Resilience Building in Selected Countries

EUROPE VERSUS DISINFORMATION: RESILIENCE BUILDING IN SELECTED COUNTRIES

AUTHORS: IZABELA ALBRYCHT, FAUSTINE FELICI, MICHAŁ KRAWCZYK, KAMIL MIKULSKI, TOMASZ PIEKARZ, JAKUB TUSZYŃSKI, ANASTAZJA WIŚNIEWSKA AUTHORS:

Izabela Albrycht Introduction, Recommendations Kamil Mikulski European Union Tomasz Piekarz Poland Anastazja Wiśniewska Germany Faustine Felici France Michał Krawczyk United Kingdom Jakub Tuszyński Three Seas states

EDITORS: Izabela Albrycht, Michał Krawczyk, Kamil Mikulski GRAPHIC DESIGN AND DTP: Joanna Świerad-Solińska TRANSLATION: Adam Ladziński

The report was financed with the support of the Open Information Partnership

The present report is a publication by The Kosciuszko Institute. At the same time, the views expressed herein are individual authors’ assessments and should not be confounded with the standpoint of The Kosciuszko Institute and publication partners. The publication is a contribution to the public debate. Individual authors are responsible solely for their opinions and their viewpoints cannot be confounded with those of other report authors.

The Kosciuszko Institute ul. Feldmana 4/9-10 31-130 Krakow, Poland +48 12 632 97 24 www.ik.org.pl © The Kosciuszko Institute [email protected] Krakow 2021 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction...... 5

European Union...... 10

Poland...... 21

Germany...... 34

France...... 42

United Kingdom...... 51

Three Seas states...... 62

Recommendations...... 72 EUROPE VERSUS DISINFORMATION: RESILIENCE BUILDING IN SELECTED COUNTRIES

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Izabela Albrycht that drew the eyes of researchers, services, and politicians in 2016,2 that is the one done in con- Introduction nection with the US presidential election,3 to the activities in Georgia and Moldova, recently “Resilience must reside within identified.4 Propaganda and disinformation as societies as well as the state” wielded by Russia are also instruments in hybrid warfare, which the war in Ukraine provides exam- Despite there being many past examples of lever- ples of. In this case, disinformation became part aging propaganda, disinformation, or information and parcel of information warfare, which has warfare in military and civilian actions, not until its origins in the Russian notion of “new-gener- the digital age were these activities possible on ation war”. Presented as early as 2013 by Gen. such an unprecedented scale with a low finan- Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of cial and organisational entry threshold. Moreover, the Russian Federation Armed Forces, the concept it is already plain to see that similar actions are pictured info ops as a fixture of warfare to be con- going to increasingly challenge the security of ducted in times of both conflict and peace – and democratic states and impact the geopolitical as the strategy was updated in 2019, the impor- rivalry which has intensified in the late 2010s. tance of hybrid activities was clearly underscored.5 Advanced information threats are notoriously General Gerasimov said that combining a small piling up, which is tied up mostly with techno- expeditionary force with information opera- logical progress. Collecting more data on each tions had proved that they could be expanded to of us and on our proclivities makes it possible to “defend and advance national interests beyond create content that better targets its user, while the borders of Russia”.6 Across Europe, Russia- the development of artificial intelligence and originated information operations in cyberspace machine learning technologies causes the prop- have in recent years become an important ele- agation of deepfakes, which are yet another ment of Moscow’s foreign policy, often aimed not arrow in the fake news quiver. The last process is only to pursue political and economic interests an instance of information disorder, with the ava- but also to polarise societies. Russian disinforma- lanche of doctored or fake (but indistinguishable tion surged in the aftermath of Malaysian MH17 from real) multimedia only set to grow. As they plane being shot down over Ukrainian territory respond to the threat, democratic states will and in the wake of Sergei Skripal assassination need to strike a balance between the freedom of attempt in the United Kingdom, highlighting that expression as the principle and the need to regu- any European country can find itself the target of late the information space. They will also need to similar information-related actions. take a look at the level of responsibility shown by the internet platforms when addressing the prob- State services are raising the alarm that more and lem – the spaces which thanks to digital infra- more often democratic countries are becoming structure and applied algorithms are the main the targets for China’s info ops. Beijing uses media in the contemporary world. Crucially, pro-Chinese narratives or manipulations to further actions will need to be harmonised through inter- its political and economic agenda that aims at tech- national cooperation, bilateral and multilateral nological and economic domination. Many experts alike, including regional formats.1 also point out that the strategy has its second, less rhetorically aggressive facet, whose essence is to Information operations and propaganda are try to silence open public debate, as is happening, methods of influence and power projection that e.g. now in Estonia, where the Chinese embassy Russia (but also China and Iran) regularly uses, has expressed its dissatisfaction with Estonian de facto all over the world: from the campaign foreign intelligence service findings, accusing it of

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“unprofessional style” and “ideological prejudice”.7 and individual members of both these organisa- China acts, then, to render the information space tions have tried to meet this challenge. COVID- silent on issues that Beijing finds uncomfortable,8 19 seems to have left no doubts as to the exist- including the topics of COVID-19 or political influence of the problem, yet an effective systemic ence of the Chinese Communist Party on tech response to it has not been formulated so far. companies, e.g. Huawei, which are engaged in dig- We can, however, expect the challenge to remain itally transforming the world.9 near the top of the democratic states’ political agenda. In the so-called Reflection Group It is worth noting that both China and Russia regard report for NATO we read that “NATO populations information operations, disinfo included, as - anor expect to be protected against new threats such mal peacetime activity. And although the two use as cyber and disinformation and expect their gov- different methods and tools for it, they -lever ernments, supported by NATO, to develop tools age the operations to quell social unrest or dis- for attribution and deterrence. Resilience must satisfaction within their borders and to control reside within societies as well as the state.”14 in the longer term what the citizens think. Yet, in terms of European security, what seems important The ability to spread fake news with no limits is chiefly that “digital authoritarianism” models are imposed by geography or technology and with exported by China and Russia and used to play pol- exceedingly low costs has emerged alongside itics abroad – which clearly sets these states apart the development of the internet and social net- from Western democracies that tend to self-limit working platforms. The latter are playing a key the activities of this sort to warfare only.10 role as a tool for reaching millions of addressees, profiting from the content presented, or conduct- However, the disinformation problem is also spill- ing info ops. Their unregulated character and lack ing over the frame of international rivalry and of transparent disinformation-related legislation conflicts or information operations. For it also cause controlling the content on these portals to affects the lives of ordinary people, as has been be very difficult. The global character of the plat- highlighted in the COVID-19 pandemic, which is forms, geographically unbridled data flow tak- visibly accompanied with a disinformation epi- ing place on them, and being active in a realm demic on an unprecedented scale that many are that is still very much unregulated all make them calling infodemic.11 In this case, fake news may seek to follow a universal policy towards their impact people’s health, in extreme situations users all over the world, which is impossible at their lives, as well as the extent to which pan- times. As of now, many countries are attempt- demic escalates in a given country and the polit- ing to regulate the activity of tech companies ical tensions rooted in differing approaches to and social platforms, and are unveiling legislation tackling the epidemic, while exacerbating not that directly deals with disinformation. The global only the public health crisis but also trust erosion character of the platforms is related to worldwide and society polarisation on the grounds of deci- challenges in tacking disinformation, as coopera- sions and events that spark emotion. Still, even in tion by all stakeholders is required. An example is this case, “non-political” at first sight, an interven- the collaboration of the major platforms and EU tion is necessary from public institutions, which states in combating COVID-19 vaccine disinfor- should first of all understand the nature and mation. It seems, and the present report recom- scale of the problem, and then mount an effec- mends this as well, that the private sector’s and tive information campaign and take action to sys- democratic countries’ cooperation in this respect temically foster society-wide resilience-building is particularly important, if the chances for its with regard to disinformation. Over the last year, success are to increase. both the European Commission12 and NATO13,

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Disinfo? Hybrid threats? Fake news? Both the European Union institutions and Member States’ authorities have devoted a lot of atten- The term “information disorder” is used to refer to tion to the question of responding to informa- a dense tangle of concepts, which covers popular tion disorders and building resilience on regional terms such as fake news, disinformation, or (at least and national levels. European civil society organ- in part) hybrid threats. At the same time there isations and social media platforms have also can be no doubt that the terms just mentioned, become involved in countering these adverse although they can touch on similar phenomena, are phenomena. Thus, they set up a complicated sys- not in fact synonyms. Fake news, disinformation, tem with two structures: vertical (from collab- and hybrid threats slip away whenever attempts to oration-coordinating European institutions to capture them in impeccable definitions are made Member States to the private and third sectors) and happen to be understood in different ways by and horizontal (encompassing joint initiatives of var- those who use them. The underspecification was ious actors at the national and international levels). not an obstacle big enough to stop the UK publisher of the Collins dictionary from choosing “fake The present report aims to offer a holistic news” as their 2017 Word of the Year, whereas dis- description of the European resilience system in information and hybrid threats have reached deep a manner that both covers the main initiatives, into the heart of European public policies. subjectively determined, and provides nuggets of interesting information in the field of responses to The European Commission’s (henceforth: the information disorder throughout the Central the Commission) communication Tackling online and Eastern Europe, which seldom appear in sim- disinformation: a European Approach15 explains that ilar documents. Hence, the report starts with disinformation “is understood as verifiably false or pan-European-level initiatives undertaken by EU misleading information that is created, presented institutions, and then moves on to describing and disseminated for economic gain or to inten- actions by France, Germany, United Kingdom,17 tionally deceive the public, and may cause public and Poland, to finally portray the most -impor harm”. The same definition is recalled in the Action tant actions by the Three Seas Initiative coun- Plan against Disinformation and the EU Code of tries. The Kosciuszko Institute is going to con- Practice on Disinformation, the latter specifying tinue the topic of information disorder through it by way of a limited authentic interpretation. the undertakings of its CYBERSEC Disinfo Lab Notably, EU Code of Practice on Disinformation was and General Talks podcast. Please enjoy the read in fact prepared by the High Level Expert Group and follow our publications. on Fake News and Online Disinformation.16

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Media literacy level across Europe

European Policies Initiative published in 2019 a ranking of media literacy in 35 European countries. The states discussed in the report are presented below with their places in the ranking and their scores shown.

ESTONIA 70 points Rank 5

LATVIA UNITED 54 points KINGDOM Rank 17 60 points Rank 12 LITHUANIA 52 points Rank 19 POLAND GERMANY 53 points 64 points Rank 18 Rank 8 CZECHIA 51 points SLOVAKIA Rank 21 44 points AUSTRIA Rank 22 FRANCE 59 points 59 points Rank 13 HUNGARY Rank 15 41 points Rank 26 ROMANIA SLOVENIA 36 points 59 points CROATIA Rank 28 Rank 14 43 points Rank 25 BULGARIA 32 points Rank 29

Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5

Source: European Policies Initiative, Open Society Institute – Sofia

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ENDNOTES

1 In the case of Central and Eastern Europe, two platforms for such cooperation are active. The first one is the Visegrad Group, which has emphasised the need to collaborate on disinformation in its latest joint Digital Declaration signed on 17 February 2021 in Kraków; the second one is the Three Seas Initiative.

2 What should be noted is that foreign-inspired disinformation in Poland has intensified since 2014 – the outbreak of the “dignity revolution” in Kyiv’s Maidan and subsequently the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.

3 In this case the disinformation kept being sown by Russian trolls from the Internet Research Agency; alongside a number of other operative activities by Russian services such as the attempts to hack into Hillary Clinton’s e-mail server, it formed part of an operation designed to influence the outcome of the election.

4 Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service, International Security and Estonia 2020, [online]: https://www.valisluureamet.ee/pdf/ raport-2020-en.pdf.

5 Andrzej Krzak, Wojny przyszłości po rosyjsku – wojna hybrydowa, informacyjna i psychologiczna na tle konfliktu ukraińskiego, [online]: http://www.abw.gov.pl/download/1/2420/1PBW18AKrzak.pdf.

6 Zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa w procesach globalizacji, ed. by H. Chałupczak, K. Marzęda-Młynarska, M. Pietraś, R. Suduł, Wydawnictwo UMCS 2020, p. 40.

7 ERR, Embassy protests foreign intelligence service report China coverage, [online]: https://news.err.ee/1608114640/ embassy-protests-foreign-intelligence-service-report-china-coverage.

8 Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, Estonia warns of “silenced world dominated by Beijing”, Axios 2021, [online]: https://www.axios. com/estonia-warns-of-silenced-world-dominated-by-beijing-09e54843-6b45-491a-9bfd-e880f6f14795.html.

9 Adam Satariano, Inside a Pro-Huawei Influence Campaign, [online]: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/29/technology/ commercial-disinformation-huawei-belgium.html.

10 Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer, Paul Charon, Russia as a Hurricane, China as Climate Change: Different Ways of Information Warfare, [online]: https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/russia-as-a-hurricane-china-as-climate-change-different-ways-of-information-warfare/.

11 The Lancet Infectious Diseases, The COVID-19 infodemic, 2020, [online]: https://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/ PIIS1473-3099(20)30565-X/fulltext.

12 Speech of Vice President Věra Jourová on countering disinformation amid COVID-19 “From pandemic to infodemic”, [online]: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_20_1000.

13 NATO’s approach to countering disinformation: a focus on COVID-19, 2020, [online]: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/ natohq/177273.htm.

14 NATO 2030, United for a new era, 2021, p. 19, [online]: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/ pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf.

15 European Commission, Tackling online disinformation: a European Approach, 26 April 2018, [online]: https://eur-lex.europa. eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0236.

16 The EU’s manner of referring to the issues of disinformation and fake news seems inconsistent. Although in the case under discussion the Union identifies disinformation with fake news, the 2018 report of the Commission’s Joint Research Centre The digital transformation of news media and the rise of disinformation and fake news considers them to be two separate phenomena and defines them differently.

17 Although the United Kingdom is no longer an EU Member State, it remains one of the most active countries in countering disinformation and hybrid threats.

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Kamil Mikulski Disinformation and hybrid threats through the lens of European Union laws and policies

Introduction

The European Union is an international organisation with supranational elements that works in the framework of a complex institutional and legal system. In particular areas (sectors), depending on the communitarisation level, it has been- fur nished with specific competences by the Member States: exclusive, shared, supporting, and special (coordinating1). Since the mid-2010s, the EU has been taking a number of steps meant to counter the detrimental wave of disinformation and hybrid threats on the basis of manifold documents – most frequently via the so-called soft law acts2 and Commission staff working documents (e.g. an annual evaluation of Union Code of Practice on Disinformation) but also through generally applicable legally binding EU acts (e.g. General Data Protection Regulation or GDPR). The present chapter takes as its subject matter a comprehensive description of actions various EU institutions – mostly the Commission, the Council of the EU, and the European Parliament – direct at the Member States, private and third sectors, and EU citizens. Due to size limitations for the chapter, EU actions enacted in cooperation with the European Council, OSCE, and NATO, instruments of European Neighbourhood Policy, along with issues only indirectly related to disinformation / hybrid threats, such as personal data protection, will be omitted.

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Disinformation, fake news, and hybrid Hybrid threats / disinformation with threats – traits of the phenomenon respect to EU competences and its and a definitional commentary institutional architecture

The European Commission sets forth a very broad Keeping in mind both underspecified definitions of definition of hybrid threats in the joint communi- the phenomena and the sectoral risks entailed by cation to the European Parliament and the Council disinformation and hybrid threats and presented of 6 April 2016, titled Joint Framework on coun- in the Joint Framework, we can note that the said tering hybrid threats – a European Union response.3 risks are not of a nature which would pigeonhole Namely, such threats are characterised by “the them decisively to just a single area of EU policies. mixture of coercive and subversive activity, con- Depending on the field, and thus on the compe- ventional and unconventional methods (i.e. dip- tence type, the EU is equipped with diverse legal lomatic, military, economic, technological), which instruments to wield in regulating hybrid threats can be used in a coordinated manner by state or / disinformation. For instance, with regard to per- non-state actors to achieve specific objectives sonal data protection the Union is equipped with while remaining below the threshold of formally exclusive competence and was able to enact declared warfare”. Further on in the document, GDPR; in the domain of more “typical” disinfor- the Commission’s descriptive explanation plainly mation, in sectors where its competence is of the states that with such threats “There is usually an special type, it will have to remain confined to emphasis on exploiting the vulnerabilities of the acts of soft law and coordinating Member States’ target and on generating ambiguity to hinder deci- actions. With regard to public-private partnership, sion-making processes. Massive disinformation the EU initially preferred intersectoral cooperation campaigns, using social media to control the polit- and self-regulation, counting on social media plat- ical narrative or to radicalise, recruit and direct forms, among others, to join in constructing the proxy actors can be vehicles for hybrid threats.” European resilience system efficiently. The state of Undoubtedly then, disinformation does represent affairs is most likely to change once the regulation a particular and chief example of a hybrid threat. on digital services has entered into force (more on this further in the chapter). Another Commission communication to the Parliament and the Council, Tackling online disinfor- The varied character the threats take on and the mation: a European Approach,4 explains that disinfor- complex system the EU regulatory competences mation should be “understood as verifiably false or have are both reflected in the institutional space. misleading information that is created, presented In broad strokes, the most active EU institu- and disseminated for economic gain or to intention- tions that can be pointed to as action takers are ally deceive the public, and may cause public harm”. the Commission, European Council, European Notably, EU Code of Practice on Disinformation Parliament, and the Council of the European Union (henceforth EU Code of Practice) was in fact pre- (henceforth the Council). Other active EU organs pared by the High Level Expert Group on Fake News and agencies include the High Representative for and Online Disinformation or HLEG (although the Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in command first part of its specialty5 seems to be de-empha- of the European External Action Service (EEAS), sised). The very same definition is referred to in the particularly its EU Intelligence and Situation Action Plan against Disinformation and EU Code of Centre (INTCEN) and its units created follow- Practice, while the latter also elucidates it by way ing the 2015 Joint Framework: the East Strategic of a limited authentic interpretation. Communication Task Force responsible for strategic communication – especially as regards the Eastern Partnership countries – and the EU

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Hybrid Fusion Cell. In the context of research and European Council conclusions of 20 March 2015 training, the European Centre of Excellence for and 26 June 2015 Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) is significant. Within their respective fields, the Union’s The first among main EU documents dealing with agencies CERT-EU, FRONTEX, and EUROPOL the issue of Russian disinformation is the European remain active in combating disinformation as well. Council meeting conclusions of 19–20 March The Commission collaborates closely with other 2015. The European Council highlighted in the EU institutions, bodies, and agencies both on its part on European Neighbourhood Policy (section own initiative and in the institutional framework 13) that it noticed “the need to challenge Russia’s which the High Representative functions in, who ongoing disinformation campaigns and invited the concurrently is responsible for conducting CFSP High Representative, in cooperation with Member (and CSDP), vice-chairs the Commission, and States and EU institutions, to prepare by June heads the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) in the an action plan on strategic communication. The Council. With FAC being one of permanent rep- establishment of a communication team is a first resentatives’ configurations set up in the Council, step in this regard.”7 The European Council hence the disinformation-countering issue notably does hinted at three significant issues: 1) it noticed the come up on the Council agenda in the works of need to formulate an EU response to disinforma- both the COREPER II committee (not only FAC) tion, 2) it names the High Representative asthe and COREPER I. competent organ to come up with an action plan regarding strategic communication in cooperation EU policy on countering hybrid with Member States and EU institutions, and 3) threats and disinformation: it set the first step and the time frame to carry it regulations and developments out. The Action Plan on Strategic Communication,8 published on 22 June 2015, communicates the Between 2015 and 2020, the development of creation of the Eastern Partnership based on the EU policy and regulatory instruments with regard European Neighbourhood Policy and of the East to hybrid threats and disinformation has been in StratCom team formed as part of the EEAS. full swing, taking the shape of strategic decisions, reports, and acts of soft regulations. Admittedly, the The fact that the EU recommended setting up Union used to take various steps in order to com- a specialised strategic communication and public bat hybrid threats and disinformation before 2015, diplomacy cell as the first step seems important for yet they were sporadic by nature. To give an exam- four reasons. First, the unit could have been cre- ple, a statement by the President of the European ated relatively quickly and with minimal negative Council Herman Van Rompuy and the President of consequences in terms of institutional reforms; the European Commission José Manuel Barroso,6 second, the importance of information (cyber) which concerns additional restrictive measures space (a priority from the European Council’s (“sanctions” in popular parlance) imposed on Russia point of view) was highlighted; third, the East in relation to its lawless infringing Ukraine’s territo- StratCom team was set up within the EEAS insti- rial integrity. Crimea and Sevastopol annexation by tutional structure – an agency directly subordi- Russia gave rise to the European Council’s adopt- nate to the High Representative and coordinating ing the first conclusions which set into motion Member States’ actions; and fourth, its inception the build-up of institutional and political resilience only fostered a more comprehensive estimate of architecture in the EU. the significance attached to hybrid threats and disinformation apropos of the European security system and institutional architecture. In June 2015, the European Council adopted the conclusions9

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wherein it again called for10 mobilising financial target threat financing, recognised radicalisa- instruments necessary to counter hybrid threats. tion and extremism as featuring among the threat Both sets of conclusions had their results pub- sources, and mentioned the necessity for coop- lished just under a year later. eration increase with third countries (mainly Eastern Partnership countries and Maghreb and Joint Communication to the European Parliament Mashreq states incorporated into the European and the Council of 6 April 2016 entitled Joint Neighbourhood Policy) as well as with NATO, Framework on countering hybrid threats and Anna UN, and OSCE. Actions taken by the European Fotyga’s Report of 14 October 2016 Council, High Representative, and Commission were met with understanding and support from Exceedingly difficult as it is to assess which EU the Parliament, whose Committee on Foreign document was the most important for resilience Affairs called for countering disinformation, prop- building in the Union’s institutional system, the aganda, and other hybrid threats, as it recognised 6 April 2016 communication11 was the one politically Russia’s and ISIS/Daesh’s negative roles. to delineate the disinformation phenomenon in The report by the Committee on Foreign Affairs a comprehensive way and against the broader con- of 14 October 201613 went down in history under text of hybrid threats (disinformation is a particu- the name Anna Fotyga’s Report. lar type of a hybrid threat), as well as to present it from the perspective of political risks for particular European Council conclusions of March 2018 sectors. In Joint Framework as such, the systemic resilience was conceptualised for the first time March 2018 is a watershed for EU capacity build- in terms of hybrid threats, including prevention ing as regards countering hybrid threats. Sergei of, reacting to, and overcoming crises. The High Skripal poisoning in London galvanised the Representative and the Commission involve the European Council, the body which per the EU law European Parliament and Council in building the gives the Union impetus that is indispensable for systemic resilience as they divide the tasks that its development and determines main political need to be performed among different institu- directions and priorities (Art. 15(1) of the Treaty tions, organs, and bodies, the Commission, High on European Union), On 22 March, the European Representative, ENISA, and CERT-EU along with Council adopted conclusions14 by which it called 28 national CSIRTs among them. The framework on the EU and Member States to strengthen their introduces important and far-reaching institutional hybrid threat response capacities, including the changes, developing the existing East and Arab cybersecurity, strategic communication, and coun- StratCom Task Forces, establishing Hybrid Fusion terintelligence domains.15 The European Council Cell, and setting up the Helsinki-based Hybrid CoE designated the European Commission and High to counter hybrid threats.12 Representative to fulfil this task and to report its implementation progress to the European Council. In a sectoral view, Joint Framework identified the threats and determined the actions neces- Communication of 26 April 2018 – Tackling online sary to counter them effectively. The areas and disinformation: a European Approach sectors emphasised included: the protection of critical infrastructure, including supply chains, Following the European Council conclusions, the energy networks and transport, space infrastruc- Commission published on 26 April 2018 a com- ture, defence capabilities, protecting public health munication entitled Tackling online disinformation: and food security, cybersecurity in relation to a European Approach, in which it defined disinfor- industry, energy, financial systems, and transport. mation as a distinct threat singled out from the The Framework also highlighted the need to hybrid threat notion used previously. What is more,

