Securitization of the Crisis in Ukraine

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FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES

Master thesis

OLEKSANDR SLYVCHUK

Supervisor: Monika Gabriela Bartoszewicz, MA, MLitt, PhD

Department of Political Science Conflict and Democracy Studies

Brno 2020

SECURITIZATION OF THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE

Bibliografický záznam

Autor: Oleksandr Slyvchuk Fakulta sociálních studií Masarykova univerzita Katedra politologie Název práce: Securitization of the Crisis in Ukraine Studijní program: Magisterský studijní program Studijní obor: Conflict and Democracy Studies Vedoucí práce: Monika Gabriela Bartoszewicz, MA, MLitt, PhD Rok: 2020 Počet stran: 120 Klíčová slova: Donbas, hrozba, konflikt, publikum, referenční objekt, Rusko, sekuritizace, sekuritizující aktér, Ukrajina

2 SECURITIZATION OF THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE

Bibliographic record

Author: Oleksandr Slyvchuk Faculty of Social Studies Masaryk University Department of Political Science Title of Thesis: Securitization of the crisis in Ukraine Degree Programme: Master's degree Field of Study: Conflict and Democracy Studies (Eng.) Supervisor: Monika Gabriela Bartoszewicz, MA, MLitt, PhD Year: 2020 Number of Pages: 120 Keywords: Audience, conflict, Donbas, referent object, Russia, securitization, securitizing actor, threat, Ukraine

3 SECURITIZATION OF THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE

Abstrakt

V roce 2014 se Ukrajina stala terčem zahraniční ozbrojené agrese. Ruská Federace v té době obsadila a zabrala poloostrov Krym a následně její vojska pronikla dále na území regionů východní Ukrajiny, oblasti Doněck a Luhansk, a vyvolala tam vlny separatismu. Odpovědí ukrajinské vlády bylo rozhodnutí nasazení národních ozbrojených sil ke vzdoru proti novým ruským vlivům v regionu a k obnovení právního státu na území, nad kterým ztratila kontrolu. Tyto vojenské operace vyústily ve zdlouhavý konflikt, který doposud nebyl vyřešen. Tato diplomová práce pojednává o následcích ruské agrese, která zapříčinila sekuriti- zaci tohoto celého konfliktu, neboť bezpečnost se stala centrální záležitostí národní politiky Ukrajiny. Pro podporu tohoto tvrzení se odvolávám na teorii sekuritizace zpracovanou na Kodaňské škole bezpečnostních studií. Tento výzkum je založen na jedné případové studii. Analýza odkazuje na ukrajinské politické procesy, jednotlivé politiky a celé frakce, ruské zájmy na Ukrajině a diskurzní analýzu. Mé výsledky poukazují na to, že ukrajinská krize je sekuritizována. Mimoto, meziná- rodní vztahy s Moskvou jsou taktéž předmětem sekuritizace. Ruská účast ve sférách mimo těch bezpečnostních je často označována za neblahou; proruské politické nálady jsou po- važovány za zrádné. Společnosti a elity obou zemí dávají důraz na bezpečnost v rozhodování otázek konfliktu, což způsobuje vnitrostátní debaty a ovlivňuje politický směr. Sekuritizace je překážkou k vyřešení konfliktu na Ukrajině. Tento výzkum zdůrazňuje potřebu vzetí vývoje sekuritizace na Ukrajině v potaz pro analýzu budoucího vývoje a zpracování pří- padných scénářů vyřešení konfliktu. Bezpečnostní agenda nepřestane hrát klíčovou roli v dohledné budoucnosti Ukrajiny.

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Abstract

In 2014 Ukraine experienced foreign armed aggression. The Russian Federation annexed the Crimean Peninsula, intruded into the Ukrainian eastern regions, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, and instigated separatism there. The Government of Ukraine decided to involve national armed forces in order to oppose Russian interests in the region and restore the rule of law over the uncontrolled territory. The military operation transformed into the protracted conflict that has not been resolved yet. The thesis claims that after the Russian aggression took place security started to play the central role in the national policy that caused securitization of the Ukrainian conflict. To support this statement, I refer to the theory of securitization elaborated by the Copenhagen School of security studies. The research is based on a single case study. The analysis refers to the Ukrainian political processes, individual politicians and whole factions, Russian interests in Ukraine, discourse analysis. My results showed that the Ukrainian crisis is securitized. Moreover, state relations with Moscow also are a matter for securitization. The Russian presence in other than the security spheres is often represented as ominous; pro-Russian political moods are considered to be treasonous. Both state elites and society pay much attention to security in decision- making that results in domestic debates and influences the political flow. Securitization is an obstacle for the conflict resolution in Ukraine. This research emphasizes the need to take into account securitization development in Ukraine for the analysis of future developments and elaboration of the conflict resolution scenarios. The security agenda will not cease to play the central role in the near future in Ukraine.

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Affidativ

I hereby declare that I have created the Master thesis on the topic of Securitization of the Crisis in Ukraine independently. All sources that I used to write this thesis were quoted in the text and are listed in the bibliography section.

Brno, June 3, 2020 Oleksandr Slyvchuk

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8 SECURITIZATION OF THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE

Acknowledgments

I would like to express gratitude to my supervisor Monika Gabriela Bartoszewicz, MA, MLitt, PhD, for the patient guidance, counselling and consistent encouragement that helped me in my first profound research in the field of political science.

9 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents

List of Images 11

List of Graphs 13

List of Terms and Abbreviations 14

1 Introduction 15

2 The Ukrainian Crisis. Its Reasons and Main Events 18

3 The Theory of Securitization 28

4 The Main Actors of Securitization in Ukraine 34 4.1 The pro-Ukrainian faction ...... 35 4.2 The pro-Russian faction ...... 44 4.3 The role of the Church...... 54

5 Main Security Narratives 62 5.1 Large-scale war ...... 64 5.2 Land corridor to Crimea ...... 65 5.3 Russian Federation is the sponsor of terrorism ...... 66 5.4 Nord Stream 2 pipeline is the energy threat for Ukraine ...... 67 5.5 Civil war in Donbas ...... 68 5.6 Responsibility to protect Russians and Russian speakers abroad ...... 70 5.7 NATO and the US play the pivotal role in provoking the Ukrainian crisis ...... 71

6 Securitization Analysis in Ukraine 76 6.1 Turning point in 2019 ...... 81 6.2 The reverse of roles ...... 86

7 Future Development of the Crisis 94

8 Conclusions 99

Bibliography 103

10 LIST OF IMAGES

List of Images

Image 1. The map of the administrative division of Ukraine and territories controlled by Rus- sia and pro-Russian militants. 18 Image 2. The map shows the distinction in public opinion over the integration of Ukraine with the European Union. The support of the Euromaidan was the lowest in southeastern regions. 20 Image 3. The map of the Crimean Peninsula shows locations of main cities and military facilities. 22 Image 4. The map of the uncontrolled territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. 24 Image 5. Geography of the Kerch strait incident. 26 Image 6. The billboard says: “We - Ukraine. Army protects our land. Language protects our heart. Faith protects our soul. Petro Poroshenko”. 40 Image 7. The usual regional division used in the Ukrainian media and public policy discourses. 45 Image 8. Public opinion about the prospects of Russia-Ukrainian relations in the future. Re- sults divided by regions. 46 Image 9. Public opinion about the state’s policy towards Russia. 46 Image 10. Public moods according to the pro-Western political orientation. 47 Image 11. Public support of granting special status for Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and status of the second state language to Russian. 47 Image 12. Public opinion about the status of self-proclaimed state entities “Donetsk People’s Republic and “Luhansk People’s Republic”. 48 Image 13. Public support of the direct Ukraine - “DPR” - “LPR” negotiations. 49 Image 14. Conflict of terminology around the Donbas crisis in public discourses. 49 Image 15. Opinion disparities over the conflict resolution. 50 Image 16. Electoral support of the “Opposition bloc” political party in the parliamentary elections in 2014. 51 Image 17. Electoral support of the “Opposition Platform - For Life” political party in the parliamentary elections in 2019. 52 Image 18. Dominance of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate over the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate by oblast. 56 Image 19. Booklet distributed by the Security Service of Ukraine that affiliates Moscow Pa- triarchate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church with pro-Russian militants in Donbas. 59 Image 20. Booklet distributed by the Security Service of Ukraine that affiliates Moscow Pa- triarchate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church with pro-Russian militants in Donbas. 60 Image 21. Ukrainian regions under the martial law in November 2018. 80 Image 22. Campaign poster in which Petro Poroshenko (in the left) stands in front of Vladimir Putin. The phrase below: “April 21[date of the presidential elections 2019]. The decisive choice”. 83 Image 23. Petro Poroshenko campaign advertising in 2019. “Army! Language! Religion! Away from Moscow!” 83 Image 24. Petro Poroshenko Campaign advertising. “The strong army is the key to peace!” 84

11 LIST OF IMAGES

Image 25. Petro Poroshenko Campaign advertising. “The autonomous church is the key to independence.” 84 Image 26. Protest action in Kyiv provoked by the “Steinmeier formula” approval in October, 2019. Phrase in the banner: “No to Capitulation”. 92

12 LIST OF GRAPHS

List of Graphs

Graph 1. Considerable decline in losses of armed vehicles was caused by the decrease of warfare intensity from its peak in 2014. 78

13 LIST OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

List of Terms and Abbreviations

ATO – Anti-terrorist operation CPU – Communist Party of Ukraine DPR – Donetsk People’s Republic EU – European Union FSB – Federal Security Service KPSS – Communist Party of the Soviet Union LPR – Luhansk People’s Republic NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization NSDC – National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe R2P – Responsibility to protect concept ROC – Russian Orthodox Church UN – United Nations UOC-KP – Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate UOC-MP – Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate USA – United States of America a.t. – English translation made by the author of the thesis. of.t. – Official English translation. or.t. – Original English text. web.t. – English translation derived from the webpage.

14 INTRODUCTION

1 Introduction

The Ukrainian crisis is the series of events that took place in Ukraine from 2014 and considerably transformed the country’s security situation. The Russian aggression in the Cri- mean Peninsula and in Donbas had a critical influence on the domestic political agenda of Ukraine. The security sphere has taken the center stage and moved other issues to the second place. External violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty made the political elites to adjust to the new reality and take the specific position. Ukrainian authorities decided to oppose the Russian aggression that resulted in a protracted war in the East of Ukraine. There- fore, the situation in the country destabilized, security became the main attribute that Ukraine lacked for its further development. That stimulated political elites to raise discussions around the security topic, manipulate with public opinion, involve national security into the electoral political programs. The popularized security discourse on the one hand mobilized social support the country needed in critical moments in 2014. However, on the other side, it preserved the situation of constant alarm that was promoted by political activities of elites in power.

This research is aimed to analyze how the security agenda influenced political processes in Ukraine through the lenses of the theory of securitization elaborated by the Copen- hagen School of security studies. In my thesis, I present a claim that the Ukrainian crisis has elevated the role of security in the national political discourse. Accordingly, Russian aggression was the trigger for securitization to take place in Ukraine. My analytical framework consists of two pillars: Theory wise it draws upon the securitization theory, while methodo- logically it employs a single case study analysis. As for the case study research it helps to test theoretical knowledge, illustrates the theory’s operation, contributes to the already existing discussion, and motivates political scientists to further improvements. It allows us to collect information about the topic or event that is still in progress. It is especially valuable if the research problem has not been resolved yet. Thus political scientists do not measure the analysis by the already known outcomes. The single case study in its turn allows us to look at specific underlying processes that cannot be investigated while comparing several cases. It

15 INTRODUCTION provides the reader with the descriptive information that can be used in the comparative politics afterwards. Besides, single case study analysis is useful in the interpretation of the so- called “deviant” cases that either lack features for comparison or have not been researched before. Additionally, in my single case study about the Ukrainian crisis I use discourse analysis while quoting politicians, state institutions, official documents, mass media outlets, in order to back my argumentation. The theory of securitization is a concept that discusses the states’ reaction to the specific threat, takes into consideration the positions and roles of different actors who directly or indirectly influence the security agenda. In what follows, an overview of the crisis is pro- vided first to set the factual background. In order to prove or deny the statement that Russian aggression has caused securitization in Ukraine, it is necessary to analyze the detailed information of the conflict, pay attention to the interests of both sides. Subsequently, the research considers the role of the main actors of securitization in Ukraine. Among them are state authorities, high officials, politicians with the pro-Russian positions, the Church. The concept of securitization is based on political utterance, speeches, and discourses. Hence, the research proceeds with the analysis of the main narratives around the Ukrainian crisis in order to show the contribution of every actor in securitization. Besides, it is worth looking into contradic- tions among the Ukrainian politicians around the perception of the Ukrainian crisis. Their positioning can help to clarify the understanding of the conflict and decisions in the future. Finally, as shown in Chapters 6 and 7 securitization influences domestic political processes, and creates obstacles for possible scenarios of the conflict resolution.

This research takes into consideration the unique characteristic of the object of study that creates certain limitations. The central one is the constant development of the conflict that is not static and hence the research had to be adjusted to the changing developments of a “case in progress.” At the same time, the discussion around the crisis is alive which undoubtedly facilitated the search of scholar opinions and argumentations. Media outlets actively cover the situation that also alleviates the analysis. However, there is a considerable lack of research that would apply the securitization theory into the Ukrainian case. As shown in Chapter 3, Securitization has been already discussed by a variety of scholars. At the same

16 INTRODUCTION time, the existing research does not provide a clear answer to the question of whether Ukraine has already experienced securitization or not and my thesis aims to address this gap. Finally, this research contributes to the current discussion on the topic of securitization. The study of the Ukrainian case is valuable because it presents a profound analysis of the crisis and applies theoretical postulates into practice. While basing on the outcome of the current research it would be possible to understand political decisions made in the past, analyze future development around the crisis in Ukraine, its influence on regional and international security.

17 THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS. ITS REASONS AND MAIN EVENTS

2 The Ukrainian Crisis. Its Reasons and Main Events

The Ukrainian crisis is a prolong period of the modern Ukrainian history that started in the end of 2013 and lasts will today. 2014 was the most critical year within the whole period. It was beginning of 2014 when Ukraine experienced foreign armed intervention that violated peace, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state. In this chapter I will provide the detailed chronological information about the main events of the Ukrainian crisis, historical background, current developments and the general political situation in the country.

Image 1. The map of the administrative division of Ukraine and territories controlled by Rus- sia and pro-Russian militants. Sterling Law. https://sterling-law.co.uk/ua/home-office-kategoriyi-osib-krym-donetsk- luhansk/under_att_eng/

On November 21, 2013, the big wave of civil unrest started in the capital Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities. It was sparked by the sudden decision of the Ukrainian Government to suspend the process of preparation for Association Agreement signing between Ukraine and the European Union (Shveda and Ho Park 2016, 85). For the society such governmental

18 THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS. ITS REASONS AND MAIN EVENTS decision meant Ukrainian pivot to the East with further adherence to the Russia leading integration formations. Because the main events were taking place in Independence Square1, in the very center of Kyiv, the Ukrainian media named that period the Euromaidan revolution. Civil disobedience expanded significantly after violent clashes with the police forces. The Euromaidan protest was oriented against the rule of Victor Yanukovych, the then president of Ukraine, the Government under the rule of the Prime Minister Mykola Azarov, the parliamentary coalition of the pro-Presidential “Party of Regions” and representatives of the cor- rupted elites. The Ukrainian authorities denied to negotiate with the protestants but counted more on the law enforcement that resulted in dozens of victims and injured persons from both sides. On February 22, 2014, due to the sharp political crisis, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine2 voted for the dismissal of Viktor Yanukovych from the post the President of Ukraine (Shveda and Ho Park 2016, 88-90). On the same day the president, prime minister, general prosecutor, and several ministers from the government escaped from Ukraine to the Russian Federation

(BBC News 2014). From the very beginning, Russia adopted an antagonist position towards Euromaidan. Russian media outlets actively proliferated fake news, blamed protestants and considered a resignation of Victor Yanukovych as a coup d’état attempt in Ukraine (Polygraph.info 2018). Therefore, intensive media influence provoked a national debate between supporters and opponents of Euromaidan and the Ukrainian integration with the European Union. Because the population of the Crimean Peninsula and the eastern regions of Ukraine in their majority did not support protests in Kyiv, Russian authorities have chosen it as a target audience for the spread of the anti-Ukrainian agenda. Since Ukraine used to be part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, these regions maintain close economic and cultural ties with Russia, most of the population there speak the Russian language as their mother tongue, watch Rus- sian media.

1 “Square” means “maidan” in the Ukrainian language. 2 Official name of the Parliament of Ukraine. 19 THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS. ITS REASONS AND MAIN EVENTS

Image 2. The map shows the distinction in public opinion over the integration of Ukraine with the European Union. The support of the Euromaidan was the lowest in southeastern regions. Euromaidan Press. http://euromaidanpress.com/2016/04/01/ukrainians-overwhelmingly- support-european-integration-infographics/

From the middle of February, pro-Russian rallies were held in the main cities of Cri- mea and in the Ukrainian southeast with the participation of local activists and Russian instigators planted there (Putiata et al. 2020). The main goal was to persuade the local population that power in Kyiv was seized by nationalists who remained hostile towards the Russian speaking minority in eastern Ukraine and in Crimea. Thus, according to the Russian media, the Crimean Peninsula should be taken over by Russian armed forces as a prevention measure against the aggressive nationalistic policy of the new Ukrainian authorities (Yuhas 2014). After the Soviet dissolution, the Crimean Peninsula has not ceased to be so strategi- cally important for Moscow that required Kremlin to remain their military presence there. Due to the Ukrainian administrative-territorial division, the Crimean Peninsula had the status of an autonomous republic. In 1997, Ukraine and Russia signed the interstate agreement “On the Status and Conditions of Stay of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation on the

20 THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS. ITS REASONS AND MAIN EVENTS territory of Ukraine” that officially established conditions of the Russian Black Sea Fleet presence in the Ukrainian territorial waters (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 2010). The newly created fleet continued its stationing in the Crimean Peninsula till 2017 with possible prolon- gation. On the rental basis, Russia obtained access to the navy base in the city of Sevastopol, the main and the biggest military infrastructure located in the south of Crimea. Additionally, the Russian Armed Forces could use a navy testing center in Feodosia, a communication center in Sudak, two air facility complexes in Gvardeyskoye (central Crimea) and in Kacha (southern Crimea). The treaty allowed to maintain 25 000 military personal, 24 artillery vehicles, 132 armored vehicles, and 22 military planes (Kimball 2014).

