PROCRASTINATION AS A FORM OF SELF-REGULATION FAILURE 1

PROCRASTINATION AS A FORM OF SELF-REGULATION FAILURE A review of the cognitive and neural underpinnings.

Bachelor Degree Project in Cognitive Neuroscience Basic level 22.5 ECTS Spring term 2020

Iselin Fridén

Supervisor: Anders Milton Examiner: Katja Valli PROCRASTINATION AS A FORM OF SELF-REGULATION FAILURE 2

Abstract

The action of postponing an intended plan is often referred to as procrastination. Research on procrastination generally views the phenomenon as a form of self-regulation failure. Self- regulation refers to the conscious and non-conscious processes that enable individuals to guide their thoughts, feelings, and behaviors purposefully. Research indicates correlations between self-regulation and executive functions providing a fruitful integration. From a neuroscientific perspective, this integration generally associates the prefrontal cortex with top-down control whenever successful self-regulation is achieved. On the contrary, self- regulation failure appears to involve a bottom-up control, in which subcortical regions have greater influence on behavioral outcomes. Subcortical regions involved in emotional and rewarding processes, such as the amygdala and nucleus accumbens appears to lie at the core of self-regulation failure, whereas cortical executive functions of regulating emotion and impulsive behaviors may contribute to successful self-regulation, thus overcoming procrastination. This thesis aims to obtain a deeper understanding of the mechanisms of procrastination, specifically investigating self-regulation failure and its relationship with executive functions and the neural underpinnings of self-regulation.

Keywords: procrastination, self-regulation failure, executive functions, prefrontal cortex, nucleus accumbens, amygdala.

PROCRASTINATION AS A FORM OF SELF-REGULATION FAILURE 3

Table of Contents

Introduction 4

Self-regulation and Executive Functions 8 Self-regulation 8 Executive Functions 9 The Relationship Between Self-regulation and Executive Functions 11 Self-regulation and working memory 11 Self-regulation and inhibition 13 Self-regulation and shifting 14

Procrastination as Self-regulation Failure 15 Task Characteristic 16 Task-aversiveness 16 Timing of the task and (future) rewards/punishments 16 Self-efficacy 17 Individual Differences 18 Emotion Regulation 20 Temporal Motivation Theory 22

Neural Mechanisms of Self-regulation 23 Top-down Control 23 Bottom-up Control 27 Self-regulation Failure and its Neural Underpinnings 28 Regulation of emotions 29 Regulation of appetitive behaviors 31

Discussion 32

References 37

PROCRASTINATION AS A FORM OF SELF-REGULATION FAILURE 4

Introduction

“I will do it tomorrow” - a common thought people all can relate to in some manner. Whether it is updating a photo album, heading out for a run, clearing the garage, or starting a diet, humans all have something they tend to postpone. Psychological research has made tremendous progress in understanding what makes life worth living (Lyubomirsky,

2008). Subsequently, society has been presented with a vast amount of information on the topic. However, lack of information is not the whole picture of motivation. Despite the fact that people possess knowledge and the “right” intentions, how come it still can feel so overwhelmingly hard to follow up on initial goals? Why can it be so hard to just tie those running shoes and head out for a run?

The action of postponing an intended plan is often referred to as procrastination.

Like many common-language terms, a specific definition is favorable when implementing into a scientific context. In his meta-analysis, Steel (2007) defines procrastination as “...to voluntarily delay an intended course of action despite expecting to be worse off for the delay”

(p. 66). In literature, procrastination is commonly argued to be a form of self-regulation failure (Pychyl & Flett, 2012; Steel, 2007). Self-regulation is a wide concept referring to both regulation of emotion, thoughts, and actions in a goal-directed manner (Kelley, Gallucci,

Riva, Romero Lauro, & Schmeichel, 2019). Subsequently, given that self-regulation is a wide concept, and that procrastination is a form of self-regulation failure, this indicates that procrastination is a somewhat ambiguous concept. Steel (2007) points out several characters that show a strong correlation with procrastination. These features include task-aversiveness, future outcomes, and individual differences, to name a few. Thus, this review will particularly investigate self-regulation failure concerning these features. The following sections will use the terms procrastination and self-regulation failure interchangeably. However, this thesis does not imply that self-regulation failure could synonymously be replaced with PROCRASTINATION AS A FORM OF SELF-REGULATION FAILURE 5 procrastination, but rather that the two concepts share common features that overlap to some extent.