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the Commission set out the overarching princi- to set up special task forces for the EU’s southern ples and goals related to countering disinforma- neighbourhood and the Western Balkans. What is tion. What is worth stressing, even though the more, the document establishes the Rapid Alert Commission had published another document, System (RAS) which Member States, other similar Commission Recommendation of 1.3.2018 on meas- monitoring networks, the European Parliament, ures to effectively tackle illegal content online,16 just NATO, and the G7’s Rapid Response Mechanism over a month earlier, explicit reference to disinfor- all participate in. mation or hybrid threats is not to be found there. The Commission also called for an increased coop- Further, in Section 3.1.1 of the Communication, eration with the Parliament, especially communi- entitled Online platforms to act swiftly and - effec cation-wise and with regard to fostering European tively to protect users from disinformation, the values and public policies. The cooperation and Commission assesses social media platforms’ strategic communication aspects were mentioned activities negatively as regards marshalling the in terms of EU neighbours, whereas with reference resources for sufficient transparency in politi- to civil society the Union posited the need to sup- cal advertising, sponsored content, and message port education, media literacy, and awareness-rais- marketing dissemination provided by paid human ing as concerns the cyber-enabled threats. influencers or robots. As a remedy, it proposes that the platforms need to decisively step up their The European Union – cooperation efforts and ought to self-regulate in an effectively with other sectors deployed and well monitored way via an ambitious code of practice that would be based on key prin- EU cooperation with social media giants ciples proposed by a high-level expert group and would commit online platforms and the advertis- Concurrently, the works of the HLEG, set up in ing industry to achieve the objectives which the January 2018 and comprising 39 members, were communication then lists. underway and resulted in a report published under the title A multi-dimensional approach to disinfor- Action Plan against Disinformation – end of 2018 mation. The Group contained representatives of the private sector (including social media plat- The signals the European Council sent and the forms), public sector (e.g. public higher educa- preparation of institutional framework along with tion), third sector, and last but not least independ- the assessment of political risks by the Commission ent experts and journalists. With the report as and the High Representative paved the way for a springboard, the Commission fulfilled the targets drawing up a complex systemic resilience build-up of the April 2018 communication and put forward plan. On 5 December 2018, Action Plan against the EU Code of Practice. This document imposes Disinformation (henceforth: Action Plan) was pub- a number of obligations on its signatories, primar- lished.17 Therein, four pillars of tackling disin- ily as regards political advertising transparency, formation and ten tasks ahead of the European countering misrepresentation, intensified efforts Union are specified. They highlight the necessity to close fake accounts, clearly marking activities to enhance the capacities and financing for both by bots, and ensuring service integrity. The Code strategic communication and EU delegations (that seeks to find the right balance between limiting delegations, chronically short-staffed as they are, disinformation as well as its ill effects in- cyber at times engage in intelligence analysis efforts, space and guaranteeing access to reliable infor- especially valuable for hybrid threats and dis- mation while ensuring a diversity of viewpoints. information, is worth noting) and task the High It also stresses the need to empower the con- Representative with the duty to evaluate the need sumer and the research community and imposes

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on its signatories the duty to invest in technology EU cooperation with Member States and NGOs measures so as to prioritise relevant, authentic, accurate, and authoritative information. The EU – Member States collaboration takes place in a few of their bailiwicks, but the states’ role is The Commission’s approach has thus made some most pronounced wherever the intergovernmen- concessions in that it regulates the public-private tal decision-making process predominates, that is partnership18 by means of a self-regulatory act mainly in the Council and the European Council. co-created by business as part of HLEG. Within Since the issue of the contribution the Council Action No. 6 of Action Plan, the Commission took makes and the role the High Representative plays upon itself the duty to continue to closely moni- has been touched on earlier, what we should focus tor the implementation of the EU Code of Practice on are extra-political areas where an effective with the explicit proviso that if the implementa- cooperation is absolutely indispensable. The spe- tion and effects of the Code prove unsatisfactory, cial (coordinating) competence covering CFSP and the Commission would propose further actions, CSDP means that Member States did not restrict including measures of regulatory nature. Such their own sovereignty in this area, nor did they hand a direct wording on the part of an EU institution the tools to enact these policies over to the EU. meant to say that although the Union considered Consequently, the level of EU knowledge and capa- effective collaboration with social media giants to bilities in this regard hinges on the nature (and qual- be optimal, it did not hesitate to convey to its part- ity) of information provided by Member States. ners what the consequences of an unsatisfying collaboration level would be. At the moment of EU INTCEN staff numbered around 100 peo- this writing, the EU Code of Practice as a self-reg- ple in 2019, which is hardly an adequate num- ulatory act was signed, among the social media ber for performing time-consuming operational players, by Facebook, Twitter, Google, Mozilla, tasks (e.g. data collection). Notably, insufficient and TikTok, and by several19 trade associations. INTCEN staff training happens to be an obstacle The signatories are obliged to report their imple- as well, as the employees are oftentimes not in mentation of EU Code of Practice provisions. the international staff but recruited from the sec- onded national experts. Naturally, East StratCom In December 2020, the Commission published and Hybrid Fusion Cell (a division of INTCEN), a draft regulation called the Digital Services Act20 that is units which directly deal with monitoring (DSA), where – in its explanatory memorandum and EU responding to hybrid threats and disinfor- – the attention was drawn to the online plat- mation, have staff that is far less numerous. Apart form disinformation problem. DSA mainly men- from the human factor, the unwelcome phe- tions disinformation in the context of “very large” nomenon of Member States’ reticence in shar- platforms (which means average monthly active ing intelligence information is also occurring, as recipients of the service exceeding 10% of the EU they regard the data as an element of information population, prominent role, and massive societal advantage over other states. For example, the impact) and with reference to systemic risk lim- Rapid Alert System, the linchpin of Action Plan, itation and crisis management. DSA recalls other launched in March 2019, was used zero times pertinent EU documents such as the EU Code of until October.21 Perhaps the emergence of mod- Practice and exemplifies particular forms of disin- erate RAS use during the COVID-19–related info- formation spread on internet platforms – bots and demic is a portent that a breakthrough is coming trolls among them. and the mutual warning system will be bolstered.

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The European Union also acts in relation to other an example, as does Commission representatives’ entities and supports the non-governmental- sec participation in the yearly EU Disinfo Lab con- tor by means of financial instruments. As early ference.24 What is more, the Directorate-General as the April 2018 Tackling online disinformation: for Communications Networks, Content and a European Approach communication, the Union Technology (DG CONNECT), aiming to ensure committed itself not only to draw up the EU Code that EU citizens are in with a chance to take part of Practice but also to act to foster an independent in developing public policies and getting into con- pan-European fact-checking network, media liter- tact with civic society representatives, launched acy, and high-quality journalism. Thanks to Horizon in 2015 the DG CONNECT University, where 2020 funds (grant No. 825469), in November new kinds of threats, including disinformation, are 2018 an international Social Observatory for being faced. In addition, as part of the Futurium Disinformation and Social Media Analysis (SOMA) web portal, the Commission has been assum- was set up.22 SOMA is a complex platform which ing the role of an educator, having run nearly 40 increases social awareness of matters tied up with media literacy workshops since 2018. disinformation and hybrid threats via its reports that contain the results of cross-border and mul- Qualitative assessment of EU cooperation with tilingual disinformation analysis and through free the private, public, and NGO sectors webinars and trainings. In addition, SOMA has created three national research centres and come The European Commission published two impor- into contact with around 70 entities that -prac tant reports that make possible an effective tice social media analysis. Among various valuable evaluation of the European Union activities and projects the observatory develops, DisInfoNet is of the cooperation quality between the EU and worth a mention – a free open source program23 other actors (institutions, agencies, Member that makes it possible to explore disinformation States) and the private sector (platforms in the at macroscale using sentiment analysis. social media industry and trade associations). The first of these documents is the Report on Another instance of EU cooperation with (mostly) the implementation of the Action Plan Against the third sector is a network being built cur- Disinformation of 14 June 2019.25 rently – European Digital Media Observatory or EDMO. Its aim is to create – on the basis of The Commission and the High Representative focus Florence’s European University Institute structures on underscoring the successes and the potential – an all-European hub which single- and multi-na- of solutions developed. For instance, they high- tional grassroots centres would be subordinate light the significance of international cooperation to in functional and organisational terms. The EU and the importance of RAS for information sharing is funding EDMO using the Connecting Europe and coordinated responses. With its overall positive Facility, all in all to the tune of about 11.5 mil- assessment, the Report calls for further strength- lion euro. Besides EDMO, the EU also cooperates ening of cooperation and building the capaci- with civil society representatives directly, through ties to counter disinformation and hybrid threats. engaging in events and availing itself of their expert Contained therein is also a partial evaluation of EU and consultation services. The above-mentioned Code of Practice implementation progress. HLEG notwithstanding, the Union occasionally con- tacts NGOs. The European Parliament’s collabora- This barely matters now, owing to the Commission tion with Open Information Partnership (by estab- publishing a new and updated working document lishing Special Committee on Foreign Interference in September 202026 on the basis of self-assess- in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, ments and a few other reports (by the Commission, including Disinformation, INGE) might serve as ERGA, VVA), which includes evaluations of EU

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Figure 1. Overview of joint and coordinated action against disinformation.

Source: Report on the implementation of the Action Plan Against Disinformation, p. 3.

Code of Practice implementations. The - work as well as its efficacy the condition that must be ing document listed inconsistent and incomplete satisfied – if not, other measures would be taken. application of the Code across platforms and Member States among the implementation weak- Other itemised problems were: nesses, especially in the following respects: • manipulative online behaviour falling outside • scrutiny of ad placements, the scope of the Code,

• transparency of political and issue-based • micro-targeting of political advertising, advertising, • fairness in online political advertising, • integrity of services, • lack of Key Performance Indicators and data • consumer empowerment. for monitoring and oversight of the Code.

Additionally, the Commission alleged that Notably, the working document spends three Signatories had failed to provide uniform defini- pages appreciating Code deployment successes tions of the issues mentioned above. The working and four times more on implementation criticism document also identifies a set of related problems and shortcomings. Doubtless, a year after the which the Code did not explicitly cover, but they Code entered into force the quality of public-pri- indicate that its regulatory scope is too narrow vate partnership leaves a lot to be desired, yet the and lead to an improper functioning of the sys- central question is whether different actions com- tem – it is worth remembering the Commission ing from the EU institutions would be the proper made an adequate implementation of the Code remedy, for instance a legislative path.

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Published on 3 December 2020 by the Commission, Summary the communication On the European democracy action plan27 includes a variety of future institutional The European Union has since 2015 made consider- and material development directions as regards able strides in connection with increasing systemic countering hybrid threats and disinformation. The resilience to hybrid threats and disinformation. foregrounded issue is interference in democratic processes (election) and topics related to the press Over a short time, the EU: and the quality of public life. As an example, the document proposes better safety and protection • explored, defined and conceptualised the phe- of journalists or public figures against strategic nomenon so that the resulting conceptual lawsuits (abusive litigation) and raising the qual- framework answered the diverse tasks the EU ity of participatory and deliberative democracy. institutional system is charged with; In the disinformation context, it includes critically important guidance and indicates future directions • conducted a complex analysis of strategic risk of EU action. Namely, in 2021 the Commission and potential outcomes which hybrid threats is going to present a legislative project regarding / disinformation may have for various sectors; the transparency of sponsored political content, to complement the DSA regulations on various • drew up the Action Plan, consistently pursued, issues. Additionally, it adds a new catalogue to the and the plan of December 2020; (already detailed) classification system with hybrid threats, disinformation, fake news, election inter- • designated the bodies competent to advance ference and announces devising new well-honed the security architecture, viz. the Commission policies and instruments for the response toolbox and the High Representative, and included that will counter the threats. the Parliament – mostly with regard to foreign interference in democratic processes; Here, the Commission distinguishes: a) misinformation, defined as false or misleading content • expanded its coordination capabilities within shared without harmful intent; b) disinforma- INTCEN and set up the East StratCom Task tion, defined as false or misleading content that Force (followed by two others, directed to- is spread with an intention to deceive or secure wards MENA and the Western Balkans); economic or political gain and which may cause public harm; c) information influence operations, • created the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell and the or coordinated efforts by either domestic or for- European Centre of Excellence for Countering eign actors to influence a target audience using Hybrid Threats; a range of deceptive means, including suppress- ing independent information sources in combi- • drew up the EU Code of Practice, intensifying nation with disinformation; and d) foreign inter- the cooperation with social media companies ference in the information space, often carried and trade associations; out as part of a broader hybrid operation, can be understood as coercive and deceptive efforts to • mobilised significant sums for building the disrupt the free formation and expression of indi- resilience infrastructure as it co-created and viduals’ political will by a foreign state actor or its fostered the establishment of pan-European agents. This is no doubt a sea change in under- monitoring, fact-checking, and research net- standing the phenomenon. works for hybrid threats and disinformation;

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• facilitated the involvement of civil society in system against the threats is still some way away. a public policy creation process; The quality of cooperation with the public sector (especially Member States) and the private sector • showed commitment to citizenship education leaves plenty to be desired. The quality of EU Code and raising awareness as to the risks that hy- implementation puts a question mark over the brid threats and disinformation pose. future self-regulation–based public-private partnership between the Union and the social media Taking into account that both hybrid threats and giants. Access to reliable information, high-qual- disinformation are developing in a tremendously ity journalism, and trustworthy institutions are all dynamic way, with political, institutional, and legal foundations underpinning information society and changes being reactive and secondary to the dan- a functioning democracy. Here is hoping that the gers, the achievements listed above are noth- Union, which – as the published documents imply ing short of impressive. Still, claims that the goal – understands the gravity of the threat and the has been reached would certainly be exagger- shortcomings of its own actions, will be able to ated, for a democratic and functioning resilience protect its citizens even more effectively.

ENDNOTES

1 Coordinating – within Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which constitutes an integral part of the former.

2 Soft law is a set of non-binding – but important in a regulatory sense – legal acts derived from the international public law and encountered often in EU legislation. Its examples are recommendations and opinions (described in Art. 288 of Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), but also green and white books, communications, explanatory (interpretative) communications, codes of best practices, action plans, reports, and guidelines. More: Ziemowit Cieślik, VI. Rola Sejmu w Unii Europejskiej, p. 155, [online]: http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/wydbas.nsf/0/F873B8E7897A0892C1257F03002E76DC/$File/ Strony%20odPrzewodnik-7.pdf.

3 European Commission, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats – a European Union response, JOIN(2016) 18 final, 6 April 2016, [online]: eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/ HTML/?uri=CELEX:52016JC0018.

4 European Commission, Tackling online disinformation: a European Approach, 26 April 2018, [online]: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0236.

5 The EU’s manner of referring to the issues of disinformation and fake news seems inconsistent. Although in the case under discussion the Union identifies disinformation with fake news, the 2018 report of the Commission’s Joint Research Centre The digital transformation of news media and the rise of disinformation and fake news considers them to be two separate phenomena and defines them differently.

6 European Council, Statement, EUCO 158/14, 29 July 2014, [online]: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/ docs/pressdata/en/ec/144158.pdf.

7 European Council, Conclusions – 19 and 20 March 2015, EUCO 11/15, 20 March 2015, [online]: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21888/european-council-conclusions-19-20-march-2015-en.pdf.

8 European Commission, Action Plan on Strategic Communication, Ares(2015)2608242, 22 June 2015, [online]: https://archive.vn/iaGkd.

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9 European Council, Conclusions – 25 and 26 June 2015, EUCO 22/15, 26 June 2015, [online]: https://data.consilium.europa. eu/doc/document/ST-22-2015-INIT/en/pdf.

10 A curious detail is a mistake in the official Polish translation of the subsequent document discussed here, Joint Framework, where the reference to the conclusions of June 2015 is accompanied by the verb odwołać, treating recall as if it meant “revoke” instead of “remind” or “remember”. The author of the present article would like to dispel any doubt – the Union did not revoke the mobilisation of financial instruments to counter hybrid threats.

11 European Commission, Joint Framework…, op. cit., JOIN(2016) 18 final, 6 April 2016, [online]: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52016JC0018.

12 Task and competences given to Hybrid Fusion Cell and Hybrid CoE were broadened by way of provisions in the joint communication of 13 June 2018 Increasing resilience and bolstering capabilities to address hybrid threats.

13 European Parliament, Report on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties, 2016/2030(INI), 14 October 2016, [online]: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2016-0290_EN.html.

14 European Council, Conclusions – 22 March 2018, EUCO 1/18, 23 March 2018, [online]: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ media/33457/22-euco-final-conclusions-en.pdf.

15 Ibidem, p. 5.

16 European Commission, Commission Recommendation of 1.3.2018 on measures to effectively tackle illegal content online, C(2018) 1177 final, 1 March 2018, [online]: https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=50095.

17 European Commission, Action Plan against Disinformation, JOIN(2018) 36 final, 5 December 2018, [online]: https://eur-lex. europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52018JC0036.

18 Besides the EU Code of Practice, Commission Recommendation (EU) 2018/334 of 1 March 2018 (OJ L 63, 6 March 2018, see note 16 supra) was also prepared, but that document was more concerned with illegal content and terrorism than disinformation.

19 Including AACC, EACA, EDIMA, IAB, SAR, UBA, WFA, AKA, and Kreativitet & Kommunikation.

20 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Single Market For Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC, COM(2020) 825 final, 15 December 2020, [online]: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52020PC0825.

21 Samuel Stolton, EU Rapid Alert System used amid coronavirus disinformation campaign, Euractiv, 4 March 2020, [online]: https://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/news/eu-alert-triggered-after-coronavirus-disinformation-campaign/.

22 CORDIS, Social Observatory for Disinformation and Social Media Analysis, grant ID 825469, [online]: https://cordis.europa.eu/ project/id/825469.

23 Its functional version has not been published yet, but its demo can be seen at the following address: http://193.204.157.124/.

24 In 2019, the European Parliament also issued a short document entitled Online disinformation and the EU’s response, in which it recognises the threats and underlines the potential consequences of disinformation for European elections.

25 European Commission, Report on the implementation of the Action Plan Against Disinformation, JOIN(2019) 12 final, 14 June 2019, [online]: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52019JC0012.

26 European Commission, Assessment of the Code of Practice on Disinformation: Achievements and areas for further improvement, SWD(2020) 180 final, 10 September 2020, [online]: https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=69212.

27 European Commission, Communication on the European democracy action plan, COM(2020) 790 final, 3 December 2020, [online]: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0790.

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Tomasz Piekarz Poland’s legislation and policy towards disinformation

Tackling disinformation is within the remit of bodies and institutions that are tasked with national security. Published in 2017 by the Ministry of National Defence, The Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland mentions leveraging disinformation by Russia as an active means of pursuing its policies.1 In a similar vein, National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, adopted in 2020, addresses the threat from the Russian Federation as it names disinformation among non-military actions below the threshold of war that are- car ried out “to destabilise the structures of Western states and societies and to create divisions among Allies”.2 When picturing the Polish Republic’s security ecosystem, the strategy also points out the particular role of cyberspace, which against the background of the digital revolution is offering an ever increasing room for manipulating information. In addition, it lists “[e]nsuring secure functioning of the state and its citizens in the information space”3 among strategic objectives and notes four resulting actions to be implemented:

1. Build capabilities to protect the information space (including systemic fight against disinformation) understood as the intertwining layers of virtual, physical, and cognitive spaces.

2. Create a homogenous system of the state’s strategic communications.

3. Actively counteract disinformation by building capabilities and creating procedures for cooperation with the news media and social media while ensuring citizens’ and NGOs’ involvement.

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4. Aim to increase public awareness of 3. Bolstering social awareness and education threats related to manipulating infor- regarding information security, which should mation through education in the field of be implemented as a mandatory compo- information security.4 nent in schooling. Its goals ought to include improving critical thinking skills among pupils, The strategy includes recommendations prepared recognising disinformation and its types. by the National Security Bureau, which also set out the concept of a system for strategic commu- 4. Actively defending cyberspace with -struc nications and disinformation tackling, which com- tures that should be both offensive and prises five areas: defensive. Such defence mechanisms should monitor and respond to threats not only on 1. Creating a strategic communications cell at the Polish soil but also as part of activities the highest echelon of state governance. by Polish diplomatic posts and military forces Establishing such a cell would meet the need stationed abroad. In the Bureau’s opinion on the part of state institutions for access to a significant part of these tasks is performed a wide gamut of communication channels and by the national cybersecurity system. media. The unit would also be able to equip institutions in “tools to recognise and influ- 5. Building up Polish soft power with govern- ence the situation in various subdomains ment, non-government, and private sec- of national security”.5 Similarly, the Bureau tors’ participation as they act autonomously, includes the following in the cell’s activ- yet pursue well-defined priorities and aims. ity scope: to forecast and plan communica- Likewise, building communication channels tive actions that take into account current that use such means as mass culture is much events and long-term projections, formulate needed. Soft power creation should be coor- communication strategies, prepare key mes- dinated by specially designated actors that sages for entities answering to the Council of take into consideration the aims of historical Ministers, draw up disinformation-campaign policy and the tools of international coopera- reaction scenarios, and collect media reports tion and diplomacy. on potentially sensitive situations as well. The National Security Bureau claims that establish- 2. Actively withstanding disinformation by ing the system requires supra-ministerial coopera- means of constantly monitoring, analysing, tion on multiple levels from the state administration. and shaping the Polish information space. Moreover, comprehensive protection of the state’s Drawing on domestic experience and that information realm requires spurring non-govern- of foreign partners, capacity building and mental and academic circles, private sector, and procedure preparation need to be sought citizens themselves to action, as effective disinfor- in order to achieve readiness in disinformation tackling should be based on positively fos- mation tackling, all the while maintaining tering grass-roots initiatives.6 The Bureau did devise the system’s inclusivity in terms of involving a project of Poland’s information security doctrine, non-governmental organisations, internet too, but ever since its publication in 2015 it has platforms, media and citizen representatives remained in the draft stage. The doctrine discerns in gathering and analysing the content which disinformation as one of the gravest threats stem- surfaces in the information space. ming from civil society’s imperfect functioning and from administration, vulnerable sectors, and critical infrastructure operating in cyberspace.7

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At the ministerial level, the Ministry of Justice is authority will have strong ties to the Office of engaging in disinformation issues, as evidenced Electronic Communications, the latter provid- by the 15 January 2021 draft act on protecting ing professional, administrative, and clerical sup- the freedom of expression in online social media, port and financing the Council activities. The draft which targets fakes news and arbitrary user also introduces the possibility to complain about account blocking by the largest social platforms unlawful content (including content that violates (the ones with over a million users). The draft personal rights), which platforms must consider imposes a number of obligations on sites, which, within 48 hours. Failure to respond in a timely e.g., “shall not remove posts nor block user manner is to result in a referral of the case to accounts as they see fit, provided that the content the Council, which is supposed to conduct pro- therein does not infringe the Polish law”.8 The draft ceedings only electronically. The draft law also additionally imposes an obligation on -the ser provides for the establishment of a new institu- vice to prepare a report on complaint settlement tion – the so-called blind lawsuit, which will allow details – when the number of complaints exceeds the party or parties injured by an unknown person 100 in a calendar year – which will then be publicly (e.g. a fake personal account on a social network- promulgated in the Official Journal of the Office ing platform) to file a lawsuit for the protection of Electronic Communications with no delay once of personal rights, indicating only the URL where the platform applies for its publication. The draft the content was published, the publication date also proposes the appointment of between one and time, and the name of the profile).9 The draft and three platform representatives who will rep- legislation will undergo further work at the gov- resent it in judicial actions and be responsible for ernment level, meant to make headway on adopt- handling complaints and liaising with the Freedom ing it into the Polish legal order. of Speech Council. All representatives must know the Polish language. Platforms will also be obliged The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is also to establish internal control procedures for user engaging in the fight against disinformation. complaints about account suspensions, visibili- The MFA is focusing on: awareness-raising among ty-reducing account access restrictions, and for officials, its own institutional capacity-building, complaints about distributing unlawful content cooperation with the StratCom cells of EU and – with the platform having 48 hours to investi- NATO partners, designing and conducting infor- gate the matter. The draft provides for institut- mation campaigns, and supporting Polish NGOs. In ing the Freedom of Speech Council, to consist of 2019, within its structures the MFA created a cell five members elected by the Polish parliament to be responsible for identifying, countering, and with a 3/5 majority for a six-year term. In addition, responding to disinformation about Polish foreign only a person with a university degree in law or policy priorities. The MFA also organises training knowledge of new technologies or linguistics may sessions and workshops on countering disinfor- become a member of the Council. This institution mation, which it has directed to journalists, state controls whether the portals comply with their administration, students of the National School new obligations and constitutes a second instance of Public Administration and of the Diplomatic to which users may appeal against an unwelcome Academy, and the like. Further, the Ministry decision by the platform owner. In this respect, actively supports disinformation-countering the project is an extension of the contact point non-governmental organisations that operate at idea described in the subchapter on social media. home and abroad, and cooperates with EU and In the case of a site non-discharging the duties NATO partners by being committed in terms of imposed by the Act, the Council can impose, by staff and financing to the EU’s StratCom cell way of a decision, a fine ranging from PLN 50,000 for countering disinformation within the struc- to 50,000,000. The draft assumes that the new tures of the European External Action Service.

