THOMAS AQUINAS ON NATURAL LAW AND THE TWOFOLD BEATITUDE OF HUMANITY Taylor Reed Marshall, Ph.D. University of Dallas, 2011 Father James Lehrberger, O.Cist.

Abstract

Human persons naturally desire happiness. Beginning with Plato and Aristotle,

philosophers have sought to articulate both the nature of happiness and how it is that man

both knows and desires this happiness. This present dissertation examines the history of

this question of natural desire as it regards natural law, and the way in which Thomas

Aquinas synthesized this tradition. The current academic debate over Thomas' synthesis

centers on the question of whether Thomas asserted a natural human desire for one

beatitude or two beatitudes. The former position posits that man has but one supernatural

end. The latter posits that man has both a natural end and a supernatural end.

This thesis proposes that a proper interpretation of Thomas Aquinas incorporates

both ends by identifying the analogical relationship between the natural and the

supernatural throughout the Corpus Thomisticum. Since Thomas treats human teleology

most clearly while treating law, natural law becomes an analogue by which one may

analyze whether man has one end or two ends. The analogical relationship of natural law

to divine law is related to the way in which Thomas treats natural reason and supernatural

faith in his commentary of De Trinitate by Boethius. This "twofold" analogical order is

further confirmed by the fact that Thomas repeatedly employs the term duplex to speak of

the natural end and supernatural end of humanity. Duplex or "twofold" is neither one nor two, but "two in one." An appreciation for "twofold beatitude" is the missing key in most debates concerning Thomas' teaching on natural beatitude and natural law. The controversy between advocates of Henri de Lubac (one end) and advocates of Thomas

Cajetan (two ends) can be overcome by referring back to Thomas' analogical arrangement of human beatitude. Moreover, Thomas is able to incorporate the teaching of

Aristotle regarding human happiness without denying the Christian teaching of supernatural beatitude by appealing to this analogical relationship between natural happiness and the supernatural happiness. So then, the language of typology, analogy, or participation rightly defines the way that natural beatitude is oriented to supernatural beatitude. Thomas consistently presents a twofold order: natural/supernatural, reason/faith, and natural law/divine law. The distinction between natural beatitude and supernatural beatitude is just that—a distinction but not a division. Beatitude is duplex non duo. THE BRANIFF GRADUATE SCHOOL

OF THE

UNIVERSITY OF DALLAS

THOMAS AQUINAS ON NATURAL LAW AND THE TWOFOLD BEATITUDE OF HUMANITY

by

TAYLOR REED MARSHALL

B.A., TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY, 2000

M.A. WESTMINSTER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, 2003

M.A. UNIVERSITY OF DALLAS, 2009

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the University of Dallas in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy in the Institute of Philosophic Studies

December 13, 2011

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ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 Thomas Aquinas on Natural Law and the Twofold Beatitude of Humanity Copyright 2011 © Taylor R. Marshall All rights reserved To my patient bride Joy, and to our children Gabriel, Mary Claire, Rose, Jude, Becket, and Blaise.

And also to the Reverend Father James Lehrberger, O.Cist. —a true Doktorvater.

And chiefly to my Mother and Queen:

Videmus nunc per speculum in enigmate, sed Mater tu Speculum Iustitiae es.

O Domina Immaculata, in lumine gloriae tu eum vides maxime.

Sedes Sapientiae, ora pro nobis, ut digni efficiamur promissionibus Christi,

Multcefilice congregaverunt divitias tu supergressa es universas. CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 7 CHAPTER ONE: ONE-ENDERS AND TWO-ENDERS 15 Status Quaestioms 15 Does Man Have One End or Two Ends? 35 Aristotle on Nature and Inclination 42 CHAPTER TWO: EARLY HISTORY OF NATURE AND TELEOLOGY 45 Cicero on Nature and Teleology 45 Judaism and Saint Paul on Nature and Teleology 66 Augustine on Nature and Teleology 77 CHAPTER THREE: PATRISTIC & MEDIEVAL DEVELOPMENTS IN NATURAL TELEOLOGY 94 Early Patristic Accounts 94 Medieval Accounts of Law and Teleology 99 Early Scholasticism on Law and Beatitude 100 Aquinas on Natural Law and Natural Inclinations 102 Thomas Aquinas on Synderesis 106 Aquinas on the Practical Intellect . 108 Connaturality Ontological and Epistemological Elements 111 The Insufficiency of Natural Law for Beatitude . 117 CHAPTER FOUR: NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL TELEOLOGY AFTER AQUINAS 125 John Duns Scotus on Law and Teleology 125 Strict and Extended Commandments of Decalogue 134 Scotus contra Thomas 139 Hugo Grotius & Natural Law after Scotus 146 CHAPTER FIVE: RECENT ACCOUNTS OF NATURAL LAW AND TELEOLOGY 149 Analysis of the pnmumpraeceptum legs ("bonus est faciendum, etc ") 151 Suarez vs Grisez 153 New Natural Law Without Law 160 CHAPTER SIX: AQUINAS ON NATURAL LAW AND BEATITUDE 162 Pedagogical Role of Law 163 Aquinas on Natural Law and Divine Law 169 The Decalogue and the Secondary Precepts of the Natural Law 175 First Table of Decalogue 179 Second Table of Decalogue 179 Conclusion Decalogue as a Teleological Instrument 180 CHAPTER SEVEN: DUPLEX OR DUO? 184 Cardinal Ca|etan vs Cardinal de Lubac 186 Summa theologiae on Obediential Potency 195 De ventate on Obediential Potency 200 Problem Passages for the Cajetanians 206 "Two Ender" Response Toward Henri de Lubac 208 Philosophical Difficulties with "Two Ender" Thesis 210 History of Nature/Grace Problem Pure Nature and Baianism 211 Suarez and the State of Pure Nature 217 CHAPTER EIGHT: ANALOGY & THE TWOFOLD ORDER 222 Plato & Anstode on the Philosophical End of Man . 222 De Deo An Sit? Quid Deus Sit? 227 Could Man Have Two Ends? . 229 Why is Man's End Disproportionate to His Nature? 232 "Duplex Beatitudo" in the Corpus Thomisticum 235 Thomas on "Duplex" and Natural Desire 244 CHAPTER NINE: SYNTHESIS OF THE DUPLEX ORDO 250 Natural Desire of Wonder 255 Synthesizing through Typology & Analogy 278 EPILOGUE 283 APPENDIX A: "POTENTIA OBEDIENTIALIS/OBEDIENTIAE" IN THE CORPUS THOMISTICUM 284 APPENDIX B: "PURA NATURALIS" IN THE CORPUS THOMISTICUM 294 APPENDIX C: "DUPLEX FELICITAS/BEATITUDO" IN CORPUS THOMISTICUM 304 BIBLIOGRAPHY 309 Works of Saint Thomas Aquinas 309 Primary Sources 309 Secondary Sources 310 7

INTRODUCTION

The past twenty years have experienced a proliferation of philosophical research on the subject of human teleology with regard to human beatitude. Recent interpreters of

Thomas Aquinas, for example those following Henri de Lubac, have sought to overturn the received scholastic interpretation of Thomas positing a natural end of man and a

See Denis J. M. Bradley, Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good: Reason and the

Human Happiness in Aquinas's Moral Science (Washington, DC: Catholic University of

American Press, 1997). Bernard Lonergan, "The Natural Desire to See God" in

Collection: Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,

1993). Lawrence Feingold, The Natural Desire to See God according to St. Thomas

Aquinas and His Interpreters (Rome: Apollinare Studi, 2001; Sapientia Press, 2010).

John Milbank, The Suspended Middle: Henri de Lubac and the Debate concerning the

Supernatural (Cambridge: William B Eerdmans, 2005). Steven A. Long, "On the Loss, and the Recovery, of Nature as a Theonomic Principle: Reflections on the Nature/Grace

Controversy," Nova et Vetera 5 (2007): 133-83. Steven Long, "On the Possibility of a

Purely Natural End for Man," The Thomist 64 (2000), 233. Reinhard Hutter, "Desiderium

Naturale Visionis Dei—Est autem duplex hominis beatitudo sive felicitas: Some

Observations about Lawrence Feingold's and John Milbank's Recent Interventions in the

Debate over the Natural Desire to See God," Nova et Vetera 5 (2007): 81-131. 8

supernatural end of man, a task that required a reinvestigation into the relationship

between the natural and supernatural. Notably, this debate is the only philosophical

question that received a corrective reaction from a pope in the twentieth century.

Fundamentally, the answer to the question raised by de Lubac will define the

position of philosophy to theology and the final purpose for the human person. Is the

human person naturally inclined to the supernatural end of the beatific vision of God's

essence or not? Lamentably, recent scholarship has generally neglected one pertinent

work of Thomas with respect to the natural powers of man and the supernatural. I refer to

the Expositio super librum Boethii De trinitate by Thomas Aquinas. Super de trinitate

investigates the relationship of faith and reason, particularly as it relates to our knowledge

of God when we consider the existence of a First Cause. The proposed thesis of this

dissertation is that Thomas himself circumvents the contemporary Delubacian "one-

enders" and the traditional Cajetanian "two-enders" by his articulation of a duplex felicitas or beatitudo in his Summa theologiae, De veritate, De virtutibus, Summa contra

Gentiles, and especially in his Super de trinitate. This reading is further confirmed by the

way Thomas treats the teleology of natural law in Prima secundae of the Summa

theologiae.

The right interpretation rests not in limiting human teleology to one end or two

ends, but in maintaining the phraseology of Thomas by insisting on his ubiquitous

The interpretation of Thomas Aquinas stating that human persons have a natural

desire for a supernatural end of humanity sparked a debate leading even to a papal

intervention in 1950 with the publication of Pope Pius XIFs Humani Generis. 9

qualification that beatitude is duplex—twofold. Strictly speaking, a twofold end is not

strictly one end nor two ends. Thomas Aquinas, as this dissertation shall demonstrate,

returns repeatedly to this formulation, but especially when he addresses the matter in

relation to nature, law, philosophical contemplation, and human teleology. Moreover,

Super de trinitate accomplishes this task by detailing the distinctions between

philosophical knowledge and divine revelation.

The debate between "Two-Enders" and "One-Enders" arises from Thomas

Aquinas own careful language regarding the "desiderium naturale visionis Dei" in the

Corpus Thomisticum. The problem arises from passages such as Summa contra Gentiles

in which Thomas writes: "It was proved above that every intellect naturally desires the

vision of the divine substance." Other important passages include Summa theologiae I,

q. 12, a. 1; I-II, q. 3, a. 8; Summa contra Gentiles III, c. 25, c. 48-54.

According to this proposed dissertation thesis, the strict bifurcation of the duplex

beatitudo from the sixteenth to nineteenth century derived from an over-extended

apologetic defense of the Catholic doctrine of grace against Martin Luther's claims at the

Diet of Worms in 1518—namely Luther's assertion that the supernatural was essentially

extrinsic to man and not intrinsic and transformative.4 Essentially, the divergence of late

"1

"Supra probatum est quod omnis intellectus naturaliter desiderat divinae

substantiae visionem." Summa contra Gentiles III cap. 57 n. 4

For a thorough treatment of the extrinicism regarding nature and grace in

Luther's thought see, Alister E. McGrath, IustitiaDei: A History of the Christian

Doctrine of Justification, Third Edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 10 medieval nominalism from early medieval realism reinforms the way Thomist scholars articulated the supernatural telos of man. Moreover, the recent attempt by twentieth century thinkers to recast the teaching Thomas Aquinas as presenting an innate natural desire for supernatural beatitude is problematic since it neglects Thomas' teaching regarding obediential potency. Moreover, Thomas does not use the terms "innate" and

"elicited" with regard to natural desire.

As Aquinas describes in the Summa theologiae, natural law is insufficient, because man is oriented toward the goal of eternal beatitude {ad finem beatitudinis aeternae), but this goal is out of proportion with human nature and natural law. It is true that natural knowledge does incline humanity toward God, but natural knowledge and natural law are not capable of elevating humanity to its Final End. Natural law allows us to participate in the eternal law of God only as it pertains to natural finite goods. It points to that which is beyond, but does not supply the way.

The place and purpose of natural law further illuminates the twofold arrangement of the natural and the supernatural in that the insufficiency of natural law evokes the need for a higher order with regard to human ethics. Natural law serves as a "pre-pedagogue" in a manner similar to the way in which the Old Law functions for Aquinas as a

"pedagogue". The introduction of supernatural law or divine law as a twofold response to man's teleological insufficiency completes what the natural law intends without replacing

pp. 231-240.

5 See Chapter Nine where this is explored more fully and the terminology of

Thomas is suggested. 11 it.

This proposed dissertation seeks to establish a number of conclusions about the nature of natural beatitude and supernatural beatitude (and the corollary of natural law and divine law) as duplex. First, for Thomas to state that something is duplex is to hold that it is "one" with "two" aspects or "twofold." Natural happiness" and "supernatural happiness" do not exist as two independent realities. Rather, grace perfects and elevates nature since nature participates in grace. Consequently, natural and supernatural happiness should be distinguished but not divided. The reason for this is that supernatural ultimate happiness perfects and elevates natural happiness. The relation of the natural beatitude to supernatural beatitude is one of fulfillment by which the supernatural beatitude assumes the natural beatitude. Natural beatitude is a reflection "as in a mirror dimly"6 of the supernatural beatitude. The duplex account of the natural and supernatural end consequently reveals an analogical relationship. Moreover, the relationship of natural law to the divine law (in the progress of Old Law and New Law) as a fulfillment of types provides a parallel account of Thomas' relationship between the natural and the supernatural.

Secondly, a "twofold" interpretation demonstrates that nature, reason, and philosophy should not be expelled from mankind's pursuit for perfect happiness. The role and function of philosophy is established and protected. The duplex arrangement of

Thomas holds that reason and philosophy have a valued, but subservient role.

Philosophy and theology, like nature and grace, have a twofold relationship to one

61 Corinthians 13:12. RSV. 12

another. Moreover, the division of the natural and the supernatural or the separation of

philosophy from theology may not be a genuine Thomistic development. Rather, this

separation may be an overreaction to Protestant accusations of the sixteenth century (that

is, the apologetic posture of Cajetan) against a misunderstood version of Thomism.7 By

returning to the authentic Thomistic notion of duplex or twofold, we can transcend the

debate and appreciate the points made by Cajetan in his context and de Lubac in his own.

The helpful qualification of beatitude as "twofold" lends itself to articulations of "two"

and "one" without doing violence to the other. The important distinction that must be

maintained is that one made by Thomas in Super de trinitate, "even though by his nature

man is inclined to his ultimate end, he cannot reach it by nature but only by grace, and

Q

this owing to the loftiness of that end." A more robust understanding of beatitude as

duplex allows nature to participate in grace as distinct but not divided. It also illustrates

how natural law is a preparation for divine law.

7 In 1518 Pope Leo X sent Thomas Cardinal Cajetan as papal legate to the Diet of

Augsburg in order to examine the teachings of Martin Luther with the hopes of

reconciling Luther to the Catholic Church. For a Lutheran perpspective on Cajetan's

approach to Luther's doctrine of nature and grace, see Bernhard Lohse, Martin Luther:

An Introduction to his Life and Work, Translated by Robert Schultz (Minneapolis, MN

Fortress Press, 1986), pp. 46-48.

Q

Super de trinitate, q. 6, a. 4 ad 5. "Quamvis enim homo naturaliter inclinetur in

finem ultimum, non tamen potest naturaliter ilium consequi, sed solum per gratiam, et

hoc est propter eminentiam illius finis." 13

This present dissertation first establishes the status questionis concerning those

who are identified as "one-enders" and "two-enders" with regard to human beatitude. The

second chapter traces the history of this question, beginning with Cicero's philosophy of

nature, but especially as Cicero articulates human teleology with regard to natural law.

The Latin tradition of natural teleology finds it origins in Cicero and for this reason an

extensive examination is necessary. The importance of nature, law, and teleology in the

West is also due to the Jewish understanding of cosmology and natural order. The Jewish

tradition of cosmic order and law is synthesized by Saint Paul and receives its official

canonization in Christian theology. Saint Augustine then elaborates on Ciceronian,

Jewish, and Pauline tradition by defining the relationship between eternal and temporal

law. Hence, Augustine laid the foundation for the advanced natural teleology articulated

by Thomas Aquinas.

The third chapter examines how the Byzantine and Medieval Latin theologians

articulated man's final end with regard to nature and transcendance. Here the difficulty

arises over whether man can naturally attain or even desire a supernatural end. This

chapter examines how Thomas Aquinas overcame certain elements of Neo-Platonism

blowing from the East, and how Thomas rooted law and teleogy in the natural

inclinations of the practical intellect. The fourth chapter examines subsequent

developments in natural teleology after the death of Thomas Aquinas—in particular, the natural law theology of John Duns Scotus and the gradual shift away from teleology in the natural law tradition beginning with Hugo Grotius. The fifth chapter then examines

contemporary accounts of Thomas' natural teleology, with particular contrast with the previous Thomistic tradition. The sixth chapter then illustrates how Thomas orients 14 natural law and divine law to human beatitude. By examining this problem, the thesis develops its central theme, namely that human beatitude is twofold just as law is twofold.

Chapter Seven examines the contemporary criticism of Henri de Lubac against the received Thomistic tradition characterized by Thomas Cajetan with regard to "pure nature" and a purely natural end. Chapter Eight seeks to overcome discrepancies in both de Lubac and Cajetan by using Thomas Aquinas' commentary on Boethius' De trinitate as a guide for understanding Thomas' nuanced articulation of "duplex beatitudo." The concluding ninth chapter synthesizes the concept of "duplex beatitudo" with the overarching philosophy of Thomas Aquinas with regard to the typological analogical relationshiop between nature and grace, reason and faith, philosophy and theology.

Moreover, this conclusion proposes how the Thomist might transcend the debate over

"innate" vs. "elicited" desire for supernatural beatitude. Human beatitude, then, is not either natural or supernatural. Rather, it is a twofold arrangment by which natural beatitude participates in the ultimate supernatural goal of human nature—the quiditative knowledge of the divine substance. 15

CHAPTER ONE: ONE-ENDERS AND TWO-ENDERS

STATUS QUAESTIONIS

The last several years have enjoyed a renewed interest in the question concerning man's natural desire to see God, that is, to enjoy the beatific vision of the divine essence.

The question itself is not restricted to Christianity, since even Plato postulated the possibility of beholding the form of the Good in the Republic and again in the

Symposium in which Diotima speaks of the possibility for man "to see the heavenly beauty face to face." She asks him, "Would you call his life an unenviable life, whose eyes had been opened to the vision, and who had gazed upon it in true contemplation until it had become his own forever?"10

Judaism also expressed an implicit awareness that beholding the "face of God" was the rich reward of the righteous: "I am the God of thy father, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. Moses hid his face: for he durst not look at

God."11 Moses also identified blessing with seeing God: "If therefore I have found favor

9 For the description of the TOO ayaeoO (5eav, see Plato, Republic 508c-509a.

10 Plato, Symposium 21 ld-e.

Exodus 3:6. For a Christian liturgical appropriation for "hiding the face" in the presence of God with regard to Moses at Ex 3:6, see Saint Ambrose's application in his

"Exposition of the Christian Faith," Book 1, 10. For English translation see Philip Schaff, 16 in thy sight, show me thy face, that I may know thee, and may find grace before thy eyes: look upon thy people this nation."12 Likewise, the Psalms depicts a deep human longing for seeing God face-to-face: "But as for me, I will appear before thy sight injustice: I shall be satisfied when thy glory shall appear,"13 and, "For with thee is the fountain of life; and in thy light we shall see light." These passages from the Hebrew Scriptures certainly hope for a vision of God; however, the possibility of attaining this blessing is unclear. The more primitive passages depict the afterlife in Sheol as a shadowing experience without direct access to God.15 The Second Temple book of Sirach

The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers Second Series Vol. X, 212 (Oak Harbor: Logos

Research Systems, 1997).

12 Exodus 33:13. For John Cassian's appropriation of Ex 33:13, see his in De incamatione 5, 13. For English translation see Philip Schaff, The Nicene and Post-Nicene

Fathers Second Series Vol. XI, 589 (Oak Harbor: Logos Research Systems, 1997).

13 Psalm 16(17):15. See "Realm of the Dead," James Swanson and Orville Nave,

New Nave's Topical Bible Commentary (Oak Harbor: Logos Research Systems, 1994).

14 Psalm 35(36):10. On the use of this passage from the Catholic point of view, see Augustine, Confessions 5, 1. Also see John F. Walvoord, Roy B. Zuck and Dallas

Theological Seminary, The Bible Knowledge Commentary : An Exposition of the

Scriptures, at Ps 35:7-10 (Wheaton, IL: Victor Books, 1983-).

The Hebrew term Sheol literally refers to a human grave. The Jewish

Encyclopedia: "With the body in the grave remains connected the soul as in dreams, the dead buried in family graves continue to have communion (cf. Jer. 31:15). Sheol is 17 rhetorically asks concerning Sheol: "Who will sing praises to the Most High in the netherworld, as do those who are alive and give thanks? From the dead, as from one who does not exist, thanksgiving has ceased; he who is alive and well sings the Lord's praises.16 In the pseudopigraphical 1 Enoch 22, Sheol is divided into four regions: 1) natural paradise or "Abraham's bosom," 2) a second place where the moderately righteous wait, 3) a third purgatorial region where the wicked are temporarily punished till judgment day, and lastly 4) Gehenna where the wicked experience everlasting torment. It seems that those in the first three regions may in fact be delivered from

practically a family grave on a large scale." The Jewish Encyclopedia, "Sheol," Edited by

Isidore Singer and Cyrus Adler (Funk and Wagnalls, New York, 1901-1906).

16 Sirach 17:27-28. See "Hades" in Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, ed. Gerhard Kittel, Geoffrey W. Bromiley and Gerhard Friedrich, (Grand Rapids, MI:

Eerdmans, 1964). Also consult R. H. Charles, Index to the Apocrypha and

Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament, Volume 2 (Logos Research Systems, Inc., 1913;

2004), 851.

17 This fourfold division roughly mirrors the "four abodes" of hell depicted by

Thomas Aquinas {limbus patrum, limbus puerorum, purgatory, and hell proper) at

Summa theologiae, Supp. q. 69, a. 7. "I answer that, the abodes of souls are distinguished according to the souls' various states... If it is in the state of receiving its final retribution, this happens in two ways: either in the respect of good, and then it is paradise; or in respect of evil, and thus as regards actual sin it is hell, and as regards original sin it is the limbo of children. On the other hand, if it be in the state where it is hindered from 18

Sheol on the Judgment Day, but this remains unclear. As one approaches the time of

Christ, however, there is within certain strains of Judaism an expectation that Sheol might

I Q offer natural delight and happiness—perhaps even deliverance from death.

Christ also appealed to the Jewish desire to see God when when He explicitly promised the vision of God when at the sermon on the mount he proclaimed, "Blessed are the clean of heart: for they shall see God." Moreover, Saint Paul also confirmed that the blessed will see God face to face: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face. Now I know in part; but then I shall know even as I am known."20

receiving its final reward, this is either on account of a defect of the person, and thus we have purgatory where souls are detained from receiving their reward at once on account of the sins they have committed, or else it is on account of a defect of nature, and thus we have the limbo of the Fathers, where the Fathers were detained from obtaining glory on account of the guilt of human nature which could not yet be expiated."

18 For the Messicanic judgment and the transferal from Sheol in Jewish thought see August Dillmann's Book of Enoch (Michigan: University of Michigan, 2007

[Reprint]), pp. 50-53.

19 Matthew 5:8. See Saint John Chrysostom's "Homilies on Matthew XLVII" in

Philip Schaff, The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers Vol. X, 295.

20 1 Corinthians 13:12. "pXs7to|j,sv yap apxi 5i eaoTixpon sv aiviy(j,axi 'now we see only puzzling reflections in a mirror' In 1 Cor 13:12 the term a'ivryp,a may be interpreted as lack of clarity in perception, so that the meaning would be 'that which is difficult.to see clearly,' but the general usage of aivvy^a would seem to point to the meaning of 19

Within the Western tradition, the possibility of beholding the divine essence came

under serious question in the thirteenth century. Through the influence of Greek thought

(translated to the West through the pen of John Scotus Eriugena), Latin thinkers began to

argue against the possibility that both angels and humans might see God per essentiam.

Eventually the bishop of Paris, William of Auvergne intervened and condemned this

theory of "extreme transcendence" in 1241. The anathematized statement read, "Neither

man nor angel is able to see the divine essence in itself."21 Although the position was

condemned in 1241, it did not receive a full intellectual treatment and defense until

Thomas Aquinas took up the question beginning in the 1250s.

Beginning with Scripta super libros Sententiarum and then De veritate, Thomas

set out a thorough defense that angels and men, by the light of glory, could enjoy the

supernatural vision of God's essence. Yet, despite Thomas Aquinas' extensive treatment,

there still remains a fierce debate as to how Thomas framed his argument with regard to

human nature. Two questions bring the debate into clear light:

Does Thomas Aquinas teach that human nature naturally desires only

natural beatitude, i.e. not the vision of the divine essence

difficulty in understanding and comprehension rather than in visual perception. For

another interpretation of aivvyu.a in 1 Cor 13:12, see 24.37." in Johannes P. Louw and

Eugene Albert Nida, Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament: Based on Semantic

Domains, electronic ed. of the 2nd edition. (New York: United Bible societies, 1996).

21 See J.-P. Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas, vol. 2, Spiritual Master (Washington,

DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2003), 27-31. Cited in Feingold, 28. 20

Or:

Does Thomas Aquinas teach that human nature naturally desires

supernatural beatitude, i.e. the vision of the divine essence?

Clearly, these questions seek to understand relationship between the natural and

supernatural with regard to human teleology. The debate hinges on what is meant by

"naturally." Is human nature naturally ordered something beyond nature? If so, does this

do violence to nature? Moreover, the question also leads to difficulties relating to nature

and grace, philosophy and theology, reason and faith.

In the last eighty years, two divergent opinions have come into conflict over the

matter. One position, popularized by Henri de Lubac, holds that human nature

possesses an innate natural desire the supernatural vision of God. As such, there can be

no such thing as beatitude apart from the beatific vision. Aristotle's natural contemplation

can in no way be "beatitude" or "happiness."

The so-called "two-tier" Thomistic tradition represented more recently by

Laurence Feingold and Steven Long, holds that Thomas Aquinas theorized two

Henri de Lubac, Mystery of the Supernatural, p. 140. For De Lubac's original

complaint against his perceived exaggeration against obediential potency, see Surnatural,

137.

23 Lawrence Feingold, The Natural Desire to See God according to St. Thomas

Aquinas and His Interpreters (Rome: Apollinare Studi, 2001; Sapientia Press, 2010).

Steven A. Long, "On the Loss, and the Recovery, of Nature as a Theonomic Principle:

Reflections on the Nature/Grace Controversy,"Nova et Vetera 5 (2007): 133-83. Steven 21

beatitudes, one natural conforming to pure human nature, and then a supernatural

beatitude, the desire for which is elicited by divine grace. In this way, human nature is

not in vain, and it does not desire something beyond its nature. However, natural

intellects can by the influence of grace, desire something more than mere natural

beatitude, they can desire to see the divine essence.

So then, the two principle interpretations of Thomas Aquinas are as follows. One

school says that the human person naturally possesses an innate desire and appetite for

the vision of the divine substance (the position of Scotus, de Soto, and De Lubac). That

is, every human person naturally wants to be in heaven in order to see God's essence.25

Long, "On the Possibility of a Purely Natural End for Man," The Thomist 64 (2000), 233.

24 Other thinkers holding the "innate desire" position include Durandus of Saint

Pourcain (c. 1270-1334), Domingo de Soto (1494-1560), Francisco de Toledo (1532-

1596), Saint Robert Bellarmine (1542-1621), and the heretic Cornelius Jansenius (1585-

1638). The Jansenists denied the state of pure nature and therefore logically denied the

possibility of a natural beatitude. Cornelius Jansenius' De statu purae naturae I, ch. 2. For

more details, see the diagram below. See also Feingold's Natural Desire, xxv-xxvi.

One important exception is Bernard Lonergan who certainly falls into the camp

of the "one-enders" but speaks differently of natural desire. Instead, he speaks of desire in terms of a transcendental. "Must not a desire and its fulfillment have the same object? If

so, how can the desire be natural and the fullment supernatural? If not, how can the fulfillment be fulfillment of the desire? The desire and its fulfillment must have the same material object. But a desire to understand cannot have the same formal object as the 22

According to this position, human beings innately want God just as a rock moves to the center of the earth.26 On the other hand, the other school claims that the human desire for the beatific vision is elicited directly by God or by a knowledge of God's existence (the position of Cajetan, Suarez, and Long). It comes down to whether human desire for our highest good is innate or whether it is elicited.

John Duns Scotus' "innate desire" solution was met with approval by the

Dominican William Durandus of Saint Pourcain (1270-1334). Durandus explicitly stated

71 that the "intellect desires beatitude by a natural appetite." Although Durandus represents the Dominicans of the early fourteenth century, his position reads Thomas

Aquinas as in agreement with Scotus on this matter.

The controversy over innate natural desire began with neither the Scotistic

fulfilling act of understanding. A desire to understand is specified by what we already know. The fulfilling act is specififed by what as yet we do not know. Thus, the object of the natural desire is transcendental; but the object of the fulfilling is supernatural." B.

Lonergan's "The Nature Desire to See God," Collection: Papers of Bernard Lonergan,

S.J. (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), 90.

John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio 4, dist. 49, qq. 9-10. Here, Scotus discusses natural and elicited appetite. For an English translation of the passage, see Allan Wolter's

Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America

Press, 1986), p. 156.

27 Durandus of St Pourcain, In Petri Lombardi Sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IV, dist. 49, q. 8, n. 8 (Ridgewood, NJ: Gregg Press, 1964). 23

Franciscans nor the Thomistic Dominicans, but in the quiet cell of a Carthusian.

Dionysius or Denis the Carthusian (1402-1471) dedicated his book De puritate et

•70 felicitate animae to the particular question regarding the natural desire to know God.

Denis focused his attention to those passages in Thomas Aquinas,29 which refer to

obediential potency as the capacity to fulfill a command that is above an agent's nature.

The assumption here is that the powers of a certain nature cannot extend beyond that

nature's natural capacity. Here, then, is this historical point at which the controversy over

the natural desire for the vision of the divine essence begins.

The Dominican opposition to Scotus (and the Dominican Durandus), officially

began shortly after the death of Denis the Carthusian. The Dominican Francisco

Sylverster of Ferrara (1474-1528) expanded the thesis of Denis and articulated the

doctrine of an appetitus elicitus. Unlike Denis, Sylvester focused on Summa contra

Gentiles III and the difficulties in interpreting Thomas Aquinas' assertions on natural

desire in Summa contra Gentiles, such as, "omnis intellectus naturaliter desiderat divinae

Dionysius Cartusianus, De puritate et felicitate animae. In Opera omnia 40.

Tournai, 1911, aa. 55-62.

Denis especially weighs De virtutibus q. 1, a. 10 and Summa theologiae III, q.

11, a.l, beginning at his own De puritate a. 55.

30 Dionysius, De puritate et felicitate animae, a. 59. "The nature itself o the soul

with relation to the supernatural munificence and absolute power of God obtains an

appetite and capacity for supernatural beatitude." Emphasis mine. Here the appetite for

the supernatural is something superadded and not innate. 24

•j i substantiae visionem" This led Sylvester to a more nuanced position than Denis the

Carthusian. Whereas Denis implies that supernatural grace is needed to elicit a desire for the supernatural, Sylvester blended the position of Durandus and Denis. Like Durandus, he placed desire for the supernatural within the natural appetite. Like Denis, he stated that this desire for the supernatural was not naturally innate. Sylvester, based on his reading of

Summa contra Gentiles found a third way—natural desire for the supernatural was an elicited natural desire.32

Thomas Cardinal Cajetan (1469-1534) who was contemporary with Sylvester built the ediface of "two-tier" Thomism by stressing obediential potency and elicted desire for the supernatural vision of the divine substance. As a result, twentieth century thinkers such as Henri de Lubac, Karl Rahner, and John Milbank point to Cajetan as the great "distorter" of the Thomist tradition.33

It would be a mistake to think that Cajetan was the final word or that his position

31 Summa contra Gentiles III cap. 57 n. 4

Note however that Thomas Aquinas never used the term "desiderium innatum" with respect to the desire to see or know God. Sylvester is original here. Citations from

Sylvester are from Franciscus de Sylvestris Ferrariensis, Commentartary on Summa contra Gentiles in Leonine edtion ofSancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera omnia (Rome:

1918-1926).

Cajetan's doctrine of obediential potency and De Lubac's position on Cajetan is explored in Chapter Seven. This chapter also details and cites the exact accusations of

Henri de Lubac, Karl Rhaner, John Milbank, and others. 25 became universally recognized. Rather, the Dominican tradition continued to struggle with this question even after Sylvester and Cajetan. The Dominican Domingo de Soto

(1494-1560), like the Dominican Durandus before him, reads Thomas Aquinas as in agreement with Scotus with respect to an innate natural desire for supernatural beatitude.

De Soto even uses the same analogy as Scotus—that of a stone that naturally tends to the center of gravity—what he calls the weight of nature or pondus naturae.

The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were dominiated by the Jesuits and their internal debate on the matter. This "innate natural desire" position was taken up by the

Jesuit Francisco de Toledo (1532-1596) and was defended by the eminent Robert

Bellarmine (1542-1621). However, the Jesuits Gabriel Vasquez (1549-1604) and

Francisco Suarez (1548-1617) embraced a position that the natural desire for God was naturally elicited and not innate within the soul.

The amicable debate ended in the early 1600s with the publications of Cornelius

Jansenius (1585-1638). The radical anthropology of Jansenius (and later Baius) calcified the debate and in many regards led thinkers to defend a bifurcated position with regard to nature and grace. The positions and papal condemnations of Jansenius and Baius are discussed at length in Chapter Seven. Let it suffice to say that the "safer" position after

Domingo de Soto, In quartum Sent. dist. 49, q. 2, a. 1.

35 Robert Bellarmine, De gratia primi hominis cap. 7: "I respond that beatitude is man's natural end with regard to appetite." See also Feingold, pp. 207-10 for an account of how Toledo and Robert Bellarmine perpetuated the modified innate natural desire position for the Jesuits. 26

Jansenius was to follow the "elicited natural desire" position of Denis, Cajetan, Suarez and John of Saint Thomas.

It was not until the twentieth century that the old position favoring Thomas as teaching "natural innate desire" became worthy of interest. Joseph Marechal (1878-1944) followed by Karl Rahner (1904-1984) and Henri de Lubac (1896-1991) started a philosophical revolution by overthrowing what was assumed the received consensus defended by the likes of Reginal Garrigou-Lagrange36 (1877-1964) and the received

Dominican tradition.

Henri de Lubac will be examined below. Here it suffices to say that De Lubac almost single-handedly freed the "innate natural desire for the supernatural" to become

"safe" once again—if not universally approved. This becomes evident when twentieth century Thomists, such as Josef Pieper freely use the exact same analogy as Scotus and de Soto—that of the stone naturally falling to earth. Pieper also compares man's innate nantural appetite for God as the way in which a "flower turns to light" and how "a beast hunts its prey." Bernard Lonergan, Denis Bradley, John Milbank have also joined

Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, "La notion catholique du surnaturel et certaines opinions recentes." Angelicum 25 (1948): 294-98, and Life Everlasting. Rockford, IL:

Tan Books, 1952.

37 Josef Pieper, Happiness and Contemplation, Translated by Richrd and Clara

Winston (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1966), 21

38 Pieper's analysis also incorporates Plato's Symposium wherein Diotima instructs Socrates that loving the good entails the natural desire for possessing the good. 27 the ranks as ardent defenders of the innate natural desire for the supernatural.

The near universal reception of Henri de Lubac's position on the natural desire for the supernatural since the 1960's has recently come under renewed scrutiny. Two contemporary thinkers in particular have sought to unwind Henri de Lubac's assumed victory: Steven Long and Laurence Feingold. Steven Long defends this position

See J. Pieper, Happiness and Contemplation (1966), pp. 24-26.

in

Bernard Lonergan, "The Natural Desire to See God," in Collection: Papers by

Bernard Lonergan, SJ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), 84-95.

40 Denis J.M. Bradley, Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good: Reason and Human

Happiness in Aquinas's Moral Science (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press,

1997).

John Milbank, The Suspended Middle: Henri de Lubac and the Debate concerning the Supernatural (Grand Rabids, MI: Eerdmans, 2005).

42 Steven Long, "A Note on Jean Porter's Nature as Reason." Nova et Vetera,

English Edition Vol. 6, No. 3 (2008): 681-688. Natura Pura: On the Recovery of Nature in the Doctrine of Grace. New York: Fordham University Press, 2010. "Obediential

Potency, Human Knowledge, and the Natural Desire for God." International

Philosophical Quarterly 37 (March 1997): 45:63. "On the Loss, and the Recovery, of

Nature as a Theonomic Principle: Reflections on the Nature/Grace Controversy," Nova et

Vetera 5 (2007): 133-83. "On the Possibility of a Purely Natural End for Man," The

Thomist 64 (2000), 233.

Lawrence Feingold, The Natural Desire to See God according to St. Thomas 28 regarding the philosophical possibility of pure nature in the teaching of Thomas Aquinas on obediential potency. L. Feingold's work is the most expansive treatise on both the history of the question and the Thomistic texts regarding it. Feingold is particularly interested in De Lubac's interpretation of Thomas Aquinas. He generally avoids the topic of pure nature and instead forms his arguments from Thomas' teaching on obediential potency. Notably, Feingold also employs Thomas Aquinas' Christology as a window into the potencies of the human soul. John Milbank has been critical of Feingold's thesis.44

Milbank faults Feingold for not thinking through the ontological background of Thomas' teaching on desire. This dissertation seeks to address directly the ontological basis of beatitude—the relationship between nature and teleology. We shall find that the one but twofold desire of of mankind corresponds to the one but twofold beatitude of man.

The following table roughly outlines the adherents of the general positions described above:

Innate for God Position Elicited Desire for God Position "one-enders" supernatural "two-enders" natural & supernatural absolute desire for God conditional desire for God

John Duns Scotus (1265-1308) Denis the Carthusian (1402-1471) Durandus of St Pourcain (1270-1334) Francisco Sylvester of Ferrara (1474-1528) Domingo de Soto (1494-1560) Thomas Cajetan (1469-1534) Francisco de Toledo (1532-1596) Domingo Bafiez (1528-1604) Robert Bellarmine (1542-1621) Francisco Suarez (1548-1617) Cornelius Jansenius (1585-1638) Gabriel Vazquez (1549-1604)

Aquinas and His Interpreters (Ave Maria, Florida: Sapientia Press, 2010).

Milbank calls Feingold's work, "an arch-reactionary book" and the "proof- texting of a Protestant Fundamentalist" on p. 26 of Suspended Middle. Note also that

Milbank incorrectly refers to L. Feingold throughout as "L. Feinberg." 29

Blaise Paschal (1623-1662) John of St Thomas (1589-1644) Joseph Marechal (1878-1944) Matthias Joseph Scheeben (1835-1888) Etienne Gilson (1884-1978) Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange (1877-1964) Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984) Jacques Maritain (1882-1973) Karl Rahner (1904-1984) William R. O'Connor Henri de Lubac (1896-1991) Steven Long Josef Pieper(1904-1997) Laurence Feingold Denis Bradley John Milbank Jean Porter Kevin Staley

It is notable that most of the thinkers above (with certain exceptions, such as John Duns

Scotus) see themselves as faithful interpreters of Saint Thomas Aquinas. For the most part, then, each side claims Thomas as representing their own position.

Five chief arguments of the "innate desire" for one single supernatural end are as follows:

1. Any account that stacks the supernatural on top of nature or revelation

onto reason is contrary to the teaching of Thomas Aquinas. The natural

and supernatural must be integrated to one final, supernatural end.

2. Even if Thomas speaks of an elicited natural desire to see God,

nevertheless this still preserves the underlying innate natural desire for the

vision of God.

*° "Finally, would this system [of pure nature] not be in large part responsible for the evil of 'seperated theology,' and evil from which we still suffer greatly today." Henri de Lubac, "Letter to Maurice Blondel" (3 April 1932).

46 "To reduce his thought to the clumsy affirmation of an appetites elicitus without deep roots in the nature of the soul is to deprive his though of all significance." 30

3. Everything has a natural desire for its ultimate perfection and final end.

All the more so for human persons. Our final end is supernatural, therefore

there is an innate natural desire for the supernatural.

4. If an innate desire for the beatific vision were denied, then the vision of

God would be extrinsic and not intrinsic. Yet this is contrary to teaching of

Thomas Aquinas.

Henri de Lubac, Augustinianism and Modern Theology, 125.

47 "Aquinas says with unequivocal clarity that the will as a nature does have a natural appetite or an innate desire for good in general or happiness." Denis Bradley,

Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good, p. 445.

"St. Thomas himself speaks of a desiderium naturale for the immediate vision of god. Whatever the more eact meaning of this statement may be for St. Thomas (many theologians have written on the subject and many views have been expressed), it shows nonetheless that St. Thomas saw that relationships obtained between the spirituality of man (his naturd), its immanement dynamism {desiderium) on the one hand, and the visio beatifica on the other—relationships, moreover, which arise not merely from the actual calling of man in grace to have an immediate vision of god, but which precede it are

"natural." Karl Rahner, Hearers of the Word (New York: Herder and Herder, 1963), 81.

For concern regarding the supernatural end of man being extrinsic, see Karl Rahner,

"Concerning the Relationship between Nature and Grace" Theological Investigations 1,

299. Also see Henri de Lubac, Mystery of the Supernatural, pp. 54-55. 31

5. If man does not innately desire the supernatural call toward supernatural

beatitude, we might conclude that man is not morally bound to receive the

supernatural elicitation to supernatural beatitude. That is, man might

respond: "God, thank you for the offer of supernatural beatitude, but I am

content to pursue only my innate natural desire for natural beatitude. I will

live solely by the natural inclinations and desires that you have instilled

within me."49

The arguments of the "elicited desire" position positing "two ends" are as follows:

1. Innate natural inclinations are always in proportion to the natural powers

of the creature. E.g. peat moss is not naturally inclined to fly like an eagle.

Consequently, human nature is not naturally inclined to the supernatural

vision of God's essence.50

See Karl Rahner, Hearers of the Word (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969),

159: "Why does man a priori in virtue of his nature need to indulge in a factual

investigation of history to find out if a revelation has been given?"

50 "A rock cannot know and love God without ceasing to be a rock—it cannot

even be helped to know and love because it lacks any such faculties that might so be helped. By contrast while a human person cannot know and love God in a direct vision

and embrace without supernatural aid, with such aid the human person may partake in intrinsically supernatural divine friendship: and this is the specifidc notion of obediential potency as applied to the Iretoin of grace to nature." Steven Long, "On the Loss, and the

Recovery, of Nature as a Theonomic Principle," Nova et Vetera 5 (2007): 165. 32

2. A natural desire for the supernatural confuses the two orders with regard

to human nature. Therefore, the two orders must be distinguished if we are

to be true to Thomas Aquinas.

3. If the supernatural vision of God were naturally desired, then God would

owe the supernatural vision to the human qua human. At least from a

Christian philosophical point of view, this removes the gratuity of the

supernatural order and would contradict Saint Augustine's doctrine of

nature and grace as defined in his De natura et gratia. In other words,

does not the "one-ender" position lead us to speak of debitum naturae?

Hence, the innate desire position is incorrect because it would place

Aquinas is direct opposition to Augustine—something foreign to the

thought of Aquinas.52

4. From a textual point of view, the works of Thomas Aquinas often denote

human beatitude as natural and as supernatural. Examples would be found

51 "The Church necessarily supposes that there is a natural goal and end; for it teaches that the end now appointed for nature, consisting as it does in the beatific vision of God, is absolutely supernatural, and is to be communicated to us by a special grace.

And yet there must be a necessary end for nature." Matthias Joseph Sheeben, Nature and

Grace (St Louis: Herder, 1954), 93.

52 "Gratuitous is said to be that which is not due to nature, but is freely given."

Thomas Cajetan/rc Summam theologiae I, q. 62, a. 2. 33

inDe veritate q. 14, a. 2. Opponents of the "innate desire" position point

to passages such as this one as proof that the human person has an innate

appetite for the vision of God.

5. Thomas' explicit teaching about human nature's obediential (not innate)

potency confirms two potencies and two ends.

These then are the arguments for the contrary positions on Thomas Aquinas doctrine of human nature and teleology. This present thesis attempts something daring. It attempts to recast the question by suggesting that Thomas' argument is more nuanced. Whereas the

"innate desire" analysis postulates a natural desire for a single supernatural beatitude, and whereas the "elicited desire" analysis postulates two beatitudes, a natural end and a supernatural end, I suggest that the relationship is best understood by emphasizing

De veritate q. 14, a. 2, corpus. "Aliud est bonum hominis naturae humanae proportionem excedens, quia ad ipsum obtinendum vires naturales non sufficiunt, nee etiam ad cognoscendum vel desiderandum; sed ex sola divina liberalitate homini repromittitur; I Corinth. II, 9: oculus non vidit etc., et hoc est vita aeterna."

5 "Therefore, there must necessarily belong to human nature some natural happiness in addition to supernatural beatitude." Francisco Suarez, De ultimo fine hominis disp. 4.

"In man there is a capacity and aptitude of nature according to obediential potency to be elevated to the vision of God" Domingo Banez, Scholastica commenatria in primam partem, q. 12, a. 1. 34

Thomas' use of the term duplex beatitudo. Furthermore, I believe that this argument is reaffirmed by the way that Thomas describes the relationship between natural law and divine law through analogy, typology, and reflection. Lastly, I believe that Thomas is much more Augustinian than previously appreciated and that Thomas' position on nature, teleology, and law is in full continuity with Augustine. In other words, there is not an

en

"Augustinian" position that is distinct from the "Thomist" position. Those who think this way have not fully appreciated the way that Thomas answers the question regarding human nature and human teleology. In order to demonstrate this position, my argument will concentrate chiefly on Thomas' Super Sententiis, De veritate, De virtutibus, Summa contra Gentiles, Summa theologiae, and especially Super De triniate Boethii since the latter situates beatitude in the context of human knowing and human nature with regard to faith and reason.

See Chapter Nine for Thomas' use of "desire of wonder" or desiderium admirationis as a more accurate reading of "natural desire."

Augustine gives special attention to Saint Paul's "law written in the human heart" in his workDe libero arbitrio voluntatis. For English translation, refer to

Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, trans. Thomas Williams (Indianapolis, IN,

Hackett, 1993). Here Augustine engages the debate concerning the freedom of the will as it touches on two schools in opposition to him, namely his past Manicheanism and his struggle with Pelagianism. For difference in Augustine's natural law theory from that of

Cicero, see Matthew Levering, Biblical Natural Law: A Theocentric and Teleological

Approach (New York: Oxford University Pres, 2008), 77. 35

DOES MAN HAVE ONE END OR TWO ENDS?

We begin with the two questions previously stated:

1. According to Thomas Aquinas, Does Human Nature Innately Desire Only

Natural Beatitude?

2. According to Thomas Aquinas, Does Human Nature Innately Desire

Supernatural Beatitude?

These two questions seek to discover the way Thomas speaks of human teleology. Does the human person have an imperfect end and a perfect end, or does he simply have a perfect end? The history of Western philosophy often presupposes that the philosopher

CO chooses the perfect end over an imperfect end. It is better to contemplate truth, they say, than it is to be rich, healthy, and happy. No one doubts that temporal happiness is "good."

However, it is not perfect happiness. Readers of Saint Thomas recall his catalogue of goods in Summa theologiae I-II q. 2 in which he lists the various imperfect goods of creation:

q. 2, a. 1 Does happiness consist in wealth?

q. 2, a. 2 In honor?

q. 2, a. 3 In fame or glory?

q. 2, a. 4 In power?

q. 2, a. 5 In any good of the body?

q. 2, a. 6 In pleasure?

q. 2, a. 7 In any good of the soul?

q. 2, a. 8 In any created good?

CO Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics 10, 7. 36

The final response of Aquinas is expected: "Augustine says: As the soul is the life of the body, so God is man's life of happiness of Whom it is written: 'Happy is that people

whose God is the Lord.' I answer that it is impossible for any created good to constitute

man's happiness."60 Nevertheless, Thomas occasionally speaks of man's connatural end

in distinction to a supernatural end.

Hence it is necessary for man to receive from God some additional

principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness, even as

he is directed to his connatural end, by means of his natural principles,

albeit not without Divine assistance. Such like principles are called

"theological virtues": first, because their object is God, inasmuch as they

direct us aright to God: secondly, because they are infused in us by God

alone: thirdly, because these virtues are not made known to us, save by

Divine revelation, contained in Holy Writ.

Augustine, De Civitate Dei 19, 26. Here Augustine quotes Psalm 143:15.

Summa theologial-ll, q. 2, a. 7.

61 Summa theologiael-ll, q. 62 a. 1, emphasis mine. "Unde oportet quod

superaddantur homini divinitus aliqua principia, per quae ita ordinetur ad beatitudinem supernaturalem, sicut per principia naturalia ordinatur adfinem connaturalem, non tamen absque adiutorio divino. Et huiusmodi principia virtutes dicuntur theologicae, rum quia habent Deum pro obiecto, inquantum per eas recte ordinamur in Deum; turn quia a solo Deo nobis infunduntur; turn quia sola divina revelatione, in sacra Scriptura, huiusmodi virtutes traduntur." See also where Thomas touches on this question in De 37

Here, then, Thomas describes supernatural beatitude {beatitudinem supernaturalem] and

also man's connatural end {finem connaturalem). Moreover, Thomas elsewhere insists

that this final supernatural beatitude is not attainable by man's natural powers. In De

virtutibus, when also discussing the virtues, Thomas explains that man is able to be

perfect in a twofold way {dupliciter}. One way is according to the capacity

{capacitatem} of his nature and the other way is according to supernatural perfection

{supernaturalem perfectionem} .63

virtutibus, q. 1 a. 10 arg. 2. "Sed dicebatur, quod oportet hominem perfici per virtutem non solum in ordine ad connaturalem finem, sed etiam in ordine ad supernaturalem, qui

est beatitudo vitae aeternae, ad quam ordinatur homo per virtutes infusas.- Sed contra,

natura non deficit in necessariis.

Summa theologiae I-II q. 5 a. 5. "Therefore man is not able through his natural powers to attain beatitude." One might compare this to the recent summary of the

Catechism of the Catholic Church, which reaffirms Thomas' insistence on this point at paragraph no. 362. Cf. the full text of Summa theologiae I-II q. 5 a. 5. "Sed contra, homo

est principium naturaliter actuum suorum per intellectum et voluntatem. Sed ultima beatitudo Sanctis praeparata, excedit intellectum hominis et voluntatem, dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. II, oculus non vidit, et auris non audivit, et in cor hominis non ascendit, quae praeparavit Deus diligentibus se. Ergo homo per sua naturalia non potest beatitudinem consequi."

63 De virtutibus, q. la. 10 ad 1 "Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sicut secundum primam perfectionem homo est perfectus dupliciter, uno modo secundum nutritivam et 38

I wish to emphasize here that Thomas does not indicate that a man simply has two

perfections. Nor does he simply state that man has one perfection. He qualifies his

account with the term dupliciter and this observation is of fundamental importance. We

find then that beatitude is duplex or twofold and not simply one or two. Within Thomas'

descriptions, we also discover that one way or modo is by our natural powers and that the

other is attainable by the supernatural light of glory.

As can be discerned in the passage above from De virtutibus, Thomas

distinguishes between the powers of the soul and the twofold beatitude of man. The

nutritive and sensitive aspects of the soul do not exceed the capacities of the material

body. However, the intellective aspect does exceed the material body. This is the reason

that Thomas gives for positing beatitude as dupliciter or twofold. This observation is as

old as the Greeks and we find it clearly in Plato and Aristotle in the conviction that

sensitivam, quae quidem perfectio non excedit capacitatem materiae corporalis; alio

modo secundum partem intellectivam, quae naturalem et corporalem excedit: et

secundum hanc simpliciter est homo perfectus, primo autem modo secundum quid; ita et

quantum ad perfectionem finis, dupliciter homo potest esse perfectus: uno modo

secundum capacitatem suae naturae, alio modo secundum quamdam supernaturalem perfectionem: et sic dicitur homo perfectus esse simpliciter; primo autem modo

secundum quid. Unde duplex competit virtus homini; una quae respondet primae

perfectioni, quae non est completa virtus; alia quae respondet suae perfectioni ultimae: et haec est vera et perfecta hominis virtus."

It is noteworthy that Thomas speaks of the two facets of beatitudes as "modes." 39 contemplation, not physical enjoyment, is the highest mode of beatitude.

The difficulty in Thomas is the distinction between contemplating God abstractly as our first cause and in contemplating God per essentiam divinam. In the first way, we contemplate God as a highest good and first principle, but we do not experience the deiformity necessary to see Him as He is. Aristotle, for example, did not understand happiness as a theosis, and he seems content with his restrained notion of contemplation.65

To complicate matters, there are a few of passages in which Thomas states that this form of natural contemplation is not in itself true happiness—that the human soul naturally desires the vision of God—that man wants not merely consider "De Deo An

Sit?" but "Quid Deus Sit?" This is the ultimate question of Thomas' often-neglected treatise Expositio super librum Boethii De trinitate, to which we will turn in Chapter

Eight.