Judging from the number of publications, research on self-regulation in its general definition has grown increasingly over the past decades. According to Web of

Science, publications including the search term self-regulation have extended from 36 articles in 1986 to 2518 articles in 2019. On the contrary, search of publications with the term procrastination displays 3 articles in 1986 to 208 in 2019.

The failure to do what one intends to do, what the ancient Greeks called akrasia, is very common in everyday life (Pychyl & Flett, 2012). Pioneers such as Mischel (1974) and

Bandura (1977) suggested that human beings do seem to demonstrate an ability to adjust, influence, and modify their responses. Over the past four decades, theory and research have made considerable progress in the understanding of self-regulation, self-regulation failure, and forging its links to cognitive neuroscience (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Carver &

Scheier, 1981; Dohle, Diel, & Hofmann, 2018; Heatherton & Wagner, 2011). Research suggests that core components of executive functions (an umbrella term referring to mental processing of goal-directed behavior), such as working memory and inhibition, support important mechanisms of self-regulation (Hofmann, Schmeichel, & Baddeley, 2012). This rapprochement is proposed to bring new valuable insight and expertise into the field. Further, research has made several attempts to identify the neural structures involved in executive functioning (Niendam et al., 2012). Most of the efforts point to a general activation in the prefrontal cortex (PFC), demonstrating a top-down control over subcortical regions involved in reward and emotion (Heatherton & Wagner, 2011; Niendam et al., 2012; Yuan & Raz,

2014). On the contrary, self-regulation failure is proposed to occur whenever the scale is tipped in favor of subcortical areas, resulting from strong emotions or impulses, or when the prefrontal function is weakened (Heatherton & Wagner, 2011). PROCRASTINATION AS A FORM OF SELF-REGULATION FAILURE 6

Occasionally, procrastination can be a coping mechanism in positive sense. For instance, Bernstein (as cited in Steel, 2007, p. 66) means that “[o]nce we act, we forfeit the option of waiting until new information comes along. As a result, no-acting has value. The more uncertain the outcome, the greater may be the value of procrastination”. Benefitting from procrastination can include individuals who work in unpredictable, demanding, and fast- changing environments (Chu & Choi, 2005). As such, procrastination can be an effective coping mechanism to engage in reprioritizing each of their tasks in order to meet frequently changing demands. However, the positive form of procrastination is more rare, and the particular focus of this paper will be on the negative nature of procrastination.

In the context of understanding and coaching clients to live a more positive and fulfilling life, it is not only essential to know what makes life worth living. It is important to also stress how individuals can navigate through changes in order to accomplish their goals.

As coaching has a goal-oriented focus, it is relevant to point out possible obstacles (thus, self- regulation failure) that may conflict with the client’s initial goals and lead to self-regulation failure. By obtaining a deeper understanding of why these barriers might occur, this knowledge might bring valuable information on how to reach the goals and avoid failure.

This thesis aims to obtain a deeper understanding of the mechanisms of procrastination, specifically investigating self-regulation failure and its relationship with executive functions and the neural underpinnings of self-regulation. In order to do so, the attempt is to present a literature review of the cognitive nature of procrastination, and to describe the neural mechanisms behind the phenomenon.

