Bending and Binding Disciplines : The Interdisciplinary Ways of African-American Thinkers Anthony Mangeon

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Bending and Binding Disciplines: The Interdisciplinary Ways of African-American Thinkers By Anthony Mangeon

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sans papier is a collection of electronic pre-prints in French and Francophone Studies at Cornell University.

A. Mangeon, “Bending and Binding Disciplines,” November 07

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Bending and Binding Disciplines: The Interdisciplinary Ways of African-American Thinkers By Anthony Mangeon

Abstract

This paper argues that the intellectual projects of post-Reconstruction African-Americans demonstrated an interdisciplinary approach to knowledge avant la lettre and that this approach constitutes a “blackening” of our understanding of interdisciplinarity. The paper explores how these projects used double strategies of mastering traditional knowledge-power articulations of Europe over Non-Europeans and of “deforming” these articulations. Focusing on William E.B. Du Bois and Alain Leroy Locke, the paper identifies two overriding processes: bending disciplines to common ground and binding them to African-American concerns. The paper traces these processes in the education and intellectual endeavors of the two men to illustrate the bending and binding of both regimes of thought and of disciplines. The paper concludes by proposing the analogy of interdisciplinarity as “temperament” in the musical sense of the term. Interdisciplinarity would thus be the bending and binding of thought and disciplines in order to tune in and jam with others, and just as African-Americans were “blackening” the European scale, African-American thinkers were “blackening” theories, concepts, and practices.

About the Author

Anthony Mangeon studies the interactions and relations between literature and knowledge in Africana, African-American, and West Indian studies. He is Maître de Conférence at the Université Paul-Valéry (Montpellier III) and is affiliate at the Institut de Recherches en Etudes Culturelles (IREC). He has edited and translated six of Alain Locke's Haitian conferences, which will soon be released, along with his introduction: Alain Locke : Le Rôle du Nègre dans la culture des Amériques, et autres textes. Paris, L’Harmattan, Collection Autrement Mêmes, 2007.

Contact Information [email protected] [email protected]

Source

This paper was first given at the “Undisciplined Knowledge? Franco-American Interdisciplinarity in the Humanities” Conference, a French Studies event held on March 2-3, 2007 at Cornell University, Ithaca, NY. A French version of this text appeared in the issue of Labyrinthe entitled La fin des disciplines? (Laurent Dubreuil ed.; Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose; 2007)

A. Mangeon, “Bending and Binding Disciplines,” November 07

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Bending and Binding Disciplines: The Interdisciplinary Ways of African-American Thinkers

At the turn of the twentieth century, the idea of interdisciplinarity was, in America, no more an academic concern than interracial relations were thinkable on a non-segregational basis. Yet among post-Reconstruction African-American intellectuals, an interdisciplinary approach to knowledge was in actuality fuelling and backing up new intellectual, cultural and political projects. Historically and socially defined by a “double consciousness,” black intellectuals also pursued double strategies which combined “mastery of forms” and “deformations of mastery.”1 Mastering western discursive practices (such as history, , literature, or human and social sciences), and mastering the major western cultural and political idioms (such as Christian universalism, Marxism, Enlightenment ideals, Republicanism and Law) first appealed to them as ways to achieve understanding, or to realize rational assessments of the social, cultural, economic relationships Europe had historically built with the rest of the world, and especially the black world; but this “mastery of forms,” or mastery of intellectual and cultural logics which backed up the social and political ones, was primarily meant to foster new social and political agencies, agendas, and thus to allow a “deformation” of traditional knowledge-power articulations of Europe over Non-Europeans, Whites over Blacks. Interdisciplinarity, in that sense, was conceived as a way to find intersections which allowed or accounted for different interactions between groups and cultures. It went along with another concern, which consisted in “blackening” discursive practices, theories, and concepts to address the specific problems of peoples of African origins or descent. This “blackening” process was therefore no reducing tapping of western disciplines, claims or ideals, but a way of bending down their abstract schemes, categories and disembodied objectives, to the concrete needs, demands and situations of subjugated peoples. Neither rejecting western or ideologies, nor giving them full credit in their restrictive Eurocentric terms, black intellectuals actually struggled to exceed their limits and to implement them to their full meaning. As, for example, C.L.R. James and Léon- Gontran Damas argued in the 1930s,2 the Rights of Man and Citizen became only truly “universalized” once the slaves in Saint-Domingue reclaimed and practically enacted them; consequently, speaking of a “Black Internationalism”, a “Black Marxism” or a “Black Enlightenment” was not reducing these idioms to any particularist understanding, but imposing on them a pragmatic bent and an acid test which revealed what would have called their “cash-value.”3 Accordingly, speaking of a “black interdisciplinarity” would just be an invitation to explore how black intellectuals contributed to the development and understanding of interdisciplinary ways.