The first key passage is the one found in Summa theologiae I-II, q. 3. Two others are found in Summa contra Gentiles III, cap. 50 and cap. 57. In the summarizing article

Denis Bradley observes that "while the Christian seeks to the contemplate out of love for what is contemplated, Aristotelian beatitude arises out of the contemplative's love of himself. But if the Aristotelian philosopher is self-centered so are his gods...Perhaps, then, Aristotle thinks that men can only honor rather than love the gods."

D. Bradley's Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good (Washington, DC: Catholic

University of America Press, 1997), 389-90. See also Aristotle, Metaphysics 12, 9 and

Nicomachean Ethics 10, 7. of Summa theologiae q. 3, Thomas asks whether the ultimate perfection of the intellect or beatitude {ultima intellectusperfectio seu beatitudo}, consists in seeing the essence of

God. Thomas' argument here contains two important distinctions. First, true happiness lies in rest and not in desire.66 Secondly, Thomas then describes how knowledge of an effect elicits the knowledge of its cause. According to Thomas, this desire is not merely to know whether the cause exists, but it entails more than that. It is a desire to know the

Frederick Crowe, S.J. beautifully describes the ontological dimension of desiring God—specifically as it structures Thomas' transition in the Summa theologiae,

"So there arises in man a new type of love: the intentio boni, desire, tendency. There is then a transition from complacency to concern, from passivity to activity. The passive actuation which is complacency in an ideal end becomes the principle of operations for achieving the ideal. The affective contemplative charity which is at rest in its object takes on a new function to govern in effective charity all the least details of the soul's involvement in the universe and its ascent to God. The point of actual transition may vary with age, temperament, calling, and the changing day-to- day circumstances of the external situation. But in an ordered study of God and the universe, one must give it a fixed place. And so, following the ontological division of St. Thomas, one would say that for God the transition occurs at q. 44 of the Pars prima, where the theme shifts from the divine being (the object of His complacency) to the processio creaturarum a Deo (the object of His concern)." F. Crowe, "Complacency and Concern in the Thought of Saint

Thomas" in " Complacency and Concern in the Thought of St. Thomas," Theological

Studies, XX (1959): [in three parts] 1-39, 198-230, 343-95, citation above on p. 349. 41 thing as it is. Thomas appeals to Aristotle and provides the example of a solar eclipse.

Now the object of the intellect is "what a thing is," i.e. the essence of a

thing, according to De Anima. Wherefore the intellect attains perfection,

in so far as it knows the essence of a thing. If therefore an intellect knows

the essence of some effect, whereby it is not possible to know the essence

of the cause, i.e. to know of the cause "what it is"; that intellect cannot be

said to reach that cause simply, although it may be able to gather from the

effect the knowledge of that the cause is. Consequently, when man knows

an effect, and knows that it has a cause, there naturally remains in the man

the desire to know about the cause, "what it is." And this desire is one of

wonder, and causes inquiry, as is stated in the beginning of the

Metaphysics.68 For instance, if a man, knowing the eclipse of the sun,

consider that it must be due to some cause, and know not what that cause

is, he wonders about it, and from wondering proceeds to inquire. Nor does

this inquiry cease until he arrive at a knowledge of the essence of the

69

cause.

We know the effect (a solar eclipse), and we thereby seek the cause. However, knowledge that there is a cause is not satisfying. According to Thomas, if we do not understand the essence of the cause, we are not satisfied. We are not yet at "rest." As then

De anima 3, 6.

Aristotle, Metaphysics A, 2.

Summa theologiael-Il, q. 3, a. 8. 42 with God, the intellect perceives the first cause as prime mover, but this is not satisfying.

Knowledge that there is a first cause leads to a desire concerning what the first cause is.

The "that" leads to a "what." So then, there can be no perfect happiness for an intellectual substance without it coming to know the first cause per essentiam.

ARISTOTLE ON NATURE AND INCLINATION

In the argument above, Thomas appeals to the first book of Aristotle's

Metaphysics. It is important demonstrate how Thomas' argument depends on at least four

70

Aristotelian principles. So then, Thomas is not merely appealing to the Christian deposit of faith. He is making a strictly philosophical argument. Below are the Aristotelian principles behind Thomas' argument: 71

1. A perfect and self- sufficient good would lack nothing.

2. Perfection of a faculty is specified by its formal object. Hence, the mind

must know not only "that" something is, but "what" something is.

3. Humanity naturally desires to know and thus is disposed to wonder and

this is the "beginning of philosophy."

Aquinas lists six principles based on Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics 10, lections 10-11. L. Feingold reproduces the six Aristotelian arguments, cf. Natural Desire to See God, p. 5.1 have reduced them to four for the sake of simplicity.

71

Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics 1.7.1097b 15-20.

72 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 2.1-89b29-90al.

73 Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.2.982M2. 43

4. Beatitude consists in the activity of that which is highest in man, namely

his speculative intellect.74

The most noteworthy is the fourth Aristotelian premise, namely that beatitude relates to the speculative intellect. Philosophically, human beatitude finds its fulfillment in the speculative intellect. However, Thomas elsewhere insists that the inclination to know the truth exists "lower" in the practical intellect. In fact, it is in the practical intellect that

Thomas places the inclinations of the natural law. Consequently, we discern a relationship between the contemplative and the practical, or we might say, between human beatitude and natural law. This connection is essential for comprehending the way in which Thomas relates the supernatural to the natural law. Moreover, it reveals the structure of Prima secundae in his Summa theologiae, in which he begins with questions of beatitude and progresses to the end of the Prima secundae with discussions on natural law, the old law, and the new law. Hence, for Thomas, discussions of beatitude are necessarily related to how he understands law. The current thesis holds the difficulty of relating natural and supernatural ends is best seen in this light. However, we limit our analysis to passages that explicitly regard beatitude, specifically twofold beatitude.

Thomas' interest in Aristotle on the subjects of natural teleology and ethics further strengthens the coordination of beatitude to law. Does not Aristotle orient his ethics to contemplation? Aquinas is not original in this synthesis. In fact, it is as old as

Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics 10.7.1177al2-78a8.

Summa theologiael-ll, q. 94, a. 2.

See Appendix C: Duplex Felicitas/Beatitudo in Corpus Thomisticum. 44

Christianity. Before delving into Aquinas' analysis of the speculative and practical intellect (and thereby natural law) regarding human teleology, we should observe the way in which the tradition of natural law developed and entered into Christian thought. The chief mind responsible for packaging human teleology with ethics and contemplation was

Cicero. It was in Cicero's articulation of lex naturae that the Christian West imbibed the tradition of linking natural law to contemplation. Certainly, Aristotle's insistence in the

Ethics on man's perfection lying in contemplation is Thomas Aquinas' authority, but

Thomas is already breathing the air of Cicero's lex naturae in the atmosphere of the

Medieval Latin tradition. Let us, then, turn to Cicero and examine how these concepts developed and extended from their pagan and also Jewish origins. 45

CHAPTER Two: EARLY HISTORY OF NATURE AND TELEOLOGY

The three pillars of the ancient natural law tradition are Cicero, Paul, and

Augustine. The first is a pagan, the second is a Torah-trained Jew and author of the bulk of the New Testament, and the last is a North African Christian bishop universally recognized as one of the most influential theologians of all time. Cicero's political works reveal the connection between law and the rational cosmos. The place of Paul highlights how the pagan philosophical tradition and the Christian theological tradition find their apex in Judaic notion of cosmology. Saint Augustine, last of all, incorporates Cicero and the Judeo-Pauline account in order to present an advanced account of natural law and teleology.

CICERO ON NATURE AND TELEOLOGY

Cicero dedicated his political works to establishing the "whole range of universal

77 justice and law." Cicero's philosophy of nature, then, is the source for his doctrine of

De legibus, I, 17. Cicero, De republica & De legibus, Translated by Clinton

Walker Keyes (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press—Loeb Classical

Library, 2006). All subsequent Latin and English references from De republica and De legibus are taken from this edition. A helpful study is S. Adam Seagrave's "Cicero,

Aquinas, and Contemporary Issues in Natural Law Theory," Review of Metaphysics 62 46 law. While Cicero does not present a thorough ethical system in terms of what medievals and moderns would later describe as lex naturalis, he does often speak of lex naturae. By

"law of nature" Cicero refers to the voice of nature inclining man to a certain end. As such, Cicero's concept of nature and law is teleological. By linking universal law to nature, Cicero was able to break away from the Aristotelian concept that men are ordered to the polisher se. Instead, the law of nature orients mankind toward a universal application of justice. Further, Cicero's emphasis on nature and his distinction between ius gentium and ius civile opened the way for the natural law theories that developed after him, particularly the Christian understanding of law as divinely ordered and as transcending the positive laws of a certain commonwealth or era.

Cicero derived his philosophic presuppositions primarily from the skepticism in vogue in Athens. Cicero himself reports that he was a skeptic in accordance with the New

Academy:

For we Academicians are not men whose minds wander in uncertainty and

never know what principles to adopt.. .but as other schools maintain that

some things are certain, other uncertain, we, differing with them, say that

something are probable, other improbable.78

(2009): 491-523. See also Gerard Watson "Natural Law and Stoicism," mProblems in

Stoicism, ed. A. A. Long (London: The Athlone Press, 1971).

HO

De officiis, II, 7. Translated by Walter Miller (Cambridge, Massachusetts:

Harvard University Press—Loeb Classical Library, 2005). All subsequent Latin and

English references from De officiis are taken from this edition. See also Academica II, 78 47

This skepticism dovetailed nicely with Roman practicality and worked against the philosophical dogmatism that Cicero found dangerous. However, Cicero found that this skepticism needed to be supplemented in the arena of ethics, particularly when ethics intersected with politics.79

Cicero's ethical system is therefore largely indebted to the Stoics. This is evident is Cicero's emphasis on "nature" throughout his philosophical writings. According to the Stoics, to be truly human is to operate in accord with reason and nature. For the skeptical Cicero, the Stoic account of morality seemed most probable—almost too probable to deny. Consequently, Cicero's discussion of law is also a discussion of nature and the inclination of man's nature to virtue and the common good of society. For Cicero, the goal of human life is to conform to this inclination of nature, which drives men together into common bonds. Of particular importance to Cicero was the belief that

01 nature leads the best men into the service of the commonwealth for the good of all.

Cicero vehemently fought against the Epicurean belief that the highest good might be achieved in the pleasure of one's own garden. Cicero also wrote against those

where Cicero credits his conversion to the New Academy to Philo of Larissa.

79

De legibus II, 39. "I should like to win over this school [i.e. New Academy of

Carneades], and so do not dare to banish it from the discussion."

80 "Introduction to De officiis" in Cicero, De officiis, Translated by Walter Miller

(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2005), xiii-xiv.

81 De officiis I, 157. "sic hominess, ac multo etiam magis, natura congregati adhibent agendi cogitandique sollertiam." 48

O-) philosophers who withdrew from society for the sake of speculative knowledge. Here, not surprisingly, we find the Roman preference for pragma over dogma. However, even

Cicero sought to link the fulfillment of nature in society with a quasi-supernatural beatitude as a reward.83 In summary, Cicero's ethical system of law is bound to his conception of nature as rooted in the concept of society. Although Cicero was philosophically skeptical, a cursory reading of his political philosophy reveals that he was hardly skeptical on the subject of law. He is convinced that that the law of nature is universal and applies to all without exception.

Cicero defines law as the highest reason, implanted by Nature, which commands what ought to be done and forbids the opposite. Those familiar with the Thomistic natural law tradition will at once perceive that Cicero's definition is not far from Thomas

Aquinas' own definition of the fundamental principle of natural law: "Good ought to be done and pursued, and evil ought to be avoided." This similarity may cause more

De officiis I, 157. "Hence it follows that the claims of human society and the bonds that unite men together take precedence of the pursuit of speculative knowledge."

83 That is, if we take the "Dream of Scipio" seriously and not as a noble lie as might be suggested by Leo Strauss. Regarding religious myth and political law, see L.

Strauss, The City and Man (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), p. 22.

84 De republica, 3, 22, 33.

De legibus, 1, 18.

86 Summa theologiael-ll, q. 94, a. 2. "bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum." 49 confusion that it does clarity. As we shall see, Cicero's doctrine of the "law of nature" is teleological, but his teleology is different from that of Thomas Aquinas and of the medievals in general. Moreover, Cicero's speaks of the law of nature, never of the natural law {lex naturae not lex naturalis)}1

This law of nature, says Cicero, commands right conduct and forbids wrong conduct. It is an inherent principle, so strong as to be called a "force of nature." As the highest law its origin extends before any written law existed or any commonwealth had been established. Nature is not only prior to justice, but it provides justice as a gift.

Humans as rational agents resemble the gods because they can consider that which is reasonable and therefore perceive what is just.

Virtue {honestas} is the "perfection of Nature, developed to its highest point." °

Martin Rhonheimer has recently described a "nature/reason dichotomy" consisting of two competing notions of natural law in his "The Cognitive Structure of the

Natural Law and the Truth of Subjectivity," The Thomist 67 (2003), 18. The former he claims as Stoic (and Ciceronian), the latter as Thomistic. Matthew Levering has made a strong case that this is a false dichotomy because practical reason belongs to our nature and responds to our natural inclinations. For his critical analysis of Rhonheimer's position, see Matthew Levering, "Natural Law and Natural Inclinations: Rhonheimer,

Pinckaers, McAleer," The Thomist 70 (2006), 155-201.

De legibus, 1, 19.

89 De legibus, 1, 19. "naturae vis."

De legibus, 1,25. 50

Since Nature provides the criteria for justice, justice is an expression of virtue on the human level. All humans partake of the same nature and therefore all humans are capable of justice. Thus, right does not depend on the opinions of men, but upon Nature itself.

Having established the primary role of virtue as the gift of Nature, Cicero then establishes that virtue ought to be sought for its own sake. Correspondingly, justice ought to be sought for the sake of justice. If virtue and justice are not sought for their own sake, but for the sake of something else, then that something else must be greater.93 However, what could be greater than virtue? Money, public office, beauty, and health cannot be the natural ends of humanity. On this matter, Cicero is convinced that the Academy and the

Stoics are in full agreement, although they differ in terminology. The Academy held that the honorable or virtuous is the summum bonum, whereas Zeno held it to be the solum bonum.94 For Cicero, this distinction is merely a semantic one. According to Cicero,

Xenocrates and Aristotle are in full agreement with Zeno. Regardless of whether virtue is the highest good or only good, it is nevertheless the final goal of human life.

Having established virtue as the gift of Nature and the purpose of human endeavors, Cicero places in the mouth of his brother Quinrus the observation that this

De legibus, 1, 30.

92 De legibus, 1, 28.

De legibus, 1, 52.

94 De legibus, 1, 55.

95 De legibus, 1, 55. 51 application properly situates a discussion about "civil laws and statutes". One cannot discuss civic law until one has established the criteria for the law of nature and its goal of virtue. Virtue as a perfection of nature inclines man not only to his highest good, but also orients him to his neighbors. In brief, rational man, as a participant in a universal nature, becomes universally concerned with those who belong to his nature. Human nature is social and so Cicero believes that we cannot divorce the human life from the political life.

Cicero sets forth his code of law in the second book of De legibus and here his conception of nature becomes rather teleological. Cicero's code of law begins with the precept: "They shall approach the gods in purity bringing piety, and leaving riches

97 behind. Whoever shall do otherwise, God Himself will deal out punishment to him.'

God's judgment frames the legal code from beginning to end. We find that this is the case because God is identified as Nature. For Cicero, humanity's conformity to God is merely no another way of stating humanity's conformity to Nature.

Although, Cicero's code repeatedly refers to other lesser gods, Cicero seems to believe that Jove or deus ipse is not merely the chief of a pantheon, but the supreme being

De legibus, 1, 56.

De legibus, 2, 19.

no

Cicero's doctrine seems similar, but by no means identical, to Benedict

Spinoza's (1632-1677) teaching, which reduces "God" to "Nature." To compare, see

Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, Chapter Six on miracles. This problems could be avoided by following the way that Thomas Aquinas posits being and the good in

Summa theologiae I qq. 4-5. 52 who is synonymous with natura. Thus far in De legibus, Cicero refers to the supreme god of the universe as Iovis. Elsewhere, this "god" is identified by Cicero as the princeps deus, deus arcens, and deus aeternus. InDe legibus, he is mens divina and ratio divina.102 Law is in fact called the ultimam mentem.103

Cicero's legal code permits the ancient veneration of lesser gods and the household Lares; however, his primary concern is with that god who is the ultimam mentem. When Atticus asks Marcus whether the state auspices were founded by the state to assist the state or whether the auspices actually perform legitimate divination, Marcus replies that he believes that auspices are capable of real divination.104 Marcus' conviction does not rest on superstition or miracles. Rather, his belief in divination rests on the same foundation as his legal theory—that of the mens divina. The Divine Mind as the rational principle in nature inclines men to one another. This social bond formed the Roman commonwealth and forms all states. Since Nature or the mens divina leads rational men to engage in social affairs, the commonwealth must pay homage to this divine principle of rationality in the universe. As the natural principle of the universe, divination allows men to peak into the divine mind of the Nature.

De re publico, 6, 13, 26.

De re publico, 6, 17.

1 De re publico, 6, 26.

De legibus, 2, 10.

3 De legibus, 2, 8.

De legibus, 2, 32-3 53

Following the custom of the Stoics, Cicero stresses the supreme God of Nature and tolerates the traditional folk religion of the masses. Reverence for household gods and for local deities is important, because these devotions sanctify family bonds and local communities. However, true devotion is that cult oriented to the abstract Iovis who is synonymous with natura. As the mens divina, the will of Nature rules the universe and his mind orders humanity. Divine retribution for broken oaths arises from this supreme deity. Cicero grants that Xerxes and the Persians had a point about gods not living in shrines but in the universe. Rome has followed the Greek custom of building temples because this practice teaches people that the gods are among them. Consequently, "this idea encourages a religious attitude that is useful to States." So we find that Cicero believes that Iovis as divine Nature has established the political order, but that the particulars of local cults, temples, and customs are merely matters of utility since each fosters devotion to the commonwealth.

Although the final goal of Cicero's teleology remains a mystery, he comes closest to revealing it in the sixth book of De republica with the Dream of Scipio. Here is where

Cicero hints at the possibility of a quasi-supernatural beatitude. Scipio recounts a vision that he received in a dream wherein his adopted grandfather Scipio Africanus the Elder and his father Paulus Macedonicus instructed him to "keep you eyes fixed upon these heavenly things, and scorn the earthly."107 Whereas, a great portion of De republica

De legibus, 2, 26.

De legibus, 2, 26.

De republica, 6, 20. 54

disavows Plato's ideal republic in favor of the historic Roman republic, Cicero concludes

Scipio's dream by inverting the motifs of ideal and earthly. According to the Dream of

Scipio, committed service to the republic is an earthly endeavor in pursuit of an ideal

reward of celestial beatitude. Plato projected an ideal republic to be approximated on

earth. Cicero described an earthly kingdom as a means to an ideal existence. Those who

defend the republic have a "special place prepared for them in the heavens, where they

may enjoy an eternal life of happiness."108 This destiny is according to the design of the

"chief god."109 In other words, nature itself inclines man to the eternal life of happiness.

A teleological account of the immortality of the soul is introduced by the Elder

and completed by the Younger's father Paulus. The universe is described as temple

{templum) and souls derive their existence from the eternal fires of the stars. This ethereal

account of the immortality of the soul is fully Stoic as is the pantheistic account

describing the universe as the supreme God himself. The goal of the human soul is to become reunited to its origin in the Milky Way.111

The theological and cosmological account of Cicero provides the reason for why philosophic men should conform to nature and seek the active life of justice. Paulus

enumerates a number of virtues that merit entry into this celestial reward: love for justice

De re publico, 6, 13.

109 De republica, 6, 13. "princeps deus." This passage reveals a kind of theistic teleology in Cicero—a provocative and neglected aspect of Cicero's legal theory.

110 De re publica, 6, 17.

De republica, 6, 16. 55 and duty to one's parents and family—but especially to one's fatherland. Duty paid to one's fatherland, says Paulus, is the "road to heaven".112 Repeatedly, Scipio's paternal guides explain that detachment from earthly glory is the way to achieve this celestial glory. Although Rome is undoubtedly the greatest republic on earth and most worthy of service, Rome herself is not the goal of the statesman's life.

Cicero cites Romulus as a model for this cosmic detachment, because Romulus was a man who conformed himself and his city to the law of nature. Romulus' apotheosis

(a sign of natural virtue) took place in conjunction with a solar eclipse (also a sign of natural power). Thus we find that Nature was perfectly at work in Romulus in the founding of Rome. We also learn that Romulus was destined not for earthly Rome, but for the goal of heaven. The heavens are the "eternal home and resting place" of the soul.113 As Romulus achieved it, so also, "a path to heaven, as it were, is open to those who have served their country well."

The philosophical justification for the republic finds its ultimate expression in that the "spirit is the true self and "you are a god" albeit a god distinct from the Supreme

God.115 This "true self is another way of referring to the rational inclinations within man toward the good and virtuous. As a "god" the soul operates according to its nature as prime mover in the order of the republic. Moreover, the human soul causes justice to

112 De republica, 6, 16. "via in caelum."

De republica, 6, 25.

114 De republica, 6, 26.

De republica, 6, 26. 56 prevail if it remains detached from the things of the earth. By so detaching itself, the soul makes a "swifter flight to its proper home".116 Thus, the proper home of humanity is not the republic, but the heavens. The republic is the means by which the virtuous ascend to their proper goal.

Having defined the philosophical background of law and nature in the works of

Cicero, we turn to Cicero's own sustained arguments about the "law of nature." Cicero consistently and repeatedly presents the law of nature as the foundation of his message.

As such, the law of nature is the key to understanding Cicero's perspective on how law operates both practically and universally.117

Not surprisingly De re publico emphasizes the role of law and nature with respect to the republic. Cicero first refers to "the common law of nature" in distinction from civil law.118 In the words of Laelius, Cicero defines the law of nature as:

True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal

application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its

commands, and avers from wrongdoing by its prohibitions. And it does

not lay its commands or prohibitions upon good men in vain, though

neither have any effect on the wicked. It is a sin to try to alter this law, nor

is it allowable to attempt to repeal any part of it, and it is impossible to

116 De re publico, 6, 29.

1 1 7

Cicero's argument from nature also provide an insight into how Cicero understood on tyrannical maneuvers of Antony and the Caesars as unlawful. 118 De re publico, 1, 27. "nee civili nexo, sed communi lege naturae." 57

abolish it entirely.

Cicero further explains that while there are different laws in Rome and at Athens, there is

1 JO still only one true law that is "valid for all nations and all times". This universal law of nature is established by the "one master and ruler, that is, God, over us all, for he is the 1 71 author of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge." Moreover, he who disobeys the law, deprives his own nature since by transgressing the law of nature, he actually denies his own rational nature.122

Turning to De legibus, Cicero begins his treatise on law with a discussion of poetry. "Is the Romulus apotheosis legend true? Is the Greek legend of Aquilo true?" 1 7*\ asks Cicero. Cicero's point is that poets are held to different standard of truth than are legal witnesses. History, says Cicero, is read differently than poetry. In this way, law is similar to poetry. Law points toward realities that transcend human affairs. This is how we must comprehend the origin of law and universal justice. As stated above, law is the highest reason implanted in Nature which commands what ought to be done and

119 De re publica, 3, 33.

120 De re publica, 3, 33. "sed et omnes gentes et omni tempore una lex."

De re publica, 3, 33. "unusque erit communis quasi magister et imperator omnium deus, ille legis huius inventor, disceptator, lator."

1 92

De re publica, 3, 33. "naturam hominis aspernatus."

123 De legibus, 1, 3.

De legibus, 1,16. 58 forbids the opposite.125 Nature is also the highest law,12 and the root of justice is discovered in Nature.127 Reason pertains to both gods and men and so men have law in

1 ?R common with the gods. Like all the lesser gods, man recognizes the highest God because he is the "source from which man sprang."129 Although Cicero does not state that 130 man is the imago Dei, he does say, "there is a likeness between man and God." Cicero also explains that reason is the link between men and God: "What is more divine.. .than reason."131

Furthermore, right is based on nature and since nature is universal, anyone can attain to virtue.132 Cicero argues, "If they have received Law, they have received justice, 1^^ 1^4 too," because "justice is inherent in Nature." Since law is found in nature, it is an unwritten law. This is why a man aware of the law of nature also recognizes that "he

125 De legibus, 1, 18. "facienda sunt, prohibetque contraria."

126 De legibus, 1, 19. "summa lege."

127 De legibus, 1, 20. "stirpem iuris a natura."

De legibus, 1, 23.

129 De legibus, 1, 25.

1 "^0

De legibus, 1, 25. "est igitur homini cum deo similtudo."

De legibus, 1, 23. 132 De legibus, 1, 28, 30.

De legibus, 1, 33.

134 De legibus, 1, 34. "quo facilis ius in natura esse positum intellegi possit."

De legibus, 1, 42. 59

i ^ft i ~\n has a divine element within him," because the "divine mind is the supreme Law." By now it is clear that Cicero constantly blends together the concepts of nature, law, justice, and god. It is not a matter of dissimilation, but a natural consequence of his Stoic presuppositions. At root, honorable and dishonorable acts are determined by Nature and

138 not by rule of the state or by the whims of individuals.

The distinction between the law of nature and the positive laws of the state form an important distinction in Cicero's political philosophy. The law of nature is an eternal law, whereas civil laws are approximations of the law of nature. Cicero teaches that the eternal law of nature "did not first become Law when it was written down."139 Rather the true law of nature is primal and originated with "the right reason of supreme Jove."

Civil laws may accurately reflect the law of nature and to the extent that they do correspond to the law of nature, they are true:

Therefore Law is the distinction between things just and unjust, made in

agreement with that primal and most ancient of all things, Nature; and in

conformity to Nature's standard are framed those human laws which

inflict punishment upon the wicked but defend and protect the good.

De legibus, 1, 59.

1 ^7

De legibus, 2, 11. "divina mens summa lex est."

138 De legibus, 1,45.

De legibus, 2, 10.

140 De legibus, 2, 10. "summi Iovis." 141 De legibus, 2, 13. 60

Cicero seems to have in mind the idea that vice creates its own natural punishment.

Hadley Arkes observed that Cicero, "understood, with a sober realism, that the systematic violation of certain principles of justice will have an almost immediate effect in impairing, or contracting, our common life."142 However, is it truly the case that nature always punishes vice with an immediate effect? Cicero introduces a tension in his presentation at this point because he states that law ought to persuade by natural reason and not by force. It is difficult to imagine how a republic could conform to this standard in which punishment was strictly natural. Clearly, Cicero does not believe that this is strictly the case, because he himself served as a Roman advocate and argued for the punishment of many transgressors against the state. The tension is resolved when we recall that nature instills in men the sense of corporate justice and thereby provides them with the means to try, convict, and punish those who have committed crimes against society.

Returning to Cicero's De officiis, we find an emphasis on the relationship of virtue and reason to the law of nature. The first example of the law of nature occurs in

Cicero's discussion of the passions. Cicero describes how the passions overleap their bounds and gallop away rather than "obey reason to which they are subject by the law of

Hadley Arkes, "That 'Nature Herself Has Placed in our Ears a Power of

Judging': Some Reflections on the 'Naturalism' of Cicero" in Natural Law Theory:

Contemporary Essays, Edited by Robert P. George (New York: Oxford University Press,

1992), 260. 61 nature." Here the law of nature subjects the passions to reason. It orders the proper inclinations within man. Similarly, Cicero also states that nature herself impels men to love those who possess virtue.

Since reason reigns in the passions, "reason of nature itself is the divine and human law." Consequently, the law of nature takes on a moral value, for Cicero explains that he who obeys this divine and human law "will never be guilty of coveting anything that is his neighbor's or of appropriating to himself what he has taken from his neighbor."1 6 Moreover, "nature ordains" that a man promotes the interests of his fellow man and "in accordance with that same nature," have common interests with others. All this is the case because "we are all subject to one and the same law of nature." Cicero

1 AQ concludes: "we are certainly forbidden by Nature's law to wrong our neighbor." When men disregard this law, their "attitude demolishes the whole structure of civil society."149

The dishonorable passions of Caesar are ultimately the cause for the destruction of the

Roman Republic.

De officiis 2, 102. "nee rationi parent, cui sunt subiecti lege naturae.'

144 De officiis 2, 32. "in quibus eas virtutes esse remur a natura ipsa diligere

cogimur.

145 De officiis 3, 23. "ipsa naturae ratio, quae est lex divina et humana."

146 De officiisl), 23.

De officiis 3, 27. "una contineumur omnes et eadem lege naturae."

148 De officiis 3, 27. "certe violare alteram naturae lege prohibemur.

De officiis 3, 28. 62

Cicero explains that the particular crime of theft is also "contrary to the law of nature."150 In fact, the law of nature itself {lex ipsa naturae) "protects and conserves the interests of men." Even when civil laws or customs do not condemn evil acts, they are nevertheless "forbidden by the natural law."152 Cicero praises the ancient Roman founders for recognizing that there is a universal law (ius gentium) and a civil law (ius civile). This distinction recognizes that not all civil laws necessarily conform to the ius gentium.

Cicero makes an unusual claim that this universal law is not perspicuous:

But we possess no substantial, life-like image of true Law and genuine

Justice; a mere sketch is all that we enjoy. I only wish that we were true

even to this; for, even as it is, it is drawn from the excellent models which

Nature and Truth afford.153

Incidentally, Cicero states that natura is interchangeable with ius gentium. He states this clearly when he writes, "But this principle is established not by Nature alone, that is, by the law of nations (natura, id est, iure gentium).'"

Cicero's doctrine of the law of nature in relation to the ius civile accomplished

De officiis 3, 30. "contraque naturae legem."

De officiis 3, 31. "lex ipsa naturae, quae utilitatem hominum convervat et continet."

152 De officiis 3, 69. "tamen naturae lege sanctum est."

]53De officiis 3, 70.

154 De officiis 3, 23. 63

three things in the history of political thought. These three accomplishments

correspond to three stages in his written works. De republica establishes the common

application of the law of nature in all men. Law is universal because nature is universal.

The commonwealth finds it origin in mankind's inclination to come together for the

greater good. Cicero's vision is broader than that of Plato and Aristotle. He does not think

of ethics as a question pertaining solely to the polls. Rather, he imagines law as universal

and finds its particular application more or less in the Roman Republic. Cicero blended

the Stoic emphasis on the cosmopolitan role of law with the historical tradition of the

Roman Republic. Cicero lowered political philosophy from the realm of speculation to the realm of history. Yet at the same time, he also accounted for how true law could also be universally applicable.

The second accomplishment of Cicero is found in his emphasis on the teleological role of law. This aspect corresponds to his workZ)e leglbus. Nature is not a static reality.

Instead nature is the divine mind and the inclination in all things toward their proper end.

Cicero elevates reason as the guide to true law. Reason is the gift of nature/god placed within man for his own well-being.

While Cicero's teleological emphasis is clear throughout De leglbus, it is difficult to pinpoint the actual telos of law. Nature clearly orders men for a purpose, but what is that purpose for Cicero? It seems that Cicero provides two answers to this difficulty, but neither seems satisfactory. If we read the Dream of Scipio in Book VI ofDe republica as

This relationship between the law of nature and civil law is also addressed by

Augustine and described in the section below. 64 an authentic presentation of Cicero's beliefs, then we might imagine that celestial contemplation and immortality are the final end of the law of nature. As described above, the Dream of Scipio indicates that celestial beatitude awaits those who conform their lives to right reason and nature.

If we do not regard the Dream of Scipio as accurately presenting Cicero's mind, then we might presume that the earthly republic is the final goal and end of mankind.

This solution would reinterpret the Dream of Scipio as promoting the civic life as the highest life because the statesman serves the republic in the most excellent way. If this is the case, then the law of nature has ordered all men to come together into a just and harmonious society. Consequently, there would be no final telos for mankind in celestial regions of the Milky Way as presented in the Dream of Scipio. The sole end of man is to preserve and nurture the republic—what Cicero would call the active life of virtue. This conclusion seems more consistent with the works and writings of Cicero.

The third contribution of Cicero is that his doctrine of the law of nature opens the door to civil disobedience. By stating that there is an unwritten law of nature that transcends (and sometimes disagrees) with civil law, Cicero explains how is legally justified in civil rebellion.156 One might be surprised that a conservative minded thinker

H. Arkes observes: "Cicero's 'naturalism' would alert us, then to the reality of certain natural goods that lie beyond the Constitution. But once we have taken this further step, we would seem to license possibilities that are sobering," from Hadley Arkes' "That

'Nature Herself Has Placed in our Ears a Power of Judging': Some Reflections on the

'Naturalism' of Cicero," In Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays, Edited by 65 like Cicero would so eagerly endorse a system that allowed nature to supercede the state.

However, Cicero's disapproval of the dictatorship of Caesar and the manipulations of

Mark Antony provide the context for Cicero's appeal to a higher law. As a result, he opens the gap between the law of nature and the so-called laws of men.

Obviously, the Christian tradition found agreement with Cicero's distinction between natural law and human law, perhaps climaxing in Augustine's assertion: "that which is not just seems to be no law at all."157 The medieval tradition developed this conviction along the lines of natural law: "Consequently every human law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law of nature. But if in any point it deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law." Cicero was not the first to appeal to a law higher than the law of the state, but he provided the philosophical basis for this appeal.

In summary, Cicero does have a clear doctrine of the law of nature and natural teleology. It is based on the observation that nature has endowed all men with reason and that all men share a common nature. This universal law is teleological and inclines men to one another. Thus, men are naturally social. The highest good of humanity cannot simply pertain to the happiness of an individual. Rather the highest good must relate to

Robert P. George (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 272.

157 Augustine, De libero arbitrio 1,5.

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Summa theologiae I-II, q. 95, a. 2, resp. "Unde omnis lex humanitus posita intantum habet de ratione legis, inquantum a lege naturae derivatur. Si vero in aliquo, a lege naturali discordet, iam non erit lex sed legis corruptio." 66 the common good of all men. Lastly, Cicero's doctrine of the law of nature establishes the tradition that there is an eternal and unchanging law serving as the basis for all temporal laws. This is precisely why subsequent Christian thinkers were so eager to incorporate Cicero as a complementary voice to the legal worldview of Judaism.

JUDAISM AND SAINT PAUL ON NATURE AND TELEOLOGY

The locus classicus for natural law in the New Testament is that passage in the

Epistle to the Romans wherein Paul wrote:

For when the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things

that are of the law; these, having not the law, are a law to themselves. Who

show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing

witness to them: and their thoughts between themselves accusing or also

defending one another, in the day when God shall judge the secrets of men

by Jesus Christ, according to my Gospel."

The key phrase here is cpuaei xa TOU vouou rcoiwaiv, that is, "by nature they do those things of the law." Saint Jerome's Vulgate captured the passage as naturaliter ea quce legis sunt faciunt. Nowhere does Paul, or the rest of the New Testament for that matter, mention "natural law." This passage is as close as it gets. This passage, incidentally, is the place where Thomas finds the apostolic witness to natural law.1 ° Even though the pagan Gentiles did not possess the law in a divinely revealed manner (as in the

Decalogue granted to Israel through Moses), Paul is convinced that they did possess TOU

159 Romans 2:14-16, Revised Standard Version.

Thomas Aquinas, Super Romanos, cap. 2 lectio 34. 67 vouou YpotTtTOV SVTOUC, KocpSiouc, aurcov or "a law written in their hearts." The Gentiles are without an external law, but they have an internal law. Paul's description of the law

"in their hearts" reveals that he did not have "positive law" in mind. He did not refer to civil codes of law. Rather, he appealed to a universal law in the hearts of all men. Hence, the Christian tradition finds in this passage the explicit foundation for natural law.

However, as Ralph Mclnerny quipped, "The natural law, as St. Paul remarks, is inscribed in our hearts. But knowing the natural law does not entail knowing St. Paul."

Where did Paul derive this conviction that humanity bore a "law written in the heart"? Two answers present themselves. The first is that Paul arrived at the notion of a universal inward law through his study of the Hebrew Scriptures. The second answer suggests that Paul imported this concept from Hellenic philosophical sources—primarily from Stoic sources. We have evidence that Paul was trained in classical philosophy and poetry, so this second answer cannot be quickly dismissed.162 The most likely explanation

161 Ralph Mclnerny, "Thomistic Natural Law and Aristotelian Philosophy," St.

Thomas Aquinas and the Natural Law Tradition: Contemporary Perspectives, ed. John

Goyette, Mark S. Latkovic, and Ricahrs S. Myers (Washington, DC: Catholic University of American Press, 2004), 38.

In Acts 17.28, Paul quotes the Greek poet and philosopher Aratus with the words, "we are all his offspring." Titus 1:12 certainly refers to Epimenides. 1 Corinthians

15:33 may allude to a saying of Menander. For more on Paul's references to classical pagan authors, see Frederic William Farrar, The Life and Work of St. Paul, Volume 1

(London: Dutton, 1880), especially pp. 631-3. 68 is that Saint Paul gained his doctrine of a universal teleology for humanity from the

Hebrew Scriptures and that he found this articulated in terms of law through out the

Hebrew poetic tradition—in Psalms and Proverbs but particularly in the second-Temple deuterocanonical books of Sirach and Wisdom. In these Jewish texts the cosmos is consistently defined as rational and lawfully ordered through the personification of

Wisdom. The Jewish fascination with Torah expands so as to include the entire universe.

Law becomes something universal and eternal. Those who correspond to this divine order are deemed "wise." Those who act contrary to the cosmic order are called "fools." This is the thrust of Hebrew wisdom literature. The wisdom tradition itself denotes a transition of

Israel's status as a nation to that of an international kingdom under Solomon. The international role of Solomon's kingdom and his alliances with the surrounding nations is implied with the construction of the Temple as "a house of prayer for all peoples."163 The inclusion of the Gentile nations in God's plan is revealed by the Davidic covenant and is repeatedly described by the Minor Prophets. Hence, there is a shift from Torah, which was peculiar to Israel, and Wisdom, which is universal: "From the beginning, and before the world, was I created, and unto the world to come I shall not cease to be, and in the holy dwelling place I have ministered before him."164 Notably, Sirach 24:31-33 interprets

Deuteronomy 33:4 as presenting the Mosaic Torah as a presentation of the universal laws of God:

They that explain me {i.e. wisdom} shall have life everlasting. All these

Isaiah 56:7.

Sirach 24:14. 69

things are the book of life, and the covenant of the most High, and the

knowledge of truth. Moses commanded a law in the precepts of justices,

and an inheritance to the house of Jacob, and the promises to Israel.

One might therefore conclude that Judaism does not speak of "natural law" per se, but it does speak of "wisdom" as a universal moral law built into creation. The eternal wisdom of God is clearly juridical and legal. In Proverbs 8:15 it is written, "By me (i.e. Wisdom) kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things." A similar idea is expressed in Proverbs

8:22, which reads: "The Lord possessed me (i.e. Wisdom) in the beginning of his way, before his words of old."

Arguably the Psalms and the sapiential books emphasize that all nations will eventually embrace the justice and righteousness of Israel. Moreover, most passages assume that the nations will become righteous in a way that does not necessarily involve

i fn the six hundred thirteen precepts of the Mosaic Law. The prophetical books, in

165 Sirach 24:31-33.

Proverbs, Wisdom, Sirach, Ecclesiastes.

167 Maimonides confirms that Jews had an obligation to guide the Gentile nations to the God of Israel by means of the Noahide law. See Mishne Torah: Laws of Kings

8:11: "Everyone who accepts the seven [Noahide] commandments and is careful to perform them -this person is of the pious onces of the nation, and he has a portion in the world to come. He accepts them and performs them because they were commanded by the Holy One, blessed be He, revealed to us by the hand of Rabbi Moses that the children of Noah were previously commanded in these things." These seven laws being: 1) 70 particular, assume this. One of the most impressive prophecies is that of Isaiah in which justice reigns "to the Gentiles into the sea, into Africa, and Lydia them that draw the bow: into Italy, and Greece, to the islands afar off, to them that have not heard of me, and have not seen my glory."168 More notably, the God of Israel promises to turn Gentiles into priests and levites—something absolutely forbidden in the Law of Moses.

The presumption here is that the Davidic covenant introduced an international mandate to the Gentiles. The Temple in Jerusalem becomes a "house of prayer for all nations,"170 not for Israel alone. Scripture records Solomon proclaiming the international significance of Israel for even the "the stranger who is not of thy people Israel":

Moreover also the stranger, who is not of thy people Israel, when he shall

come out of a far country for thy name's sake, (for they shall hear every

where of thy great name, and thy mighty hand, And thy stretched out arm)

so when he shall come, and shall pray in this place, Then hear thou in

heaven, in the firmament of thy dwelling place, and do all those things, for

Prohibition of Idolatry, 2) Prohibition of Murder, 3) Prohibition of Theft, 4) Prohibition of Sexual immorality, 5) Prohibition of Blasphemy, 6) Prohibition of eating flesh taken from an animal while it is still alive, and the 7) Establishment of courts of law.

168 Isaiah 66:19.

169 Isaiah 66:21-22. "And I will take of them to be priests, and Levites, says the

Lord. For as the new heavens, and the new earth, which I will make to stand before me, says the Lord: so shall your seed stand, and your name."

Isaiah 56:7. 71

which that stranger shall call upon thee: that all the people of the earth

may learn to fear thy name, as do thy people Israel, and may prove that thy

171

name is called upon on this house, which I have built.

Consequently, the Solomonic literature is not concerned with the Mosaic Law, but rather with the practical application of wisdom and justice in every earthly affair. In Moses, we read about blood sacrifice, priests, kosher foods, and purity laws. In the Solomonic literature, take Proverbs for example, we read about how to become a just man, how to avoid adultery, how to marry a virtuous woman, how to avoid financial debt, how to avoid strife and the evils of bloodshed. The law of David and of his son Solomon is not specifically Jewish at all. In fact, as one reads the book of Proverbs, one might mistake it for a book of Confucian wisdom. So then, the Solomonic era of Judaism is more universal, less nationalistic, and chiefly concerned with the constant theme of "wisdom."

Law and justice are ordered the established created order of God.

David Novak has recently confirmed the role of wisdom as an ordering principle of nature within Jewish thought in his important work Natural Law and Judaism. Novak notes how the account of Cain and Abel in Genesis 3 suggests than humans have a natural inclination to the good and that a violation of this natural awareness is what

Genesis 4 calls "sin" or het. Not only this, but the account presumes that Cain and Abel have a natural inclination to worship God. Already, it would seem, humanity was

171 1 Kings 8:41-43.

172 Cf. Gen 4:3. D. Novak, Natural Law and Judaism (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1998), 32-33. 72 naturally inclined to revere God and not injure his neighbor. Moreover, God tells Cain,

"Is it not so that if you do well, you will be uplifted, but if you do not do well, sin

17 "3 crouches at the door, and unto you is its desire, but you shall master it." God condemns

Cain as a transgressor of the law—a law that Cain knew. So then, what is the "law" in

Genesis? It is certainly not the externally inscribed Ten Commandments carved in stone.

Neither is the six hundred thirteen precepts of the Mosaic Torah. Rather, we have a natural awareness for right and wrong—for pursuing the good and avoiding the evil. The same could be extrapolated from the account of Adam and Eve. In that account, precepts are directly associated with human teleology. Law and ends are united. Beatitude is conditional, even before sin.

Novak also notes how the account of Noah and the Flood presupposes that man naturally knows how to live righteously. This is manifested by the fact that humanity is corrupted through unnatural sex.17 "And the earth was corrupted (va-tishahet) before

17J Genesis 4:7.

Genesis 6:2 reads: "When the sons of God (elohim) saw how desireable (tovot) the daughter so the men were (benot ha'adam) were, they took from them any wife they happened to like for themselves." I do not wish to enter into a theological argument over whether the sons of God or demigods, angels, demons, or human kings. It is most important here to note that it is an "unnatural" sexual activity that provokes the divine wrath against humanity by means of the deluge. For a discussion on the nature of these beings see "Angelology and Demonology" in A.B. du Toit, J.L. de Villiers, I.J. du Plessis et al., vol. 2, The New Testament Milieu, Guide to the New Testament (Halfway House: 73

God and the earth was filled with violence (hamas)." Maimonides suggests that

unnatural sex leads to violence.176 Novak finds further confirmation in Maimonides'

conclusion by noting that only married couples (and divinely paired animals) were

permitted aboard Noah's Ark. Notably, the account of the Flood ends with the remark

177

"for man was made to the image of God." Last of all, Novak cites the destruction of

Sodom as justifiable because the Sodomites perverted nature. The assumption is that

these inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah were guilty of breaking a law, which could be 178 known through the nature of things.

So then, it is incorrect to claim that the Hebrew Scriptures lack any awareness of a

law in accord with nature. The same conclusion is explored by M. Bockmuehl in his

work Jewish Law in Gentile Churches: Halakhah and the Beginning of Christian Public

Ethics.119 Bockmuehl demonstrates that Second Temple Judaism in particular wrestled 1 on

with the idea of universal law and order. Second Temple Judaism, having endured the

dispersion of all Israel into Gentile lands, naturally began to ask how the Gentile nations

Orion Publishers, 1998).

Genesis 6:11.

176 Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed^, 49.

177 Genesis 9:6. The Septuagint renders "image of God" here as ehcovi 9eo0.

17 Novak, Natural Law in Judaism, 39.

Marcus Bockmuehl, Jewish Law in Gentile Churches: Halakhah and the

Beginning of Christian Public Ethics (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000).

180 Bockmuehl, 90. 74 could be acquitted or condemned if they did not have the revealed law of God via Moses.

This certainly seems to be the question addressed by Paul in Romans. The Jewish mind, since it perceives creation as "good," was already inclined to see in nature a principle of goodness. In other words, if God called creation "good" in Genesis, then creation or nature had an inherent moral propensity. Even more, the placement of the holy Sabbath as the last day of the week in Genesis further confirms that God ordered creation toward a telos. The telos is the Sabbath day rest. Creation, then, is ordered to divine rest. Recalling

Aristotle's maxims cited by Aquinas in the introduction, we might easily identify "divine rest" with "beatitude," since Thomas Aquinas identifies supernatural beatitude with

"rest."181

Saint Paul seems to have the natural created order and law in mind in his advanced argument in Romans 5. One of the most intriguing passages is found in verse

13 where Paul teaches that "sin is not counted where there is no law." Paul teaches that the time between Adam and Moses was a unique dispensation.

Therefore as sin came into the world through one man and death through

sin, and so death spread to all men because all men sinned - sin indeed was

in the world before the law was given, but sin is not counted where there is

no law. Yet death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over those whose

sins were not like the transgression of Adam, who was a type of the one

who was to come.

1 Summa theologiae q. 3, a. 8.

Romans 5:12-14. 75

Paul observed that men continued to sin after Adam and that they died accordingly.

Nevertheless, sin was not "counted" because the law had not been given. The reference to

"Moses" in the fourteenth verse reveals that "law" here refers to the Law of Moses. So then is Paul denying the existence of natural law from Adam to Moses?

Paul, as a trained Pharisee, observed a connection to the probation and failure of

Adam with the probation and failure of Israel at the time of Moses. In a sense, Israel recapitulates Adam's failure. The High Priest, the priests, the Levites, and all the

Israelites are "New Adams" with a new temptation and trial. The Tabernacle containing the ark of the covenant and the Ten Commandments is a New Eden. These "New Adams" fail and so God removes them from their New Eden by destroying the Temple in 586

B.C. By sin "counting" or "not counting", Paul refers to probationary periods where covenant fidelity fails. Adam's sin "counted" because it brought sin and death into the world. Sin under the Law of Moses "counted" because it revealed Israel was unable to bring "light to the nations" along with universal devotion to the God of Israel. It is not that men between Adam and Moses were not guilty of their sins because they were without law. On the contrary, God judged men at the flood for their sins because of their guilt. Paul states quite clearly: "For when the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law; these, having not the law, are a law to themselves."183 According to Paul, men and women were culpable of their sins on account of natural law:

Who show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience

Romans 2:14. 76

bearing witness to them: and their thoughts between themselves accusing

or also defending one another.184

Thus, in Romans 5, "sin counting" has to do with the possibility of universal blessing, or in the case of Adam and Israel, universal darkness. Paul is not excusing from sin all of mankind prior to Moses and all the non-Israelite nations. It is quite clear from the second chapter of Romans that he does not hold this position. So then, Romans chapters two and five, when read in continuity, indicate that the natural law argument made in Romans chapter two applies to the situation of humanity from Adam to Moses. This is the conclusion that Thomas Aquinas draws from the biblical data:

Humanity was proud of his knowledge, as though his natural reason could

suffice him for his salvation. And therefore, in order that his pride might

be overcome in this matter, man was left to the guidance of his reason

with the help of a written law; and man was able to learn from experience

that his reason was deficient, since about the time of Abraham man had

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fallen headlong into idolatry and the most shameful vices.

We will return to this passage in Thomas Aquinas in a subsequent chapter. At present, the

184 Romans 2:15.

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 98, a. 6. "Et ideo ut de hoc eius superbia convinceretur permissus est homo regimini suae rationis absque adminiculo legis scriptae, et experimento homo discere potuit quod patiebatur rationis defectum, per hoc quod homines usque ad idololatriam et turpissima vitia circa tempora Abrahae sunt prolapsi." 77 passage demonstrates how Romans 2 and 5 became the chief passages for Christian interpreters of natural law. A.J. Carlyle notes that this passage quickly became the rallying point for fourth and fifth century Christian theologians interested in natural law:

There can be little doubt that Saint Paul's words imply some conception

analogous to the 'natural law' in Cicero, a law written in men's hearts,

recognized by man's reason, a law distinct from the positive law of any

State, or from what Saint Paul recognized as the revealed law of God. It is

in this sense that St Paul's words are taken by the Fathers of the fourth and

fifth centuries like St Hilary of Poitiers, St Ambrose, and St Augustine,

and there seems no reason to doubt the correctness of their

interpretation."186

And thus the Jewish sapiential tradition and Saint Paul's legal application find a full synthesis in the fourth and fifth century. For the sake of brevity, we will examine the most influential interpreter on the matter, Augustine of Hippo.

AUGUSTINE ON NATURE AND TELEOLOGY

The synthesis of Cicero's lex naturae with Paul's "law written in the human heart" culminates in the writings of Augustine of Hippo, but particularly in his work De

1 R7 libero arbitrio voluntatis. Here Augustine engages the debate concerning the freedom of the will as it touches on two schools in opposition to him, namely his past

A.J. Carlyle, A History of Medieval Political Theory in the West, vol. 1, p. 83.

187 For English translation, refer to Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, trans.

Thomas Williams (Indianapolis, IN, Hackett, 1993). 78

Manicheanism and his straggle with Pelagianism. As Matthew Levering notes, Augustine

diverges from Cicero in virtue of the fact that Cicero is merely concerned with how man

i oo

lives in an ordered society. Augustine is concerned with more than that. As a Christian,

Augustine desires to account for man's end with regard to creation, original, sin, and the

scope of free will. Augustine handles a question not raised by Cicero: "Is God the cause

of sin?" The obvious answer is that he is not the cause of sin, yet monotheism

traditionally holds that God is sovereignly omnipotent so that nothing can occur contrary

to His will. Moreover, Augustine's Manichean past required that he show that the

problem of evil can be accounted for without recourse to the existence of essential evil.

In De libero arbitrio voluntatis, Augustine and his interlocutor Evodius discuss

the further complication of contradictory laws that apply to various situations. A

contemporary example might be the right to bear arms protected by the Second

Amendment of the United States Bill of Rights. Yet, bearing arms is a federal offense

within an airport. Positive law, then, retains the conditions of situational applications.

Augustine then appeals to the laws that are universal and do not appeal to the codes of

nations and to particularities at hand. The example he uses is that there could never be a

good society that legislated: "the wicked shall flourish but the good shall be miserable."

Every man recognizes that good should not be punished. Hence, Augustine touches on a

species of law that is immutable and universal. Augustine defines the former as temporal

Matthew Levering, Biblical Natural Law: A Theocentric and Teleological

Approach (New York: Oxford University Pres, 2008), 77.

1 RQ Augustine, De libero arbitrio voluntatis, 1, 1-6. 79 law and the latter as eternal law. Augustine has in mind the saying of Saint Paul, "that every one may receive the proper things of the body, according as he hath done, whether it be good or evil." The Psalms repeatedly identify the God of Israel as the governor of all the earth. As the true governor, it must be that God has a true "eternal law" that does not change with the seasons or situations. Here Augustine drew on both Cicero and

Paul. True human laws must be in accord with the eternal law of God. Augustine sums it up nicely by stating: "Nothing is just and legitimate in the temporal law except that which

192 human beings have derived from the eternal law."

The difficulty is that Augustine has not yet appealed to nature nor has he yet explicitly incorporated human teleology. However, M. Levering notes that Augustine

193 does explicitly state that the "eternal law" is "stamped upon our minds." Why did

JW 2 Corinthians 5:10.

191 One must not confuse Augustine's use of "eternal law" with Thomas Aquinas use of the term "eternal law" in Summa theologiae I-II, q. 91. Augustine speaks of eternal law as the order of providence and also the means by which rational creatures participate in the eternal law. However, Thomas makes a distinction between eternal law proper and the way in which rational creatures participate in it. The latter being "natural law." The distinctions are described in detail in Chapter Three.

