WTO DECISION MAKING: A BROKEN WTO no. Cancun PROCESS Series Paper 4

Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy WTO Decision Making: A Broken Process

Shefali Sharma, Director of Trade Table of Contents Information Project

2003 Introduction 2

Breakdown in Seattle 3 2105 First Ave S Minneapolis, Nine Practices Damaging the WTO Process 4 Minnesota 55404 USA Pushing for Reform 10 www.iatp.org The Irreversible Road to Cancun 11

Conclusion 12

References 13

Glossary 14

Sources back cover

Table of Contents Decision Making: 1 Introduction internal transparency by WTO member countries themselves. In the last nine years, the WTO has gone from 128 to 146 members. While it took Following the negotiations, a group negotiators eight years to complete the of members known as Uruguay Round, governments gave them- the Like Minded Group (LMG) submitted selves only three years to conclude the a paper critical of the WTO’s lack of clear Doha Round, with the half way mark negotiating procedures: “Since the WTO approaching at the Cancun Ministerial in was established in January 1995, four September 2003. Governments in Ministerial Conferences have been held so Cancun will also decide whether to far. The procedures adopted, both in the launch negotiations on four additional preparatory process in and at the issues (Investment, Competition, Ministerial Conference itself, have been Government Procurement and Trade different. This uncertainty in the process Facilitation – also known as the Singapore makes it difficult for many Members to issues). The Doha Ministerial created an prepare themselves for the conferences. ambitious agenda for negotiations, with 17 Some basic principles and procedures for different and complex areas of discussion. this Member–driven organization need to Each of these areas is discussed in formal be agreed upon, so that both the prepara- and informal sessions, and numerous tory process and the conduct of the meetings of subsidiary bodies. The total Ministerial Conference are transparent, number of meetings in the year 2002 is inclusive and predictable.” astonishing. According to the Information (WT/GC/W/471, pg. 1) and Media Relations Division of the WTO, there were 5,224 meetings in 2002, The LMG was addressing what are known practically double the number of meetings as “process issues,” which refer to the that took place in 1997.1 decision–making procedures for WTO member states. This absence of clear pro- The high profile issues in Cancun will be cedures greatly benefits certain powerful agriculture, access to essential medicines, members by allowing the flexibility to Special and Differential Treatment for change the rules to suit their interests, and developing countries, the four Singapore weakens the ability of the less powerful Issues, and improving implementation of and under–staffed delegations to prepare, existing WTO rules. Yet critical to the follow, and participate in the negotiations. outcome of each of these negotiations will be how the negotiations are managed. The WTO has already paid a heavy price Non–governmental organizations (NGOs) for the weaknesses in its negotiating and the media have long criticized the process. The Seattle WTO Ministerial WTO for its secretive decision–making broke down largely because of a process process, but the institution has been just that excluded large numbers of member as harshly admonished for its lack of countries at significant points in the nego-

A Broken Process Introduction 2 tiations. However, the same process issues, members is not an easy task, but how although somewhat different in form, decisions are made and agreements are remain and continue to threaten the cred- reached matters. It matters in the imple- ibility of the WTO. In addition to the use mentation of the agreements and the of so–called “Green Room” meetings, follow–through on commitments. It also where only a limited number of countries matters for the future of the WTO as a are asked to resolve difficult issues, new credible multilateral institution. exclusionary methods have evolved. The chairperson of each negotiating Breakdown in Seattle committee is increasingly relied upon to write a summary of negotiations on his or Seattle was supposed to be a turning point her own responsibility, allowing strong dif- in WTO history. At the Ministerial ferences among members to be glossed Conference, held in November 1999, the over or ignored. So–called exclusion of the majority of the member- Mini–Ministerials have become increas- ship by an economically powerful few ingly common, which bring together some members was revealed in dramatic fashion 20 or 30 member countries to an informal to the world. The European Commission negotiating session whose results are then (EC), United States, Japan, and Canada very difficult for the uninvited members to (together known as the Quad) and a few reject. Overall, the time to prepare for other countries failed to launch the new meetings and for negotiating processes as a round of trade negotiations they wanted whole has been shortened, making it ever because, among other things, the margin- harder for small delegations to keep alized majority revolted. A communiqué abreast of developments. The result is a by Latin American and Caribbean deeply unaccountable decision–making countries in Seattle expressed disagree- process. ment with the process that allowed only a few countries “to define the scope and An important casualty of the WTO’s extent of the future negotiating round that negotiating process is the dialogue all member–countries are to adopt. We between capitals and citizens about the are particularly concerned over the stated content and implications of trade negotia- intentions to produce a ministerial text at tions. There needs to be time for govern- any cost, including the modification of ments to hold meaningful discussions with procedures designed to secure participa- their constituencies before taking their tion and consensus.”2 final negotiating positions. When negotia- tions exclude member countries until the However, governments failed to rise to the last minute and make decisions and challenge. After Seattle, the WTO proposals behind closed doors, the critical General Council took on the heavily dialogue between negotiators and capitals contested problem of process in the form is severely diminished. of “best practices,” collected by the then General Council Chairman, Kare Bryn of Negotiating by consensus with 146 Norway. Rather than providing clear and