1 Houston Baker Jr, 1987. 2 James, 1936 ; Damas, 1939. 3 “The pragmatic method », says James in his book Pragmatism (1907), « is to try to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences. What difference would it practically make to any one if this notion rather than that notion were true ? [...] You must bring out of each word its practical cash-value, set it at work within the stream of your experience. The pragmatic method appears less as a solution, then, than as a program for more work, and more particularly as an indication of the ways in which existing realities may be changed” (“What Pragmatism means”, in McDermott (ed, 1996 : 380).

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I will not deal with many examples, but focusing on William E.B. Du Bois and Alain Leroy Locke, I would like to demonstrate a twofold process of “bending” and “binding” disciplines. In this formula, all terms can be understood in at least two ways : bending and binding disciplines means bringing them together on common grounds, but it also implies bending and binding them to actual African-American concerns, in order to produce a significant difference in experience. And by disciplines, one must not only understand the traditional units of knowledge, but also the conceptual regimes which put you very easily, intellectually, into some disciplinary habits. So beyond the bending and binding of disciplines, a more radical bending and binding of conceptual schemes is at stake, which helps to characterize the objectives of the mastering and deforming strategy; and even if, in the end, these interdisciplinary practices do not appear as specifically nor exclusively African-American, they will nonetheless bear witness, or surely I do hope to prove so, to an original process of “blackening” to be taken into consideration in our understanding of interdisciplinarity. Bending and Binding Regimes of Thought Many critics of the movement have underscored the deep influence William James exerted on Du Bois and Locke. Both of them attended his courses and lectures at Harvard; Locke was even present in Oxford when James was invited to Manchester College, in 1908, to deliver his Hibbert lectures later published as A Pluralistic Universe. Comparatively, the impact of European thinkers on Du Bois’ and Locke’s thoughts and writings has often been neglected; moreover, when critics highlight their common philosophical background, the specific ways Locke and Du Bois bent concepts and bound together disciplines like philosophy, psychology, and sociology are usually left aside. But quick biographical inquiries teach us that both Du Bois and Locke followed James’ example to go abroad, in Germany, to pursue further training, and respectively attended the University of Berlin in 1892-1894, and in 1910-1911. There, both African-American students registered in philosophy, sociology, and economy courses, and they were consequently exposed, in different ways, to Max Weber and Georg Simmel’s teachings. Later, Locke would even go to France to attend Henri Bergson’s lectures at the Collège de France in 1911. Now, my argument is the following: when it comes to James, Simmel, and other American or European thinkers, Du Bois and Locke seem less influenced by specific systems or precise concepts than moved and driven by the antithetical regimes of thought or the antagonist intellectual logics which run though these very systems and concepts. Since ’s distinction between the “sons of earth” and the “sons of heaven”, philosophy had traditionally been divided into two tendencies, or two ways of situating oneself with regard to what Deleuze and Guattari called the “immanence plan,” meaning the surface that philosophy traces when it institutes itself as a “discourse on and knowledge of experience.” On the one hand, or on the upper side, the traditional and dominant “idealist-tending world view” conceived of philosophy as a theory of knowledge and it consequently fostered the mind’s activity of representation or “mirroring of nature,” thus “giving an image to thought,” in Deleuze and Guattari’s words, or to put it in Richard Rorty’s neo-pragmatist words, “searching for the immutable structures within which knowledge, life and culture must be contained.”4 “Philosophy-as-epistemology” could thus be defined by its representationalist and fundationalist claims, and it could be characterized by its structural concern for a priori conditions of possibility, or “special constraints which ‘rationality’ exerts and which explain why our ideal