192 Augustine, De libero arbitratio voluntatis, 1, 6.

1 Q3

Augustine, De libero arbitratio voluntatis, 1, 6, 15. See. M. Levering, Biblical

Natural Law, 79, n. 31 and his citation and comment on Ernest Fortin's The Birth of

Philosophic Christianity: Studies in Early Christian and Medieval Thought. Ed. J. Brian 80

Augustine not repeat the Pauline language of "a law written on the human heart"? Given the context of De libero arbitrio voluntatis, it seems that Augustine is careful to highlight the order of the soul and the extent and limit of original sin. Thus, Augustine carefully places the stamp of eternal law "upon our minds." This wording accomplishes three goals for Augustine. First, it allows Augustine to address human teleology from a different point of view. Second, it protects Augustine from an anthropology that would entirely eviscerate the soul of an inclination to the good. Third, the eternal law "upon the mind" allows Augustine to address the root of human evil as the privation of original righteousness that is naturally transmitted to every human person. We refer here to original sin. All three goals assume a rational order in the soul of man that should incline to the eternal law stamped upon the mind. Thus, Augustine introduces human teleology only after he establishes law. I might add that Augustine works in the opposite direction of Thomas Aquinas, but that each arrives at the same conclusion. Augustine begins with law and then moves to human inclination and teleology. Thomas Aquinas begins with human teleology (Summa theologiae I-II qq. 1-8) and then moves toward law (I-II q. 90 ff.).

Augustine extrapolates the argument of Paul in Romans 6-7 concerning the war between mind and the flesh and shows that the mind with eternal law is at war with the concupiscence of the bodily desires. Augustine observes humanity in the state of original sin not as having their natures destroyed by sin, but rather as their souls being a state of disorder. Beginning at.De libero arbitratio voluntatis 1,13, Augustine incorporates the

Benestad (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefeld, 1996) 33-4. 81 human will's inclination for happiness in the true good. All desire to be happy. The difference between the just man and the wicked man is that the just man wills happiness rightly and the wicked man wills happiness wrongly. Augustine explains: "the eternal law.. .has established with unshakable firmness that the will is rewarded with happiness or punished with unhappiness depending on its merit." Here is where Augustine introduces his teleology of law. The purpose of natural law is to lead man to happiness or beatitude. This is achieved, says Augustine, through love. So then the end of the law is love and this is precisely the formulation of Christ and Saint Paul: "For all the law is fulfilled in one word: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,"196 and again, "For he that

197 loveth his neighbor hath fulfilled the law."

The difficulty in assessing Augustine's account of "eternal law" as a form of natural law is that Augustine seems to be less focused on nature than Cicero and Paul.

The simple fact that he speaks of "eternal law" and not "natural law" is noteworthy. Does

Augustine reveal a Patristic retreat from the intrinsic natural law accounts of Cicero and

Paul? We should be careful not to make too much of this vocabulary. It is likely that

Augustine is more aware of Cicero's pantheistic account of nature as god itself and thus wishes to distance himself from a naturalistic notion of the divine.198 This purpose would

Augustine, De libero arbitratio voluntatis, 1.14.

Ibid, 1.14. Cited in M. Levering, Biblical Natural Law, 80.

Galatians 5:14.

Romans 13:8.

Cicero, De re publico, 6, 13-17. 82

conform to Augustine's insistence that grace is not of the natural order. Nevertheless,

Augustine confirms Cicero's presupposition that honestum has happiness as its end.

Depending on whether we take Cicero's Dream ofScipio as a literal preternatural

account, the difference lies in Augustine's assertion that the end of man is supernatural.

However, Augustine's distinction of eternal law and temporal law may indicate that he

holds to a twofold account of the human good. Augustine holds that true "temporal law"

reflects "eternal law." So then there is temporal happiness, which reflects eternal

happiness.

In Augustine's De sermone Domini in monte, we discover one of the rare

instances in which Augustine refers to lex naturalis. In the passage, Augustine appeals to

the second chapter of Paul's Epistle to the Romans:

Saint Augustine refers to the Paradise of Adam and Eve as a natural happiness

lacking the supernatural beatitude entailed in seeing the vision of God—though ordered to it. Hence, in the mind of Augustine natural beatitude is not isolated from supernatural beatitude but ordered to it. Augustine describes Paradise this way: "[Adam] was, in every respect, happy; his life, therefore, had alike respect to his body and his soul, since in his

soul a right judgment and a proper government of the affections prevailed, there also life reigned; in his body there was no defect, wherefore he was wholly free from death. His earthly life truly would have been temporal; yet he would have passed into heaven without death, and without injury." Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim 1,

16. As discussed below, Augustine also identifies the Limbus Patrum wherein the Old

Testament Patriarchs lived until the death of Christ as a natural "paradise." 83

For when will they understand that there is no soul so perverse that it is in

no way able to reason, in which God does not speak by means of the

conscience? Indeed who wrote in the hearts of men the natural law

{naturalem legem) if not God? Of which law, the Apostle says, "For

when the gentiles, who have not the law, naturally do that which is of the

law, those not having the law are a law unto themselves. They show the

work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing

witness and their thoughts either accusing them or excusing each other, in

that day in which God shall judge the secrets of men. Therefore in the case

of every rational soul, blinded by desire, which things and reasons,

whatever is true in its reason ought to be attributed not to itself, but to the

very light of truth by which however faint is illumined by its capacity so

that it might sense some truth by reasoning.

200 Augustine, De sermone Domini monti 2, 32. English translation mine. "Nam quando illi valent intellegere nullam esse animam quamvis perversam, quae tamen ullo modo ratiocinari potest, in cuius conscientia non loquatur Deus? Quis enim scripsit in cordibus hominum naturalem legem nisi Deus? De qua lege Apostolus dicit: Cum enim gentes, quae legem non habent, naturaliter quae legis sunt faciunt, hi legem non habentes ipsi sibi sunt lex; qui ostendunt opus legis scriptum in cordibus suis, contestante conscientia illorum et inter se invicem cogitationum accusantium aut etiam excusantium, in die qua iudicabit Deus occulta hominum. Quapropter si omnis anima rationalis etiam cupiditate caecata tamen cum cogitat et ratiocinatur, quidquid in ea ratiocinatione verum 84

This passage reveals that Augustine did employ the term lex naturalis and that he finds it

oriented to lumini veritatis. Moreover, Augustine supports the view later taken by

Thomas Aquinas in Summa theologiae I-II q. 94, a. 6, namely that the natural law can

never be abolished from the heart of man. It is indelibly written in the human heart.

Augustine's treatment here of lex naturalis reflects that which he describes in the

Confessiones, where he speaks again of transgressing the "lex scripta in cordis

hominum " in the well-known passage describing Augustine infamous act of pear

thievery. The same phrase "lex scripta in cordis hominum " occurs again in his

commentary on Psalm 58. In each case it seems to conform to Augustine's notion of lex

aeterna treated in his De libero arbitro voluntatis. In these passages lex is twofold and

oriented to a twofold end, namely an earthly end and a divine end. In all these cases,

"law" is also applied to heathens or those who are not Christians. Augustine assumes here

and in all the anti-Pelagian books, especially in De natura et gratia, that the Christian

receives a higher law through divine revelation.202 Augustine's eternal or natural law is

est non ei tribuendum est sed ipsi lumini veritatis, a quo vel tenuiter pro sui capacitate

illustratur, ut verum aliquid in ratiocinando sentiat." For more the place of this passage in

the thought of Saint Augustine, see Simon Gathercole, "A Conversioin of Augustine," in

Engaging Augustine on Romans, edited Daniel Parte, Eugene TeSelle (Harrisburg, PA:

Continuum International Publishing Group, 2002), 151 ff.

Augustine, Confessiones 2, 4.

202 Augustine, De natura et gratia, 2: "For if he said this about the law, which

only the nation of the Jews received, how much more justly may it be said of the law of 85

clearly distinct from the divine law introduced by Moses and then brought to completion

in Christian revelation.

One might ask how Augustine's account of "eternal law stamped on the mind"

squares with his famous assertion in the Confessions: "You have made us for yourself, O

Lord, and our hearts are restless until they rest in you." Which is primary for

Augustine, the mind or the heart? Should we observe the distinction or should we see the

two accounts as harmonious? The "eternal law stamped on the mind" and the "law

written in the heart" seem to be the same. In each case the law is immutable and above

human laws. If Augustine calls it "eternal law" in one place with regard to the mind and

"natural law" in another place with regard to the heart, the difference should be

accounted for by the contexts. With regard to law in the mind, Augustine is addressing

the technical hierarchy of the soul with regard to original sin. In the "law in the heart"

passages, Augustine is speaking colloquially and less technically.

The position of Augustine regarding a natural end is rather clear. It is well known

that Saint Augustine (unlike Thomas Aquinas ) did not reserve a place of natural

nature, which the whole human race has received, If righteousness come by nature, then

Christ died in vain. If, however, Christ did not die in vain, then human nature cannot by

any means be justified and redeemed from God's most righteous wrath—in a word, from punishment— except by faith and the sacrament of the blood of Christ."

Augustine, Confessiones, 1,1. "Inquietum est cor nostrum, donee requiescat in te."

"The infants are separated from God perpetually in regard to the loss of glory, 86 imperfect beatitude for unbaptized infants, but rather consigned the unbaptized infants to the fires of Gehenna.205 This difficult teaching of Augustine was softened later by Peter

Abelard and by Pope Innocent III who decreed that those who die only original sin on their souls (that is, infants) "will suffer no other pain, whether from material fire or from the worm of conscience, except the pain of being deprived forever of the vision of

707

God." So then, Augustine did certainly deny the existence of a "perfect natural happiness." Does Augustine, then, deny natural beatitude altogether?

Augustine certainly rejects a terminal natural beatitude (e.g. Limbus puerorum), but he does speak of a natural beatitude as ordered to the fulfillment of supernatural beatitude. The claim that the Greek Fathers and Latin Fathers know nothing of "natural

which they do not know, but not in regard to participation in natural goods, which they do know.. .That which they have through nature they possess without pain." De malo q. 5. a.

3. ad 4.

205 Augustine,Depeccat. merit, et remissione,\, 21: "It may therefore be correctly affirmed, that such infants as quit the body without being baptized will be involved in the mildest condemnation of all. That person, therefore, greatly deceives both himself and others, who teaches that they will not be involved in condemnation." See also the sentence of the Council of Carthage (A.D. 418), which condemns the belief in "an intermediate place, or of any place anywhere at all {ullus alicubi locus), in which children who pass out of this life unbaptized live in happiness" (Denzinger 102).

206 Peter Lombard, Sent. II, 33, 5.

207 Pope Innocent III, Corp. Juris, Decret. I. Ill, tit. xlii, c. iii. 87 beatitude" requires a careful nuance. While is is true that Augustine and the Fathers did not dwell on "natural beatitude" in a philosophical way, they did maintain belief in a natural temporary happiness in deference to the article of the Apostles Creed: "descendit ad infernal The sermons of the Fathers contain a vast collection of commentary on the

7 OH descent of Christ ad inferna —espeically in the context of the Paschal Vigil and its liturgical significance for the Old Covenant believers who awaited Christ. These passages explain how the soul of Christ was "in hell" and yet "in paradise" as He had 210 promised the good thief: "Today you shall be with me in paradise.' We refer here to the paradise of Sheol or Hades, which the Fathers held as the abode of the Old Testament saints.

Augustine and the Fathers explain that this "paradise" was a state of natural beatitude in which the Old Testament saints dwelled until the coming of Christ. This state of happiness is identified by Augustine both as "paradise" and "Abraham's bosom."

The ancient Latin forms of the Apostles Creed alternatively read "ad inferos," that is, "to those below." P. Schaff, Creeds of Christendom (New York, Cosimo Books,

2007), p. 21.

Augustine's sermons 219, 221, 233, 263, and 265 are devoted to the theme of

Harrowing of Hell. For more on the Fathers and the Bosom of Abraham, see Irene Rima

Makaryk, About the Harrowing of Hell (Washington, DC: CUA Press, 1989).

210 Luke 23:43. "of||j,spov U£T' euou son ev x& 7tapa5siocp."

211 "Profecto igitur in paradiso atque sinu Abrahae," in Augustine, "Epistle to

Evodius" 164:8. This letter dates to A.D. 414. The reference to "Abraham's bosom" is a 88

Augustine goes so far as to call this state of natural happiness a "remarkable repose"

{memorabilis quietis}, "abode of certain secret rest" {secretae cuiusdam quietis habitatio}, and "that grand felicity" {tantae illius felicitates) away from the fires of

Gehenna.212 Here, human souls, such as Moses and David, enjoyed "grand felicity" without the vision of the divine essence. Elsewhere, Augustine refers to it as, "the place

nil of rest given to men after death." So then, for Augustine, the natural law and the Old

Law found their relative end in a form of natural peace.

No doubt, this "grand felicity" did not set Moses and his companions perfectly at rest and therefore it is not perfect beatitude since Augustine holds that perfect beatitude is supernatural beatitude. Although Augustine refers to it as a "remarkable repose," this must be understood relatively since the soul would not truly be at rest until it is as rest in the vision of God—as he states explicitly in the Confessions. The reason for why

Christians in the New Testament do not go to this relative natural peace is that the obstacle to Heaven has been taken away by the death and resurrection of Christ. It is important to realize, that although Augustine holds to a form of "natural beatitude," he

borrowing of a phrase of Christ to describe the paradise of the Hebrew faithful in a separate abode within Sheol. "And it came to pass that the beggar died and was carried by the angels into Abraham's bosom. And the rich man also died: and he was buried in hell." (Luke 16:22)

212 Augustine, "Epistle to Evodius" 168:7. Here Augustine also refers to this state of natural happiness as "not an integral part of hell."

Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim 1,12. 89 always perceives it as ordered to the supernatural vision of the divine essence. Natural beatitude, for Augustine, expects a consummation in supernatural beatitude. In other words, Moses may have been "happy" in the so-called Limbus Patrum, but he still longed for and awaited the beatific vision of the divine essence.

So then, Augustine's teaching on natural quietude remains that of a temporary state that still awaits a supernatural end. Christian revelation itself indicates that the Old

Testament saints were eagerly awaiting their transferal from "Abraham's bosom" to the supernatural joys of Heaven. As such, Augustine does not hold to a purely "natural end." This helps as we turn to the "restless heart" of Augustine. Is the human heart restless because of an innate appetite for the divine beatitude or is it restless because all natural goods fail to satisy the heart and thereby provoke the human heart to long for the

Sumum Bonum, which men call God? Peter Lombard discerned that Augustine may have taken an extreme view in light of Augustine's pessimistic anthropology. In his Sentences,

Lombard quotes Augustine's De praedestinatione sanctorum: "To be capable of having

See for example the following three passages: "Amen, I say to you, many prophets and just men have desired to see the things that you see, and have not seen them: and to hear the things that you hear and have not heard them" (Matthew 13:17).

"Abraham your father rejoiced that he might see my day: he saw it and was glad" (John

8:56). "Of which salvation the prophets have inquired and diligently searched, who prophesied of the grace to come in you. Searching what or what manner of time the Spirit of Christ in them did signify, when it foretold those sufferings that are in Christ and the glories that should follow. " (1 Peter 1:10-11) 90

faith and charity belongs to man's nature; but to have faith and charity belongs to the

grace of the faithful."215 Lombard makes this observation about Augustine's distinction

regarding natural human capacities for the supernatural:

This is not meant to imply that free will is sufficient to produce faith or

charity, but rather that man's mind has a natural aptitude for faith and

charity. Through the prevenient movement of the grace of God, it believes

and makes an act of charity, which it could not do without grace.216

According to Peter Lombard's interpretation, Augustine's capacity for the supernatural

was merely what would later be called an "obediential potency."217 It is an aptitude, not

an appetite. However, one might counter that this does not necessarily mean that

Augustine taught an elicited desire. Here, Peter Lombard refers explicitly to "movment"

and this is quite different than "desire." No doubt, the movement toward God and the

obtainment of sanctifying grace requires prevenient grace. So then, Augustine surely held

to the notion of obediential potency, but this did not necessarily entail an elicited desire.

In his De trinitate, Augustine makes a similar conclusion about the soul's

capacity. He writes: "Indeed it {the soul} is His image by which it is capable {capax} of

Him and able to be a partaker of Him, since how could such a great good be attained if

215 Augustine, Depraedestinatione sanctorum 5, 10, Patrologia Latina 44, 968.

216 Peter Lombard, Sententiae II, d. 28, ch. 3, n. 5. Patrologia Latina 192, 718.

217 See Chapter Seven for a full treatment of Thomas Aquinas' doctrine of obediential potency. 91 not through being His image.' So then, Augustine insists on the capacity of the soul for union with God, but does not necessarily insist on the accompanying innate appetite for that end. L. Feingold notes that Saint Bernard of Clarivaux confirms this reading of

Augustine inDe Trinitate 14: "God is the author of salvation; free will is only capable of it. No one could give it except God, nor is anything capable of receiving it, except free will.' Yet here, Feingold seems to be pushing this passage too far. "Movement" and

"achievement" of grace do not amount to "desire." Following these interpretations, our

770 so-called "two-enders" would insist that Augustine held that man's "restless heart" is due to two things. First, that man is created with the capacity or obediential potency to be

7 1 R

Augustine, De trinitate 14, VIII, 11. Translation mine. "Eo quippe ipso imago eius est quo eius capax est eiusque esse particeps potest, quod tam magnum bonum nisi per hoc quod imago eius est non potest." 7 1 9

Bernard of Clairvaux, De gratia et libero arbitrio 1, 2. Patrologia Latina 182,

1002b. "Deus auctor salutis est, liberum aribitrium tantum capax. Nee dare ilium nisi

Deus, nee capere valet nisi librum arbitrium."

220 For example Steven A. Long, "On the Loss, and the Recovery, of Nature as a

Theonomic Principle: Reflections on the Nature/Grace Controversy," Nova et Vetera 5

(2007): 133-83. Steven A. Long, "On the Possibility of a Purely Natural End for Man,"

The Thomist 64 (2000), 233. Reinhard Flutter, "Desiderium Naturale Visionis Dei—Est autem duplex hominis beatitudo sive felicitas: Some Observations about Lawrence

Feingold's and John Milbank's Recent Interventions in the Debate over the Natural

Desire to See God," Nova et Vetera 5 (2007): 81-131. 92 conformed to God, but that his nature does not demand it. Secondly, that the heart is restless but only explicitly desires God naturally when incited an elicitation to know the divine essence. This two-ender version of "natural desire" is conditioned by the concepts of capacity and elicitation with regard to the human soul. The obvious response from a

"one-ender" would be that Augustine's statements speak only of capacity and that elicitation is not necessarily implied.

To summarize Augustine's position on natural law and teleology, then, is to conclude that he observed a twofold law and a twofold end, and that his teaching of natural law and natural beatitude are emphatically ordered to the supernatural.

Augustine's natural law pales in comparison to the Divine Law. Moreover, the natural happiness of Augustine's Limbus Patrum is only a stop along the way to the supernatural glories of the beatific vision. The eternal or natural law is universal and immutable in the hearts or minds of men. All men are without excuse before the tribunal of God because each man bears the law within him. Nevertheless, human hearts are "restless until they rest in thee." So then, the natural law written in the human heart is not sufficient to bring

9? 1 about perfect happiness or beatitude. Temporal beatitude reflects the divine beatitude, just as the natural law (and Old Law) reflects the perfect law of charity revealed through

Christ. Here we reconcile the twofold nature of law and beatitude through the principle of

Corresponding to this, the Old Law which is a ritual and liturgical extrapolation of natural law also does not attain to the beatific vision. This is why the Old

Law terminates in the natural beatitude of Abraham's bosom and not in the supernatural vision of the divine essence. 93

typology and fulfillment. We shall return to the theme of typology later in the context of

the importance of the term duplex. Let it suffice here to state that the limits of nature

include a merely knowledge "that" God exists and that this incites wonder. This natural

contemplation reflects the more perfect supernatural contemplation. Similarly, the natural

law reflects the supernatural divine law. Even more, natural beatitude reflects the

supernatural beatitude of humanity. Although not explicit, the relationship between

duplex and legal typology222 are important and retaining and defining the relationship

between nature and teleology.

222 By "legal typology," is meant that the natural law and the Old Law are types of the New Law and find their fulfillment in the New Law as antitype. This conforms to

Augustine's conviction that the Old Testaments saints were "on the way" to the New

Covenant promsises in Christ. 94

CHAPTER THREE: PATRISTIC & MEDIEVAL DEVELOPMENTS IN NATURAL TELEOLOGY

EARLY PATRISTIC ACCOUNTS

The Patristic tradition of natural teleology after Saint Paul is difficult to analyze.

The writings of the Apostolic Fathers are few and those preserved are not concerned with

these questions. However, as we move to the second century, Saint Irenaeus stands out as

an important think with regard to the origin and telos of humanity. Irenaeus, in particular,

is often presented as the founder of the Eastern doctrine of theosis.223 However, Irenaeus'

teleology is greatly dependent on his doctrine of the incarnation of the Divine Logos.

According to Irenaeus, man was made in the image of God, God takes up this image

through the incarnation of Christ, and man is thereby destined to become a partaker of the

divine nature. Irenaeus taught that God "became what we are in order to make us what he

See Henri Rondet who makes this claim in his Gratia Christi (Paris,

Beauchesne et Ses Fils, 1948), 78-79. Meanwhile, Rondet also points to Gregory of

Nyssa and Gregory of Nazianzus as equally as in important for the importance of theosis

in the East. The similar conclusion is made by Gosta Hallonsten, "Theosis in Recent

Research: A Renewal of Interest and a Need for Clarity" in Partakers of the Divine

Nature: History and Development of Deification, edited by Michael J. Christensen and

Jeffrey A. Wittung (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), p. 285. 95

00 A is himself This concept was made well-known by Saint Athanasius in the fourth century: "God became man so that men might become gods."225 Although this teaching became more pronounced in the East than in the West, Saint Augustine taught the same:

"To make human beings gods, He was made man who was God."226 Here then, the telos of man is linked with the incarnation of Christ who came to share our nature. Teleology is not explicitly centered on the inherent inclinations of human nature, but is centered on the divine intervention of God in human history. The anthropology of Christ determines the anthropology of mankind.

This emphasis on the incarnation led the Eastern tradition to approach law and human teleology differently than the Western tradtion. In the West, legal categories 001 prevailed; whereas in the East, the model of deification prevailed. Moreover, the

Latin manuscripts read: "Factus est quod sumus nos, uti nos perficeret quod et ipse." Irenaeus of Lyons, Adversus haereses, Preface to Book 5.

225 "AuTOg yap evrrvGpdmiaev, tva r\\idq 0£OJioiriOd)|j,ev." Athanasius, De incarnatione

Verbi, 54. Patrologia Graeca, 25, 192 B

226 Augustine, Sermo 192, 1.

001

This is not to say that theosis or deification was denied or neglected in Western

Christianity. Certainly, Augustine articulated deification in Confessions, Book 7, Chapter

10, as well as in the sermon mentioned in the previous footnote. The theme of deification is presented without controversy in the works of Peter Lombard, Alexander of Hales,

Albert the Great, St. Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure. Moreover, the Carmelite tradition preserves a strong mystical theology based on union with God. See John of 96

Eastern tradition tended to give a greater emphsis to the ontological transcendence of

God. As early as John Chrysostom, we find statements such as the following: "No man hath seen God at any time. Not prophets only, but neither angels nor archangels have seen God. For how can a creature see what is increatable?"228 It seems that Chrysostom denied that man could see God at all on account of his status as a creature. The Pseudo-

Areopagite also claims, "Neither is there sense, nor image, nor opinion, nor reason, nor knowledge of Him."229 Prior to the statement of above, the Areopagite writes: "He is universally to all incomprehensible," indicating that this statement does not refer to the blessed in particular. This interpretation of the Areopagite was advanced by Maximus the

Confessor through the Orthodox insistence on "two wills" in Christ and the deification of

Avila's fifth chapter of Ascent of Mount Carmel where the human soul in union with God

"appears to be God himself."

228 John Chrysostom, Horn. 11 in Joan., 1:18. For a thorough treatment of Greek tendency toward a super-transcendent theology and the "essence-energies" distinction, see John Meyendorff s Byzantine Theology: Historical Trends and Doctrinal Themes

(New York: Fordham University Press, 1987). Thomas Aquinas shows that this quote in context refers to the vision of the Son who is in the bosom of the Father. See Suppl. Q.

92, a. l,ad. 1.

Dionysius the Areopagite, Divina Nomina, 1. For an interpretation that favors the strict reading of Dionysius that denies a vision of the divine essence, see Vladimir

Lossky's Vision of God (New York: St Vladimir's Press, 1997), 123. 97

230 the human will as the goal of human salvation. There may in fact be a distinction here between a vision of comprehension and a vision of union. Regardless, Eastern theologians such as J. Meyendorff have claimed that the essence of God shall not be seen by the blessed, but that they will rather experience God by means of uncreated 231 energies.

So then, Greek thought has tended to posit man's final end as something other than the essence of God.232 The teleological consequences are grave. It is no surprise that

For an analysis of the way in which Maximus reads the Areopagite, see Paul

Rorem's Pseudo-Dionysius: A commentary on the texts and an introduction to their influence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) pp. 121-131. The same subject is addressed in the opening essay of Jaroslav Pelikan to Maximus the Confessor: Selected

Writings (New York: Paulist Press, 1985).

See John Meyendorff s Byzantine Theology: Historical Trends and Doctrinal

Themes (New York: Fordham University Press, 1987).

Kallistos Ware, Act out of Stillness: The Influence of Fourteenth-Century

Hesychasm on Byzantine and Slav Civilization. Ed. Daniel J. Sahas (Toronto: The

Hellenic Canadian Association of Constantinople and the Thessalonikean Society of

Metro Toronto, 1995). John Meyendorff. Byzantine Theology: Historical Trends and

Doctrinal Themes. Second Edition (New York: Fordham University Press, 1987). For an alternate view, which attempts to reconcile the Greek and Latin positions on teleology, see Michael J.Christensen, Jeffery A. Wittung's Partakers of the Divine Nature

(Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses 2007). 98

Byzantine theology did not form along the lines of law, but instead developed as a

hierarchy of ontological participation. This system is most thoroughly articulated in the

Areopagite's account of the ecclesiastical hierarchy of laity, clergy, and the sacraments,

being elevated by the celestial hierarchy.233 Ultimately, the process of theosis or henosis

is apophatic. Consequently, the Westerner looks in vain in early or medieval Byzantine

sources for mention of natural law or natural inclinations to beatitude. Moreover, the

duplex arrangement of nature and supernature is difficult to unearth in Greek sources.

Instead, the natural, by virtue of the Incarnation of the Logos, is divinized and

supematuralized. The incarnation brings about a cosmic desire for beatitude. This may be

the reason why Greek soteriology speaks primarily of divinization and union without the

familiar Latin emphasis on law, justice, and covenant. To summarize, Eastern theology

considers the natural as engulfed by the supernatural in virtue of Christ as the New Adam

of a New Creation. As such, all created things have a desire for the supernatural.

Ironically, however, the supernatural telos in Greek theology is not the vision of the

Divine Essence (as in Latin theology), but instead the theophany produced by God's

energies. The Augustinian goal of the vision of God does not find traction in the

Byzantine quest for ultimate transcendence.234

See especially, the Areopagite's Caelestis hierarchia and Ecclesiastica

hierarchia.

According to Gianmarco Stancato, Thomas Aquinas was able to "assimilate

and synthetically reconsistute" the Aristotelian tradition with the Biblical and Dionysian tradition. This was accomplished by making the umoved mover also the prime substance, 99

MEDIEVAL ACCOUNTS OF LAW AND TELEOLOGY

This Greek tradition of "extreme transcendence" did influence the West through

ninth century Latin translations of John Scotus Eriugena, who himself claimed,

"Therefore, we shall not see God Himself through Himself, for neither do the angels see

Him, for this is impossible for any creature. Indeed, as the Apostles says, 'He...dwells in

inapproachable light.' However, he shall contemplate certain theophanies made by Him

in us."235 While Eriugena's thought was popular, it certainly did not become the mainstay

of Western theology thanks to preventative force of Augustine's writings. The chief

defender of Augustine's view was Hugh of St. Victor, who wrote, "Let them stop putting

a fence between us and our God with these images of their invention. For since nothing

can satisfy us except God Himself, neither can we come to rest outside of Him.' Hugh,

in this commentary on Dionysius, seems to be confronting the very ideas set forth by

something not imagined by Aristotle, but proposed by Thomas. Thomas accomplishes an

incorporpation of not only Dionysius and Scripture, but also Aristotle. "Ces schemas

philosophiques sont done assimiles et recomposes synthetiquement par Thomas, mais ce

qui conduit 1'Aquinate e'est la foi chretienne avec ses concepts bibliques de creation et

redemption." In Gianmarco Stancato's Le concept de desir dans I'oeuvre de Thomas de

'Aquin (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 2011), p. 166.

John Scotus Eriugena, De divisione naturae 1.9, Patrologia Latina 122, 448b-

c. Cited by Feingold, 27, n. 1.

Hugh of St. Victor. Commentariorum in Hierarchiam coelestem S. Dionysii

Areopagitae, Bk. 2, Patrologia Latina 175, 955b-c. Cited in Feingold, The Natural Desire

to See God, 28-29. 100

Dionysius and Eriugena.

Despite Hugh of St. Victor's opposition, the tradition of extreme transcendence did find inroads into Latin theology. Notably, the Dominicans masters such as Hugh St.

Cher and Guerric of St. Quentin at the University of Paris in the 1230's were taking

Eriugena's thesis to it logical extremes by doubting the Augustinian hope in the supernatural vision of God's essence. Eventually the bishop of Paris, William of

Auvergne intervened and condemned this "extreme transcendence" position in 1241. The anathematized statement read, "Neither man nor angel is able to see the divine essence in itself."238 The Dominican position was then reformed by Albert the Great and then finessed by his greatest student, Thomas Aquinas.

EARLY SCHOLASTICISM ON LAW AND BEATITUDE

The condemnation of the Eriugenan "essentia invisibilis" doctrine in 1241 brought the debate to an end but required a defense of the Augustinian position regarding man's vocation to the supernatural end of the beatific vision. We find Thomas Aquinas entering the debate as early as the 1250s. In the first half of this decade, Thomas provided an Augustinian answer to the possibility of the beatific vision in his Scripta super libros

Sententiarum. A few years later, we find the same defense in Thomas' De veritate. In the latter work, Thomas dedicates the eighth question to the topic and leads with the question

L. Feingold, The Natural Desire to See God, p. 28, n. 3.

238 See J.-P. Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas, vol. 2, Spiritual Master (Washington,

DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2003), 27-31. Cited in Feingold, 28. 101

2^9

whether angels are able to see the essence of God. Thomas sets forth fifteen counter

arguments against the Augustinian position, the majority of which derive from

Chrysostom and Dionysian corpus. Thomas' sed contra is rooted in the language of

Scripture where "seeing God" is promised. In particular, he appeals to Matthew 18:10:

"Angeli eorum semper vident faciem Patris. " Thomas claims that the essentia invisibilis

position is "haeretica," since it is contrary to Scripture and Augustine, but he goes one

step further. Thomas provides a Neoplatonic argument stating that, "ultimate perfection

of a certain thing occurs when it reaches {pertingit} its own first principle." Thomas is

able answer the Neo-Platonists with an even better Neo-Platonic reply. The second article 242

then asks whether angels or men are able to comprehend the essence of God. Thomas

cites Ambrose and Augustine to show that while the divine essence may be seen, it

cannot be comprehended. This distinction between seeing and comprehension is the

means by which Thomas reconciles the various biblical and Patristic passages—

especially those of the Areopagite. Moreover, Thomas provides a thorough examination

of human nature and human inclinations in order to position his argument regarding

humanity's natural desire for the supernatural beatitude.

De veritate, q. 8, a. 1. "utrum Angeli videant Deum per essentiam."

De veritate, q. 8 a. 1, corpus.

241 "quia ultima perfectio cuiuslibet rei est, quando pertingit ad suum principium.'

Ibid.

242 "utrum intellectus Angeli vel hominis beati essentiam divinam comprehendat.'

De veritate q. 8, a. 2. 102

AQUINAS ON NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL INCLINATIONS243

Aquinas defined law as a precept of reason, directed to the common good by a

person or persons governing a community, and rightfully promulgated. He also

specified five kinds of law: eternal law, natural law, human law, divine law, and the law

of sin. Eternal law is primary and it is the ratio by which God governs the universe.

Eternal law is thus the principle of "divine providence" elaborated in the Prima Pars.

243 For recent scholarship on Natural Law and Natural Inclinations, see Fulvio Di

Blasi, God and the Natural Law: A Rereading of Thomas Aquinas. South Bend, IN: St.

Augustine's Press, 2006. The definitive article by Germain Grisez, "The First Principle

of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the Summa Theologiae, 1-2, Question 94, Article

2" in Natural Law Forum 10 (1965): 168-201. Also Pamela M. Hall, Narrative and the

Natural Law: An Interpretation of Thomistic Ethics. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of

Notre Dame, 1994. Kossel, Clifford G. "Natural Law and Human Law (la Iae, qq. 90-

97)." in The Ethics of Aquinas. Edited by Stephen J. Pope. Washington, D.C.:

Georgetown University Press, 2002. Levering, Matthew. "Natural Law and Natural

Inclinations." The Thomist 70 (2006): 155-201. Lisska, Anthony J. Aquinas's Theory of

Natural Law: An Analytic Reconstruction. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. Maritain,

Jacques. Natural Law: Reflections on Theory and Practice. Edited by William Sweet.

South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, 2001. R. Hittinger, "Theology and Natural Law

Theory." Communio 17 (1990). Rhonheimer, Martin. "The Cognitive Structure of the

Natural Law and the Truth of Subjectivity." The Thomist 67 (2003): 1-44.

244 Summa theologiae I-II, q. 90, a. 1-4.

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 91, a. 1, resp. 103

Eternal law extends to rational creatures through the three participating forms of law: natural law, human law, and divine law.246 Aquinas' discussion of eternal law and human nature hearkens back to the opening question of Prima Secundae concerning the last end of man. The discussion of the natural law and divine law in the Prima Secundae is the climatic resolution of Aquinas' argument that man has but one final end: "Therefore, just as of all men there is naturally one last end, so the will of an individual man must be fixed on one last end."247 Natural law accounts for how man proceeds "naturally" to his last end. As will become apparent, divine law provides the supernatural elevation of natural law and functions as the auxilium legis naturalis ,248

Natural law is the means by which rational creatures participate in eternal law.

"Now it is evident, granted that the world is ruled by Divine Providence, as was stated in the Prima Pars250 that the whole community of the universe is governed by Divine

Reason.' Eternal law governs non-rational creatures in so far as they are moved by divine providence. Eternal law governs rational creatures through their self-discovery of

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 93, a. 3, resp.

247 Summa theologiae I-II, q. 1, a. 5.

248 Summa contra Gentiles, III, cap. 117, n. 6.

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 91, a. 2, resp. "et talis participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura 'lex naturalis' dicitur."

250

Summa theologiae I, q. 22, aa. 1-2.

251 Summa theologiae I-II, q. 91, a. 1, resp. You can almost hear Cicero's voice echoing in this passage. the precepts of natural law since they possess an intellect and will that enable them to live

according to reason and thereby participate in the eternal law of God.252 Natural

OCT

inclinations passively participate in the eternal law, per modum principii motivi.

With regard to natural law's participation in the eternal law, Martin Rhonheimer

describes a "nature/reason dichotomy" consisting in two competing notions of natural

law. Citing Josef Fuchs' distinctions, Rhonheimer describes these "two series" of

formulations as an "ontological" and an "noetic."255 The ontological articulation is

objective and defines natural law as the normative ordering of human nature. The noetic

articulation views natural law as residing in human reason. The former is alleged to be a

Stoic articulation of natural law, and the latter understanding is assumed to be the

authentically Thomistic understanding of natural law.

In his "Natural Law and Natural Inclinations," Matthew Levering criticized

Rhonheimer's interpretation of Aquinas' doctrine of natural law, arguing that the

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 93, a. 5, resp.

253 Summa theologiae I-II, q. 93, a. 6.

Martin Rhonheimer, "The Cognitive Structure of the Natural Law and the

Truth of Subjectivity," The Thomist 67 (2003), 18.

255 Josef Fuchs, Natural Law: A Theological Investigation, trans. H. Reckter and

J. Dowling (New York, 1965; original German edition 1955).

256 The Stoic articulation would confirm to what Cicero calls: "recta ratio naturae congruens." See Cicero, De republica 3, 22, 33. 105

distinction between ontological and noetic is incorrect and unhelpful. Whereas

Rhonheimer writes that the human good is "constituted and formulated only in the intellectual acts themselves,' Levering notes that Aquinas grounds the human good in natural inclinations: "Practical reason does not need to 'constitute' or 'establish' it, because, as Cicero already recognized, it is already there in our (created) nature, moving

our natural inclinations.' The ontological and noetic distinctions are for Aquinas not an

"either/or" predicament but a synthesis of "both/and." Natural law has both an

"ontological" and "epistemological" foundation rooted in natural inclinations. Jacques

Maritain explained, "whenever human reason intervenes as author, we are in the general domain of the positive law.' Whereas, natural law is known through inclination, human law is known through the conceptual exercise of human reason. In consequence of this distinction, natural law cannot be merely understood as a noetic rationalization of moral precepts.

Natural law, says Thomas, orients humanity, "to its due act and end through

For a critical analysis of Rhonheimer's position, see Matthew Levering,

"Natural Law and Natural Inclinations: Rhonheimer, Pinckaers, McAleer," The Thomist

70(2006), 155-201.

258 Rhonheimer (2003), 28.

259 Levering (2006), 197.

Jacques Maritain, Natural Law: Reflections on Theory and Practice, ed.

William Sweet (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, 2001), 48.

261 Maritain (2001), 48. which it has a natural inclination." Thomas understands natural law primarily as inclinations that direct rational creatures to their own good according to their nature.

Thus, natural law is for Thomas not a rule of codes and regulations but an orientation to a goal.263 Natural law is not primarily a set of immutable imperatives, such as "Thou shalt not kill." Rather, natural law consists of the inclinations in rational creatures as these creatures press on to their divinely ordered goal, which is our good.

THOMAS AQUINAS ON SYNDERESIS

Thomas begins his first article of Question 94 by examining the genus of natural law. Thomas explains that natural law is not a habit essentially. The first objection of

Question 94, a. 1 seeks to identify natural law as a power, habit, or passion. The proposed solution is that natural law is itself a habit. Thomas denies that natural law is a habit,

"since a habit is that by which we act, a law cannot be a habit properly and essentially." The second objection of Question 94, a. 1 cites "Basil the Great' who

262 Summa theologiae I-II, q. 91, a. 2, resp. "per quom habet naturalem inclinationem ad debitum actum et finem."

263 See Pamela M. Hall, Narrative and the Natural Law: An Interpretation of

Thomistic Ethics (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 1994), p. 28, who notes that Thomas's concept of natural is "first in terms of inclinationes, ways of being directed to our end, and not in terms of any set of rules".

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 94, a. 1, s. c.

265 Thomas wrongly cites Saint Basil the Great when the source is, in fact, Saint

John Damascene, Orthodox Faith 4, 22. identifies synderesis as the law of the mind. Previously, Thomas established that synderesis is a habit of the intellect: "Synderesis is not a power but a habit; though some held that it is a power higher than reason; while others said that it is reason itself, not as reason, but as a nature."266 Since synderesis is a habit, and "Basil" identifies synderesis with natural law, it would seem that natural law is a habit. Thomas clarifies this difficulty by explaining that natural law is not a habit, but that natural law is held habitually by synderesis. "Synderesis is said to be the law of the mind, because it is a habit containing the precepts of the natural law." If natural law were a habit, then it would be a quality of the soul. Yet, habits of the soul can be lost, whereas natural law cannot be removed from the soul. Consequently, if natural law were a habit, Thomas' teaching on the universality of natural law would fail.

Having established that natural law is not a habit, but held habitually by synderesis, Thomas logically moves to the question as to whether natural law contains one or many precepts. Since the natural law is held habitually by practical reason, it would seem that the precepts of natural law are one, just as the intellectual power is one.

Thomas denies this by demonstrating that the precepts can be specified. Thomas accomplishes this by specifying the three kinds of inclinations of the soul with the lower inclinations participating in the higher inclinations. The remaining articles of Question 94

(aa. 3-6) follow from the conclusion of Article Two. Article Three examines the plurality

Summa theologiae I, q. 79, a. 12, resp.

Summa theologiae II, q. 94, a. 1, ad. 2.

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 94, a. 6. 108 of precepts in natural law in relation to the habits of virtue, since article two firmly established that natural law pertains to inclination according to nature—a conclusion related to the rationality of virtues. Article Four assumes the conclusion of article two by stating that natural law is uniform in all men in the general principles, because all men are naturally inclined according to their common nature. Nevertheless, men do differ concerning the conclusions they draw from the primary principles. Article Five builds on the plurality of precepts established by Article Two in stating that precepts may be added, but not subtracted from natural law. Article six explains that the general precepts of natural law cannot be blotted from the heart of man, but the secondary precepts can be blotted from the heart. This distinction preserves the often-repeated conclusion of q. 94, a. 2 that natural law belongs to everything to which a man is inclined by nature.

According to Thomas, abolishing the natural law from the heart of man is tantamount to man losing his nature. This is clearly impossible. Based on the conclusion of Article

Two, natural law in its primary principles cannot be blotted from the heart of man.

AQUINAS ON THE PRACTICAL INTELLECT

Following Aristotle, Aquinas distinguishes in Prima Pars between the speculative intellect and the practical intellect.269 This distinction becomes important as Thomas examines the precepts of natural law. The foundation of Thomas' argument is that there are self-evident (per se notd) propositions that lay the foundations of both speculative and practical reason.

269 Summa theologiae I, q. 79, a. 11.

270 Clifford G. Kossel, S.J. "Natural Law and Human Law (la Iae, qq. 90-97)" in Aquinas states, "the precepts of the natural law are to the practical reason, what the first principles of demonstrations are to the speculative reason."271 The first principles of demonstration relate to the speculative intellect. This means that the speculative intellect naturally recognizes certain axiomatic principles. For example, one cannot simultaneously affirm and deny a proposition (the law of non-contradiction). The precepts of natural law, on the other hand, relate to the particulars of the practical intellect. This means that the practical intellect naturally recognizes certain human goods in accordance with human inclinations. The law of non-contradiction pertains to the speculative intellect; the natural law pertains to the practical intellect. The practical intellect discerns the good by observing man's natural inclinations. As P.M. Hall explains, Thomas roots his concept of natural law "first in terms of inclinationes, ways of being directed to our end, and not in terms of any set of rules."272

Thomas describes what he means by self-evident propositions in Question 94, a.

2. Self-evident propositions must meet two conditions:

1st. its predicate must be contained in the notion of the subject

2nd. the person must know the definition of the subject

The Ethics of Aquinas, Stephen J. Pope, ed. (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University

Press, 2002), 172.

271 Summa theologiae I-II, q. 94, a. 2, resp. "praecepta legis naturae hoc modo se habent ad rationem practicam, sicut principia prima demonstrationum se habent ad rationem speculativam."

272 Hall (1994), 28. 110

For example: "Man is rational." This is a self-evident statement because the subject,

"man" denotes a "rational animal;" and the predicate "is rational" clearly pertains to the

97^

subject. This does not mean that Aquinas believes that these precepts are somehow

"innate" in the strict sense. As way of clarification, Aquinas does not teach that we are

born with the "Ten Commandments" pre-installed within our souls. Following Aristotle, 974

Thomas holds that all human knowledge begins in the senses.

A second clarification is also necessary. A human agent need not be able to

articulate the natural law in order to know its precepts. As with the speculative intellect,

an illiterate man can know that a whole is greater than any part of it, even though he may

have never contemplated or articulated this principle. The same is true of the precepts of

the natural law. For example, a seven-year-old child may have never articulated the

precept "Do not steal" and yet he will still recognize the injustice of kidnapping. When

someone objects to a human act by exclaiming, "Well that is just wrong!" he is

recognizing a precept of the natural law, but without proper articulation. Even this vague

case would qualify for Aquinas as "knowledge" of the precepts of the natural law.

A third clarification might also be necessary to avoid confusion. Human beings are not

required to formulate a thorough teleology of human life in order to possess knowledge

of natural law. Some readers misunderstand Aquinas' natural law theory precisely at this

1" Kossel (2002), 173.

974

Summa theologiae I, q. 78, a. 4, ad 4. "Although the operation of the intellect

has its origin in the senses: yet, in the thing apprehended through the senses, the intellect knows many things which the senses cannot perceive." Ill point. Even if a person denied a final purpose or end of human life, that person would still be able to discern that murder is wrong.

975

Thus, human beings are not born with a list of rules inscribed in our souls.

Rather, the natural law is attained through reflection on sensation, which means that knowledge of the natural law requires experience. Our knowledge of the precepts of natural law is progressive. In fact, one might live one hundred years and not fully articulate the precepts of natural law. C. G. Kossel explains: "And it is possible that one might never adequately formulate them; however, one knows well enough to employ them in rational discourse and in practical life."276

CONNATURALITY: ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL ELEMENTS

The genuine natural law doctrine of Thomas Aquinas expresses both how human nature is ordered by inclinations and that natural law is known through inclinations. These two

277 distinctions are the "ontological and epistemological elements of natural law."

Regarding the epistemological element, the term connaturality or congeniality is used to

This is likely the most misunderstood element of Thomas' natural law theory.

Although Saint Paul writes that the law of nature is "written on the heart," Thomas

Aquinas does not envision natural law as a list of precepts inscribed on the heart like the

Tem Commandments were inscribed on the tablets of stone. Thomas understands Paul's words derivatively. Moral standards are derived from the inclinations. Only in this way can we say that the natural law is written on the human heart.

276 Kossel (2002), 173.

277Maritain(2001),25. 112 denote that natural law is "known naturally."

Thomas Aquinas writes that there are two ways to ascertain whether something pertains to a moral virtue. First, one can possess the truth cognitively. The moral philosopher may have memorized all that pertains to the virtues. Yet, he would not be a virtuous man. He knows them cognitively, but he does not know them as guiding his actions. Secondly, a person may not be an advanced moral theologian, but he may have grown in the virtues through right living. In the latter case, he has become "co-natured" with virtue. He acts rightly by conforming to the right inclinations of his nature. Thus, this man knows the virtues connaturally even if he does not fully know them cognitively.

This idea of connatural knowledge highlights the experiential aspect of natural law. Man lives in time. Consequently, he develops essential human inclinations. Accidental, vicious habits may develop as well. A human does not make moral acts based on facts alone—he is guided by the experienced contours of his soul. J. Maritain summarizes Aquinas' process of action and inclination:

When a man makes a free decision, he takes into account, not only all that

he possesses of moral science and factual information, and which is

manifested to him in concepts and notions, but also all the secret elements

of evaluation which depend on what he is, and which are known to him

through inclination, through his own actual propensities and his own

virtues, if he has any.

Summa theologiae II-II, q. 45, a. 2.

Maritain (2001), 19-20. 113

While discursive reasoning may play a part in ethical judgments, the primary principles of natural law are not known through discursive reason. Practical reason grasps that

"good is to be done and pursued" connaturally.

Natural law is goal oriented. As Thomas states: "whatever is a means of preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law.' In

Question 94 a. 2, Thomas enumerates the natural inclinations. These are particular goods serving as a means to an end and not the final good, which is God himself.

o NUTRITIVE INCLINATIONS

Inclinations toward life (e.g. nourishment, avoiding obstacles to life).281

These man shares with all organisms.

o SENSITIVE INCLINATIONS

These are inclinations to sensory experiences for the preservation of the

species (e.g. sexual intercourse, education of offspring). These man shares

with the animals.

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 94, a. 2, resp. "Et secundum hanc inclinationem, pertinent ad legem naturalem ea per quae vita hominis conservatur, et contrarium impeditur."

281 Thomas extends "self-preservation" to all substances as he claries in the article q. 94, a. 2: "Because in man there is first of all an inclination to good in accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances: inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according to its nature." 114

o INTELLECTIVE INCLINATIONS

These are inclinations to good according to the nature of human reason

(e.g. to understand the truth, to live in society). These inclinations are

proper to man as a rational animal.

Aquinas identifies four goods from these three natural inclinations: 1) the perceived good

of personal survival; 2) the perceived good to reproduce for the survival of the human

race; 3) the perceived good to live in society; and 4) the perceived good to seek and know

the truth. The third set of intellective inclinations to the good pertains to human acts since

they are informed by reason. Man, according to Thomas, naturally inclines to reason, and

thus reasonable objects, that is to say, good objects. The intellective appetite naturally

inclines to these goods as objects. Therefore, it acts accordingly since actions seek a

desired object. The contraries are evils. The inclinations to seek good objects and avoid

their contraries begin to trace out the primary principles of the natural law. This distinction answers Aquinas' question as to whether there is one or several precepts of the natural law. Human inclinations are plural, and so the precepts of the natural law are plural. Consequently, there are many precepts of the natural law in order to correspond to the many goods.

-jon

The form of human beings is the soul, in which Thomas distinguished the intellective and appetitive powers.283 The rational powers act for certain objects.

Reversing this order, we can examine the objects and come to know their acts. By the

Summa theologiae I, q. 76, aa. 1, 3-4.

Summa theologiae I, q. 79, a. 1. 115 acts we know the powers and by the powers we know the nature. Since growth occurs through potentiality, Thomas recognizes the capacity for natural law in the soul.

The object of the intellective appetite is "the good." Since action is logically prior to the object, the rational agent must ask, "What shall I do to attain the good?" This is the origin of cognitive recognition of natural law in the agent. The answer to the question concerning how acts might attain a good is the condition for the first precept of the natural law. Just as the principle of non-contradiction structures the intellective operations of the soul, so the principle of "good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided"284 structures the proper voluntary operations of the soul. Thomas concludes:

"All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this, so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided."285 Germain Grisez has brought attention to a tendency to see the primary precepts of the natural law as imperatives. Aquinas does not say the principle of natural law is "do good and do not do evil."286 Rather he says, "good

TOT is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided.' In Latin, Thomas does not

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 94, a. 2. "Hoc est ergo primum praeceptum legis, quod bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum."

285

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 94, a. 2, resp.

286 This mistake is made by Jacques Maritain in his Man and the State (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1951) p. 98 where he quotes the first principle of natural as

'Do good and avoid evil.' Germain Grisez, "The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on 116

288 employ the imperative, but rather the gerundive. All human acts are a means to this final end of human life—to attain the good. By way of clarification, the rational appetite for the object of the good relies on the existence of natural inclinations. Natural law describes these inclinations.

As the principle of non-contradiction orders the speculative intellect, so the first principle of natural law orders the practical intellect. Thomas articulates the principle in this way: "Hoc est ergo primum praeceptum legis, quod bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum." This should not be abridged to read: "Do good. Do not do evil, or "Facite bonum. Non facite malum." The fundamental principle of natural law is not an imperative. As J. Lehrberger succinctly states: "[L]aw in its very essence is rational instruction or knowledge; it is a dictate of practical wisdom guiding its subjects to the good and away from evil."289 The philosophical insight of Thomas Aquinas's

the Summa Theologiae, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2," Natural Law Forum 10 (1965), p. 109. The position of Grisez and other proponents of the New Natural Law theory are discussed below in separate section.

288 The gerundive in Latin is a verbal adjective and thus not rightly an imperitive.

As in the famous line of Cato the Elder: "Ceterum autem censeo, Carthaginem esse defendant." The gerundive indicates that a noun deserves to be the object of an action.

See Joseph Henry Allen, James Bradstreet Greenough's Allen and Greenough's New

Latin Grammar (Boston: Ginn & Company, 1903).

289 As cited above, Germain Grisez discusses this at length in his "The First

Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the Summa Theologiae, 1-2, Question 117 natural law would be obscured by collapsing the gerundives into simple imperatives and by omitting "to be pursued" in Thomas' articulation of the fundamental principle of natural law. The gerundives "faciendum," "prosequendum," and "vitandum" denote

"what-is-to-be"—not commandments. They imply potentiality. The pursuit of the good implies the inclinations of human nature. Thomas escapes "moralism" precisely because he does not base natural law on a fundamental imperative. The dynamic anthropology of Thomas presupposes that the human nature is inclined to an end. The rational nature is not static and cannot be static.

THE INSUFFICIENCY OF NATURAL LAW FOR BEATITUDE

Aquinas orders his treatment of law in qq. 90-114 by beginning with God and then ordering all things back to God. First, Thomas establishes the causal definition of law (q.

90) along with the species of law (q. 91) and the propria of law (q. 92). God orders all things by eternal law (q. 93). We find that natural law is insufficient in leading man toward his divine goal (q. 94; q. 98, a. 6). The revelation of divine law and the gift of grace conferred by the New Law orders man back to God.

Natural law (q. 94), as it participates in eternal law, also orients rational creatures toward God. However, as natural law orients humanity to God it fails to actually escort

94, Article 2" in Natural Law Forum 10 (1965): 168-201.