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Poland is also a member of the European Centre Another actor committed to tacking disinformation of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats which should be mentioned by name is theNational (Hybrid CoE) and participates in NATO Strategic Research Institute NASK (the Research and Communications Centre of Excellence pro- Academic Computer Network). The basic area of jects (whose Chief of Staff for 2018–2021 is NASK’s activity is ensuring Internet security by Commander Grzegorz Łyko10). The MFA is also various means, as part of which the institute deals the coordinating ministry for EU cooperation with disinformation. In this regard, NASK issues within the EU Rapid Alert System.11 expert reports on a regular basis, which cover disinformation threats as well (Cyberbezpieczeństwo The Ministry also contributed in 2018 to A.D. 2018 and 2019 reports), runs information the establishment of the Counter Hybrid Support campaigns (#OznaczDezinfo – against the coro- Team affiliated to the Crisis Management Team in navirus-related infodemic) and social research,16 the Government Centre for Security (GCS; Polish finally hosts workshops and training sessions abbreviation: RCB),12 which is an important link in (e.g. for electoral committees and media repre- preventing, countering, and responding to hybrid sentatives ahead of the 2019 European Parliament threats, among which disinformation is counted. election).17 NASK is also the entity that created The role of the Team includes situational analy- the BezpieczneWybory.pl (SafeElection) portal sis and activity coordination in the preparation of together with the then Ministry of Digitalisation structures, tools to identify, and defence against and the Computer Security Incident Response hybrid actions. It also conducts threat monitor- Teams (CSIRTs) from the Ministry of Defence and ing, assesses the risk of emergencies caused by the Internal Security Agency (ABW), with NASK hybrid actions and is responsible for drawing up assigned the informational and educational role.18 a response plan and coordinating how government administration bodies, institutions, and -ser The Polish Press Agency (PAP) and the government vices carry it out.13 The Team was established agency GovTech Poland have also joined the fight in response to the conclusions of NATO Crisis against disinformation. They jointly launched Response Exercises CMX16 and CMX17, which the #FakeHunter project, which aims to “refute indicated the need to establish an appropriate unit false information related to the SARS-CoV-2 at the government level.14 The GCS activities also virus”.19 As the success of the project was noticed, focus on publications addressed to ministers and a decision was made to extend it to the financial other government decision-makers and heads of market as well, which was done with the participa- services. One of the publications is the Monitor tion of the Financial Supervision Authority (KNF).20 of Security of the Republic of Poland’s Eastern Border – the External Border of the EU, co-created Established under Poland’s constitution which by the GCS, which includes a chapter “Information came into force in 1997, the National Broadcasting Security” analysing “the most important disinfor- Council (KRRiT) might serve as a case study for mation activities concerning Poland, aimed to state authorities’ cooperation within EU institu- build a negative image of the Republic of Poland tions; in accordance with the Broadcasting Act, abroad and influence public opinion and socio-po- the KRRiT stands guard over “the freedom of litical processes in the country”. The GCS is like- speech in radio and television broadcasting, pro- wise involved in a number of smaller-scale expert tect[s] the independence of media service providers activities, as it discusses the disinformation threats and the interests of the public, as well as ensure[s] and information warfare dangers on the pages of an open and pluralistic nature of radio and televi- its Analytical Bulletin as well as addresses them sion broadcasting”.21 The KRRiT is a member of during conferences. Nevertheless, these are indi- the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual vidual and one-off activities.15 Media Services (ERGA) founded in 2014, which

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supports the European Commission in moni- – although initially the scope of ERGA’s research toring the obligations of the Code of Practice was supposed to be broader, it was then nar- on Disinformation, while being a platform that rowed due to the upcoming date of the European brings together high-level representatives from Parliament elections and the regulators’ limited independent national regulators of audiovisual access to the data. Notably, not all ERGA mem- media markets. ERGA keeps monitoring the com- ber states “expressed their willingness to carry mitments through dedicated expert groups and this monitoring out, citing, among other things, smaller task forces, which are formed by repre- a lack of effective verification tools, adequately sentatives of EU member state regulators. KRRiT trained specialists, and too limited a time to col- representatives are included in Action Group for lect and analyse the data”.23 In the end, 13 out of ERGA Subgroup 1 on Media Pluralism, whose 16 regulators who declared their participation in task was to monitor how the commitments con- the study executed the complete monitoring plan. tained in the above-mentioned Code are followed The KRRiT analysis showed partial implementation by Google, Facebook, and Twitter. The monitoring of the Code provisions by the entities monitored.24 was performed in two phases: As part of the second monitoring phase, the KRRiT analysed circa 80 political adverts on Facebook 1. The first one had taken place before the EP and Google prior to the parliamentary elections election campaign began and its aim was to in Poland (13 October 2019). The research was verify the signatories’ fulfilment of their obli- conducted by the same group of experts, who gations ensuring the implementation of mech- reapplied the methodology used for phase one. anisms to enhance the protection of electoral The team appointed by the Council failed to iden- processes against disinformation. tify significant improvements in the platforms’ operation and procedures that are to do with 2. The second was a comprehensive evaluation political advertising transparency, compared to regarding the performance of all obligations the May research.25 Taking into account the stat- adopted in the Code. utory objectives facing the KRRiT as well as its experience in monitoring the obligations of the EU In order to implement the first phase, Code, amid new challenges related to forms of the KRRiT appointed a temporary team consisting disinformation as they develop (traditional media of its experts, which analysed, within the Subgroup included), the regulator is indicated as the one framework, political advertisements through who should and assume some responsibility for the lens of “ensuring transparent rules and proce- combating it in Poland. As shown by the Chairman dures, by the Code signatories mentioned above, of the KRRiT’s response to the questions posed by for dissemination of this kind of promotional con- the Commissioner for Human Rights on televised tent, the degree of differentiation and recognition hate speech, the Council is working “on preparing of political advertisements, their pricing, the iden- a document devoted to counteracting the phe- tity of advert commissioning entities, the reach of nomena called fake news, disinformation, and hate the advertising, its target groups, the effective- speech in the media space”.26 The report, dated ness of the registration procedures introduced, December 2020, presented the actions to tackle and the identification and removal of advertise- disinformation taken by European institutions and ments which do not meet the registration require- selected member states, and actions to limit the phe- ments, and the user accessibility of the data stored nomenon in Poland, while discussing the particular in the archives/libraries of particular platforms and importance of media literacy in this context, under- services”.22 The basis for the analysis conducted stood as shaping media competences.27 from 13 to 17 May 2019 comprised dozens of political adverts from Polish electoral committees

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NGO activities in Poland which it has been developing in consortium with the AGH University of Science and Technology The activities of non-governmental organisations following a grant awarded by Warsaw’s National in Poland focus on several areas: Centre for Research and Development. The project aims to “create a methodology and ICT solutions • expert work directed at decision-makers in for complementary tool[s] to support and help public administration and at interested groups, experts working with disinformation”.32 The activities conducted by The Kosciuszko Institute are • media literacy, intended to develop working methods for an analyst to employ – for this purpose the team moni- • promotion of quality journalism, tors the emergence and spread of disinformation narratives, and regularly analyses the Polish infor- • fact-checking. mation space.33 The CYBERSEC Disinfo Lab also cooperates with the Open Information Partnership The expert work is carried out by the “Center (an association of European NGOs, news portals, for Propaganda and Disinformation Analysis” and media market actors that aims to support Foundation. Its goals include increasing public collaboration and counteract disinformation and knowledge on information acquisition and analysis propaganda, while promoting reliable journalism); and setting up educational and research initiatives the Lab issues expert reports, such as the OIP- in the area of propaganda and disinformation.28 cofinanced report on COVID-19-related disinfor- As part of its expert work, the Center issues publi- mation in Polish cyberspace.34 The Institute is also cations and recommendations for the state admin- a member of an organisation created by the EC – istration, e.g. concerning Poland’s strategic com- Social Observatory for Disinformation and Social munication, an example being StratCom: the Polish Media Analysis (SOMA), which aims “at supporting perspective. Structure of the communication system and developing the European community of enti- and analysis of the campaign about the 20th anni- ties combating disinformation”.35 versary of Poland’s accession to NATO (in Polish).29 The issues of disinformation and security in As the existing research puts it, “educational activ- the information environment are also handled by ities undertaken so far, designed to teach young the INFO OPS Poland Foundation. The instiution users to approach the media critically, have a posi- runs a number of projects related to expert pub- tive effect on protection against the results of dis- lications and workshops. One of them is INFO information”.36 According to NASK, these activ- OPS EXE, held in cooperation with the aforesaid ities, both in Poland and in many other member GovTech Polska agency as a GovTech Festival states, have been predominantly shouldered by event. Its aim is to develop competence in recog- the NGO sector.37 The Demagog Association is nising disinformation in a virtual environment.30 one group that remains active in this field, through What is more, the Foundation is a patron of Disinfo its Fact-Checking Academy project, which is meant Digest (a project to research and prevent manip- for both pupils, students, teachers and businesses ulation of the information space) and carries out or seniors. So far the Association has held 150 analyses to recognise information operations and workshop and training sessions for 3,800 partic- check information environment security.31 When ipants, cooperating with The Kosciuszko Institute sketching the punditry landscape, a mention, per- (during CYBERSEC for YOUTH), the US Consulate haps less than modest, should also be made of General in Kraków, and others.38 The Association The Kosciuszko Institute, in which the CYBERSEC has also created an educational browser game Disinfo Lab team has been operating since 2019. Fajnie, że wiesz (Good for you to know), which The team is involved in the Prozodia project, aims to teach spotting fake news.39 In this respect,

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what deserves a mention is the Edukacja Medialna A lot of activity among Polish NGOs in the field (Media Literacy) project aimed at developing crit- of counteracting and tackling disinformation can ical media reception skills, which the Modern be noticed in fact-checking. The already men- Poland Foundation runs. It is a comprehensive syl- tioned Demagog Association, apart from labus available for free and adapted to all stages the Fact-Checking Academy, mainly applies its of education. The Media Education service -oper expertise in checking promises and statements ates under the honorary patronage of the Ministry by politicians. It is the first and so far (December of Culture and National Heritage and the Ministry 2020) the only organisation of this kind in Poland of Education and Science.40 The Cegielski Center that belongs to the International Fact-Checking for Analysis has also developed its own educa- Network (IFCN), which groups together over 70 tional programme for schools. The project Sposób organisations from all over the world that have na Dezinformację (Disinfo Trick) involves con- adopted common fact-checking principles. By join- ducting 50 lessons throughout Poland in coop- ing the IFCN, Demagog has gained the chance to eration with local organisations which qualify for participate in Facebook’s third-party fact-check- the programme, so that their representatives, having programme.45 Working to verify information ing passed a preparatory programme, will be able to (including information that citizens report) and educate secondary school students on their own.41 tackle fake news, the Association pens analyses and reports, but also runs a monthly expert news- The third sector also strives to support journal- letter Demagog INFOSKAN that contains dis- ists who often unintentionally happen to repro- information analyses.46 The most recognisable duce false or misleading information due to its Polish portal concerned with fact-checking, and at overwhelming amount and verification difficul- the same time the second besides Demagog that ties. To limit journalistic mistakes, the Panoptykon was included in the Duke University Reporters’ Lab Foundation and the Reporters Foundation both list, is OKO.press, run by the OKO Civic Control created a publication-cum-manual entitled Dealing Centre Foundation.47 The portal focuses on check- with Disinformation. A Handbook for Journalists. ing facts and politicians’ words, and on investiga- The document, released in September 2019 (before tive journalism;48 it enjoys widespread popularity – the parliamentary elections in Poland), focuses on ranking seventh among the most authoritative web acquiring skills: to check information and its sources, portals in Poland and first among new online media to cover Parliament elections and limit the impact of brands (Digital News Report 2020 research).49 disinformation on the electoral process, and to build All the same, OKO (literally “Eye”) sets itself apart the image and position of the editorial teams in from similar organisations by its commitment to the long term as reliable and trustworthy.42 Separate commenting on the events of the Polish political activities related to training journalists in prevent- scene, and its inception in 2016 was supported ing and combating disinformation are carried out by financially by, e.g., Polityka Sp. z o.o. S.K.A. and the Reporters Foundation (which focuses on inves- Agora Holding Sp. z o.o. (publishers of leading lib- tigative journalism). As far as the workshops offered eral media outlets in Poland) and was a response are concerned, the Foundation teaches “investiga- to “the fate of democracy and the media in PiS- tive journalism, obtaining and verifying informa- ruled Poland”.50 The Cegielski Center for Analysis, tion, modern journalistic methods and tools, work- mentioned above, also runs its own project in ing with social media and open sources (OSINT), this area, namely odfejkuj.info (fake-off.info) deal- fact-checking, online safety, or running internet ing with fact-checking the reported content, and portals and managing news teams”.43 It has so far with creating its own analyses and articles. Setting held workshops and training sessions in Poland and up this portal was supported by the National many European countries, at conferences, in edito- Freedom Institute – Centre for Civil Society rial offices, and at universities.44 Development from the funds of the Civil Society

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Organisations Development Programme for 2018– nevertheless, after the user types in search terms 2030.51 It should be noted that apart from NGOs, related to the COVID-19 pandemic, the plat- other combatants in the war on disinformation are form nowadays refers them to information from media companies, as they set up their own por- the official website of the Ministry of Health tals: konkret24.pl (TVN Group), Demaskator24.pl and promotes material from reliable channels. (Agencja Informacyjna AIP 24 – Polska Press Group) YouTube does not cooperate with the NGO sec- and Antyfake (HGA Media). As NASK underscores, tor in Poland to manage content either, which, none of the above projects engages in international however, may change in the future, as the plat- cooperation within European initiatives. Nor do form has extended its fact-checking cooperation the organisations share a common policy in fighting with the IFCN, of which the Demagog Association disinformation, and they operate independently of is a member, to other countries – the UK and each other.52 Germany.58 Thus, YouTube’s activities in Poland include deactivating or removing the accounts Social media activities in Poland of users who violate the portal rules; notably, the platform has an extensive system for fighting The Polish social media market has an oligopolistic disinformation and flagging government-spon- structure, which is dominated by several plat- sored channels (e.g. Sputnik).59 Its public affairs forms from the USA. The most popular among activities are handled by the platform owner, them include four: YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, Google, and its Polish branch, which is active in and Twitter,53 which cluster in three capital such areas as teaching media literacy and com- groups (Alphabet, Facebook, and Twitter) that petences or training journalists. One of Google’s are also signatories to the Code of Practice on flagship projects whose target audience are chil- Disinformation, published by the EC in 2018. dren and young people is Asy Internetu (Internet That the Code “was a form of self-regulation by Aces). According to information obtained from the business sector and was drawn up by repre- the organiser, a third of Polish schools and 65,000 sentatives of online platforms, of the advertising students took part in the programme. It aims industry, and of the media, with the support from to improve digital and media skills.60 Moreover, academia and civil society”54 is worth underlin- Google runs a number of international training ing. The effectiveness evaluation for the Code, and grant programmes, e.g. for COVID-19 vac- completed in September 2020, suggests that cine anti-misinformation projects,61 trains jour- the platforms have deployed its provisions in a sat- nalists who are developing digital competences isfactory, but not complete way.55 What should (fact-checking and disinformation detection be noted is that although the platforms are clas- included),62 and provides a fact-checking tool.63 sified as social media, their forms significantly dif- fer. Even as Facebook and Twitter mainly moder- For its part, Facebook (Instagram owner) is active ate textual content, Google (YouTube) moderates in Poland in many areas, cooperating with both video content, and Instagram moderates images, the governmental and non-governmental sector which translates into disparate characteristics using its platform brand. In terms of fact-checking, of disinformation problems on different platforms. the American giant is supported by the aforesaid Demagog Association, which is one of the inde- The most popular social site (the percentage pendent verifiers that can assess the credibility of of internet users who come to visit it at least once information posted on the platform (verifiers are a month exceeds 90%)56 is YouTube. The cooper- also active on Instagram).64 OKO.press also has ation with government bodies and institutions a smaller, non-formalised role in combating dis- does not seem to be its focus (although it has information and fake news posted on the portal. been subject to the VoD tax since July 202057); In May 2019, their investigation and passing

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the news on to Facebook led to closing a network Another memorandum signatory is NASK, of 13 Polish-language sites with more than one which was responsible for project implementa- million likes – although according to OKO.press tion and the continuous IT support. NASK also the complete network is at least 80 sites with acts as an intermediary, passing on blocked con- almost 5 million likes.65 The social platform also tent or accounts for reconsideration by the plat- cooperates with NGOs in order to increase media form.69 The contact form received 2168 requests literacy in society. Together with Polityka Insight from December 2018 to 26 May 2020, of which (an expert NGO), in 2018 it published the report 605 were granted, thus the blocked content How to read in the fake news era. The document or profiles were restored.70 It should be noted summarises a series of workshops held at leading that the Ministry has invited other social plat- Polish universities, thanks to which the platform forms to participate in this globally unique managed to collect 118 takeaways on disinfor- solution. As Deputy Minister of Digitalisation mation tackling. Facebook also carried out edu- Karol Okoński’s words on 28 November 2019 cational activities, which it disseminated in coop- make clear, the government is in talks about eration with the PAP. Having created a teaching the possibility of extending the point of contact tool in the form of infographics on recognising with YouTube and Twitter. In the conversation, fake news online, Facebook helped it reach more the Deputy Minister predicted that “an agree- than 10 million users in Poland through circula- ment could be reached in the next few months”.71 tion across PAP channels.66 In addition, in 2018 Unfortunately, since then the Ministry (abolished it announced the launch of a programme aimed on 7 October 2020) has not reported on the sta- at Polish start-ups and micro-enterprises, which tus of talks with the platforms, and by December intends to also train media literacy competences.67 2020 the YouTube and Twitter contact points had not been launched. Nevertheless, the government Facebook maintains direct relations with the gov- site for appealing the bans shows a message about ernment as well. In November 2018, the Ministry Twitter’s specially prepared information for Polish of Digitalisation signed a Memorandum of users and the method of proceeding in the case of Understanding with the platform, introduc- appealing against the platform’s decision, available ing extensive recourse options for users whose on its website.72 This fact suggests that it has not accounts are blocked – the first such arrange- decided to join the initiative. ment in the world. The platform agreed to set up a so-called contact point to which owners of Even so, the government cooperates with Twitter blocked or deleted accounts will “be able to submit in another area. The Ministry of Health (MoH) requests for an additional re-examination [to verify] states that from March 2020 on once the words whether the blocking was done rightly”.68 The use of “coronavirus”, “COVID-19”, and their various con- the checkpoint needs to abide by two conditions: figurations are typed into the site’s search engine, the first message displayed to the user directs 1. The pages, profiles, or content removed must them to the MoH website for reliable information. fall into the categories listed in the form According to the former Minister of Digitisation developed by the Ministry of Digitalisation. currently acting as the Secretary of State in the Chancellery of the Prime Minister Marek 2. The user has previously made an unsuccessful Zagórski, this action aims to tackle disinforma- attempt to appeal the decision, and Facebook tion about the coronavirus threat.73 Unfortunately, rejected the appeal or failed to respond to it Twitter does not seek broader cooperation with within 72 hours. either the government or the non-governmental sector, nor does it have an office located in Poland.

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Summary addressed both to journalists and school children, seniors, or ordinary interested citizens. What The awareness of the Polish central and mili- seems to be especially poignant is the support for tary administration on disinformation threats journalists as a profession particularly vulnerable should be rated high, which is largely a deriva- to conceivably succumbing to disinformation and tive of the Russian Federation’s hostile actions in unintentionally increasing its reach. The organisa- the information space. On the one hand, Poland tions also conduct fact-checking activities, verify- treats Russia as the main threat to its security ing the veracity of statements made by politicians and tries to keep track of all its hostile activities and public figures, articles and media reports, or (information warfare included) in as much detail content submitted by social media users or read- as possible; on the other hand, over the last dec- ers with doubts about the reliability of informa- ade, to achieve its own political goals, Russia has tion. The Demagog Association stands out in par- repeatedly used disinformation campaigns in ticular as the only member of the international NATO and EU states, the most notorious being its IFCN network, which allows it to fact-check involvement in the 2016 US presidential campaign on Facebook-owned platforms. Unfortunately, and the referendum campaign on UK’s Brexit in NGOs cooperate to a limited extent and do not the same year. For this reason, major strategic share common strategic and tactical goals in documents on national security and defence list the fight against disinformation. potential large-scale disinformation offensives as one of the non-military threats. At the same time, Similarly, Twitter’s and YouTube’s cooperation with recommendations are made on how to combat the government and NGOs is limited to an abso- them, which reiterate the need to build an inter-in- lute minimum, despite their being the platforms stitutional cell to combat disinformation and coor- used by 35% and 92% of Poles respectively. dinate state communications. The Hybrid Support Google (YouTube parent company) is involved Team established at the GCS is a substitute for in a number of programmes to develop digital such a cell. Still, the failure to adopt the draft infor- and media literacy among students and journal- mation security doctrine of the Republic of Poland ists, and supports disinformation-fighting pro- since 2015 is worrying. jects through grant programmes. Facebook’s involvement is different. Apart from conducting At the same time, public sector entities are a number of educational activities on its own actively involved in international cooperation as and in cooperation with the third sector, it signed orchestrated by EU and NATO activities (MFA). a memorandum, the first of its kind worldwide, The KRRiT’s active role in ERGA efforts and in with the Ministry of Digitalisation and NASK. On monitoring the fulfilment of obligations assumed its basis, Polish users could appeal to the second by social media, as well as the development of instance against Facebook’s decision to block or its own documents dedicated in part to dis- remove particular content or pages. Despite dia- information threats proves the commitment loguing with the other popular social platforms of the national regulator. in Poland since the solution launched in 2018, they have not decided to join and implement In Poland, many NGOs that focus on combating the mechanism. The latest project presented by disinformation through various activities carry on the Ministry of Justice should also be singled out their work. As part of their expert activity (car- – it aims to introduce the supremacy of Polish law ried out by the state research institute NASK, too), over the social sites’ Ts & Cs and the “blind law- they produce many publications, analyses, train- suit” mechanism that makes fighting hate speech ing sessions, and even IT solutions. The third sec- online possible, and to regulate freedom-of- tor is also actively involved in media education speech issues on large platforms.

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Keeping the above actions and pursuits in mind, it uncoordinated. No anti-disinformation response should be noted that the disinformation threat is plan adopted by the State in cooperation with meeting with deep awareness and broad response the NGO sector is in place, and administration from numerous NGOs and public administration activities so far have focused mostly on monitor- actors. Meanwhile, private sector’s commitment ing. These hurdles notwithstanding, the experi- in Poland is, excepting Facebook, limited, which ence the entities described above have amassed in no small part relates to the platforms’ global in multi-layered reactions to the disinformation outlook and their heterogeneous specificities, problem is considerable, which provides large putting either textual, or pictorial, or audiovisual potential for setting and adopting the aims which content front and centre, as well as their varying the governmental and non-governmental bodies modes of action. Sadly, threat countering is now alike are going to centre their activities upon.

ENDNOTES

1 Ministry of National Defence, Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland, 2017, p. 24, [online]: https://www.gov.pl/ attachment/78e14510-253a-4b48-bc31-fd11db898ab7. 2 National Security Bureau, National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, 2020, p. 6, [online]: https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/ dokumenty/National_Security_Strategy_of_the_Republic_of_Poland_2020.pdf. 3 Ibidem, p. 21. 4 Ibidem. 5 Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, System komunikacji strategicznej w zwalczaniu dezinformacji, in: Zjawisko dezinformacji w dobie rewolucji cyfrowej. Państwo. Społeczeństwo. Polityka. Biznes, ed. by Magdalena Wrzosek, NASK Państwowy Instytut Badawczy, Warszawa 2019, p. 10. 6 Ibidem, pp. 9–10. 7 Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, Doktryna Bezpieczeństwa Informacyjnego RP, projekt, 2015, pp. 6–7, [online]: https:// www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dok/01/Projekt_Doktryny_Bezpieczenstwa_Informacyjnego_RP.pdf. 8 Ministerstwo Sprawiedliwości, Przełomowa ustawa o ochronie wolności słowa w internecie, 2020, [online]: https://www.gov.pl/ web/sprawiedliwosc/przelomowa-ustawa-o-ochronie-wolnosci-slowa-w-internecie. 9 Draft law on freedom of speech protection in online social services, 15 January 2021. 10 NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, Employees, [online]: https://www.stratcomcoe.org/employees. 11 Biuro Rzecznika Prasowego MSZ, Działania Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych RP w obszarze przeciwdziałania obcej dezinformacji, in: Zjawisko dezinformacji w dobie rewolucji cyfrowej. Państwo. Społeczeństwo. Polityka. Biznes, op. cit., pp. 11–12. 12 Grzegorz Świszcz, Anna Zasadzińska-Baraniewska, Działania Rządowego Centrum Bezpieczeństwa w zakresie przeciwdziałania dezinformacji, in: Zjawisko dezinformacji w dobie rewolucji cyfrowej. Państwo. Społeczeństwo. Polityka. Biznes, op. cit., p. 17. 13 Rządowe Centrum Bezpieczeństwa, KRAJOWY PLAN ZARZĄDZANIA KRYZYSOWEGO Aktualizacja 2020 CZĘŚĆ A, 2020, p. 48, [online]: https://rcb.gov.pl/wp-content/uploads/KPZK-cz.-A-2020-1-1.pdf. 14 Grzegorz Świszcz, Anna Zasadzińska-Baraniewska, Działania Rządowego Centrum Bezpieczeństwa w zakresie przeciwdziałania dezinformacji, in: Zjawisko dezinformacji w dobie rewolucji cyfrowej. Państwo. Społeczeństwo. Polityka. Biznes, op. cit., p. 17. 15 Ibidem, pp. 17–18. 16 NASK, Social and educational research, [online]: https://en.nask.pl/eng/activities/science-and-business/social-and-educational/2179,Social-and-Educational-Research.html. 17 Magdalena Wrzosek (ed.), Cyberbezpieczeństwo A.D. 2019, NASK Państwowy Instytut Badawczy, Warszawa 2020, pp. 181–182.