4 Rorty (1979) : 163.

A. Mangeon, “Bending and Binding Disciplines,” November 07 2 sans papier theories must ‘correspond to reality.’”5 In its dualistic, hierarchical, and finalist habits, it subordinated the body to the mind, the content to the form, the world to the psychè, and it favored some kind of teleological transcendence where superior faculties (such as reason or judgment) took over by taking themselves as their own end and by implementing their own ways of functioning. On the other side of the immanent plan, you could find an anti-intellectualist and naturalist tradition which refused the usual transcendental bent and argued, on the contrary, that “there is no such thing as a non-causal condition of possibility”6; since it did “not view knowledge as a matter of getting reality right, but rather as a matter of acquiring habits of action for coping with reality,”7 it was anti-representationalist and consequently, instead of giving primacy to the mind’s structural features, it insisted on processes of production or on the paralleling development of body and mind, form and content, and it underscored the dynamic process of expression and reciprocal action between the world and the individual, or between individuals. Through this immanent bent, philosophy was less conceived as a theory of knowledge than as a “discourse on nature” (which implied as a “discourse on human nature” or “anthropology”) according to which consciousness was consequently less defined by rationality and reflexivity than by desire and belief. During their philosophical and sociological training, Locke and Du Bois were deeply and constantly immersed into these concurrent philosophical regimes: in Harvard, idealist philosophers like Josiah Royce and George Herbert Palmer, and radical empiricists like William James and used to engage themselves in critical assessments of each other’s views and systems. Later in Berlin, Max Weber and Georg Simmel would frequently insist on the antagonizing of philosophies which paralleled the pluralism of value systems in social life, and they consequently argued for a philosophical practice that seriously took into account, or even accounted for, relativism and diversity of life attitudes, while looking at the same time for structural patterns and commonalities in thought: on the one hand, Weber would forge what he called “ideal types,” or abstract concepts capable of grasping empirical phenomena and real relationships in actuality (while still being “ideals” exceeding the concrete aspects of experience under scrutiny); on the other hand, Georg Simmel would focus on dynamic processes of “reciprocal action” in social life while looking for what he called a priori forms of socialization. So after Weber and Simmel, and just like William James had first opposed, in his Pragmatism, two antithetical philosophical tempers, the tender-minded or the idealist one, and the tough-minded or the empiricist one, only to mediate between them in his later lectures on A pluralistic Universe,8 Du Bois and Locke couldn’t escape the antagonizing of intellectual logics, but they tried to situate themselves in a sort of “in-between,” especially when they explored their major concerns for the possible relationships between ethics and aesthetics, or between race and culture. The origins and antagonizing of values, the articulation between racial and cultural features were indeed heavily discussed at the turn of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, and certainly African-American thinkers could not be indifferent to those debates, even if their voices were not the ones most listened to. I will not dwell here on Du Bois’s essays on “The Renaissance of Ethics” and “The Conservation of Races,” since his philosophical speculation

5 Rorty (1979) : 295. 6 Rorty (1991b) : 55. 7 Rorty (1991a) : 1. 8 James distinguished the cynical temper from the sympathetical one, which included pluralists like himself and absolutists like Royce, who both felt concerned by the spiritual well-being of humanity at large.

