John Mcpherson, Collingwood 29 June 2009 Mr R Willis, Secretary
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John McPherson, Collingwood 29 June 2009 Mr R Willis, Secretary, Council Committees, Legislative Council, Parliament House Melbourne Victoria 3002 To the Members of the Select Committee on Train Services: Terms of Reference: “To inquire into the factors leading to and causes of failures in the provision of metropolitan and V/line train services.” As an interested observer of Melbourne’s public transport performance for nearly 40 years and as an active member of the Public Transport Users Association (with some years as vice-president), I propose to make limited comments on a defined range of issues that I believe are relevant to the committee’s remit. My main relevant qualification is a Bachelors Degree in Economics, majoring in transport economics. Institutional Factors Affecting Train Service Provision: Organisational Model Melbourne has imported somewhat dubious expertise from the UK, which is the home of the ‘franchise’ model of public transport operation. All other state capital rail systems have remained state-run in the decade that has passed. At each change in the make-up of the franchisees, alterations have been made to attempt improvement in the operation of the model. The model has survived as it pleases the economic rationalist tendencies of both senior bureaucrats and politicians (similarly in the UK), not because it has been effective in supplying the basics of good public transport. In fact, investigation by a former colleague at the PTUA, Dr Paul Mees of RMIT (see his submission, as my views are not dissimilar) shows that arms-length operation is easily twice as expensive as keeping operations in-house. Our system now has a large number of separate entities such as suburban train and tram operators, many bus companies,Victrak, Metlink, a number of divisions at DOT, a division at Vicroads etc. All these entities must co-ordinate somehow. Legal issues relating to contracts can easily arise to blunt co-operation. Co-operation was much easier when functions tended to be undertaken by departments of the same entity - Victorian Railways. Investment over time The pressures on the state transport budget only increase. Over the last 40 years state funding for high grade freeways both urban and country has displaced adequate funding for a rail-based public transport system. Yet its clear the voting Victorian public still see great value in a comprehensive rail system. After decades of very slow growth, our suburban rail system has seen a recent large spurt in patronage caused by rocketing petrol prices, large employment growth in the CBD, continuing peak congestion on the arterial and motorway network plus rising population growth. The Regional Fast Rail mainline rehabilitation project has lead to fast growth in provincial patronage, also prompted by the factors mentioned above. Its safe to say the suburban rail system has been under- funded for 40 years. Although the Melbourne urban area has expanded greatly, it is 80 years since a completely new rail line has opened. Rollingstock has been updated, a handful of major stations rebuilt and enlarged, and, unfortunately, the underground City Loop project blotted up capital funds for a period of 20 years. The City Loop system was planned to double the CBD capacity of the system but day to day maintenance and regular upgrading of track, electric overhead and signalling suffered as capital funding was diverted. The justification for a high level of maintenance was further weakened by falling or flat system-wide patronage through the 1980s and into the 90s. The City Loop project was the public transport ‘spoke’ of the 1970s style transport ‘wheel’ that mostly consisted of a grid of US style urban motorways. In the 25 years since the City Loop was completed at a cost approximately 500% higher than first estimated, the operation of the suburban rail system has shifted through a number of entities - government and non-government. Operational discipline declined, as on-the-ground knowledge was lost and as layers of middle managers retired over time. However in the central city area, the City Loop provided massive overcapacity and this encouraged operational ‘slackness’ with no noticeable impact on service level reliability at the level that met, the then, flat demand until the early 2000s. Franchise Operation Period Over the first years of franchise operation demand continued flat, but began to rise fast around 5-6 years ago. Then the limitations of the current CBD rail system began to reveal themselves. Almost all CBD bound train services had been assigned to the four City Loop tracks; a number of platforms at Flinders St had been de-commissioned and later as part of the Federation Square project more platforms and many convenient stabling tracks in Jolimont Yard were abolished. Then approximately 