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18 NASK Państwowy Instytut Badawczy, POWIEDZ: „SPRAWDZAM!”. NIE DAJ SIĘ MANIPULACJOM W INTERNECIE, [online]: https://www.nask.pl/pl/aktualnosci/2365,Powiedz-quotSprawdzamquot-Nie-daj-sie-manipulacjom-w-internecie.html. 19 #FakeHunter, About the project, [online]: https://fakehunter.pap.pl/en/o-projekcie. 20 Dariusz Dalmanowicz, Three Polish institutions to fight fake news on financial market, The First News 2020, [online]: https://www.thefirstnews.com/article/three-polish-institutions-to-fight-fake-news-on-financial-market-13778. 21 Broadcasting Act of 29 December 1992, Article 6(1). 22 Agnieszka Wąsowska, Marek Krawczyk, Działania monitorujące Krajowej Rady Radiofonii i Telewizji – „Kodeks postępowania w zakresie przeciwdziałania dezinformacji”, in: Zjawisko dezinformacji w dobie rewolucji cyfrowej.Państwo. Społeczeństwo. Polityka. Biznes, op. cit., p. 19. 23 Ibidem, p. 19. 24 Ibidem, pp. 18–20. 25 ERGA, ERGA Report on disinformation: Assessment of the implementation of the Code of Practice, 2020, p. 21, [online]: https://erga-online.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ERGA-2019-report-published-2020-LQ.pdf. 26 Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich, KRRiT wyda dokument, jak przeciwdziałać fake newsom, dezinformacji i mowie nienawiści w przestrzeni medialnej, 2020, [online]: https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/krrit-okresli-jak-przeciwdzia%C5%82ac-fake- newsom-dezinformacji-mowie-nienawisci-w-mediach. 27 KRRiT, Fake news - dezinformacja online: próby przeciwdziałania tym zjawiskom z perspektywy instytucji międzynarodowych oraz wybranych państw UE, w tym Polski, [online]: http://www.krrit.gov.pl/Data/Files/_public/Portals/0/obserwator/fake-news_ob- serwator-krrit-1.pdf. 28 Center for Propaganda and Disinformation Analysis, About Foundation, [online]: https://capd.pl/en/mission-and-goals. 29 Marta Kowalska, Szymon Wigienka, StratCom: perspektywa polska. Struktura systemu komunikacji i analiza kampanii na temat 20. rocznicy przystąpienia polski do NATO, Centrum Analiz Propagandy i Dezinformacji 2019, [online]: https://capd.pl/pl/analizy/221-stratcom-perspektywa-polska-struktura-systemu-komunikacji-i-analiza-kampanii-na-temat-20-rocznicy-przystapie- nia-polski-do-nato. 30 INFO OPS Polska, INFO OPS EXE, 2020, [online]: https://infoops.pl/zaproszenia/. 31 INFO OPS Polska, projekty, [online]: https://infoops.pl/projekty-2/. 32 Instytut Kościuszki, CYBERSEC DISINFO LAB: PROJEKT PROZODIA, 2020, [online]: https://ik.org.pl/en/projects/project/. 33 Ibidem. 34 Instytut Kościuszki, RAPORT COVID-19: DEZINFORMACJA W POLSKIEJ CYBERPRZESTRZENI, 2020, [online]: https://ik.org.pl/publikacje/raport-covid-19-dezinformacja-w-polskiej-cyberprzestrzeni/. 35 Instytut Kościuszki, CYBERSEC DISINFO LAB: PROJEKT PROZODIA, op. cit. 36 Anna Borkowska, Zuzanna Polak, Edukacja medialna jako forma przeciwdziałania dezinformacji. Jak chronić dzieci i młodzież przed manipulacją?, in: Zjawisko dezinformacji w dobie rewolucji cyfrowej. Państwo. Społeczeństwo. Polityka. Biznes, op. cit., p. 39. 37 Ibidem, p. 40. 38 Stowarzyszenie Demagog, Akademia Fact-Checkingu, [online]: https://akademia.demagog.org.pl/. 39 Stowarzyszenie Demagog, Uodpornij się na fake newsy z Fajnie, że wiesz!, 2020, [online]: https://demagog.org.pl/ analizy_i_raporty/fajnie-ze-wiesz/. 40 Edukacja Medialna, o projekcie, Fundacja Nowoczesna Polska, [online]: https://edukacjamedialna.edu.pl/info/o-nas/. 41 Ośrodek Analiz Cegielskiego, Sposób na dezinformację, [online]: https://snd.osrodekanaliz.pl/. 42 Panoptykon Foundation, Dealing with Disinformation: A Handbook for Journalists, 2019, [online]: https://panoptykon.org/ dealing-disinformation. 43 Fundacja Reporterów, Szkolenia, 2017, [online]: https://fundacjareporterow.org/o-nas/szkolenia/. 44 Ibidem. 45 Stowarzyszenie Demagog, Demagog dołącza do Programu niezależnej weryfikacji informacji Facebooka, 2019, [online]: https://demagog.org.pl/analizy_i_raporty/demagog-dolacza-do-programu-niezaleznej-weryfikacji-informacji-facebooka/. 46 Stowarzyszenie Demagog, INFOSKAN – zapisz się do newslettera!, 2020, [online]: https://demagog.org.pl/analizy_i_raporty/ infoskan-zapisz-sie-do-newslettera/. 47 Rafał Babraj, Czym jest fact-checking? – zarys inicjatyw na świecie i w Polsce, in: Zjawisko dezinformacji w dobie rewolucji cyfrowej. Państwo. Społeczeństwo. Polityka. Biznes, op. cit., pp. 43–44. 48 OKO.press, O nas, [online]: https://oko.press/o-nas/.

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49 Miłada Jędrysik, Piotr Pacewicz, OKO.press wśród najbardziej opiniotwórczych i czytanych mediów, 2020, [online]: https://oko.press/oko-press-wsrod-najbardziej-opiniotworczych-i-czytanych-mediow/. 50 OKO.press, Kto stoi za OKO.press? Szczera do bólu informacja o naszych finansach, 2017, [online]: https://oko.press/stoi-oko-press-szczera-bolu-informacja-o-naszych-finansach/. 51 Odfejkuj.info, Kim jesteśmy?, [online]: https://odfejkuj.info/onas/. 52 Rafał Babraj, Czym jest fact-checking? – zarys inicjatyw na świecie i w Polsce, op. cit., pp. 43–44. 53 Money.pl, Media społecznościowe. Które wybierają Polacy?, 2020, [online]: https://www.money.pl/gospodarka/media-spolecznosciowe-ktore-wybieraja-polacy-6529596997314689a.html. 54 Magdalena Wrzosek (ed.), Wprowadzenie, in: Zjawisko dezinformacji w dobie rewolucji cyfrowej. Państwo. Społeczeństwo. Polityka. Biznes, op. cit., p. 7. 55 Paweł Zegarow, OCENA UNIJNEGO KODEKSU POSTĘPOWANIA W ZAKRESIE ZWALCZANIA DEZINFORMACJI, NASK Państwowy Instytut Badawczy 2020, [online]: https://cyberpolicy.nask.pl/ ocena-unijnego-kodeksu-postepowania-w-zakresie-zwalczania-dezinformacji/. 56 We Are Social, Hootsuite, Digital 2020. Global Digital Overview, 2021, [online]: https://wearesocial.com/digital-2020. 57 Wirtualnemedia, 4 mln zł w ciągu kwartału z „podatku od VoD”, płacą go też Agora i Grupa RMF, 2020, [online]: https://www.wirtualnemedia.pl/artykul/vod-serwisy-podatek-do-pisf-placa-netflix-i-hbo. 58 John Glenday, YouTube rolls out conspiracy debunking fact-check feature in the UK, The Drum 2020, [online]: https://www.thedrum.com/news/2020/09/24/youtube-rolls-out-conspiracy-debunking-fact-check-feature-the-uk. 59 Google, How Google Fights Disinformation, 2019, [online]: https://kstatic.googleusercontent.com/files/388aa7d18189665e- 5f5579aef18e181c2d4283fb7b0d4691689dfd1bf92f7ac2ea6816e09c02eb98d5501b8e5705ead65af653cdf- 94071c47361821e362da55b, pp. 17–24. 60 Google, Asy Internetu, [online]: https://beinternetawesome.withgoogle.com/pl_all/. 61 Google, An open fund for projects debunking vaccine misinformation, 2021, [online]: https://www.blog.google/ outreach-initiatives/google-news-initiative/open-fund-projects-debunking-vaccine-misinformation. 62 Google, Building a stronger future for journalism, Google News Initiative, [online]: https://newsinitiative.withgoogle.com/intl/pl/. 63 Google, Google Fact Check Tools, [online]: https://toolbox.google.com/factcheck/explorer. 64 Wirtualnemedia, Instagram rozpoczyna aktywną walkę z fake newsami. Korzysta z organizacji fact-checkers pracujących dla Facebooka, 2019, [online]: https://www.wirtualnemedia.pl/artykul/instagram-rozpoczyna-aktywna-walke-z-fake-newsami-korzysta-z-organizacji-fact-checkers-pracujacych-dla-facebooka-dlaczego. 65 Daniel Flis, Sukces śledztwa OKO.press! FB usunął strony promujące m.in. fake newsy i Adama Andruszkiewicza, OKO.press 2019, [online]: https://oko.press/sukces-sledztwa-oko-press-fb-usunal-strony-promujace-m-in-fake-newsy-i-adama-andruszkiewicza/. 66 Jakub Turowski, Walka, która nigdy się nie kończy – jak Facebook ogranicza rozprzestrzenianie się dezinformacji, in: Zjawisko dezinformacji w dobie rewolucji cyfrowej. Państwo. Społeczeństwo. Polityka. Biznes, op. cit., p. 63. 67 Facebook, Training 1 Million People and Small Businesses in Europe by 2020, 2018, [online]: https://about.fb.com/ news/2018/01/community-boost-europe/. 68 Cyfryzacja KPRM, Pierwsze tego typu porozumienie. Ministerstwo Cyfryzacji i Facebook, Serwis Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej 2018, [online]: https://www.gov.pl/web/cyfryzacja/pierwsze-tego-typu-porozumienie-ministerstwo-cyfryzacji-i-facebook. 69 Ibidem. 70 CyberDefence24, „Punkt kontaktowy” dla użytkowników Facebooka. Czy wyniki pracy są zadowalające?, 2020, [online]: https://www.cyberdefence24.pl/punkt-kontaktowy-dla-uzytkownikow-facebooka-czy-wyniki-pracy-sa-zadowalajace. 71 Wirtualnemedia, Wiceminister cyfryzacji: Będzie polski punkt kontaktowy dla YouTube’a i Twittera. Trwają rozmowy z Rosjanami o 5G, 2019, [online]: https://www.wirtualnemedia.pl/artykul/wiceminister-cyfryzacji-bedzie-polski-punkt-kontaktowy-dla-youtube-a-i-twittera-trwaja-rozmowy-z-rosjanami-o-5g-dlaczego-kiedy-5g-w-polsce-terminy-warunki-ceny. 72 Serwis Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Odwołaj się od decyzji portalu, [online]: https://www.gov.pl/web/gov/ odwolaj-sie-od-decyzji-portalu. 73 Cyfryzacja KPRM, Koronawirus w internecie razem przeciw dezinformacji i nieuczci wym praktykom Serwis Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej 2020, [online]: https://www.gov.pl/web/cyfryzacja/koronawirus-w-internecie--razem-przeciw-dezinformacji -i-nieuczciwym-praktykom.

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Anastazja Wiśniewska Germany

Germany’s legislation and policy towards the disinformation phenomenon

The so-called Renate Künast case was a watershed in Germany’s policy towards hybrid threats and disinformation, as in 2017 this member of the Greens party allegedly commented on a crime by an immigrant who had murdered a young woman in Freiburg, saying: “The traumatised young refugee has indeed killed, but one must nevertheless help him”.1 In actual fact the MP apparently was not the author of the statement she got the discredit for, and this piece of fake news aimed to whip up the anti-immigrant sentiment and tarnish the Greens’ public image. Once the MP initiated civil court proceedings against Facebook, false information was removed within three days. What the Renate Künast case brought to policy-makers’ attention was the threat disinformation may pose to German democracy, public debate, and social attitudes.

Currently in the German legal system, creating and disseminating disinformation and fake news is regulated not by means of an overarching legal act but by several specialised acts. They include:

Network Enforcement Act (Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz, NetzDG)

Passed in 2017, it is an example of legal regulations which focus on content moderation. NetzDG aims to improve the enforcing of law and to increase accountability carried by the social media for the actions regarding online speech. The legislation in force states that platforms must provide users with a mechanism to flag the content and be able to examine and remove it in 24 hours after the material in question was reported.2 Social platforms risk fines of up to 50 million euros for non-compliance with the regulations. Yet, they are not obliged to

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search of their own accord for harmful content Interstate Treaty on Media which violates a given platform’s terms and condi- (Medienstaatsvertrag, MStV) tions or is deemed unlawful.3 This media regulation came into force on 7 The Act is only applicable to social media net- November 2020, backed by all German federated works that have two million or more registered states or Länder. It pertains to the challenges sort- users in Germany. Social media networks were ing and content-recommending algorithms pose on given the following definition: “telemedia -ser video-streaming portals such as YouTube and Netflix vice providers that operate online platforms with and in media intermediaries (e.g. Facebook, Google, the intent to make a profit and on which users can and Twitter, Inc.). The principal purpose of the Treaty share content with other users or make that con- is to prevent the dissemination of content that goes tent publicly available”.4 Social platform operators against a service’s terms and conditions (by impos- are obligated to provide their users with an easy ing restrictions on access to them), to promote jour- complaint mechanism, inform the complainants of nalistic content (broadcast programmes), and to the results, publish a report containing the data create easy-to-understand guidelines and instruc- on the number of grievances every six months tions with regard to the way algorithms operate.7 (applies to the platforms which receive more than 100 complaints per year), and appoint a represent- Act against Restraints of Competition ative in Germany to assist in the potential financial (GWB-Digitalisierungsgesetz) penalty process and in court procedures.5 The amendment to the act, put forward by The 18 June 2020 amendment to the Act, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and intended to strengthen users’ rights and increase Energy (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und the transparency of social platform actions by Energie) on 9 September 2020 focuses on a rebal- such means as simplifying user notification system ancing effort in the digital economy and on explor- and streamlining the appeal procedure for revert- ing how digital powerhouses (such as Facebook, ing the content, caused concern among the pub- Google, and Amazon) may abuse their dominant lic. More stringent legal measures impose on social market positions in order to limit the competition.8 platforms the obligation to hand over the reported The Act proposes tighter controls on abuse in large content to the Federal Criminal Police Office digital industry companies as well as enhanced (Bundeskriminalamt, BKA); pursuant to this duty, legal protections and deductions, especially for the social networks have to share certain user small and medium-sized businesses. The amend- data, including IP addresses and port number, with ment could be a key step ahead towards further state bodies. This is supposed to guarantee effec- calibrating the legal framework to the needs of tive tracking of disinformation spreaders and false platform operators’ business models. information peddlers.6 In addition, the Act envisages a counterclaim procedure to be implemented, The activities of the German federal government one which would allow the people who put in the realm of legislative actions directed against the content online or lodge complaints to repub- disinformation also cover: lish wrongly removed posts or reassess them, and newly set up arbitration bodies to be considered • cooperation with ministries, government insti- competent for solving disputes between users and tutions, and NGOs that foster media projects platforms in extrajudicial proceedings. and actions, digital education and media - liter acy, so as to tackle hate speech, cyberbullying, and disinformation, in particular as relates to children and young people, among others;

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• collaboration with European Union Member What is more, since 2010 in Germany over States’ governments in search of effective means twenty initiatives have been set up that act in to counteract9 hate speech and disinformation; a quest to counter hate speech, cyberbullying, and disinformation (Table 1) • broadening the digital technology competences which are crucially important in build- Because federal states are responsible for edu- ing resilience to cyberthreats and fortifying cation, digital education falls within their compe- digital sovereignty on both the national and tences as well. Media authorities in federal states European levels.10 (Landesmedienanstalten in German) have been tasked by the legislators to protect adolescents in Media education in Germany regard to media. Among their competences is the promotion of digital skills. The Commission for the On the national level, the German federal govern- Protection of Minors in the Media (Kommission ment cooperates with ministries and government für Jugendmedienschutz, KJM), meanwhile, exam- institutions which foster projects concerning edu- ines whether content disseminated by mass media cation in digital matters and bolstering media liter- infringes on the interstate treaty on the protec- acy. Their instances include: tion of minors in the media (Jugendmedienschutz- Staatsvertrag, JMStV) and make decisions on • Federal Agency for Civic Education (Die possible penalties.14 Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung), which furthers the media literacy development What is more, according to the index in the 2019 through numerous initiatives, e.g. organising European Policies Initiative report, Germany was simulation games, publishing guidebooks that ranked eighth among European countries [media paint a picture of the modern-day media land- literacy map, page 8]. The ranking estimates thir- scape, and providing information on the pos- ty-five countries’ resilience to disinformation and sibilities that involving digital media in educa- fake news using media freedom, education, and tional work gives;11 public attitude towards the media as indicators. The result suggests that the initiatives to increase • Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior media-related competences are highly effective.15 Citizens, Women and Youth (Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend) NGO activities in tackling strengthens media literacy skills among par- disinformation ents and education-focused professionals – it also promotes coming into contact between Apart from governmental and legislative actions, media workers and supports contests for chil- a role in media education and the fight against dis- dren and young people; in running such con- information is also played by the third sector rep- tests, it partners with Children and Young resented by NGOs, fact-checking organisations, or People’s Film Centre in Germany (Kinder- und institutes such as the Institute for Media Research Jungendfilmzentrum in Deutschland);12 and Media Education (Institut für Medienpädagogik in Forschung und Praxis, JFF), located under the govern- • Federal Ministry of Education and Research ment of each federated state.16 Digital technologies (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung) offer the opportunity to participate in creating and strives to support and promote using digital spreading information on an unprecedented scale, media in a professional capacity via financing which entails the need to invest in digital aware- programmes that enhance media competences.13 ness development and to counteract the dissemination of misinforming and disinforming content.

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Table 1. Sample initiatives to enhance media literacy.

NAME DESCRIPTION

The award celebrates media-related or media-pedagogical education projects and methods. It is given by the Association for Media Education and Communication Culture (Gesellschaft für Medienpädagogik und Kommunikationskultur, GMK) and Ministry Dieter Baacke Preis for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth (Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend). Its purpose is to raise awareness and critical thinking skills in terms of the new media and the related threats.

More than 60 children’s websites have banded together for the project. The pages involved are by independent teachers, journalists, federal ministries, companies, churches, Seitenstark associations, and children’s clubs. The aim is to establish quality standards for children’s and youth’s web pages.

The Blickwechsel team provides media education seminars and training for educators and teachers, holds parents’ media education evenings in schools and community centres, on Blickwechsel top of that initiates hands-on media projects with children and young people in order to improve their media literacy.

Schau hin! Was Dein An internet guide for parents concerning traditional and social media, smartphones, Kind mit Medien macht. and digital technologies.

A guide for parents and carers with regard to getting to know and safely using Ein Netz für Kinder the internet by children.

Workshops intended to inform teenagers about such issues as hate speech, social partici- Demokratielabore pation and engagement.17

Source: Own work based on the data gathered by the European Audiovisual Observatory, 2016.

Areas of particular focus on the part of the German The German fact-checking community is made up non-governmental sector include: increasing tech- of the following initiatives and websites: nological competences, developing digital identity management skills, and developing digital learn- • Wafana – the first German fact-checking in- ing awareness and the appropriate forms of digital stitution, set up in 2016. Its name takes its self-expression.18 syllables from blending the beginnings of the words truth (Wahrheit), facts (Fakten), and Fact-checking organisations news (Nachrichten). The organisation conducts online content-verification training for -jour Among the fact-checking organisations that are nalists all over the country. verified signatories to the code of the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) two can be named: • Crowdalyzer – a tool that uses machine-learn- dpa-Faktencheck at the editorial office of Deutsche ing algorithms and helps monitor social media. Presse-Agentur and Correctiv. As a consequence of Not only does it allow journalists to spot fake the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak and the accom- news, it also lets them pinpoint target groups panying infodemic, more and more fact-check- which such information is aimed at.19 ers have been emerging. Duke Reporters’ Lab has added Faktenfinder, affiliated with the German • CrowdNewsroom – a special platform initiated public broadcasting consortium ARD, to its list. by the fact-checking organisation Correctiv,

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verifying the maelstrom of news related to without adequate legal protection. Nick Wallace the coronavirus pandemic, serving as the place (analyst at the Center for Data Innovation) and Alan where suspicious content which stirs public McQuinn (analyst at the Information Technology opinion can be checked. The data points gath- and Innovation Foundation) argue that German ered on the platform are then verified by media attempts to regulate disinformation in social media workers from the editorial office, who engage are impractical, as its clear definition is lacking. in assessing whether they are true to fact. Changes in this area may also increase the costs for platforms. Therefore, implementing content dele- • AFP Germany – a branch of a global information mechanisms among start-ups may not be feasi- tion agency. As part of its partnership with ble in the absence of resources that large providers Facebook, German became the sixteenth have to moderate content.22 language which AFP collates its fact-checking articles in; the agency publishes them on Facebook’s cooperation with fact-checking the multilingual page AFP Fact Check.20 organisations

• Hoaxmap – a website covering refugee and In Germany, Correctiv, dpa-Faktencheck and Facebook immigrant–related news. The digital map of are working together to verify information. The algo- Germany in maintains allows you to locate rithms used on the platform can amplify the spread fake news by searching in such categories as of false information among its users. Facebook pro- the Land, place name, and topic. vides analysts with a list of reported posts, which are then analysed. If false news does find its way online, • SWR-Fakefinder – a tool in the form of a game users will see a corrected version displayed below which helps differentiate between untrue and the original post, and the person who wants to share true information. Each task is complemented by the false content will receive a warning.23 links to websites devoted to exposing fake news. International initiatives – the European Union • First Draft News – an organisation set up in and Germany 2015, which prepares guidelines on dealing with disinformation once it is being dissemi- Taking the global nature of the Internet into con- nated across the social media. In Germany, First sideration, countering disinformation cannot stop Draft originators cooperate with dpa, Die Zeit, at the German border. Active strategic communi- ARD, and Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen (ZDF).21 cation at home and abroad is essential to combat disinformation in a more effective way. Germany’s Social media activities in Germany assumption of the presidency in the Council of the European Union in July 2020 intensified efforts Currently, we are dealing with fake websites, directed towards accelerating and rebalanc- bots, and trolls online, which are all attempting to ing the digital transformation as well as towards manipulate public opinion. In 2017, Angela Merkel, the development of digital and technological sov- German Chancellor, addressed the dangers of dis- ereignty.24 In line with its presidency programme, information and expressed the need to regulate Berlin concentrated on technological advances in social media. Nevertheless, it is often a matter of artificial intelligence and quantum technologies debate whether they are sufficient. In 2018. Human and on the protection of citizens’ sovereignty as Rights Watch discussed the Network Enforcement regards accessing and storing data on all users’ Act (Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz, NetzDG), consid- devices without a third-party interference.25 ering it a vague regulation that turns private companies into overzealous censors and leaves users

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Table 2. Fact-checking mechanism on Facebook in Germany.

