september 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 9

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point CTC Sentinel Objective . Relevant . Rigorous

Contents Are the Afghan Taliban Involved

FEATURE ARTICLE in International Terrorism? 1 Are the Afghan Taliban Involved in By Anne Stenersen International Terrorism? By Anne Stenersen

Reports 5 The Insurgent-Narcotic Nexus in Helmand Province By Captain Michael Erwin, U.S. Army 8 The Expansion Strategy of Al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula By Gregory D. Johnsen 11 A Profile of Pakistan’s Lashkar-i-Jhangvi By Arif Jamal 14 The Failure of Salafi-Jihadi Insurgent Movements in the Levant By Bilal Y. Saab 18 The Dangerous Ideas of the Neo-Zarqawist Movement By Murad Batal al-Shishani 20 The July 17 Jakarta Suicide Attacks and the Death of Noordin Top By Noor Huda Ismail Afghan Taliban walk through a bazaar in Quetta, Pakistan in 2005. - Photo by Robert Nickelsberg/Getty Images n a video aired on ABC News frequently use “al-Qa`ida-style” anti- 22 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity in June 2007, Afghan Taliban Western rhetoric, and insurgents have 24 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts commander Mansour Dadullah endorsed suicide bombing as a tactic—a

is shown speaking to a group of phenomenon previously unknown in Iaround 300 masked men. The men are Afghanistan. Moreover, the Afghan presented as “suicide bombers” about to Taliban’s most immediate enemies are go on missions in Western countries, in the United States and its allies, who particular to the United States, Canada, they claim have occupied their country the United Kingdom and Germany.1 since 2001. They do not shun attacking The video created considerable media and killing foreigners—civilian as well attention, but was soon dismissed as military—inside Afghanistan. Is it About the CTC Sentinel as “jihadist bravado” rather than only a matter of time before the Afghan The Combating Terrorism Center is an representing a genuine threat. Two years Taliban start engaging more directly in independent educational and research after it was aired, the Afghan Taliban have international terrorism?3 institution based in the Department of Social yet to put Dadullah’s words into action. Sciences at the United States Military Academy, West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses The Afghan Taliban movement has Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (London: Hurst, the Center’s global network of scholars and changed considerably since it was first 2007), p. 13. practitioners to understand and confront formed in southern Afghanistan in 1994, 3 As a starting point, it is essential to distinguish between contemporary threats posed by terrorism and and it has been described by some scholars the various layers of the Afghan insurgency. The Afghan other forms of political violence. as an integrated part of the global jihadist Taliban leadership (Mullah Omar and his shura council, movement.2 Afghan Taliban leaders also referred to as the Quetta shura) gives general directions and speaks on behalf of the organization, while local com- The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, manders in Afghanistan and in the tribal areas of Pakistan the Department of the Army, or any other agency 1 “Inside the Taliban Graduation,” ABC News, June 28, carry out militant activities in the Taliban’s name, often of the U.S. Government. 2007. with a high degree of autonomy. Foreign militant networks 2 Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The such as the “Pakistani Taliban” and al-Qa`ida support

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This article assesses the likelihood troops, and Afghan civilians. Foreign Taliban said these retaliations would of the Afghan Taliban carrying out civilians inside Afghanistan have also be limited to attacking Dutch soldiers terrorist attacks in the homelands of been subjected to attacks. This includes inside Afghanistan, and they also NATO countries that are militarily targeted attacks on foreign diplomats claimed to have carried out actual engaged in Afghanistan.4 It argues that and NGO workers, but also terrorist attacks to this end: while individual insurgent commanders attacks against places frequented by have issued threats to attack the West, foreigners. The Afghan Taliban use On our part we pledge revenge— the senior leaders of the Afghan Taliban these attacks to achieve political and Allah willing—on these Dutch are currently uninterested in pursuing propaganda aims and to support the soldiers with the value of their such a strategy. While this may be wider insurgent effort. For example, skulls, who came to our land as due to a number of factors, this article the Afghan Taliban have claimed that occupiers and where most are stresses that such a venture could diplomatic missions from NATO states present in Uruzgan Province. The easily jeopardize the Afghan Taliban are targeted because they have troops killing of two of them yesterday leadership’s sanctuaries in Pakistan. stationed in Afghanistan. After the and the destruction of their At the same time, it cannot be excluded bombing of the German Embassy in tanks are a part of the series of that such attacks could be carried out Kabul in 2008, a Taliban spokesman revenge...9 by lower echelons of the network or by individual sympathizers, especially if Overall, there is little doubt that the opportunity arises. The Baitullah “The Afghan Taliban the Afghan Taliban are hostile to Mehsud-led faction of the Pakistani leadership is probably the West and that they do not shun Taliban has already shown willingness attacking foreigners—civilian as well to exploit such opportunities, making reluctant to carry out as military—inside Afghanistan. Yet, them a greater immediate terrorism actions that would attacking Western targets outside of threat to Western countries than the Afghanistan’s conflict zone is a different Afghan Taliban.5 increase the pressure on its matter. sanctuaries in Pakistan.” Attacks on Westerners Inside Afghanistan Specific Threats and Plots to Attack in Western The Afghan Taliban’s insurgent Countries campaign uses a mixture of guerrilla Mullah Dadullah and his brother warfare and terrorist tactics. Most justified it by saying, “The Germans Mansour Dadullah were the Afghan attacks have targeted Afghan police have forces in the north of Afghanistan Taliban leaders who most explicitly and security forces, international and they are involved in the killing of threatened to take the battle outside innocent Afghans.” The spokesman also Afghanistan’s borders. Mullah Dadullah, the Afghan Taliban insurgency, but they typically have threatened that “the Taliban will target who was a member of the Afghan wider agendas and carry out attacks in their own name. all those countries that have forces in Taliban’s shura council and commander 6 Moreover, in this article it has been assumed that the of- Afghanistan.” in southern Afghanistan, was killed ficial views of the senior Afghan Taliban leadership are in May 2007. He was succeeded by those that are expressed through the official websites, The Afghan Taliban have also expressed his brother, Mansour Dadullah, who communiqués and spokesmen of the Islamic Emirate of enmity toward the West for other subsequently appeared in a series of Afghanistan. Mullah Omar himself stated in 2007: “The reasons than the military “occupation” interviews and propaganda videos. comments of the Islamic Emirate are those which are of their country. Countries that are Mansour Dadullah, for instance, was released by our official spokesmen and our al-Emarah perceived as insulting Islam or the the leader who threatened to dispatch web page.” For more, see Mukhtar A. Khan, “Quetta: Prophet Muhammad, such as Denmark suicide bombers to Western countries 10 The Headquarters of the Afghan Taliban,” CTC Sentinel and the Netherlands, have been directly in June 2007. Interestingly, Mansour 7 2:5 (2009). threatened. The Netherlands received Dadullah was sacked from the Taliban 4 For other studies discussing the internationalization several threats in 2008 after a Dutch in December 2007, officially because he 11 of local conflicts, see Åshild Kjøk, Thomas Hegghammer, politician, Geert Wilders, released the refused to obey the chain of command. Annika Hansen et al., Restoring Peace or Provoking Terror- Islam-critical movie called Fitna. The ism? Exploring the Links between Multilateral Military Inter- Afghan Taliban leadership’s statements 9 Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, “Statement from the ventions and International Terrorism (Kjeller: Norwegian encouraged all Muslims of the world Shura Council on the Production of a Film Desecrating 8 Defence Research Establishment, 2003); Brynjar Lia to take revenge against the “insults.” the Qur’an by a Member of Parliament in Holland,” March and Åshild Kjøk, Islamist Insurgencies, Diasporic Support At the same time, however, the Afghan 30, 2008; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, “Heavy Casu- Networks, and Their Host States - The Case of the Algerian alties Were Inflicted on the Dutch Forces in Uruzgan (in GIA in Europe 1993-2000 (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence 6 “Two Dead in Explosion Near German Embassy,” Der revenge for the film Fitna by Geert Wilders),” March 31, Research Establishment, 2001); Matthew Levitt, ”Could Spiegel, January 17, 2009. 2008; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, “Killing 8 Dutch Hamas Target the West?” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 7 In 2005, a series of 12 cartoons representing the Occupiers, Including the Son of the Commander of the 30:11 (2007): pp. 925-945. Prophet Muhammad appeared in the Danish Newspaper Dutch Forces, in the Series of Revenge Operations in Re- 5 For more on the European plot that allegedly involved Jyllands-Posten, which sparked a wave of protests across taliation for the Publishing of the Harmful Film ‘Fitna,’” the Baitullah Mehsud-led Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, the Muslim world. April 21, 2008. see Fernando Reinares, “A Case Study of the January 8 Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, “The Eternal Enemies 10 “Inside the Taliban Graduation.” 2008 Suicide Bomb Plot in Barcelona,” CTC Sentinel 2:1 of Islam Have Committed Another Historic Crime!” 11 There was speculation that he was trying to establish (2009). April 1, 2008. an independent power base with support from his al-

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The exact nature of the relationship take action in your capitalist public transportation system.19 In a between the Dadullah brothers and al- department stores and this time, videotaped interview released in August Qa`ida is not known.12 Mullah Dadullah’s without warning.15 that year, TTP spokesman Maulvi Omar statements, and those of his brother took responsibility for the plot. He said Mansour, have on several occasions It is not publicly known whether any that the men “were under pledge to contradicted the official statements of members of the alleged group were Baitullah Mehsud” and indicated that the Afghan Taliban leadership. The arrested, but in any case there were the attacks were motivated by Spain’s Dadullah brothers were also known to few indications that the group had military presence in Afghanistan.20 run their own media campaign (through any organizational links to the Afghan There were other indications of links a local “media agency” called Umar Taliban or al-Qa`ida. As analysts noted, between the arrested militants and Studio), indicating a certain desire to act the language in the letter as well as the TTP. Notably, one of the group’s autonomously. Ultimately, there were the group’s modus operandi seemed to members claimed to have received few indications that Mansour Dadullah resemble left-wing activists more than training in Waziristan and Afghanistan, had the actual will or capabilities to militant Islamists.16 As far as is known, as well as having met with the TTP’s follow up on his threat. In the two years neither the Afghan Taliban leadership leader.21 after the video was issued, no firm links nor Farouq’s group issued any further have been established between arrested comments in the case. The failure The Barcelona case indicates that the terrorist suspects in Western countries of the Afghan Taliban leadership to TTP leadership is willing to be associated and Dadullah or the Afghan Taliban. publicly refute Farouq’s statement, or with, and possibly also directly involved statements from the Dadullah brothers, in, international terrorist plots. This Another example of threats against the is not necessarily indicative of their is in contrast to the Afghan Taliban, West was a video aired on al-Arabiya tacit approval; the Afghan Taliban which have not yet been associated with in November 2008.13 The video showed leadership generally avoids criticizing any plots to launch attacks in Western a local Afghan Taliban commander members in public to avoid fueling countries. nicknamed “Farouq,” who claimed rumors of splits or disagreements responsibility for killing 10 French within the movement.17 Capabilities and Opportunities soldiers in an ambush in Kabul Province An important reason why the Afghan on August 18, 2008. He warned France Pakistani Taliban a Different Case Taliban leadership is not taking their that they should withdraw from The Pakistani Taliban, which is distinct battle to Western countries may be Afghanistan or “they will hear our from the Afghan Taliban, has a record of the lack of capability. Unlike groups response in Paris.”14 involvement in international terrorism. such as the Algerian Armed Islamic Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), led Group (GIA) or al-Qa`ida, which have The local commander’s threats to carry by Baitullah Mehsud until his recent both staged a series of terrorist attacks out attacks in Paris appeared to be death, has made explicit threats to in Europe, the Taliban do not have bravado. In December 2008, however, attack the West, and it has even claimed strong and active support networks in explosives were found in a department responsibility for such attacks. While the West. Most of its foreign support store in Paris, and a group calling not part of the Afghan Taliban, it is networks are believed to be located itself the Afghan Revolutionary Front useful to compare the TTP’s claims in the Gulf region and in Pakistan.22 claimed responsibility. In a letter, the with those of Afghan Taliban militants. Nevertheless, they could theoretically group stated, Some of the TTP’s claims have been coordinate with the al-Qa`ida network unsubstantiated, such as in April or other foreign militants present in Send the message to your president 2009 when Baitullah Mehsud claimed Pakistan and Afghanistan to carry that he must withdraw his troops responsibility for a firearms attack out attacks on their behalf; it appears, from our country before the end on a U.S. immigration center in New however, that they have decided of February 2009 or else we will York State, carried out by a Vietnamese against this strategy. For example, the national.18 A more interesting case is Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) has attracted Qa`ida allies, and it was feared that he would become a the Barcelona plot, revealed in January volunteers from Europe who have rival to Mullah Omar. See “Dadullah Sacking Highlights 2008, when a dozen Pakistanis and carried out operations in Afghanistan 23 Taliban Rifts,” Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, Jan- two Indians were arrested in Spain and on behalf of the Haqqani network. uary 16, 2008. accused of plotting to attack Barcelona’s In the most publicized incident, a 12 There are few details of this relationship in open sources. It can be noted, however, that besides Shaykh 19 For a detailed analysis of this plot and its international Muhammed Yasir, Mullah Dadullah and his brother 15 “Explosives Found in Paris Store,” BBC, December links, see Reinares. Mansour are the only high-ranking Taliban members 16, 2008. 20 “NEFA Exclusives: Video Interviews with Top Paki- who have been featured by al-Qa`ida’s propaganda 16 “Explosives Found in Paris Department Store,” Times stani Taliban Spokesman Maulvi Omar,” NEFA Foun- agency al-Sahab. Online, December 17, 2008. dation, August 29, 2008. 13 “Taliban Threatens to Carry Out Operations ‘in Paris’ 17 The official sacking of Mansour Dadullah by the Tali- 21 Reinares. Unless France Withdraws from Afghanistan,” al-Ar- ban leadership in December 2007 was an exceptional 22 “Taliban’s Foreign Support Vexes U.S.,” Wall Street abiya, November 18, 2008; “Taliban Video Warning to case. Journal, June 1, 2009. France,” Reuters, November 17, 2008. 18 “Pakistani Taliban Chief Claims U.S. Shooting,” Reu- 23 Einar Wigen, Islamic Jihad Union: al-Qaida’s Key to the 14 “Taliban Kill 10 French Troops in Afghanistan,” Reu- ters, April 13, 2009; “FBI Rejects Mehsud’s Claim for NY Turkic World? (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Es- ters, August 19, 2008. Attack,” Dawn, April 4, 2009. tablishment, 2009).