The main text of the thesis is divided into three main sections. First, the paper will embrace a description and examination of the conceptual nature of self-regulation and forging its links to executive functions. Next, the following section will address the causes and correlations of self-regulation failure, i.e., procrastination. Finally, with respect to the PROCRASTINATION AS A FORM OF SELF-REGULATION FAILURE 7 conceptual components being laid-out, the third section will advance to investigate the associated neural underpinnings. This section elaborates which cortical regions are suggested to be involved in executive functions and cognitive control (hence, self-regulation), referred to as a ‘top-down’ control, and also which structures seem to be involved in emotional and reward processing, referred to as 'bottom-up' control. In short, the structures engaged will be identified as well as evaluated for their proposed contribution. In order to close this thesis, these somehow comprehensive results need to be integrated. The intention of the following discussion will, therefore, be to sum up this thesis’ insights.

To conduct this theoretical review in cognitive neuroscience, databases such as Web of

Science and PsychINFO have been used, with keywords such as: “procrastination”, “self- regulation failure”, “inhibitory control”, “working memory”, “prefrontal cortex and executive functions”. In order to navigate a rather ambiguous field, the first filter assessed the articles' relevance as measured by high citation and impact factor, to remark the most established findings regarding procrastination as a form of self-regulation failure. From this standpoint, the second filter took into account more current research that may not pass such a criterion, but would still contribute with new valuable insights. Within the limited scope of this thesis, and given the rather ambiguous context, the most well-established and replicated findings were, to some extent, given more weight. Still, this sort of exclusion does not come without certain limitations (that may have omitted new contributing insights) and therefore, some of these findings will be elaborated in the discussion.

Indeed, both self-regulation (failure) and executive functions, and the neural structures and networks engaged, can be argued to be composed of several different components, and as such, each of the topics is a broad area of research in itself. This literature review could arguably not cover all potential literature. Yet, it aims to present and introduce a delimited resource of research, devoted to specifically understand the nature of self-regulation PROCRASTINATION AS A FORM OF SELF-REGULATION FAILURE 8 failure (for further comprehensive reviews, see e.g. Diamond, 2013; Dixon, Todd,

Thiruchselvam & Christoff, 2017; Koob & Volkow, 2010; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Steel,

2007). Subsequently, this thesis is suggested to be reviewed as a delimited presentation of a wider, and more complex field.

Self-regulation and Executive Functions

Self-regulation

Self-regulation refers to the conscious and non-conscious processes that enable individuals to guide their thoughts, feelings, and behaviors purposefully (Kelley et al., 2019).

This capacity enables people to follow personal aims, maintain a healthy lifestyle, to strive, and achieve ambitious goals throughout their lifespan. Self-regulation, as such, enables people to beneficially control impulses, make plans and choose among alternatives, as well as inhibit unwanted behavior, and regulate otherwise harmful thoughts (Heatherton & Wagner,

2011; Tagney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). In summary, the term self-regulation can widely define a goal-directed behavior, typically within at least a short temporal perspective. In contrast, the term self-control is generally used to describe a narrower subset of self- regulatory processes. Hence, self-control refers to specific aims such as to override unwanted, prepotent impulses or urges, like the urge to indulge in a high-calorie dessert when on a diet

(Hofmann, Schmeichel, & Baddeley, 2012).

Even as the details may vary to some degree, most models of self-regulation can be said to deal with three essential components (Wagner & Heatherton, 2014). The first one involves an intended state that is desired. This intention can be a goal, such as a goal to lose weight and avoid binge eating, but this may also include a set of standards, such as rules of conduct (i.e., whenever invited for dinner, avoid desserts). The second component refers to an awareness of one’s actions, generally defined as monitoring. As outlined in cybernetic models PROCRASTINATION AS A FORM OF SELF-REGULATION FAILURE 9 of self-regulation (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1982), monitoring occurs whenever current behavior is compared to desired intentions and signals discrepancy. Monitoring is a crucial component of self-regulation, as failure to evaluate current actions inevitably entails an inability to observe (and thus control) undesirable behavior. Finally, the last component is regulation itself. More than identifying certain emotions or thoughts that stand in conflict with intended goals, one must be able to inhibit or negotiate the undesired impulse.