Breakdown in Seattle World Trade Organization Decision Making: 3 binding rules of procedure, Bryn provided Delegation (HODs) meetings.” “Small only an interim report and his own group consultations” were invented, to statement “best practices” for internal which countries particularly involved or transparency. The report had little impact. interested in an issue would be invited. In principle, no country asking to join the Instead of addressing the very real consultation would be refused. However, concerns about the negotiating process often informal meetings were not openly raised by many WTO member countries announced. Frequently, informal meetings in the wake of Seattle, the WTO has side- are set from one informal session to stepped them. Most of the basic another, so by missing one, a country problems—secrecy, lack of accountability would not be on a list to know about the and unpredictability—are as prevalent as next meeting.3 Moreover, in many cases, they were before Seattle. Only now they countries interested in a particular issue have taken a different form. were excluded from the consultation. There are numerous accounts of these Nine Practices Damaging the experiences4 where countries had to WTO Process struggle to be included and were not always successful. 1. Green Rooms Here is one example from a Caribbean As the preparatory process for 2001 Doha country delegation: WTO Ministerial concluded, it became evident that attempts to improve the “I was present at a consultation conducted negotiating process were not going to by Ambassador Bryn who was handling result in greater inclusion of developing Implementation Issues. Ambassador country views. Tanzania, on behalf of 30 Akram of complained about the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), lack of progress and when he began to commented to the General Council in press the issue, the U.S. Ambassador October 2001, “In most areas, the draft responded in frustration, ‘Akram, we will does not adequately present the views of discuss this in the session tomorrow LDCs. It would have been preferable if morning!’ But no one in the room knew these views had been presented, even as about this HOD. I asked the Chair after options, so that there is fairer representa- the meeting, what time, and where and tion of our views.” he said he didn’t know. He told me to ask his secretary. But the secretary didn’t New formats as problematic as the old know. She asked to check the board, but were being introduced. For instance, it said nothing on the board. Finally, I rather than using “green room” meetings asked Mario,5 and he knew the time and (secret and exclusive meetings characteris- place. This meeting was obviously fixed tic of pre–Seattle days), the Secretariat with a few delegations.”6 institutionalized “open–ended Heads of

