july 1934 Arms Manufacturers and the Public J. Volume 12 • Number 4 The contents of Foreign Affairs are copyrighted.©1934 Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution of this material is permitted only with the express written consent of Foreign Affairs. Visit www.foreignaffairs.com/permissions for more information. ARMS MANUFACTURERS AND THE PUBLIC ByJ. a ON MAY 18, 1934, President Roosevelt sent strongly to worded Message the Senate, recommending that it to give generous support the Special Committee which under the Chairmanship of Senator Nye has been charged with the investigation of the munitions industry. He further urged consent to that the Senate give its advice and the ratification of the Arms Traffic Convention of 1925, and expressed the hope that the General Disarmament Conference might find it possible to an more agree upon international convention providing for stringent regulation and control of the international traffic in an arms than that agreed upon in 1925. Within hour after the reading of this Message, Senator Pittman, Chairman of the Com on mittee Foreign Relations, presented to the Senate the unani mous report of the Committee in favor of the ratification of the Convention of 1925, and introduced a Joint Resolution, which he stated had the of the the support Administration, authorizing arms war to President to prohibit the sale of and munitions of Bolivia and Paraguay; and Senator Nye moved that $35,000 be added to the for the of his Committee. appropriation expenses events of to a The that day served focus public opinion upon question in which various organizations have for years been to attempting awaken public interest, and for which opinion had been prepared by the appearance within the past few months of a number of widely-read articles and books.1 to was It would probably be impossible determine just when it first realized that the private manufacture of arms and the inter arms national trade in constituted serious dangers to the peace of the world, and that governmental supervision and control of those whom the President in his called "manufacturers Message " must a and merchants of engines of destruction be fundamental to or con element in any program designed restrict abolish armed 1 Among the most recent books and articles, some frankly sensational, others more sober, have been: "Merchants of Death," by H. C. Engelbrecht and F. C. Hanighen (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1934); "Iron, Blood and Profits," by George Seldes (New York: Harper, 1934); "Arms and the Men," Fortune Magazine, March 1934 (reprinted in pamphlet form by Doubleday, Doran); "Slaughter for Sale," by John G?nther, Harper's Magazine, May 1934; "The Armaments Scan dal," by Jonathan Mitchell, New Republic, May 9 and 23,1934. Council on Foreign Relations is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve, and extend access to Foreign Affairs ® www.jstor.org 640 FOREIGN AFFAIRS flict among the nations. It first became a matter of world-wide discussion immediately after the Great War when men were means to the recurrence of such a seeking every possible prevent The statesmen conflict. who drafted the Covenant of the League were aware of Nations well of it when they included in it the fol : lowing provision The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enter of war to prise munitions and implements of is open grave objections. The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those Members of the are not to League which able manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety.2 more two Within little than months after the signature of the a Treaty of Versailles, Convention for the Control of the Trade in was at Arms and Ammunition signed St. Germain-en-Laye and on Paris September 10, 1919, by the representatives of twenty eight powers. Frank L. Polk, Henry White and General Tasker H. Bliss signed for the United States, but the failure of the Senate to give its advice and consent to the ratification of the Treaty of same Versailles brought upon this Convention the fate which met the other subsidiary treaties negotiated at the Peace Conference. It was not transmitted by the President to the Senate. On numerous occasions from 1921 to 1923, the United States was urged by other signatory governments, and by the League of to out as Nations, ratify this Convention. They pointed that long as one of the remained principal manufacturing powers unfettered to by its terms, other countries could not be expected subject themselves to limitations which would result not in the control or the diminution of the trade in arms, but in the transfer of that trade to competitors of other nationalities to whom the Conven not tion did apply. The objections of this Government were, how The Convention was the ever, insuperable. predicated upon sup position that all the signatories would be members of the League, were and certain functions of supervision and control placed in the hands of that organization. Thus ratification by the United States was, politically speaking, impossible. When this situation to to finally became clear the other signatories the Convention, was no and when they had come to realize that there likelihood near reverse that the United States would in the future the posi to tion which it had assumed in respect the League, European 2 Article 8, Section 5. ARMS MANUFACTURERS AND THE PUBLIC 641 statesmen carne to the conclusion that the Convention of St. Germain could never be put into effect. on The Council of the League April 21, 1923, adopted the fol lowing resolution: on The Council, the proposal of the Temporary Mixed Commission for the Reduction of Armaments, requests its President to ascertain whether the as Government of the United States would be disposed to state its views to the manner in which it would be willing to cooperate with other governments in arms arms. the control both of the traffic in and the private manufacture of to The reply of the United States Government the communica was as to tion transmitting this Resolution such discourage all was not but the most persistent. The Council, however, discour an was aged. On December 14,1923, invitation sent to the United to a new States participate in preparing the draft of convention. In the interval between these two communications, certain sec tions of public opinion in the United States had been aroused by the of the Government to with apparent unwillingness cooperate a so to other nations in dealing with problem vital the peace of the world. Perhaps the emphatic expression of this opinion had some effect in changing the attitude of the Government. In any was case, the invitation of the Council accepted and representa a new tives of the United States participated in the drafting of was convention. A conference to consider this draft called by the on League to meet in Geneva May 4, 1925. The American dele gates were Theodore E. Burton, former Senator from Ohio, at a that time Member of Congress; Hugh S. Gibson, then Minister to Switzerland; Rear Admiral Andrew T. Long, Allen W. Dulles, and Brigadier General Colden L. Ruggles. Throughout the nego an on tiations, there was evident desire the part of the delegates a en of the other Powers to produce convention which would no counter difficulties in being ratified by the United States. Mr. Burton, in the report of the American Delegation of December 16, 1925, stated: The delegates at the Conference impressed upon the American Delegation their view that any international convention for the control of the trade in arms would be ineffective unless adhered to by the United States, one of the a important arms-producing Powers. With view to facilitating American ad not herence, the Conference did press for the inclusion of any provision for the or an supervision control of the arms trade by international commission, to recognizing that such control woijld be inacceptable this Government. to Further, the various proposals advanced from time time by the American Delegation received the full and sympathetic consideration of the Conference 642 FOREIGN AFFAIRS and in every case where American principles and interests were involved, were solutions which the American Delegation considered acceptable adopted. The American Delegation desire to record their recognition of this attitude or and, in submitting the Treaty, to state that in their opinion the success no failure of the present Convention will in small measure depend upon the matter. position assumed by the American Government in the was The Convention transmitted by President Coolidge to the on Senate for its advice and consent to ratification January 11, 1926. was The signing of the Arms Traffic Convention of 1925 hailed as a throughout the world great and signal victory. The evils arms arising from the private manufacture of and the interna tional traffic in arms were now about to succumb to international supervision and control. Enlightened public opinion had tri ? or so umphed it seemed. But the proponents of the Convention were doomed, as a result of the indifference of the United States to a Senate, great disappointment. The Convention slumbered in on the Committee Foreign Relations from January 11,1926, until no was May 18,1934. It is difficult to determine why action taken over a are on this Convention such long period. There those who have not failed to discern in the inaction of the Senate the result of the nefarious machinations of American arms manufacturers. more to in A much probable explanation appears be that, the ab sence an of aroused public opinion in this country, the Senate did not to act a in feel impelled upon Convention which few of its were were members particularly interested.