july 1934

Arms Manufacturers and the Public

J.

Volume 12 • Number 4

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ByJ. a ON MAY 18, 1934, President Roosevelt sent strongly to worded Message the Senate, recommending that it to give generous support the Special Committee which under the Chairmanship of Senator Nye has been charged with the investigation of the munitions industry. He further urged consent to that the Senate give its advice and the ratification of the Arms Traffic Convention of 1925, and expressed the hope that the General Disarmament Conference might find it possible to an more agree upon international convention providing for stringent regulation and control of the international traffic in an arms than that agreed upon in 1925. Within hour after the reading of this Message, Senator Pittman, Chairman of the Com on mittee Foreign Relations, presented to the Senate the unani mous report of the Committee in favor of the ratification of the Convention of 1925, and introduced a Joint Resolution, which he stated had the of the the support Administration, authorizing arms war to President to prohibit the sale of and munitions of Bolivia and Paraguay; and Senator Nye moved that $35,000 be added to the for the of his Committee. appropriation expenses events of to a The that day served focus public opinion upon question in which various organizations have for years been to attempting awaken public interest, and for which opinion had been prepared by the appearance within the past few months of a number of widely-read articles and books.1 to was It would probably be impossible determine just when it first realized that the private manufacture of arms and the inter arms national trade in constituted serious dangers to the peace of the world, and that governmental supervision and control of those whom the President in his called "manufacturers Message " must a and merchants of engines of destruction be fundamental to or con element in any program designed restrict abolish armed 1 Among the most recent books and articles, some frankly sensational, others more sober, have been: "Merchants of Death," by H. C. Engelbrecht and F. C. Hanighen (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1934); "Iron, Blood and Profits," by George Seldes (New York: Harper, 1934); "Arms and the Men," Fortune Magazine, (reprinted in pamphlet form by Doubleday, Doran); "Slaughter for Sale," by John G?nther, Harper's Magazine, ; "The Armaments Scan dal," by Jonathan Mitchell, New Republic, May 9 and 23,1934.

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flict among the nations. It first became a matter of world-wide discussion immediately after the Great War when men were means to the recurrence of such a seeking every possible prevent The statesmen conflict. who drafted the Covenant of the League were aware of Nations well of it when they included in it the fol : lowing provision The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enter of war to prise munitions and implements of is open grave objections. The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those Members of the are not to League which able manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety.2 more two Within little than months after the signature of the a Treaty of Versailles, Convention for the Control of the Trade in was at Arms and Ammunition signed St. Germain-en-Laye and on Paris September 10, 1919, by the representatives of twenty eight powers. Frank L. Polk, Henry White and General Tasker H. Bliss signed for the United States, but the failure of the Senate to give its advice and consent to the ratification of the Treaty of same Versailles brought upon this Convention the fate which met the other subsidiary treaties negotiated at the Peace Conference. It was not transmitted by the President to the Senate. On numerous occasions from 1921 to 1923, the United States was urged by other signatory governments, and by the League of to out as Nations, ratify this Convention. They pointed that long as one of the remained principal manufacturing powers unfettered to by its terms, other countries could not be expected subject themselves to limitations which would result not in the control or the diminution of the trade in arms, but in the transfer of that trade to competitors of other nationalities to whom the Conven not tion did apply. The objections of this Government were, how The Convention was the ever, insuperable. predicated upon sup position that all the signatories would be members of the League, were and certain functions of supervision and control placed in the hands of that organization. Thus ratification by the United States was, politically speaking, impossible. When this situation to to finally became clear the other signatories the Convention, was no and when they had come to realize that there likelihood near reverse that the United States would in the future the posi to tion which it had assumed in respect the League, European 2 Article 8, Section 5. ARMS MANUFACTURERS AND THE PUBLIC 641