The occupation of the peninsula started on February 20, 2014. Small groups of Rus- sian land troops crossed the Kerch strait that was the administrative border between Ukraine and Russia. At the same time, heavy armored vehicles and military trucks were smuggled using the Kerch ferry line (Simpson 2014). Russian Black Sea Fleet used landing craft carri- ers to redeploy land troops and armored vehicles from the Russian military base in Anapa (Russian Federation) to the Sevastopol navy base that was the jumping-off ground for further occupation from the southern part (Walker, Salem, MacAskill 2014). Thirteen Russian planes with troopers violated the Ukrainian airspace in Crimea and landed in the Gvardeyskaya air- base (Euromaidan Press 2014). Russian soldiers lacked chevrons and national insignia on their uniform, vehicles trav- eled without identification plates. The Crimean Parliament, Ukrainian telecommunication company, radio stations and airports in the capital city Simferopol and in Sevastopol were blocked by Russian troops (Kyiv Post 2014). Ukrainian military bases and infrastructure facilities were beleaguered and attacked (Government portal 2014). Ukrainian Armed Forces did not fight back and surrendered. On March 16, Russia held the illegal referendum in Cri- mea to” justify” its further annexation as the “will of the local population” (BBC News 2014). On March 18 Vladimir Putin, the President of the Russian Federation, together with the representatives of the Crimean authorities signed the Agreement on the accession of Crimea to

21 THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS. ITS REASONS AND MAIN EVENTS the Russian Federation. On March 20 the State Duma3, the lower house of the Russian Par- liament, ratified the treaty. On March 21 it was ratified by the Federation Council, the upper house of the Russian Parliament (State Duma 2019). On March 24 Oleksandr Turchynov, the Acting President of Ukraine4, signed a decree and implemented the decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine5 (NSDC) to redeploy military units and law enforcement agencies from the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city Sevastopol6 to other regions of Ukraine (Government Portal 2014). It was the beginning of the Ukrainian withdrawal from Crimea under the Russian military occupation.

Image 3. The map of the Crimean Peninsula shows locations of main cities and military facilities. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26606097

3 Official name of the lower house of the Parliament of the Russian Federation. 4 After the former President Victor Yanukovych left the office Oleksandr Turchynov, the then Head of the Parliament, according to the Constitution took a post of acting President till the next elections. 5 The coordinating body in matters pertaining to national security and defence. Supervises state institutions in the field of national security and defence. 6 The city of Sevastopol has the special administrative territorial status.

22 THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS. ITS REASONS AND MAIN EVENTS

Pro-Russian demonstrations in the Ukrainian southeast started right after Russian troops appeared in the Crimea. The biggest rallies took place in Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, and Odesa (Putiata, Karbivnychy, Rudyka 2020). Consequently, at the beginning of April 2014 in Donetsk and in Luhansk the protestants took over buildings of the police and the Security Service of Ukraine7 that gave them access to firearms stored there. On April 7 Do- netsk People’s Republic (DPR) was proclaimed in the building of the Donetsk oblast8 council (Kyiv Post 2014). Afterward, similar proclamations of sovereign state entities were announced in Luhansk (Luhansk People’s Republic - LPR) (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2014), and in Kharkiv (Shapovalova and Jarábik 2018). The Ukrainian Government decided to abandon any attempts of peaceful negotiations and used force to restore the rule of law in these regions. It was successful in Kharkiv where main instigators were immediately arrested but was too late in Donetsk and Luhansk where cities were already full of Russian diversion- ists. On April 13, Oleksandr Turchynov stated that the National Security and Defense Council decided to launch a large-scale anti-terrorist operation (ATO) involving the Armed Forces of Ukraine in order to stop the spread of terrorism organized by Russian special services in the eastern oblasts of Ukraine (CBS News 2014). Officially, that day was the beginning of the war in Donbas9. During April and May, the Armed Forces of Ukraine lifted the blockade of several cities in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and forced militants to retreat. However, at the beginning of July Ukraine lost control over the long line of the land border with Russia after several attacks against Ukrainian checkpoints from the Russian side (Case et al. 2015). Hence, the balance of power changed dramatically when Russian armed units could easily penetrate into the Ukrainian territory, smuggle weapons, tanks, and armed vehicles. In August 2014, massive clandestine intervention of the Russian armed forces begun that made the Ukrainian Army drop back (Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine 2017).

7 The main law-enforcement institution and security agency in the field of counterintelligence and counterterrorist activities. 8 Oblast – one of Ukraine's 24 primary administrative units. In English is translated as “region”. 9 Donbas – historical, cultural, and economic region in eastern Ukraine (Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts). The word Donbas is formed from Donets Basin and refers to the river Siversky Donets that flows through the whole region. 23 THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS. ITS REASONS AND MAIN EVENTS

Image 4. The map of the uncontrolled territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts (as of February, 2020). BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-51543463

Besides the armed confrontation, the Ukrainian government emphasized their open- ness to a peaceful resolution with the involvement of international partners. On June 6, 2014, leaders of France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine met on the margins of the 70th anniversary of the D-Day landing in Normandy, and established the so-called Normandy Format (also called the Normandy contact group) (De Galbert 2015). It operates through the meeting and phone calls of state leaders and ministers of foreign affairs. On September 5, representatives of Ukraine, Russian Federation, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and also leaders of militants from Donetsk and Luhansk met in Minsk to sign the ceasefire agreement also known as the Minsk protocol (United Nations Peacemaker 2014). Later on September 19, the Memorandum on the implementation of the Minsk Protocol was signed (Kyiv Post 2014). Simultaneously, it is important to point out that neither Ukraine nor Russia sent official delegations to Minsk but were rep-

24 THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS. ITS REASONS AND MAIN EVENTS resented by persons who received the mandate for negotiations. The parties agreed to establish the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine (or Minsk format group) with the participation of Ukraine, Russia, and the OSCE. Minsk protocol was a political agreement but not a set of legally binding documents that have to be ratified by the Ukrainian Parliament as an international legal treaty. That document played its role to stop the Russian offensive in September 2014 and later in February 2015 (Interfax Ukraine 2019). Among the main points of the Minsk protocol was the creation of the 30 kilometers security zone along the frontline that would stop artillery bombardment and freeze the movement of troops (Kyiv Post 2014). Furthermore, the protocol banned the use of several artillery assets and required the removal of all foreign mercenaries from the conflict zone. On February 11, 2015, the Normandy Format conducted their next meeting in Minsk. State leaders agreed to review and complete the previous Minsk protocol. Thus, the Trilateral Contact Group signed a new document: A Set of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Protocol (Financial Times 2015). It duplicated the previous agreement but included several important provisions. Firstly, the Ukrainian government should restore control over the state border with Russia right after local elections in Donbas were held under the OSCE monitoring. Secondly, Ukraine was supposed to conduct the Constitutional reform that would include decentralization and introduction of the special administrative status of particular districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. These two conditions are central in current negotiations about the conflict resolution (President of Ukraine 2019; Ukraine Crisis Media Center 2019). From 2016 the combat intensity steadily decreased. Starting from the end of 2015, Ukrainian Army and pro-Russian militants begun mutual disengagement in several sectors in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. At the same time, Minsk protocol does not function effectively because militants still use prohibited weapons and violate ceasefire. There- fore, the Ukrainian Army experiences casualties and local population remains under the threat till today.

On November 25, 2018, the first clash happened in the sea. Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) from the occupied Crimea fired upon and captured three Ukrainian Navy ves- sels that were passing from the Black Sea into the Azov Sea through the Kerch strait on their

25 THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS. ITS REASONS AND MAIN EVENTS way to the Mariupol port (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2018). The Ukrainian government considered that incident as a potential threat of the Russian open invasion and declared martial law along the border with Russia and in Black Sea coastal area for 30 days (Roth 2018). That was the first case of open armed clash between the Ukrainian and Russian armed forces that provoked a big national debate according to the necessity of introducing such extreme measure as martial law.

Image 5. Geography of the Kerch strait incident. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46551464

Currently, the combat intensity is considerably lower. In 2016 the agreement on the disengagement of forces was signed. On June 26, 2019, the first stage of troops withdrawal was fulfilled near the village of Stanytsia Luhanska that was later confirmed by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission. On October 1, 2019, the Trilateral Contact Group in Minsk agreed on disengagement in the next two settlements, Zolote and Petrivske. That facilitated the creation of a demilitarized zone in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts (112 Ukraine 2019). On December 7, 2019, before the Paris Normandy format summit the National Secu- rity and Defense Council of Ukraine approved one of five scenarios of Donbas reintegration 26 THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS. ITS REASONS AND MAIN EVENTS

(UNIAN 2019). The main pillars that were announced by the NSDC secretary Oleksandr Danilov were the general ceasefire, return of the control over the Ukrainian-Russian border and holding local elections in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Thus, the leaders of the Nor- mandy Four format, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, President of France Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, met in the Paris summit on December 9, 2019. Parties reached the consent to provide bilateral exchange of prisoners of war, continue mutual disengagement of forces and the full ceasefire, expand the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission’s mandate to the 24/7 monitoring format. Ukraine regaining control over the state border and carrying out the local elections have not been agreed yet and remain in the negotiable list (Ukraine Crisis Media Center 2019). Unsurprisingly, in their final utterances leaders of Ukraine and the Russian Federation interpreted several issues differently. For Mr. Zelenskyy security and control of the state border was the main precondition for the progress in further talks. The Ukrainian President accented the withdrawal of the illegal and foreign military units. However, Mr. Putin insisted on the political element, namely changes in the Ukrainian Constitution. In the final speech he emphasized the necessity to fulfil the Minsk agreement, grant the special administrative status to particular districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and formalize such amendments in the Ukrainian Constitution (President of Russia 2019). For the Russian side, political dimension precedes the security one. The Russian President made a point of the dialogue Kyiv should start with the self-proclaimed People’s Republics that Ukraine ac- cuses to be terrorist entities (Chawryło and Tadeusz 2019). Therefore, the December Nor- mandy summit was the remarkable event of the diplomatic way to resolve the Donbas conflict. Afterward, Ukraine held several exchanges of prisoners with so-called “DPR” and “LPR” on December 30, 2019 (The Guardian 2019) and on April 16, 2020 (Zoria 2020).

27 THE THEORY OF SECURITIZATION

3 The Theory of Securitization

The securitization theory is closely associated with the Copenhagen School of security studies. Its fellows, Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, and Jaap de Wilde, studied and described this concept in their common book “Security: A New Framework for Analysis” that was published in 1997. Later, the theory was widely researched by such scholars of political science as Holger Stritzel, Jef Huysmans, John Wells Kingdon, Michael Williams, Nick Vaughan - Williams, Ralf Emmers, Thierry Braspenning-Balzacq, and others. The concept of securitization discusses the influence security has on state functioning and crisis management. It is considered that security undoubtedly is an essential part of human life, necessary for its prosperous development. Actors usually do not talk about security when the status quo is stable, balanced, and tranquil. Securitization appears when security moves to the central place on the agenda after its recent violation. By saying “security,” political actors perform a specific move that takes politics away from the established classical rules and requires extraordinary measures for future survival (Bartoszewicz 2016, 36). Hence, securitization is a strategic and pragmatic process that is possible due to specific circumstances, context, and social readiness (Balzacq 2011, 61). The process of securitization is gradual, has several vital elements and conditions to be met. Any security issue is nonpo- liticized in the beginning. It does not provoke public debate or present a specific interest in politics. State institutions function in their normal way and the government is not obliged to focus specifically on security. Politicization takes place when security issue starts being part of public policy but is managed within the traditional political system and requires classic decision making. This is a common practice for state politics. Such security issues as drug trafficking, transboundary smuggling, or organized crime are usually politicized but remain within the established system. Therefore, the issue is securitized if the threat it provokes cannot be regulated without extraordinary measures. It is the moment when an actor gives the highest priority to security, is ready to break political rules, limits civil freedoms, place re- strictions with the aim to restore the previous status quo (Buzan et al. 1998, 23; Peoples and

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Vaughan-Williams 2010, 23). Hence, politicization is a necessary precondition for securitization. Security problems must appear in the political realm before they will be dealt out of normal politics (Emmers 2013, 133).

Securitization consists of several elements that are interdependent inter se. Its essence is constituted on a referent object and a threat that questions its existence. A referent object is an endangered entity that has to survive at any cost. In this line state sovereignty and territorial integrity, public health during an epidemic, economic stability or informational security are those essential objects for any state. In international relations, a classic example of an existential threat is when a state is under attack. That legitimizes a right to impose a state of emergency, declare martial law, renew general conscription, close infrastructure facilities (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010, 66). The referent object creates a basis for further securitization process. An existential threat for a referent object is the trigger for securitization to appear. The theory focuses on three primary types of actors who either resist or contribute to the idea of threat existence: the securitizing actors, the audience, and the functional actors. All groups are constitutional in the concept. Securitizing actors are those individuals or factions that make a securitizing move. In other words, literally speak about the danger, raise an alarm. By performing a securitizing move they claim that a referent object experiences an existential threat (Buzan et al. 1998, 21). The most common securitizing actors are political leaders, lobbyists, media actors and interest groups. In their “speech acts,” securitizing actors refer to the audience (Buzan et al. 1998, 24). The audience is characterized as “those the securitizing move aims to persuade to acknowledge exceptional measures to oppose a threat” (Balzacq 2011, 59). The speech act itself is a convincing instrument that is aimed to influence targeting audience and explain the changing status quo. In other words, to create threat images for social masses. The securitizing move has a chance for success if the audience’s, i.e. most often, the society’s feelings and interests are correctly understood (Balzacq 2011, 13). Its success or failure is the central prerequisite for securitization. In order for a speech act to be persuasive, securitizing actors must respect certain conditions. Most of all, it should be uttered by state power representatives. Various issues

29 THE THEORY OF SECURITIZATION can have a security dimension after they are presented and accepted as such, but not necessary due to their threatening potential. Moreover, it is critically important to choose the right moment when threat recognition is the most possible. Additionally, it would be much easier to utter a security speech if the historical connotation of a current danger exists and the referent object has been already threatened before (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010, 67). By saying “security” a state official means emergency and asks for urgent, drastic steps. Hence, securitization is complete only after the audience agrees that the referent object is endangered, and extraordinary measures have to be imposed. Otherwise, we witness impotent unilateral acts unable to securitize a problem. To see whether the acceptance took place it is necessary to analyze different groups’ interests, positions, fears. The audience’s role is doubled: it provides securitizing actor with the moral consent and with a formal mandate to fulfill political decisions. While the first role is blurred, vague and is the matter for manipulations, the second one requires preciseness and consecution (Léonard et al. 2016, 500). From the history of previous securitization cases it is possible to see the difference between these two roles. For instance, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s effort to securitize Iraq invasion in 2003 was controversial. From the one side, he failed to convince the British society in the threat Saddam Hussein regime posed and did not receive societal consent for sending British soldiers abroad. However, from the opposite side, another audience, the British Parliament, supported and secured the decision that was much more valuable for securitization success. Au- dience’s role and status helps to admit the possibility of failed securitizing move (Léonard et al. 2016, 500). A securitizing act is a mutual consensus between authorities and the public. The audience’s approval is based on its own attitude to a referent object. The securitizing actor in its move relies on the opinion that prevails in the whole society or among certain potential social groups. It is almost impossible to reach total consent for emergency measures to be applied. On the other side, it is the right moment for manipulations with public opinion. Se- curitization is a certain verification of social ability to adequately understand the situation and counteract wrong interpretations (McDonald 2008, 572). The functional actors are directly involved in security sector decision making. They do not securitize the issue but execute securitization in practice. At a state level they are

30 THE THEORY OF SECURITIZATION legislative and executive branches, armed forces, law enforcement bodies, and other state institutions in this field (Buzan et al. 1998, 36). If a country experiences securitization, functional actors are entitled to help the reference object to survive by declaring and executing emergency measures if needed. The threat for the state and its existential nature must be approved and accepted. Ad- ditionally, the solution to a security problem also is a matter of acceptance. In line with the Copenhagen School, securitization move places security on a specific level, but the further solution should not counteract those expectations the audience has but should be the matter for debate (Balzacq 2011, 121). The solution must be qualitatively new and not merely an extension of the previous policies.

Failure of the securitizing move means a fiasco for securitization. Thus, it is necessary to pay attention whether the existential threat was accepted or rejected, was the proposed solution assumed or declined, were emergency measures appropriate to the securitizing actor’s powers or illegitimate. The breakdown of securitization can be caused by the variety of reasons. First of all, the securitizing move is a complicated act that very often contradicts the state apparatus and justice system because of the extraordinary measures it demands (Emmers 2013, 135). The securitizing move also can fail due to the audience’s unwillingness to conceive a threat as an existential for a referent object. Hence, the main condition of securitization – bilateral approval – is not fulfilled. Finally, the audience can accept the securitizing move but reject the solution the state body proposes or extraordinary measures it requires. For instance, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, there was no doubt that global terrorism was a threat that must be tackled. However, American society did not fully support further armed intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq because considered these exceptional measures as excessive (Balzacq 2011, 124-125). Even issues with high threatening potential require prior presentation and acceptance. As well as after securitization any security issue can leave the emergency politics back to the normal political agenda and perform the so-called desecuritization. Finally, the Copenhagen School considers securitization as a phenomenon to be avoided. They claim it is harmful to the state system to overestimate security as such. Always there is a risk for securitization to

31 THE THEORY OF SECURITIZATION be a manipulative tool for elites in power. Hence, security is a notion to be carefully treated and proclaimed as an instrument necessary for stability, negotiation, and tolerance rather than oppressive to them.

The theory presents the general mechanism of how securitization works regardless of peculiarities in every state. In a case study, it is necessary to refer to these essential elements the theory possesses. Therefore, securitization can have different effects in response to the political regime predominant in the country. Authoritarian regimes are used to powerful security measures in their foreign policy, oppression of political dissent, lack of confidence, and public opinion oppression. Very often approval of securitizing move is not an essential condition for policy securitization. The Soviet Union conducted successful securitization of its antagonistic policy towards the West and did not rely on societal approval. That is why, I can make an assumption that “audience” in non-democratic regimes is a narrower notion and does not necessarily mean the society as such, but elites in power. In general, different con- ceptual elements may experience transformation and adjustment to a specific case. For instance, it is necessary for the theory to look at the regime in power. While comparing the analysis of securitization in the democratic United Kingdom and the autocratic Russian Fed- eration peculiarities of both political systems must be taken into consideration. The theory is not static but is open to different interpretations. Similarly, every specific securitizing case has unique results. However, the theory does not show the effect securitization can have. The Copenhagen School points out that the rise of security issues in political discourse is a negative tendency. Every threat should be tackled carefully in order to do not misuse the state monopoly over the security agenda. Therefore, there is a lack of understanding to what extent this concept embodying can modify or harm the state policy. Also, it is not clear whether securitization is the right answer to the threat or it is an automatic consequence of violation. The theory describes the general trend of how states usually respond to security risks, but every other case requires specific research. The concept is weak in explaining developments after the securitization has taken place. It should also be pointed out that the criteria for securitization completion also is a matter of adjustment. Due to its postulates, securitization leads after the audience’s approval.