A Broken Process Damaging Practices 4 Whether they are called open–ended selected the participants and on what meetings, super informals, or small group basis. In fact, the WTO Secretariat consultations, green rooms have insisted that the Mini–Ministerials were continued both inside and outside the organized outside their purview, on the WTO building. Sometimes governments responsibility of the host country. meet across the border from Geneva, in However, key Secretariat staff, such as the France. Mini–Ministerials are a larger, Director General, were always present at more public version of the same phenome- these meetings. After the Singapore non—the powerful green room style meeting, in a gesture towards transparen- meetings are advocated by some powerful cy, the Singaporean Ambassador briefed WTO members who feel that 146 the WTO members that had not been members is too unwieldy for invited on the outcomes of the consensus–based decision–making. They Mini–Ministerial. But the majority of the feel justified in inviting their idea of a rep- WTO members who had been excluded resentative group to try and make progress resented this and said that any process on negotiations. Those countries are then outside of WTO has no legitimate role responsible to go back and persuade the within WTO proceedings. Many WTO rest of the membership to accept what has members believe that the Mini– been proposed at the session. The prepara- Ministerial process creates an informal tions for Cancun are relying on these “executive council” of members who take kinds of exclusive meetings, leaving many WTO decisions on behalf of the rest. WTO members in the dark about the state of negotiations. “What transpired in Singapore is very close to what was in fact agreed in Doha. 2. Mini–Ministerials This method lacks transparency and is a relic of the GATT, where countries that During the negotiations before Doha, the were strong trading nations, came together WTO held two preparatory meetings— and tried to push their agenda onto one in and one in Singapore. others,” said the then Now known as “Mini–Ministerials,” these Ambassador Boniface Chidyausiku.7 two meetings were the first of their kind. Between 20–25 countries were invited by Active WTO countries that are excluded, the host country to discuss issues that were such as , wonder openly what blocking progress on an overall Doha the selection criteria for these meetings agreement. These meetings created a lot are and discredit their usefulness.8 After of tension in Geneva because the large complaining about this process in relation majority of WTO countries were to a Mini–Ministerial in , Argentina excluded. The level of secrecy surround- was invited to the final pre–Cancun ing the selection of attendees was so high Ministerial in Montreal. that neither the host country officials nor the WTO Secretariat would confirm who

Damaging Practices World Trade Organization Decision Making: 5 oping countries. Second, the Chairman of Mini–Ministerials the General Council produced a text “on on the Road to Cancun his own responsibility” and without brackets, so that opposing positions were Australia not reflected. The paper was his version of (November 14–15, 2002): how a compromise might look—and 25 Countries attended to discuss largely catered to the approval of the most patents/TRIPs and health, S&D, market powerful members of the WTO. While access, and the Singapore issues. developing countries continued to make objections to the Chairman’s procedures Japan to the last hour, the text was forwarded to (February 14–16, 2003): Ministers in the same format.9 23 countries attended to discuss market access, agriculture, services, and Singapore Zimbabwe’s comments, on behalf of the Issues. 45–country African group, were typical before the General Council on October Egypt 31, 2001: “we note with concern that the (June 21–22, 2003): absence of options in the draft Ministerial 29 countries attended to discuss market Declaration could convey the wrong access, S&D, patents and health, impression that there are no differences Implementation Issues, and Singapore amongst delegations on substance.” Issues. was very direct in the same session: “Many delegations have expressed their views Canada that the texts are biased towards one side (July 28–30, 2003): and transmitting them in their present 27 countries attended to discuss agricul- form will have far reaching consequences ture, development and general balance of for the credibility of the multilateral the discussions leading to Cancun. trading system.”

This Doha process has now become the model for Cancun. 3. Chair Driven “Reverse Consensus” Proponents of this approach, where the There were two pivotal elements in process is led by the chairperson, argue creating consensus from widely divergent that it is efficient and expedient. positions during the Doha preparatory However, a chairperson’s understanding process. First, the two draft Doha texts usually reflects the dominant, not the released in Geneva (the Doha Draft majority, interests. The use of unbracketed Ministerial Declaration and the draft text side steps the chairperson’s responsi- Implementation Decision) ignored the bility to show diverging positions, espe- dissenting opinions voiced in informal cially in heavily contested negotiations. consultations by a large number of devel-