statesmen carne to the conclusion that the Convention of St. Germain could never be put into effect. on The Council of the League April 21, 1923, adopted the fol lowing resolution: on The Council, the proposal of the Temporary Mixed Commission for the Reduction of Armaments, requests its President to ascertain whether the as Government of the United States would be disposed to state its views to the manner in which it would be willing to cooperate with other governments in arms arms. the control both of the traffic in and the private manufacture of to The reply of the United States Government the communica was as to tion transmitting this Resolution such discourage all was not but the most persistent. The Council, however, discour an was aged. On December 14,1923, invitation sent to the United to a new States participate in preparing the draft of convention. In the interval between these two communications, certain sec tions of public opinion in the United States had been aroused by the of the Government to with apparent unwillingness cooperate a so to other nations in dealing with problem vital the peace of the world. Perhaps the emphatic expression of this opinion had some effect in changing the attitude of the Government. In any was case, the invitation of the Council accepted and representa a new tives of the United States participated in the drafting of was convention. A conference to consider this draft called by the on League to meet in Geneva May 4, 1925. The American dele gates were Theodore E. Burton, former Senator from Ohio, at a that time Member of Congress; Hugh S. Gibson, then Minister to Switzerland; Rear Admiral Andrew T. Long, Allen W. Dulles, and Brigadier General Colden L. Ruggles. Throughout the nego an on tiations, there was evident desire the part of the delegates a en of the other Powers to produce convention which would no counter difficulties in being ratified by the United States. Mr. Burton, in the report of the American Delegation of December 16, 1925, stated:

The delegates at the Conference impressed upon the American Delegation their view that any international convention for the control of the trade in arms would be ineffective unless adhered to by the United States, one of the a important arms-producing Powers. With view to facilitating American ad not herence, the Conference did press for the inclusion of any provision for the or an supervision control of the arms trade by international commission, to recognizing that such control woijld be inacceptable this Government. to Further, the various proposals advanced from time time by the American Delegation received the full and sympathetic consideration of the Conference 642 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

and in every case where American principles and interests were involved, were solutions which the American Delegation considered acceptable adopted. The American Delegation desire to record their recognition of this attitude or and, in submitting the Treaty, to state that in their opinion the success no failure of the present Convention will in small measure depend upon the matter. position assumed by the American Government in the