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However, societies that experience the split in political preferences feel a lack of unanimity for accepting a mutual threat. Hence, in such a case securitization is not complete or is perceived differently by distinct social groups. In what follows, the Ukrainian case shows that part of the society expresses opposite moods towards the threat Ukraine faces. Nevertheless, the role of an audience requires precise evaluation and theoretical description. Otherwise, it is difficult to analyze when securitizing move rejection can be neglected.

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4 The Main Actors of Securitization in Ukraine

Russian aggression has polarized the society and political elites. Before 2014, Ukrain- ian politics was divided into several powerful camps with pro-Ukrainian or nationalistic, pro- Western, or pro-European and pro-Russian positions. That division with certain adjustments remains in place till today. However, before the Russian attack, the political split never affected the national security level due to the absence of a trigger. The existence of the Pro- Russian political groups was obvious due to the Soviet past and deep economic and trade ties with Russia. Besides, the pro-Western camp lacked persuasive arguments to condemn Mos- cow’s influence on Kyiv. Russian invasion to Crimea drastically transformed the status quo. After February 2014 the political discourse faced several adaptations. The pro-Russian camp experienced a decline of societal support but saved their presence in politics. Its favorable attitude to the aggressor was painfully conceived by the pro-European and nationalistic camps and the desire to restore relations with Moscow was often seen as collaboration attempts. Current Ukrainian politics shows two dominant directions. The first refers to the Rus- sian Federation as to the potential danger for the Ukrainian statehood. The second one insists on the inevitability of the Ukrainian coexistence with Russia and favors the restoration of the interstate relations in all spheres. While Russia unanimously is considered as a threat by both nationalistic and pro-European groups, their counterpart, pro-Russian camp, actively opposes further deterioration and ties rupture with Moscow. Pro-Western faction is represented by the previous and incumbent authorities. The President, the parliament, the Prime Minister, and the government, support the established narrative and are unanimous in their securitizing rhetoric. The pro-Russian faction, in its turn, positions itself as an opposition to current authorities and predominantly consists of previous president Victor Yanukovych’s supporters and favorites. To reach the set objectives of the research, it is vital to consider the position of every influential social and political group, state institution, or opinion leader. Thus, the president, the government, the parliament, opposition parties, the ruling parties, the civil society, and the church are those elements that are able to perform securitizing moves and manipulate the security agenda within Ukraine.

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4.1 The pro-Ukrainian faction

Securitizing moves in Ukraine were gradual, consisted of several stages and steps; a combination of actions. Right after Russian troops invaded the Crimean Peninsula, Ukrainian authorities were forced to speak about security. Moreover, foreign intervention neglected any doubts or debates about Russian aggressive intentions. Thus, the function of authorities was to establish a dialogue with the society and perform a security speech act before non-state actors would do that. On March 2, 2014, Verkhovna Rada, the Ukrainian Parliament, on extraordinary meeting adopted a resolution “On the address of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to the parliaments of guarantor-states of Ukraine’s security and international organizations.” The resolution informs that the Federation Council, the Upper House of the Russian Parlia- ment, has supported the decision of the possible use of Russian armed forces in Ukraine and that Russian troops have already entered the territory of Ukraine in Crimea (Embassy of Ukraine in the Republic of Turkey 2014). On the same day, the Parliament voted for another resolution “On the support of the armed forces and other armed formations”. In the text, it was emphasized that “the country faced the danger to territorial integrity, the threat to its state sovereignty, destabilization, as well as the violation of peace and order.” (Embassy of Ukraine in the Republic of Turkey 2014). Members of the Parliament supported the decision of the National Security and Defense Council to place the Ukrainian armed forces on full combat alert. Oleksandr Turchynov, the acting President of Ukraine, addressed the country to explain crisis management decisions the government made in Crimea. He informed the population that armed forces were put in full combat alert, Ukrainian military bases in Crimea were blocked and Russians put forward an ultimatum to surrender (Walker, Salem and Gal- lagher 2014). Both state institutions, the parliament and the president, made their securitizing moves via parliamentary voting and public speeches. Through the use of the right political context, the goal was to create the threat image. Whereas it was one of the first official utterances concerning the Russian threat, it lacked an essential element. Mr. Acting President and the Parliament, in the role of securitizing actors, did not ask for the imposition of the emergency measures. Eventually, neither the emergency situation nor martial law was imposed, the con-

35 THE MAIN ACTORS OF SECURITIZATION IN UKRAINE flict in Crimea never moved to armed clashes. Consequently, it can be argued that the Cri- mean case did not cause complete securitization but prepared the launching ground for future developments in Donbas. First of all, the population witnessed Kremlin’s aggressive intentions and conceived any pro-Russian moods as hostile and belligerent. The society observed a direct violation of those state pillars that have to survive at any cost: territorial integrity, sovereignty, and human security. Secondly, it made politicians openly use the word “security”. Although Kyiv did not try to restore the status quo the threat creation process for future confrontation with Russia was launched, and Ukrainian state representatives monopolized their right for securitizing moves. The term “Crimean scenario” was actively spread in the media and political discourse with the aim to accuse the authorities for way the peninsula was lost. In the Donbas context it would be understood as a rapid loss of governmental control over the territory, administrative buildings and law enforcement bodies, the use of propaganda among locals, the involvement of armed militants, blackmailing of state officials, and the most important one – clandestine use of foreign armed forces. Later, the Ukrainian officials openly stated that the “Cri- mean scenario” prevention was the main goal for the counterstand in Donbas (5 Kanal 2014, a.t.). In April 2014 during the presidential elections campaign the leading candidate Petro Poroshenko insisted that: “If we fail to hold our elections, and if the elections are postponed according to a foreign scenario, there's a very serious risk that we will have Crimea-2, Cri- mea-3, Crimea-4.” (Interfax Ukraine 2014, web.t.). On April 7, 2014, in his next video address, Oleksandr Turchynov made radically different statements. Threats were explained, and the aggressor was named in his speech: “Yesterday the Russian Federation started the second wave of their aggression against Ukraine. Their goal is to destabilize the situation, overthrow the Ukrainian authorities, thwart the future elections [presidential elections 2014], and tear our country to pieces. Sep- aratist groups controlled by Russia have grabbed the buildings of regional administration in Kharkiv and in Donetsk, buildings of the Security Service of Ukraine in Luhansk and in Do- netsk. What is especially dangerous, they are armed. Besides, the Russian Armed Forces have already moved close to our state border in the east.

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Ukrainian enemies try to perform the “Crimean scenario” in Donbas but we shall not allow this. We have created the anti-crisis staff and will impose anti-terrorist measures against those who illegally have taken up arms. Also, we shall strengthen the eastern state border…The Parliament of Ukraine will consider the law concerning the strengthening of criminal liability for separatism and crimes against the state. According to the Ukrainian legislation, several political parties and civil organizations can be prohibited due to their cooperation with the aggressor. I respect different political views including those from the opposition but separatism and the use of arms against the state go beyond any politics and are considered a grave crime. We shall impose adequate and decisive measures against crim- inals.” (5 Kanal 2014, a.t.; Radio Free Europe 2014, web.t.). Mr. Acting President created the threat image of separatism in the Ukrainian regions. He used Crimean events to stress on Russian involvement and participation in the crisis. His message was quite clear: if the “Cri- mean scenario” in Donbas was not prevented, Ukraine would lose another piece of its territory. Furthermore, Mr. Turchynov informed the population about state readiness to armed confrontation and intimidated those involved in crimes. It was the preparedness for the last and the most important speech act before the anti-terrorist operation begun. In this context, it is important to note that the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine is a state advisory institution aimed to elaborate on national security policy. It is represented by the president, the prime minister, head of the Parliament, chiefs of defense and law enforcement agencies, and several other officials. Their decision to start anti-terrorist operation was supported by Acting President Turchynov. On April 13, 2014, he signed the presidential decree that launched the operation and addressed the nation afterward: “The anti- terrorist operation has begun this morning in the northern part of Donetsk oblast. It will be carried out gradually and responsibly. Today in Donbas there are hundreds of Ukrainian citizens who have been deceived by Russian propaganda, and also hundreds of thousands of innocent Ukrainians. That is why any counter-terrorism measures should be cautious and balanced. We performed everything possible to avoid human casualties. However, Ukraine is ready to repel all attempts of invasion, destabilization, and terrorism. The National Security and Defense Council has decided to launch a large-scale anti-terrorist operation that will

37 THE MAIN ACTORS OF SECURITIZATION IN UKRAINE involve the Armed Forces of Ukraine. We will not let Russia repeat the “Crimean scenario” in the eastern regions of Ukraine. The blood that was shed in eastern Ukrainian cities, was shed in the war waged by the Russian Federation against Ukraine. The aggressor has not stopped yet but continues to organize riots in the east of our country. This is not a war between the Ukrainians. It is an artificially created situation of confrontation that aims to weaken and destroy the state itself. However, in the end, it will weaken our enemies. Today, the entire civilized world condemns Russia.” (CBS News 2014, web.t.; Hromadske 2014, a.t.; Loiko and Richter 2014, web.t.; New York Post 2014, web.t.). The securitizing move was fulfilled by the highest state official through the speech act. He explained the critical necessity of that decision, clearly defined the legal field, named the threat, and confirmed state readiness to resist. The security motif immediately moved to the central place in political life. On May 25, 2014, early presidential elections were held in Ukraine. Both leading candidates, Petro Poroshenko and Yuliia Tymoshenko, included the security agenda in their programs. The famous Ukrainian politician and former prime minister, Yuliia Tymoshenko, made emphasis on the defense issues. She promised to elaborate the modern defense doctrine, increase the state defense budget, modernize armed forces, and ratify the Rome Statute in order to seek legal protection for Ukraine in the International Criminal Court in Hague. Tymoshenko insisted on the Crimean Peninsula de-occupation and elimination of the economic dependence from Russia (All-Ukrainian Union “Fatherland” 2014). For Petro Poroshenko, previous minister of economics, minister of foreign affairs and the winner of the campaign 2014, two issues played a prominent role in his program: ending the war and restoring peace in Donbas. At the very beginning of his term the winner of the elections Petro Poroshenko announced that the goal of his team was to “stop the war, to put an end to this chaos and bring peace to united Ukraine.” (Walker and Luhn 2014, web.t.). Mr. Poroshenko criticized the effective- ness of the anti-terrorist operation launched two months before his inauguration and expressed the readiness immediately travel to Donetsk in his first work trip. The statement that ATO cannot last several months but must be completed within hours was actively promoted in the election program (UNIAN 2014). That was a skillful political move that elevated elec-

38 THE MAIN ACTORS OF SECURITIZATION IN UKRAINE toral support and Poroshenko’s popularity within the country. He supported the hostile attitude to Russia and assured the ability to restore peace in Ukraine. These two statements were topical in the very beginning of the Donbas crisis. For public opinion, there was no doubt of the country’s lack of resources for the long-term conflict. The state needed legitimate authorities with a mandate to conduct security policy. Thus, Poroshenko counted on security speech acts in order to win the electorate. He considered security as the main value Ukraine lacked at that time. That is why the decision to support confrontation with Russia was obvious and met public requests. Therefore, the 2014 presidential election campaign was special for its prominent security discussions. Security started to be an essential value for the electorate that moved economic and social agenda to the “backstage.” In the line of the securitization concept, common identity is an important element for securitization to succeed. Common understanding of the threat leads to faster approval of securitizing moves. Due to the active secessionist movements in Ukraine the notion of the national “identity” was topical. Copenhagen School stressed that national identity can be more valuable than national sovereignty because it is the society that decides whether “we” are still “us” (Buzan et al. 1998, 36). Deep Russian involvement in the Ukrainian cultural, linguistic, and social life often raised discussions about the essence of the war between countries that peacefully coexisted before. President Poroshenko transformed the identity factor into the important pillar of his agenda. His political speech has considerably transformed along with the presidency. His public rhetoric was related to the necessity of radical reforms introduction. However, Petro Poroshenko’s reformist views moved to moderate conservatism very soon. In the middle of the Presidency, the new political slogan was presented: “Army, Language, Faith. Army protects our land, language protects our heart, and faith protects our soul.” As Poroshenko often stressed it was the army that played a crucial role in the Ukrainian resistance and stopped the Russian offensive. The Ukrainian language, in turn, was considered as an essential element of a separate Ukrainian identity. Finally, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church always was a place for Russian cultural and politic influence (Yermolenko 2018). In next section I refer to the church factor in securitization in more detail.

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Image 6. The billboard says: “We - Ukraine. Army protects our land. Language protects our heart. Faith protects our soul. Petro Poroshenko”. Detector Media. https://detector.media/infospace/article/139556/2018-07-23-bilbordovii-poroshenko-back-in-ussr/

That was the message Poroshenko addressed to society. His Presidential cadence was associated with the propaganda of the pro-Ukrainian agenda in various spheres. Poroshenko started the language campaign that was aimed to promote the Ukrainian language to counter Russian cultural influence; he actively supported its legal protection as the single state language. On the other hand, it was a controversial step for such a multilingual country. In the beginning of 2019 the Parliament voted for the law “On the functioning of the Ukrainian language as the State language” that limited the use of Russian in public and media spheres (Embassy of Ukraine in Hungary 2019). Concentration over the identity question is an attempt to oppose foreign influence. For Poroshenko as for the securitizing actor it was a decision to present Russian expansion in additional sphere – in cultural.

Starting from 2014, Ukrainian media was full of security statements of the highest state officials. President Poroshenko was the prominent actor in talks about security. Mr. Poroshenko supported the discourse of a constant Russian threat and the necessity to strengthen the national defense capabilities. One of his most important speech acts took place 40 THE MAIN ACTORS OF SECURITIZATION IN UKRAINE at the United Nations General Assembly on September 29, 2015. Mr. President in his speech named Russia as an aggressor and accused Moscow in waging a war against Ukraine. “The aggressor is Russia – a neighboring country, former strategic partner that legally pledged to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and inviolability of the borders of Ukraine,” President Poroshenko declared. “In February 2014, Russia conducted open and unprovoked aggression against my country, having occupied and annexed Crimea,” he continued. “Bluntly and brutally violating international law and shocking the whole world community…Despite the fact the until now Russia refuses to officially admit its direct military invasion, today there is no doubt that this is an aggressive war against my country.” (UN News 2015, or.t.). In 2018, in the Ukrainian Parliament during his annual address the President stressed, “In our own country, we are surrounded by advertising billboards with the call for “compromise” with the aggressor [political advertisement of the pro-Russian opposition]. Almost every pillar is covered by the so-called “pigeons of peace” with a shadow of a double-headed eagle. “Peace” is a beautiful and attractive wrapper where one can put anything he wants … Let’s not forget that the enemy came here neither for Crimea nor for Donbas, but for the whole Ukraine. Only strong defense capability and diplomatic corps can bring peace to Ukraine, but not the consent with Russian conditions.” (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 2018, of.t.). On February 26, 2019, during his meeting with the leadership of the Ukrainian Armed Forces President Poroshenko summarized, “The threat of a full-scale war is not a declara- tion. It is quite real, especially due to the current military preparations of the enemy near borders and in the occupied Crimea. … It has absolutely nothing to do with Russia’s own defense. These forces are intended for a military strike, and this is precisely what the Kremlin is preparing for.” (Ukrayinska Pravda 2019, a.t.). It is important to stress that Petro Po- roshenko as a President remained in the so-called “hawks’ faction.” Donbas crisis played a crucial role in his victory in 2014 and remained a central issue throughout the whole presidency. Poroshenko positioned himself as a politician ready for a confrontation with Moscow and criticized any attempts of “aggressor appeasement.”

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All governments and prime ministers appointed after the crisis in Donbas started re- spected the established anti-Russian security discourse and were closely correlated with the president’s position. This is a peculiarity of the Ukrainian political system in which the president has more influence on the government than on the Verkhovna Rada. Moreover, according to Article 114 of the Ukrainian Constitution, it is the president who on the proposal of a coalition of parliamentary factions submits the candidacy of the prime minister to the parliament. Verkhovna Rada in its turn supports or rejects the candidate (Constitutional Court of Ukraine). That is why both institutions, president and prime minister, are close in their positioning especially in the security sphere. As an integral part of the state functioning the government is responsible for practical execution of parliamentary decisions and cannot modify the established discourse. Thus, in their public speeches, the Ukrainian prime ministers always emphasized the Russian role in the Ukrainian crisis. Their several narratives are the most common and often appear in media: Russia is considered to be a sponsor of terrorism in Donbas, Moscow is responsible for undermining international stability and committing crimes against humanity (Government Portal 2015), innocent people die from Russian weapons (Embassy of Ukraine in the State of Israel 2017), Ukraine should stand otherwise the Russian enemy would go further, Nord Stream 2 project is a vital threat for the national energy security (Kyiv Post 2019), international pressure on Russia should be more rigid (UNIAN 2018). As an executive authority, the government answered those challenges the security situation created.

Parliament, on the contrary, is the place for debate between supporters and opponents of securitization and security policy itself. In both the 8th and 9th convocations of the Verkhovna Rada, the pro-European parties formed a coalition to oppose pro-Russian opposition. The parliamentary activities were oriented on legislative adjustment and support of the state security policy. On January 27, 2015, the Parliament, issued an appeal to the United Nations, the European Parliament, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and other international organization and national parliaments for the recognition of the Russian Federation as an aggressor state. In their appeal members of the parliament accused Russia of supporting terrorism and crimes against humanity in the occupied territory of Ukraine (Verkhovna Rada

42 THE MAIN ACTORS OF SECURITIZATION IN UKRAINE of Ukraine 2015, a.t.). On February 4, 2015, the Parliament released the statement “On the recognition of the International Criminal Court jurisdiction on crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by the highest officials of the Russian Federation and the heads of terrorist organizations “Donetsk People’s Republic” and “Luhansk People’s Republic” which caused mass casualties among the Ukrainian citizens” (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 2015, a.t.). That was an unprecedented step for the Ukrainian parliamentarism that never promoted such declarations towards Ukraine before. The accusation of war crimes committed by Russia was a radical statement and shoved the readiness to openly oppose Russian discourse. On April 21, 2015, the Parliament issued its next appeal “On repelling the armed aggression of the Russian Federation and overcoming its consequences,” featuring a detailed description of the Russian intervention in the Crimean Peninsula and Donbas. What is important is that in this very appeal, the MPs accused Russia of a large scale armed intervention that was realized across the uncontrolled section of the Ukrainian - Russian border on August 27, 2014 (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 2015, a.t.). The pivotal voting related to the Donbas crisis took place when the Parliament passed a law “On the peculiarities of state policy on ensuring Ukraine’s state sovereignty over temporarily occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk regions” on January 18, 2018. In the media, that law was labeled as a “Donbas reintegration law” (Embassy of Ukraine in Romania 2018). The document recognizes Russia as an aggressor and an occupying country. The actions of the Russian Federation on the territory of Donetsk and Lugansk regions are considered as “armed aggression of the Russian Federation and temporally occupation.” In the text, the Verkhovna Rada agrees with the Ukrainian President’s decision to use armed forces and other military formations to deter and counter Russian aggression. Parliament also gives its consent to the use of troops to secure state sovereignty over temporarily occupied territories (Charitable Foundation East-SOS 2018). The law was supported by all parties and non- aligned deputies present in the parliament except for the opposition party “Opposition Bloc” that voted negatively (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 2018). On the next day, on January 19, 2018, Vladimir Putin convoked the Security Council of the Russian Federation to discuss this bill. The participants of the meeting stated that the law negatively affected the prospects of a

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“domestic settlement” of the conflict. Dmitry Peskov, the spokesman of the Russian Presi- dent, asserted that the Kremlin disagreed with the “Donbas reintegration law,” in which Rus- sia was named as an aggressor country (UNIAN 2018). From these documents, we can make a conclusion that the Parliament actively participated in creating the threat images. Ukraine is a parliamentary-presidential republic and Verkhovna Rada possesses more instruments for state policy implementation than the Presi- dent does. Besides, the Parliament as a state body represents the desires and expectations of the electorate. Therefore, its role in securitization is directly correlated with the popular re- quirements and approvals. Moreover, as compared to President or Prime Minister who usually express their own political opinion in security speeches, the Parliament passed legally binding documents in which openly and officially securitized the situation in Donbas, named the aggressor, established the legal regime of occupation in uncontrolled territories, allowed the adoption of extraordinary measures such as involvement of armed forces or imposition of the martial law. Representatives of all three institutions have already performed several securitizing moves. For the audience, it is critically important to see the unanimous position in interpretation of the war in Donbas.

