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Securitization of the Crisis in Ukraine FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES Securitization of the Crisis in Ukraine Master thesis OLEKSANDR SLYVCHUK Supervisor: Monika Gabriela Bartoszewicz, MA, MLitt, PhD Department of Political Science Conflict and Democracy Studies Brno 2020 SECURITIZATION OF THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE Bibliografický záznam Autor: Oleksandr Slyvchuk Fakulta sociálních studií Masarykova univerzita Katedra politologie Název práce: Securitization of the Crisis in Ukraine Studijní program: Magisterský studijní program Studijní obor: Conflict and Democracy Studies Vedoucí práce: Monika Gabriela Bartoszewicz, MA, MLitt, PhD Rok: 2020 Počet stran: 120 Klíčová slova: Donbas, hrozba, konflikt, publikum, referenční objekt, Rusko, sekuritizace, sekuritizující aktér, Ukrajina 2 SECURITIZATION OF THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE Bibliographic record Author: Oleksandr Slyvchuk Faculty of Social Studies Masaryk University Department of Political Science Title of Thesis: Securitization of the crisis in Ukraine Degree Programme: Master's degree Field of Study: Conflict and Democracy Studies (Eng.) Supervisor: Monika Gabriela Bartoszewicz, MA, MLitt, PhD Year: 2020 Number of Pages: 120 Keywords: Audience, conflict, Donbas, referent object, Russia, securitization, securitizing actor, threat, Ukraine 3 SECURITIZATION OF THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE Abstrakt V roce 2014 se Ukrajina stala terčem zahraniční ozbrojené agrese. Ruská Federace v té době obsadila a zabrala poloostrov Krym a následně její vojska pronikla dále na území regionů východní Ukrajiny, oblasti Doněck a Luhansk, a vyvolala tam vlny separatismu. Odpovědí ukrajinské vlády bylo rozhodnutí nasazení národních ozbrojených sil ke vzdoru proti novým ruským vlivům v regionu a k obnovení právního státu na území, nad kterým ztratila kontrolu. Tyto vojenské operace vyústily ve zdlouhavý konflikt, který doposud nebyl vyřešen. Tato diplomová práce pojednává o následcích ruské agrese, která zapříčinila sekuriti- zaci tohoto celého konfliktu, neboť bezpečnost se stala centrální záležitostí národní politiky Ukrajiny. Pro podporu tohoto tvrzení se odvolávám na teorii sekuritizace zpracovanou na Kodaňské škole bezpečnostních studií. Tento výzkum je založen na jedné případové studii. Analýza odkazuje na ukrajinské politické procesy, jednotlivé politiky a celé frakce, ruské zájmy na Ukrajině a diskurzní analýzu. Mé výsledky poukazují na to, že ukrajinská krize je sekuritizována. Mimoto, meziná- rodní vztahy s Moskvou jsou taktéž předmětem sekuritizace. Ruská účast ve sférách mimo těch bezpečnostních je často označována za neblahou; proruské politické nálady jsou po- važovány za zrádné. Společnosti a elity obou zemí dávají důraz na bezpečnost v rozhodování otázek konfliktu, což způsobuje vnitrostátní debaty a ovlivňuje politický směr. Sekuritizace je překážkou k vyřešení konfliktu na Ukrajině. Tento výzkum zdůrazňuje potřebu vzetí vývoje sekuritizace na Ukrajině v potaz pro analýzu budoucího vývoje a zpracování pří- padných scénářů vyřešení konfliktu. Bezpečnostní agenda nepřestane hrát klíčovou roli v dohledné budoucnosti Ukrajiny. 4 SECURITIZATION OF THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE Abstract In 2014 Ukraine experienced foreign armed aggression. The Russian Federation an- nexed the Crimean Peninsula, intruded into the Ukrainian eastern regions, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, and instigated separatism there. The Government of Ukraine decided to involve national armed forces in order to oppose Russian interests in the region and restore the rule of law over the uncontrolled territory. The military operation transformed into the protracted conflict that has not been resolved yet. The thesis claims that after the Russian aggression took place security started to play the central role in the national policy that caused securitization of the Ukrainian conflict. To support this statement, I refer to the theory of securitization elaborated by the Copenhagen School of security studies. The research is based on a single case study. The analysis refers to the Ukrainian political processes, individual politicians and whole factions, Russian inter- ests in Ukraine, discourse analysis. My results showed that the Ukrainian crisis is securitized. Moreover, state relations with Moscow also are a matter for securitization. The Russian presence in other than the security spheres is often represented as ominous; pro-Russian political moods are considered to be treasonous. Both state elites and society pay much attention to security in decision- making that results in domestic debates and influences the political flow. Securitization is an obstacle for the conflict resolution in Ukraine. This research emphasizes the need to take into account securitization development in Ukraine for the analysis of future developments and elaboration of the conflict resolution scenarios. The security agenda will not cease to play the central role in the near future in Ukraine. 