TYPE 1 TYPE 2

A link to the content corrected by fact-checking partners appears under the questionable post in the tab “More on this”. Initially, Facebook used a Sharing a post assessed as fake by the analysts results more attention-drawing signal for that: a red warn- in displaying a window with the information the post ing sign and a message notifying of the doubtful has been questioned.26 content appeared right below the post. This variant was, however, decided against due to the risk of entrenching the views instead of debunking them.27

Source: Own work.

The Council of the European Union, by creat- With the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, ing the appropriate legal conditions, has created German authorities have intensified their cooper- the possibility to securely archive data in the form ation with the World Health Organization (WHO) of so-called Standardised Secure Elements. and social platform operators to combat disinformation.30 Key tasks include primarily increasing Additionally, other initiatives taken by European the availability of reliable information and support- Union policy-makers include the establishment of ing independent media by cooperating with pub- the High-Level Group on fake news and online dis- lic health protection authorities. In this respect, information (HLEG) by the European Commission the German presidency of the Council of the EU in 2018 – which is discussed in more detail in has set itself the goal of strengthening the citi- the EU chapter.28 The German actors listed below zen’s digital participation as regards promoting participated in the work by the HLEG. skills and competences which the digital age has, arguably, at its core, with certain emphasis on At the national level, the role of Germany’s HLEG one aspect of the pandemic, that is its impact on representatives mainly consists of working with the education sector. the public sector and fact-checking organisations to increase transparency of online news, promote media literacy, counter disinformation, and help users in navigating the digital media environment. In addition, they focus on developing tools to enable them and journalists to combat disinformation and foster positive engagement with rapidly evolving information technologies.29

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Table 3. German HLEG representatives.

REPRESENTATIVE DESCRIPTION

Arbeitsmegeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtli- The ARD TV station news desk came up with the tool to check fake news, dubbed chen Rundfunkanstalten Faktenfinder. Journalists present their own opinions vis-à-vis the content circulated der Bundesrepublik on social media. Deutschland (ARD)

Representative of several RTL Group divisions participated in fact-checking workshops on user-generated content (UGC). The participants were trained in terms of Bertelsmann & Co UGC verification and exchanged their views on the topic of how their home institutions may cooperate in this field and react to disinformation-related challenges as they serve the local and international needs.31

A project, active in Belgium, Austria, and Germany, targeted at children and young people in order to increase their media competency and teach them critical thinking when facing information online. Through cooperation with journalists and Lie Detectors selected specialists, it strives to increase digital skills, creating positive feedbacks between journalists, youngsters, and teachers. Moreover, the organisation impacts policy-shaping as it advises the European Commission on stemming the tide and the social-economic impact of disinformation.32

Source: Own work.

Summary Targeted actions and a tightly knit cooperation between the German federal government and dig- The legislative solutions and best practices in ital service providers are vital, especially in the leg- the third sector’s activities listed above indicate islative sense, in order to come up with transparent that, for countering hybrid threats and disinforma- regulations that define the disinformation phe- tion, pooling the efforts and collaborating across all nomenon, the role of social platforms, and their the interested parties is indispensable. A well-inte- legal responsibility. Likewise, to keep bolstering grated, systemic approach at the institutional level, media literacy, to foster organisations which zero clear-cut obligations associated with particular state in on disinformation (to be done by the German bodies, digital service providers, or fact-checking federal government), and to deploy the European analysts, along with combining the methods they Union’s solutions are all necessary activities for employ seem to lead to a much more effective way enhancing German systemic resilience in the face to counter these threats in the cyber. of hybrid threats and disinformation.

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ENDNOTES

1 Magdalena Gwóźdź, Fake News – co to takiego i jaki mają zasięg, 2016, [online]: https://www.dw.com/pl/ fake-news-co-to-takiego-i-jaki-maj%C4%85-zasi%C4%99g/a-36742325. 2 Ibidem. 3 Library of Congress, Initiatives to counter fake news: Germany, [online]: www.loc.gov/law/help/fake-news/germany.php. 4 Ibidem. 5 Krajowa Rada Radiotelefonii i Telewizji, Fake news – dezinformacja online, 2020, [online]: http://www.krrit.gov.pl/Data/Files/_ public/Portals/0/analizy/fake-news_obserwator-krrit.pdf. 6 Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz, Weiterentwicklung des Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetzes, 2020, [online]: https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Artikel/DE/2020/040120_NetzDG.html. 7 Ibidem. 8 Ibidem. 9 Library of Congress, Initiatives to counter fake news: Germany, op. cit. 10 Statement by Germany’s Defence Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer during CYBERSEC Global 2020, [online]: https://youtu.be/my_5laNcsvk. 11 Die Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Medienpädagogik, 2020, [online]: https://www.bpb.de/lernen/digitale-bildung/ medienpaedagogik/. 12 Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend, Medienkompetenz stärken, 2018, [online]: https://www.bmfsfj.de/bmfsfj/themen/kinder-und-jugend/medienkompetenz/medienkompetenz-staerken/75350. 13 Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung, Bekanntmachung, 2016, [online]: https://www.bmbf.de/foerderungen/ bekanntmachung-1137.html. 14 Ibidem. 15 Library of Congress, Initiatives to counter fake news: Germany, op. cit. 16 EACEA National Policies Platform, National strategy, 2017, [online]: https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/national-policies/. 17 Ibidem. 18 Landesmedienzentrum Baden-Württemberg, Medienbildung und gesellschaft, 2020, [online]: https://www.lmz- bw.de/medien-und-bildung/medienwissen/medienbildung/grundlagen-der-medienbildung-und-mediendidaktik/ medienbildung-und-gesellschaft/. 19 Clothilde Goujard, Fact-checking around the world: Inside Germany’s Wafana, 2018, [online]: https://ijnet.org/en/story/ fact-checking-around-world-inside-germany%E2%80%99s-wafana. 20 AFP, AFP consolidates its place as global fact check leader with new German service, 2020, [online]: https://www.afp.com/en/ agency/press-releases-newsletter/afp-consolidates-its-place-global-fact-check-leader-new-german-service. 21 First Draft, Disinformation is damaging communities around the world, 2020, [online]: https://firstdraftnews.org/. 22 The Local, Opinion: Germany shouldn’t force social media firms to be arbiters of truth, 2017, [online]: https://www.thelocal. de/20170201/why-germany-shouldnt-force-social-media-companies-to-be-the-arbiters-of-truth. 23 Natasha Lomas, Germany tightens online hate speech rules to make platforms send reports straight to the feds, 2020, [online]: https://techcrunch.com/2020/06/19/germany-tightens-online-hate-speech-rules-to-make-platforms-send-reports-straight- to-the-feds/. 24 Council of the European Union, Together for Europe’s recovery: Programme for Germany’s Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 2020, [online]: https://www.eu2020.de/blob/2360248/e0312c50f910931819ab67f630d15b2f/06-30-pdf-programm-en-data.pdf. 25 Ibidem. 26 Philipp Müller, Warnen oder Löschen: Wie sollen Plattformen mit Falschmeldungen verfahren?, 2019, [online]: https://www.bpb. de/gesellschaft/digitales/digitale-desinformation/290481/wie-sollen-plattformen-mit-falschmeldungen-verfahren. 27 Christina Iglhaut, Facts for democracy, 2020, [online], https://www.deutschland.de/en/topic/culture/ combatting-fake-news-about-coronavirus-how-germany-is-tackling-the-problem. 28 European Commission, Tackling online disinformation: a European approach, 2018, [online]: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0236. 29 European Audiovisual Observatory, Mapping of media literacy practices and actions in EU-28, 2016, [online]: https://rm.coe. int/1680783500. 30 Susan Bergner, Remco van de Pas, Louise van Schaik, Maike Voss, Upholding the World Health Organization, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik 2020, [online]: https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2020C47/. 31 Bertelsmann, Alliance against fake news, 2017, [online]: https://www.bertelsmann.com/corporate-responsibility/projects-worldwide/project/alliance-against-fake-news.jsp. 32 Lie Detectors, Critical Thinking, 2021, [online]: https://lie-detectors.org/.

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Faustine Felici France

Introduction

May 2017, a few days before the second round of the presidential election, France was faced with an unprecedented phenomenon – quickly dubbed the “MacronLeaks” by the press. 15 GB of data – around 150,000 emails and documents – emanating from mailboxes of the then-candidate Emmanuel Macron’s party officials were dis- closed online, prompting heated online debates in a wave of social media posts and supposedly providing a mine of information for undecided voters. However, the addition of forged emails and unauthentic folders to the original documents suggests that the intent was to deceive people, to manipulate their minds, and most importantly to influence their vote. The outreach of the documents and of the accompanying comments and misleading analyses1 was undoubtedly amplified by the digital and online dimension of the campaign. Indeed, if influence operations have long been a common practice, the fast digitalisation of the public and information spheres is opening new paths for malicious actors to achieve their goals. In an increasingly connected society, where social networks represent the second preferred source of information2 for people – even the first one for young French citizens aged 18–343 – electoral campaigns marred with fake news or online disinformation offensives sowing division in society are a real danger to democracy. François Hollande – President of the French Republic at the time of the “MacronLeaks” – promised that nothing would be left “without answer”.4 An investigation was opened by the public prosecutor’s office in Paris and the National Cybersecurity Agency (Fr. Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information, ANSSI) was asked to provide its technical expertise on the case.

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In a country where freedom of expression is cher- capable of disturbing it, will be subject to a fine of ished and where “the free communication of ideas 45,000 euros”.6 The same penalty applies to def- and of opinions is one of the most precious rights amation and insult. The jurisprudence has grad- of man”,5 how do the French public authorities ually defined the type of information capable of deal with limiting the spread of dis- and misinfor- disturbing the public peace. It includes among oth- mation campaigns and countering the so-called ers the ones capable of disturbing international “fake news”? This chapter will navigate this thorny relations, of causing rationing, exodus, or news issue by exploring the French legislation and policy capable of provoking insurrectional reactions.7 targeting the publication of disinformation and by Therefore, not all fake news constitutes a distur- presenting non-governmental initiatives address- bance of public peace. ing the very same issue. Finally, relations between social media companies and the government will If freedom of expression is considered fundamen- be studied through the prism of an unprecedented tal and seen as a pillar of democratic life in France, experiment conducted together with Facebook. it is nevertheless not an absolute, and fake news is one of the areas where it has long been strictly Legislation and policy of France regulated. However, the advent of the Internet against disinformation and the multiplication and rapid development of social media prompted new abuses and challenges If concerns about disinformation resurfaced with – among them, the anonymity of online actors the development of online and social media in – breaking a fragile balance found in the 1881 the 21st century, it is, however, not a completely law. One of the strengths of the law was that it uncharted topic. Attempts to manipulate and to imposed the designation and the mention of a per- cleave public opinion are at least as old as the inven- son responsible for the publication who would tion of mass media. Therefore, it is not surprising to be held accountable in case of the issuing of fake find out that the first law tackling the issue of disin- news. The anonymity enjoyed online does not formation in France dates back to the 19th century. allow for the same level of accountability to be Recently deemed outdated and unfit to address put on online authors compared to press outlets. the problem of online disinformation, it has been The 2017 presidential election paved the way complemented by a new law in 2018. for a new reflection on the topic, which resulted in a new piece added to the legislative arsenal to The Law of 29 July 1881 on the Freedom counter disinformation. of the Press The Law of 22 December 2018 on combating Amended numerous times since its adoption, the manipulation of information the Law of 29 July 1881 on the Freedom of the Press is still in force in France. Rather than The 2017 presidential election together with the fabrication of false news, it is here its dissem- the so-called “MacronLeaks” constituted a turn- ination and therefore the manipulation of media ing point in the appreciation of the detrimen- that is targeted. The law defines – among other tal potential of disinformation on democratic life things – what is considered fake news and makes and in the mindsets of the French political elite. its dissemination a criminally punishable offence: On 29 May 2017, just a few days after being elected “The malicious publication, dissemination, and President, Emmanuel Macron raised the issue dur- reproduction, by whatever means, of false news ing the press conference closing an official visit of and documents which have been fabricated, fal- President Vladimir Putin. He denounced the prac- sified, or mendaciously attributed to third parties, tices of Russia Today and Sputnik who “did not when this has disturbed the public peace, or was behave as media organisations and journalists, but

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as agencies of influence and propaganda, lying prop- • make public the amount of remuneration aganda – no more, no less”8 and in January 2018 received in exchange for the promotion of announced his willingness to make the French legal such information content when it exceeds framework evolve in order to protect the democratic 100 euros. life of the country from fake news. Two issues were identified as prominent with regard to manipulat- Finally, in order to address the issue of foreign ing information: media controlled by foreign states controlled media interfering in domestic elections, – used as means of influence – and the status of the law of 22 December 2018 also gave France’s digital platforms, which does not allow anyone to main regulatory agency for radio and television put sufficient responsibility on them for the con- broadcasting (Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel, CSA) tent they disseminate. increased power. It may suspend11 until the end of the voting operations or withdraw12 the broadcast- These issues are addressed in the law of 22 ing license of any radio or television operator con- December 2018. It is mainly focused on electoral trolled by or under the influence of a foreign state periods – starting three months before the day if it broadcasts false information that could affect of a general election – and introduces new swift the election results or content that could harm actions. Therefore, at the request of a public pros- “the fundamental interests of the Nation” – which ecutor, a candidate, a political party or a coalition, explicitly includes the spread of fake information or any person with standing, an interim judge may in an attempt to disrupt the smooth functioning of order “any proportional and necessary measure” institutions. The decision to withdraw the broad- to stop the “deliberate, artificial, or automatic and casting license of an operator can be motivated by massive” dissemination of “inaccurate or misleading content disseminated by electronic means includ- allegation or imputation likely to alter the fairness ing the Internet, however it cannot be based solely of the election”.9 The ruling has to be made within on that factor. 48 hours. The shortness of the time frame is inten- tional and clearly targets online campaigns that can Additionally, some provisions of the law impose spread more rapidly than on any other medium. a cooperation duty on online platforms in order to push them to introduce and make public new Following the law of 22 December 2018 – also measures to eliminate fake news. First of all, deemed “anti-fake-news” law – digital platforms online platform operators must designate a legal and social media took on increased obligations. representative in France which should serve as The latter focus mainly on improving the trans- a point of contact for the application of provisions parency of online political advertising. Therefore, of the new law. Among others measures, online during election periods, online platforms with at platforms should develop a way for users to flag least five million unique visitors per month must:10 false information thanks to a method that should be “easily accessible and visible”.13 Complementary • provide users with faithful, clear, and transpar- efforts can cover the following fields: ent information on the identity of the person or organisation that bought paid content re- • the transparency of platform algorithms, lated to a debate of national interest, • the promotion of content from press companies and news agencies and from audio-visual • provide users with faithful, clear, and trans- communication services, parent information on the use of their- per sonal data in the context of the promotion • the fight against online accounts disseminat- of information content related to a debate of ing false information on a massive scale, national interest,

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• the information of users on the nature, origin, guidelines. In addition, the CNCCEP’s swift reaction and modalities for dissemination of content, after the release of the “MacronLeaks” was instru- mental in tackling the impact this disinformation • the information of users on the identity of in- campaign had. Through a press release published dividuals providing remuneration in return for the next day, it urged the media “not to report on the promotion of information content, the content of this data, especially on their web- • the promotion of media and information sites, reminding [them] that the dissemination of literacy.14 false information is a breach of law, above all criminal law.”16 Traditional media engaged in careful cov- All actions undertaken in this regard as well as erage of the information included in the leaks and means allocated to it must be compiled in a yearly some even drew their readers’ attention to the sus- document addressed to the CSA which later on picious timing of the event, engaging in turn and on publishes a report on anti-fake-news measures their own scale in a media literacy lesson directed taken by online platforms and the assessment of towards their readers. their effectiveness. The same regulatory agency for radio and television broadcasting also has Activities of NGOs and any non- the power to publish recommendations intended governmental initiatives for online platforms. It did so for the first time in the context of the European elections in 2019, Apart from government activities and the deploy- and published a list of recommendations15 which ment of new legislative frameworks, the issue of included the same six points as the comple- disinformation has also mobilised other actors, mentary efforts proposed in the text of the law mainly within the media sphere and the civil soci- of 22 December 2018, described above. ety. Through various actions like media literacy campaigns or fact-checking initiatives they take The active role of governmental an active role in the fight against misinformation agencies and disinformation in France.

If observing the evolution of the legislation is The power of fact-checking a great tool to assess the level of action against disinformation in France, the increasingly active role Faced with an unprecedented crisis, against of of governmental agencies in this domain is also backdrop of a strong loss of credibility in the eyes worth underlining. The growing powers of the CSA of the public, traditional media outlets in France have been discussed within the previous section have been pushed to develop their own counter- and two other agencies – the National Commission strike against the phenomenon of fake news in for the Control of the Electoral Campaign for order to regain their former glory. The creation the Presidential Election (Fr. Commission Nationale of fact-checking websites, platforms, or blogs has de Contrôle de la Campagne électorale en vue de been one of the most important developments l’Élection Présidentielle, CNCCEP) and the ANSSI – in the journalism sphere in the last 10 years. can be mentioned for their key role in countering In 2008 and 2009, two dailies, Libération and malicious actions, notably during the 2017 presi- Le Monde, created their own blogs – respectively dential election campaign. It has to be noted that called Désintox for Libération and Les Décodeurs their efforts have also been focused on -counter for Le Monde – with a simple objective in mind: ing cyber-attacks, but they effectively worked to check information displayed online. Later on, with presidential candidates’ campaign teams these blogs gained more and more attention to improve their digital literacy skills too, dur- from the public and became integrated as col- ing workshops or with the publication of specific umns on the online websites of the newspapers.

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Through partnerships with other media, they also Instagram in order to review the content they contributed to the expansion of fact-checking in host, including organic and boosted posts, as well France. Indeed, in addition to newspapers, other as images, videos, or links. kinds of media went down the same path, with for instance France 24 or Arte launching their own ini- Fostering media and information literacy tiatives on TV. If the proliferation of fact-checking websites, blogs, It is, however, important to mention that the major or dedicated services provides great tools to spot media is not the only actor involved in fact-checking. online disinformation, there is, however, a good One of the oldest initiatives aiming at countering amount of complementary work to be done with disinformation in France is a collaborative plat- regard to awareness raising. Indeed, to even use form called hoaxbuster.com. Created in 2000, it the fact-checking tools, people must have a certain originally focused on exposing hoaxes spreading understanding of the problem posed by disinfor- on the Internet via email chains. With the rapid mation and develop their own fact-checking skills. development of social media, it evolved towards In the follow up of the terrorist attacks of 2015 debunking false rumours and fake news in a peda- in France, greater attention has been focused on gogical manner, explaining to its users how to spot preventing the dissemination of conspiracy theo- such fakes. HoaxBuster is based on the involve- ries and anti-social behaviours often linked to false ment of internet users who can send requests to information online. It is estimated that around 55 the platform, asking it to verify the facts included key media and information literacy initiatives were in a news article, an email they received, or a social active in France in 201618 and we can suppose media post. The landscape of fact-checking ini- that their number has been increasing since then. tiatives would finally not be complete without Furthermore, according to the Findings of the Media the mention of specialised blogs like Les Surligneurs Literacy Index 2019 report released by the European focusing on verifying the legal aspects of news Policies Initiative of the Open Society Institute in titles or political speeches. Sofia, France has made the biggest progress, gaining four positions in the Index and four points between In order to fight against the propagation of 2017 and 2019.19 The index directly assessed fake news related to the COVID-19 pandemic, the resilience of 35 European countries to fake the French government created an online resource news, using indicators for media freedom, educa- referencing fact-checking articles on topics con- tion, and trust in journalism. The final findings indi- nected with the pandemic, called “Désinfox cate that with a score of 59 points and ranking 15th, Coronavirus”. Yet, it was quickly deleted after France finds itself in the second cluster of countries, a complaint by the national trade union of -jour having a good overall performance and being above nalists who denounced a bias, as the website was the average (see the map of Europe on page 8). gathering its data from only a few sources.17 Children and teenagers are the most frequent The table offers a non-exhaustive overview of beneficiaries of media and information literacy fact-checking initiatives currently active in France. activities that are mainly conducted at school. Journalists and fact-checkers regularly hold work- Slightly moving the focus and looking at a more shops or small conferences on the topic of media global perspective, it is worth noting that five and information and are nowadays focusing more French media – AFP, Le Monde, Libération, and more on how to spot online disinformation. France 24, 20 Minutes – have been certified by One of the best-known initiatives is the “Press the International Fact-Checking Network in 2019 and Media Week at School” (Fr. La semaine de la and are working together with Facebook and presse et des médias à l’école) organised since 1989

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Table 4. Main websites and fact-checking initiatives in operation in France since 2000.

INITIATIVE MEDIA DATE OF MEDIA TITLE BRIEF DESCRIPTION TITLE DIFFUSION ROLLOUT

Online collaborative platform debunking HoaxBuster HoaxBuster Online 2000 hoaxes and online rumours Online blog (2008–2013), later an online column on Libération’s website (2013–2018) Libération Désintox Online then TV 2008 and a video format produced in collaboration with Arte France (2012–present) Online blog (2009–2014), becoming an Online (and Le Monde Les Décodeurs online column in 2014, partnered with 2009 partially radio) France Inter (radio) in 2012–2013 Weekly radio programme, daily since Franceinfo Le Vrai du Faux Radio 2012 August 2012

Online column in the section France 24 Intox Online 2014 “Les Observateurs”

Printed and 20 Minutes Fake Off Series of articles 2017 online News browser answering internet users’ Libération CheckNews Online questions about news and debunking vari- 2017 ous rumours

Les Surligneurs Les Surligneurs Online Website focused on legal checking 2017

Blog checking news from different regions AFP Factuel Online 2017 and available in 18 languages

Faux et usage France 2 TV Part of a television news programme 2019 de faux

Source: own chart based on the data aggregated by Laurent Bigot in Le fact checking en France, en une chronologie, La Revue des médias (October 2019).

by the French Media and Information Literacy between true and false information online, as well Centre (Fr. Le Centre pour l’éducation aux médias as to study pictures and videos and spot signs of it et à l’information, CLEMI). Encouraging children being faked or forged. to become wiser and smarter connected citizens is a major task enshrined in the core mission Fact-checking and media and information liter- of CLEMI. CLEMI is part of the French Ministry of acy are two well-developed sectors in France and National Education and Youth but is partnering complement the legal framework put in place by with many private and civil society actors in order the government in order to fight against disinfor- to accomplish its mission. One recent example is mation. Nevertheless, when it comes to non-gov- a common initiative by Le Monde and AFP journal- ernmental initiatives in the field, we can notice ists and the association Entre les lignes which con- a certain lack of research centres and think tanks ducts workshops to help young people distinguish specially dedicated to the issue.

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Social media activities in individual any EU Member state. The mission team recom- countries mended the creation of a new regulatory system based on five key pillars: As their number of users and global influence have rapidly been growing in the last 10 years, social 1. “A public regulatory policy guaranteeing indi- media platforms have been faced with increasing vidual freedoms and platforms’ entrepreneurial pressure from lawmakers to regulate the content freedom. they host. Relations between the heads of companies and heads of states or governments around 2. A prescriptive regulation focusing on the world have taken different turns. Since his the accountability of social networks, imple- election in 2017, President Macron often met with mented by an independent administrative social media stakeholders and lately promoted authority and based on three obligations for a deepened dialogue between them and public the platforms: authorities in order to work jointly on finding solu- • Obligation of transparency of the function tions to the new problems they face. of ordering content,

The Facebook experiment • Obligation of transparency of the function which implements the Terms of Service and Between January and February 2019, an inter- the moderation of content, ministerial mission team composed of high-level • Duty of care towards its users. experts and permanent rapporteurs from several ministries, prime minister services, and 3. Informed political dialogue between the oper- independent authorities worked together with ators, the government, the legislature and Facebook on an unprecedented experiment. As civil society. stated in the mission letter, the objective was “to explore a general framework for the regulation 4. An independent administrative authority, of the social networks, starting from the fight acting in partnership with other branches against online hatred and relying on the volun- of the state, and open to civil society. tary cooperation, outside any legal framework, of Facebook.”20 The idea was therefore to study 5. A European cooperation, reinforcing Member Facebook’s policy of moderation, the resources States’ capacity to take action on global plat- it allocates to this task as well as its organisation forms and reducing the political risks related and to think of a new instrument to keep the right to implementation in each Member State.”21 balance between public freedoms – and especially freedom of expression – and the safeguard- The conclusions of this mission are at least as inter- ing of public order on social networks. The report esting as the idea and conduct of the mission itself. indicates that the exchanges between Facebook’s Through such cooperation between leading pri- and French ministries representatives focused vate stakeholders and high-level public actors at mainly on hate content but that the conclu- the ministry level, mutual understanding of precise sions of the mission may be applied to all other challenges faced by both sides is reinforced and is issues raised by the content published on social more likely to bring new solutions to tackle issues media, thus including disinformation. A special emanating from online content. This cooperative emphasis was put on the global dimension and approach recently adopted by the French govern- consequences of online content diffusion and ment contrasts with other more rigid European on the fact that the result of this French initia- approaches that will be detailed in other chapters tive should be applicable and transferable to of the report.