A Broken Process Damaging Practices 6 The use of a chairperson’s text to force significant economic power or a coalition consensus condenses the debate of a year with a large number of countries can or more into an “understanding” which significantly change the text towards says nothing about the reasoning behind their interests. Opposing or changing different country positions. This process text in a reverse consensus process puts the onus on dissenting voices, and depends almost completely on power. No mostly the weaker members, to change or one member, apart from the U.S. or the reject the chairperson’s text. In practice, it European Commission, perhaps, can creates a “reverse consensus10” approach stand up and say “no” unless they have to negotiations. the backing of a number of other members. This in effect has marginalized Traditionally, reverse consensus in the the majority of developing countries and WTO refers to a practice related to the weakened their effectiveness. Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM). It roughly means that to oppose a finding For the Cancun Ministerial, governments by the dispute panel, all members must are considering Chairpersons’ draft agree to reject the report. This process is reports, submitted on their “own responsi- now spreading, albeit informally, and is bility,” for agriculture and industrial becoming the norm in the WTO for nego- products modalities. Both these draft tiating texts, such as draft declarations for reports ignore proposals and criticisms Ministerial Conferences and draft revised raised by a number of developing rules for the Agreement on Agriculture. countries in formal and informal meetings. This means that rather than the process leading to consensus through a series of 4. Closed Doors/No Records drafts that exhibit diverging positions and attempt to narrow differences (as is the The process of preparing for both the norm in the UN), the WTO process of Doha and Cancun Ministerial arriving at consensus now increasingly Conferences has largely been through starts with a Chairman’s written interpre- informal meetings, which means that no tation, following numerous undocumented minutes of discussions have been informal consultations and leads to a “take produced. Minutes are only circulated it or leave it” type scenario. The resulting after the rare General Council meetings, report is presented with few or no where countries have the opportunity to brackets, creating strong pressure to not go on record. The lack of minutes has change much in the text, so as to avoid become a particular problem since the the whole text unraveling. It is also practice of using chairperson’s unlikely to receive unanimous opposition bracket–free texts became so common. since the final text usually favors the most Objections, proposals and major differ- powerful WTO members. ences expressed in informal meetings often disappear when a chairperson’s text In practice, only countries with is presented. Usually, there are only a few

Damaging Practices World Trade Organization Decision Making: 7 formal opportunities to revise the text. dialogue with their capitals about the Some governments have proposed that at implications of the draft text. The final least the minutes from formal meetings draft text for Cancun will be previewed for should reach delegations within ten days August 22 and members have three days of the meeting taking place, rather that to assess and give final comments on the up to four months that it now takes. August 25–26 at most likely the last In addition, updates on the outcomes of General Council before Cancun. There informal meetings for the smaller Geneva are some 23 elements for consideration in missions and the non–resident missions the Cancun agenda, all under negotiation (countries too poor to maintain a simultaneously.11 The burden under such a physical presence in Geneva) need to timeline is unrealistic and detrimental to take place systematically. These small effective and informed decision–making. steps are a minimum to improve the decision–making processes at the WTO, 6. Lack of Staff for Member States moving them toward more accountability and predictability. Members would then Many WTO members are also hampered be able to verify that their viewpoints are by a lack of staff to handle these extremely reflected adequately in the WTO debates complex negotiations. The average staff and follow negotiations more easily. capacity of member states is 7.38 delegates They would also be able to hold the per developed country and 3.51 per devel- Chair more accountable if she/he oping country (South Center Working produces a Chair’s text. Paper 11). The United States has at least 15 staff just working on the WTO while 5. Limiting Dialogue Back Home several developing countries have just one person, who is responsible for both the The lack of clarity in process is a major UN in Geneva and the WTO. concern to many governments given the high stakes in Cancun and the major 7. Make up of the Secretariat implications the agreements under negoti- ation will have for domestic policy. Compared to many international organiza- Governments need a clear process to tions, the WTO Secretariat is relatively know when to intervene and how. small at 560 staff (see WTO 2002 Annual Report). A breakdown of the staff by To prepare for the Cancun Ministerial, region of origin indicates that the WTO members were presented with a Secretariat is overwhelmingly European. draft declaration on July 18, 2003. That is In 2002, there were 371 staff from Europe, very little time before the Ministerial to 23 from the United States and 10 from comment on and change language in the Australia. This compared to 19 from the draft text. In addition, because so little entire African continent and 16 from all had been decided at the time of the first of South . Moves towards interna- draft, it is difficult for negotiators to tionalizing the Secretariat have been