A. Mangeon, “Bending and Binding Disciplines,” November 07 3 sans papier were reconducted and deepened by Alain Locke, who was even more persevering than Du Bois in exploring the general features of a “science of values,” as he was as much committed to an understanding of the race concept. Locke wrote indeed two different doctoral theses on value theory, one in Berlin, and one in Harvard, plus a few articles later published in scientific journals or collective books; he also delivered, during his whole academic career, many series of lectures (some of them in French), on the social issues and historical developments of interracial relations, both in the and in Europe or the West Indies. Because of their refined argumentation, his writings on the topics of value, race, and culture still remain of great interest to us. Alain Locke’s theory of values was precisely conceived as a mediation between the two antagonistic conceptual regimes I have previously sketched. For example, he used William James’ naturalist psychology, which insisted on the primary and immediate level of consciousness, and for which feeling was a prominent mode of knowing, to counter Franz Brentano’s psychology, which focused on the secondary and reflexive level of consciousness and consequently favored introspection as the only adequate mode of knowing. But vice versa, in order to temper Nietzsche’s physiological explanation of modes of valuation, or in order to refute Robert Eisler’s biological interpretations, Locke resorted to Heinrich Rickert’s idealism, which insisted on the mind’s relative autonomy from the body and championed the independency of Kulturwissenschaften against Naturwissenschaften. In both ways, the speculative process at work can be seen as a way of mediating between two conceptual regimes: on the one hand, Locke refuses to relate values to a simple conformity with logical categories, but on the other hand, he rebukes the fallacy of radical physiological accounts, nor does he accept to reduce values to a simple hedonist scale. Locke’s project thus overthrows the traditional opposition between valuation, which belongs to the realm of feeling, and evaluation which occurs as an act of judgment. Valuation is proved to be already a way of judging, while on the other hand, evaluation is still a way of feeling. We have here, exemplified, the typical intellectual strategy of bending and binding of regimes of thought: against the dominant regime of western thought, which runs from Descartes to Husserl through Kant, black intellectuals will indeed favour the minor and turbulent regime, which runs from Spinoza to Bergson through Herder; but this mastery and deformation couldn’t be enough, since in the end it would simply get down to favour one monologistic way of describing experience against an other, or to give special importance to a singular and univocal mode of thinking at the expense of an other. The deformation of mastery then calls for a more complex strategy: beyond the clear preference for the minor and turbulent regime, it is precisely through the slits of the two regimes, on the very watershed which unites and separates them that Locke wants to situate his discourse. In his balancing between genetic and structural concerns, Locke somehow inaugurates what other interdisciplinary thinkers, such as Mikhail Bakhtin or Gregory Bateson, will carry through in the twentieth century. In his attempt to find a mediation between Franz Brentano’s intentionality and William James’s naturalism, Locke’s project of a science of values is, for example, very close to Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology, but it departs from it by refusing the transcendental gesture which makes out of intentionality an a priori condition of knowledge; for Locke, just as for Henri Bergson, the primary dimension of consciousness is temporality as a structuring of experience: “Consciousness means, first of all, memory,” Bergson used to say; and what really matters, then, is duration and changes of valuation in their original mobility; the real issue, about consciousness and values, is how structural modes of valuing can be acquired, developed, and enhanced through experience.