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German national of Turkish origin, leadership is in Afghanistan, and our victory because it had promised to pull Cüneyt Ciftci, carried out a suicide activities are inside Afghanistan.”29 Spanish forces out of Iraq. A document attack against a U.S. military base in Notably, the Afghan Taliban have was circulated on jihadist websites prior Khost.24 The attack was commended also distanced themselves from al- to the attack arguing in favor of such by Jalaluddin Haqqani himself, Qa`ida’s global terrorist campaign. a strategy, and it is possible that the illustrating the direct link between the In an interview in 2009, Zabihullah document had inspired the attackers.32 foreign militants and the local group.25 Mujahid said, “Taliban is one thing and It appears that if the Haqqani network al Qaeda is another. They are global Similarly, the Afghan Taliban leadership wanted to send militants to carry out we are just in the region.”30 It should is fully aware of the disagreements attacks in Europe, it would have enough be noted that the Afghan Taliban and fault lines within NATO, and they candidates. Notably, the Sauerland understand that in several European cell—a group of German nationals who “It appears that while countries there is low public support plotted to carry out terrorist attacks in for the war. The Afghan Taliban Germany in 2006—was said to have ties Afghan militants may use have issued statements33 to European with the IJU and had received training foreign volunteers to fight audiences encouraging them to stop in North Waziristan.26 Still, there were supporting their country’s politics and no indications that they were acting on in their local guerrilla war, to stop “serving America’s interests.”34 behalf of the Afghan Taliban or other they seem less interested Nevertheless, one might wonder why local groups, despite the fact that the the Taliban have not sought to better Afghan Taliban have identified Germany in using them to carry out exploit NATO’s weak points. as one of its main enemies. attacks abroad.” The answer may lie in the fact that It appears that while Afghan militants the Afghan Taliban have strong may use foreign volunteers to fight in disincentives for carrying out attacks their local guerrilla war, they seem leadership has not officially denounced abroad. Although not stated directly, less interested in using them to carry al-Qa`ida or its activities, and they have the Afghan Taliban leadership is out attacks abroad. When Sirajuddin stated that al-Qa`ida and other foreign probably reluctant to carry out activities Haqqani was asked about the foreigners Muslims are welcome to join their that would increase the pressure on its he trained—in particular the militants fight in Afghanistan.31 Nevertheless, it sanctuaries in Pakistan. Since 2001, from the IJU—he stated that “we appears that the Afghan Taliban leaders the Pakistani government has been are concerned with the war here in themselves do not wish to be associated allied with the United States in the “war Afghanistan, and prefer them to carry with al-Qa`ida’s global jihadist on terrorism,” but at the same time out attacks here.”27 In another interview strategy. it is widely believed that the Afghan he was even more explicit, saying: Taliban have enjoyed unofficial support One might argue that it is merely a from within Pakistan’s territory. This We have asked our allies whether question of “ideology” and traditions. might explain why the presence of living in Pakistan or any other The Afghan Taliban leadership, Afghan Taliban leaders on Pakistani part of the world to carry out however, is not static and unchangeable; soil has been somewhat “tolerated” by attacks against Americans only in the endorsement of suicide bombing Pakistan since 2001, while a number of Afghanistan and not in any other as a tactic after 2001 is one example al-Qa`ida members have been actively country. Our policy is that we of that. A more accurate answer may pursued and arrested. In 2004, the would not interfere in the affairs of be found by looking at the incentives Pakistan Army started to crack down on any other country whether it is an and disincentives the Afghan Taliban Islamic or non-Islamic country.28 leadership may have for carrying out a 32 Brynjar Lia and Thomas Hegghammer, “Jihadi Stra- terrorist attack in the West. tegic Studies: The Alleged Al Qaida Policy Study Preced- This also appears to be the policy of the ing the Madrid Bombings,” Studies in Conflict and Terror- Afghan Taliban leadership. In 2008, Incentives and Disincentives ism 27:5 (2004): pp. 355-375. the official spokesman of the Afghan A possible incentive for the Afghan 33 It should be noted that the Taliban’s propaganda does Taliban, Zabihullah Mujahid, stated Taliban to plot attacks in the West would not resemble jihadist “strategic literature” with its quasi- that “the Mujahideen of the Islamic be to create a “Madrid effect.” This neutral analyses and specific strategy recommendations. Emirate are based in Afghanistan, the refers to the terrorist attack carried out Rather, the propaganda aims at justifying the Afghan by militant Islamists in Madrid in 2004. Taliban’s actions in retrospect, and it quotes sources se- 24 “Germany’s First Suicide Bomber in Afghanistan?” The attack was executed shortly before lectively to convey the impression that a Taliban victory Der Spiegel, March 15, 2008. the Spanish elections, and probably is inevitable. 25 “Video: Afghanistan: Veteran Mujahadeen Defies contributed to the opposition party’s 34 The IJU and al-Qa`ida have been even more explicit, West,” Adnkronos International, undated. encouraging people in Germany to vote for politicians in 26 Petter Nesser, “Lessons Learned from the September 29 “Interview with Taliban Spokesman Zabiullah Muja- the upcoming elections who want to pull German troops 2007 German Terrorist Plot,” CTC Sentinel 1:4 (2008). hid,” NEFA Foundation, February 1, 2008. out of Afghanistan, and also threatening actual attacks. 27 “Interview with Taliban Commander Sirajuddin 30 “Transcript: Afghan Taliban Spokesman Discusses For example, the propaganda uses the low public support Haqqani,” NEFA Foundation, August 18, 2008. War,” CNN, May 5, 2009. for the war in Germany as “proof” that NATO is about to 28 “Taliban’s Siraj Haqqani Shrugs Off $5m Bounty,” 31 “Agha Jan Mu’tasim: The Struggle in Afghanistan and collapse; it is not written as an explicit recommendation AfPax Insider, July 4, 2009. Opportunities for Dialogue,” al-Jazira, May 10, 2009. to its followers to carry out attacks inside Germany.

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Pakistani militants in the tribal areas, The Insurgent-Narcotic Rais Baghrani largely controls the initially because they were suspected of course of the 100 mile-long valley hiding international terrorists but more Nexus in Helmand starting just north of Musa Qala recently because they have become Province district.4 Sher Mohammed Akhundzada5 a security threat to the regime itself. and his affiliates exert the most Today, Pakistani authorities are under By Captain Michael Erwin, U.S. Army influence in the central region, where increasing pressure to do more about approximately 75% of the province’s the Afghan Taliban’s sanctuaries as for the past four years, there has been population resides. The historically well, especially since these sanctuaries a rising level of collusion between corrupt Baluchi tribe controls a majority are seen as an impediment to the U.S. insurgents and narcotic powerbrokers of the province’s southern region.6 and NATO counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan’s Helmand Province. Together, these distinctly different in Afghanistan.35 Between 2002 and 2005, the Afghan regions of Helmand are responsible Taliban-led insurgency in southern for growing more than half the world’s The Afghan Taliban have consistently Afghanistan focused its attention poppy.7 These leaders and other narco- denied having any organizational primarily in Kandahar and Uruzgan powerbrokers in Helmand have formed affiliation with the Pakistani Taliban, provinces.1 Coalition forces and Afghan a synergistic relationship with Taliban or to have any ambition outside National Security Forces (ANSF) largely insurgents where they work together to Afghanistan at all.36 Under the current left the poppy fields alone in Helmand; plant, protect and harvest poppy fields circumstances, to start engaging in in return, Helmand powerbrokers and then transport the product to drug international terrorism would be too resisted opportunities to attack labs and out of the country; in exchange, risky for its overall strategy. As long coalition forces. Militants launched the Taliban tax the farmers and also as the Afghan Taliban are experiencing sporadic attacks, but nothing similar earn money when the drugs exchange relative success with their present to the level of violence in Helmand hands in neighboring countries. Most strategy, there is a lack of incentive to today. The violence and casualty rates major narcotics leaders have ties to the venture into new territory. in Helmand currently surpass any other government, whether at the national province in Afghanistan.2 Moreover, or local level, and therefore coalition Anne Stenersen is a Research Fellow despite the highest international troop forces cannot target them effectively. and Ph.D. candidate with the Terrorism presence of anywhere in Afghanistan, Research Group at the Norwegian Defence the drug trade originating in Helmand Until 2006, minimal coalition presence Research Establishment (FFI). She holds is still a leading source of revenue for in Helmand clearly signaled to Helmand an M.Phil. in Arabic studies from the the insurgency in the southern part of Afghans that their livelihood of growing University of Oslo and is the author of the the country.3 With a limited number poppies was secure. This changed in book Al-Qaida’s Quest for Weapons of of troops and resources, the hope for the summer of 2006 when coalition Mass Destruction: The History Behind Helmand Province, and indeed the forces entered the province in sizeable the Hype. Her current research focuses entire region, rests on the ability to numbers and were accompanied by a on Islamist insurgencies in Afghanistan break down this relationship, known as and Pakistan. She would like to thank Dr. the “insurgent-narcotic nexus.” 4 Rais Baghrani fought against the Russians in the 1980s Thomas Hegghammer for his assistance and was formerly a high-ranking member of the Taliban with this article. This article will briefly outline the in the 1990s under Mullah Omar’s leadership. In 2005, problems caused by past efforts of poppy after eluding coalition forces for more than three years, eradication, relay recent successful Baghrani accepted amnesty and abandoned the Taliban counter-nexus operations in Helmand movement. He still controls the Baghran Valley, howev- Province, and define the challenges er, which is responsible for growing a significant amount ahead. Furthermore, it will explain of poppy. He is clearly involved in the drug trade, but he the significance of undermining the is no longer an ideological member of the Taliban move- insurgent-narcotic nexus to improve ment. the prospects for mission success in 5 Sher Mohammed Akhundzada is married to President Afghanistan. Hamid Karzai’s sister. He was the former governor of Helmand Province but was removed from office by Presi- A Brief History dent Karzai under pressure from the United Kingdom for The first step to analyzing the current his role in narcotics; an estimated nine tons of poppy was state of the insurgency in Helmand discovered in the basement of his house in 2005. Since Province is to identify the province’s his departure from governorship, violence has skyrock- three primary regions and their eted in Helmand Province. associated powerbrokers. In the north, 6 The Baluchi tribe numbers an estimated 120,000 in southern Helmand and controls the southern-most dis- 1 Personal discussion, MSG Tristan Schlientz, Kanda- tricts, most notably the area called Baram Cha, which is har, Afghanistan, August 2006. the gateway for drugs moving to Pakistan and weapons/ 35 “Taliban’s Sanctuary Bases in Pakistan Must be Elim- 2 Paul Waugh, “1,000 Killed or Wounded in Afghan ammunition moving into Afghanistan. inated,” RAND Corporation, June 9, 2008. Conflict,”London Evening Standard, August 17, 2009. 7 “U.S. Aims to Deprive Taliban of Drug Revenue by 36 “Interview with Taliban Spokesman Zabiullah Muja- 3 Karen DeYoung, “U.S. and Britain Again Target Pop- Promoting Alternate Crops to Opium,” Associated Press, hid,” NEFA Foundation, February 1, 2008. py Crop,” Washington Post, August 2009. June 27, 2009.

5 september 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 9 significantly more aggressive poppy and transportation phases by raiding witnessed the most effective targeting eradication effort.8 The eradication drug laboratories and interdicting of the insurgent-narcotic nexus in program—backed by both the Afghan narcotics convoys. This change of policy Helmand to date. Amid several other government and coalition forces— will lead to more large-scale poppy significant counternarcotics operations, cultivated within the provincial interdiction without directly affecting U.S. Special Forces conducted Operation population intense feelings of mistrust farmers’ livelihood. Siege Engine during a period of five and disdain for the government, Afghan weeks in April and May that interdicted security forces and coalition troops.9 The insurgent-narcotic nexus is millions of dollars worth of poppy, While poppy eradication achieved the biggest obstacle to progress in precursor chemicals, weapons and relative success in Nangarhar Province Helmand. Breaking down their ability ammunition. It was not an eradication in 2005, Afghans who stand against the to cooperate freely is the key to success. effort, but an operation to attack the narcotics industry in Helmand are often While maintaining a significant number narcotics industry where it is most targeted with violence that extends to of troops deployed to the province vulnerable: in its consolidation phases.15 their family and tribe.10 Indeed, since is essential, sending more forces The operation prevented approximately aggressive poppy eradication began specifically to Helmand—especially at $4.3 million from reaching the hands of in 2006, narco-powerbrokers have the expense of other provinces in the insurgent commanders.16 worked much closer with the Taliban than ever before.11 Consequently, “By moving away While the amount of seized material is progress in Helmand Province will not staggering (39,000 lbs of wet opium, come quickly. from government and 300,000 lbs of poppy seed and an international poppy estimated 120,000 lbs of precursor Needed Departure from Eradication Efforts chemicals—ammonium nitrate, soda The first meaningful step toward eradication efforts, ash, activated charcoal and Acidic progress occurred in June 2009 when villagers and farmers are Anhydride), these operations served an the government and coalition forces equally significant role of exposing the announced that they would no longer less likely to support the strength and depth of the relationship support poppy eradication.12 As stated insurgency.” between the Taliban-led insurgency by the U.S. envoy to Afghanistan and the narcotics world.17 Not only did and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, coalition forces uncover large quantities “eradication is a waste of money” of improvised explosive devices (IED), and has only worked to drive Afghan southern region which are all under- mortars, rockets, blasting caps and farmers to the Taliban.13 The implication resourced—is not necessary. As one explosives on each of the counternexus of this decision means that insurgent Special Forces officer who served in operations, but every raid against the and narcotic leaders can no longer use Helmand from January-July 2009 targets also witnessed an aggressive poppy eradication as a rallying cry to explained, insurgent response where they launched recruit more insurgents. attacks against coalition forces in an 75% of Helmand’s population attempt to minimize destruction of their This does not mean, however, that the lives in the central portion of the narcotics, weapons and ammunition.18 Afghan government and coalition forces province; we need to do more with Several of these missions uncovered have abandoned the effort to reduce the less throughout the province, “Taliban infirmaries” and rooms where province’s poppy production. Instead, but especially in this area. We insurgent leadership met to plan future focus and resources have shifted to can accomplish this by focusing attacks against Afghan security forces targeting narcotics in the consolidation our targeting efforts against high and coalition forces—further proof pay-off targets at the right time— of these targets’ significance to the 8 This information is based on the author’s personal ac- or in other words, aggressively insurgency. count from his deployment in 2006 and 2007. attacking the nexus and keeping 9 Personal discussions, Special Forces soldiers deployed the pressure on both components Success has come at a price, however. 14 to Helmand Province, Kandahar, Afghanistan, 2006, until they turn on each other. Fueled by narco-powerbrokers’ funds, 2007, 2009. insurgents have fought especially fierce 10 Poppy eradication has achieved more success in Nan- In his statement, the officer accurately in Helmand during the summer of garhar Province than in Helmand. One reason is that conveyed that there is a solution, but 2009 against the Afghan government, Nangarhar has a more manageable number of poppy it revolves around targeting the nexus ANSF and coalition forces comprised fields located more closely together; this is not the case more effectively and refraining from of the British, Danish and the newly- nd in Helmand. Despite this “success story,” the lack of targeting the farmers’ crops. arrived U.S. 2 Marine Expeditionary government support and alternative crops has left many Brigade. The insurgent-narcotic nexus farmers frustrated in Nangarhar. Before the policy shift regarding poppy 11 Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror: How Heroin Is Bank- eradication was announced, coalition 15 A month later, Ambassador Holbrooke announced rolling the Taliban and al Qaeda (New York: St. Martin’s forces achieved enormous success this policy shift. Press, 2009). in February-May 2009. This period 16 Personal discussions, Drug Enforcement Administra- 12 “U.S. Aims to Deprive Taliban of Drug Revenue by tion, Kandahar, Afghanistan, May 2009. Promoting Alternate Crops to Opium.” 14 Personal discussion, Major Mark Smith, Bastion, Hel- 17 Ibid. 13 Ibid. mand Province, Afghanistan, February 2009. 18 Ibid.