5 years ago, peak period passenger demand required more peak services to run on many lines. Pressures on staff, rollingstock provision and platform space began to rise and rise. As much institutional knowledge had been lost, the response of operational and planning staff has been defensive and limited. Almost all of the remaining middle-management staff had transferred to the string of private franchisees and while the promise was made of overseas expertise, not much evidence of this filtered down to day-to-day planning and operations. Claims were then made by both the franchise operator and the Department of Transport that the central area tracks were approaching full capacity and potential congestion in peak periods. Yet no more trains per peak hour were operating than had operated in the 1960s before the City Loop was constructed to double capacity. The response to the so-called ‘congestion’ issue, proposed by the only independent rail advisor (Simon Lane), was the Eddington Rail Tunnel, to extend from Middle Footscray to Caulfield via Parkville, the CBD and St Kilda Rd. This massive project (overkill?) seems a repeat of the City Loop debacle of 40 years previously. Rather than looking for a suite of smaller and cheaper projects to enhance existing infrastructure capacity, an expensive leap is made into the future with little assessment of alternatives and based on the ‘good idea’ that Parkville and St Kilda Rd should be serviced directly by an underground suburban train line. Yet even here cheaper options existed to enable the Parkville-St Kilda Rd axis to be serviced by underground train. Such as an original proposal from me, approximately 7 years ago that envisaged a link from the the Craigieburn and Upfield lines in the north to link to the Caulfield lines at South Yarra, south of the CBD. In fact an upgrade of the tramways spine along the same axis to light rail standards might give a worthwhile outcome at FAR less cost. Also, a pair of dedicated V/line tracks from Sunshine Junction via Footscray (new surface platforms) to the CBD, all at grade, is quite feasible and by seperating V/line and suburban trains would give the same 40 trains per boost in capacity as proposed for the Eddington tunnel, at much less cost. Strategic Planning Since the City Loop project of 40 years ago, any strategic planning for the suburban rail system has been notably absent. While Vicroads has a continuous stream of projects ‘ready to go’, at DOT when politicians ask for the next proposal, the answer seems to be: ‘you tell us’. One beneficial aspect of the franchise process was 2 suburban electrification extension projects. However also as part of the franchise process the original two rail operators were allowed by DOT to purchase new rollingstock of different designs (funded by the government) and to upgrade the existing Comeng fleet to two different specifications (not including air-conditioning upgrades). Making the fleets as inflexible as possible for a changed future - that duly came about when Connex took over the complete suburban system. The Comeng trains were modified again to allow them to once again intercouple (at what further cost?), but two new fleets of non-standard German and French trains would remain. The Werribee-Sunshine portion of the Regional Rail Link (RRL) project also bears all the hallmarks of a rushed planning cycle. Not all the needs are met and the cost is vast compared with modest alternatives. The ‘green wedges’ planning policy might have been turned on its head to provide a project justification as well. Off peak, all Geelong line trains would need to take the western 'outer circle' route to provide some service (2 trains per hour) to the new ‘Tarneit’ stations. These trains are likely to be up to 10 minutes slower than current trains via Newport and Werribee, because of a 10 km longer route and more station stops. Also interchange at Werribee would be lost, as ‘Tarneit’ line trains would avoid Werribee. A major defect in an integrated urban/interurban rail system. Werribee is itself a major destination in the metro area for Geelong line passengers. A more modest proposal would provide a new pair of tracks to the City from Sunshine as mentioned above and a third track on the only potentially congested section of the Geelong-Werribee-Footscray line, from Newport to Footscray. The ‘Tarneit’ residential extension would be serviced by extending the Werribee suburban line to the north-west, to a new terminus. A new station on the Melton line would service the northern sector. At comparable construction costings for rail projects in WA and Queensland, this more modest proposal would cost no more than $1 billion compared with the amazing $4billion+ estimate for the government’s RRL project. Rail system patronage growth could not continue at its current high rate as the job market in the CBD, the main driver of peak passenger loadings, is finite.