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What seems most needed is some middle ground between these extremes of subjectivism [Protagoras’s relativism] and objectivism [objective criterion of the truths of science]. The basic qualities of values should never have been sought in logical classes, for they pertain to psychological categories. They are not grounded in types or realms of value, but are rooted in modes or kinds of valuing. In fact, the value-mode establishes for itself, directly through feeling, a qualitative category which, as discriminated by its appropriate feeling- quality, constitutes an emotionally mediated form of experience.9 To specify this making of dispositional feelings through valuation, Locke borrowed from Theodule Ribot, another French philosopher and psychologist who, in his book on The Logic of Feelings, formalized what he called, in oxymoric ways, “emotional abstracts” or “affective judgments.” Locke drew upon Ribot’s theory to sustain that differentiated feeling-modes, in valuation, lead to different value-types and value-judgments and accounted for the possible antagonizing, conversion, and transvaluation of value-modes, because of their different affective dynamics. While “maximizing the value-mode itself as an attitude and activity,” or “maximizing values” was always possible, to adapt to new situations, to transform acquired meanings into some new ones, Locke was also pleading against absolutism and for the realization of reciprocity and complementarity of value attitudes in human experience. Drawing from James and Brentano, his theory of values thus offers a complete alternative to transcendental phenomenology, for it doesn’t promote another philosophy-as-epistemology, but pleads for a pragmatist anthropology on which he will later build his cultural actions. Now, if we dwell on his theory of race, Locke demonstrates the same strategy of tempering and bending one regime of thought thanks to the other. While Gobinism, social Spencerism. and other brands of racist theories were at that time prevailing in physical anthropology or social theory, Locke had no difficulty in recognizing the presence of the dominant regime of thought, whose reifying logic, and obsession for permanency and hierarchy, were interfering with the turbulent regime’s affirmation of parallelism between body and mind or with his vitalistic concern for the dynamic processes of reciprocal actions in natural and social life. Faced with the same pseudo-scientific bias, anthropologists like Franz Boas or later, Melville Herskovits, were aiming at clearing naturalism from the fallacies of invariability and hierarchy of human types, and they were notably studying and demonstrating important changes among migrants or negroes in the United States, from one generation to the other, to infer that mental changes and intellectual developments were accordingly as much possible as plausible. Although he himself favored the turbulent regime of thought, for his major genetic concern and insistence on reciprocal action, Locke adopted a very different strategy from Boas: for instead of preserving the strict naturalistic parallelism between body and mind, whatever variability human types could experience instead of fixity, Locke argued for a more radical split between physical features and mental, psychological, intellectual abilities; there again, he was true to the teachings of Henri Bergson, who argued for a necessary dualism between mind and body in his book on Matter and Memory. But Locke goes even further: while Boas and Herskovits were specifying, through anthropometric measures, what the racial differences were from one group or one generation to the other, Locke aimed at determining the sources, not of racial differences and inegalities, but of racial iniquities and discriminations in social life. We precisely reach here the point where bending and binding regimes of thought combines with bending and binding disciplines.

9 Locke-Harris, 1989: 38.

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Bending and Binding Disciplines In his theory of value, Locke had already opened philosophy to other discursive practices and ways of describing things. As we already mentioned, the problem of antagonizing value systems was not only a concern of philosophers, but also of psychologists and sociologists. In his two dissertations, Locke would indeed draw a lot of insights from Georg Simmel, Emile Durkheim and Gabriel Tarde. His description of a value-mode is close to Simmel’s description of a ‘Denkmodus,’ while his analyses of “empathy”, of the “social influencing” and even “conditioning of valuation” by “interacting and counteracting valuations on the part of others”10, merges the Durkheimian concern for social presuppositions with Gabriel Tarde’s focus on the laws of imitation, according to which circulations of beliefs and desires are the driving forces behind all social interactions. When it comes to race theory, both anthropology and sociology are called to account for prejudice and forms of interaction. The approach, once again, is double and it reflects the strategy of mastering forms to deform mastery. Marxian sociology and Tardian social psychology are first used to explain race practices and theories through their historical, materialistic and psychological causes: racial hierarchies are always, throughout history, crystallizations of differentiated status, and also rationalizations of an anthropological will to power;11 subsequently, neither scientific proof of the racist fallacies nor materialistic dialectics of class struggle will suffice to eradicate race practices and theories : since the racial feeling also finds its root in the “kinship feeling” as “the basis of all social organization”, Locke argues, “economic classes may be absorbed, but our psychological tribes will not thereby be dissolved.”12 Thus mastering forms, in this context, means both understanding the historical causes of social discrimination and exposing the ambiguities of the kinship feeling, which can function positively, actively, in a culturally-minded way as well as it can give birth to reactionary, negative and racist ways. 13Then again, how does the deformation of mastery operate? Deforming mastery means first deconstructing the dominant regime of thought by revealing the paradoxes or self-contradictions of its monist and hegemonic social logic. According to “the laws of imitation” which Gabriel Tarde formalized, or according to the sociology of conflict (“Soziologie der Konkurrenz”) which Georg Simmel promoted, watertight social frontiers, exclusive and segregational systems only exacerbate the “mimical desire” of subordinated groups, while sexual exploitation, its subsequent interbreeding, and the reality of passing not only contradict the dogmas of “racial fetishism,” but also undermine the very possibility of biracialism in the long run. To counter this monist and hegemonic social logic, Locke argues for the systemization of active social dynamics. Imitation could never be restricted to the mimicry of dominant peoples by the subjugated ones, since social interaction implied a reciprocal, although often silenced, influence of the latter on the former. And indeed, as a mentor of the Harlem Renaissance, Locke will openly call for a dialogical imitation of Blacks by Whites and Whites by Blacks, and he will especially sustain imitations of popular cultural idioms as much as he will favor the dynamics of invention, or the “crossing of different imitative series”