A Broken Process Damaging Practices 8 extremely limited since the WTO was Supachai Panitchpakdi, is campaigning for founded in 1995 (many staff continued the completion of the round by January from their time as secretariat to the 2005. Their positions echo those of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Quad and other dominant states, at the which preceded the WTO). expense of the majority of developing countries, who are unable to move at the 8. The Role of the WTO Secretariat – pace of the largest trading countries. neutral or aggressive agenda This conflict of interest was exacerbated The WTO is an intergovernmental organ- in September 2002, when Supachai ization. This means the Secretariat is cir- Panitchpakdi appointed Ambassador cumscribed in its function, which is by Stuart Harbinson of Hong Kong as his and large to service the different commit- Chef de Cabinet, making him second in tees and decision–making bodies of the command at the Secretariat. Harbinson WTO. The Secretariat is obligated by the was serving as Chairman of the Special WTO’s mandate to facilitate sustainable Session of the Agricultural Committee, development, raise living standards and which is the body where governments are provide employment through trade. The negotiating new rules for agriculture. WTO was not established to promote a Harbinson resigned as Ambassador but, at simplistic agenda of trade liberalization. the insistence of some members, continued to serve as chairman of the However, the rhetoric of the Secretariat’s agricultural talks, a position he continues leadership, through media messages and to hold. This puts a member of the WTO brochures, unambiguously promotes Secretariat in the extraordinary position of trade liberalization for its own sake – a chairing intergovernmental negotiations, message that many member countries may raising a number of concerns about the not agree with. The WTO Secretariat’s Secretariat’s neutrality. Concerns were public messages before Doha, for example, raised privately with the Director General supported the launching of a new trade and the group was prepared to send round before member states had agreed a formal letter to the Director General, this was appropriate. however, power politics came into play that split the Africa group on this issue.12 Successive Director Generals have invested their personal reputations on 9. Technical Assistance launching or completing rounds of negoti- ations, putting them at odds with their Currently there are approximately 120 obligation to balance the rights and obli- developing countries that are WTO gations of the membership as a whole. For members, 29 are identified as least instance, former Director General Mike developed, and 25 of these countries do Moore campaigned for the launch of a not even have an office in Geneva. comprehensive trade round in the Doha Because the majority of members are process, and the current Director General, understaffed given the demands of the

Damaging Practices World Trade Organization Decision Making: 9 diverse and intricate negotiations under- money for TA with expansion of negotia- taken at the WTO, governments have tions into areas of interest to them such as recognized the need for additional training the Singapore issues. In other words, for countries. However, this training, technical assistance is given to assist known as Technical Assistance (TA), has developing countries to take on more been criticized as inadequate by many commitments. While no developing members. country objects to receiving technical assistance, they do believe that broader A recent review of the TA program by the socio–political and economic implications Secretariat found that “Since 1995, WTO should be the basis upon which to expand TA activities have now grown by 660% – an already large agenda. from 79 activities in 1995 to over 600 activities requested for 2002.”13 But the Pushing for Reform capacity to evaluate the effectiveness of TA activities is strictly limited. The After Doha, a group of developing Technical Cooperation Audit (TCA) of countries expressed their opposition to the the WTO, in charge of designing evalua- unpredictability and lack of accountability tions of TA, is staffed by one person and in the negotiating process. Several groups evaluations are primarily conducted of countries pushed to create binding pro- through “self–evaluation” by WTO staff cedures as the Trade Negotiating carrying out the training. According to Committee (TNC) for Doha was estab- the WTO Technical Audit report, “The lished. What resulted, however were emphasis in the prevailing approach to non–binding “Principles and Practices,” TA in the WTO is on quantity. This is set out in a “Statement by the Chairman perhaps not surprising given the of the General Council.” (TN/C/1, 4 demand–driven notion. But within this February), which promised inclusion and there is a need to focus also on the quality transparency. The statement added of the capacity–building.”14 specific guidelines for chairs, who were to “be impartial and objective…ensure trans- According to one delegate from Africa, parency and inclusiveness…” and, most “the Secretariat attempts to put us importantly, “facilitate consensus among through university in a period of three participants and should seek to evolve days, as a result I come out even more consensus texts through the negotiation confused than when I started. These are process.” Chairs were asked to “reflect complex issues that must be addressed in consensus, or where this is not possible, layers. We have to have a base first and different positions on issues.” These last then build on it. We can’t do the whole two items continue to be subject to debate thing together.”15 in the WTO. How much leeway should a chairperson be given to facilitate Technical assistance has become a consensus? How should they reflect political tool for powers such as the U.S. different positions? These vague guidelines and the European Union who link donor are now in use as the basis of the Cancun

