Warring-Fictions

Warring Fictions Warring Fictions Left Populism and Its Defining Myths Christopher Clarke London • New York Published by Rowman & Littlefield International, Ltd. 6 Tinworth Street, London SE11 5AL, United Kingdom www.rowmaninternational.com Rowman & Littlefield International, Ltd., is an affiliate of Rowman & Littlefield 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706, USA With additional offices in Boulder, New York, Toronto (Canada), and Plymouth (UK) www.rowman.com Copyright © 2019 Policy Network All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: Paperback 978-1-78661-291-5 Electronic 978-1-78661-293-9 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data ISBN 978-1-78661-291-5 (paperback : alk. paper) ISBN 978-1-78661-293-9 (electronic) Contents Context vii 1 Left Populism and Left Pluralism 1 2 What Do We Want? 15 3 Distorting Myths 31 4 What is the Dark Knight? 39 5 The Appeal of the Dark Knight 61 6 The Case Against the Dark Knight (People) 69 7 The Case Against the Dark Knight Continued (Policy) 87 8 What is the Puppet Master? 109 9 The Appeal of the Puppet Master 131 10 The Case Against the Puppet Master (Government) 139 11 The Case Against the Puppet Master Continued (Society) 151 12 What is the Golden Era? 161 vi Chapter Number 13 The Appeal of the Golden Era 181 14 The Case Against the Golden Era (Global Economy) 193 15 The Case Against the Golden Era Continued (Politics) 221 16 The Case Against the Golden Era Continued (Psychology) 255 17 Strengths, Weaknesses and Admissions 275 18 Conclusions 285 Context About this argument Differences between pro- and anti-Corbyn wings have been the subject of painful tensions in the British Labour Party in recent years. Warring Fictions traces these tensions – and similar divisions in Europe and the US – to their source. It suggests they’re thanks to profound differences in the narratives governing our politics. The resulting divide, between the two sides of Labour, is between conflicting perspectives, not conflicting values. To make this argument, the essay sets out two outlooks on the left: • Left populism is a style of progressive politics based on the idea that only left-wing ideas can be moral, that most problems are deliberately imposed from above, and that society is in a right-wing decline. Most common on the Corbynite ‘far left’ (though not unique to it), left populism deploys stories of conflict, insurgency and crisis. • Left pluralism is an egalitarian politics more common among non-Corbynites. It rejects the idea that the political spectrum is a moral spectrum, and accepts a diversity of values. Left pluralists see social problems as organic, complex and the product of conflicting demands – not as authored. They also tend to be more upbeat about increased interconnectedness with other nations. These divergences make cooperation hard, with agreement about the context we’re working in close to impossible. They explain why the left often splits, why relationships descend into bitterness, why arguments result in non-sequiturs. viii Context Warring Fictions looks to identify the nub of the differences. It explores three narratives, which are believed in by the populist left but not the pluralist left. Underpinning my argument are two convictions about British politics. The first is that regaining a rational, civil and democratic debate should be the priority for people of all leanings. Until trust in the motives of others is restored, discourse is based on logic not conspiracy, and respect for opponents returns, politicians cannot address other problems. So, I’m asking that the left – specifically the populist left – takes the steps necessary to stop Britain being consumed by US-style ‘culture wars’. The second conviction is that the crisis of socialism and social democracy, which has put progressives out of power across Europe, is easier to solve than we think. The adage that we’ve ‘run out of ideas’ may be true. But there are answers, electorally and through policy-making, if we want them. Yet this is impossible when every conversation is distorted by sacred falsehoods and an atmosphere that straitjackets debate. The thinking needed to tackle global wealth inequality or address climate change is shut down by the visceral stories which guide left populism. The essay is therefore written from an openly left pluralist stance, and in opposition to the populist approach. It asks how we on the left can jettison our destructive myths and folklore, in order to achieve an egalitarian society. 