10 Locke, 1910 : 131 ; Locke, 1917 : 129. 11 Stewart-Locke, 1992 : 10-11. 12 Harris-Locke, 1989 : 49. 13 Stewart-Locke, 1983 : 258-259.

A. Mangeon, “Bending and Binding Disciplines,” November 07 6 sans papier that Gabriel Tarde had found at the bottom of all human creativity. Paralleling this systemization of social dialogisms, the deformation of mastery will be realized by transforming, into a principle of action, what Simmel identified as a priori forms of socialization, such as loyalty: loyalty was indeed, as Simmel underscored, the formalization of a relational bond and it acted, as such, as an a priori condition for society to exist. Locke’s proposal is to favour this general and abstracted relational form and to counter partisanship by taking loyalty as its own end : as such, the principle of “loyalty to loyalty,” which Locke borrowed from Josiah Royce, reproduced the teleological gesture of idealism, where the intentional structure was both its own end and mean, but this finalist gesture went along with a pragmatic concern for its effects in social experience, and it effectively conceived of itself as an oxymoric social logic: Royce’s advice was, “in the choice and service of a cause that you will serve loyally, [to] be always loyal to loyalty,” and Locke’s recommendation, in the defense and practice of cultural nationalism, was to be loyal too to cosmopolitanism and Americanism. Conclusion To conclude, I would like to risk an analogy: as it was practiced by Locke, but also by many other African, Caribbean and African-American thinkers, interdisciplinarity would appear, in musical terms, as a matter of “temperament.” Just like in music: tuning means finding a middle way between two ground notes by adjusting their distinctive overtones, and interdisciplinarity means bending and binding regimes of thought, or bending and binding disciplines to tune in and jam with others. But I would argue that there is also a special experiment at stake in black interdisciplinary ways. As in the blues, where the “African temperament” was creeping back in the European scale and was bending or flattening the 3rd and 7th major steps to bring back the African pentatonic scale, interdisciplinarity, as it was performed by early African-American thinkers, also implied a blackening of theories, concepts, and practices, which both make them relevant to the black experience and make the black contributions important to the interdisciplinary project. Just as the Blues is a specific crossing and hybridizing of European musical practices and African concerns, which displays both a mastery and a deformation of mastery, interdisciplinarity must conceive of itself as both a knowledge without frontiers and without illusions, or as a “gai savoir” born of disenchantment. Now, to move forward to my final statement, one could read The anthology, which Locke edited in 1925, as the concrete outcome of such a bending and binding of disciplines. The anthology was true to Locke’s pluridisciplinary approach, since he insisted on bringing together not only different literary texts (poetry by Cullen, Hughes, McKay, Toomer, ; fiction by , Bruce Nugent; Drama by Richardson, etc.), but also critical texts from various fields and authors, both Black and White. There were indeed sociological, anthropological, historical essays as well as literary, musical, or art criticism. The bending and binding were consequently both in the discipline and in the literature, which displayed wonderful mastery of Negro musical idioms such as the Blues or the Spirituals. Here again, the African temperament was playing in the overtone: for as Alain Locke would say later on, it was Like rum in the punch, that although far from being the bulk ingredient, still dominates the mixture; the Negro elements have in most instances very typical and dominating flavors, so to speak. The Negro cultural influence, most obvious, too, in music and dance, has a still wider range, — in linguistic influence, in folk-lore and literary imagery, and in rhythm,