A Broken Process Pushing For Reform 10 preparations. But concerns are rising despite vociferous opposition raised in the amongst developing countries that the preceding informal meetings. Chair of the General Council will not reflect different positions in the final draft The paper also addresses Ministerial Ministerial text for Cancun. Conference procedures, questioning whether every Ministerial needs to launch Having failed to get binding rules on pro- or conclude new negotiations. Finally, the cedures accepted with the establishment paper suggests holding all future of the TNC, a group of 15 developing Ministerial Conferences in Geneva countries (who are part of the Like because of the cost of meeting elsewhere Minded Group) issued a paper with for poorer members and the inability of all proposals on how to manage the prepara- members to have a strong presence in tory process in Geneva and the negotia- different far–off places. tions during Ministerial conferences in April 2002. Some of reforms requested in The paper was criticized by a group of their paper were very elementary: eight countries led by Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Mexico, Hong Kong • differences of positions should be clearly , Korea, Singapore and reflected where consensus is not who insisted the process should be more possible, flexible and “avoid rigidities.”17 These • facilitators and the agenda of the proposed reforms have been at a standstill Ministerial conference should be since December 2002 and will likely be decided in Geneva and by consensus of revived by the LMG weeks before Cancun all members, in order to prevent a Doha–like scenario. • frequent formal general council meetings should be held during the The Invisible Road to Cancun preparatory process, with minutes for those countries who are not present The preparatory process for the Cancun • new draft text should be provided with Ministerial has highlighted the problems enough time to allow consultation with of the WTO’s internal negotiating proce- officials in national capitals before any dures. Remarkably, WTO members had no decisions are required. idea as of early July 2003 whether Ministers in Cancun would even try to This submission by the Like Minded agree on language for a declaration, or Group16 states, “If the majority of the simply release a general communiqué as membership has strong opposition to the the outcome of the Conference. inclusion of any issue in the draft ministe- The preparatory process for Cancun limits rial declaration then such an issue should countries to Heads of Delegation meetings not be included in the draft declaration.” to express their views. Between the first This was in reference to the inclusion of draft Ministerial declaration and the the Singapore Issues in the Doha draft Cancun meeting, there were only two

Road to Cancun World Trade Organization Decision Making: 11 General Council Meetings where Conclusion: delegates had the opportunity to formally address the draft Cancun text (July 24–25 Almost four years after the WTO’s failure and August 25–26th). Immediately after in Seattle, many of the central institution- the July General Council meeting, some al weaknesses that caused the breakdown 26 countries plus the General Council of that Conference have not been Chair left for a Mini–Ministerial in addressed – in fact, they have worsened. Canada to discuss the draft in secrecy. Much work is needed on WTO Thus the full membership will have had decision–making for the institution to only two chances to express their views on take on a credible standing in the current record, as the HODs are informal and global economic architecture. therefore no minutes are circulated. It is possible for the General Council to meet A number of NGOs, including IATP, have off record also, which would eliminate any examined the problems of process in the record of different views altogether apart WTO and have outlined a detailed from any written statements that countries proposal called the Democracy Challenge circulate themselves. (see full proposal at http://focusweb.org/civil–society–call/). Given the short amount of time allowed to come up with some sort of The Challenge calls for several reforms “consensus–based text” for the Cancun including: Ministerial, the entire process is in the hands of the Director General, as head • The “informal” green room meetings of the TNC, and the Chairman of the including “Mini–Ministerials” in the General Council, Perez del Castillo of preparatory process of Cancun must be Uruguay. Because time is so short, the stopped. Secretariat will play a crucial role in “harmonizing” the texts of all the various • All negotiating texts in Cancun must subsidiary bodies of the General Council be produced by the membership, and to fit the mandate given by ministers in all members should have the opportu- the Doha Ministerial Declaration. The nity to effectively participate in the final draft could be a repeat of the Doha drafting, revision and approval. approach where informal, undocumented Differences in positions should be fairly consultations reveal an “understanding” reflected as options for example by the of the Chair who then produces a text use of square brackets. Chairpersons “on his own responsibility.” Changing must not present any documents “on the Cancun text will be very difficult for his/her own responsibility.” most WTO members if the General Council Chair does not effectively • The agenda and any draft texts to be reflect differences. used as the basis for negotiations must be approved by the entire membership