Baumeister and Heatherton (1996) argue that the ways in which this component works are similar to a muscle. It is a topic of improvement through training, but also a subject to breakdowns through fatigue. Taken together, what the model implies is that goals, monitoring, and one’s capacity to regulate, interact with one another. Subsequently, the strength of impulses and temptations is what ultimately determines self-regulation (or failure of self-regulation).

Executive Functions

For an extended period, literature from cognitive psychology regarding executive functions (EFs), and literature on self-regulation primarily derived from social and personality psychology, have broadly lived two separate lives. However, recent years have seen a significant effort in forging the links between the two areas, and integration into a fruitful collaboration (Hofmann et al., 2012). Executive functions are an umbrella term of mental top-down processes needed whenever you have to concentrate and pay attention

(Diamond, 2013). The list of all the extensive functions and subcomponents is beyond the scope of this review, although such research exists (e.g., Baddeley, 2012; Jurado, & Rosselli,

2007). Therefore, I will limit the discussion to three core components, arguably agreed to be the foundations of executive functions (Hofmann et al., 2012). These are referred to as inhibition, updating (closely connected with working memory), and shifting (also called PROCRASTINATION AS A FORM OF SELF-REGULATION FAILURE 10 cognitive flexibility). The following section will give a short description of each component

(for a more detailed review; see Diamond, 2013).

Inhibition refers to the ability to control one’s behavior, attention, thoughts, and/or emotions, to override an internally strong predisposition or external temptation, in the favor of what is convenient or required (Diamond, 2013). Without inhibition, we would be at the mercy of temptations and impulses, automatically responding with old habits of thoughts and actions (e.g. conditioned responses) regardless of the outcome. For this matter, inhibition makes it possible for people to change; to choose how to react and behave with intention.

Updating, closely connected with the construct of working memory (WM), refers to the ability to actively keep information in mind and mentally work with it (Hofmann et al., 2012). In this sense, WM provides a function to shield information from distraction.

WM is also critical for making sense of anything that unfolds over time. Thus, it enables us to access conceptual knowledge, and to consider both remembered past and future hopes in making plans and decisions (Diamond, 2013).

Shifting, also known as cognitive flexibility (or task-switching), enables humans to shift back and forth between several tasks or mental sets. It provides the ability to change perspectives spatially (e.g., “What could this look like if I viewed it from another angle?”) and interpersonally (e.g., “I will try to imagine what this looks like from your standpoint”). In order to shift perspectives, we need to inhibit our automatic reflection and activate our WM to change our point of view. In this sense, shifting both requires and builds upon inhibition and updating (Diamond, 2013; Hofmann et al., 2012).

From a neuroscientific viewpoint, evidence suggest that executive functions are associated with structure and activity of the prefrontal cortex (PFC), mainly prefrontal-, dorsal anterior cingulate-, and parietal cortices (Niendam et al., 2012, Stuss, 2011; Yuan & Raz,

2014). For instance, larger PFC volume and greater PFC thickness are found to be associated PROCRASTINATION AS A FORM OF SELF-REGULATION FAILURE 11 with better executive performance (Yuan & Raz, 2014). A more detailed investigation of the neural mechanisms correlated with executive functions will be elaborated in the third section of this thesis.

The Relationship Between Self-regulation and Executive Functions

With the previous establishment of the concepts around self-regulation and executive function, the following section will address what research suggests to be the intricate links between the two concepts. The three core components of executive functions

(updating, inhibiting, shifting) are suggested to support important mechanisms of self- regulation in relation to an individual desired goal (Hofmann et al., 2012). Subsequently, these relationships will be described below.

Self-regulation and working memory. For instance, self-regulatory goals, derived from long-term memory, may directly benefit from WM operations (updating).