4.2 The pro-Russian faction

The pro-Russian camp is represented by politicians from the former Party of Regions that dissolved after Yanukovych’s resignation. Additionally, the Communist Party of Ukraine actively presented its negative attitude to Kyiv’s decadence in relations with Moscow. Pro- Russian politicians or individuals who rejected the perceived menace from the East were automatically suspected by public opinion in collaboration with the aggressor. Therefore, the Ukrainian state did not directly oppress political parties or politicians for cooperation with Kremlin. Kyiv preferred careful, reasonable, and selective steps than a total confrontation. In this context, the pro-Russian moods or sentiments should be understood as the support of the narrative spread by Russian state officials and media outlets according to the Ukrainian crisis, propagation of relationship normalization with Moscow, anti-NATO and anti-EU slogans. The so-called pro-Russian camp in the Ukrainian political circles showed its resistance to approve the securitizing moves the Ukrainian authorities made. Alternatively, these political 44 THE MAIN ACTORS OF SECURITIZATION IN UKRAINE actors favor the Moscow’s way of seeing the crisis according to which Ukraine endures the internal civil conflict, Donbas people rebelled against Kyiv oppressors, Russian speaking population is discriminated, and the Euromaidan Revolution in fact was a coup d’état (Len- non 2019; Makarenko 2019; Opinion 2019). Thus, securitization is not considered as the right tool for national consolidation in time of crisis and foreign aggression. Such suggestions receive social support. Pro-Russian politicians have their opinion allies within the broader society. The sociological research conducted by the Ukrainian Cen- tre for Economic and Political Studies named after Oleksandr Razumkov, the non-governmental public policy think tank, illustrates that the eastern regions of Ukraine, especially those that have already experienced the impact of warfare, still show a comparatively higher level of pro-Russian moods among the population than central, southern and western oblasts. Historically eastern regions of Ukraine and the Crimea Peninsula remained close economic, social, cultural and family ties with Russia due to the big Russian national minority that lives there from the Soviet times (BBC News 2014). The Soviet Union actively promoted indus- trialization and economic development of Donbas as an area rich in the natural resources. That stimulated authorities to conduct the resettlement of people for employment in the in- dustrial sector. As a result, the density of the population in Donbas is comparatively higher than in other Ukrainian regions. Additionally, a big minority of ethnic Russians has already settled down before Ukraine got independence in 1991. Thus, electoral preferences and political views of these regions very often are oriented to the East and stand for the pro-Russian agenda in the Ukrainian policy. The sociological survey shows that the desire for relationship normalization and advanced cooperation between Ukraine and Russia is higher in the East than in central and western regions of Ukraine.

Image 7. The usual regional division used in the Ukrainian media and public policy discourse. Bodhi Commons. http://bodhicommons.org/article/ukraine-the-new-pawn-in-imperialist-geopolitics

45 THE MAIN ACTORS OF SECURITIZATION IN UKRAINE

Image 8. Public opinion about the prospects of Russia-Ukrainian relations in the future. Re- sults divided by regions. Razumkov Centre. http://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/journal/eng/NSD177-178_2019_eng.pdf

Image 9. Public opinion about the state’s policy towards Russia. Razumkov Centre. http://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/journal/eng/NSD177-178_2019_eng.pdf 46 THE MAIN ACTORS OF SECURITIZATION IN UKRAINE

Therefore, the support of the Ukrainian Euro-Atlantic integration is the lowest in the East as compared to other regions.

Image 10. Public moods according to the pro-Western political orientation. Razumkov Centre. http://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/journal/eng/NSD177-178_2019_eng.pdf

Respondents from eastern Ukraine support the idea of granting special administrative status to Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts10 as well as would like Russian to have the status of the second state language.

Image 11. Public support of granting special status for Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and status of the second state language to Russian. Razumkov Centre. http://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/journal/eng/NSD177-178_2019_eng.pdf

10 This narrative is promoted by Russia. 47 THE MAIN ACTORS OF SECURITIZATION IN UKRAINE

Hence, due to the survey proxy-state entities Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republic are sometimes considered as legitimate representatives of the local population. More than 30% of respondents have expressed such an opinion, while in central and western oblasts from 4% to 8% of the surveyed think the same way.

Image 12. Public opinion about the status of self-proclaimed state entities “Donetsk People’s Republic and “Luhansk People’s Republic”. Razumkov Centre. http://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/journal/eng/NSD177-178_2019_eng.pdf

The majority of respondents from the East consider the war as a civil conflict between pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian citizens and welcome the idea of direct negotiations between Kyiv and leaders of DPR and LPR. While other parts of the country are consolidated in their

48 THE MAIN ACTORS OF SECURITIZATION IN UKRAINE answer that it is Russia that wage the war against Ukraine. Such disparities in public opinions are represented in political programs of several political parties.

Image 13. Public support of the direct Ukraine - “DPR” - “LPR” negotiations. Razumkov Centre. http://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/journal/eng/NSD177-178_2019_eng.pdf

Image 14. Conflict of terminology around the Donbas crisis in public discourses. Ra- zumkov Centre. http://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/journal/eng/NSD177-178_2019_eng.pdf 49 THE MAIN ACTORS OF SECURITIZATION IN UKRAINE

Image 15. Opinion disparities over the conflict resolution. Razumkov Centre. http://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/journal/eng/NSD177-178_2019_eng.pdf

In September 2014 the Party of Regions conducted a rebranding campaign, merged with the other six small parties, and formed the Opposition Bloc as a separate political actor. Nevertheless, this new entity was the ideological inheritor of its predecessor. It included politicians from Yanukovych’s political environment and those who opposed the state policy direction after the Revolution. The party advocated a peaceful solution of the Donbas crisis, which stands for the neutral and non-bloc status of Ukraine and the restoration of cooperative relations with Russia (Makarenko 2019). In 2014 parliamentary elections, the Opposition Bloc received its highest support in eastern oblasts of Ukraine.

50 THE MAIN ACTORS OF SECURITIZATION IN UKRAINE

Image 16. Electoral support of the “Opposition bloc” political party in the parliamentary elections in 2014. Ukrainian Center for Social Data. https://socialdata.org.ua/en/new-political-landscape-of- ukraine-geographical-peculiarities-of-presidential-and-parliamentary-elections-of-2014/

In autumn 2018, one year before the new parliamentary elections, the party experienced an internal split. The majority of its members together with the leader Yuriy Boyko, migrated to the newly created “Opposition Platform - For Life.” Both parties followed similar political programs and their division should be understood as a political step in a struggle for electorate but not as an ideological disparity. In 2019 in the early parliamentary elections “Opposition Platform- For Life” won 13% of votes. The Opposition Bloc won only 3% and did not pass the 5% threshold (UNIAN 2019).

51 THE MAIN ACTORS OF SECURITIZATION IN UKRAINE

Image 17. Electoral support of the “Opposition Platform - For Life” political party in the parliamentary elections in 2019. Novynarnia. https://novynarnia.com/2019/07/26/dvk-maps/

Both political parties in their statements and programs favor cooperation with Russia. “Opposition Platform- For Life” advocates for granting the autonomous status of Donbas in the Constitution that is one of the main Moscow’s demands to Kyiv. Its politicians strive for the abolition of the law on language that places the Ukrainian as a single state language, for the protection of the Moscow Orthodox Patriarchy, canceling of the decommunization campaign, introduction of the right for local referendums that would legitimate the new attempts to question the Ukrainian territorial integrity via plebiscites. As for the Donbas conflict settlement, the party proposes the negotiation format Kyiv-Donetsk-Luhansk-Moscow that ex- cludes European states. Finally, it is proposed that Ukraine should restore trade and economic relations with the Russian Federation, return its neutral status, and reconsider European integration (Opinion 2019). Political programs of both parties are closely correlated with the preferences their electorate has. As it is showed in the sociological research pro-Russian agenda is topical among the population from the East where the opposition is more active and more supported by locals. Politicians from the “Opposition Platform - For Life” have represented themselves as “the peace party” opposed to “the war party.” To maintain “the peace image” leaders of the 52 THE MAIN ACTORS OF SECURITIZATION IN UKRAINE

“Opposition Platform” Victor Medvedchuk and Yuriy Boyko made a radical step. They conducted several official meetings with the Russian prime-minister Dmitry Medvedev and Gaz- prom11 CEO Alexei Miller in Moscow before the early parliamentary elections took place in 2019. Both parts of the meetings highlighted the readiness to normalize Ukrainian-Russian economic cooperation, settle the problem of the Russian gas transportation through the Ukrainian pipe system and expressed their support of peace building in Donbas (112 Ukraine 2019; Ukrinform 2019). Therefore, “Opposition Platform - For Life” was the only party that showed their real ability to reach the highest Russian officials and negotiate peace restoration. On the official level, Ukraine supported the multilateral format of Donbas crisis settlement with the involvement of the European states. The country did not express its readiness to conduct bilateral negotiations with Moscow. Russia in its turn actively blamed Kyiv authorities for their belligerent policy in Donbas. Hence, the political stalemate and a weak ceasefire regime have solidified voters’ perception of the “Opposition Platform” as the party ready to bring peace to any means. A local population that suffers from warfare and occupation favors the idea of the peace restoration (Lennon 2019; Warsaw Institute 2019).

Communist Party of Ukraine used to be the prominent actor of the pro-Moscow narrative. As the political descendant of the Communist Party of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, there was no doubt as to its connections with Russian communists. Right after the Euromaidan revolution, the new pro-European authorities started the decommunization campaign that provoked the debate about the affiliation of communism with Moscow and how it threatened national security. On December 16, 2015, the Administrative Court of Kyiv satisfied the claim of the Ministry of Justice and banned the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU). The Ministry’s application stressed that “the Communist Party of Ukraine carried out actions aimed at changing the constitutional order through violent means; violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine; propaganda of war, violence, and incitement to inter- ethnic enmity and encroachment of human rights and freedoms, and members of CPU sys- tematically make calls to create armed formations” (Coynash 2019, web.t.). Nowadays, the

11 The biggest Russian natural gas corporation. Remains under control of the Russian Government. 53 THE MAIN ACTORS OF SECURITIZATION IN UKRAINE party has no right to participate in any electoral campaign (112 Ukraine 2018). Ukraine security services also have already launched a criminal investigation concerning the role CPU played in the Crimea and Donbas occupation (112 Ukraine 2018). The CPU’s rejection to blame Russian intervention and its criticism of the Euromaidan revolution contradicted the popular preferences in Ukraine. The hostile politics of Moscow eroded the credibility of the communist rhetoric about peaceful cooperation between former Soviet republics. Despite the fact that the Communist Party of Ukraine held the pro-Russian position towards the Ukrainian crisis, the authorities succeeded to cease their influence. For this reason, we can consider communism prohibition as a securitizing move that has been successfully approved by the audience. State bodies have highlighted the danger CPU presented for peace and stability. The population did not try to impede such actions and consented to the ban. To sum up, it needs to be reiterated that the so-called pro-Russian faction in the Ukrainian politics does not accept securitization but advocates for peace without confrontation. Politicians from that camp reject to recognize the threat Ukraine faced in 2014 and do not support the necessity to impose exceptional measures such as the use of armed forces. The pro-Moscow opposition promotes the Russian view of the crisis resolution and presents it as a key to peace. Securitization in its essence is hostile to the source of danger and is aimed to eliminate it. Thus, securitization success contradicts the Russian interests in Ukraine.

4.3 The role of the Church

While being an important institution in society the church can distribute security narratives and influence public opinion. The role of this institution in securitization is limited but at the same time quite powerful. Even in secular countries church often enjoys specific relations with a state. Politicians always try to establish contacts with clerics who are social influencers. Therefore, the church takes part in public life, supports or criticizes state policy, participates in rallies, favors, or rejects certain public narratives. The influence that the Rus- sian Orthodox Church has in Ukraine is securitized by national authorities. Ukrainian authorities involved the Russian Orthodox Church into the anti-Russian security discourse and have represented it as a threat to national security. As I show in this section Russian Orthodoxy 54 THE MAIN ACTORS OF SECURITIZATION IN UKRAINE did not create its own anti-Ukrainian agenda but followed the line the Kremlin promoted in its security utterance towards Ukraine.

Eastern Orthodox Church is the main and the most popular Christian church in Ukraine. After the Soviet dissolution independent Ukraine hosted two big branches of the Orthodox Church. The first one is the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriar- chate12 (UOC-MP) as a self-governing Church under the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). It possesses an autonomous status, represents the Ukrainian orthodox parishes but respects the canonical line of the Russian Church, and is accountable to the Moscow Patriarch (Trach 2015). Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) is the second branch of the Orthodox Church in the country. It was created in 1992 with an intention to establish an independent church with the center in Kyiv. The ROC never recognized Kyiv’s Patriarchy as the rightful institution and condemned it in religious dissent. World Orthodox center in Constantinople also denied granting the autocephaly13 to Kyiv. Both branches reinforced the split by maintaining hostile relations. Nevertheless, before the Ukrainian crisis began the Moscow Patriarchy was the most widespread orthodox institution within the Ukrainian society and managed the majority of parishes.

12 Patriarchate is an ecclesiological term in Christianity. It designates the office and jurisdiction of a patriarch who is a head of a church. 13 Autocephaly (from the Greek αύτός [self] and κεφαλή [head]) is one of the basic principles of the Orthodox church that guarantees the organizational and ritual independence of the church entity. 55 THE MAIN ACTORS OF SECURITIZATION IN UKRAINE

Image 18. Dominance of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate over the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate by oblast. UA Frontier. https://uafrontier.com/en/increase-in-the-number-of-religious-communities-of- uoc-mp-and-the-uoc-kp-from-2008-to-2013/

The situation changed dramatically after the Euromaidan revolution started. Kyiv Pa- triarchy that held the pro-national position openly supported the revolution and protesters. Moscow Patriarchy that was affiliated with president Victor Yanukovych decided to remain neutral and called both parts to peace. However, the pro-European moods were not favored in general. Further occupation of Crimea and events in Donbas shoved the real church split. MP neither accused nor praised Russian intrusion but tried to balance. Nonetheless, individual MP priests and clergy in Crimea openly supported occupation troops that was shown in social media (Religious Information Service of Ukraine 2020). After the violence in Donbas started the Patriarch Kirill, the head of the Russian Or- thodox Church, criticized the anti-terrorist operation and called Kyiv’s armed resistance as a “fratricidal war.” The ROC leader also replied the Moscow’s narrative about eastern Ukraine

56 THE MAIN ACTORS OF SECURITIZATION IN UKRAINE as a historical Rus’14 lands (Bugriy 2015). Consequently, UOC-MP’s affiliation with the Rus- sian Orthodox Church was conceived as cooperation with the aggressor, even though the church did not have the possibility to interpret events differently. Thus, MP leaders refused to accuse the Russian state in its aggressive policy and criticized the hostilities in Donbas. The war was interpreted as a “value crisis among Ukrainian regions” that was a less radical statement but still did not touch the Russian role in the Donbas crisis (Shestopalets 2019). In practice, the Kyiv Patriarchate parishes that remained in the occupied territories faced the wave of discrimination and property seizure (Coynash 2019; Religious Information Service of Ukraine 2020). Conversely, the Russian Orthodox Church and its institutions in Ukraine experienced the decline of credibility among the Ukrainian society. The debate about the creation of the independent and internationally recognized Ukrainian Orthodox Church was topical as never before. The then president Petro Po- roshenko led the negotiation campaign with the World Orthodox Center in Constantinople in this matter. After the prolonged talks the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, Bartholo- mew I, finally granted the Ukrainian Orthodoxy autocephaly in January 2019 (Religious In- formation Service of Ukraine 2020). That meant the creation of the unified and recognized Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU). Ukraine received the so-called tomos15 parchment decree that granted official recognition to the OCU by the Orthodox church. Ukrainian orthodox “autocephaly” provoked the severe crisis in Ukrainian-Russian religious relations. Moscow’s Patriarch Kirill blamed Ukraine and the Constantinople Patri- archy in shaking the Orthodox canonical purity and appealed to other national churches to preserve the unity (Karelska and Umland 2020). The new Metropolitan of the OCU Epipha- nius labeled the Russian Orthodox Church as the “last pillar advance post of Vladimir Putin in Ukraine” (Borovkova and Umland 2020). Therefore, the developments around the Ukrain- ian autocephaly have acknowledged that religion is an important factor in interstate relations. Moscow’s tough reaction has confirmed the Russian hostile attitude towards Ukrainian attempts to leave its zone of influence.