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Summary Finally, and as fake news is a worldwide phenomenon requiring cooperation to be successfully As a country truly attached to freedom of expres- fought, it is worth mentioning a few French stake- sion, France has since 1881 enforced a legal holders that take part in global actions. The latter framework preventing the dissemination of false take place most frequently at the European Union news. The leaks that happened during the presi- level, with for instance one French trade association dential election campaign in 2017, however, have – Association des Agences-Conseils en Communication been a real game changer and raised awareness – who signed the Code of Practice on Disinformation among French politicians on the challenges posed initiated by the European Commission in 2018. by online disinformation towards democratic life. Furthermore, the Special Committee on Foreign A new law passed in December 2018 targets more Interference in all Democratic Processes in precisely the phenomenon of online disinforma- the European Union, including Disinformation (INGE) tion and aims at countering fake news during elec- set up by the European Parliament in June 2020 is tions periods. Besides public authorities’ efforts, chaired by a French MEP, Raphaël Glucksmann. many non-governmental initiatives are also - tak Three French MEPs have been elected members of ing place, focusing mainly on fact-checking and this special committee and two others are substi- improving media and information literacy among tutes. Whereas it is crucial to take actions against the population. France has also recently become disinformation at the national level, involvement the theatre of new experiments of collaboration and cooperation at the European level is proba- between public and private actors in order to bet- bly the most relevant nowadays and should there- ter understand the challenges and implications fore receive special attention and dedication from of the fight against disinformation. European as well as national public authorities.

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ENDNOTES

1 A few examples of misleading Tweets can be found in the article of Jean-Marc Manach, On a examiné les «Macron Leaks» pour vous, voilà ce qu’on y a trouvé, Slate 2017, [online]: http://www.slate.fr/story/145221/le-macronleaks-est-une-fakenews. 2 Noémie Bonnin, Les réseaux sociaux première source d’info en ligne chez les personnes sensibles aux théories du complot, Francetvinfo 2019, [online]: https://www.francetvinfo.fr/internet/reseaux-sociaux/info-franceinfo-les-reseaux-sociaux-pre- miere-source-d-info-en-ligne-chez-les-personnes-sensibles-aux-theories-du-complot_3191963.html. 3 Ibidem. 4 Une enquête ouverte sur le piratage d’En Marche!, Les Échos 2017, [online]: https://www.lesechos.fr/2017/05/ une-enquete-ouverte-sur-le-piratage-d-en-marche-167537. 5 Declaration of Human and Civic Rights of 26 August 1789, Article 11, [online]: https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/sites/ default/files/as/root/bank_mm/anglais/cst2.pdf. 6 Loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la liberté de la presse, Article 27, [online]: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/ LEGITEXT000006070722/2020-11-27/. 7 Basile Ader, Coronavirus et « fake news », Auguste Debouzy 2020, [online]: https://www.august-debouzy.com/fr/ blog/1412-le-coronavirus-et-les-fake-news. 8 Video: Macron slams RT, Sputnik news as ‘lying propaganda’ at Putin press conference, France 24 2017, [online]: https://www.france24.com/en/20170530-macron-rt-sputnik-lying-propaganda-putin-versailles-russia-france-election. 9 Loi n° 2018-1202 du 22 décembre 2018, Article 1, [online]: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFARTI000037847566. 10 Ibidem; Décret n° 2019-297 du 10 avril 2019 relatif aux obligations d’information des opérateurs de plateforme en ligne assurant la promotion de contenus d’information se rattachant à un débat d’intérêt général, Art. 1, [online]: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000038359165. 11 Loi n° 2018-1202 du 22 décembre 2018, op. cit., art. 6. 12 Loi n° 2018-1202 du 22 décembre 2018, op. cit., art. 8. 13 Loi n° 2018-1202 du 22 décembre 2018, op. cit., art. 11. 14 Ibidem. 15 Recommandation n° 2019-03 du 15 mai 2019 du Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel aux opérateurs de plateforme en ligne dans le cadre du devoir de coopération en matière de lutte contre la diffusion de fausses informations, Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel, [online]: https://www.csa.fr/Reguler/Espace-juridique/Les-textes-reglementaires-du-CSA/ Les-deliberations-et-recommandations-du-CSA/Recommandations-et-deliberations-du-CSA-relatives-a-d-autres-sujets/ Recommandation-n-2019-03-du-15-mai-2019-du-Conseil-superieur-de-l-audiovisuel-aux-operateurs-de-plateforme-en- ligne-dans-le-cadre-du-devoir-de-cooperation-en-matiere-de-lutte-contre-la-diffusion-de-fausses-informations. 16 Recommandation aux médias suite à l’attaque informatique dont a été victime l’équipe de campagne de M. Macron, Commission nationale de contrôle de la campagne électorale en vue de l’élection présidentielle, [online]: http://www.cnccep. fr/communiques/cp14.html. 17 Le gouvernement supprime sa page controversée « désinfox coronavirus », Le Monde 2020, [online]: https://www.lemonde.fr/actual- ite-medias/article/2020/05/05/le-gouvernement-supprime-sa-page-controversee-desinfox-coronavirus_6038753_3236.html. 18 European Audiovisual Observatory, Mapping of media literacy practices and actions in EU-28, Strasbourg 2016, [online]: https://rm.coe.int/1680783500. 19 Open Society Institute – Sofia, Just think about it. Findings of the Media Literacy Index 2019, [online]: https://osis.bg/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/MediaLiteracyIndex2019_-ENG.pdf. 20 Creating a French framework to make social media platforms more accountable: Acting in France with a European vision, Mission report “Regulation of social networks – Facebook experiment”, version 1.1, May 2019, [online]: https://www.numerique.gouv.fr/ uploads/Regulation-of-social-networks_Mission-report_ENG.pdf. 21 Ibidem.

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United Kingdom

Introduction

In early March 2018, the United Kingdom became the victim of unprecedented actions on the part of Russian special forces, which ventured an assassination attempt with a chemical weapon on its territory.1 The target was Sergei Skripal, a former Russian military officer and British intelligence -ser vice double agent.2 Unheard-of in the post-So- viet Union collapse era, the situation led to a seri- ous diplomatic crisis and had its continuation in cyberspace, where Moscow began its information operation. In a few weeks, Russian public media concocted 138 incompatible versions3 of events, which were then disseminated across the British information space using social media. The goal was to deflect attention, inject chaos, and sub- vert trust in official messages.4 The then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Theresa May, described the events as “a deluge of disinformation” that the UK pushed against in a few days after the Skripal attack.5 This was not the first time when Great Britain had to face online disinformation and manipulation. The United States presidential election in 2016 had already indirectly drawn London’s attention to this problem, especially due to Cambridge Analytica activities, a UK company which became infamous for the uproar related to its acquisition of 87 million Facebook users’ data and using it to create advanced personality models, later deployed for conducting a voter-targeting presidential campaign for Donald Trump and Ted Cruz among others.6 Cambridge Analytica activities across the pond attracted the attention to its wide-ranging actions in the UK, in particular as regards the pre- Brexit referendum campaign.7 All these goings-on caused public opinion, the media, and the political class to have much greater awareness and interest in the problem of online disinformation and manipulation. Accordingly, actions meant to map out the problem, define it, and combat it were taken, which the politicians, media, and non-governmental organisation engaged in.

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Disinformation in the UK 4. Digital literacy should become the fourth pillar of basic education, on a par with reading, In January 2017, the parliament of the United writing, and arithmetic. Kingdom expressed the need to organise a parliamentary enquiry regarding the disinformation and The report is an important contribution to fake news in their many guises, and repeated that the process of countering disinformation in the UK. need after the June 2017 snap election. As a con- It contains a comprehensive analysis of the issue, sequence, the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport which delves into its many layers, and presents Committee activities were launched in the House an extensive set of recommendations for govern- of Commons. The main result of the research, ment action, which were taken into account in analyses, and a number of consultations and hear- the drafting of the government’s strategy to com- ings conducted that emerged was the Disinformation bat online threats, that is Online Harms White Paper. and ‘fake news’ report, published in two versions: the interim report of 29 July 2018 and the final one Another element of the UK’s efforts to combat on 18 February 2019. The first sorted the general disinformation was the Cabinet’s Online Harms knowledge gathered hitherto on this phenome- White Paper, published in April 2019, which non, tried to resolve definitional concerns, described sets out the government’s proposals for tack- the tools used to propagate fake news, and sub- ling online threats. Threats were defined as “con- mitted the examples of information space irregu- tent or activity that harms individual users,- par larities and information operations that had been ticularly children, or threatens our way of life in documented till then. The final report focused on the UK, either by undermining national security, the role and responsibility of internet platforms or by undermining our shared rights, responsibil- as an issue, data gathering and use by private ities […]”.8 The position expressed in the White organisations as a topic, the role of paid-for politi- Paper identifies disinformation and manipulation cal advertising, and on foreign influence operations. as one type of harmful online activity that ought to receive greater attention from state authorities An extensive set of takeaways for future legisla- and should be met with robust legislative action tive and organisational action was also presented. needed to combat it. In the context of disinforma- The key proposals include: tion, concerns were raised over both the risk that hostile states might make use of it to undermine 1. Regulating social media and creating new legal democratic values and principles and its nature definitions and legislative solutions for tech- as a direct threat to society and the lives of citi- nological companies in order to be able to zens. With regard to external threats, the Russian enforce accountability from social media plat- Federation was named and shamed, referred to as forms for the content published on their sites. the state which was the main source of disinformation, while in both cases what was emphasised 2. Creating regulations and a mandatory code of was the role of social media platforms, which due ethics, whose observance would be supervised to their characteristics, business model, and algo- by an independent regulator with statutory rithm use can serve as an effective tool for spread- rights to monitor the activities of individual ing false information. tech companies. Online Harms White Paper presents the phenome- 3. Protecting user data and overseeing its pro- non of disinformation and manipulation in cyber- cessing by technology companies with the use space as important from the viewpoint of national of algorithms and AI. and social security. It also points to the need to come up with appropriate legislation and actions

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on the government’s part to address the chal- to online threats include the publication of a docu- lenges of the digital age. The document is another ment which outlines Ofcom’s experience in regulat- stride in the UK’s path to combat disinformation in ing radio and television, which may form the basis cyberspace. The disinformation-related measures of future guidelines on harmful online content; announced therein are going to be presented later the launch of the Making Sense of Media pro- in the chapter. gramme, which strives to improve literacy skills for online content; and the preparation of numerous Existing regulations reports, for instance Online Nation, which exam- on disinformation ine in what ways online content and services are offered to users and present the behaviour of inter- The UK does not currently have a single authority net users.10 Ofcom notes that the existence of reg- overseeing social media platforms and the content ulation regarding television and radio broadcasters they host. Similarly, there is no law concerning dis- and the concomitant lack of it for online content has information or manipulation online and -explic resulted in “a ‘standards lottery’ that allows social itly prohibiting either. The issue of illegal manip- media platforms to take advantage of lax regulation ulation and the distinction between imparting while traditional broadcasters have to follow tough reliable information and dispersing disinforma- rules on protecting audiences”.11 Concurrently, tion is by no means new from the perspective Ofcom is calling for more regulation of social media of the actions undertaken by the United Kingdom to be introduced, particularly Facebook, YouTube, government. The beginning of its activity in this and Twitter; regulation, which would first of all area was the Broadcasting Act 1990, which prohib- require platforms to quickly and effectively remove ited the use of devices and technologies that would inappropriate content under penalty.12 convey messages and influence individuals without their knowledge. The Act gave oversight powers to Another regulator that has some authority in the Independent Television Commission, later sup- the field of misinformation and manipulation planted by the Office of Communications (Ofcom). is the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA), which is a self-regulatory organisation in the advertising Regulatory bodies industry. The ASA’s role is to regulate the content of adverts, promotion, and direct marketing, and Under the Communications Act 2003, Ofcom was among its tools is the ability to conduct investiga- vested with powers to control and enforce con- tions into whether all these comply with The UK tent standards in radio and television. Despite Code of Non-broadcast Advertising and Direct the lack of regulatory competences in the domain & Promotional Marketing.13, 14 of social media or online content, this Act enables Ofcom to carry out a range of control activities The issue of political advertising and campaigns tied up with broadcasters’ standards, media plural- related to important social or political topics ism, and media literacy.9 In fact, such functions are on social media platforms is an important facet indirectly related to the problems of disinforma- of the disinformation problem as a whole, as tion and manipulation in cyberspace, which have the Disinformation and ‘fake news’ report15 and other become the subject matter for research and analy- sources mention. The ASA has limited room to sis that Ofcom is spearheading. Activities that are manoeuvre in this area, as the political advertising intended to stem the swelling tide of fake news, regulation was removed from its oversight in the late effected through broadcaster-controlling efforts 1990s. Despite this fact, its activities include inves- as well as information and fact-checking cam- tigations, inspections, and adjudications that relate paigns, have also been taken against the backdrop to advertising and campaigns surrounding socially of the COVID-19 pandemic. The actions related sensitive issues, such as environment protection,

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which not infrequently are subject to disinfor- the same plethora of actions on social media plat- mation and organised information operations. forms remain in a kind of grey area. This involves Additionally, the ASA participates in the consulta- particular dangers due to the possibility of direct tive group set up by the Electoral Commission in and individual targeting and personalising adver- Britain, which aims, among other things, to coor- tising and content for specific social groups or dinate the efforts that its members are making to individual users, whose mechanism remains with- combat disinformation in the area of advertising out any external control. The result is a novel kind and marketing.16 of threats to electoral processes.

The UK Electoral Commission, mentioned above, is Another regulator in the area of online disinfor- another regulatory body that operates in the area mation and manipulation in its broad sense is of online disinformation and manipulation through the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), the lens of political advertising. Its main role as which is a non-departmental public body account- a regulator focuses on monitoring and enforcing able to the UK Parliament. The ICO deals with rules on political campaign financing and election issues relating to the freedom of information committees’ spending. The same includes money exchange and data privacy19 as it oversees compli- spent on cyber campaigns. The Commission has ance with the Data Protection Act 2018, General the power to investigate, inspect, and sanction Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and Privacy unfair practices. However, all of them apply to and Electronic Communications Regulations a situation when an investigation is already under- 2003, among other laws. Following the legislation, way, so they cannot be used to control ongoing the ICO can take action to change the behaviour political campaigns and advertisements run in of organisations or individuals that collect, process, the digital world and especially on social media and store personal data. Its competences include platforms, whose current legal status allows them conducting investigations and audits, enforcing not to cooperate with the Electoral Commission. criminal laws and imposing penalties. Because of The Commission, in one of its official documents, its remit, the ICO investigates such topics as data has called for increased powers in terms of obtain- use and content personalisation by social media ing documents from third parties and organi- platforms. The ICO has used its powers to inves- sations, which is supposed to make it possible tigate and punish lawbreakers in this area, for to obtain data from digital service providers.17 instance in 2018, when it levied the highest pos- In addition, it can be noted that so far the issue sible fine – £500,000 – on Facebook for offend- of control and transparency in financing adverts ing twice against the Data Protection Act 1998. and political campaigns on social media platforms The ICO’s investigation found that Facebook had has depended solely on the good will of the plat- breached the law by failing to protect the per- forms themselves. In one of its recommendations sonal data which was then taken advantage of by to the government, the Commission requests that Cambridge Analytica and others to illegally create the bottom-up activities of the platforms be sub- psychological profiles of users during the 2016 jected to observation and evaluation and, should United States presidential election. The ICO is the activities and results be found unsatisfac- thus concerned with protecting personal data and tory, that the issue be legislated and regulated by controlling its use in the field of online disinforma- the UK government.18 tion and manipulation. As the organisation itself highlighted in Investigation into the use of data ana- While political advertisements broadcast on tel- lytics in political campaigns, which is the report it evision or radio are subject to close scrutiny issued, the unaccounted-for use of the data on by Ofcom, and the activities of individual -elec millions of social media users is a major threat to tion committees by the Electoral Commission, the proper flow of information and the proper

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functioning of electoral processes. Manipulation services will be responsible for identifying and misinformation has become much easier and platforms that are responsible for dissem- more efficient precisely due to the illegal use of inating disinformation. The doctrine indi- personal data, most often sourced from social plat- cates that strategic communication should be forms, and the lack of direct jurisdiction of a single treated with the same seriousness as financial regulator over the way these platforms operate.20 or military dealings. The details of the Fusion Doctrine have never been made public.22 The last institution that can be put under the regulator umbrella in the area of online disinformation • National Security Communications Team and manipulation is the Competition and Markets (NCST) – following a spate of increased activ- Authority (CMA). The CMA is the entity responsi- ity by disinformation-spreading actors in 2018, ble for strengthening business competition along- the UK government announced a significant side preventing and restricting anti-competitive expansion of the NSCT. Their main task is to activities. Within its remit, the CMA has repeat- counter threats to national security and com- edly put forward pleas against the largest social bat their “communications elements”, including media platforms which in its view, owing to their but not limited to disinformation. The activities advertising-based nature and market-monopoly– by the NCST include the Don’t Feed the Beast seeking business model, have a negative impact on awareness campaign aimed to educate the pub- the information space and access to independent lic on the topic of recognising disinformation. media. As the CMA-issued report Online platforms and digital advertising expresses it: “Finally, con- • Rapid Response Unit – a body within cerns relating to online platforms funded by digital the Government Communication Service (GCS), advertising can lead to wider social, political and which was created as part of the government’s cultural harm through the decline of authoritative policy “to help support the reclaiming of a fact- and reliable news media, the resultant spread of based public debate”.23 The role of the Rapid ‘fake news’ and the decline of the local press […].”21 Response Unit is that it “monitors news and In its work connected to disinformation, the CMA information being shared and engaged with thus focuses on preventing the market and infor- online to identify emerging issues with speed, mation space monopolisation by the few biggest accuracy and with integrity”. These activities platforms, lobbying for strict regulation for large are meant to help the Cabinet “to better under- tech companies, and scrutinising these companies’ stand the news environment […] and to assess observance of the rules on consumer rights. the effectiveness of [its] public information”.24

Government actions • RESIST Model – a toolkit designed with senior government staff, higher-echelon managers, Besides the Online Harms White Paper described and public sector communications profession- above, the UK government has undertaken many als in mind. Its intent is to equip the audi- other initiatives and activities in the area- oftack ence with a comprehensive understanding of ling disinformation. These include doctrinal shifts, the disinformation threats and vulnerabilities. newly established research units and academic cen- It also contains a description of six steps rec- tres, educational projects, and many others. Among ommended to be taken so as to minimise it.25 the most important the following deserve a mention: • Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation – a unit • Fusion Doctrine – introduced in 2018 as established within the Department for Digital, part of the government’s National Security Culture, Media & Sport. Its goal is to develop Capability Review. According to it, intelligence knowledge on data-driven technologies

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and breakthrough AI- and algorithm-based The proposed legal framework further envisages: solutions. It also explores the use of data and algorithms to influence and “warp” the infor- • The creation of an independent regulator to mation space.26 control online content and the activities of social media platforms. It would be granted • Open Information Partnership – a programme extensive powers with regard to control, bringing together organisations and experts enforcement, and punishment.28 Following that work to expose and combat disinforma- consultation surrounding the White Paper, tion. Launched in 2019, the network brings Ofcom was proposed as the regulator which together investigative journalists, NGOs, think was argued on the basis of its extensive expe- tanks, academics, activists, and fact-checkers rience in regulating television and the press.29 from more than 20 countries. The main aim is to exchange knowledge and skills and to fund • The creation of a new duty-of-care document, projects of member organisations. Set up and which will impose obligations and require- run by the Foreign Office.27 ments on technology companies and set out their responsibilities for the content published Proposed legislation and the UK’s action plan on their platforms. Compliance with such due diligence rules is going to be monitored and The two most important British documents enforced by the independent regulator. which touched on the problem of disinformation and the role of the state in combating this • The establishment of a Code of Practice, in threat, discussed above – i.e. the Disinformation which the regulator will indicate the specific and ‘fake news’ report, defining and character- actions that digital service providers will have ising the phenomenon, and proposing a wide to take to implement the duty of care and range of recommendations for the government, in the context of combating and minimising and the Online Harms White Paper, present- the risks involved. ing the government’s plans as regards combating digital threats – are crucial for understanding • Transparency, trust, and accountability are the direction that the disinformation-combating to play a vital role. The regulator will have strategy for the UK is developing in. the right to require annual reports from companies, which will have to include actions The government’s plans outlined in the Online taken by a given company against harmful Harms White Paper involve the introduction content online and, importantly, the regula- of strict regulations on technology compa- tor will have the right to demand to look into nies, who will have to take responsibility for the operation of algorithms. All reports will be the actions of their users, their security, and published and made available to the public to the content published on their sites. In case of help citizens make an informed decision about non-compliance or misconduct, the document using the services of a particular platform. authors propose to punish social media platforms with heavy fines or to block access to • In the case of national security threats, tech- them. Even senior executives could be held per- nology companies will have to come under sonally liable in the event of violations and fail- even closer scrutiny and demonstrate tangi- ure to respect the accountability law. ble steps taken to counter the proliferation of the content in question.