was The Convention transmitted by President Coolidge to the on Senate for its advice and consent to ratification January 11, 1926. was The signing of the Arms Traffic Convention of 1925 hailed as a throughout the world great and signal victory. The evils arms arising from the private manufacture of and the interna tional traffic in arms were now about to succumb to international supervision and control. Enlightened public opinion had tri ? or so umphed it seemed. But the proponents of the Convention were doomed, as a result of the indifference of the United States to a Senate, great disappointment. The Convention slumbered in on the Committee Foreign Relations from January 11,1926, until no was May 18,1934. It is difficult to determine why action taken over a are on this Convention such long period. There those who have not failed to discern in the inaction of the Senate the result of the nefarious machinations of American arms manufacturers. more to in A much probable explanation appears be that, the ab sence an of aroused public opinion in this country, the Senate did not to act a in feel impelled upon Convention which few of its were were members particularly interested. No hearings held by no the Committee and definite opposition developed. From time to time successive Secretaries of State attempted to prod the a on Committee into action. President Hoover sent Message But January 10, 1933, urging that favorable action be taken. this on Message fell stony ground. The immediate response of the on Committee Foreign Relations to the recent similar Message in no of President Roosevelt may probably be ascribed small part to to the the revival of public interest in questions relating munitions industry. The ratification of the Convention by the United States would a brief probably result in its coming into force within reasonably of interval. Other important PowerS, remembering the Treaty St. Germain, have waited action by the United States. The Con vention provides that it will become effective when ratified by or have fourteen Powers. Twelve ratifications accessions already ARMS MANUFACTURERS AND THE PUBLIC 643 been deposited. Two other Powers have decided upon ratifica tion, and one other Power upon accession, but ratification in these three cases has not been completed. Some of these ratifications are, however, conditional upon ratification by other specified on powers. The Committee Foreign Relations has recommended a similar procedure for this Government by proposing reservation to the effect that the Convention shall not come into force so far as the United States is concerned until it shall have come into force in respect to Belgium, the British Empire, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The important provisions of the Arms Traffic Convention of 1925 limit the export of arms to those arms intended for the direct state supply of the government of the importing (or with the consent a of such government for the supply of public authority a or subordinate to it), and set up machinery of licenses export arms or declarations for all exported imported, and provide for arms full publicity for the traffic. Ever since the end of theWorld War there have been two main currents as to means of opinion the proper of dealing with the arms evils arising from the private manufacture of and the international traffic therein. Some believe that the remedy lies in governmental supervision and control and full publicity; are others convinced that nothing short of the complete suppres arms sion of the private manufacture of and the nationalization of the whole armaments industry and the international traffic in arms and munitions will eradicate the evils inherent in the present system. The Arms Traffic Convention of 1925, following in general the lines laid down in the Convention of St. Germain, was an attempt to deal with the problem by the former method. are The proponents of the latter method still actively working for a solution in conformity with their views. At the of its deliberations the General Commis very beginning " a sion of the General Disarmament Conference appointed Com mittee for the Regulation of the Trade in and the Private and canvass State Manufacture of Arms and Implements of War" to the opinions of the governments participating in the Conference, to a to and make recommendations with view the incorporation a in General Disarmament Convention of provisions dealing with met at this phase of the disarmament problem. The Committee matters at intervals during 1932 and 1933 and discussed these 644 FOREIGN AFFAIRS all great length. Of the Committees of this almost hopelessly was deadlocked Conference, this Committee perhaps the most hopelessly deadlocked. Its reports "on the progress of the work" are are reports of lack of progress. Questions posed, radical divi no sions of views recorded, and conclusions of any consequence at. arrived Underlying the innumerable subsidiary differences of opinion which developed during the discussions of the Committee, was the fundamental divergence between the advocates of super vision and control and the advocates of suppression and national ization. In the forefront of those advocating the former method of were approach the delegations of the United States, Great Brit most ain, Belgium, Germany, Italy and Japan; the energetic were exponents of the latter method the delegations of France, Poland, Denmark and Spain. of The position the United States has remained unchanged was Mr. since it expressed by Burton during the negotiation of the Arms Traffic Convention of 1925, in part as follows: Many of those in Europe and America with whom I have cooperated for movements years past in for peace think that the solution of their problems so rests in the prohibition of private manufacture. They argue, that long as a private manufacture continues, there will be powerful industrial interest, the prosperity of which will be promoted by war, and this they consider to be a barrier in the way of peace. They consider also that these private manufac turers un have also been extremely skilful in the circulation of propaganda favorable to peace. Thus, they say, the manufacture of arms, munitions and war to implements of should be restricted Governments. me Let point out to you the fallacy of this argument. The private manufac ture of arms and munitions is flexible and adapted both to peace and to war. It may consist of the manufacture of explosives and material for industrial pur poses, of sporting arms which have nothing to do with war, to which can be added in time of conflict the manufacture of military arms. Take my own as an country example; the manufacture of munitions and military arms was negligible before the late Great War, but, during that period, private industry now increased to enormous proportions; it has fallen back to what it was before. Government manufacture and control, on the other hand, are inflexible and look to a state of war. It involves the maintenance of a very considerable force, always engaged in the manufacture of implements of destruction. If that a force is disbanded the nation is helpless, and there is always strong interest a in favor of maintaining in