6 september 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 9 is combining their efforts to maintain business.21 There have been several forces. This money fuels the insurgency control over the most fertile province instances in 2009 where IEDs have and helps to expand its influence. in the country because insurgents and exploded on coalition patrols between narcotic warlords, especially those with two ANSF checkpoints only 600 meters The Taliban-led insurgency and the ties to Sher Mohammed Akhundzada in apart.22 Afghan National Police (ANP) Afghan narcotics trade rely on each central Helmand, understand that losing have allowed poppy shipments to pass other; a weaker counterpart would their grip on the province means losing through their checkpoints, or worse significantly hinder the other’s money and influence—and an indication yet use their government vehicles to movement. Reducing the insurgency’s transport the poppy themselves.23 links to the narcotics trade within Failure to curb the rampant corruption Helmand Province during the course of “Focus and resources during the past three years has enabled the next 18 months is critical to the future have shifted to the insurgent-narcotic nexus to expand success of this objective. Moreover, and strengthen. In a country where by moving away from government and targeting narcotics in corruption and bribery are widely international poppy eradication efforts, the consolidation and accepted as part of day-to-day life, villagers and farmers are less likely to this task is much easier said than support the insurgency. transportation phases by done. Although the current Helmand raiding drug laboratories governor, Gulav Mangal, is struggling to Working independently, the Afghan reduce the province’s narcotics output, government, its security forces and and interdicting narcotics he continues to encounter resistance coalition troops are not strong enough convoys.” and corruption and cannot reform the to undermine the insurgent-narcotic province on his own. nexus in Helmand Province. If these entities work in concert, however, the On the heels of the elections and in Afghan people and the international of progress for the government and conjunction with the increase of coalition community will achieve progress and coalition forces.19 As the summer draws forces in the province, the people of preserve hope for Afghanistan’s future. to a close, it is almost assured that the Helmand need to witness improvement insurgent operational tempo will remain in their government and security forces Captain Michael Erwin is currently enrolled higher in Helmand Province than by early 2010; otherwise, the people of in the Ph.D. program at the University of anywhere else in the country, precisely Helmand may permanently lose hope Michigan’s Psychology Department. Captain for this reason. in their government’s and coalition Erwin was the senior intelligence officer forces’ ability to bring stability to the (S2) for 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Corruption Remains a Block to Progress province. Group from June 2006 to August 2009. One of the most significant obstacles This assignment included two deployments to progress in Helmand Province is Conclusion to southern and western Afghanistan as the corruption within the government and The biggest overarching obstacle to Special Operations Task Force-31 S2. He Afghan security forces—at the national stability in Afghanistan remains the recently returned from his second rotation and district levels—which is directly volatile southern region. Enhancing in July 2009. In his previous assignment, tied to the poppy trade. As numerous security in the south requires progress Captain Erwin was the Tactical Intelligence interviews with Afghans reveal, the in numerous areas, but reducing the Officer for Task Force 2-7 Cav during sentiment many people in Helmand insurgency’s rampant funding is an Operation Iraqi Freedom II that included feel toward the government is evident essential part of the equation. A large participation in the battles of Falluja and from a single sentence spoken by a portion of the insurgency’s monetary Najaf in 2004. He is a graduate of the U.S. businessman in Helmand’s Musa Qala backing originates in Helmand Military Academy at West Point with a district: “The Taliban were not good, but (estimates range from 40-70%24). It is Bachelor of Science degree. these people now—the government— used to pay for weapons and ammunition they are thieves and killers.”20 Lasting and is distributed to locals who help success in Helmand requires the fight Afghan government and coalition government and its security forces to significantly reduce their connections 21 There are numerous powerbrokers at the local level (and protection) to the narcotics trade. that bribe ANSF and government officials, but the most notorious is Abdul Rahman Jan (“ARJ”) who was the National and local level government former Helmand provincial chief of police. He has ties to and ANSF consistently accept bribes numerous leaders within ANSF and works with them to from narco-powerbrokers to facilitate ensure the movement of drugs. instability and the booming poppy 22 Personal discussions, SFC Charles Rodriguez, Kanda- har, Afghanistan, February 2009. 23 Ibid.; Numerous Afghans have made these assertions 19 M.J. Stephey, “Stan McChrystal: The New U.S. Com- to soldiers in the unit. mander in Afghanistan,” Time Magazine, May 12, 2009. 24 In Seeds of Terror, Gretchen Peters claims the number 20 Kathy Gannon, “The Taliban Shadow Government,” to be at 70%; recent figures claim 40% with the remain- Associated Press, August 18, 2009. ing funds originating from patrons in the Gulf states.

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The Expansion Strategy of of al-Qa`ida fighters opposing the military commanders, is a calculated military. attempt by the organization to seize Al-Qa`ida in the Arabian the moral high ground in Yemen. In a Peninsula The “Battle of Marib,” as al-Qa`ida is country where many are often distrustful now calling the incident, illustrates the of government spokesmen and official By Gregory D. Johnsen dangers and pitfalls of attempting to statements, al-Qa`ida is attempting to navigate the murky and multifaceted show that its statements are grounded during the past year, the United States conflict that fighting al-Qa`ida in in fact. This was most forcefully has grown increasingly concerned Yemen has become. Al-Qa`ida’s illustrated in the video by footage of about the dangers of instability in budding alliance with some tribes in Yemen’s minister of information, Hasan Yemen. This fear has translated into a the region means that any fight that al-Lawzi, discussing the government’s sharp increase in aid to the fragile state. is designed to be a two-sided affair version of the events in Marib, which It also helps to explain the slow but between the government and al-Qa`ida was then followed by al-Raymi’s steady trickle of official U.S. visitors will not remain that way. The logic of suggestion that people are beginning to to the Yemeni capital, Sana`a. General these conflicts will evolve in a way turn to jihadist web forums for a more David Petraeus, for example, traveled that increasingly incorporates more accurate accounting of events. to Yemen on July 26, 2009, bringing actors, as tribesmen and other fighters with him both official confirmation of are brought into the fight not out of In addition to brand protection, al- the uptick in aid along with the warning any ideological loyalty to al-Qa`ida, Qa`ida also utilized the captured that the United States would expect a but rather as a way of reacting against soldiers to its advantage, portraying significant return on its money. government action and aggression.1 them as pawns duped into obeying an un-Islamic regime. At the end of the The extra funding is largely a result In the end, the Battle of Marib cost of a resurgent al-Qa`ida threat in the the military five tanks, a number of country. In less than four years, al- dead and wounded as well as seven “Al-Qa`ida first wanted Qa`ida in Yemen has transformed itself soldiers captured, at least according to rebuild in Yemen, and from a fractured and fragmented group to a statement released by AQAP.2 of individuals into an organization The Yemeni government disputed the then it aimed to make that is intent on launching attacks statement, but a video about the battle itself relevant within the throughout the Arabian Peninsula. The was subsequently released by AQAP, development of al-Qa`ida into a regional showing the seven captured soldiers country. Now that it has organization, known as al-Qa`ida in the and further confirming al-Qa`ida’s accomplished both goals, Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), has been claims.3 The video also backed away quick but methodical as the group has from the claim made in the initial it is taking the next step by articulated and then attained each goal statement that al-Qa`ida had shelled expanding regionally.” set for itself. AQAP is increasingly the Republican Palace in Marib while establishing roots in Yemen, allowing it `Ammar Muhammad was in the to plan and execute attacks across the building. Instead, al-Qa`ida used the region. video to modify its earlier statement, video, al-Qa`ida announced that it saying only that officers were in the would not execute the soldiers, as this Take Two in Marib palace when it was shelled. was not permitted, but that if the soldiers A large part of Petraeus’ visit was would not fight with the mujahidin then devoted to counterterrorism. During The clarifications and running neither should they fight against them the meeting with President Ali commentary throughout the video by by assisting the “tyrants.” The soldiers Abdullah Salih, Petraeus pressed him Qasim al-Raymi,4 one of al-Qa`ida’s were eventually released as a result to take the fight to al-Qa`ida. Salih of tribal mediation, which `Ammar dutifully responded by dispatching was forced to rely on after his unit’s 1 Tribes in this region of Yemen have often accepted his nephew, `Ammar Muhammad, embarrassing performance. money and assistance from a variety of sources, which who is the principal deputy with the they use as leverage against the central government in National Security Bureau, to the eastern In many ways, the Battle of Marib and Sana`a. governorate of Marib, which has been the events leading up to it were eerily 2 Al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula, “Statement on the the center of al-Qa`ida activity in recent similar to another series of incidents Battle of Marib,” August 1, 2009. years. `Ammar negotiated the terms of eight years earlier. In that case, 3 Al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula, “Video on the the offensive with local shaykhs, but the President George W. Bush pressured Battle of Marib,” September 8, 2009. operation four days later did not go as Salih to arrest three al-Qa`ida members 4 Qasim al-Raymi graduated from one of Yemen’s reli- planned. First, a Yemeni supply truck during a November 2001 visit to gious institutes in the late 1990s before traveling to Af- got lost and was subsequently captured Washington. The ensuing operation in ghanistan where he met Usama bin Ladin and spent time by al-Qa`ida fighters. Second, Yemeni Marib by Yemeni Special Forces was a in an al-Qa`ida training camp. He comes from a family counterterrorism forces mistakenly disaster. The target of the attack, Abu of fighters. One brother, Ali, is currently in Guantanamo shelled a tribal house rather than an al- Ali al-Harithi, escaped along with a Bay and another, Faris, fought in Iraq and Afghanistan Qa`ida safe house. Their error sparked before being killed in mysterious circumstances in June a firefight with tribesmen and a handful 2007. Al-Raymi was one of the 23 men who escaped from a Yemen Political Security prison in February 2006.

8 september 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 9 comrade, while local tribesmen took to establish links and put down roots but it also indicates al-Shihri’s comfort several Yemeni soldiers hostage. Tribal with the tribes in Marib, al-Jawf and level in the country. Al-Qa`ida is not on mediators later secured the release of the Shabwa governorates.8 Most notably, it the run in Yemen, but rather is largely soldiers, but not before the government is accomplishing this by attempting to free to do what it wants in certain areas. was warned against a heavy footprint in marry into the local tribes. The personal Al-Shihri’s move is also indicative of a Marib. Al-Harithi was killed less than piety of many al-Qa`ida members also growing attempt by al-Qa`ida to become a year later by a U.S. unmanned aerial resonates strongly with tribesmen as do part of the local scene by integrating drone. cell phone videos of the fighting in Iraq. itself into the entire community in a At the moment, al-Qa`ida is in the early way that a single man is unable to do. Yet this is not 2001, and Yemen is less stages of a budding alliance with some inclined toward seeing U.S. priorities of the tribes in these governorates. Specific details on individuals marrying as its own. It has other security into particular tribes is difficult to problems—a civil war in the north5 and Despite early concerns immediately acquire, but anecdotal evidence received calls for secession in the south—that it after September 11, 2001, al-Qa`ida has in Yemen combined with some specific deems more pressing than the al-Qa`ida not traditionally had a strong alliance cases indicates that it is part of al- threat. Moreover, it has learned that with the tribes in Yemen. There have Qa`ida’s long-term strategy. In the latest the United States and its allies can be issue of Sada al-Malahim (Echo of Battles), for inconsistent when it comes to rewarding instance, al-Qa`ida congratulated one risk. “Al-Qa`ida’s budding of its members, Muhammad al-`Umda, alliance with some tribes in on his marriage.11 It is unclear from the Establishing Roots statement who al-`Umda married, but Both the statement and the video the region means that any the belief in Yemen is that he married about the Battle of Marib express some fight that is designed to be into one of the tribes and that his action surprise that the Yemeni government is being replicated by other fighters would even carry out an attack in the a two-sided affair between from both Saudi Arabia and Yemen. This governorate. In the video, al-Raymi the government and al- development is both new and worrying explained the military operation by because it has the potential to turn any suggesting that Salih is a “slave to Saudi Qa`ida will not remain that counterterrorism operation into a much riyals and American dollars.” Al-Qa`ida way.” broader war involving Yemen’s tribes. is increasingly viewing Marib and some of the surrounding governorates, most The Perception and The Reality notably al-Jawf and parts of Shabwa, as Another worrying indicator for the its own sphere of influence where the been cases of al-Qa`ida members being future of counterterrorism operations in government has no role. provided refuge by tribes, but often this Yemen is the general apathy toward al- was an issue of a tribesman who was also Qa`ida in the country. There is a culture With a few exceptions—the two suicide a member of al-Qa`ida playing on his of passivity and victimhood within attacks in March 20096 and the Battle of tribal identity to receive refuge. What is the government. Nearly every sector Marib—al-Qa`ida has been largely silent happening now is entirely different. of society has bought into this idea, since its attack on the U.S. Embassy in arguing that the al-Qa`ida problem is Sana`a on Ramadan 17, 2008.7 Yet this Said Ali al-Shihri, the deputy commander really a foreign problem, an outgrowth silence does not equate to inactivity. of AQAP, recently brought his wife and of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.12 Instead, al-Qa`ida has been building children to Yemen from Saudi Arabia.9 This is not the case, and by failing to a durable foundation for the future. Not only did this put them beyond the acknowledge the problem Yemen has Specifically, it has been actively working reach of the Saudi government so it could never adequately addressed it. not exert the same sort of pressure on 10 5 The sixth and most violent round of fighting to date be- him as it did on Muhammad al-`Awfi, There is silence from major clerics who tween the government and the Huthis began on August could speak out against attacks from al- 11, 2009. This sporadic conflict has been ongoing since 8 Much of the analysis in this section is based on the au- Qa`ida. The shaykhs and clerics who do 2004 and continues to be a drain on both the govern- thor’s recent trip to Yemen in July and August 2009. The preach against al-Qa`ida do not have the ment’s political and military capital. author is indebted to the help and generosity of many Ye- intellectual weight or popular following 6 A suicide bomber killed four South Korean tourists and menis who shared their views and thoughts with him. to counter al-Qa`ida’s arguments. This their local Yemeni guide on March 15, 2009. On March 9 Al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula, “Statement of has essentially ceded the field of debate 18, a convoy of the victims’ relatives along with South Congratulations,” Sada al-Malahim, No. 9, May 2009. and discussion within Yemen to al- Korean investigators was targeted in another suicide at- 10 Muhammad al-`Awfi, a former Guantanamo detain- tack, although only the bomber was killed in the second ee, was one of the four individuals featured in the video 11 Al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula, “Statement of incident. that announced the merger of the Yemeni and Saudi Congratulations,” Sada al-Malahim, No. 10, July 2009. 7 The date is significant, as was pointed out in a later is- branches of al-Qa`ida into the unified al-Qa`ida in the Al-`Umda is one of three escapees from the February sue of Sada al-Malahim, as the anniversary of the early Arabian Peninsula in January 2009. One month later, al- 2006 prison break still at large. Islamic Battle of Badr. It corresponds to September `Awfi turned himself in to Saudi authorities. It is widely 12 This conclusion is based on a number of interviews 17, 2008. The recent attempted assassination of Saudi believed that Saudi Arabia used a variety of different and conversations the author conducted with ministers, Prince Muhammad bin Nayif is the beginning of some- tactics—including pressuring the women in his family— parliamentarians, journalists and tribesmen in July and thing new for al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula. to force his surrender. August 2009 in Yemen.

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Qa`ida. The United States has been Public diplomacy is not the only U.S. The organization is also benefiting complicit in this failure by neglecting problem in Yemen. There is a frightening from other government mistakes. The to seize opportunities to counter the mix of ignorance and arrogance when it overreaction of governments such organization’s propaganda in any comes to U.S. policy toward Yemen as as Yemen, largely as a result of U.S. meaningful way. well as among many of those tasked with pressure, of arresting nearly everyone implementing this policy. The United suspected of harboring sympathy for The United States, for example, had States must learn that its insistence on al-Qa`ida in the aftermath of September a unique opportunity to go on the seeing everything through the prism of 11 and periodically since then is not offensive in August 2009 when it counterterrorism has helped to induce reducing radicalization; instead, it is released Muhammad al-Mu’ayyad and exactly the type of results it is hoping having the opposite effect. Young men are his assistant from U.S. custody.13 The to avoid. By focusing on al-Qa`ida to leaving Yemen’s security prisons more case has been a contentious domestic the exclusion of nearly every other radical than when they were initially issue in Yemen since 2003, with challenge, and by linking almost all of incarcerated. The country’s revolving everyone from the president to al- its aid to this single issue, the United door prison policy is compounding States has ensured that the issue will the problem as more young men spend never be resolved. There is growing fear significant time in prison. In a sense, “By focusing on al-Qa`ida in Yemen that the country would be many of these young men have been to the exclusion of nearly forgotten and neglected in the absence of prepared for recruitment by their time the threat from al-Qa`ida; this causes the in prison. The initial groundwork is every other challenge, and government to prolong the conflict.15 being laid not by al-Qa`ida but rather by by linking almost all of its the government’s actions, which makes This short-sighted and narrow focus by these men tempting recruitment targets aid to this single issue, the the United States has translated over when they are eventually released. United States has ensured time into a lack of influence within the country. The United States is not the Yemen refuses to allow monitoring of its that the issue will never be most important player on the domestic security prisons, which is a major cause resolved.” Yemeni scene. During the past several for concern. Many of these men are being years, Washington has not spent housed together, which only facilitates nearly enough money in nearly enough a sort of mutual encouragement different places in Yemen to have and strengthening as more radical Qa`ida calling for the pair’s release. its desired diplomatic leverage. U.S. members are able to influence younger The United States could have easily perceptions of its own importance and individuals.18 The various clerics and placed an Arabic op-ed in the official influence within Yemen are inflated and religious shaykhs who visit the prisons daily, al-Thawra, explaining its rationale do not square with reality. to preach also appear to be playing a for the release.14 Articulating that like role in the radicalization process.19 every country the United States makes The Recruiting Ground Al-Qa`ida’s potential recruiting mistakes but that it also attempts to learn While the United States and Yemen have pool in Yemen is not drying up but is from those mistakes would have went a both been distracted by other, seemingly expanding. long way toward repairing the tattered more pressing issues in recent years, al- image of the United States in Yemen. Qa`ida has been working single-mindedly AQAP’s Growing Ambition Al-Qa`ida has used al-Mu’ayyad’s case to create a durable infrastructure that Since its reemergence in Yemen in as a powerful piece of propaganda for can withstand the loss of key leaders 2006, al-Qa`ida has shown itself years, but when he was finally released and cells. It has done an excellent job to be an ambitious but tempered the United States was silent and did not of tailoring its narrative for a local organization, methodically taking the benefit. U.S. public diplomacy in Yemen audience.16 With the exception of suicide steps needed to rebuild and expand. The is all defense and no offense. attacks within Yemen itself, much of attempted assassination of Saudi Prince the group’s message is broadly popular Muhammad bin Nayif is part of the within the country. As one Yemeni organization’s shift in priorities since said, “I can no longer tell the difference the January 2009 merger of the Yemeni 13 In January 2003, the United States lured al-Mu’ayyad between al-Qa`ida in the caves and al- and Saudi branches of al-Qa`ida into and his assistant to Germany as part of a sting operation Qa`ida in the mosques,” illustrating a single regional franchise. The attack in which they were promised money for groups such as just how popular the group’s rhetoric is was an early attempt by AQAP to match 17 Hamas and al-Qa`ida. The men were arrested and extra- on many issues. action with rhetoric. dited to the United States where they were convicted in 2005 of supporting Hamas but cleared of charges related 15 This is based on the author’s interviews and conversa- to al-Qa`ida. Al-Mu’ayyad’s popularity in Yemen stems tions with government officials, as well as his own analy- not only from his role as a religious figure, but also from sis of the situation in Yemen. 18 Yemen does allow monitoring of its central prisons, his charity work. He is often referred to as the “Father of 16 This is particularly evident from the group’s videos but these are different from the country’s many security orphans” in the Arabic press. and issues of Sada al-Malahim, where al-Qa`ida uses prisons. 14 The author asked a Yemeni official about the difficulty popular grievances to criticize the regime. 19 Personal interviews, various Yemeni journalists and of placing such an op-ed, and he assured that such an op- 17 Personal interview, a Yemeni who requested ano- officials familiar with the security prisons in the country, ed would have no problem getting printed. nymity, Sana`a, Yemen, August 2009. Sana`a, Yemen, July and August 2009.