14 Kyivan Rus’ - medieval state on the territory of modern Ukraine and part of modern Russia. 15 In the Eastern Orthodox Church “tomos” is a decree of the head of a Orthodox church on certain issues. In the Ukrainian case tomos was a document signed in Constantinople by the leder of the Eastern Orthodox Church that granted independence to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. 57 THE MAIN ACTORS OF SECURITIZATION IN UKRAINE

The Ukrainian state apparatus in its turn represented this event as a political and security issue. Independence of the church was considered as the great victory of Kyiv against foreign influence agents. Ukraine finally has obtained the right to claim its supremacy over the religious agenda within the country that is seen as the crucial component for the national defense. Religious factor, as well as the linguistic, has already moved from the cultural and social spheres to the political one. Hence, developments of the last years securitized the free choice of religion, while the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate still possesses the negative political connotation (Karelska and Umland 2020; United States In- stitute of Peace 2018). The anti-Russian narrative in the religious sphere was interrelated with the “Army, Language, Faith” political slogan that emphasized the factor of a mutual religious identity. The national authorities, and especially the ex-president Petro Poroshenko, actively promoted that achievement in their political agenda. As far as Russian presence in any sphere is considered to be ominous, religion also was equated with the national security realm. The population again faced the wave of anti-Russian hostile rhetoric on the official state level (Goble 2018). The President Poroshenko speech on the occasion of granting autocephaly was the most powerful security speech act in this sphere: “This day will go down in the history of Ukraine as a sacred day...the final achievement of our Ukrainian independence from Rus- sia...This is a church without Putin. It is a church without prayer for Russian power and the Russian army...And when Moscow speaks of Ukraine as its alleged canonical territory, is not it an encroachment on our territorial integrity? And are not we obliged to protect both the Ukrainian land and the Ukrainian spirit in such conditions?... We know better than anyone else that a place where a Russian censer is swung today will be shelled by Russian artillery tomorrow...Obviously, the issue of autocephaly goes far beyond the religious sphere. This is a matter of our national security. This is a question of our statehood. This is a matter of world politics...The Russian president said that the collapse of the Soviet Union had become a major geopolitical catastrophe for Russia in the twentieth century. Granting autocephaly to Ukrain- ian Orthodoxy is Russia's second geopolitical catastrophe. Let them know...Autocephaly is part of our pro-European and pro-Ukrainian strategy.” (Ukrinform 2018, a.t.).

58 THE MAIN ACTORS OF SECURITIZATION IN UKRAINE

The state launched the media campaign against the Russian Orthodox Church con- demning their participation in Kremlin belligerent policy in Crimea and Donbas. The main goal was to persuade the population to conceive Moscow Patriarchy in Ukraine as the representative of the aggressor. Later, President Poroshenko actively used the religious factor during his presidential campaign 2019 and presented autocephaly as a victory and “the last stage of the establishment of the Ukrainian state independence.” The president often repeated that both the newly created church as well as the army protect the national defense (UNIAN 2019). The UOC (MP) was labelled as a security threat for the country, an integral part of the Russian political regime and instrument of its foreign influence. The Security Service of Ukraine distributed special informational booklets in which Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine was presented as a Kremlin religious structure in a hybrid war. Booklets contained anti- Ukrainian citations of Russian clerical elites as well as photos in which priests sanctified militants and held guns. That was the series of securitizing moves that involved the church into the national security spectrum.

Image 19. Booklet distributed by the Security Service of Ukraine that affiliates Moscow Pa- triarchate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church with pro-Russian militants in Donbas. Security Service of Ukraine. https://ssu.gov.ua/en/news/1/category/21/view/5507#.jM5BMl2h.dpbs 59 THE MAIN ACTORS OF SECURITIZATION IN UKRAINE

Image 20. Booklet distributed by the Security Service of Ukraine that affiliates Moscow Pa- triarchate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church with pro-Russian militants in Donbas. Security Service of Ukraine. https://ssu.gov.ua/en/news/1/category/21/view/5507#.jM5BMl2h.dpbs

The “autocephaly” campaign blurred the separation between church and the secular state. After receiving the tomos document, Petro Poroshenko together with the head of the OCU Metropolitan Epiphany organized a campaign tour through the Ukrainian regions (Chaika 2018). In general, the survey showed that autocephaly to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was supported by more than 50% of the population while roughly 20% were against. Besides, the regional trend was replicated. The initiative was highly supported by people in western and central oblast but did not find support among Ukrainians in the east (Sociological Group Reytynh 2019). Until today, the society does not have a common opinion about the role of the Russian Church in Ukraine. As well as other security issues the church question showed the versatility of public opinion. As has been already stated, securitization is completed after an audience accepts the securitizing move. The current case showed an ambigu- ous result. Russian Orthodoxy has saved the majority of its Ukrainian parishes. However, the religious crisis is still ongoing. The political opposition actively criticized the President for

60 THE MAIN ACTORS OF SECURITIZATION IN UKRAINE using religious factor in his political interests, especially with the intention to win the electoral support before the presidential elections 2019 (Ukrop 2019). However, the church case quite indirectly influenced the campaign results. Although the audience accepted the narrative about the Russian Orthodoxy hostility, the securitizing actor’s motives were questioned and criticized.

61 MAIN SECURITY NARRATIVES

5 Main Security Narratives

Before 2014, the Ukrainian society did not consider the Russian Federation as a potential threat for Ukrainian sovereignty, territorial integrity, and peace. On the one hand, it was an example of how short-sighted Ukrainian political strategy used to be. The Russian- Georgian war was an evident example of the tools Moscow was ready to use in its foreign policy. The threat Tbilisi faced in 2008 might have convinced the Ukrainian elites to raise the discussion about national security but Kyiv underestimated that radical changes. On the other hand, since 2010 the country was under the rule of the pro-Russian political regime of President Victor Yanukovych, and the government formed from the people of his inner circle. Hence, Ukraine had already established tight economic and political relations with Moscow and was not ready neither to see any dangers for the national sovereignty nor to consider its eastern neighbor as a threat. The situation changed dramatically after Ukraine has made a pivot to the West during the revolutionary events in 2014. In the beginning, Kremlin used media and propaganda spread to discredit Ukrainian intentions of integration with the European Union, later Russian troops crossed the Ukrainian state border (Bigg 2013; Miazhevich 2014). Russia actively used state-owned channels to cover Euromaidan events in the different from the pro-Ukrain- ian way. The main goal of the disinformation campaign was to show the dangerous consequences big protest actions could cause such as radicalization, crime spread, riots, weakening of the law enforcement. Moreover, Russian media condemned the US authorities for the protest instigation, and perceived Euromaidan as the “western special operation” to topple down the Ukrainian political regime (EU vs DISINFO 2020). In the very beginning, in December 2013, the Russian President Vladimir Putin labeled protest actions in Kyiv as pogroms and riots but not a revolution (Financial Times 2013). According to the Russian media discourse, the Euromaidan ended up in the coup controlled by the US officials (Eriksen 2018). Conse- quently, the Russian TV channels and media outlets held that line until the beginning of the Crimea occupation that started right after the Revolution. Russian aggression violated the main pillars of Ukrainian statehood. Occupation of the Crimean Peninsula and the war in

62 MAIN SECURITY NARRATIVES

Donbas happened to be an existential threat for the Ukrainian territorial integrity and sovereignty.

In accordance with the theory, securitization is impossible without appropriate narratives and security speech acts. It is a political utterance that securitizes the issue and persuades the audience. It is, therefore, necessary to analyze those security narratives that used to be and still are topical from the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis. These main discourses have both pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian connotations. Their presence in the national media and political spheres does not mean securitization of the conflict. However, proper utterance and constant repetition can make the audience to accept the specific rhetoric with further securitization development. No matter which side promotes certain ideas, they influence the Ukrain- ian security debate in general. Ukrainian media space is the usual way of narrative delivery to society. I will pay attention to those narratives that are wide-spread in Ukraine and in Russia. The main and the most important narrative considers Russia as the aggressor state and the main threat to Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity (Interfax Ukraine 2019). The phrase “Russian threat” is generalized but central for further securitizing moves. The national security agenda has already experienced the spillover of security narratives. Thus, the tendency shows that the Ukrainian media and politicians have tried to securitize the source of the threat (e.g. Russian Federation) rather than the referent objects that suffered (sovereignty and territorial integrity). The Russian factor in other than the national security spheres is considered as ominous and dangerous. Main security narratives concentrate on Russia rather than on spheres where the country operates. The Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko’s reaction to the Russian Federation’s withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty16 was the prominent example of the security spillover. Mr. Poroshenko stated that:” We [Ukrainians] are no longer bound by any limitations either on the range of our missiles nor on their power…. We need high-precision missiles and we are not going to repeat the

16 On March 4, 2019, Russia suspended from the treaty. The Treaty has expired on August 2, 2019, after the US withdrawal. Referred from: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_166100.htm

63 MAIN SECURITY NARRATIVES mistakes of the Budapest memorandum17” (Busch 2019, web.t.). The state official used the international security event to bound it to the national security agenda. Such a tendency would create obstacles for future desecuritization intentions. Incen- tives to desecuritize the economy and restore active trade with Russia will bump into the unwillingness to eliminate Russia as a source of danger from other spheres, for instance military security. Thus, such interdependence leads to the desire to either support securitization constantly or desecuritize Russia as a source of threat for Ukraine. Both variants are complicated in their fulfillment and require complex decision making. In the next chapter I will refer to this peculiarity while discussing peaceful resolution attempts made by the Ukrainian authorities.

Repetition of the security narratives favors the promotion and routinization of the securitizing moves. Thus, the securitizing act becomes the elite’s political routine. The audience’s acceptance or rejection is part of their social routines. Therefore, media and elites, which are the most common securitizing actors, tend to routinely repeat the same narratives, emphasize the same source of threat and referent objects. The audience has no chance but to accept those influences from the top and spread them horizontally if possible (Adamides 2020, 61). Such routinization of narratives is closely related to securitization development. Securitization as a concept is not self-sustained but requires support by utterance or actions. I present those central security narratives that are aimed to support securitization in Ukraine.

5.1 Large-scale war

The narrative regarding the possibility of the large-scale war against Russia plays a prominent role. At the beginning of the Donbas conflict the threat was obvious and did not require additional persuasions. Moreover, when in August 2014 Russian units appeared in

17 Interstate memorandum signed in Budapest in 1994. Ukraine agreed to abandon its nuclear arse- nal to the Russian Federation. In return the US, the UK and Russia guaranteed Ukrainian independence and territorial integrity. The memorandum is not the legally binding document. It was violated by the Russian occupation of Crimea in February 2014. Referred from: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?ob- jid=0800000280401fbb&clang=_en 64 MAIN SECURITY NARRATIVES

Donbas this narrative obtained its logical basis. Further diplomatic activities and the Minsk protocol transformed the conflict from the hot phase into the stationary or trench warfare that did not stop clashes but significantly decreased their intensity. Therefore, the large-scale war narrative required additional support. Below, I present selected quotes of state officials concerning the risk of the open war between Ukraine and the Russian Federation.

In November 2018 the then president Petro Poroshenko in the meeting with Ukrainian reporters stated that: “…The number of units deployed along the whole border has grown dramatically. Talks about possible drills do not justify these increases. Their tanks haven't been withdrawn. They are still there. That's why I don't want anyone to think this is fun and games. Ukraine is under the threat of full-scale war with Russia...” (Ruptly 2018, web.t.). In April 2019 Oleksandr Turchynov, the National Security and Defense Council secretary, pointed out that: “Russia is not just investing billions of resources in the military infrastructure, it is preparing to a…large-scale continental war in Europe. Our state [Ukraine] is the first foothold which they will try to get.” (112 Ukraine 2019, web.t.). Vadym Skibitsky, the representative of the Main Department of Intelligence of the Defense Ministry of Ukraine reported that: “By the estimates of the Main Department of Intelligence of the Defense Min- istry of Ukraine, by 2022-2023, the assault groups of the Russian Federation will be able to deliver full-fledged strategic offensive actions against Ukraine without mobilization.” (112 Ukraine 2020, web.t.).

5.2 Land corridor to Crimea

Russian involvement in Donbas partly was understood as an intention to create the land corridor to the annexed Crimean Peninsula. Such narrative has two outcomes. The first one refers to the already mentioned “Crimean scenario”. Conflict in Donbas was linked with the Crimea annexation. For the physical reasons Crimean agriculture and individual needs are 85% dependent on water supply from the continental part of Ukraine through the North- Crimean canal. After the annexation the Ukrainian Government turned the water off at the main. Thus, the goal was to prevent pro-Russian separatism spread to the South that would

65 MAIN SECURITY NARRATIVES open access to a narrow neck of land that connects Crimea to the mainland. The second outcome is geographical. For the land corridor from Donbas to Crimea to be possible it is necessary to intrude into Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. Therefore, authorities were interested in a such narrative to make the population of these regions aware of the possible threat.

Serhiy Nayev, Commander of Ukraine's Joint Forces18, in his interview with Austria’s Wiener Zeitung stated that: “…the enemy is concentrating its forces mainly on … the Azov Sea area. … Moscow looks for the opportunity to encroach on the Ukrainian territory and create a land corridor to the Crimean Peninsula.” (UNIAN 2019, web.t.) Eugene Chausov- sky, Senior Eurasia Analyst at Stratfor, assumed in the interview with the Radio Free Eu- rope/Radio Liberty that: “…a land corridor to Crimea or Transnistria is unlikely at the moment. … At the same time, such developments cannot be completely excluded. …There may be external factors that could affect the decision, as well as specific figures.” (UNIAN 2019, web.t.).

5.3 Russian Federation is the sponsor of terrorism

This is a strong narrative oriented against the Russian Federation that positions itself as a counterterrorist actor at the international level. For Ukraine to say “terrorism” means to grab the attention of those countries where terrorism has been already securitized. Besides, the term “terrorism” does not have the precise meaning and can be used for manipulations. While calling “DPR” and “LPR” fighters terrorists, Kyiv equalizes them with ISIS and Al- Qaeda militants who have already acquired such status. Casualties among civilians and the Malaysian Boeing crash19 over the uncontrolled territory in Donbas have given the Ukrainian elites the right to involve terrorism into the national security discourse. Terrorism possesses a negative image worldwide. Therefore, it is a very convenient tool for internal securitization.

18 On April 30, 2018, the Anti-Terrorist Operation was completed and replaced by the Joint Forces Operation in Donbas. 19 On July 17, 2014, the scheduled Malaysia Airlines Flight (MH17) from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur was shot down by the Russian 9K37 Buk missile system while flying over an area controlled by the pro-Russian militants in Donetsk oblast. 66 MAIN SECURITY NARRATIVES

Petro Poroshenko actively blamed Russia for terrorism support in Donbas. “Russia provides money and arms to support terrorism in Ukraine. It became a state-led policy on the occupied areas of Crimea and eastern Ukraine…” (Embassy of Ukraine in Australia 2016, of.t.), “For over 20 months, Russia’s aggression … has been continuing through the financing of terrorists and mercenaries, and supplies of arms and military equipment to the illegal armed groups…”, “…How can you [Russia] urge an antiterrorist coalition20 if you inspire terrorism right in front of your door?” (Embassy of Ukraine in the Republic of Kenya 2015, of.t.). Moreover, the “terrorism financing” narrative is strongly supported not only by security utterance. In December 2017, Ukraine filed the lawsuit to the United Nations Interna- tional Court of Justice against Russia for financing terrorism in Donbas (UN News 2019). Pavlo Klimkin, the former Minister of foreign affairs stressed in his official statement that: “In joining the Terrorism Financing Convention, the Russian Federation pledged to suppress the financing of terrorism, but in Ukraine, it does the opposite. Illegal armed groups in Donbas have perpetrated horrific acts of terrorism against civilians using arms from the Russian Federation. And Russia has violated its international obligations by failing to prevent Russian officials and other Russian nationals from providing these weapons to known terrorist groups.” (Government Portal 2018, of.t.).

5.4 Nord Stream 2 pipeline is the energy threat for Ukraine

The narrative about the threat the Russian Nord Stream 2 energy project poses to Ukraine is not directly related to the Ukrainian crisis. However, cooling of the interstate relations partly can be the reason for Moscow’s intention to diversify its natural gas supply routes to Europe and bypass Ukraine as a transit country. For Ukraine the Nord Stream 2 operation means double risk. Firstly, the state budget can lose the income Ukraine receives for the transit route between Russia and the European Union. Secondly, if losing the transit

20 The President means the international counterterrorist coalition against ISIS and other terrorist groups in the Middle East. 67 MAIN SECURITY NARRATIVES status, the country will not have the possibility to buy Russian natural gas in the European Union after it enters its territory. Therefore, the Ukrainian government would be made to negotiate the gas issue directly with Russia. Moscow can use Ukrainian energy dependence to promote its own agenda in the Donbas crisis. This narrative has been already spoken out by the Ukrainian officials. Its role is rather to support the popular opinion about the Russian threat than to securitize the energy sector. The ex-president Poroshenko named Nord Stream 2 “the Kremlin’s Trojan horse against the European energy and geopolitical security” (Ukrinform 2018, web.t.). The former Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman named the construction of the pipeline “an energy weapon of Russia” (Government portal 2019, of.t.). The current Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy uttered that “Russia with their Nord Stream - 2" is arm-twisting Ukraine” (ExPro Consulting 2019, web.t.).

In the next sub-chapters, I will analyze those narratives that counter the pro-Ukrainian discourse. In their majority, counter-narratives were uttered by the Russian side. The interesting thing is that Russian high officials actively used such discourses in their public speeches to counter their Ukrainian opponents. This raises the question of whether such actions should be considered as desecuritization attempts. I am convinced that pro-Russian speech acts also have a security connotation. The Russian vision of the conflict was the opposite of the Ukrainian one. However, through the securitizing discourse it was much easier for Moscow to explain its role in the Donbas war and in the Crimean annexation. Hence, the use of the Russian Armed Forces abroad was often explained as the necessary extraordinary tool.

5.5 Civil war in Donbas

This is the most common and widespread Russian narrative about the Ukrainian crisis. It has two advantages for Moscow. The first one helps to reject the Russian role in the Donbas war instigation, the participation of the Russian Armed Forces (Ministry of Defense of Ukraine; Zoria 2019), and constant arms supply from Russia to proxy state formations

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(Walker 2019). It presents the conflict as the internal Ukrainian problem. The second ad- vantage refers to the negative connotation the “civil war” concept has. It cultivates the toxic image of the Ukrainian crisis among the Russian citizens and abroad, questions the ability of the central government in Kyiv to control the situation. While saying “war” Russia favors securitization of the so-called “Ukrainian question”. In such a situation Russian active role in the war can be explained as an extraordinary measure.

The Ukrainian decision to launch the anti-terrorist operation in Donbas was criticized by the Russian President Vladimir Putin: “Ukraine is on the brink of civil war. It is scary. And I hope that everyone who is responsible for making decisions at the moment … has brains to avoid driving the country to such shocks.” (CNN 2014, web.t.). After the armed confrontation sparked in Donbas Mr. Putin stated: “…now we see a full-blown civil war.” (Segodnia 2014, a.t.). In February 2016 the former Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev in his speech in the Munich Security Conference pointed out that: “the Russian-Ukrainian relations are spoiled. There is a civil war in Ukraine.” (Socor 2016, web.t.). In January 2019, the press secretary of the President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Peskov said: “There is no war between Russia and Ukraine. There is a civil war in Ukraine…” (Front News International 2019, web.t.). Alexei Venediktov, the famous Russian journalist, historian, editor-in-chief of the Echo of Moscow radio station actively promotes this narrative: “…what is happening in Ukraine is a civil confrontation with elements of a civil war… Russia has its own interests there, there are Russian citizens there, there are arms deliveries, this is obvious. But without the appropriate conditions any [civil] war would happen…” (Business Online 2014, web.t.), “…as in many civil confrontations, there are external interests. In this case, Ukraine is the main external interest for Russia that certainly stands and supports… “separatists”, “Yes, they are instructors there, of course. But in fact, we have never talked about private armies. People who go there to earn are the same as American PMCs21.”, “There is a lot of hypocrisy in the Donbas war. But a civil war always happens this way. And this is a civil war.” (Apostrof 2018, a.t.).