any form of Government activity large force, to at a coun expanding its operations the maximum. Thus, I say that, least in arms try like the United States, the idea that the private manufacture of should a be prohibited, and that such prohibition would promote peace, is chimera. a More than that, why should Conference be called for the prohibition of or private manufacture and leave the Governmental public manufacture ARMSMANUFACTURERS AND THE PUBLIC 645 or alone? Shall the respective Governments of the world, whether warlike to at peaceful in their intentions, build huge structures make arms, and the same time prohibit the private manufacture? What of the private manufac turers, many of whom have the most pacific intentions? What have they done that there should be this discrimination against them? What hope have the lovers of peace in prohibiting private manufacture, if Governmental manufac ture may still go on to an enormous and unlimited extent? The opponents of nationalization of the munitions industry an contend that such action would probably result in increase in arms an the production of and munitions and in increase in the stocks maintained by the governments of the world. They argue that the governments of non-producing countries would be to to obliged establish arsenals in order supply their legitimate an to arms needs, and that their inability in emergency purchase and munitions from private producers abroad would probably to on lead them maintain very large stocks hand. They contend a further that such system would strengthen the strong and weaken the weak. The great majority of the nations of the world at ten or a would be placed the mercy of the dozen nations fa raw vored by nature with supplies of materials and possessed of the are are necessary industrial organization. There many also who to strongly opposed nationalization of the munitions industry because such a system would put governments into business on a scale unknown at present outside of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics. as can As far any tendency be discerned in the recent discus sions at Geneva, it would appear to be a tendency toward gov ernmental supervision and control rather than toward national ization. As the former solution is less extreme than the latter, to more there would appear be likelihood of its being agreed upon as a compromise, if any agreement is to be reached, than that the proponents of governmental supervision and control should be won over to an the thesis of nationalization. Such agreement a might embody reiteration of the provisions of the Arms Traffic Convention of 1925, modified in some non-essentials which have been to with to subjected criticism, together provisions similar those contained in the Draft Convention submitted to the Council a of the League by Special Commission in 1929. This Draft a Convention provides for the setting up of system of licenses arms a for manufacture and system of full publicity for the armaments to industry, similar the system of licenses and pub licity provided for the traffic in arms by the Convention of 1925. 646 FOREIGN AFFAIRS The Government of the United States has been more reluctant to accept the principle of supervision and control of the manufac arms was to to ture of than it accept this principle in respect the our at international traffic. Until November 18, 1932, delegates met Geneva had always the proposal that governmental super vision and control be established by international agreement with the statement that the Constitution of the United States a conven prevented the Federal Government from entering into tion involving the control of manufacture in the several States. at a On that date, Mr. Hugh Wilson announced meeting of the Bureau of the Disarmament Conference that the United States was to prepared accept supervision of private manufacture provided state was that manufacture also supervised. This change of posi tion had been foreshadowed by Mr. Stimson, who several days was as before quoted in the press stating that the Government had reached the conclusion that the position that the Federal Government lacked constitutional power to enter into such a convention was not well taken. In this statement, he referred to case vs. as the of Missouri Holland supporting the position that enter a this Government could into such convention and, having done so, would possess the constitutional authority to enact and to statement enforce legislation pursuant that convention. This in conjunction with the statement in President Roosevelt's was Message of May 18, 1934, that it his "earnest hope that the on representatives of the nations who will reassemble at Geneva will be able to a convention May 29 agree upon containing pro arms visions for the supervision and control of the traffic in much more were far reaching than those which embodied in the Con vention of 1925" would appear to indicate clearly that the Gov ernment an of the United States is prepared to enter into inter most national convention providing for the stringent supervision and control, both of the manufacture of arms and of the inter a national traffic in arms, by the establishment of system of licenses accompanied by full publicity. no It has been recognized by all students of the problem that can effective control of the munitions industry be established some na except by international agreement. Nevertheless, of the tions have independently enacted domestic legislation of the nature of that contemplated by the Arms Traffic Convention of at 1925 and other proposals which have been made Geneva. Great Britain and Sweden, for instance, require licenses for the ARMSMANUFACTURERS AND THE PUBLIC 647 arms and to is fre export of and munitions, permission export to the of arms in quently withheld. Authority prohibit export cases in the Executive of the of particular is vested governments countries all of the important producing except Czechoslovakia, Switzerland and the United States. in The United States has lagged far behind other nations on Our Government has on several occa legislation this subject. sions and made The expressed pious hopes pious gestures. Depart ment of State on December 27, 1923, issued a statement to the Government in to the press, defending the position of this regard Convention of St. Germain, and adding: a to in The Executive Branch of the Government is not in position intervene not to transactions which are wholly within the law; but desiring encourage other Powers to arm themselves for conflict, which is deemed contrary to the in addition to a strict spirit of the country, this Government, adopting policy has to the with regard to the sale of surplus government army stores, replied not the recent inquiries which it has received that it does encourage shipment of war material to the troubled areas of the world. This stand has been taken was not of fact although this Government unmindful the that intending pur wants. chasers would no doubt resort to other markets to supply their It may not favor also be added that under present conditions the Department would a would be the flotation of foreign loan in this country for which the proceeds utilized for armament.