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Following the merger, al-Qa`ida has groups. Moreover, Pakistani police prioritized attacks in Saudi Arabia A Profile of Pakistan’s were unable to differentiate between the and other Gulf states20 in an attempt Lashkar-i-Jhangvi groups. In many cases, one militant had to make itself regionally relevant. For overlapping allegiances and belonged to al-Qa`ida, this is the logical extension By Arif Jamal multiple groups at one time. of its development to date in Yemen. Al-Qa`ida first wanted to rebuild in lashkar-i-jhangvi (lj) is one of the This article will discuss the LJ’s Yemen, and then it aimed to make itself world’s most secretive terrorist foundation, ideology, and organizational relevant within the country. Now that it groups. Little information exists on structure. It will also show why the LJ has accomplished both goals, it is taking the organization, even though it is an is blamed for a disproportionate number the next step by expanding regionally. al-Qa`ida affiliate that is regularly of terrorist incidents in Pakistan. blamed for terrorist attacks in Pakistan. This process has followed a familiar Although the LJ was formed as the The Creation of the LJ pattern: each new phase of activity armed wing of Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan To understand the formation of the LJ, it begins with al-Qa`ida announcing (SSP), it has morphed into the collective is necessary to outline the creation and its rather ambitious goals and then armed wing of various Deobandi ideology of Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan. working to meet those goals. The attack terrorist groups. Statements about the In 1984, Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, on Muhammad bin Nayif was an early LJ from the Pakistani government and a firebrand and astute Deobandi cleric attempt to accomplish this, but it is media suggest that the group is the most from the Punjabi town of Jhang and unlikely to be the last. AQAP currently deadly Islamist terrorist organization a member of Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam feels little pressure in Yemen. It has in the world outside the Indian- (JUI), founded Anjuman-i-Sipah-i- both the time and space to plot and controlled state of Jammu and Kashmir. Sahaba Pakistan (ASSP). Inspired by launch attacks throughout the region This description, however, is not the Islamist and jihadist policies of from its base in the country. This is completely accurate, and it has served not to say that the organization will no both the handlers of jihadist groups in longer carry out attacks in Yemen, but the Pakistani military as well as other “During the mid-1990s, rather that these attacks are no longer Islamist terrorist groups who benefit by the SSP decided to create its top priority. Al-Qa`ida has reached blaming the LJ for most terrorist attacks the point where it is no longer satisfied in Pakistan outside the tribal areas. an underground terrorist with local activity. It has its sights set group that would take on something bigger. The LJ does exist as a dangerous organization, but not in the form often orders from SSP leaders Gregory D. Johnsen, a former Fulbright portrayed by the Pakistani media and but operate independently. Fellow in Yemen, is currently a Ph.D. government. Most terrorist attacks candidate in Near Eastern Studies at blamed on the LJ were in fact carried out This group became Princeton University. He is also the co- by several Deobandi1 terrorist groups, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi.” author of the Yemen blog, Waq al-Waq. of which the LJ is only one. Research into 40 terrorist incidents in Pakistan between September 11, 2001 and September 2007 show that police and General Zia-ul-Haq, Jhangvi created other sources were quoted in various the group to fight the growing influence newspapers often attributing a terrorist of the Iranian revolution among both attack to multiple Deobandi terrorist Sunni and Shi`a youth. Jhangvi dreamed groups. During this period, it was of uniting all Sunni sects under one not uncommon for the same terrorist banner to oppose Shi`a Muslims and act to be blamed on the SSP, the LJ, Iran; his goal was to establish a Sunni Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam, Jundallah, state in Pakistan and later in the rest of or another Deobandi group.2 Different the world. authority figures blamed different For almost a year, the ASSP failed to attract attention to its cause. Its 1 Deobandis are a sub-sect of the Hanafi sect, which in members spent their time writing graffiti turn is one of the four major Sunni schools of jurispru- such as “Kafir, kafir—Shi`a kafir” (Shi`a are dence in Islam. The other major sub-sect of the Hanafi infidels), and the group largely stuck to sect are the Barelvis who represent more mystical Islam. promoting this slogan. A shrewd cleric, Deobandis can also be described as the politicized Hanafi Jhangvi soon understood that he would sub-sect as they came into being in mid-19th century Brit- not succeed unless he found supporters ish India. Their principal objective at that time was to in Islamabad. By 1985, he had renamed purify Islam of the accumulated bid`a or religious inno- the group “Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan” 20 AQAP has not yet been found responsible for attacks vation to gain freedom from the British colonial power. (Soldiers of the Companions of the in other Gulf states. Its statements and some circumstan- 2 This information is based on the author’s accumulation Prophet) and became a regular visitor to tial evidence, however, imply that it is plotting such op- of press reports from Pakistani newspapers and media Islamabad. In Islamabad, he frequented erations. during the stated period.

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Arab embassies, particularly those of the SSP achieved tremendous growth was Maulana Alam Tariq, the brother of Iraq and Saudi Arabia.3 He failed to in both numbers and influence during Maulana Azam Tariq, the latter of whom convince Iraqi diplomats that his group its early years. By 1990, it had plotted later became the head of the SSP and an could fight an Iraqi proxy war against to assassinate Iranian diplomats along elected member of parliament.12 The LJ Iran in Pakistan, but he did succeed with Pakistani Shi`a Muslims. The SSP was named after the SSP’s martyred in winning over the Saudis to do the tried to kill Iranian diplomats in Lahore, founder, Haq Nawaz Jhangvi. same.4 Karachi and Multan.9 SSP members such as Riaz Basra10 and Shaykh Haq The LJ established a training camp in At the time, there were not many Nawaz Jhangvi (not to be confused Afghanistan’s Sarobi district. They also Wahhabis among the Pakistani with its founder) gained notoriety trained in the Harkat-ul-Mujahidin population, so the Saudis patronized after they succeeded in killing Iranian (HuM) training camp “Khalid Bin Deobandi parties and groups as their diplomats.11 Their operations did not Walid” in Afghanistan. Among the LJ’s proxies. Nevertheless, none of these come without resistance. For example, leaders, Riaz Basra13 emerged as one of groups were prepared to fight a proxy war the SSP’s founder, Maulana Haq Nawaz the most ruthless terrorist operatives. against Iran in Pakistan. The Saudis were Jhangvi, was gunned down in 1990, He was allegedly responsible for most particularly interested in establishing allegedly by Shi`a militants. Moreover, anti-Shi`a terrorist attacks. Basra was Sunni terrorist infrastructure—such a group of Shi`a militants created their also responsible for making threatening as military training camps—along the own terrorist group in the mid-1990s— phone calls to police officers charged Pakistan-Iran border so that terrorists known as Sipah-i-Muhammad Pakistan with investigating the LJ’s terrorist could carry out attacks inside Iran to (SMP)—and began retaliating against acts.14 The calls were effective, and incite the Sunni population against the Deobandi Muslims in Pakistan. The police officers became reluctant to Shi`a regime; after conducting attacks, SMP assassinated various Deobandi investigate the LJ’s terrorist acts out they could flee back across the border clerics. of fear of reprisals. When authorities to their sanctuaries in Pakistan. The would interrogate an SSP or LJ terrorist, Saudis even invited some Kashmiri The SSP’s killings of Iranians in Pakistan they concealed their identities with face commanders from Indian-controlled brought tremendous embarrassment and masks to prevent possible LJ retaliation, Kashmir to Saudi Arabia and offered pressure on the Pakistani government. a trend that continues to this day. The them large sums of money to abandon General Zia-ul-Haq had died, and an LJ made it a policy to assassinate police jihad in Kashmir and establish terrorist elected government was in power in officers who investigated terrorist acts or infrastructure in Baluchistan on Islamabad. The Benazir Bhutto-led interrogated their members. One of the the Iranian border.5 None of these government began to apply pressure on most significant of these assassinations commanders, however, accepted the the SSP. The SSP at the time was also was the senior superintendant of police role as a proxy army for the Saudis.6 playing a role in electoral politics and in Gujranwala, Ashraf Marth, who wanted to use parliament to further was gunned down in May 1997 after he The SSP, however, did accept the its agenda. Yet it could not accomplish investigated the LJ’s infrastructure.15 role, and became one of the first this because its involvement in terrorist Investigations into the SSP and LJ were terrorist groups to establish sizeable operations barred it from becoming a halted after his death.16 infrastructure in Baluchistan.7 The legitimate political party. Saudi money gave the SSP a “shot in The SSP continued to kill Shi`a the arm” and allowed it to establish Therefore, during the mid-1990s the Muslims under the name of the LJ terrorist infrastructure.8 As a result, SSP decided to create an underground during the second half of the 1990s.17 terrorist group that would take 3 Personal interviews, Arab diplomats, late 1980s. orders from SSP leaders but operate 12 Personal interviews, SSP leaders, Jhang, Pakistan, 4 One reason for this failure is that Iraqi diplomats were independently. This group became December 2001. Maulana Alam Tariq resurfaced to take sensitive after the Z.A. Bhutto government raided the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi. over the leadership of the SSP when his brother was as- Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad in the mid-1970s and uncov- sassinated outside Islamabad. He lost the power struggle, ered arms and ammunition. The weapons were allegedly LJ Splinters from the SSP however, to Maulana Ludhianvi. for Baluch rebels. The Iraqis did not want a replay of the As part of the SSP’s strategy, the LJ was 13 Riaz Basra was killed on May 14, 2002. Lahori suc- same incident. The Saudis, on the other hand, emerged established in the mid-1990s with the ceeded him. as close allies of the Pakistani military, which was man- objective of executing terrorist attacks 14 Many police officers told the author that they had re- aging the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan with U.S. and against Shi`a Muslims and Iranian ceived threatening phone calls from individuals calling Saudi money. nationals. Its early leaders included Riaz from public phones and claiming to be Riaz Basra. 5 Personal interview, Kashmiri Salafi-jihadi commander Basra, Akram Lahori and Malik Ishaq. 15 Ashraf Marth was gunned down in the city of Gujran- who had participated in several discussions with Saudis, The real leader of the group, however, wala as he came out of his official residence to go to his September 17, 2000. office. 6 Ibid. istan, April 1990. 16 Personal interview, senior police officer who investi- 7 During visits to Baluchistan since the mid-1980s, the 9 These incidents were widely reported in the Pakistani gated the murder, Islamabad, Pakistan, July 2003. author observed that the SSP had a visible presence in media during the time. 17 The SSP never claimed responsibility for these kill- most villages along the Pakistan-Iran border. One of the 10 Riaz Basra was involved in hundreds of sectarian ter- ings; the purpose of creating the LJ was so that the SSP SSP’s favorite tactics was to write anti-Shi`a and anti- rorist attacks, including the murder of Iranian diplomat could deny involvement in terrorist attacks. This infor- Iran graffiti on the trains that went in and out of Iran. Sadiq Ganji in December 1990. mation is based on the author’s various interviews and 8 Personal interviews, Arab diplomats, Islamabad, Pak- 11 Ibid. investigations into the SSP and LJ.

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To gain resources from the Pakistani Minister Nawaz Sharif’s efforts to rein in his crucial vote in favor of General military, the SSP/LJ also joined the terrorists, Musharraf’s interior minister, Musharraf’s candidate for the office of jihad in Kashmir. The date of this Lt. General Moinuddin Haider, visited prime minister, Mir Zafarullah Jamali, decision is not known, but according Afghanistan in March 2001 to extradite who won by one vote. Later, Maulana to one interview the LJ had lost more some LJ terrorists back to Pakistan. Tariq boasted that only his support than 100 fighters in the Kashmir The Taliban refused. They also refused sustained General Musharraf’s prime conflict by the late 1990s.18 By joining to sign any extradition treaty with minister in power. When Member of the jihad in Kashmir, SSP/LJ militants the National Assembly Maulana Azam received significant military training “The post-9/11 situation Tariq was assassinated in October 2003 and expertise from different Deobandi just outside Islamabad, the Musharraf terrorist groups, particularly from forced the SSP/LJ and regime refused to support another Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam and Jaysh-i- other Deobandi jihadist SSP candidate in the by-elections; Muhammad. These factors raised the it was exasperated with the group’s profile of the SSP/LJ significantly and groups to forge closer blackmailing. the group curried favor with Pakistan’s cooperation.” military establishment.19 Post-9/11 Period In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks Post-Coup Period on September 11, the LJ faced another General Pervez Musharraf’s October Pakistan. This came as a surprise to the dilemma: whether or not to support 1999 military coup posed one of the military; they expected the Taliban to be General Musharraf’s decision to join the biggest challenges to the SSP/LJ. more compliant considering they helped United States in its “war on terrorism.” The organization was faced with the install the regime to power in Kabul. Like most jihadist groups, the LJ decision of continuing to kill Shi`a hardliners led by Basra again chose to Muslims, which would have destabilized The links between the SSP and the LJ oppose General Musharraf’s decision. Musharraf’s military regime, or remain once again came into the open when The hardliners in other Deobandi peaceful under the new government. the SSP ran a campaign in February jihadist groups such as Harkat-ul- 2001 to save LJ terrorist Shaykh Haq Jihad-al-Islam, Jaysh-i-Muhammad, The hardliners such as the LJ’s Basra— Nawaz Jhangvi, who was to be hanged and Harkat-ul-Mujahidin also opposed even though they supported the military for murdering an Iranian diplomat. the Pakistani military. coup—wanted to continue their mission Jhangvi confessed to the crime in spite of killing Shi`a in Pakistan. A smaller of pressure by the SSP to plead “not The post-9/11 situation forced the SSP/ group led by the LJ’s Qari Abdul Hayye guilty.” Jhangvi refused to lie before the LJ and other Deobandi jihadist groups wanted to restrain their sectarian court and was hanged. The SSP resorted to forge closer cooperation, such as in violence to achieve their larger interests to widespread violence across the the killing of the Wall Street Journal’s Daniel of building an organization that could country, with SSP workers storming the Pearl.21 The unity among Deobandi eventually take power in the country streets in several urban centers. They terrorist groups led to unprecedented by cooperating with the military. These destroyed public and private property. violence in Pakistan. Most terrorist acts differences caused a split in the group in in Pakistan since 9/11 have been carried 2000. One faction was led by hardliner Despite this violence, relations between out by Deobandi or quasi-Deobandi Riaz Basra. The other, more moderate the Musharraf regime and the SSP terrorist groups, together or alone, but faction was led by Qari Abdul Hayye remained positive. The Musharraf the LJ has almost always been blamed. (also known as Qari Asadullah, or regime, for example, rewarded the SSP Talha), who was the amir of the training by helping to elect SSP chief Maulana If the government were to blame camp at Sarobi. Azam Tariq to the National Assembly jihadist groups such as Harkat-ul- in the 2002 elections.20 Maulana Jihad-al-Islam and Jaysh-i-Muhammad The Basra group maintained the policy Tariq returned the favor by casting for violence in Pakistan, it would bring of killing Shi`a even after General a bad name to the jihad in Kashmir, and Musharraf took power. Government 20 The 2002 general elections were rigged and ma- eventually discredit the government’s support, however, was not forthcoming. nipulated in several ways, before and during the elec- often-used policy of using jihadists The killings of Shi`a in the early toral process, to bring in Islamists to counter the demo- as an instrument of policy. It is much period of General Musharraf’s regime cratic political forces, particularly the Pakistan Muslim easier for the Pakistani government to destabilized the government, and it League (Nawaz) and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). scapegoat the LJ for most terrorist acts ultimately cracked down on the LJ’s Although General Musharraf’s regime had formally in Pakistan outside of the tribal areas. activities. In what was a replay of Prime banned the SSP and LJ before the 2002 general elections, the group was allowed to function freely under a differ- 18 Personal interview, an SSP leader, Peshawar, Paki- ent name. As the democratic candidates were disquali- 21 A prominent case of cooperation among Deobandi ter- stan, April 2001. fied to run for elections, Islamists were encouraged to rorist groups was the kidnapping and murder of Wall 19 Since the 1970s, the military has used various Isla- unite and replace them. The bulk of the Islamists were Street Journal journalist Daniel Pearl. Terrorists from mist groups to achieve political goals, and in this case the elected under the umbrella of Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal several groups were involved in the operation. Along military used militant Islamist parties to destabilize the (MMA). The SSP refused to join the MMA and decided with Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam and Jaysh-i-Muhammad democratically-elected government of Prime Minister to contest elections as a separate party and sent Maulana terrorists, Qari Ataur Rehman (also known as Naeem Nawaz Sharif in the post-Kargil period. Azam Tariq to parliament. Bukhari) of the LJ was implicated in Pearl’s murder.

