WTO DECISION MAKING: A BROKEN WTO no. Cancun PROCESS Series Paper 4 Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy WTO Decision Making: A Broken Process Shefali Sharma, Director of Trade Table of Contents Information Project 2003 Introduction 2 Breakdown in Seattle 3 2105 First Ave S Minneapolis, Nine Practices Damaging the WTO Process 4 Minnesota 55404 USA Pushing for Reform 10 www.iatp.org The Irreversible Road to Cancun 11 Conclusion 12 References 13 Glossary 14 Sources back cover Table of Contents World Trade Organization Decision Making: 1 Introduction internal transparency by WTO member countries themselves. In the last nine years, the WTO has gone from 128 to 146 members. While it took Following the Doha negotiations, a group negotiators eight years to complete the of developing country members known as Uruguay Round, governments gave them- the Like Minded Group (LMG) submitted selves only three years to conclude the a paper critical of the WTO’s lack of clear Doha Round, with the half way mark negotiating procedures: “Since the WTO approaching at the Cancun Ministerial in was established in January 1995, four September 2003. Governments in Ministerial Conferences have been held so Cancun will also decide whether to far. The procedures adopted, both in the launch negotiations on four additional preparatory process in Geneva and at the issues (Investment, Competition, Ministerial Conference itself, have been Government Procurement and Trade different. This uncertainty in the process Facilitation – also known as the Singapore makes it difficult for many Members to issues). The Doha Ministerial created an prepare themselves for the conferences. ambitious agenda for negotiations, with 17 Some basic principles and procedures for different and complex areas of discussion. this Member–driven organization need to Each of these areas is discussed in formal be agreed upon, so that both the prepara- and informal sessions, and numerous tory process and the conduct of the meetings of subsidiary bodies. The total Ministerial Conference are transparent, number of meetings in the year 2002 is inclusive and predictable.” astonishing. According to the Information (WT/GC/W/471, pg. 1) and Media Relations Division of the WTO, there were 5,224 meetings in 2002, The LMG was addressing what are known practically double the number of meetings as “process issues,” which refer to the that took place in 1997.1 decision–making procedures for WTO member states. This absence of clear pro- The high profile issues in Cancun will be cedures greatly benefits certain powerful agriculture, access to essential medicines, members by allowing the flexibility to Special and Differential Treatment for change the rules to suit their interests, and developing countries, the four Singapore weakens the ability of the less powerful Issues, and improving implementation of and under–staffed delegations to prepare, existing WTO rules. Yet critical to the follow, and participate in the negotiations. outcome of each of these negotiations will be how the negotiations are managed. The WTO has already paid a heavy price Non–governmental organizations (NGOs) for the weaknesses in its negotiating and the media have long criticized the process. The Seattle WTO Ministerial WTO for its secretive decision–making broke down largely because of a process process, but the institution has been just that excluded large numbers of member as harshly admonished for its lack of countries at significant points in the nego- A Broken Process Introduction 2 tiations. However, the same process issues, members is not an easy task, but how although somewhat different in form, decisions are made and agreements are remain and continue to threaten the cred- reached matters. It matters in the imple- ibility of the WTO. In addition to the use mentation of the agreements and the of so–called “Green Room” meetings, follow–through on commitments. It also where only a limited number of countries matters for the future of the WTO as a are asked to resolve difficult issues, new credible multilateral institution. exclusionary methods have evolved. The chairperson of each negotiating Breakdown in Seattle committee is increasingly relied upon to write a summary of negotiations on his or Seattle was supposed to be a turning point her own responsibility, allowing strong dif- in WTO history. At the Ministerial ferences among members to be glossed Conference, held in November 1999, the over or ignored. So–called exclusion of the majority of the member- Mini–Ministerials have become increas- ship by an economically powerful few ingly common, which bring together some members was revealed in dramatic fashion 20 or 30 member countries to an informal to the world. The European Commission negotiating session whose results are then (EC), United States, Japan, and Canada very difficult for the uninvited members to (together known as the Quad) and a few reject. Overall, the time to prepare for other countries failed to launch the new meetings and for negotiating processes as a round of trade negotiations they wanted whole has been shortened, making it ever because, among other things, the margin- harder for small delegations to keep alized majority revolted. A communiqué abreast of developments. The result is a by Latin American and Caribbean deeply unaccountable decision–making countries in Seattle expressed disagree- process. ment with the process that allowed only a few countries “to define the scope and An important casualty of the WTO’s extent of the future negotiating round that negotiating process is the dialogue all member–countries are to adopt. We between capitals and citizens about the are particularly concerned over the stated content and implications of trade negotia- intentions to produce a ministerial text at tions. There needs to be time for govern- any cost, including the modification of ments to hold meaningful discussions with procedures designed to secure participa- their constituencies before taking their tion and consensus.”2 final negotiating positions. When negotia- tions exclude member countries until the However, governments failed to rise to the last minute and make decisions and challenge. After Seattle, the WTO proposals behind closed doors, the critical General Council took on the heavily dialogue between negotiators and capitals contested problem of process in the form is severely diminished. of “best practices,” collected by the then General Council Chairman, Kare Bryn of Negotiating by consensus with 146 Norway. Rather than providing clear and Breakdown in Seattle World Trade Organization Decision Making: 3 binding rules of procedure, Bryn provided Delegation (HODs) meetings.” “Small only an interim report and his own group consultations” were invented, to statement “best practices” for internal which countries particularly involved or transparency. The report had little impact. interested in an issue would be invited. In principle, no country asking to join the Instead of addressing the very real consultation would be refused. However, concerns about the negotiating process often informal meetings were not openly raised by many WTO member countries announced. Frequently, informal meetings in the wake of Seattle, the WTO has side- are set from one informal session to stepped them. Most of the basic another, so by missing one, a country problems—secrecy, lack of accountability would not be on a list to know about the and unpredictability—are as prevalent as next meeting.3 Moreover, in many cases, they were before Seattle. Only now they countries interested in a particular issue have taken a different form. were excluded from the consultation. There are numerous accounts of these Nine Practices Damaging the experiences4 where countries had to WTO Process struggle to be included and were not always successful. 1. Green Rooms Here is one example from a Caribbean As the preparatory process for 2001 Doha country delegation: WTO Ministerial concluded, it became evident that attempts to improve the “I was present at a consultation conducted negotiating process were not going to by Ambassador Bryn who was handling result in greater inclusion of developing Implementation Issues. Ambassador country views. Tanzania, on behalf of 30 Akram of Pakistan complained about the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), lack of progress and when he began to commented to the General Council in press the issue, the U.S. Ambassador October 2001, “In most areas, the draft responded in frustration, ‘Akram, we will does not adequately present the views of discuss this in the session tomorrow LDCs. It would have been preferable if morning!’ But no one in the room knew these views had been presented, even as about this HOD. I asked the Chair after options, so that there is fairer representa- the meeting, what time, and where and tion of our views.” he said he didn’t know. He told me to ask his secretary. But the secretary didn’t New formats as problematic as the old know. She asked to check the board, but were being introduced. For instance, it said nothing on the board. Finally, I rather than using “green room” meetings asked Mario,5 and he knew the time and (secret and exclusive meetings characteris- place. This meeting was obviously fixed tic of pre–Seattle days), the Secretariat with a few delegations.”6 institutionalized “open–ended Heads of A Broken Process Damaging Practices 4 Whether they are called open–ended selected the participants and on what meetings, super informals, or small group basis. In fact, the WTO Secretariat