290 For a treatment of how Thomas avoids voluntarism, see J. Lehrberger's

"Crime without Punishment: Thomistic Natural Law and the Problem of Sanctions," Law and Philosophy: The Practice of Theory, eds. John A. Murley, et al. (Athens, Ohio: Ohio

University Press, 1992): 237-57, 249. 118

the natural man into divine beatitude. Rather, natural law instructs humanity to discover

that our natural powers cannot bring us to our ordered goal of beatitude. According to

Aquinas, there are four reasons why natural law is inherently insufficient for attaining

human beatitude:

i. Humanity is ordained toward eternal beatitude {adfinem beatitudinis

aeternae), but this goal is out of proportion with natural resources,

ii. Natural human judgment is untrustworthy, notably of contingent and

particular issues, so that various parties arrive at differing moral

conclusion and contradictory laws,

iii. Natural human judgment cannot monitor or enforce inward

dispositions but only outward and observable behavior,

iv. Natural law and human law are incapable of judging and punishing all

, • 291

wrongdoing.

Natural law's inability to perfectly order mankind to God reveals that it must be perfected

by grace so that mankind might participate in its divinely appointed goal of beatitude.

Natural law directs humanity toward the created gifts of the Creator, but does not actually

lead to one's union with God. Natural law demonstrates that another law is needed: a

divinely revealed law.

Thomas further explains that natural law is insufficient on account of the last kind

of law listed in the Summa theologiae, namely the law of lust or lex fomitis. The lex fomitis is the law of concupiscence that disorders the inclinationes of natural law so that

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 91, a. 4, resp. 119

292 our passions act out of accordance with our reason. According to Aquinas, humanity acquired this law of lust through original sin. Consequently, our natural powers are not only incapable of escorting us to eternal beatitude, but the law of lust also leads us to regard irrational objects as desirable.

Thomas teaches that natural law is both realized and obscured in the history of humanity. Natural law cannot be discovered without the narrative of human history.

Moreover, natural law can also be obscured in the narrative of human history. One must not pass over Thomas' delicate treatment of natural law as it relates to divine law

(particularly the Old Law). According to Thomas, the human race repeatedly rebelled against the inclinationes of natural law so that mankind did not progress in its discovery of natural law, but actually regressed. Human sin accounts for this regression. Sin is the rejection of natural law, in the sense that it is contrary to right reason. The rejection of natural law is fundamentally a rejection of the one who promulgated natural law- God.

Thomas is very specific as to how this collective regression from natural law exhibited itself:

[Mankind] was proud of his knowledge, as though his natural reason could

suffice him for his salvation. And therefore, in order that his pride might

be overcome in this matter, man was left to the guidance of his reason

without the help of a written law; and man was able to learn from

experience that his reason was deficient, since about the time of Abraham

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 91, a. 6, resp. 120

man had fallen headlong into idolatry and the most shameful vices.

In the drama of history, recognition of natural law reached its all-time low circa tempora

Abrahae—about the time of Abraham, as it was an era characterized by idolatry. Idolatry is simply the refusal to acknowledge the First Cause as creator. For this reason, divine revelation begins with Abraham. Abraham is for this reason known as the father and founder of revealed monotheistic religion.

This passage is especially revealing because Aquinas states that nature itself is not sufficient for attaining supernatural beatitude. He explicitly states in Question 98 that humanity is ordained to supernatural beatitude {adfinem beatitudinis aeternae}, but that this goal exceeds the natural faculties of human nature {quae excedit proportionem naturalis facultatis humanae). Thomas' argument against the sufficiency of natural law returns to his previously conclusion that human nature itself is insufficient for divine beatitude. This again highlights the difficulty regarding Thomas' doctrine of the natural desire for the supernatural beatitude. If the final end of man exceeds his nature, then it might appear that the creation of human was a cruel trick of the creator. In such a case, he made one creature that was of itself not able to naturally obtain his end. Arguably, one

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 98, a. 6. "Et ideo ut de hoc eius superbia convinceretur permissus est homo regimini suae rationis absque adminiculo legis scriptae, et experimento homo discere potuit quod patiebatur rationis defectum, per hoc quod homines usque ad idololatriam et turpissima vitia circa tempora Abrahae sunt prolapsi."

294 Summa theologiae I-II, q. 91, a. 4, resp. could also argue in this way regarding angels since they too, according to Thomas, were not created in a state of supernatural beatitude, but merited beatitude by preserving in grace and were thereby confirmed in grace:

I answer that, by the name of beatitude is understood the ultimate

perfection of rational or of intellectual nature; and hence it is that it is

naturally desired, since everything naturally desires its ultimate perfection.

Now there is a twofold ultimate perfection of rational or of intellectual

nature. The first is one which it can procure of its own natural power; and

this is in a measure called beatitude or happiness. Hence Aristotle (Ethic.

10) says that man's ultimate happiness consists in his most perfect

contemplation, whereby in this life he can behold the best intelligible

object; and that is God. Above this happiness there is still another, which

we look forward to in the future, whereby "we shall see God as He is."

This is beyond the nature of every created intellect, as was shown

above.295

295 Summa theologiae I, q. 62, a. 1. "Respondeo dicendum quod nomine beatitudinis intelligitur ultima perfectio rationalis seu intellectualis naturae, et inde est quod naturaliter desideratur, quia unumquodque naturaliter desiderat suam ultimam perfectionem. Ultima autem perfectio rationalis seu intellectualis naturae est duplex. Una quidem, quam potest assequi virtute suae naturae, et haec quodammodo beatitudo vel felicitas dicitur. Unde et Aristoteles perfectissimam hominis contemplationem, qua optimum intelligibile, quod est Deus, contemplari potest in hac vita, dicit esse ultimam One must read this passage in light of what Thomas previous stated in Summa theologiae

I qq. 4-5 regarding the good. In the context of discussing the Good in general, Thomas asks whether creatures can be like God (I, q. 4, a. 3) and answers in the affirmative by quoting two noteworthy biblical verses: "Let us make man to our image and likeness,"296 and: "When He shall appear we shall be like to Him." The former verse refers to our origin and nature (creation). The latter verse refers to our end (deification). These two verses are like "bookends."

Thomas' account of human nature and beatitude in Prima secundae depends on this groundwork he laid in Pars Prima regarding the perfection (I, q. 4) and goodness of

(I, q. 5) God. The perfection of God relates to the perfection of man and if one fails to understand the former, he fails in the latter, as well. As Thomas cites in I, q. 4, a. 1: "Be you perfect as also your heavenly Father is perfect."298 God is perfect and he is the final end of humanity. Thomas also provides and inclusivist account of perfection by affirming that all perfections are within God: "All created perfections are in God. Hence He is spoken of as universally perfect, because He lacks not, says the Commentator (Metaph.

hominis felicitatem. Sed super hanc felicitatem est alia felicitas, quam in futuro expectamus, qua videbimus Deum sicuti est. Quod quidem est supra cuiuslibet intellectus creati naturam, ut supra ostensum est." See also Summa theologiae I, q. 12, a. 4.

Genesis 1:26.

297Uohn3:2.

298 Matthew 5:48. 5) any excellence which may be found in any genus." Thomas bases his undertanding of perfection and goodness on an analogical relationship between the perfection of God and the perfection of creatures.

This analogical distinction helps us answer our original questions: According to

Thomas, do created intellects have an innate natural desire for supernatural beatitude? If so, then it would seem that God owes these created intellects the grace necessary to obtain it. Yet grace is not owed, according to Thomas,301 and therein lies the problem.

Alternatively, if man does not have an innate natural desire for supernatural beatitude, then he must have a innate natural desire for a natural beatitude. This leads us to position of "two ends" or "two perfections," one natural and one supernatural. How then, do we reconcile these questions? The answer lies in Thomas' language of duplex beatitudo.

There are not two beatitudes, but a twofold beatitude. Moreover, we reconcile "each side of the fold" (natural and supernatural) through the Augustinian notion of reflection. A

Summa theologiae, I, q. 4, a. 2. "Respondeo dicendum quod in Deo sunt perfectiones omnium rerum. Unde et dicitur universaliter perfectus, quia non deest ei aliqua nobilitas quae inveniatur in aliquo genere, ut dicit Commentator in V Metaphys."

Summa theologiae, I, q. 4, a. 3, ad 3. "Ad tertium dicendum quod non dicitur esse similitudo creaturae ad Deum propter communicantiam in forma secundum eandem rationem generis et speciei, sed secundum analogiam tantum; prout scilicet Deus est ens per essentiam, et alia per participationem."

301 For Thomas' defense of the gratuity of grace, see Summa theologiae, I-II, q.

114, a. 5. notion that Thomas picks up in his analysis of natural law, the Old Law, and the New

Law, with regard to typology. However, before delving into Thomas' solution, let us examine alternative approaches to this question, namely the Scotistic tradition on natural law and inclination, and also more recent contemporary approaches. 125

CHAPTER FOUR: NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL TELEOLOGY AFTER AQUINAS

JOHN DUNS SCOTUS ON LAW AND TELEOLOGY

The most notable divergence from Thomas' articulation of law and teleology occurred shortly after Thomas' death with the subtle doctor John Duns Scotus (c. 1265-

1308). Duns Scotus' difference with Thomas lay chiefly with Scotus' opposition to the

Aristotelian principle that every natural passive potency corresponds to a natural active potency. Allan Wolter explains:

Since this 'desire' of nature is nothing more than an ontological

relationship with perfectibility, it is said to be in vain only if its realization

involved an extrinsic impossibility, namely if no cause whatsoever

existed—neither natural nor supernatural—that could import this

perfection. Hence, [Scotus'] vehement opposition to the Aristotelian thesis

that to every natural passive potency there is a corresponding natural

active potency.

Consequently, Scotus does not view natural desire as necessarily fulfilled by a natural agent. This allows for Scotus to have an innate natural potency fulfilled by a supernatural

Allan Wolter, "Duns Scotus on the Natural Desire for the Supernatural." New

SchoJasiticism 23 (1949): 315. agent, that is, by God. Scotus, however, accounts for this corresponding natural active

potency in a way that could be reconciled with the Aristotelian principle. In the Prologue

to the Ordinatio, Scotus directly addresses the problem of having the First Cause as the

corresponding natural active potecy. Scotus writes:

I say that a passive power is not in nature as a trick {frustra}, because

even if through a natural agent it cannot be reduced principally to act,

nevertheless a disposition to it can through such an agent be induced, and

it can through any agent in nature — that is by an entire coordination of

being or of beings — for example as it can through a prime and/or

supernatural agent completely be reduced to act. And if it be objected that

this vilifies nature because it cannot arrive at its own perfection out of its

natural powers, since nature is less deficient in those things more noble,

from De caelo et mundo. I respond if our felicity would consist in a

supreme speculation to which we can now naturally attain, the Philosopher

would not say that nature was deficient in things necessary.

303 John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio Prol. I, q. un, nn. 74-75. "Dico quod potentia passiva non est frustra in natura, quia etsi per agens naturale non possit principaliter reduci ad actum, tamen potest per tale agens dispositio ad ipsum induci, et potest per

aliquod agens in natura —id est tota coord inati one essendi vel entium — puta per agens primum vel supernaturale complete reduci ad actum. Et si obicitur quod istud vilificat naturam quod ipsa non possit consequi perfectionem suam ex naturalibusl, cum natura minus deficiat in nobilioribus, ex II De caelo et mundo, respondeo: si felicitas nostra So then, the the natural passive agent does have a corresponding active agent—the Prime

Agent. So then, Scotus does except the principle of Aritlotle's correspondence between active and passive potency. He differs in that he allows God who he grants as

"supernatural" to provide the corresponding active potency.

A second difference is the way in which Scotus articulated the relationship between the natural and supernatural order along with his doctrine of affectio. Scotus links justitia with caritas.304 This association rests on the perfection of the will with regard to the two inclinations. While the affectio commodi is perfected in the virtue of hope, the affectio justitiae is perfected in the virtue of charity. These natural inclinations are raised by the theological virtues. Justice finds its perfection in charity.

This relationship between justice and love is pivotal to understanding the Scotian connection between natural law, the human will and final human beatitude. The conception of the will articulated by John Duns Scotus logically corresponds to his conception of natural law in the context of freedom and love. Scotus understands human freedom as the ability to transcend the affection for the beneficial by exercising one's

consisteret in speculatione suprema ad qualem possumus nunc naruraliter attingere, non diceret Philosophus naturam deficere in necessariis."

Allan B. Wolter writes, "'Charity' for Scotus is just another name for 'justice', as he explained in selection 23." (This is a typo and should read "in selection 25".) Duns

Scotus on the Will and Morality (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press), 90. Wolter refers to Ordinatio 3, d. 27, n. 8. See note 3 below for the full quote by Duns Scotus.

See also Ordinatio 3, d 26, q un, n. 110 and Ordinatio 2 d. 27, q. un, n. 17. affection for justice. This affectio justitiae is "the liberty innate to the will, since it represents the first checkrein on this affection for the advantageous."306 For Scotus the affectio justitiae allows the will to be free and thus able to love God for Himself, and he presents the structure of natural law as conforming to humanity's radical freedom to love. In particular, Scotus' treatment of the Decalogue reveals this unique perspective on caritas as it relates to natural law.

In order to highlight the unique character of Scotus' theory of natural law, it is worth noting how Scotus explicitly opposed Thomas on this matter. As Hannes Mohle observed:

The position that Scotus chooses as a foil is substantially that of Thomas

Aquinas, who held that all the commandments of the Decalogue belong to

the natural law. According to this view, the apparent exceptions are not

dispensations in the strictest sense; instead, they can be explained by

Ordinatio II, d. 6, q. 2; trans. Allan B. Wolter, Duns Scotus on the Will and

Morality (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press), 470-471.

•3(17

Scotus explains: "This virtue which thus perfects the will insofar as it has an affection for justice, I call 'charity'." Ordinatio 3, d. 27, n. 8; trans. Allan B. Wolter, ed.,

Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press), 427.

"hanc itaque virtutem perficientem voluntatem inquantum habet affectionem justitae voco "caritatem." Ordinatio 3, d. 27, n. 8; Latin text from Allan B. Wolter, ed., Duns

Scotus on the Will and Morality (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press), 426. reference to the real intention behind the commandment in question.

As discussed above, Thomas systematized the relationship of natural and divine law by positing that there are four kinds of law: 1) eternal law; 2) natural law; 3) divine law; and

4) human or positive law.309 According to Thomas, natural law is the means by which

Tin rational creatures participate in eternal law of God. Eternal law governs non-rational creatures in so far as they are moved by divine providence. Eternal law governs rational creatures, i.e. human beings through their self-discovery of the precepts of natural law •5 1 1 since they possess an intellect and will.

Natural law, says Thomas, orients humanity "to its due act and end through which it has a natural inclination." Thomistic natural law, then, is the inclination in rational creatures as they press on toward their divinely ordered goal by participating in eternal law. For Thomas, the intellect is naturally inclined to the truth and so the will is naturally inclined to assent to that good which the intellect presents to the will. In conclusion, the

Hannes Mohle, "Scotus's Theory of Natural Law," The Cambridge

Companion to Duns Scotus. Thomas Williams, ed. (New York: Cambridge University

Press, 2003): 314.

Summa theologiae I-IIq. 91, a. 1-4.

Summa theologiae I-II q. 91, a. 2, resp. "et talis participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura 'lexnaturalis' dicitur."

311

Summa theologiae 1-2 q. 93, a. 5, resp.

312 Summa theologiae 1-2 q. 91, a. 2, resp. "per quo habet naturalem inclinationem ad debitum actum et finem." natural law includes the Decalogue since its precepts possess a formal goodness that necessarily orient mankind to its final end, that is, to God himself. It follows then for

Thomas that commandments of the Decalogue are not good because God commands them, but that God commands these commandments of the Decalogue because they are good—leading man to attain his nature's perfection. In the Thomistic understanding, all the commandments hold God immediately as their object to a greater or lesser degree.

Scotus seems to have in mind Thomas' formulation of dispensations to the

Decalogue when he summarized his opposing view in Ordinatio 3, dist. 37. Scotus refutes this opinion in two ways. First, he dismisses the casuist argument required by such a position with respect to the numerous divine dispensations concerning the

Decalogue, for example the account that describes God commanding Abraham to slay his son Isaac on Mount Moriah. Secondly, Scotus denies the intellectualist teleology of

Thomas Aquinas since his position contradicts Scotus' understanding of the will's radical freedom.

Scotus' teaching on natural law becomes clear as he examines the Decalogue in light of divine dispensations that seemingly contradict its precepts. Scotus offers a unique solution to the Christian tradition as it seeks to reconcile the discomforting dispensations

313 made by God to the Decalogue and the immutable precepts of the natural law. In particular, Scotus rejects the complicated solution offered by Thomas Aquinas, particularly as it relates to God's command for Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac. If

313 Ordinatio 3, suppl. d. 37. Wolter/Frank (1986), 273.

Genesis 22. 131 every precept of the Decalogue expresses natural law, then Abraham's attempted murder of Isaac is necessarily evil. In terms of teleology, how could the law, which inclines to man's final end contradict the revealed will of God? Is the natural inclination contrary to supernatural end? Thomas must explain how "Thou shalt not kill" is an immutable precept of the natural law while at the same time accounting for this unique situation in which God commands Abraham to kill his son. Thomas offers the following explanation:

Likewise when Abraham consented to slay his son, he did not consent to

murder, because his son was due to be slain by the command of God, Who

is Lord of life and death: for He it is Who inflicts the punishment of death

on all men, both godly and ungodly, on account of the sin of our first

parent, and if a man be the executor of that sentence by Divine authority,

he will be no murderer any more than God would be.315

According to Thomas, the commandment given to Abraham to slay Isaac is not technically a dispensation from natural law, but a particular case where God appoints

Abraham as the executor of God's prerogative of life and death over every man—in this case Isaac. Antoine Vos explains why Scotus rejects Thomas' solution:

Aquinas' theological explanation is not acceptable to Duns, because

according to Thomas Aquinas this particular command belongs to natural

law. So Duns concludes that it must be a part of necessary ethics.

However, a necessary truth of ethics cannot be revoked, or dispensed with.

•3 1 er Summa theologiae 1-2 q. 100, a. 8, ad 3. 132

When there is alternative biblical information, contingency seems the only

logical way out and Duns utilizes this way out."316

In short, Scotus asserts that natural law, in the strict sense, cannot be changed. If natural law orients a person toward love of God and thereby to his final end of supernatural beatitude, then there can be no contradiction or dispensations. According to Scotus, any explanation that attempts to bend commandments pertaining to natural law must be rejected. Rather than bend the rules through casuistry, Scotus would prefer to classify certain commandments as not belonging to natural law in the strictest sense. Scotus' answer is to limit the meaning of natural law.

Before diving into questions concerning the biblical examples of dispensations to moral law, Scotus first focuses on the purpose of natural law. According to Scotus, natural law exists to lead man toward the love of God. Love of God is the only criterion for determining which precepts do and do not belong strictly to natural law. As Scotus summarizes: "If there is a God, then He alone shall be loved as God."317 Thus, natural law is given to this end and to this end only. The affectio justitiae is in fact the affectio caritatis the affection for loving the infinitely just one who is God. The natural law elicits in man a response of love toward God and man is capable of this response because he

316 Antoine Vos, "The Scotian Notion of Natural Law," Vivarium 38 (2000): 219-

20.

Si est Deus, est amandus utDeus solus; translation mine. Ordinatio 3, suppl. d.

37; quoted from Allan B. Wolter, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality (Washington,

DC: Catholic University Press, 1986), 276. 133 possesses an innate affection for justice. This is a complicated and subtle argument. To summarize, according to Scotus, man has innate desire or affection for justice and for the love of God. Recall that in Christian theology, love requires the union of persons, so

Scotus is referring here to the beatific end of man and not simply a generic "love for the

First Cause" as something noble. Scotus is speaking of a union only possible in the supernatural vision of the divine essence. However, Scotus employs natural law as something within man that elicits a response in the human will. Scotus has the concepts of "innate" and "elicited" but they are used in different ways than the later Thomists. For

Scotus, the desire of God is innate and the act of charity for God is elicited.

Charity or love for God, then, is the sum of natural law and divine law. All other commandments are relative to this purpose. Scotus defends this distinction by introducing the idea that natural law consists of strict commandments and extended commandments.

Only the latter can be dispensed because they do not belong to the immutable natural law that is self-evident.

Regarding dispensations to the natural law, God provides them in two ways.

According to Scotus, God can elaborate on a certain commandment (declaratio) or God can revoke a previously given commandment (revocatio). These principles are not foreign to the Christian tradition. The beatitudes of Christ are elaborations on previous given commandments: "Again you have heard that it was said to the men of old, 'You shall not swear falsely, but shall perform to the Lord what you have sworn.' But I say to you, do not swear at all, either by heaven, for it is the throne of God." Moreover, there

Matthew 5:33-34. Revised Standard Version. are also examples of God revoking previously given commandments: "But Peter said,

'No, Lord; for I have never eaten anything that is common or unclean.' And the voice

came to him again a second time, 'What God has cleansed, you must not call common'"

(Acts 10:14-15). Contrary to Thomas Aquinas, Scotus believes that God really does

revoke commandments of the natural law, but only commandments that belong to the

natural law in a secondary or extended sense. Hence, the most fundamental difference

between Thomas and Scotus is that Scotus wants to limit natural law, in its strictest sense,

to inclinations toward God.

STRICT AND EXTENDED COMMANDMENTS OF DECALOGUE

According to Scotus, commandments can be changed so that the recipient is

enabled to fulfill the purpose of law—the love of God by which man attains to eternal

beatitude. The law exists with the sole purpose of eliciting in man a response of love

toward God. Whenever laws interfere with this purpose, they can be divinely dispensed

as in the case of Abraham and Isaac. This distinction of Scotus allows him to say that

there are strict commandments that can never be dispensed and that there are extended

commandments from those that belong to the law the strictest sense. Therefore, extended

commandments can change but the strict commandment to love God can never change.

Another way of saying this is that our inclination toward God can never change, but our practical decisions regarding our neighbors can and do change in order to best orient us to

our final beatitude. Natural laws in the strict sense are those "God himself cannot make

false." These commandments primarily and properly belong to natural law. Other

3,9 Ordinatio 3, suppl. d. 37; trans. Wolter/Frank (1986), 271. commandments belong to natural law only in a secondary or extended sense.

Scotus directly addresses this issue with the question: "Do all the commandments of the Decalogue belong to natural law?" Scotus responds that not all the commandments of the Decalogue belong to natural law in the strict sense of the term. In order to justify his distinction, Scotus appeals to the traditional division of the Decalogue into two tables. The first table of the law consisting of the first three commandments pertains to man's duty to God. The second table of the law consisting of the last seven

322 commandments, pertain to man's duty to man. This division is quite useful to Scotus.

The commandments of the first table are these: 1. You shall have no other gods before me.

320 Ordinatio 3, suppl. d. 37; trans. Wolter/Frank (1986), 269.

The twofold division of the Decalogue derives from the biblical description of the Ten Commandments being issued on two stone tablets. "And he gave to Moses, when he had made an end of speaking with him upon Mount Sinai, the two tables of the testimony, tables of stone, written with the finger of God" (Ex 31:18).

322 In order to avoid confusion, it should be noted that the Catholic and Lutheran traditions number the Decalogue differently than the general Protestant tradition.

According to the Protestant numeration of the Ten Commandments, the first commandment is split into two commandments and the ninth and tenth commandments are combined as a single commandment. This means that in the Protestant tradition, the first table consists of the first four commandments and the second table consists of the last six commandments. Nevertheless, the content is the same. 136

2. You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain.

3. Remember the Sabbath day, to keep it holy.323

The first commandment stipulates worship of the true God and the second commandment prohibits blasphemy of God's name. Both commandments are commandments to love and revere God. These two commandments are primary to the natural law because they lead man to love what is best: God himself. This justifies the appeal of Scotus to the

Decrees ofGratian, "where it is said that the natural law begins from the very beginnings of rational creatures, nor does time change it, but it is immutably permanent, and this I concede."324 Consequently, Scotus believes that the immutability of natural law must hold for the prelapsarian state of mankind before the fall as well as the postlapsarian state of mankind after the fall.

Scotus seems to undermine his position and also the traditional integrity of the

"first table of the law" by stating that although the third commandment, "keep holy the

Sabbath day," was inscribed on the first table of the Decalogue, it does not properly belong to natural law in the strict sense since only the first two commandments "regard

325 God immediately as object." If Scotus' twofold division of the Decalogue contains a weakness, it is here with respect to the first table of the law. It is rather convenient that

Exodus 20:2-8.

324 Ordinatio 3, suppl. d. 37; trans. Wolter/Frank (1986), 277. "Ius naturale coepit ab exordio rationalis crearurae nee mutatur tempore, sed immutabile permanens - quas concedo."

lie Ordinatio 3, suppl. d. 37, n. 5; trans. Wolter/Frank (1986), 277. the Decalogue traditionally breaks into a twofold division of commandments pertaining to God and commandments pertaining to mankind. The two tables of the law do demonstrate the twofold division of law, but unfortunately for Scotus, the third commandment was written on the wrong tablet.

Regardless of the placement of the third commandment, Scotus does effectively demonstrate that the first two commandments differ essentially from the remaining eight commandments because the first two commands "regard God immediately as object."326

In the strict sense, natural law boils down to: "God shall be loved' or negatively "God shall not be hated."328 The twofold division of the Decalogue provides Scotus with his distinction between commandments oriented to love of God and commandments oriented to love of neighbor, even though he dismisses the actual numeration of the two tables with respect to the third commandment.329

"Ilia immediate repiciunt Deum pro obiecto." Ordinatio 3, suppl. d. 37; trans.

Allan B. Wo Iter, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality (Washington, DC: Catholic

University Press, 1986), 276.

327 Ordinatio 3, suppl. d. 37, n. 6. trans. Wolter/Frank (1986), 277.

32 Ordinatio 3, suppl. d. 37, n. 7. trans. Wolter/Frank (1986), 277.

According to Scotus, the precept to keep holy the Sabbath does not immediately regard God as its object. Scotus could have reinterpreted the third commandment as a commandment to worship God and then the command would regard

God as it object. This would have preserved the enumeration of the tables and perhaps bolstered the argument of Scotus. Regardless, Scotus' point stands. 138

The last eight commandments of the Decalogue (including the commandment concerning the Sabbath) are therefore general applications flowing from the assumption that God must always be loved. These extended or secondary commandments, like the commandment prohibiting murder, are understood to be a means by which man loves

God. The extended commandments are included because they have "agreement" with the strict, self-evident commandments. The agreement between the strict precepts pertaining to God and the extended precepts pertaining to our neighbor is Scotus' philosophical articulation of the biblical maxim: "he who loves God should love his brother also" (1

John 4:21).330 Mohler observes: "Scotus's concept of agreement is defined negatively insofar as it implies that there is no strict deductive connection that would permit a

331 necessary inference from overarching self-evident principles." Again, the extended commandments are not per se nota and are not strictly necessary.332 They are contingent

Duns Scotus quotes this verse in his argument concerning love of God and neighbor at Ordinatio 3, d. 28, n. 5.

331 H. Mohle, "Scotus's Theory of Natural Law," (2003), 316.

332 In an attempt to refute the claim by Thomas Williams that Scotus was a radical voluntarist, C.P. Ragland asserts that Scotus is in fact a radical voluntarist with respect to the last eight precepts of the Decalogue, though not with the first two strict precepts.

Ragland need not grant even this to Williams. The remaining eight extended precepts are not absolutely necessary, self-evident, and immutable. Nevertheless, the extended precepts maintain that characteristic convenientia with the primary precepts. See Thomas

Williams, "The Unmitigated Scotus," Archivfur Geschichte der Philosophie 80 (1998), to the strict precepts of the Decalogue commanding love and reverence for God.

SCOTUS CONTRA THOMAS

Scotus rejects the Thomistic doctrine of natural law for a second reason. Scotus has difficulty with accepting a model of natural law that is based on inclinations, particularly intellectualist inclinations. Scotus presents the will as absolutely free and undetermined. For this reason, Scotus mistrusts the teleological ordering of natural law as inherently determined. As a result, Scotus breaks radically from the Thomistic understanding of natural law.

Scotus arranges natural inclinations in the will differently than Thomas. The affectio commodi has reference to the self, but the affectio justitiae allows for love for others and love for God. Scotus states: "According to the affectio commodi, however, nothing can be willed save with reference to self. And this we should possess if only an intellectual appetite with no liberty followed upon intellectual knowledge, as sense appetite follows sense cognition."333 Here, Scotus relegates natural inclinations to the lower affectio commodi. This affection for the advantageous naturally seeks the advantageous. On the other hand, the innate freedom of the will is secured by the presence of a second affection. The affection justitiae allows the moral agent "to love something in itself [or for its own sake]," because this "is more an act of giving or

162-181. C.P. Ragland responds in "Scotus on the Decalogue: What Sort of Voluntarism"

Fz'rarmm 36 (1998), p. 81.

ill Ordinatio 3, suppl. dist 26; trans. Wolter/Frank (1986), 179. sharing and is a freer act than is desiring that object for oneself."

One can see the difference between Thomas and Scotus by examining the

rationale behind certain precepts of the Decalogue. As discussed above, Scotus does not

believe that commandments of the second table regard God as their immediate object.

"Thou shalt not commit adultery" extends from the commandment to love God, but it

does not necessarily follow from the commandment to love God. Atheists can and do

obey the commandment to not commit adultery. However, their obedience does not

regard God as its object. An atheist might not commit adultery because it is advantageous

to his general happiness. For example he might not trespass the command in order to

avoid feeling guilty. Moreover, his obedience will prevent him from experiencing public

shame or the loss of his children and financial capital in divorce. For Scotus, this proves

that extended commandments are not necessarily part of the immutable natural law of

God. Only love for God fulfills this criterion. One either loves God or he does not love

God. All the other commandments are contingent on this act of the will. Charity toward

God is preeminent. Nevertheless, adherence to the second table of the law is not optional.

Scotus assumes that the entire Decalogue remains normative and in force. The emphasis

on charity and the first table is a distinction not a division.

In Ordinatio 3, dists. 27 and 29, Scotus tackles a series of questions that relate to

the relationship between the innate affectio justitiae and the role of caritas. If the affectio justitiae is capable of love for God, why does the viator need a divinely infused

supernatural virtue of charity in order to love God as he ought? As discussed previously,

Ordinatio 3, suppl. d. 26; trans. Wolter/Frank (1986), 179. Scotus teaches that the obligation to love God is something known per se as the highest good, which means that caritas is justitia?35 Caritas can either be acquired naturally by exercising the affectio justitiae or be acquired by a supernaturally infused habit of the soul. Man is obliged by natural law to love God and thus the natural will is able to comply with this command. However, the perfection of charity requires the supernatural infusion of the virtue of charity. This supernatural charity does not replace the charity of the affectio justitiae but magnifies it.337 The natural charity of the soul for God is elevated by grace.

This distinction made by Duns Scotus once again reveals the centrality of caritas in his doctrine of the will and morality. It is centered on the caritas Dei. This love for

God is love for God's intrinsic worth. Ultimately, God is not loved because he loves us in return. Love of God is for his own sake, not because the results of this love are advantageous to the viator.

Scotus rejects the familiar intellectualist notion of natural law because it does not fully account for the full character of human morality. The reason for this is that a single

335 Wolter, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality (1986), 90.

For Scotus fuller treatment on what charity's necessary contribution, see

Quodlibetal Questiones q. 17, nn. 19-21. Scotus teaches that the habit of charity adds to the substantial intensity of the act of love, which the will alone could have given to the act by exerting an equal effort. However, he goes on to say that an act do out of the habit of charity has the special character of being accepted by God.

337 Ordinatio 3, suppl. d. 27; trans. Wolter/Frank (1986), 443. 142 affection theory of the will assumes that the will is naturally inclined toward perfection.

A single affection theory has the character of being predisposed toward God and this compromises the radical freedom of the will. Scotus' distinction between the affectio commodi and the affectio justitiae naturally leads to a moral theory that is radically theocentric since true freedom is based on love for God simply because he is God.

This theocentric orientation of morality does not by any means reduce humanity's moral obligation to observe secondary precepts of the natural law, for example, "Thou shall not kill." Rather, all precepts flow from the presupposition of love. Scotus explains,

"And in so loving, I love both myself and my neighbor out of charity, viz. by willing that

loo both of us love God in himself." Natural law is not a code regulating behavior, but is for Scotus a window to the will's affectio justitiae. The immutable precept is that God's contingent love for man should be reciprocated and returned to God - and this love cannot be something that people are predisposed to do in the first place. The only true love is contingent love. Forced love is valueless. Mary Beth Ingham summarizes the natural law theory of Scotus in light of his emphasis on caritas. The centrality of caritas as it relates to the first two commandments of the Decalogue excuses Scotus from the allegation of being a divine command theorist, because the command to love God is an analytic truth. Its rationale is based solely on the self-evident truth that God is the greatest good.

John Duns Scotus roots his teleology by first presenting an account of how God relates to his creatures. The most perfect being is most worthy of love. This is the

Ordinatio 3, d. 28; trans. Wolter/Frank (1986), 450-1. necessary premise of Scotus' moral theology. As the most perfect being, God then must

be loved in the most perfect way and this means that love must be contingent and not

necessary. Predisposed love is not true love and so Scotus rejects the teleological model

based on inclinations. Redemptive history records that God acts contingently, but also

consistently with love toward his creatures. This consistent love of God is not due to

divine necessity but is accounted by Scotus' concept offirmitas.

This divine commitment toward humanity requires dispensations in order to lead

man to a love for God. For Scotus, this consideration is built into the natural law and

illustrated by structure of the Decalogue. These dispensations do not introduce moral

discord, but rather accomplish a general harmony with the strict precepts of God's love,

that is, those precepts commanding that God should be loved for Himself. Scotus sees the

divine dispensations to the second table of the Decalogue as evidence that the natural law

is constituted by love of God and love of God alone.

All of this means that natural law is based on the love of God. The affectio justitiae becomes the means for caritas and thus it might even be called the affectio

caritatis. The love of God is relational and this entails that love for one's neighbor is

required by the natural law. A. Vos explains:

It is clear that, for Scotus, love means loving someone for his own sake.

Righteousness ('iustitia,' elsewhere also 'rectitude') truth and the value of

thing as they are in themselves and for themselves, and as such this

'rightness' is at the heart of love. Loving a person means doing justice to that person as he is in himself.'

In other words, the extended precepts oriented toward our neighbor are exceedingly

consonant with the strict precepts that command us to love God for his own sake. In this

way the extended precepts of the Decalogue maintain a kind of convenientia with the

strict precepts of the law. In short, the love of God requires the love of neighbor. Love of

God is self-evident and love of neighbor is derived from the love of God. Scotus escapes

the allegation of being an irresponsible voluntarist because the moral precepts of God are

not arbitrary but rather maintain a characteristic decor, propriety, or convenientia.

Scotus' teaching on natural law reveals that true love is only proper love if it is

defined by the love of God. By such a position, Scotus does not place a sharp distinction

between the natural and supernatural. His moral theology is framed by the conviction that

"God is to be loved." In his characteristically subtle manner, the potential nuances of

Duns Scotus on Divine Love: Texts and Commentary on Goodness and

Freedom, God and Humans, A. Vos, H. Veldhuis, E. Dekker, N.W. den Bok, A.J. Beck,

eds. (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003), 68-9.

340 As mentioned above, Thomas Williams present the ethics of Scotus as

radically voluntaristic in his "The Unmitigated Scotus," Archiv fur Geschichte der

Philosophic 80 (1998), 162-181. For a rebuttal of Williams' position, see A.B. Wolter,

"The Unshredded Scotus: A Response to Thomas Williams," American Catholic

Philosophical Quarterly 11 (2003): 315-56. See also M. E. Ingham, The Harmony of

Goodness: Mutuality and Moral Living According to John Duns Scotus (Quincy, IL:

Franciscan Press, 1996). either the subjective genitive or objective genitive for the term caritas Dei converge so that the "love of God" is reciprocated by the viator as "love for God".341 Scotus reminds us that love is not opposed to justice. Rather, love is the criterion of the law.

All this being said, Scotus's distinction with regard to the Decalogue is the point of divergence from Thomas' doctrine of natural inclinations and natural law. According to M. Levering the division of the two tablets of law in the mind of Scotus was a "crucial step" in the history of natural law theory.342 By emphasizing the first commandment's prohibition against polytheism and false worship, and the second commandment's prohibition against irreverence, Levering claims that Scotus overturned the doctrine of natural law established by Thomas Aquinas. According to Levering, the second table directing man's relationship with society lost its "intrinsic teleological unity with the movement of the will."343 In Scotus, it is clear that nature inclines man to God. However, he accomplishes this differently than Thomas through his articulation of charity as the fulfillment of affectio justitiae.

3411 owe this observation to a footnote in Duns Scotus on Divine Love: Texts and

Commentary on Goodness and Freedom, God and Humans, edited by A. Vos, H.

Veldhuis, E. Dekker, N.W. den Bok, A.J. Beck (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing

Company, 2003), p. 84, n. 8.

Matthew Levering, Biblical Natural Law (New York: Oxford University Press,

2008), 84.

343 Levering, (2008), 84. HUGO GROTIUS & NATURAL LAW AFTER SCOTUS

Scotus' differences with Thomas, we might say, were significant but not nearly as radical than the complete reformulation of nature and natural law within the writings of

Hugo Grotius. Whereas Scotus made a distinction in the natural law regarding man's relationship to God and others, Grotius made a sharp division between the two and cast off God altogether. Scotus emphasized love and reverence for God as primary, but

Grotius articulated law without reference to God at all. Grotius, for example, wrote that natural law is true "even if we say there is no God." The positions stand in opposition to one another. For this reason, I believe that it is a mistake to lay the blame at the feet of

Scotus for the shift in natural law after Thomas. Grotius, then, marks the shift away

Anton-Hermann Chroust holds that Hugo Grotius merely advanced the post-

Scotistic tradition regarding natural law. However, this cannot be correct. Scotus represents a limiting of natural law. Grotius represents a universalizing of natural law.

See Anton-Hermann Chroust's "Hugo Grotius and the Scholastic Natural Law

Tradition," New Scholasticism 17, 1943), 101-33.

Hugo Grotius, De iure belli acpads, 1,10.

346 Matthew Levering and Heinrich Rommen are a bit more aggressive on this matter. Whereas, they seek to find fault in the "voluntarism of Scotus and Ockham," perhaps the fault should be limited to Ockham since Scotus was at least a metaphysical realist. See M. Levering, Biblical Natural Law (2008), 85, and H. Rommen, The Natural

Law: A Study in Legal and Social History and Philosophy, trans. Thomas R. Hanley

(Indianapolis, Indiana: Liberty Fund, 1998), 53-63. The most aggressive attacks against

Duns Scotus as the true Judas Iscariot of the philosophical tradition comes from the 147 from natural law as pertaining to natural teleology. Natural law becomes reified as something altogether different than intrinsic natural inclinations to the Good. The shift in natural law became apparent with the birth of modernism and so wherever one would place the transition from the late-medieval period to the modern era, there one will also

T.AQ find a redefinition of nature and teleology. Notably, Leo Strauss found Machiavelli and

sectors of Radical Orthodoxy, but in particular from the pen of Catherine Pickstock.

Pickstock claims: "The suggestion that Duns Scotus rather than Kant is the caesura in the history of philosophy involves a revision in the understanding of the importance of theology in the history of philosophy, because Duns Scotus' philosophical and theological reflections are connected in a complex way. As we will see, his central thesis of the uni- vocity of being is subtly linked to his understanding of the consequences of the Fall." Catherine Pickstock, "Duns Scotus: His Historical and Contemporary

Significance," Modern Theology 21:4 (2005): 543-74. See also Pickstock's After Writing: the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy (New Jersey, Wiley-Blackwell, 1998), pp.

121-138 especially. Her account begins by calling the system of Scotus, "the first theoretical symptom of the destruction from within the liturgical city" (p. 121).

In confirmation of this thesis, see H. Rommen, The Natural Law (1998), 62.

For a complete analysis of the topic, see Michael Allen Gillespie, The

Theological Origins of Modernity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). See also

Etienne GIXSOVLS Etudes surle role de lapensee medievale dans la formation du systeme

Cartestien, (1930), which stresses how modernity grew naturally from medieval ideas— and continuation thesis. Karl Lowith followed by identifying the secular agenda of 148

Thomas Hobbes culpable for natural law's shift away from nature. Yet others have attacked the very Thomisitic tradition itself for burying the authentic tradition of Thomas

Aquinas regarding natural inclinations and natural law. With that we turn to the theorists of the New Natural Law Theory.

modernism in its disguise of pious Protestantism with Meaning in History (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1957). Hans Blumenberg's The Legitimacy of the Modern

Age (Boston: MIT Press, 1966) described medieval Christianity as a form of neo-

Gnosticism, which required the modern age as its cure. According to Blumenberg, what others have called "secularization" is actually a return to pre-Gnostic Christianity whereby the saeculum finally frees itself of "superstition." Blumenberg's thesis is a return to the dominant view of the last several centuries, namely that the middle ages were a terrible hiatus in the progress of humanity until modern authors redirected Europe toward renaissance and then enlightenment. According to Gillespie, the last stop on this route is Nietzsche's insistence on radical freedom.

349 Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

1953), 177-202. Cited in Levering, BNL (2008), 85, n. 48, where he provides these words of Strauss: "[i]t was Machiavelli, that greater Columbus, who had discovered the continent on which Hobbes could erect his structure." 149

CHAPTER FIVE: RECENT ACCOUNTS OF NATURAL LAW AND TELEOLOGY

The New Natural Law theorists openly accuse the Thomistic commentary tradition of altering the authentic teaching of Thomas regarding nature, law, and teleology. Germain Grisez stimulated renewed interest in the relationship between natural law and natural inclinations in his 1965 article "First Principle of Practical Reason: A

Commentary on the Summa theologiae, Question 94, Article 2"350 which highlighted the significance of the gerundive structure of Aquinas' articulation of the first principle of practical reason: "bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum."351 Grisez notes that the grammatical structure is neither indicative nor imperative. Instead, Thomas

Aquinas articulates this first principle of practical reason as directive, i.e. what is to be done or what is to be avoided. Grisez claimed that the scholastic tradition had misinterpreted Aquinas' authentic natural law theory. Grisez and others have suggested

350 Germain Grisez, "First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the

Summa theologiae, Question 94, Article 2," Natural Law Forum 10 (1965): 168-201.

K 1

"The good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided." Summa theologiae I-II q. 94, a. 2, c.

Joseph Boyle, Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, Free Choice: A Self

Referential Argument (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1976). John Finnis,

Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 150

that this gerundive articulation ("faciendum") indicates a pre-moral interpretation to the

first principle of practical reason. This pre-moral basis is a means by which New Natural

Law theorists escape the fact/value criticism made by David Hume and most ethicists

since the Enlightenment, namely that an "is" does not imply an "ought."353 In brief,

morality springs up from this pre-moral first principle of what is to be done. However, by

avoiding the "is," the New Natural Law theorists avoid the highest inclination of human

nature: final beatitude and the entailing vision of the divine essence. The New Natural

Law theorists have shed light on the first principle of practical reason in St. Thomas'

Germain Grisez and John Finnis, "The Basic Principles of Natural Law: A Reply to

Ralph Mclnerny," American Journal of Jurisprudence 26 (1981): 21-31; reprinted Finnis,

J. (ed.), The International Library of Essays in Law and Legal Theory: Natural Law, vol.

1. Martin Rhonheimer, Natural Law and Practical Reason: A Thomist View of Moral

Autonomy (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000).

353 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Lewis Amherst Selby-Bigge, Ed.

(New York: Clarendon Press, 1896), 469-470. "[W]hen of a sudden I am surpriz'd to

find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not,

expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it." 151 doctrine of natural law; however, they have wrongly read an Enlightenment distinction into Thomas' formulation of human nature. By doing so, they have removed the concept of law from natural law. The New Natural Law Theory is a natural law theory that avoids the importance of human nature and the final end of human nature. The result is that the new theory is able to function as a secularized version of Thomas Aquinas' natural law theory. This may prove useful to some, but it lacks the articulation of "nature" found in natural law theory of Aquinas.

ANALYSIS OF THE PRIMUMPRAECEPTUMLEGIS ("BONUS EST FACIENDUM, ETC.")

As discussed above in Chapter Three, Thomas' discussion of the natural law and divine law in the Prima secundae is the climatic resolution of Aquinas' argument that man has one final end: "Therefore, just as of all men there is naturally one last end, so the will of an individual man must be fixed on one last end."354 Divine law, Thomas elaborates, provides the supernatural means by which man attains to this end. For this reason, Thomas calls the divine law the auxilium legis naturalis?55

Moreover, according to Thomas, natural law orients humanity, "to its due act and end through which it has a natural inclination.' Nevertheless, knowledge of the natural law begins with the senses, which means that knowledge of the natural law requires experience. Thus, the genuine natural law doctrine of Thomas Aquinas accounts for both

354 Summa theologiae I-II, q. 1, a. 5.

Summa contra Gentiles III, cap. 117, n. 6.

356 Summa theologiae I-II, q. 91, a. 2, resp. "per quam habet naturalem inclinationem ad debitum actum et finem." 152 how human nature is ordered by inclinations and how natural law is known through inclinations. Chapter Three above explored these distinctions as they relate to connaturality of natural law, or how natural law is "known naturally". Moreover, Thomas enumerates the natural inclinations as the nutritive inclinations (nourishment), the sensitive inclinations (procreation and education), and the intellective inclinations (to understand the truth, live in society and know God). Here, then, is a hierarchy of good and this hierarchy in Thomas is in important to remember as we turn to the New Natural

Law theory.

Now then, the principle of non-contradiction structures the intellective operations of the soul, so the principle "good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided' structures the proper voluntary operations of the soul. Thomas concludes: "All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this, so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided."359 This is precisely where the New Natural Law

Theory seeks to establish itself. As stated above, Germain Grisez and others have attempted to correct a tendency of post-Tridentine natural law theories that perceive the primary precepts of the natural law as imperatives. Grisez notes that Aquinas does not say the principle of natural law is "do good and do not do evil," rather he says, "good is

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 94 a. 2.

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 94, a. 2, resp. "Hoc est ergo primum praeceptum legis, quod bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum."

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 94, a. 2, resp. 153 to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided." Grisez summarizes what he believes to be the authentic Thomistic articulation as "emphasizing the practical character of the principle" and "lacking imperative force." The goal of the New Natural Law Theory is to make this original principle "pre-moral" so that it cannot be interpreted as a

"commandment" set in the soul.

This is a correct observation. The problem is that Grisez deemphasizes Thomas' teaching that all human acts are a means to a final end and goal of human life, that is, to attain the Good. Instead, Grisez's incommensurability of goods obscures Thomas' intent—that the inclinations are arranged hierarchically so that the human person arrives at the final beatitude. By way of clarification, the human persona's rational appetite for the good as object (which is ultimately God) relies on the existence of natural inclinations. Natural law describes these inclinations. The New Natural Law rightly affirms the role of inclinations, but fails to order morality with respect to the priority of goods that culminate in He who is the Good.

SUAREZVS. GRISEZ

Grisez's New Natural Law Theory's emphasis on the gerundive structure of

Aquinas' articulation of the first principle of practical reason ("bonus est faciendum, etc.") bolsters his claim that the traditional commentary scholastic tradition misinterpreted Aquinas' authentic natural law theory. Grisez is particularly critical of

Germain Grisez, "The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the Summa Theologiae, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2," Natural Law Forum 10 (1965), p.109. 154

Francisco Suarez's formulation of natural law as "natural goodness plus prescriptive divine law."361 It seems Suarez's summary does not appreciate the gerundive articulation of the first principle of practical reason as a directive. The expression of the scholastic version as "act in accord with nature" or "do good and avoid evil" essentially collapses into a moral theology consisting in the agent's will submitting to the divine will. The first principle of practical reason ("bonus est faciendum, etc.") is for Grisez a "directive for action, not a description of good and evil."363 Consequently, the New Natural Law theorists view any "imperative interpretation" of Aquinas as a divine command theory masquerading as a natural law theory. Grisez certainly has a valid point in this respect.

Grisez also faults the scholastic theory for positing a natural end of moral agent. As addressed in Chapter One, this criticism bases itself on the opinion popularized by Henri De Lubac and others in the twentieth century that the post-

Tridentine tradition misunderstood the relationship between nature and grace, natural and supernatural. De Lubac's fear is that the commentators after Aquinas created a concept of

-I /r-t

Russell Hittinger, A Critique of the New Natural Law Theory (Notre Dame,

Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), p. 15 referring to Grisez, "First Principle of Practical Reason The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the

Summa Theologiae, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2," Natural Law Forum 10 (1965), 193 and

Suarez De Legibus 2, 7.

362 R. Hittinger (1987), 16.

363 Germaine Grisez, Christian Moral Principles, 179. Grisez, Christian Moral Principles, 25. Cited in Hittinger, 17. natura pura and consequently reinvented the supernatural as divorced from nature. The result was an "upstairs—downstairs" depiction of grace and nature. This error regarding nature led to errors regarding natural law. Consequently, Grisez faults the Thomistic commentary tradition for promoting a kind of casuistry that "is far more adept at issuing a few prohibitions than at directing people's lives toward growth and flourishing."

Furthermore, Grisez criticizes the scholastic natural law theories for failing to appreciate what David Hume previously identified as the fact-value distinction or the so- called fallacy that an is does not imply an ought. "[I]t is not human nature as given, but possible human fulfillment which must provide the intelligible norms for free choice."366

Grisez is not alone in his criticism. Since his groundbreaking article "The First Principle of Practical Reason," Grisez has gathered disciples, most notably John Finnis. Finnis has acknowledged that his own work is an elaboration of Grisez's work in natural law.367

Moreover, in 1981 the two scholars co-authored an article in their defense against the criticism of Ralph Mclnerny, "The Basic Principles of Natural Law: Reply to Ralph

Mclnerny." Since then, Russell Hittinger distinguished himself as the most outspoken critic Grisez's New Natural Law Theory with his book A Critique of the New Natural

Grisez, Christian Moral Principles, 105ff. Cited in Hittinger, 17.

Grisez, Christian Moral Principles, 105. Cited in Hittinger, 19.

367 See John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press,

1980), p. vii.

368 Germain Grisez and John Finnis, "The Basic Principles of Natural Law: Reply to Ralph Mclnerny," American Journal of Jurisprudence 26 (1981): 21-31. 156

Law Theory. Hittinger has observed that "Grisez is prepared to separate question 94 of the Prima secundae of the Summa theologiae—in which Aquinas articulates the first principle of practical reason—from the preceding questions which set forth Aquinas's understand of the teleological principles governing man's natural end."370 The reasons for

Grisez's bold move should be obvious. Contemporary moral philosophy does not take seriously the idea of a final cause. In Grisez's article "Against Consequentialism," he approvingly notes that consequentialists identify human fulfillment as related to moral actions. This conforms nicely with Grisez's moral theory that seeks to base itself on the

Aristotelian goal of human fulfillment in the pursuit of goods without respect to a supernatural end of the beatific vision. However, as Hittinger notes, Grisez reckons consequentialism as the lesser of two evils (to use a consequentialist phrase) when compared to the scholastic natural law theory precisely. It is perhaps surprising to discover that Grisez, a supposed defender of Aquinas' natural law, would prefer the company of consequentalists rather than the Thomistic scholastic tradition of Jean

Capreolus (1380-1444), Thomas Cardinal Cajetan (1469-1534), Francisco Suarez (1548-

1617), and John of St. Thomas (1589-1644). The reason for this is that Grisez wishes to avoid a morality that places its final end of humanity in a supernatural beatitude. In

Russell Hittinger, A Critique of the New Natural Law Theory (Notre Dame,

Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987).

370 R. Hittinger (1987), 20.

371 Germain Grisez, "Against Consequentialism," American Journal of

Jurisprudence 23 (1978): 21-72. 157

Grisez's opinion, the scholastic tradition leans (or falls) toward voluntaristic tendencies because it wrongly incorporates man's final end as the beatific vision of God's

372

essence.

Nevertheless, Grisez is critical of consequentialism or proportionalism because it

focuses on what he holds to be a false belief about the "commensurability of goods".

Grisez does not believe that goodness is measurable, and he does not believe that moral

agents can calculate the net consequences of a certain action. Grisez denies that there is a hierarchy of goods: "When it comes to making choices, there is no objective standard by which one can say that any of the human goods immanent in a particular intelligible 373 possibility is definitively a greater good than another." Consequently, consequentialism must be false. For Grisez, any so-called hierarchy of goods is simply personal.374

Grisez may have an interesting moral theory, but does it accurately depict the

"natural law" of Thomas Aquinas as articulated in I-II q. 94, a. 2? Grisez's account fails to conform to Aquinas in three ways:

1. Grisez's New Natural Law lacks the teleology toward supernatural

beatitude inherent in Aquinas' doctrine of nature.

372 R. Hittinger(1987), 22.

Grisez, Christian Moral Principles, 156. Quoted in Hittinger, 24.

374 R. Hittinger (1987), 24. The consequence of this position reveals the non-

Thomistic underpinnings of such a theory. 2. Grisez's affirmation of the incommensurability of goods is contrary to

Aquinas' distinction of a hierarchy of inclinations and hence a hierarchy

of goods.

3. Grisez's distinction between pre-moral and moral is a modern attempt to

hurdle Hume's is/ought distinction—a distinction unknown to Aquinas

lie

and therefore anachronistic.