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• The regulator should lobby online platforms that is mentioned apropos of introducing the legal for greater access to internal data to be norms presented in the Online Harms White Paper given to independent researchers and scien- may be the risk of infringing on freedom of expres- tists, while the companies themselves should sion and opening the door to partial censorship of focus on developing new secure technologies. the Internet. As a London-based non-profit Index The government has also announced a new on Censorship reckons, the planned actions cover strategy on online media literacy.30 too many disparate areas, and “the wide range of different harms that the government is- seek New regulations on technology companies and ing to tackle in this policy process require dif- social media platforms herald huge changes in ferent, tailored responses”.33 In addition, Index the context of fighting against disinformation. of Censorship alleges that clear definitions are The new regulatory reality will enjoin them to lacking and the potential for decisions with arbi- conform to high standards that the government trary tendencies and without social consulta- imposes. In spite of other countries and the EU tion is high as regards the content published planning to likewise regulate the digital sphere, no online. According to representatives of technol- one has yet tried to regulate such vast swathes of ogy companies, the planned measures could neg- the cyberworld. Therefore, in this context, the UK atively affect the United Kingdom’s digital indus- is emerging as a leader in international efforts for try and its innovative side. In particular, start-ups, a secure information space. The publication micro-businesses, and SMEs are supposed to suf- of the White Paper has been followed by an ongo- fer.34 Finally, what is highlighted is the problem ing public consultation process, including a stage of in assessing the true extent to which disinforma- official government response to the issues raised by tion poses a threat. While some of its forms, such stakeholders. To date, the government has partially as fake news about medicines or vaccines, can provided its view of the matter, and the final consul- have consequences for people’s health and lives, tation report, following which the Act may be pre- other types, such as harmless forms of conspir- sented in Parliament, is estimated to be published acy theories spread on YouTube, may not be worth in the time frame before the end of 2021. Initial “regulating the internet” and the risks this poses to declarations indicated a quicker pace of work; how- a free and democratic society.35 ever, at the time of writing this report no details have been provided as to further timescales or Third sector plans for the policy concept outlined in the Online Harms White Paper. According to unofficial informa- The United Kingdom exemplifies tion trickling from around the Parliament and gov- an extensive system of independ- ernment, the passage of the Act may well extend ent media, NGOs and a wide range of fact-checking into 2023 or 2024.31 organisations that are committed to tackling disinformation and manipulation online. Threats and risks in the Online Harms White Paper Fact-checking organisations The doubts that have been voiced include the problem with failing to provide a precise defi- A prominent fact-checking organi- nition of disinformation in the submitted docu- sation is Full Fact, founded in 2009. ment and the issue of assessing intentionality in An independent organisation, it has its dissemination process. Some companies argue had charitable status since 2014 and functions that they will be unable to determine the purpose thanks to donor contributions. Full Fact primar- of the activity under investigation on the basis of ily conducts extensive fact-checking and analyti- unclear definitions and premises.32 Another threat cal activities across major social media platforms,

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and focuses on analysing the information space in and educational materials, and carries out similar the framework of elections and other democratic initiatives, too, in other countries such as India, processes. In January 2019, Full Fact partnered Nigeria, and Myanmar.43 The Guardian is also with Facebook, for which it provides a service developing its own initiative, in partnership with to verify content on the platform that has been Google and others, with its NewsWise project. flagged as fake by UK users.36 On top of that, This is a programme aimed at educating children the organisation is currently working on devel- in media and information literacy. The intended oping an automated fact-checking tool as part of effect is to equip them with the knowledge and the Google AI Impact Challenge.37 Its other activi- skills to navigate today’s complex information ties include research and publications dealing with space efficiently.44 The Associated Press initia- disinformation, its psychological aspects, and con- tive, AP Fact Check, is also worth noting – a global spiracy theories.38 fact-checking network which verifies information from many regions of the world thanks to the com- Full Fact is a member of the International Fact- mitment of local journalists.45 Checking Network (IFCN),39 which groups together fact-checking initiatives from around Higher learning the world. Apart from it, the IFCN membership includes three other UK organisations: The most interesting UK initiative from the STEM sector is • FactCheckNI – the first independent organisa- a project led by the Oxford Internet Institute – tion of its kind in Northern Ireland, operating The Computational Propaganda Research Project since 2016.40 (COMPROP). As part of it, researchers are exploring the interaction intricacies between algorithms, • Ferret Fact Service – the first fact-checking or- automation, and politics. The research covers dif- ganisation in Scotland, founded in 2017 thanks ferent scholarly fields such as sociology, commu- to a Google Digital News Initiative grant.41 nication, computer science, and political science. Among the numerous results of COMPROP work • Logically – an organisation which combines are publications concerning disinformation on dif- advanced AI techniques and the largest ferent social platforms, the manner in which false fact-checking team in the world to combat information spreads, and the topic of disinforma- disinformation.42 tion monetisation.46 In addition, the COMPROP project has brought about the CompProp Media Navigator, which is an internet guide to resources that make it possible and easier to better under- The work of media organisa- stand and respond to disinformation.47 tions is another element of building national resilience in the information space. The list goes on Their focus is mainly on facilitating access to verified information, education and training in There are also a number of inno- media literacy and in recognition of disinforma- vative initiatives, most often com- tion and manipulation. Most major TV, newspa- bining modern ICT solutions and fact-checking per, and radio outlets have their own teams, ser- activities or the work of independent journalists. vices, or tools that are dedicated to these tasks. The most interesting among them are: Sereley, These include the BBC Beyond Fake News service, a mobile application for real-time image and video which provides accurate items of information on analysis, which detects image and sound editing or the COVID-19 pandemic, offers online training doctoring;48 Eyewitness media verification, a tool

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that enables verification and authentication- dur published by the Internet Association (IA), a lobbying the creation of spontaneous material by eye- ing group representing such entities as Facebook, witnesses to events;49 Kendraio Verify aimed at Twitter, YouTube, Microsoft, and Amazon.55 There, enabling joint content verification by journalists the trade organisation highlights the tech giants’ from all over the world, who will be able to create redoubled efforts for privacy and transparency a “chain of verifiable facts” and engage in collabo- and writes about their willingness to work with rative journalism.50 the government in this regard. Still, it stresses that the proposed approach is too general and individ- Social media platform activity ual solutions should be fine-tuned to the nature of the issue. Attention is also drawn to the potential The largest social media platforms, damage that the UK’s new technology sector may like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, suffer, as can the values of freedom of speech and have taken action to counter disinformation in expression.56 In addition, the IA raises the concerns the UK, particularly in the context of the 2019 and issues delineated in this chapter in the “Threats general election and the infodemic (a term used to and risks” subsection. Yet it also reaffirms its wish describe the wildfire-like propagation of fake and to co-design new regulations with the govern- manipulated news about COVID-19). Recently, ment, writing: “IA supports balanced, proportion- in partnership with the UK government, these ate regulation that achieves the joint objectives of platforms have agreed on an action package to protecting people from harm online and ensuring tackle vaccine disinformation. They declared that that the internet can continue to deliver benefits to companies would not benefit from fake news on the economy and society.”57 the subject and would set about working closely with public health authorities to promote truth- Summary ful and accurate information.51 Other social platform activities meant to fight disinformation The sceptred isle’s actions to combat online dis- include Facebook cooperating, as previously men- information and manipulation, initiated in 2017, tioned, with the fact-checking organisation Full serve as an example of a multi-faceted approach Fact; YouTube introducing a verified-information and an attempt to regulate the whole social media panel displayed above the list of videos in search landscape. The attempt is ambitious, as it aims to results for certain phrases;52 and Twitter notifying increase state regulation over the digital behe- us when we want to like or forward a tweet con- moths’ activity and to enable individual consumers taining claims marked as “disputed”.53 Altogether, to make conscious decisions about using their ser- the efforts are mostly focused on fact-checking, vices thanks to enhancing transparency and facil- information transparency, and more efficient mod- itating access to internal data and technological eration activities. solutions that these businesses deploy. The plans detailed in Online Harms White Paper position With regard to the government’s plans outlined London as the leader in the global struggle over in the Online Harms White Paper, major technol- digital market regulation, social media activity, and ogy companies have not adopted a distinct stance. combating disinformation. Obviously, in the- cur In many of his statements, Facebook CEO Mark rent stage, that is the planning stage, there emerge Zuckerberg has stressed the need to regulate legal numerous points of contention, murky issues, and issues and increase the role that state regulators threats that representatives of social media com- play. However, he underscored that this should panies, media, or NGOs are trying to handle. Yet happen in cooperation with the largest companies what they are all highlighting is the need to intro- and via a jointly developed consensus.54 The only duce regulations of online disinformation and official document on the matter is a comment information space, so that we may be extricated

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from the current situation, one where legal solu- be directed to further actions by Her Majesty’s tions to these problems are missing. For everyone Government and to the effects that the Online putting their hand to the plough to solve similar Harms White Paper provisions, protracted as they problems worldwide, the attention should then are, have as they are being put into practice.

ENDNOTES

1 BBC News, Russian spy: What happened to Sergei and Yulia Skripal?, 2018, [online]: https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-43643025. 2 BBC News, Sergei Skripal: Who is the former Russian intelligence officer?, 2018, [online]: https://www.bbc.com/news/ world-europe-43291394. 3 Gordon Ramsay, Sam Robertshaw, Weaponising news, RT, Sputnik and targeted disinformation, King’s College London Centre for the Study of Media, Communication & Power 2019, p. 7, [online]: https://www.kcl.ac.uk/policy-institute/assets/weaponising-news.pdf. 4 DFRLab, UK Poisoning: Russia Recycles Responses, 2018, [online]: https://medium.com/dfrlab/ uk-poisoning-russia-recycles-responses-77e1d357b777. 5 GOV.UK, PM statement on the Salisbury investigation: 5 September 2018, 2018, [online]: https://www.gov.uk/government/ speeches/pm-statement-on-the-salisbury-investigation-5-september-2018. 6 Cecilia Kang, Sheera Frenkel, Facebook Says Cambridge Analytica Harvested Data of Up to 87 Million Users, The New York Times 2018, [online]: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/technology/mark-zuckerberg-testify-congress.html. 7 Information Commissioner’s Office, RE: ICO Investigation into use of personal information and political influence, 2020, [online]: https://ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-taken/2618383/20201002_ico-o-ed-l-rtl-0181_to-julian-knight-mp.pdf. 8 HM Government, Online Harms White Paper, 2019, p. 6, [online]: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/ uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/793360/Online_Harms_White_Paper.pdf. 9 Written evidence submitted by Ofcom (FNW0107), p. 1, [online]: http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevi- dence.svc/evidencedocument/culture-media-and-sport-committee/fake-news/written/48434.pdf. 10 Ofcom, Raising awareness of online harms, [online]: https://www.ofcom.org.uk/about-ofcom/ annual-reports-and-plans/2019-20-annual-report/raising-awareness-of-online-harms. 11 Aliya Ram, Nic Fildes, Ofcom outlines case for regulating social media networks, Financial Times 2018, [online]: https://www. ft.com/content/a16935a4-bb39-11e8-94b2-17176fbf93f5. 12 Ibidem. 13 The Advertising Standards Authority, How we handle complaints, [online]: https://www.asa.org.uk/about-asa-and-cap/the- work-we-do/how-we-handle-complaints.html. 14 The Advertising Standards Authority, Advertising codes, [online]: https://www.asa.org.uk/codes-and-rulings/advertising-codes.html. 15 House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Disinformation and ‘fake news’: Final Report, 2019, p. 57, [online]: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/1791/1791.pdf. 16 Official letter by the Advertising Standards Authority Chief Executive Guy Parker to Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee Chair Damian Collins, 2019, [online]:https://www.asa.org.uk/uploads/assets/uploaded/50fe478e-ebc2-4f94-b4cf - 223bacdf48c1.pdf. 17 The Electoral Commission, Digital Campaigning, Increasing transparency for voters, 2018, [online]: https://www.electoralcom- mission.org.uk/sites/default/files/pdf_file/Digital-campaigning-improving-transparency-for-voters.pdf. 18 Ibidem, p. 23. 19 Information Commissioner’s Office, Your data matters, [online]: https://ico.org.uk/your-data-matters/. 20 Information Commissioner’s Office, Investigation into the use of data analytics in political campaigns, 2018, [online]: https://ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-taken/2260271/investigation-into-the-use-of-data-analytics-in-political-campaigns-final-20181105.pdf. 21 Competition & Markets Authority, Online platforms and digital advertising, 2020, p. 9, [online]: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5fa557668fa8f5788db46efc/Final_report_Digital_ALT_TEXT.pdf. 22 HM Government, National Security Capability Review, 2018, p. 10, [online]: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/705347/6.4391_CO_National-Security-Review_web.pdf. 23 Government Communication Service, Alex Aiken introduces the Rapid Response Unit, 2018, [online]: https://perma.cc/837J-UF2U.

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24 Ibidem. 25 Government Communication Service, RESIST Counter-disinformation toolkit, 2019, pp. 8–16, [online]: https://gcs.civilservice. gov.uk/publications/resist-counter-disinformation-toolkit/. 26 Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation, About us, [online]: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/ centre-for-data-ethics-and-innovation/about. 27 Open Information Partnership, [online]: https://openinformationpartnership.org. 28 HM Government, Online Harms White Paper, 2019, p. 44, op. cit. 29 Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport, Online Harms White Paper – Initial consultation response, 2020, [online]: https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/online-harms-white-paper/public-feedback/ online-harms-white-paper-initial-consultation-response. 30 Digital Action, Online Harms White Paper: Seven Experts Perspectives, 2019, p. 2, [online]: www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Seven-expert-perspectives-on-the-UK-online-harms-White-Paper-.pdf. 31 BBC News, Online Harms bill: Warning over ‘unacceptable’ delay, 2020, [online]: https://www.bbc.com/news/ technology-53222665. 32 Global Partners Digital, Unpacking ‘Harmful Content’: Disinformation, 2020, [online]: https://www.gp-digital.org/ unpacking-harmful-content-disinformation/. 33 Index on Censorship, Index on Censorship submission to Online Harms White Paper consultation, 2019, [online]: https://www. indexoncensorship.org/2019/07/governments-online-harms-white-paper-risk-damaging-freedom-of-expression-in-the-uk/. 34 Internet Association, Internet Association Initial Response To The Online Harms White Paper, 2019, [online]: http://uk.intern- etassociation.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2019/05/IA_Initial-OHWP-Response_30-09-19_UK.pdf. 35 The Guardian, The Guardian view on online harms: white paper, grey areas, 2019, [online]: https://www.theguardian.com/ commentisfree/2019/apr/08/the-guardian-view-on-online-harms-white-paper-grey-areas. 36 Full Fact, Full Fact to start checking Facebook content as third-party factchecking initiative reaches the UK, 2019, [online]: https://fullfact.org/blog/2019/jan/full-fact-start-checking-facebook-content-third-party-factchecking-initiative-reaches-uk/. 37 Full Fact, Automated Fact Checking, [online]: https://fullfact.org/about/automated/. 38 Ibidem. 39 International Fact-Checking Network, Verified signatories of the IFCN code of principles, [online]: https://www.ifcncodeofprinciples.poynter.org/signatories. 40 FactCheckNI, https://factcheckni.org/. 41 The Ferret, About us, [online]: https://theferret.scot/about-us/. 42 Logically, About Us, [online]: https://www.logically.ai/about. 43 BBC, Beyond Fake News, [online]: https://www.bbc.co.uk/beyondfakenews/. 44 The Guardian, NewsWise: who we are and what we do, 2019, [online]: https://www.theguardian.com/newswise/2018/ jun/12/newswise-who-we-are-and-what-we-do. 45 AP Fact Check, [online]: https://apnews.com/hub/ap-fact-check. 46 Oxford Internet Institute: The Project on Computational Propaganda, About, [online]: https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/about/. 47 Oxford Internet Institute,Oxford experts launch new online tool to help fight disinformation, 2019, [online]: https://www.oii.ox- .ac.uk/news/releases/oxford-experts-launch-new-online-tool-to-help-fight-disinformation/. 48 Serelay, Our products, [online]: https://www.serelay.com/our-products/. 49 Google News Initiative, Eyewitness media verification, [online]: https://newsinitiative.withgoogle.com/dnifund/dni-projects/ eyewitness-media-verification/. 50 Google News Initiative, Kendraio Verify, [online]: https://newsinitiative.withgoogle.com/dnifund/dni-projects/kendraio-verify/. 51 GOV.UK, Social media giants agree package of measures with UK Government to tackle vaccine disinformation, 2020, [online]: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ social-media-giants-agree-package-of-measures-with-uk-government-to-tackle-vaccine-disinformation. 52 The Irish News, YouTube adds fact-check panels to search results in the UK, 2020, [online]: https://www.irishnews.com/ magazine/technology/2020/09/23/news/youtube-adds-fact-check-panels-to-search-results-in-the-uk-2076531/. 53 Sky News, Twitter is warning users when they attempt to ‘like’ misinformation, 2020, [online]: https://news.sky.com/story/ twitter-is-warning-users-when-they-attempt-to-like-misinformation-12140940. 54 Mark Zuckerberg, The Internet needs new rules. Let’s start in these four areas, The Washington Post, 2019, [online]: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mark-zuckerberg-the-internet-needs-new-rules-lets-start-in-these-four-areas/2019/03/29/9e6f0504-521a-11e9-a3f7-78b7525a8d5f_story.html. 55 Internet Association, Internet Association Initial Response To The Online Harms White Paper, 2019, op. cit. 56 Ibidem, pp. 3–6. 57 Ibidem, p. 9.

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Jakub Tuszyński Three Seas states

Introduction

The Three Seas Initiative is a forum of political and economic cooperation among twelve EU states located between the Adriatic, Baltic, and Black Seas, which comprises: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The Initiative aims to strengthen the region’s development by setting forth priority projects in three pillars – energy systems, transportation, and digital – and their joint pursuance. As the European Commission communication Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats: a European Union response expressed (described in more detail in the EU policies and legislation chapter), all these sectors have been determined to be at risk from hybrid threats, including disinformation and propaganda. For example, Hybrid CoE in its report Assessing Energy Dependency in the Age of Hybrid Threats points to1 (inter)dependency ties between the countries that are energy suppliers and energy consumers. Regular energy supplies are, according to the CoE, tied up with geopolitical relations, which in turn entail hybrid threats. Not only are particular sectors vulnerable, but so are the Three Seas countries themselves. Enhanced infrastructural and economic integration in the region makes it necessary to prepare cross-border methods to secure this integration. Therefore, the Kosciuszko Institute is an active advocate for the idea to build Digital Three Seas, which includes in its guiding principles the active countering of hybrid threats in NATO’s eastern flank. Cooperation framed within this new platform would surely strengthen the already existing North Atlantic Alliance initiatives such as NATO StratCom (this group’s mission is to better the Alliance’s communication abilities with the use of modern technologies and analytical tools).

Some of the actions particular countries have taken in order to pursue the guiding principles

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of Digital Three Seas merit special attention. conduct influence operations due to economic For this reason, the present chapter will describe sanctions levied against Russia, which has resulted in more depth the initiatives coming from in them “aggressively pushing its familiar narra- Lithuania (as the representative of the region tives, particularly its interpretation of history”.6 which focuses on building international partnerships), Estonia (which has built an advanced insti- Estonia has also taken legislative steps to regu- tutional and legal system), as well as Slovakia and late the media market, mostly by way of adopting Bulgaria – since their civil society is functioning the Media Services Act (Meediateenuste seadus), so actively. The most intriguing activities from which imposes the obligation to verify informa- other countries of the region – except Poland, tion before publishing it on media service sup- which a separate chapter in the report is devoted pliers. The second important law is the Public to – will be discussed as well. Broadcasting Act (Eesti Rahvusringhäälingu seadus), which defines the framework of action for pub- Legislation and policy of states lic media. Estonian media are obliged to observe with respect to countering the self-regulation code of ethics7 that requires disinformation journalists to learn about the subject matter in depth, present the arguments of both sides, and Estonia keep their reporting evidence-based.

Since the time of 2007 cyberattack, wherein Estonia is raising the hybrid threat aware- the websites of Estonian parliament, ministries, ness across its society with such initiatives as banks, and others were attacked, Tallinn has been the Estonian National Defence Course (Kõrgemad improving its cyber-resilience capacities and inten- riigikaitsekursused), which is coordinated by sifying its actions in terms of institutional and legal the International Centre for Defence and Security mechanisms that aim to protect the state from (ICDS) think tank. The course mostly focuses on hybrid threats, including disinformation campaigns. discussing the Estonian security policy ideas, for- An example of doubling down on such efforts is eign and defence policy, and the national defence Estonia’s National Security Concept2 (Eesti julgeole- concept in a broad sense. Its programme also kupoliitika alused) of 2017, which addresses such includes an array of topics regarding the modern issues as building resilience and strengthening warfare (including information war). The course societal unity. The concept pays particular atten- has politicians, high-level officials, Estonia’s tion to society’s resilience to external influence, Defence Forces (Eesti Kaitsevägi) members, opinion which should be countered by promoting common leaders, and NGOs as its target audience. values and forging trust in the state and its institutions. Psychological defence, understood to be Another entity engaged in fighting fake news citizens’ awareness of hostile information - oper is the Estonian Public Broadcaster (Eesti ations, was also highlighted as an important ele- Rahvusringhääling, ERR), which has created a whole ment that builds resilience and unity in society. media literacy subsection8 on its website, where it publishes how-tos, articles, radio shows, and other Estonian Internal Security Service3 (Kaitsepolitseiamet) resources (for young people as well). A separate lists hybrid threats among the challenges which example of ERR actions in this respect is the pub- the country has to face and give particular atten- lication of Media Literacy Week materials (Неделя tion to Kremlin’s activity in info ops and his- медиаграмотности in Russian)9 for the event that torical propaganda. In its report on 2019,4 took place on 26–30 October 2020, drew atten- Kaitsepolitseiamet points out that the Russian tion to problems stemming from information over- actors show “a lack of ideas and resources”5 to load, and presented ways of handling the issue.

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It was targeted at young people primarily – as The information space is monitored by part of it, workshops and debates with experts the Strategic Communications Department of who offered advice on recognising fake news the Lithuanian Armed Forces (LAF), and LAF were organised. The initiative was carried out experts lend a helping hand to the country’s Radio by the Ministry of Education and Research and Television Commission in its activities on (Haridus- ja Teadusministeerium). countering the spread of fake news. LAF carries out educational outreach efforts at various levels, Lithuania from state institutions to schools. The last set of measures described in the white paper boils down Lithuania has introduced a wide host of mea- to promoting bilateral and multilateral collabo- sures from enacting legal acts to drawing up stra- ration with NATO and EU institutions and their tegic documents to initiatives in the international member states, which is supposed to be based on arena. One of the chief Lithuanian legislative doc- experience sharing, best practices, and analysing uments in terms of the problematics discussed targets, outcomes, and tactics used during attacks here is the Law on the Provision of Information to conducted in the information domain. the Public (Lietuvos Respublikos visuomenės informa- vimo įstatymas),10 which sets out the competencies Lithuania is also active in the international scene. of the Radio and Television Commission of Lithuania A mention-worthy case in point is the joint state- (Lietuvos radijo ir televizijos komisija, LRTK). The Act ment13 issued in November 2020 after the 26th gives the Commission the right to temporarily or per- Baltic Council of Ministers14 (BCM) session, manently suspend a particular operator’s or VoD ser- the alliance comprising Lithuania, Latvia, and vice provider’s broadcasting licence for publications Estonia. In the statement, Vilnius expresses including but not limited to: spreading war propa- its support for EU actions on combating disin- ganda, instigating war or hatred, ridicule, humilia- formation and calls on the Union to both more tion, instigating discrimination, violence, physical actively help the countries and societies in violent treatment of a group of people or a person the region as they are building resilience to belonging thereto on grounds of age, sex, sexual ori- Russia’s destabilising influence and continue to entation, ethnic origin, race, nationality, citizenship, foster independent, pluralistic media throughout language, origin, social status, belief, convictions, the Eastern Partnership states. The statement views, or religion.11 The LRTK decision must be does not neglect priorities of Lithuania’s presi- sanctioned by the Vilnius Regional Administrative dency in the Council in 2021, among which tack- Court (Vilniaus apygardos administracinis teismas). ling disinformation is included, which means that the Baltic states do consider the phenomenon to The problem of disinformation is also explored be a significant issue which has to be met. in the Lithuania’s defence policy white paper (Lietuvos gynybos politikos Baltoji knyga),12 which Among the positives, there are no doubt contains the following actions: the actions by the Lithuanian state which aim to raise societal awareness that hybrid threats 1. monitoring and analysing the information do- directly impact citizens’ lives as well as the inclu- main to determine the targets, the scale and sion of the problem in strategic documents and means of the information attacks; the attempts to find an answer to it via cooperation in the international arena. 2. a range of public education campaigns to increase society’s awareness;

3. advocating for NATO and EU cooperation.