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From the LJ to the TTP The Failure of Salafi-Jihadi terrorist plots in the Levant, it does not Today, the LJ is still involved in terrorist appear responsible or interested in the attacks in Pakistan. Little is known Insurgent Movements in few Islamist insurgent movements that about the group’s current activities, and the Levant have arisen in the region.5 it is not completely clear how the two factions of the LJ—the Basra group and By Bilal Y. Saab This article assesses why the Levant the Qari Hayye group—have evolved. has been a less attractive place for Both factions likely still exist, although it is remarkable that the Levant, a global Salafi-jihadis and a more different leaders are in charge. The sub-region plagued by internal and challenging environment for them to Basra group, for example, is now part external crisis conditions that are mobilize and conduct operations. It of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and generally conducive to terrorism and attributes these failures to the existence contributes to its jihadist operations. LJ political violence, has been free from of well-established mainstream Islamic operatives probably help facilitate the any insurgent1 Islamist group with movements in the Levant that see the TTP’s terrorist acts in Punjab Province, verifiable material ties to al-Qa`ida’s violent and extreme Salafi-jihadis where the LT/SSP has an established central leadership.2 The two ambitious as a threat to their interests; the base.22 attempts by Arab Salafi-jihadis to create distinct historical and socio-political insurgent forces in the Levant occurred circumstances in the Levant that make it In fact, a similar paradigm is now in Lebanon in May-September 2007 less hospitable to Salafi-jihadi ideology; occurring with the TTP. The Pakistani when Fatah al-Islam3 violently emerged the relative success of the region’s government blames the TTP for nearly in the northern part of the country, and security and intelligence services to every terrorist attack in Pakistan, some on August 15, 2009 in Gaza when Jund prevent the Salafi-jihadi threat from of which likely had little to do with the Ansar Allah4 declared war on Hamas. inflating; the subduing effect of Iran’s organization. Yet just like the LJ, it is These two attempts sought to radically dominant influence in the Levant; and easy to scapegoat the TTP rather than change the existing socio-political finally the lack of material support from reveal the true extent of jihadist violence orders in Lebanon and Gaza through the al-Qa`ida’s central leadership to Salafi- in Pakistan and the many groups and use of religiously-inspired insurgent jihadi insurgent groups in the region. actors involved. violence. Both attempts failed, however. Although al-Qa`ida has been tied to Al-Qa`ida’s Lack of Allies in the Levant Arif Jamal is a visiting scholar at New York Other than Jund al-Sham6 and Fatah al- University and author of Shadow War: Islam (and the now crushed Jund Ansar The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir. 1 The emphasis on the word “insurgent” is deliber- Allah), al-Qa`ida does not have allies ate and used to differentiate from the word “terrorist.” in the Levant that could effectively While there are a number of analytical and practical dif- help project its influence and ideology ferences between an insurgent group (or insurgencies) into the region and to serve its various and a terrorist group (or cell), this article only focuses on strategic objectives.7 four: one, insurgent groups enjoy a certain level of sup- port from a segment of society, whereas terrorist groups Jund al-Sham’s lack of organizational usually work alone and do not need indigenous sup- coherence, discipline, and fighting port; two, insurgent groups are usually bigger and bet- capabilities make it an unreliable partner ter armed than terrorist groups; three, insurgent groups for al-Qa`ida in the Levant.8 Far from work overtly, whereas terrorist groups operate most ef- fectively in a clandestine fashion; four, insurgent groups 5 No hard evidence on direct material ties between these find it essential to seize territory for the realization of two groups and al-Qa`ida’s central leadership has ever their revolutionary objectives, while terrorist groups emerged, even though they appear to share the same generally do not. ideological agenda. 2 Very few comprehensive studies have been written on 6 Jund al-Sham is a title claimed by several Sunni Islamic al-Qa`ida’s presence and influence in the Levant. For a extremist entities, all or none of which may be connected. commendable paper on the subject, see Hassan Mneim- These entities mostly operate in Lebanon, Syria and Jor- neh, The Jihadist International: Al-Qa`ida’s Advance in the dan, and their goals include the establishment of an Is- Levant (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Insti- lamic caliphate throughout the Levant. tute, April 8, 2009). 7 For instance, without the Taliban in Pakistan and 3 Fatah al-Islam is a militant Sunni Islamist group that Afghanistan or the Salafist Group for Preaching and is inspired by al-Qa`ida’s ideology. Its members are Combat in Algeria, al-Qa`ida would have found it ex- mostly Arabs from various Middle Eastern countries. It tremely difficult, if not impossible, to expand and oper- emerged in the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp ate in South Asia or the Maghreb. More examples where in Lebanon in November 2006. Its goals are unclear but al-Qa`ida relied on local support to expand its influence include the establishment of an Islamic state in northern and pursue its goals in various regions around the world Lebanon. include al-Shabab in Somalia, al-Qa`ida in Iraq, and the 4 Jund Ansar Allah was founded in southern Gaza in Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines. November 2008 as an armed Sunni Islamist group with 8 There are three groups—Hizb al-Tahrir, Jaysh al-Is- 22 Hassan Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban Net- strong Salafi-jihadi credentials. Its goals include the es- lam, and Jaysh al-Umma—in the Palestinian Territories work,” CTC Sentinel 2:4 (2009). tablishment of an Islamic state in Gaza. that claim to be inspired by al-Qa`ida’s ideology, but they

14 september 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 9 being an al-Qa`ida “franchise” in the enter Ain al-Hilwah.11 In Syria, Jund al- the Salafist groups in the north, who Levant, Jund al-Sham is a title claimed Sham has been accused of perpetrating can be regarded as ideologically closer by several Sunni Islamic extremist a number of terrorist operations in the to al-Qa`ida than other Islamic groups, entities, all or none of which may be country and of facilitating the stream have no ties to al-Qa`ida and are largely connected. More like a movement, of Islamic fighters that reportedly non-militant and involved in preaching Jund al-Sham, whose alleged link to make their way to Iraq through Syrian activities. These Islamic entities and the late al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI) leader territory.12 others such as the Lebanese Shi`a group Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi stems from Hizb Allah have made it more difficult reports that he had arranged training Fatah al-Islam’s crushing defeat for al-Qa`ida to mobilize and create a for the group’s fighters at al-Qa`ida and ultimate transformation from a solid base in Lebanon. camps in Afghanistan, has a presence centralized insurgent group to a loose in Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee camps network of underground terrorist cells In Syria, the Syrian Muslim after the Nahr al-Bared battle with the Brotherhood, the biggest and most “Al-Qa`ida’s ideology does Lebanese army in the summer of 2007 important Sunni Islamist group in the makes it an unreliable partner for al- country that is opposed to al-Qa`ida’s not have a strong popular Qa`ida. extremism, is seen by many Syrians following or support base as a safety valve against al-Qa`ida’s Meanwhile, Usama bin Ladin and attempts to establish an insurgent in most of the Levant.” Ayman al-Zawahiri could not relish the presence in their country.15 In Jordan, news of the birth of Jund Ansar Allah the Salafists and Jabhat al-Amal Islami in Rafah in the Gaza Strip. As soon as (Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood) are the group’s leader Shaykh Abdel Latif peaceful and denounce al-Qa`ida. In the and in Syria (possibly in Jordan too).9 Moussa publicly declared an Islamic Levant, Islamic politics, like all politics, Jund al-Sham members have been emirate in Gaza, Hamas forces, who are local and are rarely connected to the described by terrorism analysts and have been officially in charge of the global Salafi-jihadi movement. Arab counterterrorism officials as Strip since the June 2007 coup against jihadist freelancers who are only tied the Palestinian Authority, confronted Al-Qa`ida’s Ideology: Few Followers in the together by ideology and a desire to the newly-born Salafi-jihadi group and Levant violently defend a radical Islamic order. killed 22 of its members in a day-long Al-Qa`ida’s ideology does not have a Many Islamic fighters tied to Jund al- gun and artillery battle.13 Hamas has strong popular following or support Sham in Lebanon merged with Fatah al- repeatedly fought al-Qa`ida-inspired base in most of the Levant. This is in Islam during its rise and fall, while the entities in its bid to impose its influence part because of the region’s long history rest went into hiding and took refuge in and role over Palestinian society. of communal (Christian-Muslim and the Palestinian camp of Ain al-Hilwah.10 Sunni-Shi`a) co-existence and rejection Lebanese press reports indicate that In Lebanon, mainstream Sunni Islamist of takfiriyya (labeling a Muslim an one of the leaders of Jund al-Sham in groups such as Jama`a al-Islamiyya, infidel), which is a basic tenet of al- Lebanon, Shaykh Wissam Tahbish, Harkat al-Tawhid al-Islami, and Jabhat Qa`ida’s ideology.16 was arrested on August 19, 2009 by al-Amal Islami do not support al- the Lebanese army as he was trying to Qa`ida and its takfiri ideology.14 Even In Syria, while society has lately become more Islamic—as evidenced by 11 “Army Arrests Leading Jund al-Sham Member,” Na- the increased number of veiled women, have no direct ties to the terrorist organization and are harnet.com, August 19, 2009. skyrocketing mosque-construction, a too small and weak to be reliable partners. For more on 12 Al-Qa`ida’s Syrian network is thought to have suf- thriving religious literature market, Fatah al-Islam and the story of its rise and fall, see Bilal fered a setback as the United States implemented a coun- significant growth in Islamic charity Y. Saab and Magnus Ranstorp, “Fatah al Islam: How an terinsurgency program in Iraq in 2007 and executed a organizations and rising attendance Ambitious Jihadist Enterprise Went Awry,” The Brook- covert operation in Syria in 2008, which targeted and at informal home Qur’an classes— ings Institution and the Swedish National Defence Col- killed a senior member of al-Qa`ida’s facilitation net- increasing religiosity in the country lege, November 28, 2007. For more on al-Qa`ida in Leba- work. An estimated 120 foreign fighters a month are has not translated into a rise in takfiri 17 non, please see Bilal Y. Saab, “Al-Qa`ida’s Presence and thought to have entered Iraq from Syria at its peak in ideology or Islamic militancy. In Influence in Lebanon,”CTC Sentinel 1:12 (2008). 2007. This number is now estimated to be in the single 9 For more on Jund al-Sham in Syria, see Chris Zambe- digits, but there is concern that the Syrian network is 15 The group, however, is banned by the Syrian regime. lis, “Violence in Syria Points to Radical Islamic Unrest,” being rejuvenated. For more on Islamic fighters mak- The only Islamist party that is able to publicly operate in- Terrorism Focus 3:23 (2006). On Jund al-Sham’s alleged ing their way to Iraq through Syrian territory, see Karen side Syria today is Hizb al-Tahrir, and it is largely moder- presence in Jordan, see Alon Ben-David, “Jordanian In- DeYoung, “Terrorist Traffic Via Syria Again Inching ate and non-violent. dictment Reveals Operations of Jund al Sham’s Terror Up,” Washington Post, May 11, 2009. 16 Another possible reason is the enduring spiritual and Network,” Jane’s Information Group, June 16, 2003. 13 Erin Cunningham, “Growing Threat to Hamas: Ga- cultural influence by the secular colonizing powers—the 10 To learn more about the support Fatah al-Islam re- zans Who Think it has Sold Out,” Christian Science Moni- Ottoman Empire in the past, and more recently France ceived from Jund al-Sham, please consult Bilal Y. Saab tor, August 17, 2009. and the United Kingdom—over the Levant. and Magnus Ranstorp, “Fatah al Islam: How an Ambi- 14 For profiles of these groups, see Bilal Y. Saab and 17 For example, sermons delivered in Syrian mosques tious Jihadist Enterprise Went Awry,” The Brookings Magnus Ranstorp, “Securing Lebanon from the Threat of have largely been moderate in tone and substance. No Institution and the Swedish National Defence College, Salafist Jihadism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30:10 frequent use of takfiri language or sign of widespread ad- November 28, 2007. (2007). vocacy for militant Islam has been reported in any Syrian