Regarding the first, Aquinas believes that human nature is oriented to the final end of beatitude—the first question of Prima secundae begins with this conviction. All men act for a one final end because this is proper to their nature.376 All of men's acts are specified

The is/ought distnetion is in a certain sense anachronistic, but Thomas' account of "goodness in general" in Prima Pars reveals that for Thomas goodness does not differ from being. Thomas anticipates Hume by five hundred years: "bonum et ens sunt idem secundum rem, sed differunt secundum rationem tantum. Quod sic patet. Ratio enim boni in hoc consistit, quod aliquid sit appetibile, unde philosophus, in I Ethic, dicit quod bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Manifestum est autem quod unumquodque est appetibile secundum quod est perfectum, nam omnia appetunt suam perfectionem.

Intantum est autem perfectum unumquodque, inquantum est actu, unde manifestum est quod intantum est aliquid bonum, inquantum est ens, esse enim est actualitas omnis rei, ut ex superioribus patet. Unde manifestum est quod bonum et ens sunt idem secundum rem, sed bonum dicit rationem appetibilis, quam non dicit ens." Summa theologiae I q. 5 a. 1, co.

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 1, aa. 1-2. 159

177 as good or evil by whether they conform to this end. This end is one and the same for all humans and it is unique to human beings.378 While the inclinations of humans are plural, the highest inclinations hold priority—thus establishing a true hierarchy of goods.

Surely the inclination to mate is not incommensurable to the inclination to know the truth. And yet Grisez and Finnis are intent in defending the incommensurability of all goods within their moral theory.

In the second question of Prima secundae, Aquinas even lists a number of human goods, which conform to the human inclinations described in Question 94, Article 2. One by one, Aquinas demonstrates that they do not conform to man's ultimate beatitude.

Aquinas rejects wealth, honor, glory, power, health, pleasure, and even the good of the soul. In article eight we learn that happiness, fulfillment, and beatitude consist in something uncreated, i.e. God himself. Human happiness consists in the vision of the divine essence. This conclusion is not a revisionist theory of Cajetan or Suarez—it is the very teaching of Thomas Aquinas. The inclination to this final end is the foundation of

Aquinas' doctrine of human nature and natural law. For this reason it stands at the beginning of the Prima secundae and paves the way for his discussion of law ninety questions later.

Thirdly and lastly, the New Natural Law Theory seems preoccupied with making a distinction between what is pre-moral and moral with reference to the first principle of

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 1, a. 3.

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 1, aa. 4-8.

G. Grisez, Christian Moral Principles, 156. practical reason. Certainly the first principle is for Thomas understood as a directive (on account of the gerundive structure), and not as an innate natural commandment. Grisez's emphasis in this regard is applauded and welcomed. Commentators such as Suarez may be faulted rightly for oversimplifying this first principle as "do good and avoid evil" or as

ion

"act in accord with nature." However, it is unlikely that Aquinas foresaw the

Enlightenment objection that an "is" cannot imply an "ought" or the objection that the study of nature cannot provide morality. Grisez has pounced upon an element in Saint

Thomas that proves very useful in avoiding a debate regarding human nature or final causes. Nevertheless, the citation of a passage in Aquinas' treatise in law does not entail that the theory amounts to being classified as "natural law".

NEW N ATURAL LAW WITHOUT LAW

We are left then with the dilemma of classifying the New Natural Law Theory. It is certainly "new" in that it breaks with the previous Thomistic legal tradition. It is also a moral "theory" that investigates human nature and its proper inclinations as the basis for morality. In this sense, it is also "natural". Thus far we have "New" "Natural" and

"Theory. The concept of "law" is what the theory lacks. The reason for this twofold. As explained above, law according to Aquinas is "(1) an ordinance of reason (2) for the common good, (3) made by him who has care of the community, and (4)

380 See Francisco Suarez at De legibus ac de Deo legistore (Coimbra, 1612), 11, cap. 6, para. 4. John F. Crosby has written in defense of Suarez saying that he was

"wrongly attacked" by Grisez and Finnis. See John F. Crosby, Personalist Papers

(Washington, DC: Catholic University of America, 2004), 66. TO 1 promulgated." The New Natural Law Theory skirts around the issue of the latter two elements within the definition: (3) authority of one in care, and (4) promulgation.

Obviously, these two elements introduce a discussion about God and how God communicates his law to man. Natural law is law because God promulgates it. The New

Natural Law Theory fears divine command theory so much that it avoids divine promulgation and so it must also avoid the hierarchy of goods with God at the top. In summary, the New Natural Law Theory is neither true to Thomas Aquinas' vision of nature and beatitude, nor is it a natural law theory in the strictest sense. It is instead a secularized version of Thomas Aquinas' natural law theory without final beatitude and without the voice of a promulgator. If we are going to seriously consider Thomas' doctrine of law and teleology, we must look elsewhere.

-> Q 1

Summa theologiae I-II q. 90, a. 4, c. The four numerals are added for emphasis. 1) is the formal cause, 2) is final cause, 3) is the efficient cause, and 4) is the material cause. CHAPTER SIX: AQUINAS ON NATURAL LAW AND BEATITUDE

As Aquinas described above, natural law is insufficient, because man is oriented toward the goal of eternal beatitude {adfinem beatitudinis aeternae), but this goal is out

TOO of proportion with natural resources. It is true that natural knowledge does incline humanity toward a philosophic notion of God, but natural knowledge in itself is not capable of elevating humanity to God. Natural law allows us to participate in the eternal law of God only as it pertains to natural finite goods. It points to that which is beyond, but does not supply the way.

The insufficiency of natural law highlights the teleological aspect of Aquinas' ethics. Natural law serves as a "pre-pedagogue" in a manner similar to the way in which the Old Law functions as a "pedagogue." Aquinas explains in his treatment of Abraham and the era of idolatry that man, "thought that his natural reason could suffice him for his salvation."383 Humanity was humbled in this state. Vice spread as positive law became

382

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 91, a. 4, resp. "Sed quia homo ordinatur ad finem beatitudinis aeternae, quae excedit proportionem naturalis facultatis humanae, ut supra habitum est; ideo necessarium fuit ut supra legem naturalem et humanam, dirigeretur etiam ad suum finem lege divinitus data."

383 Summa theologiae I-II, q. 98, a. 6. "quasi ratio naturalis ei posset sufficere ad salutem." 163 perverted. P.M. Hall explains how divine law perfected natural law:

With the needed amplification of human law, it orders us to enjoy finite

goods in a rational manner and to approach God to the degree to which our

powers permit us. But this is not enough to satisfy us, and for this reason

God provides a law with the capacity to help us to our final end. Thus the

divine law completes what the natural law intends.

Natural law is not only unable to usher humanity into eternal beatitude, it is further obstructed by the fifth law identified by Aquinas—lexfomitis. There are thus two obstacles on the pathway to beatitude. First, natural law in unable to raise humanity to

God. Secondly, the presence of sin in the form of concupiscence disorders the powers of the soul.

PEDAGOGICAL ROLE OF LAW

Aquinas introduces divine law by examining the Old Law. His discussion begins by stating that the Old Law is good. This is an interesting question because Aquinas holds the traditional view that the Old Law of Moses did not and cannot confer sanctifying grace. It resembles human law because it regards the temporal well-being of a community, but as divine law it does not lead humanity to attain the final end of eternal beatitude. The Old Law is good in that it clarifies the natural law and anticipates the New

Law. It is in this context that Aquinas discusses the Decalogue. Aquinas explains the purpose of Old Law's function in this regard:

As stated above (q. 79, a 4), God sometimes permits certain ones to fall

P.M. Hall, 46. 164

into sin, that they may thereby be humbled. So also did He wish to give

such a law as men by their own forces could not fulfill, so that, while

presuming on their own powers, they might find themselves to be sinners,

and being humbled might have recourse to the help of grace.385

Paradoxically, the Old Law leads humanity away from God and yet causes sinners to be more disposed to their final end. The Old Law is impotent in that it does not accomplish the final goal of law—yet it is good in that it prepares humanity for the New Law. Thus, it is good. The Old Law was given so that "sin might abound" (Rom 5:20)—not for the sake of damnation but for the sake of salvation.

The relationship between natural law and the Old Law is found in Aquinas' discussion of moral precepts in Question 100, a. 1: "Do all the moral precepts of the Old

Law belong to the law of nature?" The answer is affirmative: "all the moral precepts of the [Old] Law belong to the law of nature." Ultimately, the purpose of the Old Law is to re-teach the natural law to humanity.

Just as the natural law leads humanity by connaturality and experience, so the Old

Law also taught by experience. The Old Law, consisting of the moral, ceremonial, and judicial precepts, taught Israel a lesson through their constant experience of failure.

Aquinas finds it fitting that the Old Law (primarily through the moral precepts) educated

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 98, a. 2, ad. 3. "Deus aliquando permittit aliquos cadere in peccatum, ut exinde humilienrur. Ita etiam voluit talem legem dare quam suis viribus homines implere non possent, ut sic dum homines de se praesumentes peccatores se invenirent, humiliati recurrerent ad auxilium gratiae." a people in the school of natural law via divine revelation:

[NJatural law began to be obscured on account of the exuberance of sin:

for it was fitting that this help should be bestowed on men in an orderly

manner, so that they might be led from imperfection to perfection;

wherefore it was becoming that the Old Law should be given between the

law of nature and the law of grace.

Aquinas teaches that while the primary precepts of natural law cannot be blotted from the heart of man, the secondary precepts of natural law can be lost. Just as natural law can be progressively discovered through inclinations, so the secondary precepts can be lost through perversion. As discussed above, the precepts of the natural law are progressively known through natural inclinations as the practical intellect gains experience. Aquinas now accounts for the reversal of this process.

From a Jewish or Christian point of view, it may seem odd that God did not immediately institute the Old Law in humanity's primitive state in order to clarify the precepts of natural law. Aquinas provides two reasons for the delayed institution of the

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 98, a. 6. "lex naturalis obscurari incipiebat propter exuberantiam peccatorum. Oportebat autem huiusmodi auxilium quodam ordine dari, ut per imperfecta ad perfectionem manuducerentur. Et ideo inter legem naturae et legem gratiae, oportuit legem veterem dari."

TOT

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 94, a. 6, ad. 3. See also the discussion below concerning Ross A. Armstrong's Primary and Secondary Precepts in Thomistic Natural

Law Teaching (Martinus Nij off/The Hague, 1966). 166

Old Law. Both reasons relate to redemptive history. Aquinas lists: 1) the need for humbling; and 2) the perspicuous witness of natural law prior to Abraham. First,

"because man was so confident in his own reason," and secondly, "because as yet the dictate of the natural law was not darkened by habitual sinning."388

Aquinas describes how the Old Law redirected the people of Israel to eternal beatitude by disposing them Christ. Aquinas employs the Pauline image of the

"pedagogue."389 Initially, the Old Law appealed to Israel through promises of temporal blessings and curses. The pedagogical function of the Old Law, according to Aquinas, implies imperfection and immaturity.390 These temporal promises are in accord with natural law since the inclinations of human nature cannot transcend temporal goods and reach their final good—eternal beatitude. Natural law does not stand alone as a secular alternative to divine law, but as the prelude for the Divine Law that plays out in two

391 stages - the Old Law and the New Law.

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 98, a. 6, ad. 1. "Turn quia adhuc dictamen legis naturae nondum erat obtenebratum per consuetudinem peccandi."

389 See Galatians 3:19-25.

390 Summa theologiae I-II, q. 99, a. 6. "Imperfectorum autem est quod temporalia bona desiderent, in ordine tamen ad Deum. Perversorum autem est quod in temporalibus bonis finem constituant. Unde legi veteri conveniebat ut per temporalia, quae erant in affectu hominum imperfectorum, manuduceret homines ad Deum."

391 Russell Hittinger commenting on Summa theologiae I-II, q. 98, a. 6, observes that, "man was left to the law of nature in order to prepare him to be tutored by a divine Aquinas recounts how some men "are led willingly to virtue by being admonished better than by coercion: but men who are evilly disposed are not led to virtue unless they are compelled." The precepts of the Old Law work accordingly to incite both kinds of men to pursue the Good. The three kinds of precepts in the Old Law, the moral, ceremonial, and judicial precepts, work to instill obedience in both kinds of men.

The Old Law commands exterior acts that reinforce the natural law. Aquinas writes that the ceremonial laws were given to counteract the idolatrous tendencies of the nascent people of Israel:

For in that people there were many prone to idolatry; wherefore it was

necessary to recall them by means of ceremonial precepts from the

worship of idols to the worship of God. And since men served idols in

many ways, it was necessary on the other hand to devise many means of

repressing every single one: and again, to lay many obligations on such

like men, in order that being burdened, as it were, by their duties to the

393 Divine worship, they might have no time for the service of idols.

positive law." Here the idea of "tutoring" is extended back from the Old Law into the

Natural Law. R. Hittinger, "Theology and Natural Law Theory" in Communio 17 (1990),

404-5.

392 Summa theologiae I-II, q. 95, a. 1, ad. 1. "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homines bene dispositi melius inducuntur ad virtutem monitionibus voluntariis quam coactione, sed quidam male dispositi non ducuntur ad virtutem nisi cogantur."

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 101, a. 3, resp. "Erant enim in illo populo aliqui ad 168

Consequently, the precept of the Old Law that prohibits boiling a calf in its mother's milk394 is not simply a dietary law. Thomas teaches that this commandment was instituted to prevent the Israelites from entering into a practice pertaining to pagan fertility cults.

The prohibition against idolatry belongs to the secondary precepts of natural law along with precepts such as "Do not steal."3 The judicial precepts ensure that Israel is just as a nation—both to the Israelite and to the sojourner in Israel's midst.

idololatriam proni, et ideo necesse erat ut ab idololatriae cultu per praecepta caeremonialia revocarentur ad cultum Dei. Et quia multipliciter homines idololatriae deserviebant, oportebat e contrario multa institui ad singula reprimenda, et iterum multa talibus imponi, ut, quasi oneratis ex his quae ad cultum Dei impenderent, non vacaret idololatriae deservire."

394 Exodus 23:19.

395

Summa theologiae I-II, q.102, a. 6, ad 4. The practice of boiling a kid in its mother's milk was in fact a Canaanite fertility ritual whereby the person consuming the stew would be endowed with sexual potency. See footnote "e" in Summa Theologiae Vol.

29 The Old Law la2ae. 98-105 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1972) pp.

220-1.

Secondary precepts as deduced conclusions. See Summa theologiae I-II, q. 99, a. 2, ad. 2. "Circa alia vero praecepta moralia, quae sunt quasi conclusiones deductae ex communibus principiis legis naturae, multorum ratio oberrabat, ita ut quaedam quae secundum se sunt mala, ratio multorum licita iudicaret." 397 See Lev 24:22: "You shall have one law for the sojourner and for the native; 169

The Old Law in its moral, ceremonial, and judicial precepts, reconstitutes human society in conformity to natural law in preparation for the New Law. The Old Law only contains these three kinds of precepts because duty is twofold: 1) duty according to reason; and 2) duty according to the rule of a law that prescribes that duty. The former pertains to the moral precepts. Regarding the latter, legality frames our friendship with

God and our friendship with society. In this way Aquinas subdivides legality into two species of precepts: ceremonial precepts (friendship with God) and judicial precepts

(friendship within society).

AQUINAS ON NATURAL LAW AND DIVINE LAW

Aquinas' discussion of the Decalogue focuses on the moral precepts as they relate to natural law. As discussed above, the primary precepts of the natural law are indemonstrable and known connaturally. The secondary precepts of natural law are those that are not self-evident. The secondary precepts of natural law are deduced from the primary precepts by discursive reasoning.399 Consequently, the precepts of the Decalogue

for I am the LORD your God."

398 Summa theologiae I-II, q. 99, a. 5. "Ex quibus omnibus apparet quod omnia legis praecepta continentur sub moralibus, caeremonialibus et iudicialibus, alia vero non habent rationem praeceptorum, sed ordinantur ad praeceptorum observationem, ut dictum est."

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 99, a. 2, ad. 2. "Circa alia vero praecepta moralia, quae sunt quasi conclusiones deductae ex communibus principiis legis naturae, multorum ratio oberrabat, ita ut quaedam quae secundum se sunt mala, ratio multorum licita relate to the secondary precepts of natural law.

In Question 100, Aquinas asks whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the natural law (a. 1), and whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to the precepts of the Decalogue (a. 3). These two articles depend on the distinction of primary and secondary precepts of the natural law.

In article one, Aquinas clearly states: "Therefore all the moral precepts of the Law belong to the law of nature."400 Aquinas then refers to Question 94, a. 2 discussed at length in Part One above, and identifies three kinds of precepts as they derive from the first principles of natural law:

And as every judgment of speculative reason proceeds from the natural

knowledge of first principles, so every judgment of practical reason

proceeds from principles known naturally {principia naturaliter cognota},

as stated above: from which principles one may proceed in various ways

to judge of various matters. For some matters connected with human

actions are so evident, that after very little consideration {modica

consideration one is able at once to approve or disapprove of them by

means of these general first principles: while some matters cannot be the

subject of judgment without much consideration {multa consideration of

the various circumstances, which all are not competent to do carefully, but

iudicaret."

400 Summa theologiae I-II, q. 100, a. 1, s.c. "Ergo omnia moralia praecepta legis sunt de lege naturae." only those who are wise: just as it is not possible for all to consider the

particular conclusions of sciences, but only for those who are versed in

philosophy: and lastly there are some matters of which man cannot judge

unless he be helped by Divine instruction; such as what should be

believed.

First, Thomas identifies the judgments of practical reason as the common "principles known naturally" {principia naturaliter cognota). These are those precepts known connaturally. They are the bedrock of natural law and are identified elsewhere as the prima principia legis naturae.402 R. A. Armstrong notes that Aquinas recalls the primary

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 100, a. 1, resp. Emphasis mine. "Sicut autem omne iudicium rationis speculativae procedit a naturali cognitione primorum principiorum, ita etiam omne iudicium rationis practicae procedit ex quibusdam principiis naturaliter cognitis, ut supra dictum est. Ex quibus diversimode procedi potest ad iudicandum de diversis. Quaedam enim sunt in humanis actibus adeo explicita quod statim, cum modica consideratione, possunt approbari vel reprobari per ilia communia et prima principia.

Quaedam vero sunt ad quorum iudicium requiritur multa consideratio diversarum circumstantiarum, quas considerare diligenter non est cuiuslibet, sed sapientum, sicut considerare particulares conclusiones scientiarum non pertinet ad omnes, sed ad solos philosophos. Quaedam vero sunt ad quae diiudicanda indiget homo adiuvari per instructionem divinam, sicut est circa credenda."

402 Ross A. Armstrong, Primary and Secondary Precepts in Thomistic Natural

Law Teaching (Martinus Nijoff/The Hague, 1966), 100. principles articulated in Question 94, a. 2, but that, "it is not these precepts that S.

Thomas wishes us to direct our attention. Rather we are called upon to consider the class of precepts which have the status of conclusiones, i.e. the secunda praecepta."

Aquinas then subdivides the secondary precepts into three categories.404 First, there are "some matters connected with human actions are so evident, that after very little consideration one is able at once to approve or disapprove of them by means of these general first principles." These are those secondary precepts that are grasped with "little consideration" {modica consideration from the primary precepts. Next, there are other secondary precepts that "cannot be the subject of judgment without much consideration of the various circumstances." These are the precepts that are grasped with "much consideration" {multa consideratio). Third, there are some precepts that a man cannot grasp, "unless he be helped by Divine instruction." These last kind pertain to divine revelation.

The two kinds of secondary precepts, those known with little consideration, and those known with much consideration, correspond to human experience. Some precepts are easily drawn from the primary principles of natural law, for example, "Do not murder." This is perceived with little consideration. There are ethical questions that are extremely difficult to derive from the primary principles of natural law. The conditions for a just war might pertain to this latter sort of precepts that require "much consideration."

Armstrong (1966), 100.

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 100, a. 1. See above for Latin. 173

This distinction in Question 100, a. 1 does not demarcate two contrary classes of precepts. Rather, they exist on a continuum. Aquinas is granting that some secondary precepts are more or less difficult to discern through reason. These should not be thought of as secondary and tertiary precepts. Armstrong cites several scholars that quibble over this point405 Among them, W. Farrel divides the precepts classified in Question 100, a. 1 as the primary precepts (known connaturally), the secondary precepts (easily considered), and "remote conclusions" (considered with difficulty).406 This assertion cannot be sustained since the so-called "remote conclusions" are derived from the primary precepts by reason just as the easily discerned secondary precepts. Whether the precepts are apprehended with little or much consideration, they are secondary precepts nonetheless.

An alternate error cited by Armstrong is that of R. Jolivet who includes the precepts of the Decalogue with the primary precepts of the natural law as comprising the primary precepts of the law. All other derived precepts derived from these are secondary precepts. It is clear that this formulation is not what Aquinas articulates. The primary precepts are not reached by discursive reason and cannot be grouped with the Decalogue, which serve as secondary precepts. Aquinas asserts that the precepts of the Decalogue are not the primary precepts of the natural law, because the primary precepts do not require discursive, while the secondary precepts do require discursive reasoning. Primary and

405 R.A. Armstrong, 102.

W. Farrel, The Natural Moral Law ofS. Thomas and Suarez, (Ditchling,

1930), 107-8. Cited by Armstrong, 102-3.

407 R.A. Armstrong, 102. 174 secondary precepts are distinguished in how they are known. Aquinas further explains the difference:

Nevertheless both kinds of precepts are contained in the precepts of the

Decalogue; yet in different ways. For the first general principles are

contained in them, as principles in their proximate conclusions; while

those which are known through wise men are contained, conversely, as

conclusions in their principles.^

Jolivet's classification is incorrect in that it fails to appreciate the subtle way in which

Aquinas employs the term prima principia.

A more nuanced examination of the how Aquinas structures the secondary precepts in light of the Decalogue is provided by O. Lottin. Lottin sets forth the precepts in the following fashion:

1. Primary Precepts: These include "the good is to be done and pursued and

evil is to be avoided" and "act according to reason."

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 100, a. 3 resp. Emphasis mine. "Utraque tamen horum praeceptorum continentur in praeceptis Decalogi, sed diversimode. Nam ilia quae sunt prima et communia, continentur in eis sicut principia in conclusionibus proximis, ilia vero quae per sapientes cognoscuntur, continentur in eis, e converso, sicut conclusiones in principiis."

409 O. Lottin, "L'ordre moral et l'ordre logique d'apres Saint Thomas," Annales

Inst. Supr. Phil., 5 (1924). I follow the summary provided by Armstrong, p. 106-7. 175

2. General Precepts: These include all the precepts that flow reasonably from

the primary precepts. They are the "secondary precepts" and "immediate

conclusions" arrived at by discursive reasoning.

3. Remote Precepts: These precepts are those precepts that either do not

apply to all people or are not known to all people. Lottin cites Aquinas'

discussion of a precept that obliges us to "pay our debts." This command

would need to be carefully analyzed given the variety of circumstances

that might surround it, e.g. the reality of bankruptcy or "third world debt"

in contemporary economics.

Articulated in this way, it becomes unclear as to how "remote" precepts belong properly to the secondary precepts. The important point to be made is that there is not a tertiary class of precepts in the natural law. This is important as we examine the Decalogue as it relates to the secondary precepts of the natural law.

THE DECALOGUE AND THE SECONDARY PRECEPTS OF THE NATURAL LAW

The precepts of the Decalogue differ from the rest of the Old Law in the way in which they were promulgated. According to the Exodus and Deuteronomy, the explicit precepts of the Decalogue were written with the finger of God and thus directly instituted by God. The rest of the law was mediated through Moses. Aquinas explains the

410 Cf. Ex 31:18; Deut 5:22.

"God revealed these 'ten words' to his people on the holy mountain. They were written 'with the finger of God,' unlike the other commandments written by

Moses." Catechism of the Catholic Church, § 2056. The rest of the six hundred thirteen 176 significance of the Decalogue being instituted in this way:

The precepts of the Decalogue differ from the other precepts of the Law,

in the fact that God Himself is said to have given the precepts of the

Decalogue; whereas He gave the other precepts to the people through

Moses. Wherefore the Decalogue includes those precepts the knowledge

of which man has immediately from God. Such are those which with but

slight reflection can be gathered at once from the first general principles:

and those also which become known to man immediately through divinely

infused faith.412

Aquinas recognizes that the Decalogue uniquely contains those precepts "which with but slight reflection can be gathered at once from the first general principles." If we were to use the classification of Lottin, the Decalogue would be the secondary precepts in the

precepts are in the Pentateuch. Maimonides catalogued the six hundred thirteen commands in his Sefer HaMitzvos which served as an introduction to Mishneh Torah.

For English, see Mechon Mamre translation (Jerusalem: Mechon Mamre, 2011). See also

Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 74a.

Summa theologiae I-II q. 100, a. 3, resp. Emphasis mine, "praecepta Decalogi ab aliis praeceptis legis differunt in hoc, quod praecepta Decalogi per seipsum Deus dicitur populo proposuisse; alia vero praecepta proposuit populo per Moysen. Ilia ergo praecepta ad Decalogum pertinent, quorum notitiam homo habet per seipsum a Deo.

Huiusmodi vero sunt ilia quae statim ex principiis communibus primis cognosci possunt modica consideratione, et iterum ilia quae statim ex fide divinitus infusa innotescunt." "general" sense. They are immediate conclusions acknowledged with little consideration.

Aquinas' description of the institution of the Decalogue clearly places the Ten

Commandments as secondary precepts of the natural law since they require "slight reflection." The precepts of the Decalogue cannot be primary precepts because the primary general precepts are self-evident and have been promulgated in human nature and not within a historical situation. The precepts of the Decalogue are the "most clear" set of secondary precepts. One could easily arrive at these conclusions if one engaged in

"slight reflection" over the primary principles of natural law. The precepts of the

Decalogue are the furthest away from remote conclusions of the secondary precepts. One might think of the Decalogue and the remote conclusions as resting on opposite ends of the spectrum within the continuum of secondary precepts of the natural law.

In particular, Article Three classifies the precepts of the Decalogue as secondary precepts of the natural law:

Those two principles are the first general principles of the natural law,

and are self-evident to human reason, either through nature or through

faith. Wherefore all the precepts of the Decalogue are referred to these, as

conclusions to general principles.413

In the same article, Aquinas states that first general principles are contained

{continentur} in the precepts of the Decalogue.414 How does the Decalogue serve as the

413 Summa theologiae I-II, q. 100, a. 3, ad. 1. "Et ideo omnia praecepta Decalogi ad ilia duo referuntur sicut conclusiones ad principia communia."

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 100, a. 3, resp. "Nam ilia quae sunt prima et 178 conclusions of the general principles and also contain the general principles? While

Aquinas does not state it himself, it seems that the Decalogue uniquely pertains to the general principles of natural law. The precepts of the Decalogue are the proximate conclusions {conclusionibus proximis} of the general principles. While it is incorrect to state: "Natural Law is the Ten Commandments placed in the heart of man," it is permissible to state that the Decalogue most perfectly contains the proximate conclusions of natural law. This is why the Decalogue stands apart from the rest of the Old Law. The

Decalogue is most proximate to natural law. The fundamental principle: "bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum" is delineated rationally by the traditional division of the Decalogue into two tables. The first table of the law consists of the first three commandments pertaining to man's duty to God. The second table of the law consists of the last seven commandments pertaining to man's duty to man:

communia continentur in eis sicut principia in conclusionibus proximus."

415 The twofold division of the Decalogue derives from the biblical description of the Ten Commandments being issued on two stone tablets. "And he gave to Moses, when he had made an end of speaking with him upon Mount Sinai, the two tables of the testimony, tables of stone, written with the finger of God" (Ex 31:18). 179

FIRST TABLE OF DECALOGUE SECOND TABLE OF DECALOGUE

1. Thou shalt have no other gods before 4. Thou shalt honor thy father and mother, me. 5. Thou shalt not kill. 2. Thou shalt not take the name of the 6. Thou shalt not commit adultery. Lord thy God in vain. 7. Thou shalt not steal. 3. Thou shalt remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy. 8. Thou shalt not bear false witness. 9. Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife. 10. Thou shalt not covet they neighbor's j 416 goods.

By rationally reflecting on the connatural principle: "bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum," we can discern that stealing is not to be done.

Interestingly enough, the Decalogue as secondary (proximate) precepts of the natural law does include theological content. Aquinas does not say that only the precepts of the second table of the law (commandments four through ten) are proximate conclusions of natural law. The precepts of the first table of the law (commandments one through three)

As stated in a previous footnote, it should be noted that the Catholic and

Lutheran traditions number the Decalogue differently than the general Protestant tradition. According to the Protestant numeration of the Ten Commandments, the first commandment is split into two commandments and the ninth and tenth commandments are combined as a single commandment. This means that in the Protestant tradition, the first table consists of the first four commandments and the second table consists of the last six commandments. Nevertheless, the content is the same. See also Summa theologiae I-II, q. 100, a. 4 where Thomas distinguishes the precepts of the Decalogue. 180 belong to the secondary precepts of natural with the same force as "Thou shalt not kill" or

"Thou shall not steal." The three precepts of the first table regarding monotheism, reverence, and worship pertain to the natural law. According to Aquinas' presentation, one cannot be a consistent adherent to natural law and claim to be an atheist, since this would mean that the first three commandments of the Decalogue as secondary precepts of the natural law would be broken417 Still, Aquinas holds that the second table of the law does indeed belong to the natural law. This position was largely rejected by the

Franciscan tradition through the influence of John Duns Scotus as described in Chapter

Four.

CONCLUSION: DECALOGUE AS A TELEOLOGICAL INSTRUMENT

Thomas Aquinas' articulation of natural law and the Decalogue roots precepts in natural inclinations. In doing so, Aquinas presents an anthropological account of natural law that resists an overly theological and deontological version of ethics. Natural law theory has the tendency in slipping into two opposite directions: 1) the Scotian tendency as it seeks to interpret natural law in light of divine law, and 2) the modern tendency after Grotius that severs natural law from its teleological orientation toward supernatural beatitude.

For the need of legislator and promulgator of the Thomas Aquinas' natural law theory, see James Lehrberger's "Crime without Punishment: Thomistic Natural Law and the Problem of Sanctions," in Law and Philosophy: The Practice of Theory, eds. John A.

Murley, et al. (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1992): 248-9

418 On Hugo Grotius and the subsequent misunderstandings concerning natural law, see J. Maritain, Natural Law: Reflections on Theory and Practice, ed. William 181

In both cases, natural law is no longer considered as a participation in eternal law in anticipation for Divine Law. Natural law obliges by virtue of its participation in eternal law. If natural law leads man to have a supernatural relationship with God, it takes on the supernatural features of grace and leaps forward as divine law. If natural law is not a rational participation in the eternal law of God, then it cannot truly oblige men as law.

This "participatory law" introduces the feature of analogy, as Thomas states: "It is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature's participation of the eternal law." The various species of law, according to Thomas, are not stacked but allow the subject (here, the rational creature) to participate in that which is higher.

The genius of Thomas Aquinas' natural law theory is that it presents an analogical theory of natural law. Aquinas prevents the "slippage" described above by preserving distinctions in law by participation. Natural law participates in eternal law.

The Decalogue, although divinely revealed, immediately participates in the general principles of natural law. Thomas does not make sharp distinctions between each, but sees each as an enfolding of the others. Even the Old Law is extrapolation of the natural law. Moreover, New Law is an unfolding and fulfillment of both natural law and the Old

Sweet (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, 2001), 45-7.

Summa theologiae I-II q. 91 a. 2 co. "Unde patet quod lex naruralis nihil aliud est quam participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura."

See Summa theologiae I-II, q. 91, a. 5, co. but especially ad. 3. 182

Secondly, by dividing the precepts of natural law into primary precepts and secondary precepts, Aquinas is able to present natural law as primarily non-imperative:

"bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum." It reflects the ability of human powers to conform to their nature. It states something about the potency of human nature. Imperatives such as "Do not steal" are secondary precepts of natural law.

Imperative commandments do not properly encapsulate natural law at the primary level.

Imperatives are derived by human reason from the primary precepts.

We find in Thomas that the good has the intelligibility of an end. How is it then that Thomas escapes utilitarianism if goodness is teleological? The answer lies in the fact that Thomas' teleology is not that of the moderns. Nature, for Thomas, acts toward an end. A fish does not swim because it is useful—it swims because it is the nature of a fish to do so. In the same way, a man does not reason because it is useful—he reasons because he is by nature a rational animal. Thomas' teleology is one of actualization. It is the movement from potency to actualization by means of natural inclinations. Human beings as rational agents act according to their natural dispositions and incline toward the rational, that is the good. Thus, the value of an end is the realization of the natural inclinations. This Thomas would call "conformity to the natural law."

Regarding the Decalogue, Aquinas resists moralizing the natural law by refusing to conflate it with the Ten Commandments. Aquinas emphatically preserves the distinction between primary and secondary precepts and places the Ten Commandments in the latter category. The Decalogue holds a unique place as it represents the proximate conclusions of the natural law. Its place in redemptive history clarifies the role of natural law, distills the Old Law, and prepares man for grace to be received in the New Law. As 183 such, Question 94, a. 2 and Question 100, aa. 1-3 shed light on one another and clarify

Aquinas' understanding of the pedagogical role of law leading up to the grace received through the New Law. An appreciation for how Thomas understands law analogically with regard to the final supernatural end of men will help us to steer through the debate regarding the end or ends of humanity. It will also allow us to appreciate for Thomas' nuanced approach to beatitude as "twofold." 184

CHAPTER SEVEN: DUPLEX OR DUO?

We now turn to the Thomas' careful treatment of beatitude as it regards a supernatural end and/or a natural end. Henri de Lubac's controversial interpretation of

Thomas Aquinas' supernatural end of humanity sparked a debate leading to the apparent condemnation of de Lubac's thesis under Pope Pius XII Humani Generis (1950). De

Lubac sought to overturn the received Cajetanian interpretation of Thomas that posited a natural end of man and a supernatural end of man, a task that required a reinvestigation

4?? into the relationship between nature and grace. His treatment of the subject is his 1965 revision of Surnatural has been widely received.423 Nevertheless, the last ten years have enjoyed a proliferation of theological and philosophical research on the subject.

421 The following condemnation from Humani Generis is considered to be directed against Henri de Lubac: "Others destroy the gratuity of the supernatural order, since God, they say, cannot create intellectual beings without ordering and calling them to the beatific vision." Pius XII, Humani Generis 12 August 1950.

De Lubac's role at the Second Vatican Council and his subsequent elevation as a cardinal under John Paul II in 1983 has signified for many not merely the rehabilitation of De Lubac, but his vindication on matters regarding the natural and the supernatural.

423 De Lubac, Henri. Le Mystere du Surnaturel (Paris: Aubier, 1965).

See Denis J. M. Bradley, Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good: Reason and 185

Fundamentally, the answer to the question raised by de Lubac will define the position of philosophy to theology and the final purpose for the human person. The answer will also determine what is meant by "nature" and "law." Is the human person naturally inclined to the supernatural end of the beatific vision of God's essence or not? Lamentably, scholarship has generally neglected one pertinent work of Thomas with respect to the natural powers of man and the supernatural. I refer to the Expositio super librum Boethii

De trinitate by Thomas Aquinas. This unfinished work of Thomas says precious little about the doctrine of the Trinity. Rather, Thomas' Super de trinitate investigates the relationship of faith and reason, particularly as it relates to our knowledge of God when

the Human Happiness in Aquinas's Moral Science (Washington, DC: Catholic University of American Press, 1997). Bernard Lonergan, "The Natural Desire to See God" in

Collection: Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,

1993). Lawrence Feingold, The Natural Desire to See God according to St. Thomas

Aquinas and His Interpreters (Rome: Apollinare Studi, 2001; Sapientia Press, 2010).

John Milbank, The Suspended Middle: Henri de Lubac and the Debate concerning the

Supernatural (Cambridge: William B Eerdmans, 2005). Steven A. Long, "On the Loss, and the Recovery, of Nature as a Theonomic Principle: Reflections on the Nature/Grace

Controversy," Nova et Vetera 5 (2007): 133-83. Stephen Long, "On the Possibility of a

Purely Natural End for Man," The Thomist 64 (2000), 233. Reinhard Hiitter, "Desiderium

Naturale Visionis Dei—Est autem duplex hominis beatitudo sive felicitas: Some

Observations about Lawrence Feingold's and John Milbank's Recent Interventions in the

Debate over the Natural Desire to See God," Nova et Vetera 5 (2007): 81-131. 186 we consider the existence of a First Cause. The present thesis attempts to create a synthesis—one that might be dismissed by both those who claim that man has one final supernatural end (e.g. Henri de Lubac) and by those who claim that man has a natural end and a supernatural end (e.g. Thomas Cajetan). Thomas Aquinas himself reconciles

Delubacian "one-enders" and Cajetanian "two-enders" by highlighting Thomas' articulation of duplex felicitas or beatitudo. The right interpretation rests not in limiting human teleology to one end or two ends, but in maintaining the phraseology of Thomas by insisting on his ubiquitous qualification that beatitude is duplex—twofold. Strictly speaking, a twofold end is neither one end nor two ends. Thomas Aquinas, we shall see, returns repeatedly to this formulation, but especially in his Expositio super librum Boethii

De trinitate. Moreover, Super de trinitate accomplishes this task by detailing the distinctions between philosophical knowledge and divine revelation.

CARDINAL CAJETAN VS. CARDINAL DE LUBAC

The debate regarding man's natural desire (or lack thereof) for the supernatural end of beatitude is perceived as a debate between two princes of the Church: Thomas

Cardinal Cajetan (1469-1534) and Henri Cardinal de Lubac (1896-1991)—two cardinals separated by the span of four centuries. De Lubac challenged the received interpretation of Saint Thomas Aquinas when he published his work Surnaturel 1946. Surnaturel sought to resurrect an authentic teaching of Thomas Aquinas against "two-tier" Thomism represented by Cajetan and the zenith of Thomist studies in the seventeenth century.

425 De Lubac's controversial thesis was the theme for the meeting of the American

Catholic Philosophical Association in 1949. De Lubac's thesis was contested especially 187

De Lubac claimed that Saint Thomas Aquinas was a Patristic theologian and that he should be read in continuity with the Fathers, not in continuity with subsequent so- called

™, • 426 Thomism. The Cajetanian tradition had held that nature's end is in proportion to its nature:

-All

"Natural desire does not extend itself beyond the faculty of nature.' Nature naturally tends toward its end—never beyond it. For example, a flower naturally tends toward the production of seeds and it naturally has the ability to do so. It would be ridiculous to think of a plant that naturally tended toward seed production but could not naturally do so. In brief, natural ends imply natural capabilities. Consequently, if a human person naturally desires the happiness of the beatific vision of God's essence, then he must be naturally capable of accomplishing this end. Nature must be self-sufficient.

in Gerard Smith's "The Natural End of Man," Proceedings of the American Catholic

Philosophical Association 23 (1949), pp. 47-61.

426 According to Gerard Smith at the Proceedings of the American Catholic

Philosophical Association held on April 19-20 of 1949, De Lubac finds fault in Thomas for incorporating so thoroughly the philosophy of Aristotle to the detriment of the Church

Fathers. "Fr. De Lubac maintains, why St. Thomas contributed more than any one lese to give rise to the difficulty which he himself did not see. In sum, thanks to St. Thomas and for better or worse, the Aristotelian "nature" is in Christian philosophy." G. Smith.

Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, pp. 59-60

427 "Naturale desiderium non se extendit ultra naturae facultatem." Thomas

Cajetan, Commentaria in Summam Theologiae St Thomae I, q. 12, a. 1, n. 10. 188

Consequently, post-Cajetanian Thomists generally posited that man has a purely natural end for his purely natural nature. For them, the supernatural end of man in the beatific vision and his corresponding desire for that end are superadded.

This tradition, also appropriated by Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), and John of St.

Thomas (1589-1644), holds that man does not possess an innate natural desire for the beatitude of beholding God's essence, since heaven is received by gift and glory—not by nature. To assert otherwise is to affirm the heresy of Pelagius who affirmed that human salvation could be attained without the aid of God's grace mediated through the death of

Christ.428 Contrary to Pelagius, the Christian faith holds that man is saved and elevated by grace and the light of glory to the beatitude of God. Hence, nature (even without sin) is not sufficiently equipped to attain supernatural beatitude. In order to guard against the

Pelagian notion of nature and grace, Cajetan and the commentary tradition after him adopted would later be pejoratively described as "two-tier" Thomism. This distinction bears consequences for the relationship between philosophy and theology, reason and faith, along with the secular and the sacred. It also informs the way that we articulate grace as gratuitous. Most recently, Lawrence Feingold's The Natural Desire to See God

According to St. Thomas Aquinas and His Interpreters represents the most robust defense of the traditional Cajetanian commentary tradition of interpreting Saint Thomas Aquinas as a "two-ender." Contemporary Thomists such as Romanus Cessario,429 Reinhard

Augustine, De natura et gratia 7-12(13).

429 Romanus Cessario, "Neo-Neo-Thomism—Review of Ralph Mclnerny,

Praeambula fidei: Thomism and the God of the Philosophers," First Things (2007): 48- 189

Hutter,430 and Steven Long also defend the traditional commentary tradition and

Feingold's thesis. These thinkers emphasize the idea ofpotentia obedientiae or

"obediential potency," particularly as articulated by Thomas Cajetan. As described in the

Introduction, innate natural inclinations for supernatural beatitude are explicitly denied.

L. Feingold elaborates that this exclusion of innate inclinations to the supernatural also entails a denial that "our capacity to receive such perfections should be conceived as a natural passive potency.'^2 The reason for this is clear. Feingold continues: "wherever there is natural passive potency, there is an innate inclination for its actualization, for they are correlative terms."433 Instead of an innate natural potency, Thomas Cajetan suggests an obediential potency as "the aptitude for there to be realized in a thing whatever God has decreed to work in it.' So then, the natural soul has only an obediential potency for

51.

430 Reinhard Hutter, "Desiderium Naturale Visionis Dei—Est autem duplex hominis beatirudo sive felicitas: Some Observations about Lawrence Feingold's and John

Milbank's Recent Interventions in the Debate over the Natural Desire to See God," Nova et Vetera 5 (2007): 81-131.

431 Steven A. Long, "On the Loss, and the Recovery, of Nature as a Theonomic

Principle: Reflections on the Nature/Grace Controversy," Nova et Vetera 5 (2007): 133-

83.

432 Feingold, 101.

433 Feingold, 101.

Thomas Cajetan, Commentary on Summa theologiae I, q. 1, a. 1 nn. 9,10. supernatural beatitude. However, Cajetan would not extend this sort of obediential potency to all created things. One could not say that a flower has an obediential potency for supernatural beatitude. Only men (and angels) could have this potency for supernatural beatitude because they possess intellects and wills. The overarching idea is that the human potential for supernatural beatitude is not natural but obediential. Notably,

De Lubac called Cajetan's application ofpotentia obedientiae to Thomas' doctrine of natural desire "a flagrant deviation from the master."435

L. Feingold distilled from the writings of De Lubac a syllabus of Cajetan's errors as follows:

1. Cajetan considers "natural potency decidedly in opposition to obediential

potency in the soul." Hence, natural potency and obediential potency are

mutually contrary.

2. Cajetan claims that the human capacity for supernatural perfections such

as grace is spoken of as an obediential potency. The accusation is that

Cajetan placed this argument into the mouth of Thomas when in fact, they

claim, Thomas never applied obediential potency to the supernatural end

of humanity.436

Leonine Edition, 4:8.

435 Henri de Lubac, Mystery of the Supernatural, p. 140. For De Lubac's original complaint against obediential potency, see Surnatural, 137'.

436 J. Laporta, "Les notions d'appetit naturel et de puissance obedientielle," ETL 5

(1928): 273. See also, Henri De Lubac, Mystery of the Supernatural, 141. 191

3. Cajetan reduces our relationship to divine beatitude to "a particular

instance of miracle."437

4. Cajetan failed to appreciate Thomas' careful application of natural passive

potency as always corresponds to a natural agent capable of realizing it.

They say that Cajetan did not realize that Thomas only applied this

principle to non-intellectual substances.

5. Cajetan naively considers obediential potency to adequately define the

relationship of human nature to the supernatural.

6. Cajetan rejects Thomas' principle: "The soul is naturally capable of

,,439

grace.

7. Cajetan lowers humanity or naturalizes humanity on par with non-

intellectual substances because he applies natural passive potency to all

creatures without distinction.

The second charge against Cajetan, namely that Cajetan applied obediential potency to the supernatural end of humanity, whereas Thomas did not, is the most serious accusation.440 Incidentally, Karl Rahner made the same allegation against Cajetan. If

Henri De Lubac, Mystery of the Supernatural, 143.

J. Laporta, La destinee, 87-88. Cited in L. Feingold, Natural Desire, 104.

439 This accusation also seems flimsy since the adverb "naturally" can be interpreted in a variety of ways.

440 J. Laporta, "Les notions d'appetit naturel et de puissance obedientielle,"

Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 5 (1928): 273. See also, Henri De Lubac, 192

this allegation is true then one can easily identify Cajetan as the point in which Thomistic

naturally teleology went off the track.

So then, what does Thomas say concerning obediential potency? Thomas refers to

obediential potency twenty-four times to be exact.442 The most important passage is from

Mystery, 141.

441 See Karl Rahner, "Concerning the Relationship Between Nature and Grace,"

Theological Investigations I, trans. C. Ernst (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1963),

315; "Nature and Grace," Theological Investigations IV, trans. K. Smyth (London:

Darton, Longman & Todd, 1966), 169-73. See also how Rahner preserves and defends potentia obedientialis with regard to our supernatural calling in his Hearers of the Word

(1969), 162, 176-180

See Appendix A: "Potentia Obedientialis/Obedientiae" in the Corpus

Thomisticum for all occurrences within context. I have featured the four most important

passages in bold letters. In Sent., II d. 15 q. 3 a. 1 ad 8; In Sent., II d. 19 q. 1 a. 5 co; In

Sent., Ill d. 1 q. 1 a. 3 ad 4; In Sent., Ill d. 2 q. 1 a. 1 qc. 1 co; In Sent., Ill d. 2 q. 1 a. 1

qc. 1 co; In Sent., Ill d. 2 q. 2 a. 2 qc. 3 ad 3; In Sent., Ill d. 3 q. 2 a. 1 ad 1; In Sent., IV

d. 8 q. 2 a. 3 ad 4; In Sent., IV d. 11 q. 1 a. 3 qc. 3 arg. 3; In Sent., IV d. 11 q. 1 a. 3 qc. 3

ad 3; In Sent., IV d. 11 q. 1 a. 3 qc. 3 ad 3; In Sent., IV d. 11 q. 1 a. 3 qc. 3 ad 3; In Sent.,

IV d. 11 q. 1 a. 3 qc. 3 ad 3; In Sent, IV d. 11 q. 1 a. 3 qc. 3 ad 3; In Sent., IV d. 17 q. 1

a. 5 qc. 1 co; In Sent, IV d. 48 q. 2 a. 1 ad 3; In Sent., IV d. 48 q. 2 a. 1 ad 3; Surama

theologiae III, q. 11 a. 1 co; De veritate, q. 8 a. 12 ad 4; De veritate, q. 12 a. 3 ad 18;

De veritate, q. 29 a. 3 ad 3; De potentia, q. 1 a. 3 arg. 5; De potentia, q. 6 a. 1 ad 18; De 193

De virtutibus in which Thomas makes a general claim regarding obediential potency: "In

every creature there is a certain obediential potency, according to which every creature

obeys God so as to receive in itself whatever He wills. Here all things in creation are

said to have a capacity to obey the will of God. In Jewish or Christian tradition, the

waters of the Red Sea obeyed God's will and divided. The nature of water is not to divide

and stand up. However, water has this capacity or obediential potency to do so if God

wills it. The miracles described in revelation, then, typically entail obediential potency.

In the Summa theologiae, Thomas refers to the universal obediential potency of

all creatures, and also to that which is specific to the human soul:

It must be borne in mind that in the human soul, as in every creature, there

is a twofold {duplex} passive power. One is in comparison with a natural

agent; the other in comparison with the First Agent, which can bring any

creature to a higher act than a natural agent can bring it, and this is usually

virtutibus, q. 1 a. 10 ad 13. While Summa theologiae III, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3 does not

specifically mention obediential potency, it is also an important text regarding the soul

and beatitude.

De virtutibus q. 1, a. 10, ad. 13. "Sicut enim ex aqua vel terra potest aliquid

fieri virtute corporis caelestis, quod non potest fieri virtute ignis; ita ex eis potest aliquid fieri virtute supernaturalis agentis quod non potest fieri virtute alicuius naturalis agentis; et secundum hoc dicimus, quod in tota creatura est quaedam obedientialis potentia, prout tota creatura obedit Deo ad suscipiendum in se quidquid Deus voluerit." 194

called the obediential potency of a creature.

In context, Thomas is discussing the created soul of Christ and how his soul received infused knowledge. Nonetheless, Thomas appeals to a twofold {duplex} distinction with regard to potency in all creatures. The twofold passive power is first with respect to the natural agent (what is within the potency of a certain nature), and the second with respect to the First Agent, that is, God. To use another example from the Hebrew Scriptures, the burning bush before Moses was not consumed. The fire (or the bush itself) obeyed "a higher act than a natural agent can bring it." Simply stated, Thomas' doctrine of obediential potency states that creatures have a passive receptivity to the direct will of

God.

The twofold distinction regarding goes back to Aristotle's Metaphysics Book

Theta, which discusses potency and actuality. The basic teaching of Aristotle that the potency of acting and of being acted upon is the same. Thomas assumes this matter-of- factly.446 Assuming the existence of God as distinct from creation, there are, then, two

Summa theologiae III, q. 11, a. 1. "Est autem considerandum quod in anima humana, sicut in qualibet creatura, consideratur duplex potentia passiva, una quidem per comparationem ad agens naturale; alia vero per comparationem ad agens primum, qui potest quamlibet creaturam reducere in actum aliquem altiorem, in quern non reducitur per agens naturale; et haec consuevit vocari potentia obedientiae in creatura."

See Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book Theta, 1046a.

446 See III Sent, d. 26, q. 1, a. 2. "Sed quia potentia passiva non extendit se ad plura quam virtus sui activi, secundum quod dicit Commentator in 9 Metaphysic, quod 195 kinds of potencies. One potency corresponds with the inherent nature of a substance. The other potency is effected directly by God, as in a miracle. So then, if the Aristotelian maxim that the potency of acting and of being acted upon are one and the same, then each kind of potency can be described either by its active power or passive power.

POTENCIES AS EXAMINED AS ACTIVE AND PASSIVE

NATURAL POTENCY DIVINE POTENCY (e.g. rabbits breed) (e.g. the burning bush is not consumed)

Active Power: Natural agent Active Power: Divine agent (God) Passive Power: Natural and Innate Passive Power: Obediential and Elicited

To further appreciate Thomas' application of the twofold potencies with regard to human nature and humanities supernatural beatitude, we turn to Summa theologiae III, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3.

SUMMA THEOLOGIAE ON OBEDIENTIAL POTENCY

In the Summa theologiae, Thomas speaks of a "double capacity." The distinctions made in the table above are reiterated in this text. One kind of potency is natural, whereas the other potency Thomas characterizes as obediential:

A double capability may be remarked in human nature: one, in respect of

the order of natural power, and this is always fulfilled by God, Who

apportions to each according to its natural capability; the other in respect

nulla potentia passiva est in narura, cui non respondeat sua potentia activa naturalis; ideo appetitus sensitivus ad ilia tantum bona se extendit ad quae se extendit apprehensio sensitiva." to the order of the Divine power, which all creatures implicitly obey;

and the capability we speak of pertains to this.447 But God does not fulfill

all such capabilities, otherwise God could do only what He has done in

creatures, and this is false, as stated above.448 But there is no reason why

human nature should not have been raised to something greater after sin.

For God allows evils to happen in order to bring a greater good from it;

hence it is written: "Where sin abounded, grace did more abound."449

Hence, too, in the blessing of the Paschal candle, we say: "O happy fault,

that merited such and so great a Redeemer!"450

The capacity Thomas speaks of here is the capacity for human nature to be assumed by the Divine Person of the Logos—clearly something beyond natural potency.

However, the objection (obj. 3) here regards the capacity of the soul for grace and thus the glory of supernatural beatitude. Consequently, the reply (ad 3) is especially illuminating since it directly addressed the capacity of the human soul in this regard.

Compare Summa theologiae III, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3 with obj. 3 of the same article.

448 Cf. Summa theologiae I q. 105, a. 6.

Romans 5:20.

Summa theologiae III, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3. Bold emphasis mine, "duplex capacitas attendi potest in humana natura. Una quidem secundum ordinem potentiae naturalis.

Quae a Deo semper impletur, qui dat unicuique rei secundum suam capacitatem naturalem. Alia vero secundum ordinem divinae potentiae, cui omnis creatura obedit ad nutum. Et ad hoc pertinet ista capacitas. Non autem Deus omnem talem capacitatem 197

Thus, it would seem that the charge of Henri de Lubac against Cajetan is not quite correct, namely his accusation that Cajetan applied obediential potency to human nature, where as Thomas did not. Even Karl Rahner hinted that De Lubac had pushed this point too far451

naturae replet, alioquin, Deus non posset facere in creatura nisi quod facit; quod falsum est, ut in primo habitum est. Nihil autem prohibet ad aliquid maius humanam naturam productam esse post peccatum, Deus enim permittit mala fieri ut inde aliquid melius eliciat. Unde dicitur Rom. V, ubi abundavit iniquitas, superabundavit et gratia. Unde et in benedictione cerei paschalis dicitur, o felix culpa, quae talem ac tantum meruit habere redemptorem."

