don±v) … It is for the sake of pleasure that we do wrong (âdikoÕmen diˆ ™donßn), and wrong deeds are ever associated with desperate cunning. Therefore set judgment, the serpent-fighter (t®n ôfiomáxon gnÉmjn), against it, and contend to the end in this noblest contest, and strive earnestly, by defeating pleasure that conquers all others (†pantav nikÉsjv ™don±v), to win the noble and glorious crown which no human assembly has ever be- stowed (Leg. 2,106-108). One question remains. Why, in Spec. 4,113, did Philo skip over the class of the birds in order to treat the ërpetá immediately after the aquatic creatures? A glance at the third book of the Allegorical Interpretation shows that this was wholly in keeping with Philo’s agenda. Philo’s explanation of clean and unclean fish had equated them with two types of people, the moral athlete and pleasure- lover. In Leg. 3,138-139, he states: We have already mentioned that pleasure goes not only on its breast but also on its belly, and pointed out that the stomach is a place most appropriate to pleasure, for we may almost describe it as a reservoir of all the pleasures (âgge⁄on t¬n ™don¬n äpas¬n) … And so the prophet says in another passage, “Whatsoever goeth upon the belly, and whatsoever goeth all the time upon four feet, which hath many feet, is unclean”. The lover of pleasure (filßdonov) answers to this description, always going after the belly and the pleasures of the adjoining parts25. Ultimately, Philo identifies both the unclean aquatic creatures and the unclean ërpetá with the pleasure-lover (filßdonov). Philo’s argument moves from a discussion of pleasure in general to a discussion of the belly as the seat of the appetites – and it is this which motivates him to treat the ërpetá immediately after the aquatic creatures.

6. The Logic of Clean and Unclean Birds

At long last, Philo addresses the subject of permitted and forbidden birds. It will be remembered that, in contrast to the other classes of creatures, neither Le- viticus nor Deuteronomy offers any formal criteria for distinguishing clean from unclean fowl. Instead, both Lev 11,13-19 and Deut 14,11-18 simply list those species or groups of species forbidden to be eaten. Of these [inhabitants of the air] he disqualified a vast number of kinds, in fact all that prey on other fowls or on men (ºsa Æ katˆ ãllwn Æ katˆ ân‡rÉpwn fon¢ç), creatures which are carnivorous (sarkobóra) and ven- omous (îobóla) and in general use their strength to attack others (sunólwv êpiboúloiv kexrjména ta⁄v dunámesi). But doves (fáttav), pigeons (peristeráv), turtledoves (trugónav), and the tribes of cranes (geránwn), geese (xjn¬n) and the like he reckons as belonging to the tame and gentle (™mérwç) class and gives to any who wish full liberty to make use of them as food (Spec. 4,116-117). The first thing one notices about this explanation is that it seems underde- veloped in comparison with Philo’s treatment of the other classes of creatures. 25. Emphasis added. 132 J.N. RHODES

Philo identifies the forbidden birds as aggressive and predatory, and evokes the ãgriov – Ømerov distinction introduced earlier, but he does not explicitly draw the moral analogy we expect. Philo probably expects his readers to draw this con- clusion themselves on the basis of his earlier argument against carnivorous beasts in Spec. 4,103-104. If this is an accurate assessment, then §§116-117 also func- tion as an inclusio with §§103-104. It is worth noting that Philo proceeds by naming the types of birds that Jews do eat, instead of naming the forbidden species as do Lev 11,13-19 and Deut 14,11-18. In this respect, Philo’s procedure resembles that of Aristeas, who also mentions pigeons (peristeraí), doves (trugónev), and geese (x±nev) (Let. Arist. 145). As does Aristeas, Philo also explicitly identifies the unclean birds as carnivorous creatures that will even prey on human beings. Otherwise, Philo’s treatment here lacks the repetition and explicit moralizing of Aristeas’ account.

7. Food and Desire, Revisited

Philo’s summary brings his argument full circle: Thus in each element of the universe, earth, water, air he withdrew from our use various kinds of each sort, land creatures (xersa⁄a), water creatures (∂nudra), flying fowls (ptjná), and by this as by the withdrawal of fuel from a fire he creates an extinguisher to desire (sbésin t±v êpi‡umíav) (Spec. 4,118). Philo had begun by stressing the danger of desire (êpi‡umía) in general and by identifying gluttony as one particular manifestation of its power. The “all-wise Moses” chose to discipline the appetites of the belly as a “first step” toward bringing desire under the rein of self-control (Spec. 4,96). Philo now argues that Moses has carried out his agenda consistently and thoroughly, having withheld some creatures from each of their three possible habitats. Special Laws 4,118 forms an inclusio with 4,100-102. According to Philo, the over- arching purpose of the dietary laws is the extinction (sbésin) of desire’s inherent power. Many of the specific moral analogies that Philo has developed undergird this larger purpose. This is especially true in the case of the aquatic creatures and the ërpetá, where clean and unclean species respectively symbolize freedom from, or slavery to, a life of pleasure. Some of the other moral analogies, such as those pertaining to cloven hooves, rumination, and carnivorous creatures, fit less naturally with Philo’s overall theme26. It is precisely here that Philo seems most in- debted to earlier traditions, even if he raises them to a higher level of sophistica- tion. Philo’s philosophical explanation of the Jewish dietary laws bears some similarity to the argument developed in 4 Maccabees inasmuch as it draws on the po- larity between reason (self-control) and passion (desire). Still there is a differ-

26. HECHT, Patterns (n. 4), p. 114, overstates the case somewhat when he says, “Each group of clean animals is there to represent a soul not brought downward by the passions”. This motif is far less developed in the material devoted to land animals and birds. THE LOGIC OF THE DIETARY LAWS ACCORDING TO PHILO 133 ence. For 4 Maccabees it is the individual who is able, with the help of devout reason, to quell the desire for things forbidden (4 Macc 1,33-35). For Philo it was Moses who drew the soul back to reason by disciplining the appetites of the belly (Spec. 4,95-96).

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A Map of Philo’s Argument, with Special Reference to the Letter of Aristeas

The Special Laws Other Treatises Letter of Aristeas

The dangers of desire 4,79-94

Food as the “first step” 4,95-99

Argument Proper: Clean and Unclean Creatures

Inclusio: the principle of restriction 4,100-102

Land animals: carnivorous beasts 4,103-104 [Let. Arist. 145-150]

Land animals: Post. 148-151 quadrupeds and their 4,105-109 Let. Arist. 150-161 Agr. 131-145 criteria

Aquatic creatures 4,110-112 and their criteria

¨Erpetá and Leg. 3,138-139 4,113 their criteria Migr. 64-69

Opif. 163-164 ¨Erpetá: 4,114-15 Leg. 2,105-108 the exceptions Her. 239

Birds 4,116-117 Let. Arist. 145-150

Inclusio: 4,118 the principle of restriction