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House of Representatives 2017 Election Special

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House of Representatives 2017 Election Special House of Representatives 2017 Election Special 17 October 2017 IPF Election Special 2017 ¡ Background to Election 2017 – why now ? ¡ Election basics ¡ Prediction of outcome in single seat constituencies ¡ Prediction of outcome in proportional representation ¡ Comparison of election platforms ¡ LDP election platform ¡ Political schedule moving forward ¡ Conclusion 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 0 Jan-13 Mar-13 Abe’s Cabinet approval ratings approval Cabinet Abe’s May-13 Jul-13 Sep-13 Nov-13 Jan-14 Mar-14 May-14 Jul-14 Favourable Sep-14 Nov-14 Jan-15 Mar-15 May-15 Unfavourable Jul-15 Sep-15 Nov-15 Jan-16 Mar-16 May-16 Jul-16 Sep-16 Nov-16 Jan-17 Mar-17 May-17 Jul-17 Sep-17 2 Cabinet approval rates are on rather high historical levels 90 Abe (2012-) 85 Noda 80 Kan 75 Y Hatoyama 70 Aso 65 Fukuda 60 Abe (2006-2007) 55 Koizumi 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 55 57 59 61 63 65 3 Source: NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute Why elections? Recap of political events 27 July – Renho announces to resign as DP President 3 August – Cabinet Reshuffle 4 Aug – Hosono leaves DP 29 Aug – DPRK missile over Hokkaido 1 Sep – DP elects Maehara as party leader 7 Sep –Yamao scandal 8 Sep – Q2 GDP released • Growth of 2.5% (Annualised) 11 Sep – Monthly opinion polling showing • 5% recovery from previous month (NHK) 11 Sep – Reports about possible US President visit 12 Sep – Abe ”may change use of tax hike proceeds for free-schooling”(interview with Nikkei) 13 Sep – US President visit to Japan in November confirmed 15 Sep – DPRK missile launched over Hokkaido 17 September – Media reports on snap election 17-23 Sep – Abe in New York (UN General Assembly) 25 September – Abe officially calls for a snap election 25 Sep – Yuriko Koike founds Party of Hope 26 Sep- talks of DP and Hope “merger” 28 September – House of Representatives Dissolved 29 Sep- Koike ”will refuse to endorse leftists” as Hope candidate 30 Sep – Hope and Ishin agreed for electoral co-operation 3 Oct – Yukio Edano launches Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) 22 October – Polling Day 4 Why election now? ¡ Recovery of Cabinet approval rates, following the cabinet reshuffle in August ¡ Desire to avoid running against the clock or being forced to call for an election because of factors beyond control § North Korean situation unlikely to get better before December 2018 § Division within the Democratic Party and not enough time for Tokyo Governor Koike to organize national alternative to LDP § Sliding schedule for constitutional reform meant less pressure to move ahead with discussions this year § President Trump’s coming to Japan on 4-6 November providing a “window of opportunity” 5 IPF Election Special 2017 ¡ Background to Election 2017 – why now ? ¡ Election basics ¡ Prediction of outcome in single seat constituencies ¡ Prediction of outcome in proportional representation ¡ Comparison of election platforms ¡ LDP election platform ¡ Political schedule moving forward ¡ Conclusion Electoral reforms reducing seats from 475 to 465 Number of single Number of Representational constituencies Seats Aomori ４→3 Tohoku 14→13 Iwate 4→3 Kitakanto 20→19 Mie 5→4 Kinki 29→28 