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Lebanon, despite years of sectarian and Successful Hard Measures Against al-Qa`ida In the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinian religious conflict most recently marked Security and intelligence forces in and Israeli security and intelligence by Sunni-Shi`a tensions in the aftermath the Levant have used hard measures services share the concern of al-Qa`ida of the 2003 Iraq War and several internal reasonably well to combat the threat of penetrating the Palestinian Territories, political crises, al-Qa`ida’s ideology al-Qa`ida-inspired tactics. In Lebanon, and it is possible that they have at times has not found a home. In the summer of these services and the army have cooperated in combating the Salafi- 2007, the Lebanese were shocked by the been able to crush two Salafi-jihadi jihadi threat, although there is no hard images of the Lebanese army fighting insurgencies during the past nine years evidence of this. Fatah al-Islam near Tripoli. Perhaps and break a number of terrorist cells the strongest evidence of the lack of across the country. This is a result of Iran’s Influence over the Levant popularity of al-Qa`ida’s ideology within an offensive plan that has been recently Iran’s overall influence in the Levant Lebanese Sunni Muslim society was the coordinated with the Internal Security is significant and dominant in some unwillingness of all Lebanese Sunni Forces (ISF).21 areas such as Lebanon (through Hizb Islamist groups to heed Fatah al-Islam’s Allah) and the Palestinian Territories appeal and calls for help throughout its In Syria, the regime’s notorious (through Hamas and Palestinian Islamic battle with the Lebanese army. Even the intelligence services have been able Jihad). This hampers al-Qa`ida’s relatively more radical Asbat al-Ansar, to ensure security and stability in ability to mobilize in that region. the Qarun group, the Arqoub group, the country.22 For now, the Syrian Given the adversarial and often hostile and the Majdal Anjar group remained government has largely relied on brute fairly silent and distanced themselves force to crush any al-Qa`ida-linked “The relative decline of from the battle.18 terrorist threat. The regime, however, seems to be investing in a longer al-Qa`ida in Iraq following In Jordan, the majority of the civilian term strategy by promoting moderate the success of the U.S. population considers al-Qa`ida a Islamic voices through regime-friendly terrorist organization, as opposed to a clerics such as the moderate Grand counterinsurgency effort “legitimate resistance organization,” Mufti Ahmad Badreddine Hassoun and has presumably started a according to a study published by figures such as Mohammed Habash, the the University of Jordan’s Center for director of the Islamic Studies Center decentralization process Strategic Studies.19 The increasingly and grandson-in-law of the long serving for the group.” negative perception of al-Qa`ida by mufti of Damascus, Ahmad Kaftaro. Jordanians and other Arab societies alike speaks to one of al-Qa`ida’s biggest In Jordan, its Western-trained weaknesses: its use of violence against intelligence services and special operations relationship between Iran and al- innocent civilians in pursuit of its unit (known as the Knights of Truth) are one Qa`ida (al-Qa`ida considers the Iranian goals. In recent years, there have been of the most disciplined and effective in the regime as “apostate” and Shi`a Muslims mass demonstrations in Jordan against region. Jordanian security forces foiled in general as rawafidh, or “traitors”), al-Qa`ida following terrorist attacks two Salafi-jihadi attacks in 2003, eight the latter actively works on preventing such as the November 9, 2005 Amman in 2004 and 10 in 2005.23 the former from expanding in its hotel bombings. Even Abu Muhammad own sphere of influence.24 This effort al-Maqdisi, a leading Jordanian militant 21 For more on the Lebanese military intelligence ser- usually takes the form of projection of ideologue, censured al-Qa`ida for its vices’ efforts at combating al-Qa`ida-like entities in Shi`a values and norms onto the Levant 20 acts of indiscriminate violence. Lebanon, see Saab, “Al-Qa`ida’s Presence and Influence (a process that started with the Islamic in Lebanon.” revolution) and financial and technical 22 Several al-Qa`ida-style failed terrorist operations have assistance to allies in their fight against been carried out in Syria since the outbreak of the 2003 al-Qa`ida. mosques, at least those located in Damascus. Iraq War. The most prominent took place in April 2004, 18 For profiles of these groups, please see Saab and Ran- when armed assailants raided an abandoned UN build- storp, “Securing Lebanon from the Threat of Salafist Ji- ing in the residential Mezzeh neighborhood of Damas- hadism.” cus, killing a policeman and a bystander. In July 2005, 19 Alia Shukri Hamzeh, “Majority of Jordanians View a group of terrorists were apprehended after a shooting al-Qa`ida as Terrorist Group,” Jordan Times, January 5, on Mount Qassioun, which overlooks the Syrian capital. cial operations unit, August 21, 2009. There have been 2005. Earlier that summer, Syrian authorities announced that recent suspicions by the Jordanian intelligence services 20 Al-Maqdisi’s criticism of AQI’s conduct in Iraq was they had arrested one man and killed another who had that Jabhat al-Amal al-Islami was forming a militant fac- articulated in several articles and in an interview with been planning an attack in Damascus on behalf of Jund tion. The group denies the accusations and insists it is al-Jazira. See Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, “Al-Zarqawi; al-Sham, an al-Qa`ida-affiliated group. In June 2006, only interested in peaceful political activism. munasaha wa munasara: amal wa alam,” Minbar al- Syrian security clashed with al-Qa`ida-linked terrorists 24 There is no consensus among terrorism analysts over Tawhid wa’l-Jihad, August 2004. For more details, see who, according to the Syrian Ministry of Information, the nature of the relationship (or lack thereof) between Anouar Boukhars, “The Challenge of Terrorism and were planning to execute terrorist operations in Um- al-Qa`ida and Iran. Some argue that the two often coop- Religious Extremism in Jordan,” Strategic Insights 5:4 ayyad Square and other important civilian and military erate for the purpose of defeating common enemies (in (2006); Nibras Kazimi, “A Virulent Ideology in Muta- spots in the country. The Syrian police managed to kill this case the United States), while others claim that reli- tion: Zarqawi Upstages Maqdisi,” Current Trends in Isla- four militants, wound two and arrest four. gious, political and even strategic considerations prevent mist Ideology 2 (2005). 23 Personal interview, senior member of Jordan’s spe- the two from forming any serious partnerships.

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Al-Qa`ida Unclear About the Levant strategically located precisely in Indeed, material links between Salafi- In their statements and writings, al- that region. Any attack here would jihadi cells and al-Qa`ida’s central Qa`ida’s senior leaders have often damage the Crusaders many times leadership have been reported in called for the destruction of Israel and more than attacks elsewhere.29 Lebanon. For example, in June 2009 the liberation of Jerusalem. Rarely, a cell of four people (one Kuwaiti, one however, have Bin Ladin, al-Zawahiri, or Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi is also Syrian, one Lebanese, and one Tajik) other senior leaders addressed in detail suspected of having a strategic plan that with verifiable ties to al-Qa`ida in the value of the Levant from either an included the Levant. His organization, Afghanistan was apprehended by the operational or strategic perspective.25 for example, perpetrated terrorist Lebanese military intelligence services.33 There are, however, some cases where attacks in Amman in 2005 and sent In July 2007, 10 men allegedly linked to Salafi-jihadi ideologues mentioned the many fighters to Fatah al-Islam in al-Qa`ida were arrested and accused of Levant when highlighting al-Qa`ida’s Lebanon in an effort to expand in the using a billboard advertising agency as “global strategy.” For example, Levant and destabilize the “apostate” cover to spy on the UN peacekeeping Muhammad Ibrahim Makkawi, regimes there.30 Finally, an allegedly force and the Lebanese army in allegedly one of al-Qa`ida’s “strategic leading jihadist ideologue, known as preparation for an attack.34 brains,” wrote a document entitled “al- “the Spearhead of the Mujahidin,” Qaeda’s Strategy to the Year 2020,” claims that al-Qa`ida is already well This worrying trend sheds light on the which indicated that al-Qa`ida has a established in the Levant and is focused nature of al-Qa`ida’s strategy toward master plan to pursue a long-term jihad on fighting Israel.31 the Levant. Instead of helping to create campaign of five distinct phases to rid overt insurgent movements in that the umma (global Islamic nation) of all These notable cases notwithstanding, region, al-Qa`ida is likely focusing forms of oppression.26 The strategy’s there is no evidence that al-Qa`ida’s on embedding terrorist sleeper cells third stage features the Levant where chief leader or his deputy have devoted that are in charge, with the help of al-Qa`ida would militarily engage any substantial resources to the Levant. the franchise in Iraq, of planning and the United States in a long war of This leads one to assume that this sub- conducting terrorist operations against attrition.27 region, while important spiritually to al- Western and Israeli targets. Qa`ida’s leaders because of Jerusalem, Moreover, the now-detained Abu is not currently as strategically or Bilal Y. Saab is a doctoral student at Mus`ab al-Suri, who some have labeled operationally critical as other regions the Department of Government and “the architect of the new al-Qa`ida” in the Middle East or South Asia. Politics at the University of Maryland after the September 11, 2001 attacks, and a Counterterrorism and Middle East sharply disagreed with Bin Ladin Conclusion consultant for Centra Technology Inc. and attached more significance to the While Levantine societies have had and Oxford Analytica. Previously, he was Levant than the al-Qa`ida chief or his success and luck in battling overt Salafi- a Research Analyst at the Saban Center deputy.28 In his lectures, al-Suri placed jihadi insurgencies and preventing them for Middle East Policy at The Brookings enormous emphasis on the strategic from developing in their region, they Institution. This article is inspired by a impact of striking Jewish, American, have had to face challenges in a much speech delivered by the author at the 2009 and Western interests in the heart of more demanding category: combating International Terrorism and Intelligence the Arab world: the Arab Peninsula and the threat of underground terrorist (ITI) conference in Washington, D.C. the Levant. According to one analyst cells, which seem to be proliferating in who has closely studied al-Suri, the Levant. The relative decline of al- Qa`ida in Iraq following the success of in his mind, the “new Crusader the U.S. counterinsurgency effort has imperialism” aimed to take presumably started a decentralization control of the oil resources and the process for the group. Many of its holy places, both of which were members have fled Iraq to neighboring countries such as Syria, Jordan and 25 It is worth recalling that during and after the battle Lebanon. In these countries, they have of Nahr al-Bared in Lebanon in the summer of 2007, worked on creating terrorist cells to 32 Ayman al-Zawahiri was severely criticized online by al- attack Western targets and Israel. Qa`ida sympathizers for not publicly supporting Fatah al-Islam in its fight against the Lebanese army. Even Bin Ladin did not issue a statement praising Fatah al-Islam 29 Brynjar Lia, “Dissidents in al-Qaida: Abu Mus’ab al and claimed rocket attacks from southern Lebanon by name. Suri’s Critique of bin Ladin and the Salafi Jihadi Current,” against Israel. See Patrick Galey, “Al-Qaeda Claims 26 Stephen Ulph, “Al-Qaeda’s Strategy Until 2020,” Ter- Lecture at Princeton University, December 3, 2007. Rocket Attacks Against Israel,” Daily Star [Beirut], July rorism Focus 2:6 (2005). It is not clear at what stage al- 30 See Saab and Ranstorp, “Securing Lebanon from the 27, 2009; Yaakoz Katz, “Al-Qaeda Suspected in Attack Qa`ida considers itself in today. Threat of Salafist Jihadism.” that Killed 5 UN Troops,” Jerusalem Post, June 25, 2007. 27 Ibid. 31 Murad Batal al-Shishani, “Al-Qaeda Ideologue De- 33 Hassan Oleik, “Al Iddi’a’ ala Mawkoufin min al- 28 For more on al-Suri’s life and influence, see Paul scribes Alleged Spread of Al-Qaeda in the Levant,” Ter- Qa`ida Mourtabitin bi Afghanistan,” al-Akhbar, June 30, Cruickshank and Mohanad Hage Ali, “Abu Musab al rorism Monitor 7:7 (2009). 2009. Suri: Architect of the New Al-Qa`ida,” Studies in Conflict 32 For example, al-Qa`ida cells have attacked UNIFIL 34 “Lebanon: Ad Agency Served as Cover for Terror and Terrorism 30:1 (2007). (more specifically its Spanish contingent in June 2007) Plot, Reports Say,” Los Angeles Times, July 22, 2009.

17 september 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 9

The Dangerous Ideas Background think.”4 The majority of neo-Zarqawist Differences between Abu Mus`ab writings can be found at the Midad al- of the Neo-Zarqawist al-Zarqawi and Abu Muhammad al- Sayouf forum.5 Movement Maqdisi first appeared in mid-2005, when the latter sent an open letter to The primary leaders of the movement By Murad Batal al-Shishani al-Zarqawi in Iraq entitled “Advocacy are al-Zarqawi’s brother-in-law, and Advice.” The letter asked AQI to Abu Qudama, and Abu Harith al- on june 4, 2009, Abu Muhammad al- refrain from targeting Iraqi Shi`a and Mihdhar. These two individuals are Maqdisi gave his first interview Christian civilians.2 Al-Maqdisi also best described as ideological leaders since his release from a Jordanian stressed the importance of allowing because they are not involved in actual prison in March 2008. Considered Iraqis to hold the leadership reins in jihadist operations. Nevertheless, their the ideological defender of the overall Iraq. Al-Zarqawi responded to the letter ties to al-Zarqawi and criticisms of Salafi-jihadi movement, al-Maqdisi by highlighting that its message harmed established Salafi-jihadi leaders in a admitted that there are now competing the overall “jihad in Iraq.” Since that public forum are threatening because views among Salafi-jihadis in Jordan.1 incident, divisions appeared between they could further incite militants to His confirmation of tension within al-Maqdisi’s and al-Zarqawi’s followers, resume and prolong al-Zarqawi’s legacy the movement came in response to an and they have resulted in a growing gap of spreading violence throughout the escalating dispute between al-Maqdisi within the Salafi-jihadi movement. Levant. This was partially confirmed in and his followers on one side, and on October 2008 when Jihad al-Qashih, a the other a splinter movement of Salafi- Today, a portion of the Salafi-jihadi militant who was active operationally jihadis known as the “neo-Zarqawists.” community that agrees with al-Zarqawi’s in the field with al-Zarqawi, expressed The neo-Zarqawists are a small group actions and tactics in Iraq continue to support for the movement in a letter he of ideological radicals who consider criticize al-Maqdisi directly, and they wrote from a prison cell, presumably in themselves the heirs of Abu Mus`ab al- warn other established Salafi-jihadi Syria.6 Zarqawi’s legacy. Although al-Maqdisi leaders and clerics against continuing is considered the spiritual mentor of to follow al-Maqdisi.3 In response, al- Abu Qudama Salih al-Hami’s real al-Zarqawi, the two grew apart in mid- Maqdisi and other established Salafi- name is Sati Qasrawi. He is a Jordanian 2005 when al-Maqdisi criticized al- jihadi leaders have warned their national and worked as Jihad Magazine’s Qa`ida in Iraq’s (AQI) tactics. followers against promoting the views correspondent in Afghanistan during of the neo-Zarqawists, who they call the jihad against the Soviet Union in The differences within the Salafi-jihadi “deviants.” the 1980s.7 He lost his leg there in a movement are significant because landmine explosion.8 He is married to it is rare for an established Salafi- The Neo-Zarqawists al-Zarqawi’s sister and currently lives jihadi authority—in this case Abu The neo-Zarqawist movement identifies in Jordan. Muhammad al-Maqdisi—to be criticized itself as the heirs of Abu Mus`ab al- and challenged for his writings and Zarqawi’s legacy. This legacy can best be Al-Mihdhar’s real name is Abu Abu’l- ideological position within his own defined as inducing sectarian warfare and Harith al-Mihdhar al-Shazli al-Hasani base. This ongoing rift among the attempting to spread jihadist ideas into al-Sharif.9 He is an Egyptian national Salafi-jihadi community threatens to the Levant, rather than confining jihad who studied at al-Azhar University in draw in a younger generation of militant to Iraq or Afghanistan. Importantly, Cairo, Umm al-Qura University in Mecca youth—who idolize al-Zarqawi for his al-Zarqawi’s “heirs” also ignore the aggressive tactics—intent on pursuing decrees and opinions of senior Salafi- al-Zarqawi’s legacy of spreading Salafi- jihadi clerics and leaders, most evident 4 Joas Wagemakers, “Invoking Zarqawi: Abu Muham- jihadi violence into the Levant region. through their ongoing criticisms of Abu mad al-Maqdisi’s Jihad Deficit,”CTC Sentinel 2:6 (2009). Muhammad al-Maqdisi. Their decision 5 See for example, www.almedad.com/vb/showthread. This article provides a brief background to directly challenge leading Salafi- php?t=10859, www.almedad.com/vb/showthread. on the growing tension among the Salafi- jihadi clerics shows why this movement php?t=11996 and www.almedad.com/vb/showthread. jihadi community in Jordan, identifies is less predictable and potentially more php?t=12343. Supporters of al-Maqdisi, in turn, created the leaders of the neo-Zarqawist violent; it marks a fragmentation of a forum that they named Shoumoukh al-Islam (Glory of movement, and shows that al-Zarqawi’s the established Salafi-jihadi order. Islam). legacy may translate into an increase As stated by Joas Wagemakers, “it 6 It is not clear when he was arrested, but the first refer- of terrorist plots and violence in the confirms the worrying trend among ence of his detention was in February 2007 in a report by Levant and greater Middle East region. jihadists to see themselves as capable of the Arab Organization for Human Rights of Jordan. deciding what is legitimate in combat, 7 Jihad Magazine was a bi-monthly magazine founded by irrespective of what their scholars Abdullah Azzam in 1984. It was the major media source for the Afghan mujahidin at the time. 2 Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, “Al-Zarqawi – Muna­ 8 See his participation in al-Jazira’s documentary about saha wa-Munasara,” available at www.tawhed.ws/ al-Zarqawi on July 1, 2004. This is available at www. r?i=dtwiam56. aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/930C50BF-DF09-4597-9A24- 3 These leaders include Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Jarrah 18E23556F266.htm. al-Qaddah, Abu Abdallah Riyalat, Abu Saraqa al-Faqih, 9 Iman al-Qahtani, “Sijal Bayanat bayn Islamiyee Lon- 1 Al-Sabeel, June 4, 2009. among others. don,” al-Arabiya, February 12, 2009.