5 SECURITIZATION OF THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE 6 SECURITIZATION OF THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE Affidativ I hereby declare that I have created the Master thesis on the topic of Securitization of the Crisis in Ukraine independently. All sources that I used to write this thesis were quoted in the text and are listed in the bibliography section. Brno, June 3, 2020 Oleksandr Slyvchuk 7 SECURITIZATION OF THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE 8 SECURITIZATION OF THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE Acknowledgments I would like to express gratitude to my supervisor Monika Gabriela Bartoszewicz, MA, MLitt, PhD, for the patient guidance, counselling and consistent encouragement that helped me in my first profound research in the field of political science. 9 TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents List of Images 11 List of Graphs 13 List of Terms and Abbreviations 14 1 Introduction 15 2 The Ukrainian Crisis. Its Reasons and Main Events 18 3 The Theory of Securitization 28 4 The Main Actors of Securitization in Ukraine 34 4.1 The pro-Ukrainian faction ................................................................................. 35 4.2 The pro-Russian faction .................................................................................... 44 4.3 The role of the Church....................................................................................... 54 5 Main Security Narratives 62 5.1 Large-scale war ................................................................................................. 64 5.2 Land corridor to Crimea .................................................................................... 65 5.3 Russian Federation is the sponsor of terrorism ................................................. 66 5.4 Nord Stream 2 pipeline is the energy threat for Ukraine .................................. 67 5.5 Civil war in Donbas ........................................................................................... 68 5.6 Responsibility to protect Russians and Russian speakers abroad ..................... 70 5.7 NATO and the US play the pivotal role in provoking the Ukrainian crisis ...... 71 6 Securitization Analysis in Ukraine 76 6.1 Turning point in 2019 ........................................................................................ 81 6.2 The reverse of roles ........................................................................................... 86 7 Future Development of the Crisis 94 8 Conclusions 99 Bibliography 103 10 LIST OF IMAGES List of Images Image 1. The map of the administrative division of Ukraine and territories controlled by Rus- sia and pro-Russian militants. 18 Image 2. The map shows the distinction in public opinion over the integration of Ukraine with the European Union. The support of the Euromaidan was the lowest in southeastern regions. 20 Image 3. The map of the Crimean Peninsula shows locations of main cities and military fa- cilities. 22 Image 4. The map of the uncontrolled territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. 24 Image 5. Geography of the Kerch strait incident. 26 Image 6. The billboard says: “We - Ukraine. Army protects our land. Language protects our heart. Faith protects our soul. Petro Poroshenko”. 40 Image 7. The usual regional division used in the Ukrainian media and public policy dis- courses. 45 Image 8. Public opinion about the prospects of Russia-Ukrainian relations in the future. Re- sults divided by regions. 46 Image 9. Public opinion about the state’s policy towards Russia. 46 Image 10. Public moods according to the pro-Western political orientation. 47 Image 11. Public support of granting special status for Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and status of the second state language to Russian. 47 Image 12. Public opinion about the status of self-proclaimed state entities “Donetsk People’s Republic and “Luhansk People’s Republic”. 48 Image 13. Public support of the direct Ukraine - “DPR” - “LPR” negotiations. 49 Image 14. Conflict of terminology around the Donbas crisis in public discourses. 49 Image 15. Opinion disparities over the conflict resolution. 50 Image 16. Electoral support of the “Opposition bloc” political party in the parliamentary elec- tions in 2014. 51 Image 17. Electoral support of the “Opposition Platform - For Life” political party in the parliamentary elections in 2019. 52 Image 18. Dominance of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate over the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate by oblast. 56 Image 19. Booklet distributed by the Security Service of Ukraine that affiliates Moscow Pa- triarchate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church with pro-Russian militants in Donbas. 59 Image 20. Booklet distributed by the Security Service of Ukraine that affiliates Moscow Pa-
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