451 Karl Rahner refers to obediential potency as something "scorned by de

Lubac." Karl Rahner: Theologian of the Graced Search for Meaning, ed. by Geffrey

Kelly (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1992), 114. His criticisms continue on the following page. Unlike H. de Lubac, K. Rahner seems to be exalting the notion of potentia obedientialis in the context of his supernatural existential in order to preserve the gratituity of grace, as in Hearers of the Word(1969), 162. Rahner, then, seeks to avoid the philosophical conflict between innate natural desire and the gratuity of grace by positing the supernatural existential aspect of the human person. Rahner cites this transcendental orientation as the reason humans seek supernatural beatitude. This allows him to escape perceived extrinicism (Cajetan) and also escape the accusation of conflating of nature and grace (de Lubac). However, the supernatural existential comes off as sounding like a species of inherent sanctifying grace—begging the question as to Those sympathetic to De Lubac might respond that the passage above does not explicitly refer to "obediential potency." However, it is difficult to see what Thomas could mean by the kind of "potency in respect to the order of the Divine power, which all creatures implicitly obey," if not obediential potency. In order to settle the dispute, one needs only to turn to Summa theologiaelll, q. 11, a. 1 for Thomas' reference to obediential potency with regard to human nature and the soul.

I answer that, as was said above,452 it was fitting that the soul of Christ

should be wholly perfected by having each of its powers reduced to act.

Now it must be borne in mind that in the human soul, as in every

creature, there is a double passive power {duplex potentia passiva}:

one in comparison with a natural agent; the other in comparison with the

first agent, which can reduce any creature to a higher act than a natural

agent can reduce it, and this is usually called the obediential power

{potentia obedientiae} of a creature. Now both powers of Christ's soul

were reduced to act by this divinely imprinted knowledge. And hence, by

it the soul of Christ knew: First, whatever can be known by force of a

man's active intellect, e.g. whatever pertains to human sciences; secondly,

whether Rahner believes in original sin according to the traditional Catholic understanding. Cardinal Siri made this accusation against K. Rahner regarding grace and original. See Joseph Cardinal Siri, Gethsemane (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1981)

88-89.

Cf. Summa theologiae III, q. 9, a. 1. 199

by this knowledge Christ knew all things made known to man by Divine

revelation, whether they belong to the gift of wisdom or the gift of

prophecy, or any other gift of the Holy Ghost; since the soul of Christ

knew these things more fully and completely than others. Yet He did not

know the Essence of God by this knowledge, but by the first alone, of

which we spoke above (Article 10).

Summa theologiae III, q. 11, a. 1, co. Bold emphasis mine. "Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut prius dictum est, conveniens fuit ut anima Christo per omnia esset perfecta, per hoc quod omnis eius potentialitas sit reducta ad actum. Est autem considerandum quod in anima humana, sicut in qualibet creatura, consideratur duplex potentia passiva, una quidem per comparationem ad agens naturale; alia vero per comparationem ad agens primum, qui potest quamlibet creaturam reducere in actum aliquem altiorem, in quern non reducitur per agens naturale; et haec consuevit vocari potentia obediendae in creatura. Utraque autem potentia animae Christi fuit reducta in actum secundum hanc scientiam divinitus inditam. Et ideo secundum earn anima Christi primo quidem cognovit quaecumque ab homine cognosci possunt per virtutem luminis intellectus agentis, sicut sunt quaecumque pertinent ad scientias humanas. Secundo vero per hanc scientiam cognovit Christus omnia ilia quae per revelationem divinam hominibus innotescunt, sive pertineant ad donum sapientiae, sive ad donum prophetiae, sive ad quodcumque donum spiritus sancti. Omnia enim ista abundantius et plenius ceteris cognovit anima Christi. Ipsam tamen Dei essentiam per hanc scientiam non cognovit, sed solum per primam, de qua supra dictum est." Recall how De Lubac accused Cajetan of subsuming the status of intellectual creatures with that of non-rational creatures with regard to obediential potency.454 Yet Thomas wrote and thought in the same way. As Thomas clearly states above: "in the human soul as in every creature, there is a twofold passive power." One cannot therefore affirm that authentic Thomism restricts obediential potency to the realm of non-rational creatures.

DE VERITATE ON OBEDIENTIAL POTENCY

In order to fully account for Thomas' doctrine of obediential potency, it is worth noting how he uses the term with regard to intellectual creatures who are not humans— the angels. In.De veritate, Thomas discusses the knowledge of angels with regard to a twofold potencies:

Something can be in potency to another in two ways. First, it can be in

natural potency; and it is in this way that a created intellect is in potency to

know all those things that can be manifested to it by its own natural light.

A beatified angel is ignorant of none of these things, for were he ignorant

of these his intellect would be imperfect. There exists, however, a certain

potency, which is only obediential, when something is said to be in

potency for those things which God can realize in it above its nature. If

such a potency is not actualized the potency is not imperfect.

454 Henri de Lubac, Mystery of the Supernatural, 143.

455 For J. Laporta's approach to this problem, see "Su la problematique thomiste de la vision beatifique (a propos d'un aritucle de M.E. Gilson)" Sophia 34 (1966): 101-

110. Consequently, the intellect of a beatified angel is not imperfect if it does

not know all the things which God could reveal to it.456

Angels, then, with their superior intellects are able to naturally attain a high level of activity. Yet, this knowledge would not yet be perfect, but only imperfect. So then,

Thomas speaks of a "certain potency" which is "above its nature," and this he labels explicitly as "obediential potency." If this obediential potency is realized, then the angel would exercise his intellect perfectly. This article is helpful in that it makes the distinction with regard to imperfect and perfect intellect with regard to obediential potency. Since an angel is an intellectual creature, it fulfills its own natural potency, but this potency is not said to be completely perfect, as Thomas makes explicit: "Yet the potency of an angelic intellect is not totally complete through innate forms."457 The angel cannot attain total completion of its natural potency through that which is innate.

De veritate q. 8, a. 4, ad 13. "quod aliquid est in potentia ad alterum dupliciter.

Uno modo in potentia naturali; et sic intellectus creatus est in potentia ad omnia ilia cognoscenda quae suo lumine naturali manifestari possunt; et nihil horum Angelus beatus ignorat; ex horum enim ignorantia remaneret intellectus Angeli imperfectus. Quaedam vero potentia est obedientiae tantum, sicut dicitur aliquid esse in potentia ad ilia quae supra naturam Deus in eo potest facere; et si talis potentia non reducatur ad actum, non erit potentia imperfecta: et ideo intellectus Angeli beati non est imperfectus, si non cognoscit omnia quae Deus potest ei revelare."

457 De veritate q. 8, a. 12, ad. 4. "Talis autem potentia intellectus angelici non est totaliter completa per formas innatas." Translation mine. Returning to the distinctions of Chapter One, man is inclined to know that the

First Cause exists, but he cannot naturally know what that Cause is. So also, the angels would by their intellects know that there was a God, but this would be an imperfect knowledge since their minds would then enquire into the nature of the First Cause (the nature of God) and not be able to naturally attain to it. So then, within intellectual creatures, Thomas draws the distinction between imperfect and perfect with the same criteria by which he speaks of natural potency and obediential potency.458

This "twofold" distinction is at the heart of Thomas' doctrine twofold beatitude or duplex beatitudo. It also conforms to the analogy of the relationship between natural law and divine law. Natural law, states Thomas anticipates and prepares for divine law, but it cannot of itself attain to inner renewal of human nature that is accomplished by divine law:

By the natural law the eternal law is participated proportionately to the

capacity of human nature {secundum proportionem capacitatis humanae

naturae). But to his supernatural end man needs to be directed in a yet

higher way. Hence the additional law given by God, whereby man shares

{participatur} more perfectly in the eternal law.459

The recognition of obediential potency does not necessitate the formulation of

"elicited natural desire." In fact, Thomas never uses this term. Instead, we find "desire of wonder" and this authentic account is treated in Chapter Nine.

459 Summa theologiae I-II q. 91, a. 4, ad 1. "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per naturalem legem participatur lex aeterna secundum proportionem capacitatis humanae 203

Natural law leads humans to participate in eternal law, but humanity still needs what

Thomas calls a "higher way" or altiori modo. Thomas describes this relationship in term of participation, and he calls the participation regarding the supernatural end of man as a participation more perfectly. So then, Thomas' argument regarding natural law and divine law is essentially the same as his argument regarding natural beatitude and supernatural beatitude. In each case the relationship is twofold and appeals to the former participating in the later.

One more passage in De veritate confirms this relationship, especially as it regards divine revelation:

Potency is twofold {duplex}. One is natural and can be actualized by a

natural agent, and so great a potency is complete in the angels totally

naturae. Sed oportet ut altiori modo dirigatur homo in ultimum finem supematuralem. Et ideo superadditur lex divinitus data, per quam lex aeterna participator altiori modo."

460 L. Feingold (Natural Desire to See God, p. 148), provides the English translation of De veritate q. 8, a 12 ad 4, as: "There are two kinds of potency. One is natural and..." However, the Latin reads: "quod duplex est potentia..." This reveals a general misappreciation for the significance of duplex within the Corpus Thomisticum as it regards this debate. Notice how Feingold ignored the "duplex" (he translated it "two") and disregarded the singular third person of esse (est) in the Latin and went with an

English translation with a third person plural (there are two). Grammatically and philosophically, it is not correct. Thomas speaks in the singular with "twofold." Feingold speak in the plural. through innate forms. However, it is not according to this kind of potency

that our possible intellect is in potency to know all future things. Now the

other is potency of obedience {potentia obedientiae) according to which

anything can be realized in a creature that the Creator wishes to be

realized in it. Our possible intellect is in this kind of potency to the

knowledge of all future things, in that they can be divinely revealed to

it.461

Here once again, the twofold potency is distinguished as the natural potency which can be actualized through a natural agent and then the obediential potency which Thomas describes explicitly as "anything realized in a creature that the Creator wishes to be realized in it."

Similar to the passage above in De veritate, Thomas refers in De virtutibus to the

"certain obediential potency" whereby every creature obeys God by receiving into itself whatsoever God wills.

461 De veritate q. 8, a. 12, ad 4. "quod duplex est potentia. Una est naturalis quae potest per agens naturale in actum reduci; et talis potentia in Angelis est totaliter completa per formas innatas: sed secundum talem potentiam intellectus possibilis noster non est in potentia ad futura quaelibet cognoscenda. Est autem alia potentia obedientiae, secundum quam in creatura fieri potest quidquid in ea fieri voluerit creator; et sic intellectus possibilis est in potentia ad futura quaelibet cognoscenda, inquantum ei scilicet possunt divinitus revelari. Talis autem potentia intellectus angelici non est totaliter completa per formas innatas. And according to this, we say that in the entire creation there is a certain

obediential potency whereby every creature obeys God by receiving into

itself whatever God wills. Therefore there is in the soul something in

potency, which is by nature constituted to be actualized by a connatural

agent. In this way the acquired virtues are potentially in the soul. In the

other way, there is something potential in the soul which is not naturally

ordered to be actualized except by divine power. In this way the infused

virtues are potentially in the soul.

Here Thomas explains that the infused virtues (faith, hope, and charity) are actualized in the soul by a divine power and that the soul is capable of this by a certain obediential potency—that, not through the soul's natural potency.

So then, the defenders of Cajetan have numerable passages to which they might appeal. However, the account of Thomas is that there is in the human soul a twofold potency (not strictly two potencies). The human person is able to actualize his natural potencies but the attainment of supernatural beatitude (or even the theological virtues)

De virtutibus, q. 1, a. 10, ad 13. English translation mine. "Et secundum hoc dicimus, quod in tota creatura est quaedam obedientialis potentia, prout tota creatura obedit Deo ad suscipiendum in se quidquid Deus voluerit. Sic igitur et in anima est aliquid in potentia, quod natum est reduci in actum ab agente connaturali; et hoc modo sunt in potentia in ipsa virtutes acquisitae. Alio modo aliquid est in potentia in anima quod non est natum educi in actum nisi per virtutem divinam; et sic sunt in potentia in anima virtutes infusae." cannot be accomplished through this natural potency. Instead, Thomas repeatedly appeals to obediential potency as the capacity by which man is able to ascend to his supernatural end. So then, if the "Cajetanians" have so much textual evidence, wherein lies the difficulty?

PROBLEM PASSAGES FOR THE CAJETANIANS

There are certain problem passages within Thomas' thought that the Cajetanian

Thomist tradition must overcome. The most pronounced is a passage found in Summa contra Gentiles: "It was proved above that every intellect naturally desires the vision of the divine substance."463 It would seem, then, that rational creatures naturally desire the beatific vision. We find a similar saying in Thomas' earlier commentary on the Sentences of Lombard: "However, beatitude of any rational creature consists in the vision of God through His essence."464 It seems that men of every civilization are not satisfied with the forms of happiness found in this life. As the Hebrew Qoheleth lamented: "I have seen everything that is done under the sun; and behold, all is vanity and a striving after wind."465 Saint Maximus the Confessor (|662) also indicates that man's desire for beatitude and divinization is natural:

For what is more desirable to God's precious ones than to be divinized...

463 Summa contra Gentiles III cap. 57 n. 4. "Supra probatum est quod omnis intellectus naturaliter desiderat divinae substantiae visionem."

"Beatitudo autem cujuslibet rationalis creaturae consistit in visione dei per essentiam." In IVSententiis, d. 49, q. 2, a. 7:

Ecclesiastes 1:14. Hence, the state that comes from contemplating God and enjoying the

gladness it gives is rightly called pleasure, rapture, and joy. It is called

pleasure because the term means that for which we naturally strive.. .For

God's precious ones are persuaded that in truth human nature is given no

loftier goal.

The contemporary C.S. Lewis also observed the same longing within him: "If I find in myself a desire which no experience in this world can satisfy, the most probable explanation is that I was made for another world.' Even more problematic for the

"two-enders" is the Second Vatican Council's Constitution on the Church and the

Modern World—Gaudium et Spes—which nearly quotes Henri de Lubac:

In fact, only in the mystery of the incarnate Word is the mystery of man

truly illumined. For Adam, the first man, was the figure of Him Who was

to come, namely Christ the Lord. Christ, the last Adam, in the revelation

of the mystery of the Father and His love, fully reveals man to man

himself and makes his supreme calling clear.

Compare the words of the Council to those of de Lubac: "By revealing the Father and by being revealed by him, Christ completes the revelation of man to himself."469 De Lubac's

Maximus the Confessor, Ambiguum 7. In Ad Thalassium, 60. Cited in Nicholas

J. Healy, "Henri de Lubac on Nature and Grace," Communio 35 (2008): 535-64.

467 C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (New York: HarperCollins, 2001), 137.

468 Guadium et Spes, paragraph 22.

Henri de Lubac, Catholicism: A Study of the Dogma in Relation to the account is also confirmed by the recent statement of His Holiness John Paul II regarding

the teaching of the Second Vatican Council on this matter:

This is in fact the aspiration at the heart of every human decision and

action, the quiet searching and interior prompting which sets freedom in

motion. This question is ultimately an appeal to the absolute Good which

attracts us and beckons us; it is the echo of a call from God who is the

origin and goal of man's life. Precisely in this perspective the Second

Vatican Council called for a renewal of moral theology, so that its

teaching would display the lofty vocation which the faithful have received

in Christ, the only response fully capable of satisfying the desire of the

human heart.

Natural desire is here associated with a supernatural fulfillment. The gift of God's

creation of man, constituted in grace, anticipates a second gift (grace unto the light of

glory) to elevate man to his final fulfillment in the vision of God's essence. So then, how

do we understand the desiderium naturale and the vocation to perfect happiness in God?

Does the first gift necessitate God to give the second gift?

"TWO-ENDER" RESPONSE TOWARD HENRI DE LUBAC

Modern Thomists reply that the human dissatisfaction for temporal, natural

Corporate Destiny of Mankind, translated by Lancelot Sheppard (New York: New

American Library, 1961), 189. Originally published in French by Henri de Lubac in

1938.

John Paul II, Veritatis splendor, 7. Emphasis mine. happiness is not thwarted by nature itself, but by the conditions of sin. Steven Long summarizes the position succinctly: "Our present sense of deficiency of unaided nature is conditioned by the drama in which we are ourselves immersed: that of fallen and redeemed nature."471 Long further argues that if we were to assert that man finds his capax Dei apart from divine revelation, then "we would imply that God does not reveal man to himself in Christ for the simple reason that man already would know by nature."472 According to them, our desire to know God quidditatively is superadded and not derived from an innate natural inclination. For Cajetan, this also safeguards the free gratuity of grace.473 Since men are not innately ordered to perfect, supernatural beatitude, according to Cajetan and Suarez, God is not obliged to give it to them. However, God would be obliged to give natural beatitude to man. To use the language above, God gives the first gift of creation (without the desire for the supernatural end), and then later

Steven A. Long, "On the Possibility of a Purely Natural End for Man," The

Thomist 64 (2000), 233.

472 Long (2000), 235

473 Given that Cajetan was assigned to answer Martin Luther's objections to the

Catholic Church's doctrine of grace, one quickly realizes the need for Cajetan to safeguard the gratuity of grace from the writings of Saint Thomas.

474 This assertion seems to bind "two-tier" Thomists, since it seems that God is obliged to allow all men natural beatitude regardless of sin, since original sin does not destroy human nature in the least bit. To claim otherwise is the error of Baius. Hence, it would seem that the doctrine of limbo is a necessity. 210 gives the gift of grace to enable the desire and the attainment of the final end. As we shall see below in Thomas Aquinas' Expositio super librum Boethii De trinitate, the human intellect is provoked to know the first cause of all things by moving from effects to cause until at last it arrives at knowledge of the First Cause qua cause. However, this is knowledge "that God exists" and not knowledge of "what God is."

PHILOSOPHICAL DIFFICULTIES WITH "TWO-ENDER" THESIS

There are three philosophical difficulties with the so-called "two-tier Thomist" formulation. First, it entails the positing of pure nature. Second, it entails the possibility of a perfectly satisfying natural end for men apart from union with God, e.g. the conditions for the limbus infantium. Third and most significantly, "They give credit then to a secularized natural order—cultural, moral, philosophic.. .Pure nature is thus linked to 'separated reason.'"476 One could also argue that the doctrine of natural beatitude lends itself to secularism since it holds out the promise of temporal fulfillment over and against divinely revealed religion with the promise of knowing God through His essence. Delubacians levy these criticisms and cite Summa contra Gentiles III, 57 stating,

475 Of course, Thomas (and even Scotus) defended the doctrine of limbo.

Gery Provoust, Thomas d'Aquin et les thomismes (Paris: Cerf, 1996), 48. Cited in Ralph Mclnerny's Preambula Fidei: Thomism and the God of the Philosophers

(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2006), 72. In his note on the same page, Mclnerny responds: "Provoust's criticisms, all of them admittedly secondhand, effectively criticized Cajetan for holding what Thomas Aquinas explicitly taught." 211

"Every intellect naturally desires the vision of the divine substance," as the final word.

Moreover, they also note that Cajetan openly admitted that he departed from Thomas

Aquinas on the matter of desiring the vision of God. As R. Mclnerny explains, "In

commenting on the Summa, I-II, q. 13, in paragraphs 10 and 3 of his commentary,

Cajetan says that Thomas is wrong in saying that the human intelligence desires the vision of God."477

So then, at one end of the spectrum are the Cajetanians who assert that man has a natural desire for a natural beatitude arct/may also receive a superadded desire by grace for the supernatural beatitude of knowing God quidditatively through the beatific vision.

At the other end of the spectrum are the Delubacians who hold that God constituted human nature with a desire for knowing God quidditatively. On the one hand, Cajetanian

Thomists are defending what appears to them an unbroken tradition of interpretation of

Thomas Aquinas. On the other hand, de Lubac seeks to rescue Thomas from the

"Thomists" and re-situate him in his authentic Patristic framework. Who is correct?

HISTORY OF NATURE/GRACE PROBLEM: PURE NATURE AND BAIANISM

The relationship of nature to grace raises two further questions. Can we posit nature without the supernatural? If man were constituted in grace, as Thomas Aquinas taught,478 then has there ever been a time when the operation of grace was not present with men—calling them upward to their supernatural vocation? To answer both

477 Ralph Mclnerny, Preambula Fidei: Thomism and the God of the Philosophers

(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2006), 74.

478 In II Sententiis, dist 34, pars 2, a. 3, q. 2, ad 3. 212 with men—calling them upward to their supernatural vocation? To answer both questions, Cajetanian Thomism479 posits humanity in terms of "pure nature"—man apart from grace. Yet, for de Lubac, "pure nature" is an abstraction not a true possibility. To further complicate things, the words "natura" and "pura" never appear together (in their various cases) in the Corpus Thomisticum.

The difficulty of accounting for nature and grace is best illustrated in the error

Michael Baius. Baianism, the heresy named for him, "was characterized by it rejection of the supernaturale quoad essentiam, and the cognate distinction between 'natural' and

'supernatural.'"481 Baius conflated Adam's prelapsarian gifts and righteousness with nature per se. The error of Baius is easily discerned when we note that he held that Adam naturally possessed the Holy Spirit from the moment of his creation. Moreover, divine beatitude would have been strictly merited without the need of grace at all, since man was naturally equipped with everything he need to fulfill his supernatural end of beatitude.

For Baius, grace is only necessary where there is sin. Hence, if Adam had never sinned, he would have never experienced grace. On the contrary, the Catholic Church taught that

I lament using the term Cajetanian Thomism, but do so for the sake of clarity.

The pairing of pura naturalis (in various declensions) does however appear about thirty times in the Corpus Thomisticum, half of which are rn.De veritate. See

Appendix B: "Pura naturalis " in the Corpus Thomisticum.

Alister E. McGrath, Iustitia: A History of the Christian Doctrine of

Justification, Third Edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 277.

482 McGrath, 278. 213 when Adam and Eve fell, they fell from grace. However, Baius taught that they fell from nature—becoming sub-natural, something akin to Calvinism's doctrine of total depravity.

Consequently, Pope Saint Pius V formally rejected these errors of Baius. Adam and

Eve were constituted in grace prior to their fall into sin. Hence, the original constitution of the human person included grace. Unlike the other animals, rational animals were naturally constituted in grace. Adam was never a purely natural creature. Man's original constitution confirms the well-worn maxim of Saint Thomas: "The reason whereof is because grace perfects nature according to the manner of the nature; as every perfection is received in the subject capable of perfection, according to its mode."484 Grace does not depart from nature. Rather, it perfects and elevates it.

The error of Baius must not, then, be confused with the position of Cajetan or those after him who posited a state of pure nature. Baius (and also Jansenius) argued that that the supernatural end of the beatific vision is due to human nature. One might argue that the position of Baius is essentially an alteration of the Scotistic thesis (though in the opposition direction) that human nature has an innate natural desire for God. This

Pope Pius V, Ex omnis afflictionibus. 1 October 1567. Denzinger: 1001-80.

Summa theologiae I, q. 62, a. 5.

Related to this argument is Jansen's conviction that unbaptized babies burn in hell because limbo as a place of "natural beatitude" could not exist. Of course, the modern Delubcian solution is just to posit the secret regeneration of unbaptized infants.

486 Although Scotus does hold to an innate natural desire for God, he does recognize the role of obediential potency. See Ordinatio Prol. 1 q. un, d. 94 where Scotus 214

assertion raises the question as to how there might be an innate natural desire for the

beatific vision so that it is the case that God does not owe the beatific vision as some due

to human nature. The "solution" of Baius is to simply admit what seems philosophically

obvious: there can only be one end of man and that end is supernatural.487

After the condemnation of Baius articulation by Pope Saint Pius V in 1567, those

who continued to hold that humans have an innate natural desire for God were required to

writes: "When one infers 'therefore the intellect is improportioned to it, and through

something else is proportioned to it,' I say that of itself it is in an obediential potency to

the agent, 1 and thus is sufficiently proportioned to it for this that it be moved by it.

Similarly, of itself it is capable of that assent caused by such an agent, even naturally

capable; it is not opportune, therefore, that it be proportioned through another by

receiving that assent."

As detailed above, L. Feingold, in "An Elective Recourse to Scotus: Domingo

de Soto and Francisco de Toledo" (Chapter 10 in Natural Desire to See God, pp. 197-

210) argues that both Domingo de Soto of Salamanca (Dominican, lived 1494-1560) and

Francisco de Toledo (Jesuit, lived 1532-1596) followed the thinking of Scotus with

regard to the innate natural desire to see God and also the thesis that the supernatural end

of man might be known naturally. Notably, De Soto as a Salmanancan Dominican

reinterprets Thomas Aquinas at Summa theologiae I, q. 12, a. 1 (i.e. "Whether any

created intellect can see the essence of God?") as saying what Scotus affirms, namely that

we naturally desire the vision of God by an innate natural appetite. See Domingo de Soto,

De natura et gratia I, ch. 4. 215 clarify that this fulfillment was not due to nature. Otherwise, grace would lose its gratuity. Moreover, it obscured the distinction between the natural and the supernatural.

Take for instance, the following statement that was condemned by Pope Pius V: "The sublimation of human nature and its elevation to participation in the divine nature was due to the integrity of the human being in its first state, and is therefore to be called natural, not supernatural."

This condemnation in 1567 placed a clear demarcation as to the limits of what could be meant by natural inclination and natural ends. Consequently, the tendency in

Domingo de Soto of Salamanca (1494-1560) to posit an innate appetite for the supernatural began to give way to the Cajetanian thesis that the "natural desire" for the supernatural beatitude is an elicited desire dependent on obediential potency. The battle ground texts such Summa theologiae I, q. 12, a. 1 began to be reinterpreted. This shift is signaled by Bartolome de Medina (1527-1580) who was a student of Domingo de Soto.

Medina moved away from his master De Soto after De Soto died in 1560. Seventeen years later, Medina published his Expositio in Primam Secundae in which he overturned De Soto's account of human nature and natural teleology—specifically denying the De Soto's thesis that human nature had an innate appetite ox pondus naturae for the supernatural vision of God. No doubt, Medina had the advantage of Pius V's condemnation of Baianism in 1567. De Soto, who died in 1560, never laid eyes on the

Pius V, Ex omnis afflictionibus. 1 October 1567. Denzinger: 1921.

489 Bartolome de Medina, Expositio in primam secundae angelici doctoris D.

Thomae Aquinatis (Venetiis: apud Petrum Dehuchinum, 1580). 216 papal clarifications on human nature, its limits, its original preternatural gifts, and its final end. Medina, then, represents the Spanish Dominican "restructuring" following the promulgation of the PianjEx omnis afflictionibus.

Medina's argument against his master De Soto centers on the natural desire of man qua homo. According to Medina, the innate natural desire in human nature reaches only to a generic worship and contemplation of God as "First Cause." As a matter of fact,

Medina appeals directly to Aristotle' s Nicomachean Ethics as the perfect description of man's innate natural desire for beatitude: "Beatitude is twofold. One is natural, in the attainment of which natural appetite comes to rest, and this is to know and worship God, insofar is possible for nature, a beatitude described Aristotle in book ten of the Ethics."

According to Medina, if a natural man (or even an angel in the state of nature) were to attain natural contemplation of God as simply the First Cause, then his desire would be at rest. Medina thereby affirms that Saint Augustine's saying, "You have made us for

Thyself and our hearts are restless until they rest in Thee," only pertains to an elicited desire for the supernatural. According to Medina, the voice of Augustine here is the voice of the Christian with the infused virtues of faith, hope, and charity, as he states, "The other beatitude is supernatural, in the attainment of which the supernatural appetite of hope and charity comes to rest, spoken of by Saint Augustine, "You have made us, Lord, for Yourself.. ."491 Without the beatific vision, the soul with faith, hope, and charity will never come to rest. Its natural desire has been elicited to desire something even higher

Bartolome de Medina, Expositio inprimam secundae, in q. 3, a. 8, 46b.

1 Medina, 46b. than can be attained by natural innate powers. Medina himself summarizes his view

succinctly when he writes, "With regard to the first argument of de Soto, I concede that

with a natural appetite we desire our natural beatitude, which is to know God, insofar as

our nature can know Him, and to worship and glorify Him; but not to see Him face to

face.' For Medina, the desire to see God and know him quiditatively is an elicited act

of the will which follows the knowledge that there is a God.

SUAREZ AND THE STATE OF PURE NATURE

Like Bartolome de Medina, the Jesuit Francisco Suarez also took issue with the

thesis of De Soto that there is an innate natural appetite or pondus naturae for

supernatural beatitude. Suarez emphasized the distinction between the twofold

492 Medina, 47a. Cited and translated by L. Feingold, Natural Desire to See God,

p. 214, n. 9.

Francisco Suarez, in a sense, is the ultimate champion of this thesis. However,

he stands on the shoulders of those before him, namely Thomas Cajetan, Sylvester of

Ferrara {Commentarirorum in Summam contra Gentiles, Leonine ed. Rome, 1918-1926),

Bartolome de Medina {Expositio inprimam secundae angelici doctoris Thomae Aquinae,

Venetiis: apud Petrum Dehuchinum, 1580), Domingo Bafiez {Scholastica commentaria in prima partem Summae theologicae S. Thomae Aquinatis (1584), and Gabriel Vasquez

{Commentariorum ac disputationum in primam partem Sancti Thomae, Compluti, 1599).

For a similar list and account, see also Steven Long, "On the Loss, and the Recovery, of

Nature as a Theonomic Principle: Reflections on the Nature/Grace Controversy," Nova et

Vetera 5 (2007), 133-184, especially 151. 218 potencies defined by Thomas: innate natural and elicited obediential. In the former

(natural), the potency is realized by the natural agent. In the latter (obediential), the potency is realized by God Suarez therefore treats "innate" and "natural" synonymously.494 Taking this strict position, Suarez naturally posits the possibility of a natural end. Suarez explains:

If the one beatitude is supernatural, then God could without a miracle

create man without ordering him to that beatitude, nor providing him with

the way or means by which he could attain it. In doing so, God would not

act against what is due to such a nature. But man made in this way would

necessarily have some natural happiness which he could attain if he so

willed. Therefore, there must necessarily belong to the human nature some

natural happiness in addition to supernatural happiness.495

For Suarez, one beatitude is supernatural. The other is in proportion to human nature's connatural powers, that is a natural beatitude. However, Thomas never speaks of two beatitudes.496 Thomas says that beatitude is "twofold" or "duplex." Beatitude is singular, but twofold Hence, Suarez misses an important feature of Thomas' thought.

Notably, Suarez's thesis is not merely hypothetical. In the passage from De ultimo

See Chapter Nine where this claim is refuted. Francisco Suarez, Commentaria on Summa theologica I, q. 12, a. 1.

Suarez, De ultimo fine hominis disp. 4, 3, n. 3 at Opera omnia, A-AA&.

Translation L. Feinghold, p. 230.

See Appendex C: Duplex Felicitas/Beatitudo in Corpus Thomisticum. 219 fine hominis (n. 4, at Opera 4, 44b), Suarez affirms that man has the same nature and thus the same innate capacities. Since grace perfects nature, the supernatural beatitude does not replace natural beatitude but perfects it. If then, Suarez is willing to speak of the natural beatitude as participating in the supernatural beatitude, then we should not speak of "two beatitudes." We should speak of the one beatitude as twofold. The natural beatitude is a type of the supernatural beatitude as its anti-type. The natural, imperfect beatitude participates in the supernatural beatitude.497 The natural beatitude is an imperfect reflection of supernatural beatitude. Suddenly, Thomas' frequent use of duplex begins to take on importance. One helpful insight of Suarez is that he shows that the supernatural beatitude of heaven includes and elevates the natural beatitude. The blessed in Heaven are experiencing natural beatitude and supernatural beatitude. A better way to say this is that the blessed are experiencing the supernatural elevation of the natural beatitude.

In order to confirm this, one need only to turn to Summa theologiae I, q. 62, a. 1 in which Thomas asserts the happiness attained through natural powers as beatitude "in a certain way":

I answer that, by the name of beatitude is understood the ultimate

perfection of rational or of intellectual nature; and hence it is that it is

Regarding the renovation of the relation between the natural beatitude and supernatural beatitude and the eschaton, see Summa theologiae Supp. Q. 92, a. 1, where

Thomas relates that the blessed will enjoy both the natural beatitude of the philosophers and the supernatural beatitude of seeing the divine essence. naturally desired, since everything naturally desires its ultimate perfection.

Now there is a twofold ultimate perfection of rational or of intellectual

nature. The first is one which it can procure of its own natural power; and

this is called beatitude or happiness in a certain way {et haec

quodammodo beatitudo vel felicitas dicitur]. Hence Aristotle says that

man's ultimate happiness consists in his most perfect contemplation,

whereby in this life he can behold the best intelligible object; and that is

God. Above this happiness there is still another, which we look forward to

in the future, whereby "we shall see God as He is." This is beyond the

nature of every created intellect, as was shown above (Question 12,

Article 4).499

Nicomachean Ethics, 10, 1177al2-1178b23.

49 Summa theologiae I, q. 62, a. 1. "Respondeo dicendum quod nomine beatitudinis intelligitur ultima perfectio rationalis seu intellectuahs naturae, et inde est

quod naturaliter desideratur, quia unumquodque naturaliter desiderat suam ultimam perfectionem. Ultima autem perfectio rationalis seu intellectuahs naturae est duplex. Una quidem, quam potest assequi virtute suae naturae, et haec quodammodo beatitudo vel felicitas dicitur. Unde et Aristoteles perfectissimam hominis contemplationem, qua

optimum intelligibile, quod est Deus, contemplari potest in hac vita, dicit esse ultimam hominis felicitatem. Sed super hanc felicitatem est alia felicitas, quam in futuro expectamus, qua videbimus Deum sicuti est. Quod quidem est supra cuiuslibet intellectus creati naturam, ut supra ostensum est." Thomas limits natural beatitude by writing, "this is called beatitude or happiness in a certain way {quodammodo }. Strictly speaking, then, beatitude or felicity is the supernatural beatitude. This also reaffirms the duplex nature of beatitude. Natural beatitude (something similar to Aristotle's natural eudaimonia) is folded within supernatural beatitude. The contemplation that Thomas has in mind here is not the supernatural beatitude.

So then natural beatitude is not something that stands apart from supernatural beatitude. Rather, natural beatitude belongs to supernatural beatitude. However, before tracing out this argument, it is helpful to examine how Thomas specifically addresses how Aristotle and Plato conceive of beatitude. CHAPTER EIGHT: ANALOGY & THE TWOFOLD ORDER

PLATO & ARISTOTLE ON THE PHILOSOPHICAL END OF MAN

The argument of Medina and Suarez for the limits of natural desire might be compared to that which is articulated by philosophers prior to the Christian tradition, chiefly by Plato and Aristotle. Before directly engaging the writings of Thomas Aquinas on the desire for God, we must understand the way in which Thomas articulates the distinction between know whether God exists from knowing what God is.500 Notably,

Thomas Aquinas situates this problem in a philosophical context and examines how a non-Christian might contemplate perfect happiness or eudaemonia. Plato, it would seem, held that it was possible in this life for a man to attain an intellectual apprehension of the

Form of Good. In other words, Plato argues against Bartolome de Medina's claim that the natural man desires only what is found in Aristotle's Ethics. As Thomas Aquinas observed: "In the opinion of Plato, immaterial substances are not only understood by us, but are the objects we understand first of all."501 Thomas rejects Plato's confidence in the

Incidentally, this is the chief task of Thomas in his Expositio super Boethii De trinitate, which we will come to shortly.

501 Summa theologiae I, q. 88, a. 1. "Posuit enim Plato formas immateriales subsistentes, quas ideas vocabat, esse propria obiecta nostri intellectus, et ita primo et per se intelliguntur a nobis." possibility of seeing the Good, but he does agree with Plato's distinction between

sensible and non-sensible substances. In Plato's analogy of the divided line,503 Plato

divides the intelligible realm from the sensible realm. At the highest section of the

intelligible, Plato places philosophical understanding {noesis) of the forms, followed by a

second section of mathematical knowledge (dianoia). Pertaining to the sensible is the third section of faith (pistis) followed by the fourth and lowest section of image-thinking

(eikasia). Consequently, Plato teaches that one must apprehend the Form of the Good by turning away from the senses and imagination and toward the intelligible. Plotinus confirms Plato's conviction: "In the sense-bound life we are no longer granted to know them, but the soul, taking no help from the organs, sees and proclaims them. To the vision of these we must mount, leaving sense to its own low place."504 Man's ultimate happiness, say Plato and Plotinus, is found in this vision of the highest good which entirely transcends the five senses.

Thomas Aquinas agrees with both pagan thinkers in his Expositio super librum

Boethii De trinitate q. 6, a. 2 where he asks whether we should abandon the senses and imagination in divine science. Citing Augustine, Boethius, and the Areopagite, Thomas confirms the Christian teaching that our greatest happiness, the vision of the Summum

Bonum, occurs without recourse to the senses or mental images.505 However, following

See Summa theologiae I, q. 88, a. 3.

Plato, Republic 6 509d-513e.

Plotinus, Enneads 6, 4.

Henri Rondet remarks that Thomas is not only able to synethesize the 224 the Scriptures and the Fathers of the Church, Thomas also holds that the final end of humanity (the beatific vision of the Divine Essence) is beyond the limit of our natural philosophical capabilities. Nature must be perfected by grace for man to attain his supernatural end of happiness. Although not made explicit in Super de trinitate, Thomas' full explanation is found in the Summa theologiae:

"The glory of God hath enlightened it"—that is, the society of the blessed

who see God. By this light the blessed are made deiform—that is, like to

God, according to the saying: "When He shall appear we shall be like to

Him, because we shall see Him as He is" (1 Jn 2:2).506

Aristotelian tradition but that in the persons of Aquinas and Pseudo-Dionysius, he is able to reconcile the Eastern and Western tradition. Rodet explains: "He tell us that the soul, which is created directly by God, cannot be made happy except by possessing God himself." Rodet appeals to Quodlibeta, q. 10, a. 8, co. (which Rodet wrongly cites as q.

10, a. 17): "Et quia anima immediate facta est a Deo, ideo beata esse non poterit nisi immediate videat Deum, scilicet absque medio quod sit similitudo rei cognitae, sicut species visibilis in pupilla vel in speculo; non autem absque medio quod est lumen confortans intellectum, quod est lumen gloriae, de quo in Psalm. XXXV, 10, dicitur: in lumine tuo videbimus lumen. Hoc autem est per essentiam Deum videre. Unde in hoc ponimus beatitudinem rationalis creaturae, quod Deum per essentiam videbit: sicut philosophi, qui posuerunt animas nostras fluere ab intelligentia agente, posuerunt ultimam felicitatem hominis in continuatione intellectus nostri ad ipsam."

506 Summa theologiae I, q. 12, a. 5. "quod claritas Dei illuminabit earn, scilicet 225

And again:

Hence, the light of glory cannot be natural to a creature unless the creature

has a divine nature; which is impossible. But by this light the rational

creature is made deiform.507

However, Thomas' proposed solution in Summa theologiaebegs three philosophical objections against the Thomistic teaching regarding human beatitude. They are as follows:

First, if man can know "that God exists" {de Deo an sit) by natural,

unaided reason, then why can man not also know "what God is" {quid

Deus sit) by natural, unaided reason?

Second, how can man have two ends, one natural and imperfect, the other

supernatural and perfect?

Third, if man is made in the image of God, then why is his ultimate end

disproportionate to his natural ability? It would seem that a natural desire

for happiness would be attained by the natural means of reason—

otherwise human nature would be in vain.

societatem beatorum Deum videntium. Et secundum hoc lumen efficiuntur deiformes, idest Deo similes; secundum illud I loan. Ill, cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus, et videbimus eum sicuti est."

Summa theologiae I, q. 12, a. 5. ad. 3. "Unde lumen gloriae non potest esse naturale creaturae, nisi creatura esset naturae divinae, quod est impossibile. Per hoc enim lumen fit creatura rationalis deiformis, ut dictum est." A person need not be a Christian to perceive the difficulties raised by these questions regarding the natural desires of humanity. Thomas' response to all three objections

assumes the maxim of Boethius, that "the superior manner of knowledge includes the inferior, but it is quite impossible for the inferior to rise to the superior."508 Before answering the philosopher's objections, we should also note that Thomas agrees with

Aristotle's conviction that all knowledge begins in the senses, is apprehended by mental images, and finally is apprehended by the soul.509 Thomas explains:

According to this opinion, then, on the part of the phantasms, intellectual

knowledge is caused by the senses. But since the phantasms cannot of

themselves affect the passive intellect, and require to be made actually

intelligible by the active intellect, it cannot be said that sensible

knowledge is the total and perfect cause of intellectual knowledge, but

rather that it is in a way the material cause.

All natural knowledge begins with the sensation of material things. Divine Science does

Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, Translated by Victor Watts (New York:

Penguin Books, 1999), Book 5, 4, p. 127.

Aristotle, Metaphysics 1, 1; Posterior Analytics!, 15.

Summa theologiae I, q. 84, a. 6, resp. "Secundum hoc ergo, ex parte phantasmatum intellectualis operatio a sensu causatur. Sed quia phantasmata non sufficiunt immutare intellectum possibilem, sed oportet quod fiant intelligibilia actu per intellectum agentem; non potest dici quod sensibilis cognitio sit totalis et perfecta causa intellectualis cognitionis, sed magis quodammodo est materia causae." not regard material things, but instead separate substances (that is, those subsisting or

existing without matter). Therefore, there can be no natural knowledge of separate

substances. Since God is a separate substance, it also follows that God cannot be known

naturally. Lest one doubt Thomas' insistence on this point, it is firmly confirmed in the

Summa theologiae I, q. 88, a. 1 where once again Thomas insists: "Therefore immaterial

substances cannot be known by human investigation."

DE DEO AN SIT? QUID DEUS SIT?

Thomas' conclusion that human persons cannot know God is troubling since

Christians do in fact claim to "know God." If knowledge originates in the senses, and

God is not sensible, then it would seem that God could not be known. Thomas, therefore,

dedicates the next article to two important distinctions with regard to the limits of human

reason. He asks in Super de trinitate q. 6, a. 3, "Can our human intellect behold the

Divine Form?" A philosopher might also question Thomas' positive answer to this

article, since it seems to contradict the previous article in which he affirmed that a natural

intellect can know the Divine Form. However, Thomas states that natural knowledge is

limited to "whether God exists" {de Deo an sit). Natural knowledge does not reach to

"what God is" {quid Deus sit). Thus, the human intellect can only know that the Divine

Form exists—it cannot know what the Divine Form is.

Thomas also makes a second distinction. Our natural knowledge of what God is

(quid sit Deus) is limited to the way of negation as the Areopagite affirms when he

describes Moses' experience of God on Mount Sinai: "Moses breaks free of them, away from what sees and is seen, and he plunges into the truly mysterious darkness of unknowing." If God is the transcendent cause, then nothing crearurely can belong to

Him. We can proceed by saying: "God is not white, not bald, not large, not small, not fast, not slow, etc." Consequently, we can use negation to say that God is mfinite and

/'^material. To summarize, we can have perfect knowledge that God exists, but only an apophatic knowledge of what God is—which is another way of granting that we cannot know anything positive about God except by way of analogy. We can say that God is not limited and not material. We can also employ a metaphor and say that God is like "a mighty warrior." However, we can never truly describe or comprehend the "what-ness" of God. This seems to answer sufficiently our first philosophical objection. However, if it should be objected that the divine science should naturally entail true scientia or knowledge, we must turn to Article Four for a more complete answer.

In Article Four, Thomas also explains that the natural intellect cannot know what the Divine Form is by means of a speculative science for two reasons: "We understand essences of things through the division of a genus into differences and through the examination of a thing's causes and accidents, which contribute a great deal to our knowledge of the essence." Drawing from Aristotle, Thomas holds that a thing's essence is known—a definition is generated—when we differentiate a thing within its genus. If we take the genus "animal" and differentiate one certain animal from all other animals as being "rational"—then we have properly defined the essence or "what-ness" of a human being, namely that a human is a "rational animal." We have come to know the nature of a

511 See Dionysius the Areopagite, Mystical Theology 1, lOOOd-lOOla. Emphasis mine. 229 human. Our pagan philosopher should assume, then, that Divine Science would and could do the same thing with God. One would first determine the genus and then differentiate

God within this genus. However, God does not belong to a genus. The true God does not share a class or genus with others. The true God does not belong to a pantheon of gods or even beings within which He might be differentiated from the others. Since God does not belong to a genus and cannot be properly differentiated, He cannot truly be an object of human science. Therefore, the Divine Form cannot be known by means of a speculative science.

COULD MAN HAVE TWO ENDS?

The impossibility of knowing the Divine essence through natural means prompts the second philosophical objection: "How could a man have two ends?" Thomas states here that the means by which humanity might know divine things would be "especially mystical" (maxime mysticae). This is an oblique reference to Thomas' teaching described above, namely that the rational creature requires the "light of glory" in order to be made "deiform" and thereby see the Divine Essence. The clearest reference in Super de trinitate to this especially mystical way by means of the "light of glory" is found at

Question 6, Article Four: "The other is the perfect happiness of heaven, where we will see God himself through His essence and the other separate substances; it will come through the light of glory.'"

Thomas' appeal to the light of glory and the deification of the blessed leaves the

512 Super de trinitate q. 6, a. 2, s.c.

Summa theologiae I, q. 12, a. 5. ad. 3. door open for a way in which humans might attain knowledge of "what God is." As he

says, this way is "especially mystical." This, then leads to a second philosophical

objection: "What then is this "mystical way" to knowledge of the Good and perfect

human happiness?" Thomas' reply entails that human happiness is twofold {duplex est felicitas hominis):

One is the imperfect happiness found in this life, of which the Philosopher

speaks; and this consists in contemplating the separate substances through

the habit of wisdom. But this contemplation is imperfect and such as is

possible in our present life, not such that we can know their quiddity. The

other is the perfect happiness of heaven, where we will see God himself

through his essence and the other separate substances. But this happiness

will not come through speculative science; it will come through the light

of glory.

So then, Thomas speaks of an imperfect, natural happiness, and also a perfect,

supernatural (and mystical) happiness that awaits the blessed. Thomas confirms the same

"two-fold happiness" schema at Summa theologiae q. 3, a. 6. where he states that

Aristotle's Ethics treats only the imperfect happiness that man can attain in this life—not

the supernatural happiness of knowing the separates substances. Moreover, in Aristotle's

Metaphysics, namely Books Eta and Lambda, give no hope to humanity for having any

true knowledge of the intelligible realm. Unlike the rather ambitious Plato and

514 Super de trinitate q. 6, a. 4, ad. 3

See also Nicomachean Ethics 10, 7, 2105 ff. for an account of eudaemonia in 231

Plotinus, Aristotle does not seek to possess quidditative knowledge of the celestial,

immaterial movers. In fact, it would seem that Plato and Plotinus could not truly access

the highest Form of the Good, because it violates their own conviction that an inferior

intellect cannot grasp a superior intellect. So according to Thomas, all the pagan

philosophers fall short: "Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom.' On one hand, the

Platonists suggest that the human mind of imagination can grasp the unimaginable

Good—something impossible. On the other hand, the Aristotelians place happiness

within the limits of this tangible life—contemplating only "that," but never "what." This

fact has led J. Lehrberger to conclude that Super de trinitate is a "philosophical critique

of philosophy. It is somewhat ironic that the pagan philosophers claimed to have "full

knowledge of divine realities," and yet their own words reveal otherwise. The two

greatest philosophers—Plato and Aristotle—come up short. Lehrberger explains: "In

showing that the mind knows that it cannot reach this wisdom, [Thomas] uses philosophy

to open the door for religious faith."518

Thomas demonstrates that philosophy has a positive and negative purpose.

Philosophy can highlight the human longing for attaining a perfect and final good

(however it might be imagined), and philosophy can also dash philosophical self-

this life.

516 Jeremiah 9:23.

James Lehrberger, "Aquinas' Philosophical Critique of Philosophy," Verbum:

Analecta Neolatina 6 (2004): 39-49.

518 J. Lehrberger (2004), 49. sufficiency against the rocks of its own arguments. This answers our second

philosophical objection, in that natural happiness and natural reason lead humanity to

expect a perfect and complete happiness. It must therefore be affirmed that beatitude is

for this reason called duplex and not duo.

WHY IS MAN'S END DISPROPORTIONATE TO HIS NATURE?

What then of the third and final philosophical challenge: If man is made in the

image of God, why then is his end disproportionate to his natural ability? It would seem

that a natural desire for perfect happiness should be attained by the natural means of

reason—otherwise human nature would be in vain. It would fail to meet Cajetan's

conviction: "Natural desire does not extend itself beyond the faculty of nature."519

Remember, from a philosophical point of view, grace is not knowable. Thomas does not

directly address this problem in Super de trinitate. However, Thomas does confirm that man's supernatural end is disproportionate to human nature:

Now man's happiness is twofold {duplex hominis beatitudo sivefelicitas), as was

also stated above (De Trinitate, Question 5, Article 5). One is proportionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit, which man can obtain by means of his natural principles. The

other is a happiness surpassing man's nature, and which man can obtain by the power of

God alone, by a kind of participation of the Godhead, about which it is written520 that by

"Naturale desiderium non se extendit ultra naturae facultatem." Thomas

Cajetan, Commentaria in Summam Theologiae St Thomae I, q. 12, a. 1, n. 10.

520 2 Peter 1:4. 233

Christ, we are made "partakers of the Divine nature."521

The same answer, repeated in different ways can be found in Summa theologiae I-

II q. 2, a. 8 and q. 3, a. 6. Thomas further specifies his argument regarding "perfect

happiness":

From a consideration of the specific nature of Happiness, viz. the vision of

the Divine Essence, which man cannot obtain in this life, as was shown in

the I, 12, 11. Hence it is evident that none can attain true and perfect

Happiness in this life.522

So then, why does man's nature fail to meet his end? The philosopher's question must be

answered. If man's end is beyond his nature, then human beings are the only things in

creation that cannot naturally attain their goal. Moreover, it seems that Thomas does not provide a satisfactory reply to this dilemma. As acknowledged in the Introduction, the

debate over how this objection should be answered is the focus Henri de Lubac's

Surnaturel in 1946. De Lubac found opposition chiefly from his contemporary

Dominican Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange who argued that de Lubac had conflated the desire for natural beatitude with a desire for supernatural beatitude. Essentially, Garrigou-

Lagrange harnessed the arguments of Cajetan and Suarez against De Lubac's thesis. The philosophical debate, of course, centers on this philosophical objection: If humans cannot naturally know God's essence, then can they at least naturally desire to know His essence? De Lubac holds that man has only one end—for this is the nature of the end.

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 62 a. 1 co.

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 5, a. 6. Consequently, the supernatural end of beholding the essence of God is the true end of man. Man's natural beatitude is merely relative. De Lubac laments that Augustine's "our hearts are restless until they rest in you," would have never "anticipated that one day in the twentieth century, these words would be taken in a purely natural sense."523

Garrigou-Lagrange, however, worried that positing a natural human desire for supernatural beatitude would empty grace of its free gratuity. The reason for this worry relates to our objection that nature tends toward its end by nature—consequently, grace would somehow become something natural and not supernatural. If knowing God's essence is our final end, then God would be obligated to give grace to man as something due by nature. God would be become man's debtor. Grace would no longer be a free gift.

Garrigou, therefore, stressed and distinguished two ends for men, namely the natural and imperfect happiness of this life (the eudemonia of Aristotle's Ethics), and the supernatural end of apprehending the Divine Essence in the beatific vision. By doing so, Garrigou seems to suggest that Augustine's famous declaration "our hearts are restless until they rest in thee," is merely the description of a natural longing for a natural beatitude or more likely understood as an elicited desire for supernatural beatitude, as taught by Medina. So then, it would seem that De Lubac's answer obscures nature and grace, and that Garrigou's answer obscures the Patristic teaching that humanity longs for communion with God.

Henri de Lubac, Mystery of the Supernatural (New York: Crossroad

Publishing, 1998), 38.

For an example, see G^^nigou-L^Lgx?^ngQ,s Life Everlasting 5, 28. "DUPLEX BEATITUDO" IN THE CORPUS THOMISTICUM

Super de trinitate reveals a way to navigate between the Scylla and Charybdis of the debate. In Super de trinitate, Thomas speaks of the duplex estfelicitas hominis. The key here is term duplex. The phraseology of duplex felicitas occurs fifteen times in the

Corpus Thomisticum.525 Notably, two of these occurrences are found in Aquinas' Super de trinitate, and these passages deal directly with philosophical natural beatitude. Let us systematically examine the most important passages. Before examining Super de trinitate, let us first examine the other important passages that mirror its distinctions regarding beatitude and felicity. In q. 62 of the Prima secundae, Thomas introduces the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity) and asks where there is any need for them.

Thomas responds that since human beatitude is twofold, there must also be a twofold set of virtues—natural and supernatural.

Place 1. Respondeo dicendum quod per virrutem perficitur homo ad actus

quibus in beatitudinem ordinatur, ut ex supradictis patet. Est autem duplex

hominis beatitudo sive felicitas, ut supra dictum est. Una quidem

proportionata humanae naturae, ad quam scilicet homo pervenire potest

per principia suae naturae.5

See Appendix C: "Duplex Felicitas/Beatitudo " in the Coprus Thomisiticum.