A Broken Process Conclusion 12 at a formal General Council meeting References prior to the Ministerial in Cancun, and confirmed at a formal first business 1 ’96 and ’97 numbers indicate over 2300 meetings and 2800 meetings, respectively, averaging over 10 meetings meeting in Cancun. a day. (Source: South Center Working Paper 2) 2 December 2 1999 ‘Joint Communique’ by Latin American and Caribbean Countries at the Seattle • All meetings must be inclusive and Ministerial. transparent. No Member may be 3 Based on interviews over three years with Geneva based excluded from meetings. delegations. 4 See Bibiliography. 5 Mr. Mario Trabacchi is an institution in himself. He is • When new language is proposed during listed as in charge of “Hall Security” at the WTO and the Ministerial meeting, the member(s) has been at the institution for 26 years. 6 Personal Off the Record Interview; May 18, 2003, proposing the language must be Geneva. indicated. 7 In Power Politics in the WTO, Kwa Aileen, pg. 18; Interview with Aileen Kwa, 22 February, 2002, Geneva. 8 Inside US Trade, June 6, « Agenda, Participants • Issues outside of the WTO’s agenda Finalized for Egypt WTO Mini–Ministerial. » (such as preferential access arrange- 9 In the old GATT, Mr. Arthrur Dunkel was prevented from presenting a ‘GATT view’ when he could not cite ments, aid, debt, etc.) must not be when, where and how, the Contracting Parties gave him brought into the negotiations and held such an authority….At the General Council on Thursday, the Chairman of the General Council, Mr. hostage to achieve a Ministerial Stuart Harbinson of Hong Kong China ignored objec- outcome. tions from several delegations, and without actually citing any precedent, insisted that he had the right to present on his authority draft texts for a ministerial dec- laration. » From SUNS, 5 November, 2001, « Trade : • The Secretariat should maintain neu- Attempts to repeat Seattle decision–making process at trality during the Ministerial. Doha ? » Raghavan, Chakravarti. 10 This phrase is taken from the recent South Centre Working Paper 15 « Single Undertaking: A Straight The current system is unaccountable, Jacket or Variable Geometry, Working Paper 15,» and expands the definition of what is officially meant by unpredictable, and undemocratic. But reverse consensus. there are solutions to these problems and 11 JOB(03)/98 27 May produced a checklist of Issues for they can be realized. Clear procedures for Cancun that mandate 11 issues for decisions or political guidance or stock–taking by Ministers, five recommenda- negotiation, approved through the tions and five reports. consensus process, must be established 12 See Kwa, Aileen Power Politics in the WTO, pgs 51–52. 13 soon within the WTO. The WTO WT/COMTD/W/104/Rev.2, pg 7. 14 WT/COMTD/W/11, 28 March 2003, pg 11. Secretariat and member countries need to 15 Background personal communication. April 14, 2003. appreciate that how agreements are 16 WT/GC/W/471, 24 April 2002, Communication from reached is important and often determines , Dominican Republic, Egypt, Honduras, , , , Kenya, , Mauritius, what is decided. Pakistan, , Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe 17 WT/GC/W/477, 28 June 2002

Government Positions World Trade Organization Decision Making: 13 Glossary of Terms Heads of Delegation Meetings (HODs)/HOD plus one: This refers to the format of meetings held both in the Doha and the Cancun preparatory Brackets: Square brackets are often used in inter- processes where only the Ambassador (Head of national negotiating text to indicate disagreement Delegation) of a WTO Mission is invited to attend. among governments on language. Often, several These meetings usually are in “plus one” formats options are presented within successive brackets, where the Ambassador can also select his/her representing divergent positions. Where text is not deputy or counselor to attend with her/him. They bracketed, it indicates that the negotiators have are usually informal meetings, which means no agreed on that language. record is kept of the discussion.