18 september 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 9 and studied Deoband in Pakistan.10 carry out terrorist attacks in Jordan, wal-Tawhid, providing legitimacy to He moved to London at an unknown one of which was believed directed al-Maqdisi’s agenda.20 Nevertheless, point and founded the Midad al-Sayouf by al-Zarqawi himself. He remains the neo-Zarqawist movement remains Forum. He also allegedly created the wanted in Jordan, most famously for concerning as it could attract energetic Thabitoun ala al-Ahd (Abiding by our an assassination attempt against U.S. youth, who may be less prone to rigidly Oath) site11 for Muhammad Khalil al- archaeologists in that country in April follow the dictates of al-Maqdisi and Hakaymah,12 a dissident jihadist leader 2004.15 He was also tried in absentia more attracted to al-Zarqawi’s infamous who joined al-Qa`ida.13 for involvement in the “chemical cell,” legacy in Iraq. which was a plot to blow up Jordan’s Once Jihad al-Qashih joined the General Intelligence building in 2004. Terrorism Spreading into the Levant campaign against al-Maqdisi in 2008, The plot was headed by Azmi al-Jayousi The possibility of other active militants it became clear that individuals with and organized by al-Zarqawi, who was pursuing the neo-Zarqawist ideology military experience are supporting the leading AQI at the time.16 is concerning as it would result in more radical neo-Zarqawist movement. more terrorist violence in the Levant. Al-Qashih’s real name is Ibrahim Still a Fringe Movement Although al-Zarqawi was killed on June The neo-Zarqawists are not scholars 7, 2006 in a U.S. missile strike, he left or clerics. As a result, they lack the an enduring mark on the region. His “Their decision to directly theoretical approach that characterizes legacy is partly defined by his attempt challenge leading Salafi- the writings of al-Maqdisi and other to spread jihadist violence into the established theorists. The neo-Zarqawist more stable states of the Levant—most jihadi clerics shows why writings are almost solely based on vividly witnessed in the 2005 Amman this movement is less personal criticism of al-Maqdisi. They hotel bombings. His goal was to liberate also criticize al-Maqdisi’s lack of Palestine after the battle was concluded predictable and potentially “jihadist credentials” since, unlike al- in Iraq. In December 2005, for example, more violent; it marks Zarqawi, he has never been involved in al-Zarqawi claimed responsibility for actual combat.17 The neo-Zarqawists’ launching missiles at northern Israel.21 a fragmentation of the beliefs are even more radical than al- established Salafi-jihadi Maqdisi and the established Salafi- From the establishment of his military jihadi theorists. For example, they training camp in Afghanistan’s Herat order.” oppose al-Maqdisi because he refused to Province in 2000 through his violent declare that all Shi`a are non-believers. activities in Iraq until his 2006 death, The neo-Zarqawists refuse to criticize al-Zarqawi influenced a number of suicide bombings,18 they pursue takfiri jihadists, many of whom were from the Muhammad Abdul-Thahir Zain al- ideology, and charge Jordan’s Ministry Levant region.22 Al-Zarqawi wanted `Abidin.14 He is often described on of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs with to create an “al-Qa`ida in the Levant” jihadist forums as the “hero of Falluja” blasphemy for its role in controlling organization, and he sought to establish due to his experience fighting with al- mosques. organizational and ideological links Zarqawi in Anbar Province in 2004. between his AQI movement and other Currently, he is believed to be in a Although a potentially dangerous jihadist cells in the Levant. Syrian prison, from where he wrote movement, it has not yet been accepted the 2008 letter criticizing al-Maqdisi. by the mainstream Salafi-jihadi Since the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in His long letter was posted on jihadist movement.19 This is due to the fact that 2003, Jordan has seen a significant websites, especially the sites popular the heirs of al-Zarqawi and others that increase in the number of foiled terrorist among neo-Zarqawists. pursue his more expansive ideology lack plots. During the period of 1991-2003, the credentials of the established Salafi- for example, Jordanian courts ruled Al-Qashih appears to have been jihadi scholars and clerics. Moreover, in 10 large cases related to Salafi- instrumental to al-Zarqawi’s Levantine as recently as January 14, 2009, Usama jihadis. From 2003-2008, however, strategy, as he allegedly attempted to bin Ladin praised Abu Muhammad al- that number more than doubled to 22.23 Maqdisi’s website, Manbar al-Jihad Most of the cases were at least partly 10 Ibid. linked to either Iraq, Abu Mus`ab al- 11 The website is currently defunct. Its URL used to be 15 In April 2004, Jordanian security foiled an attempt Zarqawi or AQI. Al-Zarqawi himself located at www.altabetoon.eur.st. to attack four American anthropologists who were work- was personally tried in absentia in four 12 Al-Hakaymah is one of Egyptian Jama`a al-Islami- ing in Irbid (northern Jordan). Al-Qashih was one of the of the 22 cases, while six cases were yya’s leaders who claimed that the group joined al- ringleaders in this attempt, along with Jamil Kotkot. See linked to him by one of his operatives Qa`ida, creating al-Qa`ida’s “Egyptian branch” in 2006. al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 6, 2006. Jama`a al-Islamiyya denied his claim, however. Al-Ha- 16 Al-Sabeel, January 11, 2005. 20 Usama bin Ladin, audio recording, January 14, 2009. kaymah is supposedly based in Afghanistan. 17 For more on these compare-and-contrast criticisms, 21 Daily Star, December 20, 2005; Jerusalem Post, Decem- 13 Al-Qahtani. see Wagemakers. ber 30, 2005. 14 “Al-Rad Ala’a al-Maqdsi fi Tholmeh ll Zarqawi,” pub- 18 Al-Hami. 22 Fouad Husain, Al-Zarqawi: al-Jeel al-Thani ll Qaida lished on several jihadist web forums in October 2008. 19 For example, there was strong criticism from al-Faloja (Amman: Dar al-Khayal Publication, 2005). It is still available at www.muslm.net/vb/showthread. users, many of whom demanded the closure of Midad al- 23 These numbers were derived from the author’s re- php?t=312502. Sayouf. view of all Jordanian cases since 1991.

19 september 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 9 or relatives.24 In eight cases, the major uncovered during the ongoing trials of The July 17 Jakarta Suicide charge was “planning to travel to Iraq Salafi-jihadis in Jordan. to fight Americans.”25 Although not all Attacks and the Death of of the 22 cases were connected to al- Jihad al-Qashih was originally from Noordin Top Zarqawi or AQI, they demonstrate the the Irbid camp, as was Suleiman worrying spread of Salafi-jihadi ideals Ghayyad al-Anjadi, who was killed by By Noor Huda Ismail into the Levant. Jordanian authorities after an armed confrontation in 2007. Al-Anjadi was on july 17, 2009, two suicide bombers Some of the Jordanian court cases accused of attempting to help Azmi struck the JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton established links between Jordanian al-Jayousi—who was sent to Jordan by hotels in Jakarta, Indonesia, killing jihadists and other militants in the al-Zarqawi to lead the 2004 chemical seven people. Indonesian authorities Levant region. Shakir al-Khatib, for cell—escape from prison with the help are still investigating the attacks and example, is the leader of a group on trial of other militants. Al-Anjadi is also have not yet compiled enough evidence in Jordan charged with plotting to blow accused of plotting to assassinate U.S. to know the exact parties responsible. up Christian churches and attacking a President George W. Bush during his Speculation, however, fell on Noordin Lebanese choir in July 2008.26 He was visit to Jordan in 2006. Mohamed Top, a militant who led a not trained in Jordan, however, but faction of the al-Qa`ida-linked Jemaah instead in the Ain al-Hilwah Palestinian Conclusion Islamiya (JI) terrorist group.1 The hotel refugee camp in Lebanon. According to Despite his death in 2006, Abu Mus`ab bombings shocked Indonesia because the indictment, he allegedly pledged al-Zarqawi’s legacy lives on. His speeches conditions in the country have been bay`at (oath of loyalty) to al-Qa`ida and and tactics have influenced militants in relatively peaceful since the last attack wanted to fight in Iraq.27 In 2005, the the Levant. Just as worrying, his so- by Noordin’s group in Bali in 2005. In Khatab Brigades was a group seeking called “heirs” continue to promote his the 2005 attack, three bombs struck two to fight in Iraq and to also implement legacy on jihadist web forums. The neo- tourist areas, killing at least 26 people, terrorist attacks in Jordan.28 Another Zarqawist movement has been able to among them foreign nationals.2 example is of two leading Salafi-jihadi mobilize and attract supporters despite leaders in the Ain al-Hilwah refugee its lack of a “legitimate” ideology Since 2002, Indonesian authorities have camp who were tried in absentia in when compared to Abu Muhammad al- managed to arrest most of JI’s senior Jordan: Usama al-Shihabi (Abu al-Zahra) Maqdisi and his followers. members. More importantly, they have and Haytham al-Saadi (Abu Tariq). Al- succeeded in gleaning information Shihabi was the leader of Jund al-Sham Al-Zarqawi’s followers are even more about the JI network and ideology in Lebanon, an organization supposedly radical than al-Maqdisi and the other from interrogations. Authorities have founded by al-Zarqawi himself when he established Salafi-jihadi theorists also confiscated a significant amount was in Afghanistan’s Herat Province.29 because they are pursuing a more of JI’s explosives material, and they Al-Saadi is the brother of Asbat al- unrestrained form of warfare. If his have foiled various plots, such as an Ansar leader Abu Muhjin.30 legacy gains further traction among the attempt to blow up a café frequented Salafi-jihadi community, it could mean by Western tourists in Bukittinggi, Another effect of al-Zarqawi’s legacy is a rise in terrorist plots in the relatively West Sumatra in 2008 and the planned his impact on the Palestinian diaspora stable Levant region. assassination of a foreign national in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. Socio- there.3 Most significantly, after nearly political conditions in Palestinian Murad Batal al-Shishani is a London-based seven frustrating years of near misses refugee camps in these countries play an analyst of Islamic groups and terrorism. He and false leads, Indonesian authorities important role in increasing the influence is also a specialist on Islamic movements finally managed to kill Noordin Top of al-Zarqawi’s ideology. Jordan’s Irbid in Chechnya and in the Middle East. Al- on September 17 at the end of a bloody camp, for example, is close to the Syrian Shishani is a regular contributor to several nine-hour siege in Central Java.4 Despite border and has emerged as a crossing publications in both Arabic and English such Noordin’s death, JI, and especially the point for Salafi-jihadis heading to Iraq as The Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism remaining members of Noordin’s pro- or Lebanon, as seen through evidence Monitor and the London-based al-Hayat. bombing faction, remains a threat to He is also the author of the book The Islamic Indonesian security. 24 Ibid. Movement in Chechnya and the Chechen- 25 Ibid. Russian Conflict 1990-2000, and Iraqi 26 Al-Hayat, January 28, 2009. Resistance: National Liberation vs. 1 Jemaah Islamiya is no longer a cohesive organization 27 Ibid.; Also see Murad Batal al-Shishani, “Al-Zarqawi’s Terrorism: A Quantitative Study. with a unified leadership structure. Divisions appeared Legacy Seen in Trial of Jordanian al-Qaeda Cell,” Terror- in the group after the first Bali bombing in 2002. Noor- ism Focus 6:4 (2009). din’s faction is the only group in Indonesia that has con- 28 Al-Ghad, December 7, 2005; Jordan Times, September ducted suicide attacks. 14, 2006. 2 “Bali Bomb Attacks Claim 26 Lives,” BBC, October 2, 29 “Tantheem Jund al-Sham Bada’ ma’a al-Zarqawi fi Af- 2005. ghanistan w Antaqal Beza’amt Abu Yousof ila Mukhaim 3 International Crisis Group, “Indonesia: Radicalisation A’in al-Hilweh,” Asharq al-Awsat, May 25, 2007. of the ‘Palembang Group,’” May 20, 2009. 30 “Al-Zarqawi Yoa’in Abu Muhjin al-Mutarad al-Falas- 4 “Indonesian Police: DNA Proves It Was Noordin,” Ja- tini Qaedan Maydanyan,” Elaph, August 16, 2005. karta Globe, September 18, 2009.

20 september 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 9

This article will offer a profile of Hakim12 in the 1990s in Johor Bahru, (life’s purpose is to maintain faith and Noordin Mohamed Top, describe his Malaysia. When Noordin joined the JI jihad).15 Due to the group’s willingness pro-bombing faction of JI, and assess organization, he was still a lecturer at a to accept martyrdom operations, they the future dangers posed by this violent university in Malaysia where he taught are ready to face various challenges faction. computer science. and risks, including the threat of prison or death. As stated by one prisoner Profile of Noordin Mohamed Top Noordin was not involved in the 2002 who was implicated in the 2005 Bali Jemaah Islamiya is currently a crippled Bali bombing because he had just bombings, “To die fighting for our faith organization. It officially opposes arrived in Indonesia. This allowed him is noble, and heaven awaits our arrival bombings and encourages its members to avoid arrest when governments in the with 72 beautiful angels.”16 not to participate in attacks.5 JI’s region rounded up a number of senior mainstream faction has adopted a JI members, especially in Malaysia. One imprisoned militant, interviewed “soft” approach to its mission of Darul Noordin’s role in JI and terrorism in June 2009, explained how Noordin Islam6 and has focused on preaching increased after his mentor, Ali Ghufron, recruited new martyrs: “At the moment, and conducting charity work. Yet its was arrested in December 2002. Noordin Noordin never goes looking for people potential for violence remains as a wanted to continue his mentor’s struggle committed to the cause, but rather result of an internal split that created by assuming leadership of all future young people seek him out to sacrifice a more hardcore splinter group led by bombing campaigns, beginning with the themselves. If you are on the same Malaysian JI member Noordin Mohamed August 2003 JW Marriott bombing in track, you will be able to find him.”17 Top. Noordin has orchestrated terrorist Jakarta. It is not clear whether Noordin Committed martyrs consider their operations in Indonesia since his first had actual bomb-making experience; actions as istishhad (the search to become attack on the JW Marriott in 2003. his skill-set was as a recruiter and a shahid, or martyr), and not suicide. manager. Born on August 11, 1968 in Malaysia, Eluding Arrest and Recruiting New Members Noordin was charismatic and generally Over the years, Noordin grew For the last seven years, Noordin reserved.7 One of his former associates increasingly radical and seemingly managed to elude arrest because he described him as a man of high discipline adopted some of al-Qa`ida’s video enjoyed protection from hardcore in carrying out amaliyya (the code for propaganda tactics. After the death members of the JI community and other terrorist acts).8 He switched locations of his JI associate and bomb expert individuals who shared his ideology. His regularly and never used a cellular Azahari13 in 2005, for example, Noordin sympathizers consider the Indonesian phone.9 He was considered an expert released a video threatening the West: government a “secular government at avoiding security forces. According which has succumbed to the interests of to Ali Imron,10 who was involved As long as you keep your troops the USA and its allies; it is therefore the in the first Bali bombing, Noordin in Iraq and Afghanistan and enemy and may be engaged in combat.”18 was a student of the late JI leader Ali intimidate Muslim people, you Although internal differences among Ghufron (also known as Mukhlas)11 will feel our intimidation and JI members are apparent, it has not when he taught in Pesantren Lukmanul our terror...America, Australia, regressed to the point that group England and Italy. You will be the members are regularly cooperating with target of our next attack. Especially authorities in arrests. 5 Personal interview, Abu Rusdan, leader of JI’s main- for Australia, as long as its troops stream faction, Central Java, Indonesia, June 2009. are in Afghanistan and Iraq and Although Noordin’s splinter faction is 19 6 Its mission is to reach a world of Darul Islam, or the engage in intimidation there, you likely under 50 members, it has the 14 abode of Islam in Indonesia and beyond. will also feel our intimidation. full support of dedicated youth who 7 Personal interview, Abdullah Sunata, Jakarta Police share a deep commitment to the jihadist Detention, Indonesia, August 2009. Sunata met with The video was posed in a Zarqawi-like cause. This allows the faction to recruit Noordin in 2004 when Noordin sought help from Su- setting, with a masked man, believed to new members. According to one member nata. Sunata refused to help Noordin because for Sunata be Noordin, explicitly threatening the of Noordin’s faction when describing the use of violence is only justified in conflict zones, not in West. its agenda, “Don’t just stick to the big peaceful cities such as Jakarta or Bali. jamaah (group). We have to support jihad 8 Personal interview, Jack Harun, Semarang, Central Noordin Top’s Faction anywhere and everywhere including 20 Java, Indonesia, June 2009. Harun was arrested for his The number of hardcore members in in Iraq.” For this member, jihad is involvement as Noordin’s courier and right-hand man. Noordin’s JI faction is not known, Harun was recently released from prison. although some analysts believe it is no 15 Personal interview, Anif Solchanudin, Semarang, 9 Ibid. more than a handful. Noordin’s faction Central Java, Indonesia, June 2009. 10 Personal interview, Ali Imron, Jakarta, Indonesia, is known to actively seek martyrdom 16 Ibid. June 2009. Ali Imron is one of the main actors of the first operations. The group’s main principle 17 Ibid. Bali bombing. He is also the younger brother of the late to live by is Innal hayata la aqidatun wal jihad 18 Personal interview, Ali Imron, Jakarta, Indonesia, Ali Ghufron. Ali Imron spent some time in Johor Bahru June 2009. where he met Top. 12 Pesantren are Islamic boarding schools. 19 There is insufficient evidence to know the size of the 11 Ghufron planned and executed the 2002 Bali bomb- 13 Azahari was killed by Indonesian police in 2005. He faction, but the author estimates around 20 hardcore ing and was executed by the Indonesian government in was a bomb expert with JI. members. November 2008. 14 BBC, November 18, 2005. 20 Personal interview, Urwah, Solo, Central Java, Indo-