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the tempo and emotional overtones of almost any typically Negro version of other cultural art forms.14 That’s why we should not dismiss it when interdisciplinarity is at stake.

REFERENCES:

Baker Jr, Houston (1984). Blues, Ideology, and Afro-American Literature, A Vernacular Theory. Chicago & London, University of Chicago Press, 1984. Baker Jr, Houston (1987). Modernism and the Harlem Renaissance. Chicago & London, University of Chicago Press. Bergson, Henri (1959). Oeuvres. Paris, P.U.F. Damas, Léon Gontran (1939). “89 et Nous, les Noirs”. Europe n°193, July 15 1939. Deleuze, Gilles & Guattari, Félix (1991). Qu’est-ce que la philosophie ? Paris, Minuit. Du Bois, William E.B. (1996). Writings. New York, The Library of America. Harris, Leonard (ed., 1989). The Philosophy of Alain Locke, Harlem Renaissance and Beyond. , Temple University Press. James, Cyril Lionel Robert (1936). The Black Jacobins, Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution. Rev. Ed.. New York, Vintage Books. Hutchinson, George (1995) The Harlem Renaissance in Black and White. Cambridge (Mass.) & London, the Belknap Press of Press. Locke, Alain (1910). An Essay on the Concept of Value. Moorland Spingarn Research Center, Manuscript Division, Alain Locke Papers, Box 164-125. Locke, Alain (1917). The Problem of Classification in The Theory of Value, An Outline of a Genetic System of Values. Moorland Spingarn Research Center, Manuscript Division, Alain Locke Papers, Box 164-155. Locke, Alain (ed., 1925). , An Interpretation. New York, Simon & Schuster, 1992. Locke, Alain & Stern, Bernhard J. (eds., 1942). When Peoples Meet, A Study in Race and Culture Contacts. New York, Progressive Education Association. Locke, Alain (1943). Le Rôle du Nègre dans la Culture des Amériques. Port-au Prince, Haiti, Imprimerie de l’Etat. Locke, Alain (1992). Race Contacts and Interracial Relations, edited by Jeffrey Stewart. Washington D.C., Press. McDermott, John (1996). The Writings of William James, A Comprehensive Edition. Chicago, Chicago University Press. Possnock, Ross (1998). Color and Culture, Black Writers and the Making of the Modern Intellectual. Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press. Ribot, Théodule (1905). La Logique des sentiments. Paris, Félix Alcan. Rorty, Richard (1979). Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton (N.J.), Princeton University Press. Rorty, Richard (1991a). Objectivism, Relativism and Truth, Philosophical Papers volume 1. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Rorty, Richard (1991b). Essays on Heidegger and Others, Philosophical Papers volume 2. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Royce, Josiah (1908). Philosophy of Loyalty. New York, The MacMillan Company.

14 Stewart-Locke, 1983 : 453.

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Simmel, Georg (1999). Sociologie : Etudes sur les formes de socialisation. Paris, P.U.F. Stewart, Jeffrey (ed, 1983). The Critical Temper of Alain Locke, A Selection of His Essays on Art and Culture. New York & London, Garland Publishing Inc. Tarde, Gabriel (1890). Les Lois de l’imitation. Rev. Ed. 2001, Paris, Seuil, “Les Empêcheurs de penser en rond”.

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