Without an active representation of such goal-directed records, self-regulation loses its direction and stands vulnerable to failure (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996). Thus, updating enables individuals to direct attention toward their goals by keeping goal-related information available, as well as redirect or suppress other stimuli that are not in line with desired outcomes (Dohle et al., 2018). Hence, when faced with a tempting situation, the long-term goal can operate as a “shield”, and help downregulate the tempting desire (Hofmann,

Gschwendner, Friese, Wiers, & Schmitt, 2008).

Moreover, updating is a crucial element of attention. In a way, attention could arguably be the centerpiece in self-regulation. Attention, as a rather limited resource, can serve both stimulus-driven influences as well as goal-directed processes (Knudsen, 2007).

According to the researchers Kavanagh, Andrade, and May (2005), their elaborated intrusion PROCRASTINATION AS A FORM OF SELF-REGULATION FAILURE 12 theory of desire suggests that tempting stimuli may automatically attract attention due to their motivational salience. The case in which an individual fails to resist tempting stimuli builds upon a failure to redirect attention away from the stimuli. Consequently, the desire-related thoughts and emotions of the temptation may receive additional space in WM, leading to stronger influence (Kavanagh et al., 2005; May, Kavanagh, & Andrade, 2015).

There are several other ways in which self-regulation may directly correspond to

WM operations. For instance, studies within cognitive research suggest that WM supports proactive self-regulation by offering attention, and thereby the ability to resist, in an early stage of processing (Friese, Bargas-Avila, Hofmann, & Wiers, 2010; Hofmann et al., 2008)

Further, by directing and redirecting attention into specific goals, this operation shields from otherwise competing impulses, providing a form of ‘indirect’ inhibitory control (Hofmann et al., 2012). It is predicted that when WM resources are plentiful, individuals should cooperate more effectively with goal-related behaviors (Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004; Hofmann,

Friese, & Strack, 2009). By contrast, the opposite is also true when WM capacity is low or limited. With a lacking goal-shield, individuals may correspond more strongly to automatic or impulse-driven stimuli, which leads to a less goal-oriented course of action (Hofmann, Friese,

& Strack, 2009). Research conducted by Hofmann et al. (2008) investigated how WM may individually differ in capacity (referred to as working memory capacity; WMC), and how the individual differences may lead to distinct behavioral outcomes. By definition, contrary to what the name implies, WMC is not quite about memory capacity in terms of storage volume per se, but rather about

“…the ability to control attention to maintain information in an active, quickly

retrievable state. Thus, WM capacity is just as important in the retention of a

single representation, such as the representation of a goal […], as it is in PROCRASTINATION AS A FORM OF SELF-REGULATION FAILURE 13

determining how many representations can be maintained. WM capacity is not

directly about memory – it is about using attention to maintain or suppress

information”. (Engle, 2002, p. 20)

Research shows that individuals differ in this ability (Barrett et al., 2004) and these differences can reliably be measured through a complex span of tasks (for a review, see

Conway et al., 2005). Returning back to the study conducted by Hofmann et al. (2008), their research displayed that when given the opportunity to consume tempting sweets, individuals with high WMC acted more strongly in correspondence with the goal to forego the sweets.

On the other hand, individuals with low WMC acted more strongly in line with their automatic affective desires toward the sweets. It is proposed that WM provides a ‘workspace’ for mental processes of emotion-regulation, such as suppression of negative information and cognitive reappraisal (LeMoult & Gotlib, 2019; Schmeichel & Demaree, 2010). By definition, cognitive reappraisal involves changing the way one thinks about a stimulus in order to change its affective impact (Buhle et al., 2014).