21 september 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 9 fard `ayn (personal obligation) and it is Nur Hasbi, who is wanted in connection Recent Highlights in therefore legitimate for any group or with the July 17 bombings. Two other individual to carry out jihad based on possible successors are Reno (also known Terrorist Activity their own initiatives and methods. as Tedi) and Maruto Jati Sulistiono. August 1, 2009 (SOMALIA): Burundi’s In this context, Noordin won fresh Unfortunately, there is no way to draw military announced that a third battalion recruits from among hardcore members a profile of future JI suicide bombers. of 850 soldiers had been deployed to who “idolized” him and believed that Previous profiles of suicide bombers, Somalia to reinforce the African Union the use of violence against the enemies for example, describe young men, peacekeeping force in Mogadishu. – AFP, of Islam is justified in any situation. religiously devout, alienated from August 1 Hardcore members also consider many society, and social and psychological senior JI members to be “NATO” (No outcasts. Yet the two bombers in the August 2, 2009 (RUSSIA): Militants Action, Talk Only) and no longer 2009 Jakarta hotel bombings did not attacked a three-vehicle police convoy passionate in their commitment to the fit this profile. Dani Dwi Permana, in the mountains of southern Chechnya, jihadist movement. This is because many 18-years-old, was a former high school killing “several” officers. – Voice of JI members have matured, married and student in Bogor, West Java. Dani’s America, August 3 taken on family considerations.21 teacher described him as not very talkative, but intelligent and diligent in August 3, 2009 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida Members of Noordin’s pro-bombing his studies.25 Dani sat on the executive deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri released faction are a fringe minority within JI. committee of the school’s Intra-School a new video message saying that the Nevertheless, it does not take a large Students Organization (OSIS) and was group’s “truce” offer to the United States organization to commit major terrorist known by all of the school’s students.26 still stands. The conditions of the truce attacks. The 2005 Bali bombing, for He passed the school’s final examination demand that the United States remove example, was committed by only three in 2009, but still had to collect his SMA all troops from Muslim lands and that individuals who were willing to blow (high school) diploma.27 In the case of Western countries stop supporting themselves up for the cause.22 the second bomber, Nana Supriyatna, “corrupt and apostate regimes in the 28-years-old, his neighbors describe him as Muslim world,” among other conditions. Future Dangers “sociable” and “friendly.”28 No one terrorist – CBC News, August 3 Noordin’s death is a major government profile is likely to ever be drawn. success. Yet if it is determined that August 3, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): A Noordin’s faction was behind the July Noordin’s faction will continue to rely bomb exploded near a police convoy 17 Jakarta attacks, it demonstrates on the traditional tools of recruitment in the western city of Herat, killing at an advanced level of efficiency, such as schools, kinship networks, least 10 people. The Taliban claimed sophistication and novelty of tactics friendships and small Islamic responsibility, and said that the target compared to their previous operations discussion groups.29 To make matters was a local police chief. The local police that relied on vehicles and backpack more difficult, Noordin’s group have chief was wounded in the attack. – New bombs.23 In the case of the 2009 Jakarta also embraced new technologies such York Times, August 3 hotel bombings, Noordin’s key associate, as CDs, DVDs, coded SMS messages, Syaifudin Zuhri, allegedly recruited secure e-mail, and password-protected August 4, 2009 (AUSTRALIA): More both of the suicide bombers and had websites to communicate and connect to than 400 police officers raided properties them stay overnight in luxurious new potential recruits. Until Noordin’s across Melbourne in a major Australian hotels.24 The recruits assembled their faction is dismantled, Indonesia will counterterrorism operation. Authorities bombs inside their hotel rooms. This remain at risk for future terrorist arrested four men suspected of planning allowed maximum operational security. attacks. a “suicide terrorist attack on a defense establishment within Australia involving It is possible that Syaifudin Zuhri will Noor Huda Ismail is an executive director an armed assault with automatic succeed Noordin with the help from at of a Jakarta-based, private think-tank weapons.” The men allegedly wanted least three of his followers, including called the Institute for International Peace to “kill as many soldiers as they could Building. He earned a master’s degree in before they themselves were killed.” The four men were all between the ages of nesia, June 2009. He died together with Noordin during international security from St. Andrews 22 to 26 and were Australian citizens of the police raid on September 17, 2009. University, Scotland. Somali or Lebanese descent. Police claim 21 This statement is based on the author’s personal that the men are linked to al-Shabab, an observations after a series of interviews with senior JI 25 Ibid. insurgent group in Somalia that has ties members. 26 Ibid. to al-Qa`ida. – al-Jazira, August 4 22 In this attack, Salik Firdaus recruited two suicide 27 “JW Marriott Hotel Bomber was Bogor High-School bombers and he himself was the third suicide bomber. Student,” Antara News, August 10, 2009. August 4, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): A 23 Based on evidence acquired from the attack, it is 28 Gatra, August 27, 2009. bomb exploded under the convoy of the highly likely that Noordin’s faction is to blame. There 29 These discussions, consisting of six-to-ten people, governor of Wardak Province. There were are direct connections between the current suspects and meet regularly for a number of social and religious ac- no injuries. – Guardian, August 4 Noordin. Moreover, Noordin’s faction is the only group tivities. Due to their perceived harmless nature, these in Indonesia that has conducted suicide bombings. groups inhibit authorities from preventing possible vio- 24 Gatra, August 27, 2009. lent outcomes.

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August 5, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A suspected targeted Malik Khadeen, who was killed Ministry in Baghdad, killing at least eight U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle killed or in the attack. Khadeen was an anti-Taliban people. Minutes later, a second truck bomb fatally injured Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan facilitator in Wana. – AFP, August 13 exploded outside the Foreign Ministry, chief Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan killing at least 59 people. In the aftermath Agency of the Federally Administered August 13, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A new Pew of the attacks, Iraqi authorities detained Tribal Areas. – AFP, August 20 Research Center poll found that Pakistani 11 security officers for questioning about views of al-Qa`ida and the Taliban have security failures. The Islamic State of Iraq August 7, 2009 (UNITED STATES): A grown increasingly negative since last claimed credit for the bombings. – Daily U.S. federal judge ordered the release and year. Pakistanis with an unfavorable view Telegraph, August 20; Voice of America, August deportation of Shaykh Muhammad al- of al-Qa`ida and the Taliban doubled, 20; AP, August 25 Mu’ayyad, who was previously convicted with approximately two-thirds of those of supporting terrorism in a trial in polled expressing negative views toward August 19, 2009 (SAUDI ARABIA): Saudi New York City in 2005. His conviction, the groups. – Washington Post, August 13 Arabia’s Interior Ministry announced that however, was overturned in October it arrested 44 al-Qa`ida suspects across the 2008. Al-Mu’ayyad, a cleric, will return to August 14, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): A country during the past year. Details were his home country of Yemen. His assistant suicide bomber in a vehicle detonated his not provided on whether the suspects were and bodyguard, Mohamed Zayed, will explosives at an Afghan National Army planning specific attacks, but authorities also be released and deported to Yemen. base in Helmand Province, killing at least claimed that the suspects had links to the – Washington Post, August 8 one soldier. – New York Times, August 14 “original al-Qa`ida organization.” – CNN, August 19; AFP, August 19 August 8, 2009 (MAURITANIA): A August 14-15, 2009 (ISRAEL): Hamas suicide bomber detonated his explosives crushed an Islamist group called Jund August 19, 2009 (LEBANON): Lebanese outside the French Embassy in Ansar Allah in the Gaza Strip. The Salafi- soldiers detained Wissam Tahbish, a Nouakchott, the capital of Mauritania. jihadi group defied Hamas by declaring Palestinian militant allegedly linked to al- Two embassy guards were injured. Al- an “Islamic emirate” in Gaza, sparking an Qa`ida. Tahbish was arrested as he tried Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb claimed intense gun battle as Hamas policemen to enter Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee responsibility. – BBC, August 8; AFP, launched an offensive on the group’s camp, Ain al-Hilwah. – Reuters, August 19 August 18 positions. Jund Ansar Allah’s chief, Abdel Latif Moussa, was killed in the fighting August 20, 2009 (SCOTLAND): Scottish August 10, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): when he detonated an explosives vest. authorities released Abdel Basset Ali Taliban suicide bombers armed with At least 22 people, including six Hamas al-Megrahi from prison despite his life rockets attacked Afghan government police officers, were killed during the sentence for his role in the 1988 terrorist buildings in Logar Province. The attack clashes. – Bloomberg, August 15; Haaretz, bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over killed two policemen. – AFP, August 10 August 17 Lockerbie, Scotland. Al-Megrahi, who is said to be dying of cancer, was allowed to August 10, 2009 (IRAQ): Two truck August 15, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): A return to his native Libya. – Washington bombs exploded simultaneously in the suicide bomber in a vehicle killed seven Post, August 21 Shi`a village of Khazna, just 10 miles east people outside the International Security of Mosul. Estimates place the dead at 30. Assistance Force headquarters in Kabul. August 20, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): – UPI, August 10 The attack occurred in Wazir Akbar Khan Afghanistan held presidential elections, district, one of the most secure districts in although there were widespread August 11, 2009 (KUWAIT): Kuwait’s the capital. The Afghan Taliban claimed allegations of voter fraud. – New York state-run news agency announced that credit for the attack, stating: “The target Times, September 15 security forces arrested six Kuwaitis was the U.S. Embassy, but we could not linked to al-Qa`ida who were planning reach it.” – Reuters, August 15 August 20, 2009 (PHILIPPINES): U.S. to attack Camp Arifjan, a U.S. military Defense Secretary Robert Gates decided installation in the country, with an August 17, 2009 (RUSSIA): A suicide to keep 600 U.S. troops deployed to explosives-laden truck. It is unclear when bomber rammed an explosives-laden the Philippines, where they have been the arrests occurred. – CNN, August 11 truck into the police headquarters in involved in a counterinsurgency operation Nazran, the capital of Ingushetia, killing known as the Joint Special Operations August 12, 2009 (PHILIPPINES): at least 20 people. – Bloomberg, August 17; Task Force-Philippines. – New York Times, Government troops attacked an Abu New York Times, August 17 August 20 Sayyaf Group (ASG) base in Basilan Province in the southern Philippines. At August 17, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Security August 21, 2009 (UNITED STATES): A least 30 ASG fighters were killed, along forces apprehended Tehrik-i-Taliban U.S. federal judge ordered the release of with 23 Philippine soldiers. – GMANews. Pakistan (TTP) spokesman Maulvi Omar. Muhammad al-Adahi, a Yemeni who has tv, August 12 Omar was seized in Mohmand Agency, been held at Guantanamo Bay since 2002. located on the border with Afghanistan. The judge ruled that al-Adahi’s brief time August 13, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A suicide – AP, August 18 at an al-Qa`ida training camp and two bomber rammed his motorcycle into a encounters with Usama bin Ladin was not tribal elder’s vehicle in South Waziristan August 19, 2009 (IRAQ): A bomb deployed enough to justify his continued detention. Agency, killing four people. The bomber on a lorry exploded near Iraq’s Finance – Washington Post, August 21

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August 21, 2009 (RUSSIA): Suicide Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula claimed CTC Sentinel Staff bombers riding bicycles detonated their credit for the operation, and it identified explosives in various locations in Grozny. the bomber as Abdullah Hassan Taleh Editor-in-Chief Four police officers were killed in the Asiri. The bomber traveled across the Erich Marquardt attacks. – Voice of America, August 21 Saudi border from Yemen. – AP, August Senior Editor, CTC 27; AFP, August 30 August 21, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani Editorial Board Taliban commander Hakimullah Mehsud August 27, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A COL Michael J. Meese, Ph.D. was appointed as the new head of suspected U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle Department Head Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Aides strike killed eight militants in South Department of Social Sciences (West Point) to Faqir Muhammad told reporters that Waziristan Agency. – AFP, August 27 Hakimullah was chosen by a 42-member COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. Taliban shura (council). – AP, August 22 August 27, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A suicide Deputy Department Head bomber killed 22 policemen in Khyber Department of Social Sciences (West Point) August 21, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A Agency of the Federally Administered suspected U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle Tribal Areas. The bomber blew himself LTC Reid Sawyer killed at least 13 people near Miran Shah up in the police barracks in the border Director, CTC in North Waziristan Agency. – AFP, town of Torkham. The Pakistani Taliban August 20; AP, August 22 claimed credit for the attack, saying it was Christopher Heffelfinger the “first response since the death of our FBI Fellow, CTC August 21, 2009 (PHILIPPINES): chief Baitullah Mehsud.” – AFP, August Philippine authorities arrested Khalil 27; AFP, August 28 Pareja, the suspected leader of the Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM), an al-Qa`ida- August 27, 2009 (PHILIPPINES): The linked group tied to a number of bomb Philippines extradited Madhatta Haipe Contact attacks in the Philippines. Pareja, whose to the United States where he will face Combating Terrorism Center given name is Dinno Amor Rosalejos charges of “hostage-taking” in addition to U.S. Military Academy Pareja, was apprehended in Marawi City other crimes. Haipe is an alleged member 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall in the southern Philippines. His arrest of the Abu Sayyaf Group, and he was West Point, NY 10996 is seen as a major blow to the RSM. reportedly involved in abducting four Phone: (845) 667-6383 – GMANews.tv, August 21; AP, August 25 Americans in Mindanao on December 27, Email: [email protected] 1995. – AFP, August 29 Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ August 25, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): A truck bomb exploded in Kandahar, killing August 28, 2009 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida * For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383 at least 40 civilians. The Afghan Taliban deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri released a denied responsibility. – Voice of America, new video statement accusing the United August 25 States of leading a crusade to divide Pakistan. – ABC News, August 28 August 25, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani Taliban commanders confirmed the August 30, 2009 (RUSSIA): Police support death of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan stormed a home in Dagestan, killing The Combating Terrorism Center would leader Baitullah Mehsud. The Pakistani “Doctor Muhammad,” an alleged Algerian like to express its gratitude to its financial Taliban said Baitullah died on August 23 national with connections to al-Qa`ida. supporters, for without their support and from injuries sustained in an August 5 – Reuters, August 31 shared vision of the Center products like airstrike. – AFP, August 28 the CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If August 30, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A suicide you are interested in learning more about August 26, 2009 (SOMALIA): A French bomber targeted a gathering of police how to support the Combating Terrorism security adviser held by al-Shabab fighters recruits in Mingora in the Swat Valley, Center, please visit http://www.ctc.usma. in Somalia managed to escape his captors. killing at least 15 of them. – Washington edu/support/ or call Wayne Richardson at Marc Aubriere, who was kidnapped along Post, August 31 West Point’s Association of Graduates at with a colleague from a hotel in Mogadishu 845-446-1553. on July 14, snuck past his kidnappers and August 31, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): The weaved his way through Mogadishu to commander of U.S. and NATO troops in reach the safety of the presidential palace. Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, The whereabouts of the second hostage, said that a new strategy was needed to also a French security adviser, are not fight the Taliban. According to General known. – Los Angeles Times, August 27 McChrystal, “The situation in Afghanistan is serious, but success is achievable The views expressed in this report are those of August 27, 2009 (SAUDI ARABIA): A and demands a revised implementation the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, suicide bomber attempted to assassinate strategy, commitment and resolve, and the Department of the Army, or any other agency Saudi Prince Muhammad bin Nayif. Nayif increased unity of effort.” – AP, August 31 of the U.S. Government. was slightly wounded in the attack. Al-

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