“Chair’s Own Responsibility” or Chair’s Text: An Reverse Consensus: This term is normally used at alternative to bracketed text, this phrase indicates the WTO when members wish to reject a panel that while there is no consensus among the mem- report from the dispute settlement mechanism. bership, the Chairperson will use the role of Chair Reverse consensus requires that all members agree to submit a document on his/her “own responsibili- to reject the report. The use of reverse consensus is ty.” The draft text prepared for the Doha Ministerial now informally spreading to negotiations, where a was the first time in WTO history that the Chair Chair’s text almost requires rejection by consensus. prepared language on his own responsibility, without brackets, or annotations explaining differences in Special and Differential Treatment (S&D): members’ positions, for presentation to Trade th Special and Differential Treatment dates back to Ministers. For the Cancun 5 Ministerial, Chairs of the Charter of 1947 and embodies the certain bodies have already presented entire sets of principle of integrating development concerns and documents on their own responsibility to members. special needs of developing countries in establishing The first version of the draft Ministerial text was an equitable global trading system among dramati- also drafted on the General Council and the WTO cally unequal powers. S&D Provisions in the WTO Director General’s own responsibility. consist primarily of longer implementation periods for certain agreements and lesser liberalization in Consensus: Consensus–based decision–making, certain areas for developing countries. Currently, rather than majority voting, is formally incorporat- this is an area of intense negotiations with around ed in WTO rules under Article IX:1, which defines 80 proposals to make it mandatory and meaningful. consensus in the following terms: “The body concerned shall be deemed to have decided by Single Undertaking: While initially this term meant consensus on a matter submitted for its considera- that all negotiations would begin and end at the same tion, if no Member, present at the meeting when time, this concept was re–defined during the Uruguay the decision is formally taken, formally objects to Round to mean all parties must agree and sign all the the proposed decision.” (From South Centre agreements. A common descriptive phrase is Working Paper 11) “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.”(A recent paper by the South Centre deals in depth with General Council: The General Council is the this issue: “Single Undertaking: A Straight Jacket or highest decision–making body of the WTO, after Variable Geometry, Working Paper 15.”) Ministerial Conferences. Composed of all the members of the WTO, the General Council Trade Negotiating Committee (TNC): This governs all the Committees in the WTO. It also committee was formed during the Uruguay Round to serves as the Dispute Settlement Body and the oversee negotiations on all the various issues under Trade Policy Review Mechanism. When Ministerial consideration. It reports to the General Council. Conferences are not in session, it is the WTO General Council that makes decisions. Technical Assistance and Capacity Building (TACB): Services financed or provided by donors “Green Rooms” or Small Group Consultations: and development agencies to strengthen Exclusive meetings held by “invitation only,” these trade–related institutions and build trade capacity in often occur without other members being informed developing countries. In the WTO, it refers to the that the meeting is taking place. The “Green Technical Assistance Plans, which aim to meet the Room” refers to the green décor of the room near demands of developing country members through the Director–General’s office in Geneva where key seminars, workshops, and three–day or two to three members would meet in secret to iron out differ- week courses on various trade topics of the WTO. ences and often set the agenda of the GATT and then WTO. Despite resolutions to change this practice, exclusive meetings are continuing during preparations for Cancun.

A Broken Process Glossary 14 Sources: World Trade Organization: www.wto.org GATT – Agreement on Agriculture: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/14–ag.pdf WTO Legal Documents: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm Doha Declaration and Negotiations: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm WTO Agriculture negotiations: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negoti_e.htm Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on Uruguay Round and Agriculture: http://www.oecd.org/EN/home/0,,EN–home–141–nodirectorate–no–no–no–24,00.html UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) on WTO/Uruguay Round and Agriculture: http://www.fao.org/trade/index.asp?lang=en U.S. proposal for AoA negotiations: http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/wto/as European Commission proposal for AoA negotiations: http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/external/wto/officdoc/index_en.htm U.S. Farm Bill 2002: http://www.usda.gov/farmbill/ European Union's Common Agriculture Policy: http://europa.eu.int/pol/agr/index_en.htm U.S. Dumping on World Agricultural Markets: Can Trade Rules Help Farmers?, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, 2003. http://www.tradeobservatory.org/library/uploadedfiles/United_States_Dumping_on_World_Ag ricultural_Ma.pdf Managing the Invisible Hand: Markets, Farmers and International Trade. Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, 2002. http://www.tradeobservatory.org/library/uploadedfiles/Managing_the_Invisible_Hand_2.pdf Development Box Proposals: http://www.iatp.org/tradeobservatory/library/index.cfm?c_id=42

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