Self-regulation and inhibition. Active inhibition and the ability to override tempting or impulsive stimuli in favor of desirable goals can arguably be a character of successful self-regulation. Unless inhibited, habits and impulses may activate motor schemas that lead to behavioral responses (Hofmann et al., 2012). For instance, studies investigating alcohol and food consumption found that inhibition deficits, as well as low inhibitory control, may predict the onset of heavy drinking and weight gain (Dohle et al., 2018; Lindgren et al.,

2019). Impulsivity is commonly regarded as a consequence of impaired executive functioning

(Bari & Robbins, 2013). Defining individual’s impulsive predisposition by implementing implicit reaction time measures (Nosek, Beth Hawkins, & Frazier, 2011), research PROCRASTINATION AS A FORM OF SELF-REGULATION FAILURE 14 demonstrates that people low in behavioral inhibition are more strongly influenced by these impulsive precursors (Houben & Wiers, 2009). On the other hand, training inhibitory control might correlate with improved health behaviors (Allom, Mullan, & Hagger, 2016), at least in the short term. Essentially, inhibition appears to be more effective in the rather straight forward behaviors that are required to stop a response, such as limiting the intake of high- calorie foods, opposed to carrying out actions that are required to initiate a response, such as increasing vegetable consumption (Allom & Mullan, 2014).

Self-regulation and shifting. Unlike WM operations and inhibition, tremendously little work has addressed possible links between task-switching and self- regulation. This section aims to present the narrow research that does exist and propose possible links that may stimulate future directions (Dohle et al., 2018; Hofmann et al., 2012).

An inevitable part of self-regulation includes trade-offs between the rigid pursuit of a focal goal (rigidness) and the ability to switch goal sets and being open (flexible) to alternative options for action (Dohle et al., 2018). Hofmann et al. (2012) propose two different ways (means-shifting and goal-shifting) in which self-regulation might be related to shifting. One possible link is that task-switching ability may contribute to goal pursuit by allowing individuals to forsake less-optimal means (e.g., costly or obstructed set-ups) and pursue alternative means to reach the same goal, referred to as means-shifting. For instance, a dieter may find that cutting 1000 calories a day is unreasonable and thereby switch the reduction to 500 calories instead, and at the same time exercise more (Dohle et al., 2018).

On the other hand, goal-shifting may allow individuals to temporarily disengage from self-regulatory goals and pursue tempting alternatives. Although a bit contradictory, such temporary disengagements might be part of a larger ‘master plan’ which individuals may use to optimally handle the many different long- and short-term motivations and goals in life PROCRASTINATION AS A FORM OF SELF-REGULATION FAILURE 15

(Dohle et al., 2018; Hofmann et al., 2012). Indeed, as I will review later on, the disengagement from a self-regulatory goal can rapidly lead to a regretful overindulgence (e.g.,

Schacht, Anton, & Myrick, 2013), and whether or not task-switching is ultimately beneficial in a self-regulatory context appears to depend on the interplay of neural mechanisms that either work to up- or down-regulate stimuli (Hofmann et al., 2012).

Procrastination as Self-regulation Failure

As previously defined, the act of procrastination is “...to voluntarily delay an intended course of action despite expecting to be worse off for the delay” (Steel, 2007, p. 66).

There somehow seems to be a gap between what one ought to do and what one does. Why do people willingly postpone planned tasks at the cost of forsaking long-term goals?

Research has progressively identified several features of self-regulation failure

(Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Steel, 2007; Zhang, Liu, & Feng, 2019). Specifically, self- efficacy, task aversiveness and time delay, as well as future incentives, have been confirmed as salient task characteristics that affect procrastination (Steel, 2007; Zhang et al., 2019).

Moreover, individual differences concerning impulsivity and self-control have been identified as two prominent traits of procrastination (Hofmann et al., 2009; Steel, 2007).

Followingly, this part will proceed into describing these findings in a short but specific manner. Here, I present the most consistent findings on the characteristics suggested to serve as an underlying mechanism of procrastination. Thus, this section will first describe the task characteristics correlated to procrastination, as mentioned above. Further, the second part will explain individual differences, followed by the third component that serves to explain procrastination from an emotion-regulation perspective. Finally, the last section will explain procrastination as described by temporal motivation theory (TMT) (Steel, 2007).