The results here are generated in the following way. The occurrences of the word duplex

(in all its cases) paired with either the word felicitas (in all its cases) or beatitudo (in all cases) with up to three words between them.

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 62 a. 1 co. Notably, here beatitudo and felicitas are used interchangeably. This argues against the mistake of identifying/e/zcztas' with the natural end of man and beatitudo with the supernatural end of man. We find the same interchangeability oi beatitudo and felicitas in the second occurrence of duplex felicitas in the Corpus Thomisticum, also from the

Summa theologiae:

Place 2. Ad quartum dicendum quod duplex est beatitudo sive felicitas,

una quidem perfecta, quam expectamus in futura vita; alia autem

imperfecta, secundum quam aliqui dicuntur in hac vita beati. Praesentis

autem vitae felicitas est duplex, una quidem secundum vitam activam,

alia vero secundum vitam contemplativam, ut patet per philosophum, in X

Ethic.529

If any passage argues against the present thesis, it is the one above since it employs distinction of two distinct beatitudes: "una perfecta.. .alia imperfecta." This would seem to substantiate the thesis that there are two ends. Moreover, Thomas here subdivides the

D. Bradley makes the mistake of thinking that Aquinas assigns/e/zcz'/as' to

"imperfect or this-worldly happiness" and beatitudo to "perfect or otherworldly happiness." See D. Bradley, Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good (1997), p. 398. It's odd that Bradley makes this mistake since it could be used in a way to defend the two- ender thesis—the opposite thesis of Bradley. See the following note.

coo

To distinguish the term "beatitudo" as perfect happiness in patria from the term "felicitas" as happiness in via is a false attempt to substantiate the two-ender thesis. 529 Summa theologiae II-II, q. 186 a. 3 ad 4. imperfect beatitude of this life into yet another twofold (duplex) distinction: "The happiness of this life is twofold {duplex), one is according to the active life, the other according to the contemplative life, as the Philosopher asserts.' Here we have what seems to be triplex arrangement:

1. una quidem perfecta, quam expectamus in futura vita

2. alia autem imperfecta

i. una quidem secundum vitam activam,

ii. alia vero secundum vitam contemplativam

The duplex thesis is rescued by the same passage that seems to contradict it for the following reason. If we take the duplex nature of the "una perfecta.. .alia imperfecta" arrangement as two distinct ends, then the "una.. .alia" arrangment of imperfect beatitude must also be subdivided as two distinct ends. If one should allege this, then this would yield three ends: 1) perfect beatitude, 2) imperfect beatitude of the active life, 3) perfect beatitude of the contemplative life—something clearly contrary to the teaching of

Thomas. Consequently, if we hold that the subdivided contemplative/active ends are not distinct but duplex, then we will have no difficulty in holding that the supernatural/natural ends are not distinct but duplex. If one insists on dividing duplex beatitudo into duo beatitudines, then one must also hold to tres beatitudines. Yet this is contrary to teaching of Thomas Aquinas.

See also Thomas' treatment of beatitudo imperfecta in his Sententia libri

Ethicorum 1, 10, at 1097b33 (Leonine edition, 1969) where he also confirms that imperfect beatitude is not contemplation. 238

A third occurrence of duplex felicitas occurs in Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem:

Place 3. Ad septimum dicendum, quod sicut duplex est felicitas,

spiritualis et temporalis; ita est duplex miseria, temporalis, et spiritualis.

Quamvis ergo voluntarii pauperes non sint miseri spirituali miseria; quae

simpliciter miseria est, cum dominus eos beatos vocet Matth. V, 3 et Luc.

VI, 20; possunt tamen temporali miseriae esse subiecti; unde et de

temporalibus est eis misericordia exhibenda.531

Once again, felicitas is here again used as stand-in for beatitude in the familiar sense.

Moreover, duplex is used fox felicitas as well as for miseria.

Turning now to Super de trinitate, we find the following:

Place 4. Ut enim dicit Augustinus XX de civitate Dei ex verbis Varronis,

nulla est homini alia causa philosophandi nisi ut beatus sit. Unde cum

duplex felicitas a philosophis ponatur, una contemplativa et alia activa,

ut patet in X Ethicorum, secundum hoc etiam duas partes philosophiae

distinxerunt, moralem dicentes practicam, naturalem et rationalem

dicentes theoricam.

This first citation deals with the same use of felicitas in Summa theologiae II-II, q. 186 a.

3 ad 4 (Place 2, above), which distinguished the imperfect twofold happiness of this life as active and contemplative. Here, Thomas is not considering the supernatural beatitude

Contra impugnantes, pars 2 cap. 6 ad 43.

Super de trinitate, q. 5 a. 1 ad 4. 239 of the beholding the divine essence. However, when we come to the fifth and last place in which the phrase duplex felicitas occurs, we do find Thomas distinguishing between the imperfect felicity of this life (in via) and the perfect felicity of beholding the beatific vision of God's essence (inpatria):

Place 5. Ad tertium dicendum quod duplex est felicitas hominis. Una

imperfecta quae est in via, de qua loquitur philosophus, et haec consistit in

contemplatione substantiarum separatarum per habitum sapientiae,

imperfecta tamen et tali, qualis in via est possibilis, non ut sciatur ipsarum

quiditas. Alia est perfecta in patria, in qua ipse Deus per essentiam

videbitur et aliae substantiae separatae. Sed haec felicitas non erit per

aliquam scientiam speculativam, sed per lumen gloriae.

Notably, the highest form of imperfect felicity is the "contemplation of separate substances through the habit of wisdom." The highest form of imperfect felicity, then, does not know the quiddity of these substances, just that they exist and those certain properties which go along necessarily with their existence. On the other hand, the perfect felicity of eternal life beholds the essence of God and of the other separated substances— not by the speculative science but through the light of glory. This passage is perhaps one of the most important texts in the entire Corpus Thomisticum regarding the end of man.

Super de trinitate, q. 6 a. 4 ad 3

534 Of the six times "duplex felicitas," in all its cases and various orderings appear in the Corpus Thomisticum, twice they are found in Super de trinitate, namely in q. 5 a. 1 ad 4 and q. 6 a. 4 ad 3. Yet, Super de trinitate is only one of seven works m which Thomas refers to the duplex felicitas or duplex beatitudo. The seven works mentioning either duplex felicitas or

duplex beatitudo are Super Sententiis (three times), Summa theologiae (six times), In

Psalmos (one time), Super Ioannis (one time), Super Matthaei (one time), Contra

impugnantes (one time), and Super de trinitate (two times). From these works, there are

nine other references oi duplex beatitudo (in various declensions or word orders) in the

Corpus Thomisticum, which do not employ the language of felicitas. These are also worth

exploring.

The three occurrences of duplex beatitudo in Super Sententiis do not directly bear

on the subject at hand. The first occurrence in Super Sententiis discusses the duplex

nature of heavenly beatitude in being exterior and interior: "unus exterius, secundum

scilicet id quod est desideratae perfectionis principium; alius interius, scilicet ipsa sua

perfectio, quam facit conjunctio ad principium. Unde cum beatitudo sit ultimus hominis

finis, duplex erit beatitudo."535 The second occurrence of duplex beatitudo in Super

Sententiis refers merely to the grades of supernatural beatitude: "principium distinctivum

mansionum sive graduum beatitudinis est duplex; scilicet propinquum et remotum."

The third occurance of duplex beatitudo in Super Sententiis also does not pertain to the

distinction between natural supernatural ends, but instead to the twofold gift in

supernatural beatitude: "in beatitudine non invenitur nisi duplex praemium; scilicet

In IV Sententiis, d. 49 q. 1 a. 2 qc. 1 co.

In IVSententiis, d. 49 q. 1 a. 4 qc. 4 co. 241

essentiale, et accidentale."

We have already examined the two passages in the Summa theologiae where

duplex felicitas occurs (I-II q. 62 a. 1 and II-II q. 186 a. 3). However, there are three other

Summa theologiae passages in which duplex beatitudo appears without reference to felicitas—the first of these three bears directly on the question at hand. The first directly

distinguishes the two kinds of beatitude as perfect and imperfect:

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, duplex est hominis

beatitudo, una perfecta, et alia imperfecta. Oportet autem intelligere

perfectam beatitudinem, quae attingit ad veram beatitudinis rationem,

beatitudinem autem imperfectam, quae non attingit, sed participat

no

quandam particularem beatitudinis similitudinem.

Here the same pairing of "una perfecta.. .alia imperfecta" that we observed above at

Summa theologiae II-II q. 186 a. 3 ad 4 regarding duplex felicitas occurs. Here Thomas

provides more light. Perfect beatitude attains to the true notion of beatitude (ad veram

beatitudinis rationem). Beatitude, rightly defined by Thomas, is perfect beatitude. Note

how the imperfect beatitude of this life participates {participat) in a certain particular

likeness of beatitude {quandam particularem beatitudinis similitudinem). It would seem

then that the relationship between perfect beatitude and imperfect beatitude is that of

participation. Thomas transcends univocal and equivocal understandings of ends with his

In IVSententiis, d. 49 q. 5 a. 2 qc. 1 arg. 3.

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 3 a. 6 co. paradigm of participation. Natural beatitude participates in supernatural beatitude.

Consequently, beatitude is duplex non duo.

A second duplex passage also occurs in the opening questions of Prima Secundae:

Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est beatitudo, una imperfecta, quae

habetur in hac vita; et alia perfecta, quae in Dei visione consistit.

Manifestum est autem quod ad beatitudinem huius vitae, de necessitate

Thomas also establishes this principle of analogy in Summa theologiae I-II q.

5, a. 5, ad 3 where he establishes the analogy of man's natural powers relative to supernatural happiness. He explains that the imperfect operation and perfect operation are not of the same species: "Now the imperfect operation, which is subject to man's natural power, is not of the same species as that perfect operation which is man's happiness: since operation takes its species from its object. Consequently the argument does not prove." So then, Thomas holds that the natural operation is elevated by the supernatural operation. Later he defines this in terms of theological virtues which are infused through the habit of grace. See Summa theologiae I-II q. 62. especially a. 1. Kevin Staley makes affirms the same regarding Summa theologiae I-II q. 5, a. 5, ad 3: "Natural beatitude remains imperfect beatitude. Any account of human happiness along Thomistic lines must, therefore, remain in much the same situation as Aristotle's. It is possible to conclude man can be happy, but happy only as man. This conclusion is theologically significant, but it is not for this reason meaningful only within a theological context."

Kevin Staley, "Happiness: the Natural End of Man?" The Thomist 53 [1989], 215-37. requiritur corpus.

Nothing notable here, except that the body is required for the imperfect beatitude of this life. However, we again observe the "una.. .alia" construction paired with the assertion of duplex beatitudo. Our third Summa theologiae passage comes from Secunda secundae:

Respondeo dicendum quod in adaptatione beatitudinum ad dona duplex

convenientia potest attendi. Una quidem secundum rationem ordinis,

quam videtur Augustinus fuisse secutus.541

Thomas speaks of adapting the beatitudes to the gifts in a twofold congruity. The remaining occurrences of beatitudo duplex in various cases are also unhelpful. Thomas' commentary on the Psalms speaks of beatitudo duplex, but refers to those who are blessed in heaven and those who blessed in hope of heaven. His commentary on

Matthew also speaks of the duplex causa beatitudinis; however, here he speaks of the dual causes of grace and merit. Last of all, Thomas refers states "duplex est beatitudo" in his commentary on John; however, here he refers to the blessedness of those who see and do not see and not the twofold end of man. We conclude then that the most informative passages on this subject appear in the Summa theologiae and in Super de trinitate. These two works are the hunting grounds for understanding beatitude as duplex.

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 4 a. 5 co.

Summa theologiae II-II, q. 121 a. 2 co.

Super Psalmo 31, n. 1.

Super Mt cap. 25 1. 3. 244

THOMAS ON "DUPLEX" AND NATURAL DESIRE

The meaning and nuances concerning the term "natural desire" stand at the center of the debate between "Two-Enders" and "One-Enders." We have already examined the passage found in Summa contra Gentiles: "It was proved above that every intellect naturally desires the vision of the divine substance.' Other passages include Summa theologiae I, q. 12, a. 1; I-II, q. 3, a. 8; Summa contra Gentiles III, c. 25, c. 48-54.

Regarding these passages, N. J. Healy has noted, "the gratuity of the supernatural was not a disputed question for thirteenth-century theologians. The relevant issue was whether or not it was possible for created intellects to see the essence of God."545 Hence, the gratuity of grace was not a controversial question for Thomas—gratuity was taken for granted.

The problem of grace only comes to the fore when duplex becomes duo. When was this theological consensus challenged? In sixteenth century with Martin Luther. Who did the

Pope assign to be the chief interlocutor of Martin Luther? Thomas Cajetan.

Allow me to suggest that Cajetan's bifurcation of the duplex beatitudo in Aquinas derived from his apologetic defense of Catholicism doctrine of grace against Luther's claims at the Diet of Worms in 1518. Martin Luther accused the Catholic Church of having slipped into Pelagianism, that is, he accused the Church of having abandoned the gratuity of grace. According to Luther, the Roman system of indulgences, pilgrimages, and penances had unwittingly led to the heresy of Pelagius, whereby men were justified

"Supra probatum est quod omnis intellectus naturaliter desiderat divinae substantiae visionem." Summa contra Gentiles III cap. 57 n. 4

545 Nicholas J. Healy (2008), p. 541, n. 16. 245 not by faith in the crucified and risen Christ, but by human works, merit, and achievement. Luther cited Saint Paul's teaching: "But to him that works, the reward is not reckoned according to grace, but according to debt" (Rom 4:4). Luther accused the

Catholic system of making God a debtor to man—the gratuity of grace had been compromised. Ironically, Luther was accusing the Catholic Church of being too

Delubacian.

It is quite surprising that no one (to my knowledge) has explored the thesis that

Cajetanian Thomism is an "Anti-Lutheran" species of Thomism. Perhaps Cajetan's interactions with Luther led him to overstate the distinction between nature and grace. If

Luther levies against Rome the accusation of Pelagianism—salvation by nature—then it is understandable how a Catholic apologist would stress the distinction between nature and grace in order to ward off the attack.

L. Feingold ignores the role of Luther almost altogether; however, he does grant that the thesis of "pure nature" arose as a response to Luther:

It is an elementary law of the history of theology that truths are more

vigorously stated, explored, and defended when they come under attack.

By far the greatest challenge to the possibility of a connatural beatitude

and the resulting possibility of a state of pure nature was posed by Luther,

Michael Baius, and Jansenism.546

Understandably, Cajetan reinterpreted Thomas for the debate at hand. Luther said as it were: "Rome teaches that man merits divine beatitude through natural human powers.

Feingold, 440. Cajetan responded as it were: "Bah! Natural desire does not extend itself beyond the

faculty of nature.547 Like you, we Catholics believe that the vocation to supernatural beatitude is superadded and thoroughly gratuitous!" My argument here is that Cajetan's

solution is both a concession to Luther and an addition to what Thomas wrote in the thirteenth century.

Certainly, Cajetan was thoroughly aware of the nominalist dismissal of final causality—the pursuit of philosophy without orientation toward a final end (i.e. God

Himself). Hence, Cajetan is writing and thinking in a world where the complementary arrangement of nature to grace is no longer taken for granted. Hence, Cajetan and others

(e.g. Denis the Carthusian ) speak in realist terms with the handicap of nominalism's notion of extrinsic grace and the denial of final causality. Cajetan is thus very worried about Pelagian articulations of Catholicism. He does not want nature to desire the

"Naturale desiderium non se extendit ultra naturae facultatem." Thomas

Cajetan, Commentaria in Summam Theologiae St Thomae I, q. 12, a. 1, n. 10.

Contrary to this, Bernard Lonergan suggests that the reification of the natural and supernatural orders began much earlier—even before the thirteenth century. Here the stress is on the beginning of this reification, not the completion of the process. Bernard

Lonergan, Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas.

Vol I. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: Univresity of Toronto Press,

2000), p. 17.

549 Feingold has an excellent treatment of Denis the Carthusian in The Natural

Desire to See God, pp. 67-77. 247

supernatural. He makes a move to protect the gratuity of grace against Luther's charges.

It becomes obvious that the "two-ender" thesis is useful in countering Protestant

accusations that the Catholic Church is "semi-Pelagian."

The examination duplex felicitas sive beatitudo in the corpus of Thomas' writings

has yielded a number of conclusions about the nature of natural beatitude and

supernatural beatitude as duplex. First, for Thomas to say that something is duplex is to

hold that it is "one" with "two" aspects or "twofold." Human happiness is thus duplex.

There are not "natural happiness" and "supernatural happiness" as two independent

realities. Rather, grace perfects and elevates nature since nature participates in grace.

Consequently, natural and supernatural happiness should be distinguished but not

divided. By describing beatitude as "distinguished but not divided," we do justice to

Thomas' careful distinction. Natural beatitude is not penultimate or separate from

supernatural beatitude. This account complements the traditional Thomistic integration of

philosophy and theology as distinct but united disciplines. Nature, reason, and philosophy

are not expelled in mankind's pursuit for perfect happiness. Rather, reason and

philosophy have a subservient, but valued role. Lehrberger notes how Aquinas compares

philosophy to "a beautiful woman taken captive" during an Israelite conquest.550 Moses

declared that an Israelite might marry a captive Gentile woman and bring her into his

home—but only after she shaved her head and clipped her nails551 as an act of humble

James Lehrberger, "Aquinas' Philosophical Critique of Philosophy," Verbum:

Analecta Neolatina 6 (2004), 49. The reference derives from Deuteronomy 21:11.

Deuteronomy 21:12. 248 purification. The conclusion, then, is that philosophy and its natural ends must first be, purified of its former glory (and humbled) in order to assimilate into God's economy. It seems, then, that Thomas Aquinas' Super de trinitate serves as a sharp razor. A would-be

Socrates might question Thomas in a Euthyphronic manner—but it is Socrates that leaves with a bald head. Hence, the philosophical predication that "Socrates is bald" takes on a completely new meaning.

Philosophy and theology, like nature and grace, have a twofold relationship to one another. Moreover, the separation of nature from grace or the separation of philosophy from theology may not be a genuine Catholic development. Rather, this separation may be an overreaction to Protestant accusations against a misunderstood version of Catholic theology. Similarly, natural law and divine law must not be falsely separated as they also maintain a duplex relationship. By returning to the authentic Thomistic notion of duplex or twofold, we can transcend the debate and appreciate the points made by Cajetan in his context and de Lubac in his own. The lovely nature of "twofold" lends itself to articulations of "two" and "one" without doing violence to the other. The important distinction that must be maintained is that one made by Thomas in Super de trinitate,

"even though by his nature man is inclined to his ultimate end, he cannot reach it by nature but only by grace, and this owing to the loftiness of that end." The beauty of duplex is that it allows nature to participate in grace as distinct but not wholly unrelated.

Super de trinitate, q. 6, a. 4 ad 5. "Quamvis enim homo naturaliter inclinetur in finem ultimum, non tamen potest naturaliter ilium consequi, sed solum per gratiam, et hoc est propter eminentiam illius finis." 249 CHAPTER NINE: SYNTHESIS OF THE DUPLEX ORDO

How then does one account for Thomas' assertion that there is a natural desire for supernatural beatitude if he also stated that innate natural potencies are attained by natural agency? Thomas' account is synthesized in three ways. First, by insisting on the term "duplex" with regard to beatitude. Secondly, by appreciating Thomas' account of natural law as naturally teleological. As one comes to appreciate how Thomas identifies natural law as the pre-pedagogue to the Old Law as pedagogue to the New Law, one begins to see that the natural has an analogical relationship with the supernatural. Natural

Law is oriented to and fulfilled in Divine Law. If a two- fold law orders man to his end, then beatitude is understood in the same way. Third, the direct relationship of natural beatitude and supernatural beatitude can also be understood as typological. The supernatural assumes and perfects the natural so that the beatitude is truly twofold and not merely two beatitudes. The typological relationship is simply another way of speaking of consummation. Thomas Aquinas himself speaks our future supernatural beatitude as a "consummation" of imperfect beatitude which, begins in this life:

The contemplative life both begins here and and is consummated

{consummatur} in the future, since the acts which are perfect in heaven

{inpatria} are begun in a certain way in this life, but they are yet 251

imperfect.

Note here how imperfect beatitude begins in this life in a certain way {quodammodo in hac vita inchoantur). Imperfect beatitude only begins quodammodo in this life because of its analogical relationship to supernatural beatitude inpatria.554

This relationship between natural and supernatural beatitude as duplex stands plainly in the Corpus Thomisticum. Natural law serves as our analogy for defining the relationship. Thomas argues that man has one final end: "Therefore, just as of all men there is naturally one last end, so the will of an individual man must be fixed on one last end."555 Divine law, Thomas elaborates, provides the supernatural means by which man attains to this end. As we noted in Chapter Six, Thomas identifies the divine law as the

III Sententiae d. 34, q. 1, a. 4. "Vita enim contemplative et hie incipit, et in futuro consummatur, unde actus qui erunt perfecti in patria, quodammodo in hac vita inchoantur, sed impfecisti sunt."

554 D. Bradley observes that Thomas is being truly original at this point and breaking with Aristotle since for Aristotle, human eudaimonia is in comparison to God's happiness, not in comparison with any possible human happiness. Aquinas on the

Twofold Human Good (1997), 399. Compare Nicomachean Ethics 10, 7 at 1177al0-20 where Aristotle holds that only the gods experience perfect eudaimonia. For more on a

"this worldly" natural end, see also James Mullaney, "Man's Natural, Terrestrial End,"

The Thomist, 18 (1955), p. 391.

555 Summa theologiae I-II, q. 1, a. 5. "Unde oportet quod, sicut omnium hominum est naturaliter unus finis ultimus, ita huius hominis voluntas in uno ultimo fine statuatur." auxilium legis naturalis. Thus divine law build on natural law. Natural law requires an auxiliary law. We might use the phrase auxilium legis naturalis from Summa contra

Gentiles to form an analogous phrase, namely that supernatural beatitude is the auxilium beatitudinis naturalis.

Thomas also states that natural law orients humanity, "to its due act and end through which it has a natural inclination.' When Thomas numbers the natural inclinations as the nutritive inclinations (nourishment), the sensitive inclinations

(procreation and education), and the intellective inclinations (to understand the truth, live in society and know God),558 he introduces a hierarchy of goods. In the essential passage from Prima secundae q. 94, a. 2, Thomas identifies the highest good:

Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to good, according to the nature of

his reason, which nature is proper to him: thus man has a natural

inclination to know the truth about God {homo habet naturalem

inclinationem ad hoc quod veritatem cognoscat de Deo}, and to live in

society: and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to

the natural law; for instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those

among whom one has to live, and other such things regarding the above

Summa contra Gentiles III, cap. 117, n. 6. "Lex divina profertur homini in auxilium legis naturalis."

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 91, a. 2, resp. "per quam habet naturalem inclinationem ad debitum actum et finem."

ceo Summa theologiae I-II, q. 94 a. 2. inclination.

The Latin, here, is very important. The phraseology cognoscat "de Deo" conforms precisely to Thomas' formulation of "de Deo an sit" in his Super de Trinitate Boethii.

Consequently, we know exactly what sort of knowledge Thomas speaks here about— namely knowledge that there is a God and those things that Thomas refers to as the

"preambles of faith."

The existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be

known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but are preambles to

the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace

presupposes nature, and perfection supposes something that can be

perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot

grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of faith, something which in itself is

capable of being scientifically known and demonstrated.

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 94, a. 2. "Tertio modo inest homini inclinatio ad bonum secundum naturam rationis, quae est sibi propria, sicut homo habet naturalem inclinationem ad hoc quod veritatem cognoscat de Deo, et ad hoc quod in societate vivat. Et secundum hoc, ad legem naturalem pertinent ea quae ad huiusmodi inclinationem spectant, utpote quod homo ignorantiam vitet, quod alios non offendat cum quibus debet conversari, et cetera huiusmodi quae ad hoc spectant."

Summa theologiae I, q. 2, a. 2, ad 1. "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deum esse, et alia huiusmodi quae per rationem naturalem nota possunt esse de Deo, ut dicitur

Rom. I non sunt articuli fidei, sed praeambula ad articulos, sic enim fides praesupponit 254

So then natural law in itself does incline man to know the truth about God. That is, to know the truth "de Deo." Thomas distinguishes "de Deo" from "quid Deus" in Super de

Trinitate Boethii. So then, natural law has a limit.

This limit is made explicit elsewhere in Summa theologiae I-II, q. 91, a. 4. Natural law, says Thomas is insufficient, because man is ordained to an eternal beatitude and this goal is out of proportion to his natural resources. Secondly, Thomas says that the human judgment itself is unworthy to arrive at difficult moral conclusions. Thirdly, natural law cannot monitor or enforce precepts. Lastly, natural law in itself cannot reward or judge.561

All four arguments are Thomas' affirmation that the natural innate powers of man are entirely insufficient for attaining "eternal beatitude," as he calls it here at q. 91, a. 4. This passage nicely links our analogy of law and beatitude. In it we say that natural law requires a help or an auxilium. Natural beatitude, even if we could conceive of it apart from supernatural beatitude, would itself be imperfect and require a help or an auxilium.

This is why Thomas speaks of natural imperfect beatitude as "begun in a certain way" in this life and then "consummated" in the next. This conditional qualification that Thomas

cognitionem naturalem, sicut gratia naturam, et ut perfectio perfectibile. Nihil tamen prohibet illud quod secundum se demonstrabile est et scibile, ab aliquo accipi ut credibile, qui demonstrationem non capit."

561 Regarding the judicial aspect of natural law, see James Lehrberger's "Crime without Punishment: Thomistic Natural Law and the Problem of Sanctions," Law and

Philosophy: The Practice of Theory, eds. John A. Murley, et al. (Athens, Ohio: Ohio

University Press, 1992): 237-57 255 makes at III Sententiae d. 34, q. 1, a. 4 parallels the way in which natural law and Old

Law are analogical types of the New Law. So also, then, natural imperfect beatitude is an analogical type of the supernatural beatitude entailed by the vision of the divine essence.562

NATURAL DESIRE OF WONDER

Thomas' treatment of the philosophical knowledge of our Final End in his

Expositio super Boetthii de trinitate explains that this is the case because within a created intellect, knowledge that something exists leads to a desire to know what that something is. In other words, an "An sit" leads to a "Quid sit." Thomas' conviction in this regard is strictly philosophical and depends on Aristotle's observation:

Now the object of the intellect is "what a thing is," i.e. the essence of a

thing, according to De Anima.563 Wherefore the intellect attains perfection,

in so far as it knows the essence of a thing. If therefore an intellect knows

the essence of some effect, whereby it is not possible to know the essence

of the cause, i.e. to know of the cause "what it is"; that intellect cannot be

said to reach that cause simply, although it may be able to gather from the

effect the knowledge of that the cause is. Consequently, when man knows

an effect, and knows that it has a cause, there naturally remains in the man

the desire to know about the cause, "what it is." And this desire is one of

Since typology is usually restricted to biblical anaylsis or redemptive history, here the term is qualified by the term "analogical" so as not to cause confusion.

Aristotle, De anima 3, 6. wonder, and causes inquiry, {Et Mud desiderium est admirationis, et

causat inquisitionem) as is stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics .5M

For instance, if a man, knowing the eclipse of the sun, consider that it

must be due to some cause, and know not what that cause is, he wonders

about it, and from wondering proceeds to inquire. Nor does this inquiry

cease until he arrive at a knowledge of the essence of the cause. If

therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created effect,

knows no more of God than "that He is"; the perfection of that intellect

does not yet reach simply the First Cause, but there remains in it the

natural desire to seek the cause. Wherefore it is not yet perfectly happy.

Consequently, for perfect happiness the intellect needs to reach the very

Essence of the First Cause. And thus it will have its perfection through

union with God as with that object, in which alone man's happiness

consists, as stated above (I, q. 7; aa. 2, 8).565

Aristotle, Metaphysics 1, 2.

565 Summa theologiae I-II, q. 3, a. 8. "Obiectum autem intellectus est quod quid est, idest essentia rei, ut dicitur in III de anima. Unde intantum procedit perfectio intellectus, inquantum cognoscit essentiam alicuius rei. Si ergo intellectus aliquis cognoscat essentiam alicuius effectus, per quam non possit cognosci essentia causae, ut scilicet sciatur de causa quid est; non dicitur intellectus attingere ad causam simpliciter, quamvis per effectum cognoscere possit de causa an sit. Et ideo remanet naturaliter homini desiderium, cum cognoscit effectum, et scit eum habere causam, ut etiam sciat de 257

This Aristotelian account mSumma theologiae synthesizes nicely with Thomas' observations in Super de Trinitate Boethii regarding the two kinds of knowledge and the limits of philosophical inquiry. Here, Thomas introduces something missed by both "one- enders" and "two-enders" regarding whether humans have an "innate" natural desire or an "elicited" natural desire to know the divine essence. Here, Thomas uses neither

"innate" nor "elicited," but instead speaks of the Aristotelian "desire of wonder."

causa quid est. Et illud desiderium est admirationis, et causat inquisitionem, ut dicitur in principio Metaphys. Puta si aliquis cognoscens eclipsim solis, considerat quod ex aliqua causa procedit, de qua, quia nescit quid sit, admiratur, et admirando inquirit. Nee ista inquisitio quiescit quousque perveniat ad cognoscendum essentiam causae. Si igitur intellectus humanus, cognoscens essentiam alicuius effectus creati, non cognoscat de Deo nisi an est; nondum perfectio eius attingit simpliciter ad causam primam, sed remanet ei adhuc naturale desiderium inquirendi causam. Unde nondum est perfecte beatus. Ad perfectam igitur beatitudinem requiritur quod intellectus pertingat ad ipsam essentiam primae causae. Et sic perfectionem suam habebit per unionem ad Deum sicut ad obiectum, in quo solo beatitudo hominis consistit, ut supra dictum est."

566 Elsewhere Thomas speaks of a non-cognitive natural desire of all beings for their final end or God. See Summa theologiae I-II q. 6, a. 5; q. 10, a. 1; q. 30, a. 1 ad 3; and q. 41, a. 3. Nature desire is certainly related to the nature inclinations described by

Thomas regarding natural law in q. 94, a. 2. However, there is a difference in that humans, as rational creatures, are ordered to merely to a natural perfection but that they are ordered to a supernatural perfection which entails the intellect moving from 258

Thomas describes this natural desire as a "desire of wonder" and it more accurately describes the position of Thomas regarding the natural desire for the vision of God. When we think of natural desire in terms of desiderium admirationis, the articulations of natural desire in Summa contra Gentiles becomes even more clear: "Every intellect naturally

{naturaliter} desires the vision of the divine substance." The obvious feature about intellects is that they naturally "wonder." Thomas perceives the movement from "An sit" to "Quid sit" as "wonder."

The debate over "one end" or "two ends" has so often centered on "innate desire" or "elicited desire." Here and elsewhere, however, Thomas uses neither term,568 but instead appeals to the "desiderium admirationis.'" Recently, Gianmarco Stancato has accomplished a full lexicographical study (available only in French) on the ways in which Thomas uses the term desiderium.569 This study also confirms that elicited or

knowledge about God to quiditative knowledge of God. This is what makes rational creatures unique.

567 Summa contra Gentiles III, cap. 57 n. 4. "Supra probatum est quod omnis intellectus naturaliter desiderat divinae substantiae visionem."

In the Corpus Thomisticum, Thomas only once speaks of "innate desire"

{desiderium innatum} and that in Super Joannem, cap. 12,1. 2. Moreover, he never refers to "elicited desire" {desiderium elicitum).

569 Gianmarco Stancato, Le concept de desir dans I 'oeuvre de Thomas de 'Aquin.

(Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 2011), 1-44. innate desire is not an explicit concept for Thomas. Thus, the natural desire is not technically "innate" (just as natural law is not innate), nor is it is strictly "elicited" (just as natural law is not strictly elicited). Moreover, the phrase "desiderium admirationis" emphasizes the role of the intellect in human nature. So then, the object of supernatural beatitude is not innately known or desired, nor is the object of supernatural beatitude elicited by some external prompting. Rather, the human intellect naturally inclines to

"wonder" and this is the way in which Thomas understands our natural desire for quiditative knowledge of our supernatural end.

Thomas' teaching on desiderium is rooted in his understanding of the relationship between the intellect and appetition. The passions in particular are the occasion for

Thomas' teaching regarding desire since they provide the basis and foundation of appetition. Thomas enumerates eleven passions and subdivides them as concupsicible and irascible. The soul's structure regarding appetition is especially important in understanding how Thomas treats the concupiscible passions' pull attraction to the good.

Now, in the movements of the appetitive faculty, good has, as it were, a

570 Gianmarco Stancato (2011), 45-51.

Jan Aertsen clarifies that "Everything by nature desires God. In every desired object He is desired, for a thing is only desireable if it participates in the highest Good."

Jan Aertsen's Nature and Crature: Thomas Aquinas's Way of Thought (New York: E.J.

Brill, 1988), 357. The unique element of human desire is that it unfolds. As rational animals, humans not merely tend to God, but want to know about God—what Thomas defines as the process of admiratio. 260

force of attraction, while evil has a force of repulsion. In the first place,

therefore, good causes, in the appetitive power, a certain inclination,

aptitude or connaturalness in respect of good: and this belongs to the

passion of "love": the corresponding contrary of which is "hatred" in

respect of evil. Secondly, if the good be not yet possessed, it causes in the

appetite a movement towards the attainment of the good beloved: and this

belongs to the passion of "desire" or "concupiscence": and contrary to it,

in respect of evil, is the passion of "aversion" or "dislike." Thirdly, when

the good is obtained, it causes the appetite to rest, as it were, in the good

obtained: and this belongs to the passion of "delight" or "joy"; the

contrary of which, in respect of evil, is "sorrow" or "sadness."

He defines a passion as "a movement of the sensitive appetite when we imagine good or evil: in other words, passion is a movement of the irrational soul, when we think of good

572 Summa theologiae I-II, q. 23, a. 4. "In motibus autem appetitivae partis, bonum habet quasi virtutem attractivam, malum autem virtutem repulsivam. Bonum ergo primo quidem in potentia appetitiva causat quandam inclinationem, seu aptitudinem, seu connaturalitatem ad bonum, quod pertinet ad passionem amoris. Cui per contrarium respondet odium, ex parte mali. Secundo, si bonum sit nondum habitum, dat ei motum ad assequendum bonum amatum, et hoc pertinet ad passionem desiderii vel concupiscentiae.

Et ex opposito, ex parte mali, est fuga vel abominatio. Tertio, cum adeptum fuerit bonum, dat appetitus quietationem quandam in ipso bono adepto, et hoc pertinet ad delectationem vel gaudium." 261 or evil.' Thomas, then, links the passions as movement (motus) on the occasion of thinking of good or evil. So then, thinking of the Good who is God, even merely as existing, brings about a movement in the soul. Ideally, the human soul is drawn to the good and repells that which is evil. Any good that is an object of the concupiscible appetite is "delightful" (delectabilis). This is important because it is higher than being merely useful. Moreover, the objects of this appetite are ranked by contrasts in order of their objects. A certain inclination in respect of good (amor)514 and its contrary for evil

(odium). Next, the appetite for a good not yet attained (desiderium) and its contrary in respect of evil (fuga). Last, when the good is obtained, the appetite rests (gaudium) or the contrary of not obtaining it (tristitia). With regard to human desire, love, desire, and

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 22, a. 3. "passio est motus appetitivae virtutis sensibilis in imaginatione boni vel mali. Et aliter, passio est motus irrationalis animae per suspicionem boni vel mali."

574 Unfortunately, contemporary English scarcely distinguishing between the term charity as the theological virtue of caritas and love as the passion amor. It goes without saying that it would be a grave error here to conflate "love" here in the passions with the theological virtue of caritas.

The full account for the order of the passions, including not only the six concupisible passions but also the five irascible passions is found at Summa theologiae I-

II q. 25, a. 3: "Et si ordinem omnium passionum secundum viam generationis, scire velimus, primo occurrunt amor et odium; secundo, desiderium et fuga; tertio, spes et desperatio; quarto, timor et audacia; quinto, ira; sexto et ultimo, gaudium et tristitia, quae 262 joy are related toward the object of the good. The order is clear since it represents the set of beginning, middle, and end. Thomas also relates this to the natural analogy of weight, fall, and repose.

The appetitive faculty reveals a pattern similar to the one described by Thomas in the way he describes the desiderium admirationis. Partial knowledge moves to amor which gives rise to desiderium for more knowledge. Love or amor, for Thomas, is the first in the passions.577 Amor is first because it corresponds to the original "weight" or

"beginning" of the movement toward the good. Moreover, Thomas explains, the good naturally precedes the evil since evil is the privation of the good. Consequently, amor is before its contrary odium. As outlined above, amor logical precedes the passion of desire and the passion of joy. However, in the order of intention, it is reversed, "because the pleasure intended causes desire and love. For pleasure is the enjoyment of the good,

consequuntur ad omnes passiones, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Ita tamen quod amor est prior odio, et desiderium fuga, et spes desperatione, et timor audacia, et gaudium quam tristitia, ut ex praedictis colligi potest."

576 Summa theologiae I-II, q. 26, a. 2.

For love as the first passion, see Summa theologiae I-II, q. 25, a. 2 where

Thomas cites Augustine's-De Civitate Dei, 14: "Amor enim inhians habere quod amatur, cupiditas est; id autem habens, eoque fruens, laetitia est. Amor ergo est prima passionum concupiscibilis.

578 Summa theologiae I-II, q. 25, a. 2. "Naturaliter autem est prius bonum malo, eo quod malum est privatio boni." 263 which enjoyment is, in a way, the end, just as the good itself is.'

Thomas sets down the principle that a loved good is something known to the one who loves it and that it finds harmony with it. Thomas calls this an acquisition of connaturality:

Natural love is not only in the powers of the vegetal soul, but in all the

soul's powers, and also in all the parts of the body, and universally in all

things: because, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "Beauty and goodness

are beloved by all things," since each single thing has a connaturalness

with that which is naturally suitable to it.580

The difficulty for rational creatures is that they cannot have a "connaturalness" with God by nature. Hence, amor leads to desiderium, but to a desiderium of amazement, wonder, and admiration.

If God is truly our final good, then the thought of him who is not present to us brings with it desire for him. Now in intellectual creatures, objects of the passions can usually be held

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 25, a. 2, co. "Sed secundum ordinem intentionis, est e converso, nam delectatio intenta causat desiderium et amorem. Delectatio enim est fruitio boni, quae quodammodo est finis sicut et ipsum bonum, ut supra dictum est.

con

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 26, a. 1, ad 3. "Amor naturalis non solum est in viribus animae vegetativae, sed in omnibus potentiis animae, et etiam in omnibus partibus corporis, et universaliter in omnibus rebus, quia, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div.

Nom., omnibus est pulchrum et bonum amabile; cum unaquaeque res habeat connaturalitatem ad id quod est sibi conveniens secundum suam naturam." in the mind. Yet with regard to God as our Good, this is not the case. Thomas states that

love depends on knowledge since knowledge is the cause of love.581 Moreover, amor

seeks to know the beloved completely and thoroughly.

In Summa theologiae I-II, q. 28, a. 2, Thomas explains the effects of amor by

turning to an analogy of a lover and his beloved. This analogy speaks also the way in

which Thomas understands appetition in the soul. The love of concupiscence is not

satisfied with externl possession of the beloved, but rather seeks to possess the beloved

COT perfectly, "by penetrating into his heart, as it were." Although Thomas distinguishes

this with the love of friendship, Thomas relates that the lover desires to be "in" the beloved as though he were one with him. So then, a knowledge of the beloved desires a

full and perfect union with the beloved. With regard to our final end, then, there is a wonderous desire for perfect union. Yet amor is this life cannot know God completely.

Instead it is limited to a desire grasping in wonderment—desiderium admirationis. Our

imperfect knowledge of him as First Cause gives rise to a desire to know him perfectly.

As Thomas detailed in Expositio de Trinitate the natural mind cannot grasp the

581

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 27, a. 2. "Sic igitur cognitio est causa amoris, ea ratione qua et bonum, quod non potest amari nisi cognitum."

582 Summa theologiae I-II, q. 28 a. 2 s. c. "Sed contra est quod dicitur I loan. IV, qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo. Caritas autem est amor Dei. Ergo, eadem ratione, quilibet amor facit amatum esse in amante, et e converso." 583 Summa theologiae I-II, q. 28 a. 2, resp. "quasi ad intima illius perveniens." divine essence of God by natural reason. Hence, the mind's awareness of the Good leaps toward wonder or admiratio. It seems then that the pattern of amor to desiderium to gaudium becomes more complicated in rational creatures since the final good cannot be known quidditatively. So then, the desire that Thomas speaks about is a desire of wonder or desiderium admirationis since God cannot be enjoyed in this life. Instead, man only comes to rest and enjoys God when he is made deiform in the beatific vision.

This desire of wonder can also be found in Prima pars regarding the goodness and the goodness of God (I, qq. 5-6). Thomas demonstrates that goodness has the aspect of a final cause in relation to desire:

I answer that, Since goodness is that which all things desire, and since this

has the aspect of an end, it is clear that goodness implies the aspect of an

end. Nevertheless, the idea of goodness presupposes the idea of an

efficient cause, and also of a formal cause. For we see that what is first in

causing, is last in the thing caused. Fire, e.g. heats first of all before it

Super de trinitate q. 6, a. 3. See also Chapter Seven above for a detailed account.

585

In De divinis nominibus, cap. 41, 18. "Sed considerandum est, quod non dicit quod suscipiat totam pulchritudinem deitatis, sed deiformitatis quia impossibile est quod in aliquo creato speculo, recipiatur tota pulchritudo Dei; sed in aliquo creato speculo, propter sui puritatem et claritatem, recipitur perfecte tota pulchritudo quae est possibilis esse in creatura per assimilationem ad Deum. Et quia deiformitas creaturae semper est ex parte et non tota, propter hoc temperavit addens: si est conveniens dicere." 266

reproduces the form of fire; though the heat in the fire follows from its

substantial form. Now in causing, goodness and the end come first, both of

which move the agent to act; secondly, the action of the agent moving to

the form; thirdly, comes the form. Hence in that which is caused the

converse ought to take place, so that there should be first, the form

whereby it is a being; secondly, we consider in it its effective power,

whereby it is perfect in being, for a thing is perfect when it can reproduce

its like, as the Philosopher says (Meteor, iv); thirdly, there follows the

formality of goodness which is the basic principle ofits perfection.,586

Here again Thomas links ends with causality and this conforms to what was stated above

Summa theologiae I, q. 5, a. 4, co. "Respondeo dicendum quod, cum bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, hoc autem habet rationem finis; manifestum est quod bonum rationem finis importat. Sed tamen ratio boni praesupponit rationem causae efficientis, et rationem causae formalis. Videmus enim quod id quod est primum in causando, ultimum est in causato, ignis enim primo calefacit quam formam ignis inducat, cum tamen calor in igne consequatur formam substantialem. In causando autem, primum invenitur bonum et finis, qui movet efficientem; secundo, actio efficientis, movens ad formam; tertio advenit forma. Unde e converso esse oportet in causato, quod primum sit ipsa forma, per quam est ens; secundo consideratur in ea virtus effectiva, secundum quod est perfectum in esse

(quia unumquodque tunc perfectum est, quando potest sibi simile facere, ut dicit philosophus in IV Meteor.); tertio consequitur ratio boni, per quam in ente perfectio fundatur." 267 regarding natural law and inclinations to the Good. However, in the passage above,

Thomas speaks also of final causality and desire in the context of goodness. Thomas then specifies his meaning in the next question:

I answer that, God is the supreme good simply, and not only as existing in

any genus or order of things. For good is attributed to God, as was said in

the preceding article, inasmuch as all desired perfections flow from Him

as from the first cause. They do not, however, flow from Him as from a

univocal agent, as shown above (Question 4, Article 2); but as from an

agent which does not agree with its effects either in species or genus. Now

the likeness of an effect in the univocal cause is found uniformly; but in

the equivocal cause it is found more excellently, as, heat is in the sun more

excellently than it is in fire. Therefore as good is in God as in the first, but

not the univocal, cause of all things, it must be in Him in a most excellent

way; and therefore He is called the supreme good.5SS

COT

I owe this insight to D. Bradely's Thomas Aquinas and the Twofold Human

Good, (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America, 1997), 369-449. coo

Summa theologiae I q. 6, a. 2. Emphasis mine. "Respondeo dicendum quod

Deus est summum bonum simpliciter, et non solum in aliquo genere vel ordine rerum. Sic enim bonum Deo attribuitur, ut dictum est, inquantum omnes perfectiones desideratae effluunt ab eo, sicut a prima causa. Non autem effluunt ab eo sicut ab agente univoco, ut ex superioribus patet, sed sicut ab agente quod non convenit cum suis effectibus, neque in ratione speciei, nee in ratione generis. Similitudo autem effectus in causa quidem univoca 268

Thomas identifies "all desired perfections" as "flow[ing] from Him as from the first cause." Thomas here confirms generally what he later specifies in Summa theologiae I-II, q. 3, a. 8 with regard to human nature—namely that human nature can only find perfect beatitude in the vision of God's essence: "Consequently, for perfect happiness the intellect needs to reach the very Essence of the First Cause."

This also confirms what Thomas teaches in a neglected passage from Summa theologiae I-II q. 32, a. 8 wherein he speaks again of "desire" {desiderium} and

589 "wonder" {admiratio} with regard to pleasure.

The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that wonder is the cause of pleasure. I

answer that, It is pleasant to get what one desires, as stated above

(Question 23, Article 4): and therefore the greater the desire for the thing

invenitur uniformiter, in causa autem aequivoca invenitur excellentius, sicut calor excellentiori modo est in sole quam in igne. Sic ergo oportet quod cum bonum sit in Deo sicut in prima causa omnium non univoca, quod sit in eo excellentissimo modo. Et propter hoc dicitur summum bonum."

589 Kevin Staley comes close to this conclusion about pleasure and beatitude but does not make it. He writes: "Does pleasure belong to the essence of happiness, or does it simply accompany any operation which is perfective of an agent? Can the virtuous man be called happy even in the face of the hardships of ill fortune? The answers to these questions are beyond the scope of the present essay and require careful consideration of

Thomas' moral philosophy, philosophical anthropology, and metaphysics." Kevin Staley,

"Happiness: the Natural End of Man?" The Thomist 53 [1989], p. 233. 269

loved, the greater the pleasure when it is attained: indeed the very increase

of desire brings with it an increase of pleasure, according as it gives rise to

the hope of obtaining that which is loved, since it was stated above (3, ad

3) that desire resulting from hope is a cause of pleasure. Now wonder is a

kind of desire for knowledge; a desire which comes to man when he sees

an effect of which the cause either is unknown to him, or surpasses his

knowledge or faculty of understanding. Consequently wonder is a cause of

pleasure, in so far as it includes a hope of getting the knowledge which

one desires to have.590

Summa theologiae I-II, q. 32, a. 8, resp. "Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in I Rhetoric, quod admiratio est delectationis causa. Respondeo dicendum quod adipisci desiderata est delectabile, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo quanto alicuius rei amatae magis crescit desiderium, tanto magis per adeptionem crescit delectatio. Et etiam in ipso augmento desiderii fit augmentum delectationis, secundum quod fit etiam spes rei amatae; sicut supra dictum est quod ipsum desiderium ex spe est delectabile. Est autem admiratio desiderium quoddam sciendi, quod in homine contingit ex hoc quod videt effectum et ignorat causam, vel ex hoc quod causa talis effectus excedit cognitionem aut facultatem ipsius. Et ideo admiratio est causa delectationis inquantum habet adiunctam spem consequendi cognitionem eius quod scire desiderat. Et propter hoc omnia mirabilia sunt delectabilia, sicut quae sunt rara, et omnes repraesentationes rerum, etiam quae in se non sunt delectabiles; gaudet enim anima in collatione unius ad alterum, quia conferre unum alteri est proprius et connaturalis actus rationis, ut philosophus dicit in sua poetica. 270

The desire of wonder naturally moves from knowledge of effects to desire and wonder regarding the cause. Is this "innate desire" or is it "elicited desire"? Neither term is sufficient. So instead, we should retreat to the phraseology of Thomas regarding the

"desire of wonder." This intellectual "desire of wonder" is the natural means by which humans try to know things and it is rooted in Thomas' teaching regarding goodness. It is in fact a cause of pleasure and it fits with Thomas' teaching in Prima pars regarding goodnees as having the aspect of a final end.591 Since the human intellect grasps the

Et propter hoc etiam liberari a magnis periculis magis est delectabile, quia est admirabile, ut dicitur in I Rhetoric."

Thomas teaches this explicitly in Summa theologiae I-II, q. 33, a. 2 when he relates the pleasure and desire. This is of course, building off his previous teaching in q.

27, a. 2 and q. 28, a 2 detailed above. The passion of amor leads to desiderium. Here in q.

33, a. 2, spiritual pleasures related to contemplation lead to a "thirst" or desire for more:

"Si vero per sitim vel desiderium intelligatur sola intensio affectus tollens fastidium, sic delectationes spirituales maxime faciunt sitim vel desiderium sui ipsarum. Delectationes enim corporales, quia augmentatae, vel etiam continuatae, faciunt superexcrescentiam naturalis habitudinis, efficiuntur fastidiosae; ut patet in delectatione ciborum. Et propter hoc, quando aliquis iam pervenit ad perfectum in delectationibus corporalibus, fastidit eas, et quandoque appetit aliquas alias. Sed delectationes spirituales non superexcrescunt naturalem habitudinem, sed perficiunt naturam. Unde cum pervenitur ad consummationem in ipsis, tunc sunt magis delectabiles, nisi forte per accidens, inquantum operationi contemplativae adiunguntur aliquae operationes virtutum 271 existence of a First Cause, he experiences not an "innate desire" nor an "elicited desire" but a "desire of wonder" regarding the essence of this First Cause. This "desire of wonder" is wholly natural and conforms to the way human seek the essences of all things.

The description of "desire of wonder" with regard to goodness and pleasure allows us to return to the theme of duplex beatitudo. The natural beatitude of men is imperfect and unsatisfying because it does not set the "desire of wonder" at rest.

Moreover, if goodness has the aspect of a final end, then man does not achieve his end until he knows the essence of the end. The litany of created, natural goods in Summa

corporalium, quae per assiduitatem operandi lassantur."

592

Bernard Lonergan describes natural reason's desire for the transcendental first cause in a way that merits a full quotation: "A philosopher operating solely in the light of natural reason could not conceive that we might understand God properly; for understanding God properly is somehow being God; and somehow beign God is somehow being infinite. How could a creature be concived to receive the ipsum intelligere that is identical with the ipsum esse? Theologians speak of a quasi reception of a quasi formal cause; but their speech does not elucidate the mystery; it merely provides an orderly expression for their faith; such systematized faith is not philosophy. The best natural reason can attain is the discovery of the paradox that the desire to understand arises naturally, that its object is the transcental, ens, and that the proper fulfillment that naturally is attainable is restricted to the proportionate object of the finite intellect." In

Lonergan's "The Natural Desire to See God" available in Collection: Papers by Bernard

Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), pp. 83-4. theologiael-ll q. 2 aa. 1-8 (i.e. wealth, honor, fame, glory, power, good of the body, pleasure, good of the soul, any created good) do not lead to perfect beatitude, as is made especially clear in Summa theologiael-ll q. 3 a. 8. These created goods do not satisfy the ultimate "desire of wonder" regarding our First Cause and Sumum Bonum.

Consequently, natural beatitude can only be "beatitude" by maintaining that it bears an anological relationship with perfect supernatural beatitude. By retaining the idea of duplex and speaing of supernatural beatitude as existing in an analogical relationship, nature can be distinguished from grace without the denial of one or the collapse of one into the other.

The solution is obtained by stressing beatitude as twofold and giving primacy to the supernatural aspect. As in the analogy of natural law, Thomas does not speak of the divine law as separate or divided from natural law. Divine law is not opposed to natural law nor does it teach anything contrary to natural law. Moreover, divine law presumes and assumes natural law. We might even say that natural law is consummated in divine law. By positing the twofold final good of man, Thomas excludes a notion of natural beatitude that might be found perfectly in this life. Even the natural aspect of beatitude, according to Thomas, cannot be rightly enjoyed in this life. The reason that Thomas gives is that man's soul is naturally immortal. This is not a new argument, but one made previously by Saint Augustine.593 Building on Augustine, Thomas explains that the

See Augustine, De civitate Dei 19, 4. Admittedly, Augustine refers to the post- lapsarian state. Nevertheless, Thomas cites Augustine here to show that all created goods lack permanence by their very nature. 273 immortal nature of the soul necessarily finds dissatisfaction in the changes and alterations necessary in creation:

First, from the general notion of happiness. For since happiness is a

"perfect and sufficient good," it excludes every evil, and fulfils every

desire. But in this life every evil cannot be excluded. For this present life

is subject to many unavoidable evils; to ignorance on the part of the

intellect; to inordinate affection on the part of the appetite, and to many

penalties on the part of the body; as Augustine sets forth in De Civ. Dei

xix, 4. Likewise neither can the desire for good be satiated in this life. For

man naturally desires the permanence of the good that he has {Naturaliter

enim homo desideratpermanentiam eius boni quod habet}. Now the

goods of the present life pass away; since life itself passes away, which we

naturally desire to have, and would wish to hold abidingly, for man

naturally shrinks from death. Wherefore it is impossible to have true

Happiness in this life.