There is no evidence that the announcement of this policy so as of arms and muni had any practical effect in far the export was concerned. tions by private companies and individuals Aside from the laws of the Federal Government and of the several to arms to criminals and mi States designed prevent the sale of the nors and to protect the public against explosions, only legisla arms a tion relating to the traffic in is series of Joint Resolutions to recent debates which have been brought public attention by in Congress. on The first of these Joint Resolutions was that approved April 22, 1898,? which conferred upon the Executive the power to war discretion and prohibit the export of materials "within his as seem to him ex with such limitations and exemptions would was a war measure pedient." Although this Resolution passed war on statute in connection with the with Spain, it remained the was books for fourteen years and the power conferred by it used on October 14, 1905, when President Theodore Roosevelt issued a in which "for good and sufficient reasons unto ?proclamation4 30 Stat. 739. *34Stat. 3183. 648 FOREIGN AFFAIRS me arms to appearing" he forbade the export of any port in the was Dominican Republic. This resolution amended by the pas sage of the Joint Resolution of March 14, 1912,5 as follows:

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the joint resolution to prohibit the export of coal or other material used in war from any seaport of the United States, approved April twenty-second, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, be, and hereby is, amended to read as follows: That whenever the President shall find that in any American country con are or ditions of domestic violence exist which promoted by the use of arms war munitions of procured from the United States, and shall make proclama tion thereof, it shall be unlawful to export except under such limitations and as arms or war exceptions the President shall prescribe any munitions of from any place in the United States to such country until otherwise ordered by the or President by Congress. a Sec. 2. That any shipment of material hereby declared unlawful after such not proclamation shall be punishable by fine exceeding ten thousand dollars, or not two or imprisonment exceeding years, both.

By the Joint Resolution of January 31, 1922,6 this authority was extended to include any country in which the United States exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction. These countries are, at some present, China, Morocco, Egypt, Ethiopia, and of the states of Arabia. Pursuant to the authority conferred by these two Reso lutions, restrictions upon the export of arms have been pro as claimed follows: Brazil (proclaimed October 22, 1930; revoked March 2, 1931); China (proclaimed March4,1922; still in effect); Cuba (proclaimed May 2, 1924; revoked August 29, 1924); Hon duras (proclaimed March 22, 1924; still in effect); Mexico (pro claimed March 14, 1912; revoked February 3, 1914; proclaimed October 19, 1915; revoked January 31, 1922; proclaimed January 7, 1924; revoked , 1929); Nicaragua (proclaimed Septem ber 15, 1926; still in effect). In enforcing the restrictions proclaimed under the Joint Reso lutions of March 14, 1912 and January 31, 1922, the Secretaries of State have established a system of licenses for each individual or shipment. These licenses have been granted withheld in their at mo discretion in accordance with the conditions existing the were ment in the countries for which the shipments destined. was The principle underlying these resolutions confirmed by to the Convention relating the Rights and Duties of States in the 6 37 Stat. 630. ?42 Stat. 361. ARMS MANUFACTURERS AND THE PUBLIC 649 at on Event of Civil Strife, signed Havana February 20, 1928, under which the United States, as a party to the Convention, is to obligated prevent the export of arms intended for the use of rebels against the authorities of such Governments as have rati fied that Convention. It will be noted that the Joint Resolution of January 31, 1922, refers exclusively to "conditions of domestic violence." On Janu in a recom ary 10, 1933, President Hoover, Special Message, mended that the authority of the Executive in this matter be cover extended to international conflicts. In pursuance of this recommendation, the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate unanimously reported the so-called Arms Embargo Resolution, as : of which the vital portion reads follows That whenever the President finds that in any part of the world conditions arms or war exist such that the shipment of munitions of from countries which or produce these commodities may promote encourage the employment of in course of a or force the dispute conflict between nations, and, after securing the cooperation of such governments as the President deems necessary, he makes proclamation thereof, it shall be unlawful to export, or sell for export, as except under such limitations and exceptions the President prescribes, any arms or war munitions of from any place in the United States to such country or as or countries he may designate, until otherwise ordered by the President by Congress. This Resolution was a passed without dissenting vote by the on Senate January 11, 1933. A few days later, however, Senator of Connecticut moved to Bingham reconsider, explaining that it would to on take several hours for him set forth his objections constitutional grounds to the Resolution. As it was near the end of the session and as the Senate calendar was crowded, he found no to no opportunity state his objections and further action was taken by the Senate. same During the session of Congress, the Resolution was de at on bated length by the House Committee Foreign Affairs. At a was series of hearings, it supported by the Secretary of State, Mr. and of his and strenu Stimson, representatives department, ously opposed by the representatives of a number of arms manufacturers. These latter attacked the Resolution as unconstitu as tional, potentially harmful to American trade and as constitut a menace to ing the national defense. It was, however, voted out the an by Committee with amendment limiting its application to the Western In Hemisphere. view of the effective opposition of Senator Bingham to further consideration of the Resolution in 650 FOREIGN AFFAIRS was not to the Senate, it deemed worth while bring the amended Resolution to a vote in the House. was At the special session of Congress, which called by Presi dent Roosevelt shortly after his inauguration, the Resolution was revived with the support of the new Administration. The Com on mittee Foreign Affairs of the House again discussed it at now length and held further public hearings. The discussions centered upon a statement which Mr. Stimson had made in sup port of the Resolution and, in particular upon the following por tion of his statement that "one of two conditions would exist," ? that namely a. The world would cooperate in refusing supplies to both nations. This no would certainly involve breach of neutrality by the United States as the a common movement would be general and the nations united in front. b. There might be a situation in which as a result of investigation and con on a was a sultation large scale there clear definition agreed upon by all the one or cooperating powers that side the other was the aggressor. It is becoming evident in recent years that this condition is much easier to realize than used on to be believed. The world-wide publicity afforded since the Great War every international incident and army movement, and the means of investiga tion by international commissions which is rapidly gaining ground, all show a that there are situations today in which there can be general verdict far on beyond previous anticipation. The verdict of the League of Nations this as recent a point, for example, shown by events, is perfectly practicable pro or cedure. If the League any other comprehensive group of important states a had mutually arrived at such verdict, the participation of the United States a arms not in general embargo would be merely practical and sound but our a practically necessary to preserve national dignity and standing as peace ful nation.