1 Left Populism and Left Pluralism TRUMP AND THE RISE OF POPULISM W.H. Auden called the 1930s a “low dishonest decade,”1 and it seems likely we’ll look back on the 2010s in the same way. We’ve seen the up- ending of the conventional spectrum and the rise of populist movements from right and left. The shift is profound enough for some to fear the ‘end of democracy’, with the rise of ‘fake news’ and with declining political trust.2 In the UK this has played out in Scottish nationalism, Brexit and the resurgence of the Bennite left. It has seen the two main parties split at the seams, with a short-lived, non-populist breakaway, The Independent Group (TIG), registering as Change UK and then disbanding. The rise of populism has been driven, in part, by globalisation (including technological change, inequality, migration, etc). This has gen- erated problems which are often transnational and chaotic, and beyond the immediate control of national politicians. The chasm this creates feeds us-and-them dynamics, and is exacerbated by 24-hour news and social media. These phenomena magnify and polarise. The populist movements this has spawned aren’t driven by rational arguments or policy goals. Because the problems are hard, and demand compromise, they are instead fuelled by gestures, symbolism and an- ger. It’s this that has led to the term ‘post-truth politics’ – a shorthand for a climate where rational debate is eclipsed by emotion and iden- tity. Trump claimed that he could “stand in the middle of 5th Avenue and shoot somebody” and still wouldn’t lose voters. 1 2 Chapter 1 There are three belief systems which sustain these new movements. The first is the belief in a common enemy – ‘us versus them’. Popu- lists rely on a malign foe. The second is an anti-establishment default.3 Populists imply that omnipotent and self-serving elites block the ‘will of the people’. The third is a sense of decline – often expressed through opposition to growing inter-dependence between countries. This lends urgency to the populist cause. In the UK this is manifest. Both the populist left and the populist right indulge in an attritional world view, that lets their outer fringes feel jus- tified in spitting at Tories or in intimidating MPs outside parliament (as ‘Yellow Vest’ Brexit protesters have done on several occasions). Both hold ‘elites’ culpable – ‘global’ in the case of the former, ‘metropolitan’ in the case of the latter. Both see themselves as victims of an institu- tional bias, on the part of the ‘right-wing press’ or the ‘liberal media’. And both are sustained by nostalgia, for the Keynesian consensus of Attlee or the once-Great Britain of Churchill. They’re thus driven by a sense of national decline – caused, in turn, by ‘neoliberal’ globalisation and culturally liberal internationalism – which they suggest that only their movements can avert. As a result, we have demagogues as varied as Jeremy Corbyn and Jacob Rees-Mogg. Populist belief systems are destructive, wherever they appear on the spectrum. They indulge a cognitively dissonant, conspiracy theorist’s view. And they lead to backward-looking and ideologically exclusive approaches. Worst of all is the lack of perspective they encourage. Populist narratives don’t present hard choices or contemplate other viewpoints. They hold to ransom the wider electorate, often inadvertently, and imply that they speak for a larger group than they do. They allow the idea that their views have innate moral superiority to dominate the argument. For instance, Ukip, the ‘People’s Army’, represented only four mil- lion voters at their peak. No Deal Brexit ultras are also an electoral minority. This doesn’t invalidate these groups’ views or mean they’re wrong (although I personally think they are). The problem is that, rather than using logic to promote Euroscepticism, they suggest that anyone who points out contradictions or asks questions is a member of the ‘establishment’. Many on the populist left perform the same trick, claiming that those who disagree are closet Tories, or represent ‘elite’ interests, or wish to usher in a bleak, ‘neoliberal’ future. The perspective to see that their Left Populism and Left Pluralism 3 views are – like all our views – only supported in full by a minority, is absent.4 By adopting the belief systems that prop up populism – and the cam- paigning approaches that come with them – these movements distort the conversation. They claim to speak for ‘the people’. But they lead us away from egalitarian and democratic government, and eschew a politics which is rational and honest. Ultimately, these populist approaches are the thin end of an extremist wedge. They’ve already poisoned much of the debate, and led to poli- cies with no foothold in reality. Taken to their conclusion they encourage reactionary outcomes, enabling narratives of collective guilt to take hold, or ‘elites’ to be violently purged.

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