594 Summa theologiae I-II, q. 5, a. 3, co. Emphasis mine. "Primo quidem, ex ipsa communi beatitudinis ratione. Nam beatitudo, cum sit perfectum et sufficiens bonum, omne malum excludit, et omne desiderium implet. In hac autem vita non potest omne malum excludi. Multis enim malis praesens vita subiacet, quae vitari non possunt, et ignorantiae ex parte intellectus, et inordinatae affectioni ex parte appetitus, et multiplicibus poenalitatibus ex parte corporis; ut Augustinus diligenter prosequitur XIX de Civ. Dei. Similiter etiam desiderium boni in hac vita satiari non potest. Naturaliter Now if man naturally desires for his good to abide, and the goods of creation are changing, then man desires something beyond this life. It seems that this end is after this life and that it is distinct, but not disassociated with, the supernatural beatitude. One might think of Cicero's beatitude in the heavens (without a beatific vision) in the Dream of Scipio as a depiction of this natural and permanent beatitude.

This observation that natural beatitude is not found in this life also helps us to understand that Thomas' description in places of "beatitude," as in the opening of Prima secundae, could be generic so as to include both aspects of beatitude—natural beatitude as foreshadowment and supernatural beatitude as fulfillment.596 Perhaps the mistake of

enim homo desiderat permanentiam eius boni quod habet. Bona autem praesentis vitae transitoria sunt, cum et ipsa vita transeat, quam naturaliter desideramus, et earn perpetuo permanere vellemus, quia naturaliter homo refugit mortem. Unde impossibile est quod in hac vita vera beatitudo habeatur. Secundo, si consideretur id in quo specialiter beatitudo consistit, scilicet visio divinae essentiae, quae non potest homini provenire in hac vita, ut in primo ostensum est. Ex quibus manifeste apparet quod non potest aliquis in hac vita veram et perfectam beatitudinem adipisci."

It remains unclear whether Cicero considered this to be an actual end and whether it was an incorporeal beatitude. See notes below on Cicero's preternatural end in

Chapter Two.

See for example, the opening lines of Summa theologiae I-II, q. 5, a. 3, co. where Thomas begins by speaking of "a general notion of happiness {ipsa communi beatitudinis ratione] and then specifies it later. My suspicion is that Thomas purposefully 275 certain scholastics, and the mistake of de Lubac, is to think of natural beatitude in the wrong way—as something reified and absolute.597 While it is true that Thomas often speaks of natural beatitude or natural felicity in reference to the "felicity of the philosophers"598 who enjoy a certain happiness in this life through contemplation and virtue; nevertheless, I argue that Thomas does this merely to help us know what is meant by a natural beatitude that does not entail that this is the supernatural beatitude of the beatific vision. Thomas is not identifying natural beatitude as a perfect felicity of the philosophers in this life. Rather, he is using it as an example of what it might be like and he finds their desire for this natural beatitude helpful for his argument since he seeks to ground his argument philosophically (as in Super De trinitate) without direct appeals to

Sacred Scripture.

For the sake of limiting the scope of this thesis, I do not wish to directly address the problem of a state of pure nature. Although the controversy of natural beatitude touches on the possibility of state of pure nature, it is by itself a whole can of worms. Let

begins with a "general notion of happiness" in Prima secundae in order to respect the order of philosophical inquiry. The progress of his articles in qq. 1-5 display a specification from general happiness to specific happiness—the vision of the divine essence.

597 The result is that some want to make natural beatitude somehow "perfect" of its own (two-enders) or to reject it altogether as absurd (one-enders).

598 For example, De veritate, q. 14, a. 2 "hoc est felicitas de qua philosophi locuti sunt." 276 it suffice to say even if Thomas postulated a state of pure nature, it was merely hypothetical and not historic or actual.599 While Karl Rahner was more restrictive on the possibility of "pure nature,' Bernard Lonergan free postulated a "graceless world order" but he did not feel compelled to to enter the fold of the two-enders.601 Suarez

A key passage incidentally in this debate is De veritate q. 6, a. 2 in which

Thomas asserts that nature could exist without grace and glory. Here Thomas provides the hypothetical situation of pure nature. He does not state that it is the case. Interestingly enough, it was the Franciscan tradition, and not the Dominican tradition that postulated a historical state of pure nature. For example, Bonaventure taught that Adam would have first been created in a state of pure nature and God would have subsequently endowed him with grace. See Bonaventure, In II Sent. dist. 29. a. 2, q. 2. Alister McGrath otes that the controversial position endured all the way to the time of the Council of Trent and was vigorously discussed by the Council Fathers. According to McGrath, Trent did not treat the subject directly on account of this Franciscan opposition. See Alister McGrath,

Iustitia Dei: A history of the Christian doctrine of justification. New York: Cambridge

University Press, 1998, pp. 160-4, but especially 164.

600 Karl Rahner refers to the theological possibility of "pure nature" as a mere

"remainder concept" and prefers to speak of nature as "spiritual nature" so as to preserve nature's supernatural orientation. By this, Rahner seeks to stress that it is intrinsic to human nature to desire God. See Karl Rahner: Theologian of the Graced Search for

Meaning, ed. by Geffrey Kelly (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1992), 114.

601 Bernard Lonergan readibly consents that there could be a "world-order without 277 certainly hypothesizes that God could have created rational creatures (humans, angels, or both) that were not created in a state of grace and were intended only for a natural beatitude. In such a case, natural happiness would be due. Whether or not natural beatitude could stand alone, it is certainly the case that supernatural beatitude cannot stand alone. Grace, for Thomas, always presumes nature. The duplex relation of natural beatitude and supernatural beatitude is simply an application of the duplex relation of nature and grace extended to the Thomistic doctrine of goods and ends.

grace" but that it is a "marginal theorem" and not a matter of faith. See Lonergan's "The

Natural Desire ot See God," in Collection, 94.

Francisco Suarez' "De statibus humanae naturae," in Opera omnia, 7, 182a.

For L. Feingold's thoughts on Suarez and the state of nature as it pertains to the natural desire for the beatific vision, see his Natural Desire to See God, pp. 238-2. Feingold writes: "Suarez goes beyond the explicit teaching of these texts when he infers from them that intellectual creatures could have been created for this natural happiness alone."

NDtSG, 241. For an advanced treatment of state of pure nature, see Steven Long's Natura

Pura: On the Recovery of Nature in the Doctrine of Grace. New York: Fordham

University, 2010. R. Hiitter argues that the hypothetical state of pure nature "seems rather clearly to have its roots in Aquinas's own thought rather than to be a retrospective projection of the Thomist commentators." See Reinhard Hiitter, "Desiderium Naturale

Visionis Dei—Est autem duplex hominis beatitudo sive felicitas: Some Observations about Lawrence Feingold's and John Milbank's Recent Interventions in the Debate over the Natural Desire to See God," Nova et Vetera 5 (2007), 101. SYNTHESIZING THROUGH TYPOLOGY & ANALOGY

To summarize and synthesize, Thomas Aquinas presents a consistent doctrine of nature. He expresses his position in a number of ways. He refers to nature on one hand in a way that is consistent with the way he treats the supernatural on the other hand. For example the way he describes nature and grace correlates with the method by which he treats natural law and divine law, natural beatitude and supernatural beatitude—along with any other corresponding pair within the duplex ordo of nature and grace. In each case, Thomas holds the relationship as analogical (the former participates in the latter) and typological (the former finds consummation in the latter). The natural could hypothetically stand alone, but in the corpus of Thomas, the immortal human soul does not find rest in the natural order since the created order is subject to change. The insufficiency of nature is not accounted for entirely by sin. Even Thomas states that natural law in itself possesses insufficiencies that are not the result of sin.

The answer to this problem is not that of one-enders or two-enders. The one-ender cannot simply deny natural beatitude and he cannot simply posit a single albeit supernatural beatitude for human nature. Moreover, the two-ender cannot defend natural beatitude by reifing pure nature and positing a natural beatitude that is naturally "perfect" of itself. Suppose that one were presented with the following choices:

A) Man has only a supernatural end

B) Man has only a natural end

C) Man has two ends, a supernatural end that is distinct from his

603 See the final section of Chapter Three on the insufficiency of natural law in

Thomas Aquinas. 279

natural end, and his natural end

D) None of the above

I suppose that most people would want to choose (A) and this is the choice of De

Lubac.604 Aristotle or Cicero might circle (B). I suppose that the post-Cajetanian tradition would circle (C). The proper answer would be to circle (D) "None of the above." The supernatural end can never be separated from the natural end. Again, the natural end could hypothetical exist without the supernatural beatitude, but the supernatural beatitude could never exist without the natural beatitude. The supernatural elevates the natural.

This is why beatitude must spoken of as duplex beatitudo and not as duo beatitudines.

So then, what would be the correct answer to the multiple-choice question regarding man's end? Option (C) above reads, "Man has two ends, a supernatural end distinct from his natural end and his natural end." This answer could be corrected by rewriting it using the actual phraseology of Thomas, "Man has a twofold end, whereas natural beatitude begins in a way in this life {quodammodo in hac vita} and therefore it must be consummated {consummatur} by supernatural beatitude inpatria." One could continue to modify and expand on this. The important thing is that the twofold nature of

Scotus should not here be associated with De Lubac because Scotus did in fact posit a state of pure natural beatitude. See Ordinatio 2, d 33, q un, n 11 (Vat 8, p 364), in which Scotus says that infants in Limbo with original sin only, "have a natural knowledge of all naturally knowable things more excellently than any philosophers have had in this state, and thus they can attain to a certain natural beatitude in God know in His general attributes." beatitude be expressed so that one is not forced to choose between one beatitude or two

beatitudes. We can speak of each facet, but we must always insist on it being two-fold.

One-enders and two-enders are partially correct. Each can cite passages for their

arguments and each has made convincing arguments. Thomas does say that "intellectual

creatures naturally desire the vision God" and yet he also stresses in places like De

Trinitate that humans cannot desire what they do not know and that the intellect travels

from unknowning to a desire to know. The advantage to recognizing the analogical

meaning of "duplex" is that it is able to reconcile the partial truths of both the one-ender

and the two-ender.

The term duplex itself derives, of course from duo meaning "two" and plex, plicis

meaning "fold." Perhaps it is also helpful to recall the verbal form of the word,plectere,

which means "folding, plaiting, or twining." Within books a single page is often

connected to another page. They are in fact one sheet of paper with a fold distinguishing them. The edge of these folds are then sewn or glued to others. Each page is

distinguished. Similarly a rope may be in fact two or three cords intertwined. One might rightfully identify it as "three chords" or as "one rope." If something is complex or

complicated it is thoroughly intertwined. In all these ways, we recognize that plectere

involves a folding or distinction. So then, when we speak of beatitude, is not correct to follow the Angelic Doctor and speak of beatitude as duplex and two-fold?

By preserving and insisting on duplex or two-fold we accomplish the analogical

"Supra probatum est quod omnis intellectus naturaliter desiderat divinae

substantiae visionem." Summa contra Gentiles, III cap. 57 n. 4 281 relationship between nature and grace. It is not a univocal relationship, so that nature can ascend to the supernatural. Similarly, it is not a purely equivocal relationship, so that supernatural beatitude stands in direct competition with natural beatitude. Every Thomist naturally boasts that the beauty of Thomas' system is that it holds the principle of analogy at its center. So then, this point must be insisted upon when we wade into the subject of beatitude as regards human teleology. Whenever we apply analogy there is always the danger of slipping toward univocity or equivocity. As might be expected, polemical debates affect the way the philosophical principles are articulated. For example, Thomas Cajetan is likely to stress the distinction between nature and grace as he counters Martin Luther's accusation that the Catholic Church had abandoned the gratuity of the supernatural order. Similarly, Christian philosophers of the twentieth century might overstate the primacy of the supernatural with the onset of naturalistic secularism. In a secular environment, the Catholic would stress the supernatural end. As we have seen, those sympathetic to the nouvelle theologie worry that the scholastic insistence on a natural order was itself the direct cause of the encroaching secularism in the West: "They give credit then to a secularized natural order—cultural, moral, philosophic.. .Pure nature is thus linked to 'separated reason.'"606 By identifying the

Gery Provoust, Thomas d'Aquin et les thomismes (Paris: Cerf, 1996), 48. Cited in Ralph Mclnerny's Preambula Fidei: Thomism and the God of the Philosophers

(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2006), 72. In his note on the same page, Mclnerny responds: "Provoust's criticisms, all of them admittedly secondhand, effectively criticized Cajetan for holding what Thomas Aquinas explicitly different times and debates, I do not mean to suggest that the topic itself is relative.

Instead, by noting that all goods participate in the Sumum Bonum and all perfections participate in the God who is perfect, we conclude that the proper relationship between natural beatitude and supernatural beatitude is that natural beatitude participates within supernatural beatitude. This analogical relationshp assumes that natural beatitude is always imperfect and not able to provide the ultimate rest that is stimulated by humanity's "desire of wonder" or desiderium admirationis. By emphasizing that the supernatural beatitude includes the natural beatitude, we can speak freely of a duplex beatitudo—something singular but containing two. Thomas does not envision the question of beatitude to be a decision between natural or supernatural happiness. Rather, the natural is always ordered to the supernatural. Hence, for Thomas, the blessed in

Heaven are experiencing natural beatitude within supernatural beatitude. Man is ultimately destined to duplicem beatitudinem, non duo beatitudines.

taught."

Jan Aertsen suggests a different way of looking at the difficulty. Aertsen's observes the "twofold" end and while he does not explicitly apply the term "analogy" he does seem to articulate the idea: "From this distinction is to be understood Thomas's speaking of a twofold end, although with that the last word on the duality has not yet been said. From the viewpoint of acquisition, a difference must be made between the end that can be reached through the natural powers and the end that is given through grace.

From the viewpoint of completion, there is just one beatitude." Jan Aertsen, Nature and

Creature (1988), 367. EPILOGUE

Supra probatum est quod omnis intellectus naturaliter desiderat divinae substantiae visionem.

Summa contra Gentiles III, cap. 57 n. 4

Six years ago, a Catholic bishop said to me, "When you pick your dissertation topic, be

sure that you truly love it—because when you are finished, you'll hate it!" Well, I am

happy to say that far from hating the topic of natural law and natural teleology, I love it

even more than when I began studying. I will continue to read and study this important

topic and I hope that I can retain this zeal.

I am grateful especially to my wife Joy for encouraging me along the way,

especially when I was tired and discouraged. I am grateful my Doktorvater the Reverend

Dr. James Lehrberger, Dr. William Frank, and Dr. Matthew Levering for their generous

assistance. I would also like to thank the faculty of the Philosophy Department of the

University of Dallas for their helpful instruction and encouragement. The University of

Dallas in general has been happy environment in which to learn and grow.

Last of all, and most importantly, I thank Him Who Is My Final End and

Beatitude. May it be granted to me to attain to that perfect end that I desire with wonder.

Videmus nunc per speculum in enigmate tunc autem facie adfaciem nunc cognosco ex parte tunc autem cognoscam sicut et cognitus sum...in lumine tuo videbimus lumen. 284

APPENDIX A: "POTENTIA OBEDIENTIALIS/OBEDIENTIAE" IN THE CORPUS THOMISTICUM

"Potentia Obedientialis or Obedientiae" in various forms and declensions. Search based on Lemma 55366 (obedientia, obedienti-ae), Lemma 55366e (obedientialis, obediential- e), and Lemma 64177 (potentia, potenti-ae).

24 OCCURRENCES IN 18 PASSAGES

CASE 1. PLACE 1. Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 15 q. 3 a. 1 ad 8. Ad octavum dicendum, quod nihil facit Deus in creatura quod aliquo modo in primis diebus non praecesserit: sed diversimode. Quaedam enim fuerunt in operibus sex dierum ut in principiis activis et materialibus, et secundum similitudinem speciei, ut ea quae generantur ex sibi similibus in natura: quaedam vero sicut in principiis activis et materialibus, sed non secundum similitudinem speciei, sicut quaedam animalia ex putrefactione generata: quaedam vero sicut ex principiis disponentibus et non activis, et secundum similitudinem speciei, sicut anima rationalis: quaedam vero ut in potentia obedientiae tantum, sicut ea quae per miraculum fiunt.

CASE 2. PLACE 2. Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 19 q. 1 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum, quod

/no (=obedientialis/=obedientia) =potentia 285 immortalitas dicit potentiam quamdam ad semper vivendum et non moriendum. Haec autem potentia in natura humana ex parte corporis non invenitur, nisi imperfecta, quasi potentia obedientiae tantum; eo quod per principia naturae, vitae sempiternitas haberi non potest; sed complementum hujus potentiae est ex aliquo divino munere gratis collato.

Sic ergo immortalitas dupliciter considerari potest: vel quantum ad potentiam incompletam naturalem; et sic est una et eadem immortalitas, sicut una et eadem natura; vel quantum ad munus gratiae, quod est quasi formale complens dictam potentiam, et sic invenitur differentia utriusque immortalitatis et impassibilitatis; quia prima fuit per gratiam innocentiae, ultima vero erit per donum gloriae.

CASE 3. PLACE 3. Super Sent., lib. 3 d. 1 q. 1 a. 3 ad 4. Ad quartum dicendum, quod capacitas alicujus creaturae potest intelligi dupliciter; vel secundum potentiam naturalem, quae pertinet ad rationem seminalem; et sic nullam capacitatem creaturae vacuam Deus dimittit in genere, quamvis capacitas alicujus creaturae particularis non impleatur propter aliquod impedimentum: vel secundum potentiam obedientiae, secundum quod quaelibet creatura habet ut ex ea possit fieri quod Deus vult; et hoc modo in natura humana est capacitas hujus dignitatis, ut in unitatem divinae personae assumatur. Nee oportet quod omnem talem capacitatem adimpleat; sicut non oportet quod Deus faciat quidquid potest, sed quod congruit ordini sapientiae ejus.

CASE 4. PLACE 4. Super Sent., lib. 3 d. 2 q. 1 a. 1 qc. 1 co. [...]-2 Similiter non signatur etiam potentia passiva naturalis creaturae, quia nulla potentia passiva naturalis est in natura cui non respondeat potentia activa alicujus naturalis agentis. Unde relinquitur quod dicat in creatura solam potentiam obedientiae, secundum quam de creatura potest fieri quidquid Deus vult, sicut de ligno potest fieri vitulus, Deo operante.

Haec autem potentia obedientiae correspondet divinae potentiae, secundum quod dicitur, quod ex creatura potest fieri quod ex ea Deus facere potest.

CASE 5. PLACE 4. Super Sent., lib. 3 d. 2 q. 1 a. 1 qc. 1 co. Unde relinquitur quod dicat in creatura solam potentiam obedientiae, secundum quam de creatura potest fieri quidquid Deus vult, sicut de ligno potest fieri vitulus, Deo operante. Haec autem potentia obedientiae correspondet divinae potentiae, secundum quod dicitur, quod ex creatura potest fieri quod ex ea Deus facere potest. Sed potentia Dei dupliciter consideratur: vel ut absoluta, vel ut ordinata.

CASE 6. PLACE 5. Super Sent., lib. 3 d. 2 q. 2 a. 2 qc. 3 ad 3. Ad tertium dicendum, quod unio ilia praecessit in operibus sex dierum, non in ratione seminali, sed in potentia obedientiae tantum; sicut in costa Adae fuit ut ex ea Eva nasci posset.

CASE 7. PLACE 6. Super Sent., lib. 3 d. 3 q. 2 a. 1 ad 1. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in conceptione Christi fuit duplex miraculum; unum quod femina concepit Deum, aliud quod virgo peperit filium. Quantum ergo ad primum beata virgo se habebat ad conceptionem secundum potentiam obedientiae tantum, et adhuc multo remotius quam costa viri, ut ex ea mulier formaretur. In talibus autem simul dantur actus et potentia ad actum, secundum quam dici posset quod hoc est possibile. 287

CASE 8. PLACE 7. Super Sent., lib. 4 d. 8 q. 2 a. 3 ad 4. Ad quartum dicendum, quod nulla creatura potest agere ea quae sunt supra naturam quasi principale agens; potest tamen agere quasi agens instrumentale a virtute increata motum: quia sicut creaturae inest obedientiae potentia, ut in ea fiat quidquid creator disposuerit, ita etiam ut ea mediante fiat, quod est ratio instrumenti.

CASE 9. PLACE 8. Super Sent., lib. 4 d. 11 q. 1 a. 3 qc. 3 arg. 3. Praeterea, quanto minus est de potentia ex parte creaturae in qua fit miraculum, tanto est majus miraculum quod fit per potentiam divinam. Sed in hac conversione minimum est de potentia in creatura: quia in quibusdam conversionibus miraculosis est potentia naturalis, sicut quod aqua conversa fuit in vinum, in quibusdam autem potentia obedientiae tantum: sicut quando costa formata est in mulierem; in creatione autem etsi non praecedat aliqua potentia, tamen non est aliqua repugnantia. Ergo cum in hac conversione sit repugnantia, et nulla potentia ex parte creaturae, quia non potest esse aliquid in potentia respectu totius compositi; videtur quod haec conversio sit miraculosior omni alia mutatione.

CASE 10. PLACE 9. Super Sent., lib. 4 d. 11 q. 1 a. 3 qc. 3 ad 3. Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut se habet potentia naturalis ad mutationes naturales, ita se habet potentia obedientiae ad conversiones miraculosas; unde secundum modum miraculosae conversionis modus obedientialis potentiae in creatura in aliud convertenda. Sicut ergo in conversionibus formalibus inest potentia obedientiae ad recipiendum talem formam, ita in hac substantial! conversione inest potentia obedientiae ut haec substantia convertatur in illam; unde majoris virtutis ostensiva est creatio, in qua nulla potentia obedientiae 288 praeexistit, quam haec conversio.

CASE 11. PLACE 9. Super Sent., lib. 4 d. 11 q. 1 a. 3 qc. 3 ad 3. Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut se habet potentia naturalis ad mutationes naturales, ita se habet potentia obedientiae ad conversiones miraculosas; unde secundum modum miraculosae conversionis modus obedientialis potentiae in creatura in aliud convertenda. Sicut ergo in conversionibus formalibus inest potentia obedientiae ad recipiendum talem formam, ita in hac substantiali conversione inest potentia obedientiae ut haec substantia convertatur in illam; unde majoris virtutis ostensiva est creatio, in qua nulla potentia obedientiae praeexistit, quam haec conversio.

CASE 12. PLACE 9. Super Sent., lib. 4 d. 11 q. 1 a. 3 qc. 3 ad 3. Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut se habet potentia naturalis ad mutationes naturales, ita se habet potentia obedientiae ad conversiones miraculosas; unde secundum modum miraculosae conversionis modus obedientialis potentiae in creatura in aliud convertenda. Sicut ergo in conversionibus formalibus inest potentia obedientiae ad recipiendum talem formam, ita in hac substantiali conversione inest potentia obedientiae ut haec substantia convertatur in illam; unde majoris virtutis ostensiva est creatio, in qua nulla potentia obedientiae praeexistit, quam haec conversio.

CASE 13. PLACE 9. Super Sent., lib. 4 d. 11 q. 1 a. 3 qc. 3 ad 3. Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut se habet potentia naturalis ad mutationes naturales, ita se habet potentia obedientiae ad conversiones miraculosas; unde secundum modum miraculosae 289 conversionis modus obedientialis potentiae in creatura in aliud convertenda. Sicut ergo in conversionibus formalibus inest potentia obedientiae ad recipiendum talem formam, ita in hac substantiali conversione inest potentia obedientiae ut haec substantia convertatur in illam; unde majoris virtutis ostensiva est creatio, in qua nulla potentia obedientiae praeexistit, quam haec conversio.

CASE 14. PLACE 9. Super Sent., lib. 4 d. 11 q. 1 a. 3 qc. 3 ad 3. Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut se habet potentia naturalis ad mutationes naturales, ita se habet potentia obedientiae ad conversiones miraculosas; unde secundum modum miraculosae conversionis modus obedientialis potentiae in creatura in aliud convertenda. Sicut ergo in conversionibus formalibus inest potentia obedientiae ad recipiendum talem formam, ita in hac substantiali conversione inest potentia obedientiae ut haec substantia convertatur in illam; unde majoris virtutis ostensiva est creatio, in qua nulla potentia obedientiae praeexistit, quam haec conversio.

CASE 15. PLACE 10. Super Sent., lib. 4 d. 17 q. 1 a. 5 qc. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum ad primam quaestionem, quod de ratione miraculi secundum se sumpti tria sunt: quorum primum est, quod illud quod fit per miraculum, fit supra virtutem naturae creatae agentis; secundum, ut in natura recipiente non sit ordo naturalis ad illius susceptionem, sed solum potentia obedientiae ad Deum; tertium, ut praeter modum consuerum tali effectui ipse effectus inducatur. Exemplum primi est de gloria corporum in resurrectione, ad quam natura non attingit: exemplum secundi est de illuminatione caeci, in quo non est potentia naturalis ad suscipiendum visum: exemplum tertii est de conversione aquae in vinum praeter cursum naturae.

CASE 16. PLACE 11. Super Sent., lib. 4 d. 48 q. 2 a. 1 ad 3. Ad tertium dicendum, quod pro tanto dicitur Deus die septimo a novis creaturis condendis cessasse, quia nihil postea factum est quod prius non praecesserit in aliqua similitudine secundum genus vel speciem, vel ad minus sicut in principio seminali, vel etiam sicut in potentia obedientiali. Dico ergo, quod novitas mundi futura praecessit quidem in operibus sex dierum in quadam remota similitudine, scilicet in gloria vel gratia Angelorum; praecessit etiam in potentia obedientiae, quae creaturae tunc est indita ad talem novitatem suscipiendam a Deo agente.

CASE 17. PLACE 11. Super Sent., lib. 4 d. 48 q. 2 a. 1 ad 3. Ad tertium dicendum, quod pro tanto dicitur Deus die septimo a novis creaturis condendis cessasse, quia nihil postea factum est quod prius non praecesserit in aliqua similitudine secundum genus vel speciem, vel ad minus sicut in principio seminali, vel etiam sicut in potentia obedientiali.

Dico ergo, quod novitas mundi futura praecessit quidem in operibus sex dierum in quadam remota similitudine, scilicet in gloria vel gratia Angelorum; praecessit etiam in potentia obedientiae, quae creaturae tunc est indita ad talem novitatem suscipiendam a

Deo agente.

CASE 18. PLACE 12. Summa theologiae III, q. 11 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut prius dictum est, conveniens fuit ut anima Christo per omnia esset perfecta, per hoc quod omnis eius potentialitas sit reducta ad actum. Est autem considerandum quod in 291 anima humana, sicut in qualibet creatura, consideratur duplex potentia passiva, una quidem per comparationem ad agens naturale; alia vero per comparationem ad agens primum, qui potest quamlibet creaturam reducere in actum aliquem altiorem, in quem non reducitur per agens naturale; et haec consuevit vocari potentia obedientiae in creatura. Utraque autem potentia animae Christi fuit reducta in actum secundum hanc scientiam divinitus inditam.

CASE 19. PLACE 13. De veritate, q. 8 a. 12 ad 4. [...]-l Una est naturalis quae potest per agens naturale in actum reduci; et talis potentia in Angelis est totaliter completa per formas innatas: sed secundum talem potentiam intellectus possibilis noster non est in potentia ad futura quaelibet cognoscenda. Est autem aliapotentia obedientiae, secundum quam in creatura fieri potest quidquid in ea fieri voluerit creator; et sic intellectus possibilis est in potentia ad futura quaelibet cognoscenda, inquantum ei scilicet possunt divinitus revelari. Talis autem potentia intellectus angelici non est totaliter completa per formas innatas.

CASE 20. PLACE 14. De veritate, q. 12 a. 3 ad 18. Ad decimumoctavum dicendum, quod in anima humana est potentia passiva ad recipiendum lumen propheticum, non naturalis, sed tantum potentia obedientiae, sicut est in natura corporali ad ea quae mirabiliter fiunt; unde non oportet quod tali passivae respondeat potentia activa naturalis.

CASE 21. PLACE 15. De veritate, q. 29 a. 3 ad 3. [„.]-2 Una naturalis, quae potest tota impleri; quia haec non se extendit nisi ad perfectiones naturales. Alia est potentia 292 obedientiae, secundum quod potest recipere aliquid a Deo; et talis capacitas non potest impleri, quia quidquid Deus de creatura faciat, adhuc remanet in potentia recipiendi a

Deo. Modus autem, qui crescente bonitate crescit, sequitur magis mensuram perfectionis receptae quam capacitatis ad recipiendum.

CASE 22. PLACE 16. De potentia, q. 1 a. 3 arg. 5. Praeterea, quando est simile de uno et omnibus, quod probatur de uno, intelligitur de omnibus esse probatum; sicut si probatur de uno triangulo, demonstrato quod habeat tres aequales duobus rectis, de omnibus intelligitur esse probatum. Sed similis ratio videtur de omni impossibili, quod

Deus illud possit et non possit; rum ex parte facientis, quia divina potentia infinita est: rum ex parte facti, quia omnis res habet potentiam obedientiae ad Deum. Ergo si aliquod impossibile est naturae quod facere non possit, ut respondens dicebat, videtur quod nullum impossibile facere possit.

CASE 23. PLACE 17. De potentia, q. 6 a. 1 ad 18. Ad decimumoctavum dicendum, quod quanto aliqua virtus activa est altior, tanto eamdem rem potest perducere in altiorem effectum: unde natura potest ex terra facere aurum aliis elementis commixtis, quod ars facere non potest; et inde est quod res aliqua est in potentia ad diversa secundum habitudinem ad diversos agentes. Unde nihil prohibet quin natura creata sit in potentia ad aliqua fienda per divinam potentiam, quae inferior potentia facere non potest: et ista vocatur potentia obedientiae, secundum quod quaelibet creatura creatori obedit.

CASE 24. PLACE 18. De virtutibus, q. 1 a. 10 ad 13. Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod quando aliquod passivum natum est consequi diversas perfectiones a diversis agentibus ordinatis, secundum differentiam et ordinem potentiarum activarum in agentibus, est differentia et ordo potentiarum passivarum in passivo; quia potentiae passivae respondet potentia activa: sicut patet quod aqua vel terra habet aliquam potentiam secundum quam nata est moveri ab igne; et aliam secundum quam nata est moveri a corpore caelesti; et ulterius aliam secundum quam nata est moveri a Deo. Sicut enim ex aqua vel terra potest aliquid fieri virtute corporis caelestis, quod non potest fieri virtute ignis; ita ex eis potest aliquid fieri virtute supematuralis agentis quod non potest fieri virtute alicuius naturalis agentis; et secundum hoc dicimus, quod in tota creatura est quaedam obedientialis potentia, prout tota creatura obedit Deo ad suscipiendum in se quidquid Deus voluerit. Sic igitur et in anima est aliquid in potentia, quod natum est reduci in actum ab agente connaturali; et hoc modo sunt in potentia in ipsa virtutes acquisitae. APPENDIX B: "PURA NATURALIS" IN THE CORPUS THOMISTICUM

"Pura naturalis" in various forms and declensions. Search based on Lemma 67256

(purus, pura, purum) and Lemma 53562 {naturalis, naturale).

32 OCCURENCES IN 30 PASSAGES

CASE 1. PLACE 1. Super Sent., lib. 1 q. 1 a. 1 arg. 3. [...]-4 Illud quod per se suam perfectionem consequi potest, nobilius est eo quod per se consequi non potest. Sed alia animalia et creaturae insensibiles ex puris naturalibus consequuntur finem suum; quamvis non sine Deo, qui omnia in omnibus operatur. Ergo et homo, cum sit nobilior eis, per naturalem intellectum cognitionem sufficientem suae perfectioni habere potest.

CASE 2. PLACE 2. Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 21 q. 1 a. 2 ad 5. Ad quintum dicendum, quod motus vis concupiscibilis potest dupliciter insurgere. Vel ex qualitate organi, sicut calefacto corpore insurgit motus libidinis sine aliqua imagine; et ille motus est pure naturalis nee rationem peccati habens: et ad hoc potest virtus Daemonis ex potestate suae naturae, quae in transmutationem corporalium potest nisi virtute divina cohibeatur.

Alius motus concupiscibilis est qui insurgit ex apprehensione delectabilis; et ex parte ilia

=pura =naturalis 295 appetitus concupiscibilis habet quamdam libertatem, ad minus in homine, secundum quod potest obedire imperio rationis prohibentis; et sic in concupiscibili potest esse peccatum.

CASE 3. PLACE 3. Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 27 q. 1 a. 4 co. [...]-l Gratia vero omnino conditionem humanae naturae excedit: quod patet ex ejus effectu, quia ducit in finem quern nulla creata natura per se attingere potest, propter quod dicitur 1 Cor. 2, 9: quod oculus non vidit, nee auris audivit, nee in cor hominis ascendit quae praeparavit Deus Us qui diligunt ilium. Unde donum gratiae nullo modo sub merito cadere potest ejus qui in puris naturalibus est, et multo minus ejus qui in peccato deprimitur. Sed tamen opera bona ante donum gratiae facta, praemio suo sibi proportionato non carent: causant enim quamdam habilitatem ad gratiam, et secum etiam quamdam honestatem et jucunditatem et pulchritudinem habent, in quibus praecipue eorum praemium consistit; et aliqua etiam per accidens causant, ut bonorum temporalium affluentiam, aut aliquid hujusmodi: quia frequenter, ut Gregorius dicit, Deus in hoc mundo remunerat eum qui praemium futurae gloriae non meretur, ut sic nullum bonum irremuneratum inveniatur.

CASE 4. PLACE 4. Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 27 q. 1 a. 6 ad 4. Ad quartum dicendum, quod quamvis plus prosit alicui suum opus quam alienum, dummodo sit aequalitas in utroque, tamen opus alienum informatum gratia plus accedit ad meritum condigni inquantum ex radice gratiae procedit, quam opus proprium quod ex puris naturalibus causatur.

CASE 5. PLACE 5. Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 29 q. 1 a. 2 ad 1. Ad primum, quod sicut 296 secundum Augustinum distinctio primorum dierum attenditur secundum ordinem naturae, et non secundum successionem temporis; ita etiam secundum ordinem naturae status in naturalibus puris ad statum ejus in gratia comparator; et non secundum ordinem temporis: et sic intelligendum est, quod homo in statu naturalium, intellectum non habuit unde proficere posset: quia dum gratiam habet, non habet hoc ex naturalibus sed ex gratuitis. Vel dicendum, quod hoc intelligendum est, quod homo non potuit proficere per se, etiam habita gratia, ut beatitudinem consequeretur; et hoc supra Magister dixit proficere ad meritum vitae.

CASE 6. PLACE 6. Super Sent., lib. 3 d. 30 q. 1 a. 4 ad 1. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ilia quae sunt pure naturalia, non sunt meritoria; sed ilia quae procedunt ex natura perfecta caritate et gratia, sunt meritoria, nee natura rationem meriti diminuit, ut dictum est.

CASE 7. PLACE 7. Super Sent., lib. 3 d. 31 q. 1 a. 3 s.c. 1. Sed contra, non potest evitari omne peccatum, nisi omni tentationi resistatur. Sed minima caritas potest vitare omne peccatum, cum etiam homo in puris naturalibus existens hoc potuisset. Ergo caritas quaelibet potest omnem tentationem vincere.

CASE 8. PLACE 8. Super Sent., lib. 4 d. 49 q. 2 pr. Deinde quaeritur de visione Dei; et circa hoc quaeruntur septem: 1 utrum sancti videbunt Deum per essentiam; 2 utrum possint Deum videre oculo corporali; 3 utrum videndo Deum comprehendant ipsum; 4 utrum videntium Deum per essentiam alter altero perfectius videat; 5 utrum videntes 297 divinam essentiam necesse sit omnia videre quae Deus videt; 6 utrum ad videndum Deum per essentiam aliqua creatura ex puris naturalibus possit pertingere; 7 utrum in statu viae possit aliquis Deum per essentiam videre.

CASE 9. PLACE 9. Super Sent., lib. 4 d. 49 q. 2 a. 6 s.c. 3. Sed sancti in Limbo existentes, quamvis gratiam haberent, non viderunt Deum per essentiam; unde in eorum persona dicitur Tob. 5, 12: quale mihigaudium est, qui in tenebris sedeo, et lumen caeli non video? Ergo multo minus ex puris naturalibus aliquis ad hoc pertingere potest.

CASE 10. PLACE 10. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 109 a. 4 ad 3. Ad tertium dicendum quod praeceptum de dilectione Dei non potest homo implere ex puris naturalibus secundum quod ex caritate impletur, ut ex supradictis patet.

CASE 11. PLACE 11. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 114 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod hominis sine gratia duplex status considerari potest sicut supra dictum est, unus quidem naturae integrae, qualis fuit in Adam ante peccatum; alius autem naturae corruptae, sicut est in nobis ante reparationem gratiae. Si ergo loquamur de homine quantum ad primum statum, sic una ratione non potest mereri absque gratia vitam aeternam per pura naturalia. Quia scilicet meritum hominis dependet ex praeordinatione divina.

CASE 12. PLACE 12. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 5 a. 1 co. Unde quod non habuit fidem, hoc esse non potuit nisi quod penitus ei erat ignotum illud de quo est fides. Et si 298 homo et Angelus fuerunt creati in puris naturalibus, ut quidam dicunt, forte posset teneri quod fides non fuit in Angelo ante confirmationem nee in homine ante peccatum, cognitio enim fidei est supra naturalem cognitionem de Deo non solum hominis, sed etiam Angeli. Sed quia in primo iam diximus quod homo et Angelus creati sunt cum dono gratiae, ideo necesse est dicere quod per gratiam acceptam et nondum consummatam fuerit in eis inchoatio quaedam speratae beatitudinis, quae quidem inchoatur in voluntate per spem et caritatem, sed in intellectu per fidem, ut supra dictum est.

CASE 13. PLACE 13. De veritate, q. 8 a. 3 arg. 1. Sed hoc esse non potuisset, nisi verbum vidissent. Ergo per naturalia pura intellectus Angeli vidit Deum per essentiam.

CASE 14. PLACE 14. De veritate, q. 8 a. 3 arg. 2. Sed essentia divina est maxime intelligibilis, cum sit maxime a materia immunis: ex quo contingit aliquid esse intelligibile actu. Cum ergo intellectus Angeli naturali cognitione possit alia intelligibilia intelligere, multo fortius poterit intelligere ex naturalibus puris divinam essentiam.

CASE 15. PLACE 15. De veritate, q. 8 a. 3 arg. 7. Sed Deus per sui essentiam praesentialiter est in anima, et similiter in Angelo, et in qualibet creatura. Ergo Angelus

Deum per essentiam in puris naturalibus videre potuit.

CASE 16. PLACE 16. De veritate, q. 8 a. 3 arg. 8. Si ergo ista divisio est conveniens, oportet haec esse opposita; et ita, cum Deus sit praesens intellectui angelico per essentiam, non erit ei praesens per similitudinem; et ita non potest Deus ab Angelo per 299 similitudinem videri. Si ergo ex naturalibus puris potest eum cognoscere aliquo modo, videtur quod cognoscat eum per essentiam naturaliter.

CASE 17. PLACE 17. De veritate, q. 8 a. 3 arg. 10. Sed dicebat, quod Angeli non fuerunt creati in puris naturalibus, sed cum gratia gratum faciente, vel cum gratia gratis data. Sed contra, sicut lumen naturae deficit a lumine gloriae, ita etiam lumen gratiae gratis datae, vel gratum facientis.

CASE 18. PLACE 18. De veritate, q. 8 a. 3 arg. 12. Sed finis propter quern est rationalis creatura, est videre Deum per essentiam. Ergo rationalis creatura ex naturalibus puris potest ad hanc visionem pervenire.

CASE 19. PLACE 19. De veritate, q. 8 a. 3 s.c. 1. Videre Deum per essentiam, est vita aeterna, ut patet loan. cap. XVII, 3: haec est vita etc. Sed ad vitam aeternam non potest perveniri per pura naturalia; Roman. VI, 23: gratia Dei vita aeterna. Ergo nee ad visionem Dei per essentiam.

CASE 20. PLACE 20. De veritate, q. 8 a. 3 co. Unde oportet et in intellectu esse aliquam dispositionem per quam efficiatur perfectibile tali forma quae est essentia divina, quod est aliquod intelligibile lumen. Quod quidem lumen si fuerit naturale, ex naturalibus puris intellectus Deum per essentiam videre poterit. Sed quod sit naturale est impossibile. 300

CASE 21. PLACE 20. De veritate, q. 8 a. 3 co. Sed cognitio Dei ad quam homo potest

naturaliter pervenire, est ut cognoscat ipsum per formam sensibilem, quae lumine

intellectus agentis est a sensibilibus abstracta; et ideo Rom. cap. I, 20, super illud,

invisibilia Dei etc. dicit Glossa, quod homo iuvabatur ad cognoscendum Deum per

creaturas sensibiles per lumen naturalis rationis. Cognitio autem Dei quae est per formam

creatam, non est visio eius per essentiam: et ideo neque homo neque Angelus potest

pervenire ad videndum Deum per essentiam ex naturalibus puris.

CASE 22. PLACE 21. De veritate, q. 16 a. 1 arg. 12. Praeterea, ad operandum sufficit

potentia et habitus. Si ergo synderesis sit potentia cum habitu innato, cum synderesis

inclinet ad bonum, homo sufficiens erit ex puris naturalibus ad bene operandum; quod

videtur esse Pelagii haeresis.

CASE 23. PLACE 22. De veritate, q. 16 a. 1 ad 12. Actus autem huius habitus

naturalis, quern synderesis nominat, est remurmurare malo, et inclinare ad bonum: et ideo

ad hunc actum homo naturaliter potest. Non autem ex hoc sequitur quod in opus

meritorium peragendum homo ex puris naturalibus possit. Haec enim naturali facultati

solummodo deputare, Pelagianae impietatis est.

CASE 24. PLACE 23. De veritate, q. 24 a. 7 s.c. 4. Praeterea, nulla creatura rationalis

impeditur a beatitudine consequenda nisi ratione peccati. Si ergo aliqua creatura rationalis

esset naturaliter impeccabilis, ex puris naturalibus sine gratia ad beatitudinem posset pervenire; quod Pelagianam haeresim sapere videtur. 301

CASE 25. PLACE 24. De veritate, q. 24 a. 7 co. Respondeo. Dicendum, quod nulla creatura nee est, nee esse potest, cuius liberum arbitrium sit naturaliter confirmatum in bono, ut hoc ei ex puris naturalibus conveniat quod peccare non possit. Cuius ratio est.

CASE 26. PLACE 25. De veritate, q. 29 a. 6 co. Est autem quis dominus sui actus per liberum arbitrium; unde naturalis facultas liberi arbitrii requiritur ad merendum. Ex parte vero gratiae, quia cum praemium beatitudinis facultatem humanae naturae excedat, per naturalia pura ad illud merendum homo non potest sufficere; et ideo requiritur gratia, per quam mereri possit. Haec autem omnia in Christo fuerunt.

CASE 27. PLACE 26. De malo, q. 4 a. 2 ad 22. Ad vicesimurnsecundum dicendum, quod originalis iustitia includit gratiam gratum facientem; nee credo verum esse, quod homo sit creatus in naturalibus puris. Si tamen non includit gratiam gratum facientem, non tamen propter hoc excluditur quin carentia originalis iustitiae habeat rationem culpae, quia ex hoc ipso quod aliquis peccat contra dictamen rationis naturalis, incurrit culpam.

CASE 28. PLACE 27. Quodlibet IX, q. 4 a. 3 co. Et haec opinio nihil difficultatis habet, unde prae ceteris mihi magis placet. Tertii vero dicunt, quod fuerunt creati Angeli in puris naturalibus, et quibusdam conversis ad verbum simul collata est gratia et beatitudo. Et hi dividuntur in tres vias.

CASE 29. PLACE 28. Quodlibet I, q. 4 a. 3 co. Manifestum est enim quod existens in 302 gratia, per caritatem diligit Deum supra seipsum. Sed quia possibile fuit Deo ut hominem faceret in puris naturalibus, utile est considerare ad quantum se dilectio naturalis extendere possit. Dixerunt ergo quidam, quod homo vel Angelus, in puris naturalibus existens, diligit Deum plusquam seipsum naturali dilectione secundum amorem concupiscentiae, quia scilicet bono divino magis frui desiderat tamquam maiori et suaviori; sed secundum amorem amicitiae naturaliter homo plus diligit seipsum quam

Deum.

CASE 30. PLACE 28. Quodlibet I, q. 4 a. 3 co. Sed quia possibile fuit Deo ut hominem faceret in puris naturalibus, utile est considerare ad quantum se dilectio naturalis extendere possit. Dixerunt ergo quidam, quod homo vel Angelus, in puris naturalibus existens, diligit Deum plusquam seipsum naturali dilectione secundum amorem concupiscentiae, quia scilicet bono divino magis frui desiderat tamquam maiori et suaviori; sed secundum amorem amicitiae naturaliter homo plus diligit seipsum quam

Deum. Est enim amor concupiscentiae quo dicimur amare illud quo volumus uti vel frui, sicut vinum, vel aliquod huiusmodi; amor autem amicitiae est quo dicimur amare amicum, cui volumus bonum.

CASE 31. PLACE 29. In Physic, lib. 2 1. 3 n. 9. Unde non est mirum si communicet in conclusionibus cum scientia naturali. Quia tamen non est pure naturalis, per aliud medium eandem conclusionem demonstrat. Sicut quod terra sit sphaerica demonstratur a naturali per medium naturale, ut puta quia partes eius undique et aequaliter concurrunt ad medium: ab astrologo autem ex figura eclipsis lunaris, vel ex hoc quod non eadem sidera 303 ex omni parte terrae aspiciuntur.

CASE 32. PLACE 30. Super De Trinitate, pars 3 q. 5 a. 3 ad 6. Et inde est quod de rebus naturalibus et mathematicis tres ordines scientiarum inveniuntur. Quaedam enim sunt pure naturales, quae considerant proprietates rerum naturalium, in quantum huiusmodi, sicut physica et agricultura et huiusmodi. Quaedam vero sunt pure mathematicae, quae determinant de quantitatibus absolute, sicut geometria de magnitudine et arithmetica de numero. 304

APPENDIX C: "DUPLEX FELICITAS/BEATITUDO" IN CORPUS THOMISTICUM

"duplex felicitas " or "duplex beatitudo " in various forms and declensions. Search based on Lemma 94000 (duplex) with either Lemma 32300 (felicitas, felicitat-is) or

Lemma 11271 (beatitudo, beatitudin-is). Not all the citations below directly relate to the question at hand; however, I retained all the citations for the sake thoroughness.

15 OCCURENCES IN 14 PASSAGES

CASE 1. PLACE 1. Super Sent., lib. 4 d. 49 q. 1 a. 2 qc. 1 co. Et ideo ultimus fmis cujuslibet rei habentis esse ab alio est duplex: unus exterius, secundum scilicet id quod est desideratae perfectionis principium; alius interius, scilicet ipsa sua perfectio, quam facit conjunctio ad principium. Unde cum beatitudo sit ultimus hominis fmis, duplex erit beatitudo. Una quae est in ipso; scilicet quae est ultima ejus perfectio, ad quam possibile est ipsum pervenire; et haec est beatitudo creata.

CASE 2. PLACE 2. Super Sent., lib. 4 d. 49 q. 1 a. 4 qc. 4 co. Ad quartam quaestionem dicendum, quod principium distinctivum mansionum, sive graduum beatitudinis, est duplex; scilicet propinquum et remotum. Propinquum est diversa dispositio quae erit in

=duplex *3 (=felicitas/=beatitudo) beatis, ex qua contingit diversitas perfectionis apud eos in operatione beatitudinis; sed principium remotum est meritum quo talem beatitudinem consecuti sunt.

CASE 3. PLACE 3. Super Sent., lib. 4 d. 49 q. 5 a. 2 qc. 1 arg. 3. Praeterea, in beatitudine non invenitur nisi duplex praemium; scilicet essentiale, et accidentale, quod essentiali superadditur. Sed praemium essentiale superadditum dictum est esse aureolam; quod patet ex hoc quod Exod. 25 aureola coronae aureae superponi dicitur.

CASE 4. PLACE 4. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 3 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, duplex est hominis beatitudo, una perfecta, et alia imperfecta.

Oportet autem intelligere perfectam beatitudinem, quae attingit ad veram beatitudinis rationem, beatitudinem autem imperfectam, quae non attingit, sed participat quandam particularem beatitudinis similitudinem.

CASE 5. PLACE 5. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 4 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est beatitudo, una imperfecta, quae habetur in hac vita; et alia perfecta, quae in

Dei visione consistit. Manifestum est autem quod ad beatitudinem huius vitae, de necessitate requiritur corpus.

CASE 6. PLACE 6. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 62 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod per virtutem perficitur homo ad actus quibus in beatitudinem ordinatur, ut ex supradictis patet. Est autem duplex hominis beatitudo sive felicitas, ut supra dictum est. Una quidem proportionata humanae naturae, ad quam scilicet homo pervenire potest per principia suae naturae. 306

CASE 7. PLACE 7. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 121 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod in adaptatione beatitudinum ad dona duplex convenientia potest attendi. Una quidem secundum rationem ordinis, quam videtur Augustinus fuisse secutus.

CASE 8. PLACE 8. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 186 a. 3 ad 4. Ad quartum dicendum quod duplex est beatitudo sive felicitas, una quidem perfecta, quam expectamus in futura vita; alia autem imperfecta, secundum quam aliqui dicuntur in hac vita beati.

Praesentis autem vitae felicitas est duplex, una quidem secundum vitam activam, alia vero secundum vitam contemplativam, ut patet per philosophum, in X Ethic.

CASE 9. PLACE 8. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 186 a. 3 ad 4. Ad quartum dicendum quod duplex est beatitudo sive felicitas, una quidem perfecta, quam expectamus in futura vita; alia autem imperfecta, secundum quam aliqui dicuntur in hac vita beati. Praesentis autem vitae felicitas est duplex, una quidem secundum vitam activam, alia vero secundum vitam contemplativam, ut patet per philosophum, in X Ethic. Ad felicitatem igitur vitae activae, quae consistit in exterioribus operationibus, divitiae instrumentaliter coadiuvant, quia, ut philosophus dicit, in I Ethic, multa operamur per amicos, per divitias etper civilem potentiam, sicut per quaedam organa.

CASE 10. PLACE 9. Contra impugnantes, pars 2 cap. 6 ad 43. Ad septimum dicendum, quod sicut duplex est felicitas, spiritualis et temporalis; ita est duplex miseria, temporalis, et spiritualis. Quamvis ergo voluntarii pauperes non sint miseri spirituali miseria; quae simphciter miseria est, cum dominus eos beatos vocet Matth. V, 3 et Luc.

VI, 20; possunt tamen temporali miseriae esse subiecti; unde et de temporalibus est eis

misericordia exhibenda.

CASE 11. PLACE 10. Super De Trinitate, pars 3 q. 5 a. 1 ad 4. Ut enim dicit

Augustinus XX de civitate Dei ex verbis Varronis, nulla est homini alia causa philosophandi nisi ut beatus sit. Unde cum duplex felicitas a philosophis ponatur, una

contemplativa et alia activa, ut patet in X Ethicorum, secundum hoc etiam duas partes

philosophiae distinxerunt, moralem dicentes practicam, naturalem et rationalem dicentes

theoricam. Cum vero dicuntur artium quaedam esse speculativae, quaedam practicae,

habetur respectus ad aliquos speciales fines illarum artium, sicut si dicamus agriculturam

esse artem practicam, dialecticam vero theoricam.

CASE 12. PLACE 11. Super De Trinitate, pars 3 q. 6 a. 4 ad 3. Ad tertium dicendum

quod duplex est felicitas hominis. Una imperfecta quae est in via, de qua loquitur philosophus, et haec consistit in contemplatione substantiarum separatarum per habitum

sapientiae, imperfecta tamen et tali, qualis in via est possibilis, non ut sciatur ipsarum

quiditas.

CASE 13. PLACE 12. Super Psalmo 31, n. 1. Quantum ad primum dicit, beati quorum remissae sunt etc. Sed quia beatitudo est duplex, scilicet rei et spei, isti tales, scilicet

quorum remissae sunt iniquitates, sunt beati in spe; qui tandem erunt beati in re. Beatus enim ille est spe, in quo praecedit causa beatitudinis, et via quae est virtus, et praecipue 308 perfecta: unde in quo virtus perfecta apparet, potest dici beatus in spe: sicut arbor bene florens potest dici fructificans.

CASE 14. PLACE 13. Super Mt. [rep. Leodegarii Bissuntini], cap. 25 1. 3. Supra posita est sententia de praemio, hie posita est de merito. Ex quo considerare debemus quod duplex est causa beatitudinis: una ex parte Dei, idest benedictio Dei; alia ex parte nostra, idest meritum quod est de libero arbitrio: non enim debent homines esse desides, sed cooperari gratiae Dei, ut dicitur I ad Cor. XV, 10: gratia Dei sum id quod sum, et gratia Dei in me vacua nonfuit. Sed cum sint multa bona merita, solum fit mentio de operibus misericordiae.

CASE 15. PLACE 14. Super Io., cap. 20 1. 6. Ergo magis beati qui viderunt quam qui non viderunt. Respondeo, quod duplex est beatitude Una est rei, quae consistit in munere divino, de quo quanto alicui plus conceditur, tanto beatior est; et sic quantum ad hoc beati sunt oculi qui vident, quia hoc est munus gratiae. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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