Nara ４→3 Kyushu 21→２0 Kumamoto 5→4 Total 180→176 Kagoshima 5→4 Total 295→289 7 LDP is in trouble only when locked in a 1:1 “duel style” situation Lessons from the 2014 election 120% 5% loss in bipartite 100% 19% 18% 23% 80% 60% % Lost % Won at PR 40% 81% 78% 77% 100% % Won SSD 20% 0% No oposition 1 oposition 2 oposition 3 oposition candidates candidate candidates candidates (BC) (TC) (MC) Bipartite Tripartite Multi-party * Excluding JCP candidates competition competition competition 8 Nearly 77% of the single seat constituencies in 2017 face “tripartite” battle Types of election competition Tripartite competition • Ruling coalition: (LDP) + (Komeito) + (Related independents ) • Conservative opposition: (Party of Hope) + (JIP) + (Related independents) 13% • Liberal/Left opposition: 39 districts (JCP)+(CDP)+(SP ) 10% 28 districts Bipartite conservatives competition • Ruling coalition: 77% (LDP) + (Komeito) + (Related independents ) • Conservative opposition: 222 districts (Party of Hope) + (JIP) + (Related independents) Bipartite conservative-left competition Ruling coalition: (LDP) + (Komeito) + (Related independents ) Liberal/Left opposition: (JCP)+(CDP)+(SP ) 9 Three groups calculating Liberal Democratic Party Komeito Related independents Party of Hope Japan Innovation Party (Ishin) Conservative opposition leaning independent candidates Constitutional Democratic Party Japan Communist Party Socialist Party Related independents 10 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 0 Jan-13 Mar-13 May-13 Jul-13 Abe’s Cabinet approval ratings Sep-13 Nov-13 Jan-14 Mar-14 May-14 Jul-14 Favourable Sep-14 Nov-14 Jan-15 Mar-15 May-15 Unfavourable Jul-15 Sep-15 Nov-15 Jan-16 Mar-16 May-16 Jul-16 Sep-16 Nov-16 Jan-17 Mar-17 May-17 Jul-17 Sep-17 11 After Abe spends political capital on security 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 related initiatives, his popularity ratings return 0 ( Oct enacted Secrecy Secrecy Jan-13 State Law Law HoC 201 Mar-13 (Jul 2013) 3 ) May-13 e lection Jul-13 Sep-13 consumption Nov-13 (Apr 2014) Rise in tax Jan-14 (Sep 2014) R Mar-14 eshuffle May-14 Jul-14 Favourable ( Scandals Scandals Sep-14 Oct 2014) ministers women by two by HoR Nov-14 (Dec 2014) Jan-15 e lection Mar-15 May-15 Unfavourable Jul-15 “New Abenomics (Sep 2015) Arrows Sep-15 of Launch (Summer enacted Security Security 2015) Nov-15 laws Three ” of of ” Jan-16 Mar-16 May-16 HoC (Jul 2016) Jul-16 election Sep-16 (Jul 2017) Scandal Gakuen - Nov-16 Kake Jan-17 Mar-17 First meeting with with meeting First Donald Trump May-17 (Feb 2017) (Sep 2017) dissolution Jul-17 (Aug 2016) R Latest Latest Sep-17 eshuffle 12 Cabinet approval rates’ impact on voting Approval of Cabinet Voting for party 68% 10% 5% 10% 5% 2 43% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% LDP Komeito Ishin Hope CDP JCP Yes No 41% 18% 7% 4% 26% 27% 3 14% 1 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% LDP Komeito Ishin Hope CDP SDP JCP Others 13 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 0 5 Apr-11 Jul-11 Oct-11 Jan-12 Apr-12 PFP SDP Your Komeito CDP LDP Party approval rates Jul-12 → Liberal Oct-12 Jan-13 Apr-13 Jul-13 Oct-13 Jan-14 Apr-14 Jul-14 Sunrise Party) Innovation (Japan Ishin JCP Hope DP Oct-14 Jan-15 → PFG Apr-15 → Jul-15 Kokoro Oct-15 Jan-16 Apr-16 Jul-16 Oct-16 Jan-17 Apr-17 Jul-17 Oct-17 14 Independents voting patterns 2012 2012 27% 6% 26% 15% 5% 2 19% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% LDP Komeito Ishin DP JCP SDP Others 2014 2014 41% 7% 15% 21% 9% 3 3 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% LDP Komeito Ishin DP JCP SDP Others 2017 Polls 2017 32% 7% 6% 25% 20% 8% 11 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% LDP Komeito Ishin Hope CDP JCP SDP Others 15 How many seats the LDP needs to win for the ruling coalition to retain majority? Total number of House of Representatives seats = 465 • Singe-seat districts = 289 • Proportional representations seats = 176 Type of majority Number of seats Meaning Simple majority 233 Need for passing bills Hold a majority in all HR standing committees and the Chair post for each Absolute stable majority 264 committee → Need in order to control the agenda Two-thirds majority 310 Need for revising the Constitution 16 IPF Election Special 2017 ¡ Background to Election 2017 – why now ? ¡ Election basics ¡ Prediction of outcome in single seat constituencies ¡ Prediction of outcome in proportional representation ¡ Comparison of election platforms ¡ LDP election platform ¡ Political schedule moving forward ¡ Conclusion 2014 general election single seat distribution 6 map AKITA AOMORI IWATE HOKKAIDO ISHIKAWA YAMAGATA FUKUSHIMA MIYAGI NAGASAKI FUKUOKA YAMAGUCHI SHIMANE TOTTORI HYOGO KYOTO FUKUI TOYAMA NIIGATA GUNMA TOCHIGI IBARAKI SHIGA GIFU NAGANO SAITAMA CHIBA SAGA OITA HIROSHIMA OKAYAMA KUMAMOTO MIYAZAKI EHIME KAGAWA OSAKA YAMANASHI TOKYO OKINAWA KAGOSHIMA KOCHI TOKUSHIMA WAKAYAMA NARA MIE AICHI SHIZUOKA KANAGAWA GR Japan, K. K. 18 2017 general election prediction: single seat 6 distribution LDP, Komeito 27 2 5 23 Constitutional Democratic Party of 14 Japan(CDP) Hope AKITA AOMORI IWATE HOKKAIDO 218 Ishin ISHIKAWA YAMAGATA FUKUSHIMA MIYAGI Independent NAGASAKI FUKUOKA YAMAGUCHI SHIMANE TOTTORI HYOGO KYOTO FUKUI TOYAMA NIIGATA GUNMA TOCHIGI IBARAKI SHIGA GIFU NAGANO SAITAMA CHIBA SAGA OITA HIROSHIMA OKAYAMA KUMAMOTO MIYAZAKI EHIME KAGAWA OSAKA YAMANASHI TOKYO OKINAWA KAGOSHIMA KOCHI TOKUSHIMA WAKAYAMA NARA MIE AICHI SHIZUOKA KANAGAWA GR Japan, K. K. 19 IPF Election Special 2017 ¡ Background to Election 2017 – why now ? ¡ Election basics ¡ Prediction of outcome in single seat constituencies ¡ Prediction of outcome in proportional representation ¡ Comparison of election platforms ¡ LDP election platform ¡ Political schedule moving forward ¡ Conclusion 2014 general election proportional 9 representation seats distribution map TOHOKU HOKKAIDO HOKURIKU SHINETSU KITA KANTO KYUSHU CHUGOKU KINKI TOKYO SHIKOKU TOKAI MINAMI KANTO GR Japan, K. K. 21 2017 general election prediction: 9 proportional representation seats distribution TOHOKU HOKKAIDO HOKURIKU SHINETSU KITA KANTO KYUSHU CHUGOKU KINKI TOKYO SHIKOKU TOKAI MINAMI KANTO GR Japan, K. K. 22 Pre-dissolution seats distribution in the Diet Majority (238) ↓ ↓ Two-thirds supermajority (317) LDP (287) House of Representatives Komeito (35) Nippon Ishin no Kai (15) Party of Hope (11) HoR DP (87) (475) JCP (21) SDP (2) ↑Government coalition Liberal (2) (322) Independents 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% (12) LDP (125) Government coalition 12 short of Komeito (25) ↓(150) supermajority Nippon Ishin no Kai (11) Party of Hope HoC (3) DP (49) (242) JCP (14) SDP-Liberal (6) House of Councillors Okinawa (2) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Ind.
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