21 Private military companies. 69 MAIN SECURITY NARRATIVES

5.6 Responsibility to protect Russians and Russian speakers abroad

The international law “responsibility to protect” (R2P) concept has been already used by the Russian Federation in its foreign policy. This is a global political commitment supported by all the United Nations members in 2005. It declares that the sovereignty obliges national states to protect its population from mass atrocity crimes and human rights violations. This principle considers the use of force only as a last resort under the supervision of the United Nations Security Council (United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention). Russian Federation never officially stated that its government had decided to imply such a concept in practice or asked the UN Security Council for the necessary mandate to act abroad. However, this conception has transformed into the political narrative about the protection of the Russian citizens who live in foreign countries. This is supported by the fact that after the Soviet dissolution a lot of ethnic Russians continue living in former Soviet republics. This tendency favors the promotion of the so-called “Russian world” space that is meant to be the unique cultural space for Russian nationals living in the Russian Federation and abroad. In 2008 Moscow has already referred to the use of R2P principles in order to explain its involvement in the Georgian war as an intention to prevent the genocide of the South Ossetia population (Los Angeles Times 2008). In a somehow different way this concept was used by Russians in the Ukrainian crisis. In the address to the Russian Parliament after the Crimea annexation, Vladimir Putin emphasized the fact of native Russians living in the peninsula: “Millions of people went to bed in one country and awoke in different ones, overnight becoming ethnic minorities in former Union republics, while the Russian nation became one of the biggest, if not the biggest ethnic group in the world to be divided by borders.” (Presi- dent of Russia 2014, of.t.), “…the residents of Crimea and Sevastopol turned to Russia for help in defending their rights and lives, in preventing the events that were unfolding and are still underway in Kyiv, Donetsk, Kharkiv, and other Ukrainian cities. Naturally, we could not leave this plea unheeded; we could not abandon Crimea and its residents in distress. This would have been betrayal on our part.” (President of Russia 2014, of.t.). Such a connotation explains the Russian readiness to put forward the narrative about the protection of its nationals abroad. In October 2016 during the “Russia Calling” forum Mr. Putin stated that: “We were forced to defend the Russian speaking population of Donbas, we were forced to react 70 MAIN SECURITY NARRATIVES to the desire of people living in Crimea to return to the Russian Federation” (Kharkiv Human Rights Protective Group 2016, web.t.). Security is the central factor in both citations. President Putin relies on the popular approval of Russia’s activities in Crimea and Donbas. Danger from the Ukrainian nationalism is considered as a given fact. The already created threat image of the new post-Maidan authorities in Kyiv apparently played the role of the existential threat for the peaceful life of the Russian speaking population in Ukraine. Therefore, securitization of the post-revolutionary Ukraine was the tool Moscow used in order to obtain the support from those Ukrainians and Russians who were unsatisfied with the revolutionary events. The narrative about the physical protection of foreign citizens sounds aggressive and is conceived as an extraordinary measure Kremlin performed in Ukraine.

5.7 NATO and the US play the pivotal role in provoking the Ukrainian crisis

This disputable narrative refers to the triggers of the Ukrainian crisis. No matter how unusual it is, this opinion is sometimes supported and promoted by several Western experts and journalists. The main argument goes to the fact that the risk of the Ukrainian integration into NATO provoked Moscow to intervene. In February 2007 during the Munich Security Conference Vladimir Putin in his speech criticized the recent NATO enlargement.22 Accord- ing to the President’s words it was a violation of the informal NATO - Soviet Union agreement reached after the Warsaw pact had disbanded to prevent future enlargements: “…NATO expansion … represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. …And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the War- saw Pact?...I would like to quote the speech of NATO General Secretary Mr. Woerner in Brussels on 17 May 1990: “the fact that we are ready not to place a NATO army outside of German territory gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantees.” Where are these guarantees?” (President of Russia 2007, of.t.).

22 The biggest NATO enlargement took place in 2004. 71 MAIN SECURITY NARRATIVES

During the 2008 Bucharest NATO summit, Ukraine’s and Georgia’s intentions to receive NATO Membership Action Plans23 were put on review. Vladimir Putin in his in Bu- charest speech stressed the Russian interests that go contra the Ukrainian integration into NATO: “As for the policy of expanding the alliance, we have been attentively watching your discussion. … If I speak about Georgia and Ukraine, it is clear that the matter concerns not only security issues. … In Ukraine, one-third of the population are ethnic Russians. There are regions, where only the Russian population lives, for instance, in Crimea 90% are Rus- sians. … Who may state that we [Russia] do not have any interests there? South, the south of Ukraine, completely, there are only Russians. The Crimea was merely received by Ukraine with the decision of the KPSS Political Bureau.24 … We are not trying to provoke anything, we have been acting very carefully, but we ask our partners to act reasonably as well.” (UNIAN 2008, web.t.).

After the pro-Western elites came into power in Kyiv and the armed conflict sparked in Donbas Ukrainian officials openly expressed the state’s intention to become part of NATO (NATO 2014). Russia demanded guarantees from NATO that it would never happen. Presi- dent Putin spokesmen Dmitry Peskov noted that: “such guarantees have not been offered and the situation has made Moscow nervous, prompting the Russian government to employ measures of caution.” (Concorde Capital 2014). Although no legally binding treaty between NATO and Russia about limits of the Alliance’s enlargement exists such suggestions find its support among Western political commentators and experts. British journalists Seumas Milne noted that the Crimean annexation was “the fruit of western expansion” (Milne 2014). John Mearsheimer, the American political scientist, stressed in his article: “…the United States and its European allies share most of the responsibility for the crisis. The taproot of the trouble is NATO enlargement, the central element of a larger strategy to move Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit and integrate it into the West.” (Mearsheimer 2014). Richard Sakwa, the

23 The Membership Action Plan – is a NATO programme of assistance and practical support of countries wishing to join the Alliance. 24 The Russian President means decision of the Soviet authorities to transfer the Crimean region from the Russian Soviet Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic in 1954. 72 MAIN SECURITY NARRATIVES

British political science professor, called Russian hostile reaction in Ukraine a “fateful geographical paradox: that NATO exists to manage the risks created by its existence” (Steele 2015). Political scientists Taras Kuzio and Paul D’anieri, discuss the opposite opinion in their joint article “The Causes and Consequences of Russia’s Actions towards Ukraine”: “Realism finds that states live in an insecure world, and counsels that the smart ones will always try to increase their power. If that is the case, then realism would likely have advised the US and its allies to expand their alliance while they had the possibility to do so. Indeed, the fact that Russia has now sought to move west would likely be seen by realists as further justifying NATO enlargement: it is better for the alliance to be facing Russia in Ukraine rather than in Poland or Germany. … Realism just as likely leads to the … conclusion: if Russia invaded Ukraine it was not because the West moved too far east, but because it did not move far enough east to prevent Russian territorial expansion.” (Kuzio and D’anieri 2018).

In my narrative analysis I use the approach elaborated by Emery Roe, and described in a case study by Michel J. G. van Eeten. (Fisher et al. 2007, 255-256). This approach bases on the metanarrative search after the analysis of the main narratives. Accordingly, a metanarrative is a synthesis of other narratives. It shows how opposite policy narratives over the issue operate in the specific case. The goal is to formulate the narrative able to reevaluate the issue and make it more susceptible to policymaking and analysis (Fisher et al. 2007, 256). Roe’s structure has four steps. In the first step the researcher figures out the dominant, conventional narrative within the issue that influences all other discourses. In the second step it is necessary to identify those narratives that do not conflict with the conventional one, so- called “non-stories”, or those that oppose the main narrative. The third stage refers to the metanarrative formulation. The analyst should compare so-called “stories” on the one side, and “non-stories” or counter-narratives on the other. Metanarrative is generated through the comparison of these two groups. In the last step the analyst decides the way metanarrative revises the issue and makes it more open to policy analysis. In the current research the revise should lead to securitization analysis (Fisher, et.al 2007, 255-256).

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The dominant narrative tells that Russia is the aggressor state and the main threat to Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity. No matter whether a certain security speech supports or opposes this statement, this discourse is basic and always influences security utterance. The narrative that considers the Nord Stream 2 projects as the energy threat for Ukraine refers to the “non-story” group. In opposition to the dominant narrative the “non- story” does not see the Donbas crisis as the key issue and does not talk about those threats that the dominant narrative does. However, this narrative is a result of the security spillover of Russo-Ukrainian hostilities. Nord Stream 2 energy project is a non-issue for the crisis. This argument concerns with the disadvantageous reality that weakens Ukraine and provokes confrontation with Russia in the additional sphere. All three counter-narratives presented above oppose the dominant one. The civil war narrative rejects the Russian role in the war, does not recognize the fact of foreign aggression and violation of main reference objects (sovereignty and territorial integrity). In opposition to the main discourse this interpretation uses the opposite terminology, propagates the strong claim that neglects the dominant narrative. The second discourse about the responsibility to protect Russians and the Russian speaking population abroad recognizes the Russian inter- ference but justifies it as a necessary measure, which does not show the fact of aggression. It considers the Ukrainian state as a threat to Russia and not vice versa. The last narrative about the NATO role in the crisis provocation somehow resonates with the previous one. It justifies the fact of Russian intervention as the forced decision provoked by the threat of the Russian national security. This discourse has a strong security background, withstands criticism because it seems to be rational. It shows that security decisions in Ukraine are distrustfully perceived in Russia. The final synthesis is aimed to formulate the metanarrative through the comparison of both groups. Therefore, it is noticeable that the Russian Federation expresses not a com- petitive but hostile attitude towards Ukraine in various spheres. Antagonistic moods also pre- vail in Kyiv’s position. Russian foreign policy interests frequently contradict with the Ukrain- ian ones. Both states remain in a deep crisis of mutual distrust, interpret the conflict in a different way. Consequently, Ukraine, as well as Russia, is made to increase attention to security. Moscow has already shown its readiness to act radically in protecting its interests in

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Ukraine. Moreover, Russian activities can be interpreted as securitizing attempts. Narratives presented above show the intention to justify the use of force as an extraordinary measure in protecting Moscow’s positions abroad. The question arises whether Ukrainian answers also should be in the realm of securitization. As an adequate reaction to Moscow’s aggressive discourse securitization of the Ukrainian crisis would help Kyiv to create the basis for drastic policy elaboration.

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6 Securitization analysis in Ukraine

Securitization usually is understood as a temporal answer to a specific crisis. Classical examples of securitization processes show that this concept usually has a top-down structure. Actors in the top initiate the process, and the “bottom”, the audience, decides. However, as far as every other case of securitization is unique both statements can be challenged. Firstly, securitization that has been already accepted should be constantly supported. It can become part of the state security policy. Otherwise, as any other process securitization has the pick of development and the phase of decadence. Secondly, the structures of the relationship between the securitizing actor and audience can reverse to the bottom-up when actors from the audience perform securitizing moves. The role of securitization direction becomes especially dramatic during desecuritization processes (Adamides 2020, 58). After securitization has already taken place both sides can have opposite interests for its existence. While elites usually have more pragmatic positions, the population considers securitization as a necessary tool for being secured. I believe that it is worth looking for the moment when securitization becomes nor- malized. The theory tells us that securitization is an extraordinary answer to the abnormal trigger. Thus, when this trigger vanishes or becomes weaker securitization requires a permanent reminder, adding fuel to the fire. This leads to the so-called routinization process when the threat discourses are constantly repeated, the same referent objects permanently are endangered and the source of existential threats does not change. Routinization helps the audience to accustom to the new status quo (Adamides 2020, 59). In the Ukrainian case those authorities that were in power when the Russian aggression started actively promoted routinization of the conflict environment. President Poroshenko during the whole Presidential term supported the regime of alert in his public speech acts.

I am convinced that Russian aggression is not an existential threat for the Ukrainian statehood. It would be an exaggeration to claim that events in Crimea and in Donbas have questioned the independence of the state as such. However, in 2014 Ukraine experienced several pivotal events that drastically transformed the security landscape within the country.

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They were powerful enough to automatically securitize the situation. At the very beginning of the crisis the threat was obvious for the audience. While in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts the presence of Russian military personal was clandestine, in Crimea there was no doubt that it was Russia that took over the peninsula. Therefore, mainstream securitizing actors such as elites and media supported the already launched process of securitization. At the same time, the role of speech acts was to show the state capability to manage the crisis. Consequently, Ukraine experienced an intensification of the volunteer movement. Crimean “peaceful” annexation created the fear of the “Crimean scenario” repetition in Donbas. The state’s decision to involve armed forces and launch the anti-terrorist operation was a necessary message for the audience to understand the reality of the threat. It is necessary to admit that the state bodies played a crucial role in alert elevating. For the Ukrainian authorities to perform securitizing move was to say that popular mobilization was favored. By autumn 2014 almost 30 volunteer battalions25 operated together with the governmental forces against Russian armed forces and pro-Russian militants (Hromadske International 2014). The formation of the volunteer battalions was the result of weak defense capabilities and the state’s incapacity to fully perform its central functions in the defense realm. In the first year of the war volunteers in their majority were supported by civil society before their integration to the armed forces and other armed formations (Tkach 2019). At the same time the legal side of their participation in combat activities is contradictory. The article 260 of the Ukrainian Criminal Code states that: “Creation of unlawful paramilitary or armed formations in contravention of Ukrainian laws, and participation in the operations shall be punishable by imprisonment…” (Criminal Code of Ukraine) This article was violated and the state tolerated such activities. At that moment securitization was favorable for various reasons. The state was unready to fully provide its official armed forces with required financial and technical support that seriously weakened the country’s defense potential. Thus, volunteer battalions’ formation was in some way an extraordinary measure the government allowed for certain period. Once the threat is accepted, it is difficult to challenge its image. It is time when elites and the public do not dispute over the perceptions of threats. Securitizing actors and audience are united in their understanding of the situation and have no desire to change the established

25 One battalion numbers 300-800 persons. 77 SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS IN UKRAINE views. Elites and media are unwilling to promote “domestic” opposition discourses. The absence of alternative opinion legitimizes the source of threat. Consequently, relations between pro-securitization actors on the one side and anti-securitizations opposition together with the enemy state on the other side are based on zero-sum antagonism (Adamides 2020, 61). Ukraine entered this phase right after the pivotal events happened in 2014. From activities of the then state elites and their official utterance it is noticeable the unwillingness to negotiate with Russia but rather to antagonize the situation with the goal to force the aggressor to concessions. The threat Ukraine faced has a protracted nature. The loss of control over the territory and armed clashes did not require much efforts to support threat images. Single events, such as terrorist attacks or natural disasters, on the contrary have a short period of influence and require re-securitization. Security speech acts are weak without supportive events. Till 2016 the Donbas war has experienced the gradual decline of hostilities. While during 2014 and 2015 the conflict intensity remained in the peak, from the end of 2015 we observe a steady decrease. Therefore, the security situation in 2016 and later was different from the one in 2014. Threat images were still alive but the audience understood that the “Crimean scenario” had failed in Donbas. From 2016 till the end of 2018 Ukraine experienced stagnation in conflict development.

Losses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in armored vehicles 2014 - 2016 2000 1815

1500

1000

500 325 349 61 21 5 0 2014 2015 2016

Damaged Destroyed

Graph 1. Considerable decline in losses of armed vehicles was caused by the decrease of warfare intensity from its peak in 2014. Ukrainian Military Portal. https://mil.in.ua/uk/news/oprylyudnena-statystyka-vtrat- bronetehniky-zsu-v-2014-16-rokah/ 78 SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS IN UKRAINE

The specific feature of the protracted securitization is the absence of long “negotiations” between securitizing actors and audiences. The approval of the subsequent securitizing moves is much faster as far as securitization has already received social support. Actors present their additional security steps as the necessity and rely on the audience’s understanding. In the period when threats images remain unchallenged actors and audiences look for the most efficient way to deal with problems. To manage security issues that threaten referent objects the elites can even operate without social approval. While enjoying the period of securitization both sides, actor and audience, tend to shorten the period of security discussions before making decisions. This is the best scenario if actors are motivated to preserve securitization of certain issues and the audience prefers to keep referent objects securitized. Previous security discourses are usually repeated to assert that threats are managed the same way and make the public feel safe (Adamides 2020, 62). In November 2018 as a result of the Russian attack and seizure of the several Ukrain- ian navy ships near the Kerch Strait in the Black Sea Ukraine imposed martial law. That decision was a breakthrough for securitization that stagnated. From the time of the Soviet collapse Ukraine never used such a tool in practice. Even in 2014 the state decided to launch anti-terrorist operation but not impose martial law neither in Crimea nor in Donbas. For authorities the martial law was a chance to remind the threat scenario, repeat previous speech acts, actualize the security discussion. President Poroshenko made a speech in which emphasized the “qualitatively different threat than the country has already experienced”. He repeated the same narratives that were topical throughout the whole period of crisis: “I fulfilled my constitutional duty and imposed martial law by my decree .... By attacking Ukrainian military boats, Russia entered a new stage of aggression. This is defiant and outspoken participation of regular units of the Rus- sian Federation, their demonstrative attack on a unit of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. ... This is a qualitatively different threat. .... This is clearly an element of the escalation of events planned by Russia in the waters of the Sea of Azov, and I am sure that this is far from the culmination. ... Intelligence data indicate an extremely serious threat of a land operation against Ukraine. I was given an intelligence document that contains a detailed description of all enemy forces located at a distance of several tens of kilometers from our border, ready

79 SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS IN UKRAINE at any moment for an immediate invasion to Ukraine. ... We need to strengthen our defense right now. This will allow us to react as quickly as possible in the event of an attack. ...” (TV channel Priamyy 2018, a.t.). In this speech it is noticeable that authorities did not rely on public approval but on the “constitutional duty” that allows such a decision. It did not matter that an open Russian invasion did not happen after the martial law was lifted, that was an opportunity for the President, the Parliament, and the Government to continue the established discourse and to repeat previous securitizing moves. The threat of the “large-scale war” was the central narrative that directly addressed referent objects violated in 2014.