This statement was hailed with enthusiasm by several well an a known international lawyers who sensed in it indication of more on cooperative attitude the part of the United States, and it on immediately drew the fire of other distinguished authorities international law, including John Bassett Moore. The Arms Em center a on bargo Resolution suddenly became the of debate the in to policy which the United States should adopt relation the whole structure of the machinery for peace which has been built war. up since the Out of the welter of arguments covering the Covenant of the League, the Briand-Kellogg Pact, 's as Farewell Address, and the doctrine of neutrality applied during at the Napoleonic Wars, the chief point issue clearly emerged. was It as follows: Was the President, in exercising the authority re conferred upon him by the Resolution, to be bound to apply ARMS MANUFACTURERS AND THE PUBLIC 651 on arms to an strictions the export of equally all parties to armed or he be discretion to them to a conflict, might permitted apply case so-called "aggressor nation" in aggression had been judi or case cially quasi-judicially determined, and in the Government of the United States concurred in the decision, at the same time arms to permitting the unrestricted sale of and munitions the nations engaged in resisting the aggressor? The Democratic majority of the Committee, complying with the recommenda tions of Presidents Hoover and Roosevelt and their respective Secretaries of State, voted in support of the Resolution conferring discretionary power upon the President. The Republican minor an ity presented adverse report. After prolonged debate, the Reso was an lution carried in the House by almost strictly partisan vote. on The Senate Committee Foreign Relations adopted the posi tion of the Republicans in the House and reported the Resolution on to the Senate May 30, 1933, with the so-called Johnson Amendment as follows: or Provided, however, That any prohibition of export, of sale for export, proclaimed under this resolution shall apply impartially to all the parties to or to the dispute conflict which it refers. same On the day the Secretary of State was reported in the as not press having stated that the Johnson Amendment did to or conform the views of the President of himself, and, probably as a was not to a result of this statement, the Resolution brought vote in the Senate during the special session. On February 28, 1934, the Resolution, with the addition of the was Johnson Amendment, unexpectedly called up in the Senate a were and passed without dissenting vote. As the two Houses in to was to disagreement in regard the amendment, it returned the on House where at this writing it still reposes the Speaker's desk. on The Administration has, several occasions, reiterated its op to out position the amendment. It has been pointed that Mr. Norman H. on a statement Davis, May 22, 1933, made before the General Commission of the General Disarmament Conference in which, on behalf of the United States, he declared:

In addition I wish to make it clear that we are ready not only to do our part toward the substantive reduction of armaments, but if this is effected by gen we are eral international agreement, also prepared to contribute in other ways to we are the organization of peace. In particular willing to consult the other a a states in case of threat to peace with view to averting conflict. Further than 652 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

that, in the event that the states, in conference, determine that a state has a been guilty of breach of the peace in violation of its international obligations, measures we concur and take against the violator, then, if in the judgment as rendered to the responsible and guilty party, we will refrain from any action tending to defeat such collective effort which these states may thus make to restore peace.

The passage of the Resolution may not be necessary in order to permit the Government of the United States to carry out the terms of Mr. Davis's offer, although without the passage of such a no Resolution the President would have authority to prevent arms to a shipment of both parties of conflict and the shipment of arms to an as ac aggressor nation might possibly be considered to tion tending defeat collective effort. The passage of the Reso run lution with the Johnson Amendment would obviously counter to as the principles and spirit underlying Mr. Davis's offer, the arms to prohibition of the shipment of the nations engaging in an to collective action against aggressor would undoubtedly tend defeat such collective effort. From statements made in recent Congressional debates, it may be inferred that the proponents of as the Johnson Amendment intended it evidence of their disap proval of the disarmament policy of the President. In view of the inability of two successive Administrations (of to secure different political complexions) the passage of the Arms Embargo Resolution, the prompt and unanimous action of Con on to gress the Resolution empowering the President prohibit arms war to the sale of and munitions of Bolivia and Paraguay was is little short of astounding. It introduced in the Senate by on Senator Pittman May 18 and in the House by Mr. McRey nolds on 21. The Committees voted it out unan May respective was a imously, and it passed by the House without dissenting on a on vote May 23, and by the Senate without dissenting vote seems May 24. At this writing, it probable that the President will a within few days approve the Resolution and issue the necessary to true Proclamation make the prohibition effective. It is that by terms on arms the of this Resolution any prohibition the sale of to con and munitions would apply equally both parties to the flict and that, therefore, the controversy which has raged about the Johnson Amendment did not arise. The Resolution has, how ever, the same "unconstitutional" character and offers the same "menace" to the national defense which were so eloquently de arms nounced by the representatives of manufacturers in the ARMS MANUFACTURERS AND THE PUBLIC 653 on no public hearings the Arms Embargo Resolution. This time at representatives of those manufacturers appeared the Capitol. It may be surmised that they have sensed the trend of public the no opinion within last few months and that they will longer at to ac oppose, least openly, legislation designed control their tivities in the public interest. a When Senator Nye introduced his Resolution, calling for Senate investigation of all aspects of the munitions industry and was the traffic in arms, it freely predicted that he could not pos secure on sibly favorable action by the Senate such a Resolution. as at He has been quoted having said that time that, although was he introducing the Resolution in all good faith and would make every effort to secure its passage, he nevertheless had almost no of success. A hope The Resolution has been passed. Special Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry has been seven as formed, consisting of Senators, with Senator Nye Chair man. The President, in his Message of May 18, recommended that the Senate give its generous support to the Committee and promised the full cooperation of all the Executive Departments. an The Committee is effecting organization and has begun its labors. It to is be hoped that the Nye Committee's investigation will be an objective and thorough. It has opportunity to present for the to an first time the American people the facts in regard to in are dustry of which the activities of the highest interest to the on a nation, and, the basis of these facts, it will be in position to recommend dispassionately and authoritatively legislation and a policy in field in which wise action by the American Govern ment is imperatively necessary.