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Remaining countries suggest that the EU “needs to come up with a strategy to counter disinformation about 5G technol- The majority of other Three Seas states has been ogy” and point out that in 10 European countries spurred into more assertive action in combating 5G masts have been torched and maintenance crew information space threats by the coronavirus pan- have been assaulted. Member states also offered demic and the related disinformation campaigns their help in pursuing this initiative. This exempli- (Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Romania); some fies diplomatic actions taken by Croatia in terms were prompted by the 5G mis- and disinformation of countering hybrid threats as well as fulfilling (Croatia) and hybrid actions’ rollout in the Central the principles adopted in its 2017 National Security and Eastern Europe after the Russian aggression in Strategy20 (Strategija nacionalne sigurnosti). That Ukraine (Czechia). plan mentions the paramount need to cooperate with the EU and NATO in the diplomatic realm and The government of Austria on 13 March 2020 others to build Croatia’s resilience to such threats, set up a digital crisis team15 (Digitaler Krisenstab in including disinformation. German), which is under the umbrella of Federal Chancellery (Bundeskanzleramt). Its purpose is to Russia attacking Ukraine and hybrid activities support media, civil society, and academic centres growing in intensity across the Central and Eastern as they collaborate to combat the spread of false Europe prodded Czechia to implement National information on coronavirus and to ensure a speedy Security Audit in 2015. It was finished in 2016 and information exchange on disinformation narra- resulted in a report21 which pointed out 10 threats tives. One of the actions which the team took was to Czech security, including hybrid threats and an information campaign directed at immigrants the influence of foreign powers. Among the prob- and waged in 16 languages.16 lems listed there were such challenges as undermining the trust in a democratic, law-based state Bulgaria has made attempts to regulate the dis- or sowing disinformation via media and social plat- information problem.17 One of them was a March forms. In the aftermath of the audit, Centre Against 2020 draft law on the state of emergency, which Terrorism and Hybrid Threats (Centrum proti terori- introduced an amendment to the Bulgarian penal smu a hybridním hrozbám) was established, operat- code, penalising fake news dissemination with ing from 1 January 2017.22 The Centre acts as part regard to COVID-19. The project envisages up of the internal affairs ministry and deals with mon- to three years of imprisonment as the penalty for itoring threats related to internal security, includ- such behaviour – or up to five along with a fine ing disinformation campaigns. The Centre also ranging from BGN 10,000 to 50,000, should sub- engages in society-wide education on this topic, stantial damage occur as a result. President of with its analysis of major coronavirus disinforma- Bulgaria Rumen Radev vetoed the amendment, tion narratives across Czechia23 as an example. however, as he claimed that regulation breached the freedom of expression.18 Latvia initiated the idea that involved 130 UN countries issuing on 12 June 2020 a statement regarding Croatia together with 14 EU member states the need to counter health crisis disinformation. It (including Austria, Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, contained an indication as to the role and respon- Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia) on 19 sibility of states, regional organisations, UN system, October 2020 signed a letter addressed to and other stakeholders – such as mass media, social Margrethe Vestager, European Commission networking sites, and non-governmental organisa- vice-president, Thierry Breton, internal market tions – in helping people handle disinformation and commissioner, and Vĕra Jourová, vice-president on in increasing society’s resilience.24 values and transparency.19 The letter’s signatories

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President of Romania Klaus Iohannis on 16 March with defence, strategic communication and cri- 2020 issued a decree25 on the establishment of sis management mechanisms are all going to be the state of emergency in the territory of Romania, strengthened, with various methods of hybrid which grants special powers to the National operations taken into account. Authority for Management and Regulation in Communications (Autoritatea Naţională pen- The Parliament of Hungary passed the Coronavirus tru Administrare şi Reglementare în Comunicaţii, Containment Act (2020. évi XII. törvény ANCOM). Pursuant to Article 54 of the Decree, a koronavírus elleni védekezésről) on 29 March ANCOM is entitled to block internet websites 2020, which establishes a special legal regime for which publish content “in the eventuality that [it] the duration of the pandemic and, among other promotes fake-news as to the evolution of COVID things, amends the Hungarian Criminal Code, intro- 19 and to the protection and preventive mea- ducing a prison sentence of one to five years for sures”.26 The Decree was in fact the basis for stop- disseminating coronavirus-related fake news during ping the operation of certain webpages.27 a state of emergency.33 Amnesty International34 and the International Press Institute35 point out that Slovakia in August 2020 became a member of the new regulations could lead to restrictions on the Helsinki-based European Centre of Excellence the freedom of expression. for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE), whose task is to enable the exchange of knowl- NGO initiatives in the Three edge and information regarding such threats.28 Seas states In this manner, it joined the line-up of other participants in this unit – Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Bulgaria Estonia, Austria, Czechia, Romania, Slovenia, and Hungary.29 As part of its activities, the Hybrid The Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) is CoE publishes reports and conducts training ses- an interdisciplinary think tank36 founded in 1989; sions for decision-makers of member states on in its anti-disinformation activities, it focuses pri- the subject matter of hybrid threats. The Ministry marily on studying the Russian influence across of Foreign Affairs has also taken action against dis- Europe. This activity has resulted in, for instance, information by such measures as creating a new the report The Kremlin Playbook: Understanding department whose task is to counteract these Russian Influence in Central and Eastern Europe, writ- threats and holding workshops for diplomats ten in cooperation with the Center for Strategic and staff from several ministries.30 The activities and International Studies, which described Russia’s just mentioned stem from the announcement by activities in five Central European countries in the new Slovak government, which declared in the middle of the last decade. CSD also organises 2020 that the fight against hybrid threats will be numerous expert panels37 and pursues educational one of the priorities for the next four years.31 activities concerning the disinformation problem. In the coronavirus era, CSD has also identified dis- The beginning of 2020 saw the release of Defence information narratives in Bulgaria and neighbour- White Paper of the Republic of Slovenia (Bela knjiga ing countries,38 as well as participated in drawing o obrambi Republike Slovenije),32 which announces up the reports for the European Union Agency for comprehensive country-wide activities to counter Fundamental Rights which described the impact hybrid threats. These activities will incorpo- of coronavirus on fundamental rights in all EU rate developing cooperation in identifying and Member States. The reports of March 202039 and responding to hybrid threats. Slovakia’s Situational July of the same year40 also discussed the mea- awareness, resilience against hostile intelligence sures taken by the Bulgarian government in order activities, cyber- and information security along to counter the disinformation phenomenon.

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What it described were unsuccessful attempts An example of initiatives established by SSPI is to amend the Radio and Television Act (Закон Antipropaganda.sk,47 a fact-checking service pri- за радиото и телевизията in Bulgarian), which marily dedicated to dispelling myths related to envisaged criminalising the dissemination of fake foreign and security policy issues and provid- news. Comments on the draft were submitted by ing information based on verified facts. In 2020, both public institutions and NGOs, which criti- the organisation also issued a report Assessing cised the lack of unambiguous definitions for mis- the Slovak Republic’s approach to combating hybrid and disinformation and considered the proposed threats (Zhodnotenie prístupu Slovenskej repub- amendments to be an “unjustifiably expand- liky k boju s hybridnými hrozbami).48 The aim of ing the powers of public authorities to super- the report is to assess Slovakia’s approach to tack- vise online media”,41 which could lead to violating ling such threats and to propose means and ways the freedom of speech and of the media. The July to improve it. The text discusses resilience build- report also identified the main disinformation -nar ing, internal processes, and the capacity and capa- ratives in Bulgaria, for instance the Russian propa- bility of the state administration to fight against ganda of success in combating the coronavirus. hybrid threats. The report analyses the basic documents which regulate this issue and identi- Lithuania fies the strengths and weaknesses in combating these threats at the systemic level. On this basis, A flagship example of an initiative to combat dis- what follows is a formulated proposal for a strate- information in Central and Eastern Europe is gic framework and institutional model that would Debunk.eu. This organisation uses artificial intel- both optimise Slovakia’s approach in this area. ligence in its work in the form of a tool “that Their possible implementation can be enriched by spots and identifies disinformation within 2 min- a set of takeaways. utes from real time”.42 The material is evaluated on the basis of, among other things, the content, In addition to the initiatives mentioned above, the source, and the way the information spreads Czechia’s European Values Center for Security on social media, and is then assigned to the appro- Policy (EVC) is also worth a brief mention due to priate category.43 Volunteers called “elves” and the activities undertaken by this organisation.49 fact-checkers “validate the articles with the poten- The EVC runs, among other things, the Kremlin tially most harmful narratives (on average, 2 per- Watch programme, with a focus on exposing cent of the entire content scraped)”44 that AI has Russian disinformation operations in Europe. Twin found. Once verified by humans, false content is initiatives also include Red Watch, zeroing inon flagged as disinformation and journalists are auto- Chinese activities in the area, and Balkans Watch matically notified of instances of fake news, which Briefing, a monthly newsletter summarising the lat- they expose and cover in the next step. At the end est activities against these threats in the Balkans. of the whole process, the articles are published in mainstream media, so that they can reach 90% of Social media in selected Three the Lithuanian population.45 Seas states

Slovakia Social media have become an important part of reality and thus an instrument of influence, just like One of the leading think tanks which focus on the traditional media – television, radio, and press. disinformation in Slovakia is the Slovak Security According to a study50 published in the journal Policy Institute (SSPI).46 SSPI mainly deals Nature: Human Behaviour, which was designed to with research and analysis of security chal- observe and analyse the online behaviour of three lenges, including the disinformation problem. thousand Americans in the run-up to the 2016

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US presidential election, Facebook was “a key -vec programme, is certified by the International Fact- tor of distribution for untrustworthy websites”.51 It Checking Network (IFCN),56 an independent body is also the most popular52 social networking platform of media houses, news agencies, and non-profit in the vast majority of countries across the Three organisations. In order to obtain IFCN certifica- Seas region. Facebook efforts to counter disinfor- tion, an organisation must adhere to the principles mation are called the Third-Party Fact-Checking which the IFCN Code of Principles57 contains, i.e. Program. This scheme came into force in 201653 impartiality and integrity, transparency of sources, and within its scope independent organisations of funding, organisation, and methodology, and identify fake content in the form of news, pho- a corrections policy, i.e. a clear procedure describ- tos and videos posted on Facebook and Instagram. ing how to act whenever an analysis is found to Once a news item is flagged as fake, its reach on be in error. Only when these conditions are sat- Facebook and Instagram is restricted and those who isfied and the code of principles is signed can have previously passed on the fake content are an organisation become a member58 of the IFCN. informed about that. As of 12 May 2020, Austria In the table below you will find a list of initia- and Switzerland54 are covered by the programme. tives from the Three Seas region that are part of Facebook’s fact-checking programme.59 Owing to Fact-checking in Austria will be handled by the fact that at the date of writing this report no the news agency Deutsche Presse-Agentur GmbH organisation from Bulgaria and Hungary is part (DPA), which has been conducting content verifi- of the IFCN, these countries have no representa- cation in Germany since March 2019, working in tives. As regards Slovenia, the centre for investiga- tandem with the Austrian Press Agency (Austria tive journalism in the Adriatic region Oštro, center Presse Agentur, APA). In addition, Agence France- za preiskovalno novinarstvo v jadranski regiji became Presse (AFP) has been the third actor responsible a member of the IFCN on 23 November 2020, but for Austrian Facebook since September 2020.55 was not participating in the Facebook initiative at DPA, like the other cooperating partners in this the time when this chapter was written.

Table 5. Three Seas fact-checking organisations on Facebook.

STATE ORGANISATIONS

Bulgaria NONE

Croatia Faktograf.hr

Czechia Demagog.cz, AFP – Hub

Estonia Delfi

Hungary NONE

Latvia Delfi, Re:Baltica

Lithuania Delfi

Romania AFP – Coverage

Slovakia AFP – HUB

Slovenia NONE

Source: Wo wir auf externe Faktenprüfung setzen, [online]: https://www.facebook.com/journalismproject/programs/ third-party-fact-checking/partner-map?locale=de_DE

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Summary and are by the same token harbingers of retalia- tion, with the aforesaid Czech National Security Three Seas states do not conduct a uniform pol- Audit (Audit Národní Bezpečnosti) as an example. icy against disinformation. Some of them concen- trate on setting up new institution (as is the case Throughout Three Seas states, NGOs and in the Czech Republic or Austria) or using the ones fact-checking organisations are also active, as that already exist (Romania’s case); Hungary took are specialised think tanks which are instances of a different path as it decided to penalise the dis- grass-roots action. They are indispensable in build- semination of fake news, with similar attempts, ing societies’ resilience; they also often assume although ineffective thus far, being made by an awareness-raising role – by organising the- Bulgaria. At the same time, the active approach matic workshops, lectures, or social campaigns in of several Three Seas countries in the interna- cooperation with local authorities. In the years to tional arena may be emphasised; here, Lithuania, come, building a more harmonised stance towards Latvia, and Estonia, which used to signal the need this problem is going to be important. The need for a more active debate concerning the threat, in this regard was pointed out by the Digital have been playing first fiddle. In the international Three Seas Initiative, and the signal to enhanced arena, an important initiative in the context of regional cooperation might have just been given this bundle of issues is also Hybrid CoE, joined in by the declaration of Visegrad Group countries, 2020 by Slovakia. Through this, the presence of signed on 17 February 2021 in Kraków, which Three Seas countries in this initiative has grown reads that V4 countries notice and acknowledge – 10 states are already participating, which shows “the need to tackle the spread of disinformation a lively interest in the topic of hybrid threats in disseminated online in order to protect the secu- the Central and Eastern Europe region and testifies rity of citizens and businesses alike”.60 The will to to the willingness to actively counter disinforma- cooperate in building resilience to information dis- tion. Strategic documents have also been written, orders ought to encompass as many Three Seas which point to hybrid threats as a key challenge states and to as large an extent as possible.

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ENDNOTES

1 Hybrid CoE, Assessing Energy Dependency in the Age of Hybrid Threats, January 2019, [online]: https://www.hybridcoe.fi/ wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Assessing_Energy_Dependency_in_the_Age_of_Hybrid_Threats-HybridCoE.pdf. 2 Government Office, National Security Concept, 2017, [online]: https://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/sites/default/files/elfinder/ article_files/national_security_concept_2017.pdf. 3 Its yearly reports can be found at the following address: https://www.kapo.ee/en/content/annual-reviews.html. 4 Kaitsepolitseiamet, Annual Review 2019, [online]: https://www.kapo.ee/sites/default/files/public/content_page/Annual%20 Review%202019.pdf. 5 Ibidem, p. 21. 6 Ibidem. 7 The code of ethics for the Estonian press, [online]: http://www.asn.org.ee/english/code_of_ethics.html. 8 Eesti Rahvusringhääling, Mediagramotnost, [online]: https://rus.err.ee/k/mediagramotnost. 9 Андрей Крашевский, Как ориентироваться в информационном шуме: в Эстонии началась неделя медиаграмотности, ERR 2020, [online]: https://rus.err.ee/1151455/ kak-orientirovatsja-v-informacionnom-shume-v-jestonii-nachalas-nedelja-mediagramotnosti. 10 Republic of Lithuania, Law on the Provision of Information to the Public, No I-1418, 02.07.1996, [online]: https://e-seimas.lrs. lt/portal/legalAct/lt/TAD/c4a1511305c611e8802fc9918087744d?jfwid=1clcwosx33. 11 Ibidem. 12 Ministry of National Defence Republic of Lithuania, The White Paper on Lithuanian defence policy, 2017, [online]: https://kam.lt/en/defence_policy_1053/important_documents/the_white_paper_on_lithuanian_defence_policy.html. 13 Joint Statement of the 26th Baltic Council, 2020, [online]: https://vm.ee/et/uudised/joint-statement-26th-baltic-council. 14 Which forms part of the Baltic Assembly. 15 David Christopher Jaklin, Disinformation and Covid-19: The Case of Austria, 30.04.2020, [online]: https://medium.com/@david.jaklin/disinformation-and-covid-19-the-case-of-austria-5440094a789c. 16 ORF.at, Offensive der Regierung gegen „Fake News“, 27.05.2020, [online]: https://orf.at/stories/3159533/. 17 Desislava Krusteva, Radoslava Makshutova, Bulgaria: Legislative attempts to restrict disinformation in 2020, [online]: https://www.dataguidance.com/opinion/bulgaria-legislative-attempts-restrict. 18 Ibidem. 19 HINA, Croatia and 14 More EU Members Seek Strategy Against Disinformation About 5G, [online]: https://www.total-croatia-news.com/news/47499-croatia-and-14-more-eu-members-seek-strategy-against-disinformation-about-5g. 20 The Republic of Croatia, National Security Strategy, 2017, [online]: https://www.morh.hr/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/ strategy_18012018.pdf. 21 Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, National Security Audit, Prague 2016, [online]: https://www.mvcr.cz/cthh/ soubor/national-security-audit.aspx. 22 Centre Against Terrorism and Hybrid Threats, [online]: https://www.mvcr.cz/cthh/clanek/centre-against-terrorism- and-hybrid-threats.aspx. 23 Centre Against Terrorism and Hybrid Threats, Coronavirus: An overview of the Main Disinformation Narratives in the Czech Republic, [online]: https://www.mvcr.cz/cthh/clanek/coronavirus-an-overview-of-the-main-disinformation-narratives-in-the-czech-republic.aspx. 24 Ministry of foreign affairs of the Republic of Latvia, Latvian-initiated global call to combat the “infodemic” in the context of COVID-19 is endorsed by 130 countries, [online]: https://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/news/latest-news/66123-latvian-initiated-global- call-to-combat-the-infodemic-in-the-context-of-covid-19-is-endorsed-by-130-countries. 25 Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, No. 212/16.03.2020, Decree On the establishment of the state of emergency in the territory of Romania, [online]: https://rm.coe.int/16809e375d. 26 Ibidem. 27 Georgi Gotev, Romania shuts down websites with fake COVID-19 news, 2020, [online]: https://www.euractiv.com/section/all/ short_news/romania-shuts-down-websites-with-fake-covid-19-news/. 28 Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Slovakia Becomes the Member of the Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki, 2020, [online]: https://www.mzv.sk/web/en/news/current_issues/-/asset_publisher/ lrJ2tDuQdEKp/content/slovensko-sa-stalo-clenom-centra-vynimocnosti-pre-hybridne-hrozby-v-helsinkach/10182. 29 The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, Dates of accession for the Hybrid CoE Participating States, 2020, [online]: https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Dates-of-accession-for-the-Hybrid-CoE- Participating-States-03082020.pdf.

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30 Miroslava German Sirotnikova, Pandemic Pushes Slovakia To Finally Target Disinformation, 20.10.2020, [online]: https://balkaninsight.com/2020/10/20/pandemic-pushes-slovakia-to-finally-target-disinformation/. 31 Ibidem. 32 Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia, Defence White Paper of the Republic of Slovenia, 2020, [online]: https://www.gov.si/assets/ministrstva/MO/Dokumenti/WP2020.pdf. 33 Library of Congress, Hungary: National Assembly Adopts Act Giving Government Special Powers during Coronavirus Pandemic, 2020, [online]: https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/ hungary-national-assembly-adopts-act-giving-government-special-powers-during-coronavirus-pandemic/. 34 Amnesty International, Hungary: Granting government unlimited powers under new Covid19 law is disturbing development, 2020, [online]: https://www.amnesty.ie/hungary-granting-government-unlimited-powers-under-new-covid19-law-is-disturbing-development/. 35 International Press Institute, Hungary seeks power to jail journalists for ‘false’ COVID-19 coverage, 2020, [online]: https://ipi.media/hungary-seeks-power-to-jail-journalists-for-false-covid-19-coverage/. 36 Center for the Study of Democracy, Mission, [online]: https://csd.bg/about/mission/. 37 The events to date can be seen at https://csd.bg/events/. 38 https://www.facebook.com/csdbg/videos/vb.112284368050/2813510982261037/?type=3&theater and https://www.facebook.com/csdbg/videos/vb.112284368050/393224358378169/?type=3&theater. 39 Center for the Study of Democracy, Coronavirus COVID-19 outbreak in the EU – Fundamental Rights Implications, 2020, [online]: https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/bulgaria-report-covid-19-april-2020_en.pdf. 40 Center for the Study of Democracy, Coronavirus COVID-19 outbreak in the EU – Fundamental Rights Implications, 2020, [online]: https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/bg_report_on_coronavirus_pandemic_july_2020.pdf. 41 Ibidem, p. 12. 42 Debunk.eu, About Debunk EU, [online]: https://debunk.eu/about-debunk/. 43 Eline Chivot, 5 Q’s for Viktoras Daukšas, Head of Debunk.eu, 2020, [online]: https://datainnovation.org/2019/02/5qs-for-viktoras-dauksas-head-of-debunk-eu/. 44 Ibidem. 45 Ibidem. 46 Slovak Security Policy Institute [online]: https://slovaksecurity.org/?lang=en. 47 Slovak Security Policy Institute, Antipropaganda.sk, [online]: https://slovaksecurity.org/projects/ antipropaganda-sk/?lang=en&portfolioCats=115%2C114%2C112. 48 Slovak Security Policy Institute, Zhodnotenie prístupu Slovenskej republiky k boju s hybridnými hrozbami, [online]: https://slovaksecurity.org/projects/zhodnotenie-pristupu-slovenskej-republiky-k-boju-s-hybridnymi-hrozbami/?portfolioCats=32. 49 European Values Center for Security Policy, About Us, [online]: https://europeanvalues.cz/en/about-us/. 50 Mark Travers, Facebook Spreads Fake News Faster Than Any Other Social Website, According To New Research, 2020, [online]: https://www.forbes.com/sites/traversmark/2020/03/21/ facebook-spreads-fake-news-faster-than-any-other-social-website-according-to-new-research/. 51 Andrew Guess, Brendan Nyhan, Jason Reifler, Exposure to untrustworthy websites in the 2016 US election, Nature Human Behavior 2020, p. 5, [online]: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-020-0833-x. 52 Vincos Blog, World Map of Social Networks, [online]: https://vincos.it/world-map-of-social-networks/. 53 Facebook, How Our Fact-Checking Program Works, [online]: https://www.facebook.com/journalismproject/programs/ third-party-fact-checking/how-it-works. 54 Facebook, Facebook weitet Faktenprüferprogramm auf Österreich und die Schweiz aus, [online]: https://about.fb.com/de/ news/2020/05/facebook-weitet-faktenprueferprogramm-auf-oesterreich-und-die-schweiz-aus/. 55 Facebook, Facebook weitet Faktenprüferprogramm aus: AFP wird Partner in Deutschland, Österreich und der Schweiz, 2020, [online]: https://about.fb.com/de/news/2020/09/ facebook-weitet-faktenprueferprogramm-aus-afp-wird-partner-in-deutschland-oesterreich-und-der-schweiz/. 56 Facebook, Partnering with Third-Party Fact-Checkers, 2020, [online]: https://www.facebook.com/journalismproject/ programs/third-party-fact-checking/selecting-partners. 57 Poynter Institute, International Fact-Checking Network fact-checkers’ code of principles, [online]: https://www.poynter.org/ ifcn-fact-checkers-code-of-principles/. 58 The list of signatories can be found at the following address: https://ifcncodeofprinciples.poynter.org/signatories. 59 The list of current programme partners can be found at the following address: https://www.facebook.com/ journalismproject/programs/third-party-fact-checking/partner-map. 60 Visegrad Group Joint Declaration on Mutual Cooperation in Digital Projects, 2021, [online]: https://www.visegradgroup.eu/ download.php?docID=458.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

Make disinformation-countering statutes address specific problems

New government initiatives and legislative actions should concretely approach the problems of disinformation, propaganda, information operations, etc. An approach to online problems that is too broad and an attempt to combat all threats in this environment with a uniform system, no matter the problem type, brings with it the danger of setting up an ineffective and leaky structure. An example is the British Online Harms White Paper, often criticised for its too general attitude to online threats and for proposing a system that is not specific enough and thus not airtight enough.

Include the fight against disinformation in a bigger cybersecurity picture

Disinformation campaigns are often combined with or included within broader malicious efforts. Taking the “MacronLeaks” as an example, the disinformation campaign followed suc- cessful cyberattacks on the En Marche! political movement mailboxes. It is important to consider disinformation as a ramification of malicious cyberactivities and an element of hybrid warfare – and to reinforce the resilience of telecommunications systems and networks along with cyberdefence in individual states.

Build a common anti-disinformation front

Actions to counter disinformation and other threats present in the information space should be based on public-private cooperation. Due to the delicate nature of issues related to information space, fact checking, or censorship, the agency and activity in these areas cannot rest with a single group, be it state bodies or tech giants. What we need is to establish an environment that comprises public administration bodies, private sector, NGOs, media organisations, and academic institutions. Nothing but joint action along with checks and balances may give credibility and optimisation to individual decisions taken in relation to combating disinformation.

Increase cooperation and intensify collaboration at the EU level

Further strengthening of cooperation among the European Union Member States and of coordinating competences in the European External Action Service, with particular stress on the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN) and Hybrid Fusion Cell, is needed. Creating multi-year and strategic programmes to finance cross-border and pan-European centres for social media monitoring is recommended. Intensifying cooperation with other international organisations (including NATO, OSCE, the Council of Europe) and leveraging EU delegations’ intelligence potential should be contemplated.

Promote cooperation between social media companies and the government

The experiment held between Facebook and high-level experts from French ministries at the beginning of 2019 has been presented as a highly informative one, contributing to a reflection on a new approach to the social media regulation system. Promoting such cooperation is a way for government representatives and legislators to better understand the issues faced by social media platforms as well as for social media companies to understand and decide to act on the problems generated by their platforms. This cooperation can either be conducted bilaterally or take place within high-level summits or events, gathering several countries.

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Education as the key

The basic, long-term action should be to deploy media literacy competence building (digital media in particular) as an area in the education system and to modify teaching towards increasing critical thinking skills and calling media content into doubt. Unfortunately, the current education system up to and including the secondary school level does not promote the critical thinking competences, nor does it contain media education–related elements. This should be a core goal, because society which does not analyse content and reads with no understanding is a perfect prey for disinformation campaigns.

Increase transparency and access to data

The key to fight displays of online disinformation efficiently is to better understand its nature and the environment that surrounds it. To this aim, the need to enhance transparency of actions by individual social platforms, algorithms they employ, and the technical solutions they apply seems crucial. Accessibility of disinformation-related data should also be increased for research hubs, scholars, analysts, and organisations that grapple with the problem.

Support the development of ICT tools to analyse the online information space

What should be fostered is the development of multilingual instruments serving to monitor hybrid threats and disinformation that would be able to process large amounts of data and make data collection and analysis as automated as possible.

Target coordinated inauthentic behaviour

As much as content moderation by social networks is needed to fight against online disinformation, regulations pertaining to it are often mired in debates on thresholds and definitions that malign actors are very quick to circumvent. Content moderation should remain an important working point at all times but be complemented by another increased effort on bringing down coordinated inauthentic behaviour.

Create national StratCom cells

As for state administrations, the need to establish cross-ministry and cross-institution strategic communications units is palpable; they would coordinate state communications and actively counter disinformation, owning their own communications channels. The cell should build disinformation-campaign response scenarios by highlighting critical fields liable to be used by external information agents (e.g. in the case of Poland, historical politics and relations with Ukraine) and have the means to raise awareness across the communities about disinformation goals and narratives. Concurrently, the state should in its legal framework sanction disinformation and the consequences of spreading it wilfully, while reinforcing the engagement from the social media and non-governmental sector in monitoring and coordinating the struggle against disinformation.