Image 21. Ukrainian regions under the martial law in November 2018. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-under-martial-law-in- kharkiv-shrugs-and-confusion-amid-mobilization/29628485.html

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6.1 Turning point in 2019

The turning point in national politics took place after the presidential elections in April 2019. The Resolution of the protracted war in Donbas was the central issue of the campaign. However, two leading candidates, the then president Petro Poroshenko and his main opponent Volodymyr Zelenskyy choose different approaches to the security agenda. Security images have already been routinized within the country. As shown in Chapter 4, different political actors even from the pro-Russian camp used the topic of Russian aggression in their public utterance and statements. Therefore, the society got used to the opinion that from April 2014 (when the war in Donbas begun) till April 2019 (the time of the last presidential elections) Ukraine experienced unprecedented security events and challenges. Security speech acts were not extraordinary for voters in 2019 and have been already routinized. Such routinization required repetition of threat images if politicians were interested in securitization to be saved. Mr. Poroshenko maintained his already established image of the securitizing actor. Besides the slogan “Army, Language, Faith” that considered national security, language and the Church as consolidating factors, his election program was concentrated on defense and security issues. Here I present citations from the program’s text: “peace means the complete restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence. Peace means Moscow’s unequivocal recognition of our right to go our own way. We will continue to restore the territorial integrity of Ukraine…through political and diplomatic means”, “only full membership in the EU and NATO definitively and irrevocably guarantees the Ukrainian state independence and national security”, “we have revived the army, which stopped the Russian aggressor”, “strengthening of the Armed Forces…will remain our unconditional priority”, “international sanctions against the aggressor lead to the complete deoccupation of the Ukrainian Donbas and Crimea”, “we have broken through the Russian trade blockade…did not allow the aggressor to stifle us economically”, “economy after several years of recession caused by Russian aggression…has begun to grow”, “the occupying country will be liable for damages and will be forced to reimburse them through international legal mech- anisms” (112 Ukraine. 2019; Opinion 2019). Petro Poroshenko repeated his previous securitizing speech acts while following political interests in the campaign. Barry Buzan argued 81 SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS IN UKRAINE that when the public perceiving of the threat is not self-sustained but these threats mean actor’s political goals the later will try to exasperate the situation, to perform the role of the so- called “agent provocateur” (Buzan 2006, 1107). Actors continue convincing an audience that the threat is as ominous as it used to be. For politicians in 2019, it was not necessary to negotiate with the audience over the security issues existence. This phase the Ukrainian society has already passed at the beginning of the crisis. It was more important to promote the image of the most appropriate candidate. Those actors who have already observed the public tolerance for extraordinary measures tend to support securitization and benefit from it. The Ukrainian crisis has not entered the phase of resolution yet. Therefore, threat images are still alive, Russian aggression is the unchallenged reality, and securitization has a chance to be preserved. The concept requires the threats to be managed immediately as far as actors ask for extraordinary tools. The image of immediacy and the desire to stay safe prompts the audience to support state policy and grant actors the expanded mandate for the rule. However, there is no guarantee that those actors will not try to enjoy extra possibilities even after the situation is under control. Politics are based on interests and security problem also can be a matter for bargaining. The theory does not discuss the situation when the securitization regime is violated. Actors who engage in securitization tend to acquire the image of “appropriate leaders” who have already positively shoved themselves during the crisis. Thus in order to support such an image, the narrative about the imminent danger is favored. Besides, speech acts should not only remind about the threats but also about the agents able to manage the situation (Adamides 2020, 75).

In my analysis I proceed on the assumption that both the President Poroshenko and the then elites in power were interested in securitization maintenance. The Ex-President and his political entourage actively promoted the discourse that it was Poroshenko, who saved the country in critical events of 2014 and should continue this mission in the next presidential term. Other candidates were perceived as incapable to tackle the Russian aggression that should continue to be topical in public discourse. Threat images reminding was the appropriate tool in the election campaign.

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It was pivotal for Poroshenko to cultivate the general understanding that his cabinet was capable enough to manage existential dangers. Manipulative banners supported this opinion. In one of such billboards Petro Poroshenko faced Vladimir Putin. That message was aimed to show other candidates’ impotence in a struggle with insidious enemy. Thus, any changes in the state’s top leadership could provoke new violations and losses. From the electoral activities it is possible to notice that Poroshenko’s team took Russian threat for granted. It was supposed that the audience does not require new persuasions and securitization has been already completed. Therefore, the decision was made to support the threat images.

Image 22. Campaign poster in which Petro Poroshenko (in the left) stands in front of Vladimir Putin. The phrase below: “April 21[date of the presidential elections 2019]. The decisive choice”. Deutsche Welle. https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-election-can-a-comedian-unite-a-divided- country/a-48390233

In other three billboards, the anti-Russian and security discourses are promoted.

Image 23. Petro Poroshenko campaign advertising in 2019. “Army! Language! Religion! Away from Moscow!”

Narodny Ohliadach. https://www.ar25.org/article/get- vid-moskvy-derzhavnycka-pozyciya-petra-poroshenko.html

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Image 24. Petro Poroshenko Campaign advertising. “The strong army is the key to peace!” Opora. https://oporaua.org/news/vybory/45578-maizhe-polovyna-bilbordiv-u-mistakh- oblasnoho-znachennia-na-luhanshchyni-zainiata-politychnoiu-reklamoiu

Image 25. Petro Poroshenko Campaign advertising. “The autonomous church is the key to independence.” Opora. https://www.oporaua.org/news/vybory/vybory-prezidenta/vybory-prezidenta- 2019/46737-na-kyivshchyni-predstavnyky-opory-prodovzhuiut-fiksuvaty-porushennia-vedennia-ahitatsii

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Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the professional television actor, was the leading candidate through the whole campaign. Mr. Zelenskyy was considered as the “newbie” in the political sphere. He never participated in politics before and possessed the so-called “fresh and clean” image. Moreover, from the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, Zelenskyy did not make any public statements about national security and defense. His political program was much more socio-economically oriented. The only “security” statements I recognized in the text were: “Ukraine’s integration with NATO…is a guarantee of our security”, “we must win peace for Ukraine”, “in talks with the guarantors of the Budapest Memorandum and the EU partners, we will raise the issue of supporting Ukraine in its efforts to end the war, return the temporarily occupied territories and force the aggressor to compensate for the damage”, “Ukraine would need somehow to reach an agreement with the Russians as there is no military solution to the Donbas conflict” “the surrender of national interests and territories cannot be the subject of any negotiations”, “I dream about Ukraine, where only fireworks are fired at wed- dings and birthdays” (112 Ukraine 2019 web.t.; The Ukrainian Radio 2019 web.t.; Ze Ko- manda 2019 a.t.). Zelenskyy was the politician who said “peace” instead of “security”. While Poroshenko also stressed that peace was his main goal, the aggressive anti-Russian narratives, noticeable emphasis on the defense sector strengthening, and previous security speech acts have already created the belligerent image of the “war party” for him. Instead, Volodymyr Zelenskyy expressed his readiness to negotiate with Moscow and “with anyone else” (probably meaning militants’ leaders) with the only goal to stop casualties (UA Wire 2019). Zelenskyy did not use securitization strategy and was not interested in securitization development in his political program. To use the theory’s terminology, he performed “peace” speech acts and positioned himself as a “party of peace”.

Petro Poroshenko lost the campaign and gained only 24,45% of votes. His main opponent Volodymyr Zelenskyy was supported by 73,22% of voters. From the first glance, such results showed Poroshenko’s fail as the securitization actor and the public’s indifference to his robust activities in the security realm. To some extent, that electoral outcome could even question securitization in Ukraine in general. Voters did not believe the statement that the

85 SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS IN UKRAINE president Poroshenko was the only politician able to successfully confront Russia. The audience supported the candidate out of political elites who did not presented himself as a pro- securitization politician. However, that did not mean that security stopped to engage people. On the contrary, the security topic was actively discussed before and during the campaign. Poroshenko was the candidate who tried to monopolize talks about security because of his prominent achievements during the term. His electoral defeat was caused by the variety of social and economic factors that prevailed over the security “victories”. This shows that securitization can take place without connection to actors but under the influence of events. Those actors who meet the audiences’ expectation towards security issues can count on acceptance of their securitizing or desecuritizing moves. “Party of peace” gained an ad- vantage of the so-called “hawks”. With no doubt such transformation would adjust the security agenda to new elites in power. Securitization in Ukraine, inevitably transformed in 2019.

6.2 The reverse of roles

The concept of securitization is concentrated on the relationship between a securitizing actor and an audience. Usually these relations are constructed in a top-down direction. Authorities with the political mandate influence the audience. Thus, the audience does not show the initiative but supports the political line of elites in power. The audience favors securitization of a referent object, recognizes threats, often criticizes security decisions but does not push on authorities to save securitization or expand it to other spheres. State bodies have a monopoly for securitization. I believe that at the beginning of the conflict Ukraine experienced the traditional top-down type of securitization. Previous authorities that were in power from 2014 till 2019 recognized the Russian aggression as a threat. From their speech acts, we have already understood the hostile attitude the President Poroshenko, the Prime Ministers and the Parliament showed towards Russian activities in Donbas. Security policy always was a matter of tough criticism. However, it remained to be a conservative field and there was no tendency for the policy transformation. Therefore, I must admit that securitization developments in 2014 were critically different from those in 2019. At the beginning of the war securitizing move was a response to the public request. Moreover, the state was made to defend itself. Any talks about aggressor appeasement and compromise were conceived by public 86 SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS IN UKRAINE opinion as wrong and treasonous. In 2019, representatives of the previous state elites were supported neither in presidential elections nor in the parliamentary. The pro-securitization faction moved into opposition to the new authorities. With no doubt it has an impact on the national security agenda. Securitization, as well as any other processes, cannot remain at the same point but develop together with the crisis. Diplomatic activities in Minsk and Normandy formats were aimed to search the possible resolution path. Thus, the ceasefire regime changed the perception of the Donbas war and neglected talks about further Russian troops advance. Nowadays, the warfare intensity in Donbas has significantly decreased as compared to 2014-2015 events. Moreover, the society that favored securitization before, criticizes stagnation and requires changes. The conflict has already transformed and securitization has adjusted. In this section I claim that starting from 2019 securitization in Ukraine has acquired the bottom-up characteristics. Securitization experiences the role reverse when the desires of the audience contradict the policy of securitizing actors. Securitization triggers the audience to establish certain perceptions around the conflict and to express conservatism towards radical changes. The public remains to be convinced about the source of a threat and the necessity to impose extraordinary measures with the goal to save and promote peace. Therefore, the audience is interested in further securitization of referent objects until a threat is not eliminated. Even if additional securitizing acts do not receive massive support they are unlikely to be rejected. On the contrary, the audience accustoms to the threat discourse, anticipates, and denies the opposite developments. It is hard for elites to interrupt habits. Hence those political factions that are ready to question securitized regimes are criticized. After securitization has already taken place the opposite development - desecuritization - also requires specific steps, reasons and cannot be sharp, sudden. Already routinized threat images shape public understanding of a crisis. The audience must be prepared for desecuritization, believe that the threat has disappeared and referent objects are not endangered anymore. Otherwise, society faces anxiety fears, and social tensions rise. The role reverse means move of the security initiative to the audience “in the bottom”. Elite’s ability to influence or change the process is weaker, than it was during the securitiza-

87 SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS IN UKRAINE tion zenith. In such case securitization does not attenuate, on the contrary new security discussions spark. Previous securitizing actors “in the top” remain under the pressure to accept the audience’s vision of the security situation. Therefore, the main point is the audience’s desire to keep specific referent objects securitized. In this case the audience can either press on securitizing actors, express their visions and intentions, or securitize the issue themselves while struggling against its own elites. What is important is the factor of persuasion. The audience monopolizes the power to convince because elites may experience the confidence crisis. Bottom-up securitization occurs at the moment when the audience or its parts perform securitizing acts that used to be the securitizing actors’ realm. It can be realized in protest actions, demonstrations appeal to the authorities if the public disagrees with the security decisions and policy in general. In such case authorities have two ways, either to take public demands into account or contradict and make unpopular decisions, loose political dividends. Bottom-up securitization is fulfilled after decision-makers take the audience’s claim into consideration. Security decisions are initiated in the top but under the driving influence from the bottom. In bottom-up securitization it is difficult to identify the actors because the audience usually does not represent one voice. Its demands can be a matter for manipulations as they do not have any legal base and are uttered freely. In other words, the audience does not take responsibility for speech acts due to its plural identity. Officials on the contrary bare legal liability and sacrifice their political image when they start talking about security (Adamides 2010, 76).

In 2019, Ukraine was not ready for desecuritization. Moreover, Zelenskyy and his staff did not intend to desecuritize referent objects. Their electoral campaign was based on the desire to negotiate for peace, and on sharp criticism of their political adversaries, Po- roshenko’s team. “I am not your opponent, I am your sentence”, Zelenskyy said during the electoral debate with Poroshenko (Rojansky and Minakov 2019). The new state officials did not contribute to securitization maintenance at the same level as it was after 2014. The ab-

88 SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS IN UKRAINE sence of the usual anti-Russian security narratives and the political will to modify negotiations format over the Donbas war received the specific public reaction. Zelenskyy’s “peace party” positioning was criticized by both, public and political opposition. On August 24, 2020, the former President Petro Poroshenko said during the celebration of the Independence Day: “The key to the peace in Ukraine…lies in Moscow. However, at the beginning one [Zelenskyy] must understand that war is a war, not a conflict in eastern Ukraine, aggression is aggression, not simply supporting separatism, and Russia is the aggressor and you must finally learn how to say it.” (5 Kanal 2019, a.t.). President Zelenskyy, the Government and the Parliament do not have a lot of options available. In armed conflicts the limit for decisions is usual, either securitization or desecuritization. For Ukraine where the population has already accepted the source of threat another option except of securitization was not favored. The fear images are triggers for the audience to oppose desecuritizing acts. Consequently, the least costly choice for both sides should be the preservation of the threat discourses. From the very beginning of his term, Zelenskyy held a dual position in a “war and peace” question. On the one side, the President showed the opposite pacifist discourse as compared to the belligerence of his predecessors. “I will not agree to go to war in the Donbas. I know there are a lot of hotheads, especially those who hold rallies and say, ‘Let’s go fight and win it all back!’ But at what price? What is the cost? It’s another story of lives and land. And I won’t do it. If that doesn’t satisfy society, then a new leader will come who will satisfy those demands. But I will never go for that because my position in life is to be a human being above all. And I cannot send them there. How? … then an all-out war will start, an all- out war in Ukraine, and then across Europe.” (Shuster 2019, of.t.). However, he also repeated the usual security speech acts, but with a pro-peace connotation. In the Munich Se- curity Conference Volodymyr Zelenskyy pointed out: “Russia must want to give us our land back. Now we understand that, unfortunately, a strong army or nuclear weapon or NATO is a protection of the independence and integrity of a country. No documents, no signatories, no memoranda protect…. If there is no powerful Ukrainian army, then there is no Ukraine, and everyone will understand, that this is not a war in our country, this is a war in Europe.” (Yevropeysʹka Pravda 2020, a.t.). His further security speech acts consider both war and

89 SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS IN UKRAINE peace topics: “Only with a strong army behind you can start negotiations. … We are confi- dently approaching the end of the war to reach peace.” (TV channel Priamyy 2020, a.t.), “The return of Crimea is an indisputable part of our national idea,” (BBC News 2020, a.t.), “I wanted to show the whole world, and now we are doing it, that we have a very strong army, but we are not provoking - we are fighting for our country. If they shoot at us, we will answer, but we will not be the first to shoot.” (Ukrainian National News 2020, a.t.). The turning point that supports my claim regarding the bottom-up securitization in Ukraine took place in the meeting of the Minsk tripartite contact group over Donbas, on Oc- tober 1, 2019. The representatives of Ukraine, Russia, and OSCE agreed to the so-called “Steinmeier formula”26, the mechanism for implementation of the Minsk protocol. This method proposed the integration of the conflict zone territories in Donbas under Ukrainian control. The main conditions of the formula were to hold the local elections in order to legit- imize representatives of that territories and to grant these territories the special administrative status within Ukraine. That decision was aimed to reinvigorate peace negotiations with Rus- sia. Putin’s spokesmen, Dmitri Peskov, positively commented on the formula’s support in Kyiv and named it “the important step toward implementing the earlier agreements.” (Miller 2019). This security decision was the first serious step for Volodymyr Zelenskyy in a Donbas crisis. It provoked tough debate but was not supported by society. According to the sociological survey, only 18% of respondents supported the so-called “Steinmeier formula” implementation (Sociological Group Reytynh 2019). Although the President assured that “local elections in Donbas are possible only after Russian forces are withdrawn and Ukraine rega- ins control of the state border” the agreement was critically perceived by public opinion and politicians from the opposition. The former President Petro Poroshenko, who after the 2019 parliamentary elections entered the Parliament, stated that any concession to Russia would

26 In October 2015, the German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier at a meeting of foreign ministers of the “Normandy Format” (Ukraine, Germany, France and Russia) proposed his own solution to the problem of peace in Donbass, named after him. The essence of the formula is to hold elections in the uncontrolled Donbas territories in accordance with Ukrainian law under the OSCE supervision. Besides, it is proposed to implement a permanent special status of uncontrolled districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts if the elections were held in accordance with international standards and Ukrainian legislation. 90 SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS IN UKRAINE mean capitulation. Kostiantyn Yelisieiev, the former ambassador of Ukraine to the EU, commented on Twitter that: “To sign Steinmeier’s formula in an imposed wording is to stop fighting and capitulate.” (Yelisieiev 2019). Thousands rally took place in Kyiv against the “Steinmeier formula” with the slogan “No to Capitulation”. Yana Zinkevych, MP from the Poroshenko’s party, “European Solidarity”, told in her speech during the rally that: “This is Putin’s formula, these are the things that protect Russia’s interests and not ours, we have to fight and prevent its implementation.” (Gotev 2019, web.t.). Another MP from the pro-West- ern “Golos (Voice)” party, Inna Sovsun, supported the critics and stated: “We will do our best so that the parliament does not support any special status, any conditions that Russia or Putin imposes on us.” (Gotev 2019, web.t.). Several regional councils addressed the President Zelenskyy to reject the formula.

The main peculiarity is the rise of the influence the society and opposition possess in the security agenda. Elite’s decisions are criticized, denied and resisted. Former securitizing actors such as Petro Poroshenko, who does not have enough influence to shape the current security agenda, have already moved to the audience’s “camp” that has more leverages for pressure. The audience’s reaction supports the claim that attempts to reintegrate Donbas and desecuritize it for public opinion is an extremely complicated process that does not meet support within the society. Securitization stabilizes public fears. For Ukrainian politicians to save their political image it is easier to support the regime of securitization and repeat the previous threat images. The political will to search for new ways over the Donbas war resolution is suspicious for the audience. Although after securitization desecuritization process should take place, it requires the absence of the source of threat. The “No to Capitulation” rally was the audience’s desire to keep the main referent object, the territorial integrity, securitized. The pressure on the state elites continued. Similar protest actions “Ask the President” and “No Step Back” took place afterwards. The bottom- up securitization reached its peak at the beginning of winter 2019. On December 9, 2019, leaders of the Normandy format, presidents of France, Russian and Ukraine and the chancellor of Germany, met in Paris for discussion over the Donbas crisis. Before and during the Paris summit the rally gathered in Kyiv with the demand for the President to abstain from the

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“red lines crossing”. The newly created slogan “red lines for Zelenskyy” was presented as the public initiative to show the general concern around the resolution ways. The content of the so-called “red lines” correlated with the main principles supported by the Ukrainian audience. The president should avoid any compromise on the unitary government system, do not agree to hold local elections in Donbas until Russian troops are withdrawn and illegal military formations are disarmed, do not change the European and Euro-Atlantic course, do not recognize Crimea annexation, Ukraine should continue lawsuits against Russia at international courts (Holos Ukrainy 2019). This initiative was also supported abroad. The Ukrain- ian World Congress, the international organization of Ukrainians in the diaspora, released the statement “President Zelenskyy Must Not Cross Red Lines” on behalf of several diaspora organizations (Ukrainian World Congress 2019). The agreement between Ukraine, Russia, and OSCE to establish an Advisory Board that would involve representatives of the “DPR” and “LPR” to the negotiations process also faced tough criticism in Ukraine (UNIAN 2020).

Image 26. Protest action in Kyiv provoked by the “Steinmeier formula” approval in October, 2019. Phrase in the banner: “No to Capitulation”. Euroactiv. https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/thousands-rally-in-kyiv-to- protest-the-steinmeier-formula-for-eastern-ukraine/

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The reasoning for such connotations refers to the social unreadiness for compromise in a way to peaceful conflict resolution. Previous elites did not face social pressure because their discourse was understandable, tough critics of the Moscow’s involvement in Donbas and exaltation of the hard power. Newly elected state officials under the Volodymyr Zelen- skyy’s leadership tried to change the antagonistic position of Kyiv with the goal to promote peace talks and resolve the deep crisis of a mutual distrust. Consequently, that contradicted with the metanarrative discussed in previous chapters, that was steadily developed by state elites before. Any concessions from the Ukrainian side that would be beneficial for Russians are considered as wrong and treasonous. Thus narratives about granting special status to the uncontrolled territories and conducting direct negotiations with representatives of the “DPR” and “LPR” are rejected by the society. It is noticeable that the Ukrainian crisis is not to the classical case of bottom-up securitization. Authorities still possess the monopoly for security initiative and decisions. How- ever, disapproval between the elites and audience around the crisis resolution ways shows that actors from “the bottom” still are not satisfied with desecuritization. Zelenskyy’s electorate supported his “peace” speech acts. But at the same time people put their security on the first place and are not ready to compromises, concessions and sacrifices within the national security realm. Recent developments around the Donbas crisis do not mean securitization failure. On the contrary, it has acquired characteristics of the “bottom-up” securitization that creates additional troubles in a way to its resolution.

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7 Future Development of the Crisis

As it usually happens in armed conflicts, there is a period when confrontation receives social support. Consequently, peace is an acceptable option either after an enemy is defeated or is forced to negotiate. However, inevitable mutual losses transform the public discourse from aggressive and strong-willed to more prudent and cautious. Peace can be reached in different ways. The capitulation of one party to a conflict is enforcement to peace. In such a case audience of a loser side, does not have much chance to question the results even if peace is unacceptable. The other way, mutual stalemate, leads to a different scenario. The absence of developments sooner or later should result in a compromise. In protracted conflicts stagnation causes financial, political, and moral exhaustion. Reactivation of former hostilities is not popular and does not show outcomes. Therefore, peace and stability are topical and required. Stalemate promotes search of the most appropriate resolution. A way to peace is much harder in such conditions than after capitulation because peace on the enemy’s terms is usually inappropriate for both sides. Currently, the war in Donbas experiences stagnation. As shown in Chapter 6, warfare intensity has considerably decreased but the peaceful resolution is far from the end. The Rus- sian threat for the Ukrainian territorial integrity and sovereignty has not been eliminated yet. The self-proclaimed quasi-states Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics remain under the Russian political and economic control; the territory of the Crimean Peninsula has not been returned back under the Ukrainian jurisdiction. Therefore, the main goal of the Ukrainian authorities that has been already proclaimed officially is the complete restoration of sovereignty over the internationally recognized territory of Ukraine. Securitization considerably influences any developments around the crisis. While the political manoeuvre is measured by internal and external factors, the main question is how the Ukrainian policy should operate in conditions of securitization. Sub-chapter 6.1 elucidated that the electorate supported Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s peace speech acts. The president and the government have shown that peace is their prefer- ence. They proceed from the fact that the hot phase has already passed. Authorities’ intentions are to stop warfare in Donbas, establish an effective ceasefire regime, and, finally, reintegrate

94 FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRISIS the uncontrolled territories after mutual negotiations and compromises. Basing on the current status quo, Ukraine has successfully prevented the so-called “Crimean scenario” in Donbas. Besides, there is no need for additional security speeches as the anti-Russian messages have been already routinized and are used not as new securitizing acts, but as a way to express a political position. In view of the above, peace promotion shows a certain ambiguity. From the one side, the audience disliked excessive concentration on security. The peaceful intentions of the new authorities were understood and accepted. However, on the other side, desecuritization, the process opposite to securitization, still is not possible. Desecuritization requires specific conditions to be met. It can be the option if securitizing actors together with the audience cease to perceive Russian policy towards Ukraine as a threat against which the country has counter- measures. Anti-Russian narratives must disappear from the national security discourse. Po- litical debates should leave the defense realm but acquire features of politics in a peaceful time. To desecuritize the problem means to move security issues out from the emergency politics back to the standard political process. Desecuritization takes place when the state shows that other sectors except for the military one are freed from the use of force and the role of armed forces is marginalized; when security tools are not the most appropriate in problem-solving. Securitization weakens if the threat is not topical any more. These postulates do not match with the modern security situation in the country. In this context, the key factor is that the Ukrainian crisis is not an internal Ukrainian problem. On the contrary, it is an externally driven crisis that developed because of the external trigger. Consequently, desecuritization cannot take place unless the trigger disappears. In other words, the crisis cannot be resolved without Moscow’s readiness to withdrawal and consideration of Kyiv’s interests. When military security remains a central issue, it is difficult to stop arguing how dangerous the threat is. Decisions around the Donbas war are still made while keeping military security in the forefront. The elites in Kyiv should take such status quo into consideration in the way to conflict resolution. In 2019, excessive securitization cost Poroshenko the post. Unfavorable peace for Ukraine can cost Zelenskyy the image and prompt civil unrest. The audience in Ukraine has already acquired the status of the powerful

95 FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRISIS controller of authorities. In the subsequent section, I present current debate around the possible resolution scenarios and what can be done given the circumstances and limitations.

Granting autonomy to uncontrolled territories of Donbas The actual debate around the Donbas crisis resolution is concentrated on the issue of reintegration of uncontrolled territories back to Ukraine. In the Minsk protocol signed in 2015, it is stated that Ukraine agrees to grant administrative autonomy to these territories after their reintegration. This scenario finds support in Kremlin. Among the main conditions of the Ukrainian authorities are disarmament of the illegal armed formation, withdrawal of the Russian military personnel, regaining control over the state border with the Russian Fed- eration. After these conditions are fulfilled the local elections should be held under the Ukrainian law to elect legitimate representatives of these territories. If successful, this scenario protects the referent object and results in its desecuritization. As it is shown in Chapter 2 both Minsk and Normandy negotiations formats have already discussed such a sequence of events. However, this initiative was subjected to harsh criticism from the audience. Even Ukrainian politicians in power cannot reach consensus around the issue of autonomy for Donbas. This scenario has political support but does not receive public approval. The audience puts security in the first place. It is peculiar that restoration of territorial integrity, the main referent object of securitization in Ukraine, is less valuable than the safety of the current status quo. Due to the lack of trust, Russian proposals are “Trojan horses” for the Ukrainian audience. Donbas autonomy is considered to be an important Russian influence agent in Ukraine that blocks the scenario implementing. To escape this deadlock, the Government should either transform its approaches toward the scenario of the Donbas autonomy or act against the will of the society.

Status quo preservation In the actual stage of the conflict development status quo preservation is the easiest but not the less costly scenario. In this case, authorities should not make any discreditable and complicated decisions. The “wait and see” concept can be applied according to which decision-makers continue observing the situation with the goal to identify the most beneficial

96 FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRISIS moment for manoeuvre. Status quo preservation is possible for short-term perspectives. After Zelenskyy’s victory, no radical changes happened with regards to the Donbas crisis and the status quo has been already preserved. The conflict is securitized at the same level as it used to be during the predecessors’ rule. However, this scenario is a passive one as much as it can be easily disrupted by the Russian desire to revive active warfare. Such a setting takes away from Kyiv any leverages to influence the situation and allows merely to “go with the flow”. Such a decision is costly because it does not solve the problem, Ukraine incurs casualties, resources from the defense budget cannot be oriented to the civil sphere. Finally, the audience experiences a decline of confidence to authorities due to the protracted stagnation.

Freezing of the conflict Freezing of the conflict somehow correlates with the previous scenario and can be its consequence. Freezing leads to the ceasefire; the country can concentrate its efforts on the necessary internal reforms. For politicians, it is also beneficial because it creates the impres- sion of the long-awaited peace. If this scenario is fulfilled the frozen war in Donbas can cause partial desecuritization of the political discourse. The audience is satisfied as far as no national interests are surrendered. The security topic again is the monopoly of politicians and the “grassroots” forces lose their activity. Nevertheless, this scenario requires Ukraine to have a specific position. The country avoids complicated negotiations and concessions but there is no guarantee that Donbas war freezing is accepted in Moscow. As I have already stated, peace in the east of Ukraine depends on the Russian position.

On the basis of my findings, on the macro-level, the Ukrainian elites should continue to express their readiness for peace. The military scenario has already played its central role and prevented the advance of the Russian troops and militants. It is unfavorable for Kyiv to fight for victory and promote the violent de-occupation of the Crimean Autonomy, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts. Russia’s role in both cases is vital. Enemy capitulation scenario is impossible for Ukraine. For the long term perspective, Ukrainian elites should admit that securitization will not disappear. The Donbas crisis can be resolved only as a result of stable security guarantees from Moscow. The Crimean case can be desecuritized only after the

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Ukrainian government restores its control over the peninsula and Russia rescinds the claims for Crimea. Under the term “resolution,” I understand the restoration of the territorial status quo as of February 2014. This fact does not preclude peaceful scenarios that are possible concomitantly. Securitization does not reject peaceful developments but merely creates additional obstacles for them. In securitized crises, the audience pays more attention to security. As it is stated in Chapter 6 the Ukrainian society has already shown resistance to the recent decisions around the peace question. In conditions of securitization, state elites should have stable, everlasting, and based on mutual trust relations with the audience and with political opposition. This would impede internal turbulence. Bottom-up securitization, by and large, was caused by the lack of trust between securitizing actors and the audience. In relation to Russia, Ukraine should avoid zero-sum scenarios. Kyiv cannot rely on the fast restoration of the prewar status quo; Moscow also observes the Ukrainian antagonism towards the autonomy for Donbas. For Ukraine, the less costly way is to avoid the accelera- tion of events. Decision-makers in Kyiv must be sure of the internal stability and impossibil- ity of civil unrest. As I have shown in Chapter 2 Euromaidan revolution also was provoked by the unpopular decision made by the Ukrainian President and Government. The President Zelenskyy risks on being blocked between the necessity to agree with Moscow and social opposition in Kyiv. Therefore, the peace that will not satisfy the population cannot be stable. Compromises are inevitable in any scenario. The main goal is to represent this compromise as favorable for Ukraine. State elites should be ready for unpopular decisions in the way to crisis resolution that can affect their electoral support in the future.

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8 Conclusions

By analyzing the Ukrainian crisis and events that took place after 2014, this thesis has shown that Russian aggression has caused securitization in Ukraine. The role and scope of national security has elevated in the political discourse and has influenced political processes within the country. My research is based on the securitization theory that was profoundly studied and described by the Copenhagen School of security studies. This concept discusses the influence security has on crisis management and state functioning. According to the theory, security starts playing a central role if the country experiences the existential threat for the referent object, a specific entity that has to survive by any cost. Referent object differs in dependence on cases. It can be state sovereignty and territorial integrity, public health during an epidemic, economic stability or informational security, and other essential issues for any sphere. To securitize an issue means to claim the use of extraordinary measures in order to manage the threatful situation. Securitization takes place when classical political tools are not effective in struggling against the threat. Securitizing actors are those individuals or factions who openly speak about security and perform the so-called securitizing moves, speech acts in which they claim the use of extraordinary measures in order to protect the referent object. Securitizing actors in their utterance address the audience. Theory describes the latter as a separate actor that either accepts or denies securitizing actor’s claim for exceptional measures. Consequently, securitization success depends on the audience’s position. In case the use of extraordinary tools is rejected, securitization is not fulfilled. Additionally, the theory explains the opposite to securitization process. The so-called desecuritization takes place when a security issue leaves the emergency politics back to the normal political agenda. Desecuritization cannot take place unless the trigger of securitization disappears. This approach helped me to analyze the Ukrainian crisis, its main actors, possible ways of resolution. In the research, I claim that two referent objects, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of Ukraine, were threatened by Russia after the Crimean Peninsula was taken over and the war sparked in Donbas. The analysis has shown that securitization in Ukraine originates from the Euromaidan Revolution, the big wave of civil unrest that took place in

99 CONCLUSIONS

Kyiv in 2013-2014. The protest was oriented against the pro-Russian rule of the then Presi- dent Victor Yanukovych and the “Party of Regions.” Revolutionary events and sharp political crisis forced the President and other high officials to flee from Ukraine and ask for the political shelter in Russia. In February 2014, Russian troops took over the Crimean Peninsula and questioned the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Afterward, the pro-Russian rallies took place in the eastern Ukrainian cities. The protest actions in the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk transformed into the armed confrontation. Kyiv decided to launch the anti-terrorist operation in eastern Ukraine and accused Russia in instigation and support of the armed disobedience. The operation that was supposed to be fast transformed into the protracted war between Ukraine on the one side and the Russian Federation with the pro-Russian militants in the other. The conflict has not been resolved yet. Chapter 6 shown that Russian invasion in 2014 was the beginning of securitization in Ukraine. State officials immediately named the threat during the Crimean events and announced the use of armed operation to prevent the spread of pro-Russian separatism in Don- bas. Securitization had a top-down structure according to which state authorities influenced the audience, actors from the “grassroots”. The main securitizing actors were the then Presi- dent Petro Poroshenko, the Parliament, the Government, and media outlets. The analysis of political speech acts showed that politicians actively talked about security issues after Ukraine experienced foreign aggression. It is necessary to admit the peculiarity of the current case study. At the beginning of the crisis, the Russian threat was obvious for the Ukrainian society. There was no need for securitizing actors to persuade the audience in threat existing. Therefore, politicians by saying “security” showed that an extraordinary measure, such as armed forces, was necessary and the state was ready for that. As far as securitization is based on speech acts the “war of narratives” plays a prominent role in the Ukrainian crisis. While Ukrainian politicians in their utterance actively blamed Moscow for attacking Ukraine and for the spread of terrorism, Russian state elites and media denied their role in Donbas and promoted the discourse about the “civil war”. The Ukrainian securitizing actors supported the narrative about the possible Russian full-scale invasion and repetition of the so-called Crimean scenario through the spread of separatism to other Ukrainian regions. Moscow state officials explained their interest through the paradigm of protecting Russians and Russian

100 CONCLUSIONS speakers abroad. Mutual hostile narratives have already taken the leading place in the relations of two countries. The synthesis of the leading discourses in Ukraine has shown that Russia is not perceived as a competitor but as an enemy in various spheres. Kyiv openly expresses its antagonism, but both states remain in a deep crisis of mutual distrust, interpret the conflict in a different way. Consequently, Ukraine was made to increase attention to security because Moscow has already shown its readiness to act radically in protecting its interests in Ukraine. The analysis of Ukrainian political landscape in Chapter 4, clarified that the Russian threat polarized the Ukrainian political elites into the pro-Ukrainian and the pro-Russian factions. The pro-Russian political camp opposed securitization in Ukraine. Politicians from the former “Party of Regions” created new political parties, “Opposition Bloc” and “Opposi- tional Platform – For Life,” that continued the pro-Eastern political line of their predecessors. Both parties denied anti-Russian narratives, and received the electoral support in the eastern Ukrainian regions. Even after the conflict, the pro-Russian discourse is still favorable among voters in the east. The sociological survey shows that citizens in the eastern oblasts in their majority favors restoration of relations with Moscow, support Russian vision of the situation in Ukraine. The country still lacks unity around the perception of the Ukrainian crisis. The pro-Ukrainian camp, on the contrary, actively promoted securitization. Politi- cians in power in their speech acts accused Moscow of its hostilities against Ukraine. Presi- dent Poroshenko played a prominent role in securitization promotion. The tough anti-Russian utterance was an integral part of his image during the presidential term. National defense was the core topic for Mr. Poroshenko’s internal and external policy. He successfully integrated threat images into the political program and was interested in securitization preservation. President Poroshenko conducted several anti-Russian campaigns. The prominent one was lobbying for the independence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from Moscow. This achievement showed the spillover of securitization in Ukraine. Russian presence in other than the national security sphere was represented as ominous. Petro Poroshenko used the image of the Russian threat in his own electoral campaign in 2019. The then President was presented as the only one politician able to efficiently oppose Moscow’s belligerence towards Ukraine.

101 CONCLUSIONS

Securitization started to be a pillar in the political programs. This problem is explored at length in Chapter 6. Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s victory in the Presidential elections was a result of the excessive securitizing agenda of his predecessor. Moreover, his attempts to reach consensus with Russia and promote the peaceful resolution of the war met tough criticism of the audience. The society favors peace but dislikes desecuritization. In this context, the Ukrainian case showed an interesting phenomenon that contributes to the studies of securitization. The country faced the so-called bottom-up securitization, as far as the audience rejected compromise scenarios but required the referent object to remain securitized. This is an important signal that supports the claim that securitization in Ukraine is an enduring reality that would rather adapt than disappears. The political life in the country is concentrated on the security agenda. The theory of securitization efficiently explains the political transformation that has taken place in Ukraine after Russian aggression. The considerable rise of attention to the security issues directly supports the claim that securitization has been developed in this country. Nowadays, securitization creates additional obstacles for state elites in their search of the conflict resolution scenarios. The audience does not recognize considerable concessions and compromises but always puts security in the first place. At the same time, those resolution scenarios that are supported in Kyiv must also find support in Moscow. The Ukrainian crisis is externally driven and cannot be resolved unilaterally. It is hard to analyze future developments while basing on the theoretical postulates. Securitization in Ukraine is not static but actively metamorphose due to the frequent political changes around the crisis and on this basis Chapter 7 proposed possible scenarios of future developments. Nevertheless, while the offered policy advice draws upon the findings this research yielded, it must be emphasized that any further events are able to enrich the current perception of this theory.

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