PROCRASTINATION AS A FORM OF SELF-REGULATION FAILURE 16

Task Characteristic

Procrastination involves the voluntary choice of one action or task, in favor of other options. Accordingly, one cannot delay all of one’s tasks but simply choose some options over others. Research indicates strong and consistent factors that predict procrastination; task aversiveness and timing of rewards/punishments, as well as self-efficacy

(Bandura, 1997; Sirois & Pychyl, 2013; Steel, 2007).

Task-aversiveness. Task aversiveness refers to actions that one perceives as discomforting or unpleasant. It can result from several specific task characteristics such as frustration, boredom, lower autonomy, and resentfulness (Zhang et al., 2019). The reasons why people find specific tasks unpleasant may vary to some degree, yet research reveals a strong and positive correlation between trait procrastination and the unpleasantness of tasks

(for meta-analysis, see Steel, 2007). Thus, if people find a task unpleasant, research indicates that one is more likely to put it off. To this extent, one notion is worth mentioning. There needs to be a specific timing connected to the task in order to perceive it as a delay, and not merely task-avoidance. This notion gives rise to the next topic.

Timing of the task and (future) rewards/punishments. In order to procrastinate, one is failing to act upon one's intentions promptly. Subsequently, this gives the phenomenon an association with two kinds of intentions: an unwillingness to act in the present moment, and a willingness to act in the more distant future. In 1957, Ferster and

Skinner's reinforcement theory proposed that by delivering (either) positive or negative outcomes, one could strengthen people's actions. From this standpoint, several research attempts have continued in the same footsteps, proposing that future outcomes (both positive and negative) contribute to motivate people to engage in a task (Steel & König, 2006; Strunk, PROCRASTINATION AS A FORM OF SELF-REGULATION FAILURE 17

Cho, Steele & Bridges, 2013). Moreover, not only do future outcomes play a role in whether or not one decides to engage in a task but also the specific time frame serves as an essential component.

For an extended period of time, research has indicated that the further away an event temporally is, the less impact it has upon people’s decisions, a phenomenon referred to as temporal discounting (Ainslie, 1975; Steel & König, 2006). Further, research indicates that people prefer instant payoffs in favor of future rewards. Only, the closer temporally an event becomes, the greater its influence will be (Steel, 2007). For instance, students’ intention to study increased in an exaggerated way as the day of the deadline approached (Dewitte &

Schouwenburg, 2002; Schouwenburg & Groenewoud, 2001). At the individual level, procrastinators show higher sensitivity to time delay, thus the value of rewards and punishments are more quickly discounted in comparison to non-procrastinators (Wu et al.,

2016). Referring to the latter, this study displayed that procrastinators decided to discount the delayed monetary reward more quickly compared to non-procrastinators (Wu et al., 2016). In a similar manner, studies reveal that procrastinators display less consideration of the potential future outcomes of their behaviors (Sirois, 2004), they have difficulty delaying gratification

(Ferrari & Emmons, 1995) and they think less about the future (Sirois, 2014b; Specter &

Ferrari, 2000).

Self-efficacy. Another aspect that shows a strong correlation to procrastination concerns one's underlying beliefs of having the ability to perform the task, a concept referred to as self-efficacy (Bandura, 1997; Steel, 2007). Concerning goal attainment, self-efficacy plays a crucial role depending on whether one perceives having the ability to produce desired effects. Without this belief, one lacks encouragement to act or persevere in the face of difficulties (Bandura & Locke, 2003). Inevitably, people's core beliefs affect whether PROCRASTINATION AS A FORM OF SELF-REGULATION FAILURE 18 individuals think in a self-enhancing or self-debilitating way. Moreover, these core beliefs affect how well people motivate themselves and persevere regardless of difficulties, their sensitivity to stress and depression, as well as the choices they make at crucial decisional points. Thus, an irrational perception of one's lacking abilities to perform by specific standards may also contribute to a poor perception of one's inadequacy as a person (i.e., low self-esteem). Arguably, both self-efficacy and self-esteem have direct links to procrastination

(Steel, 2007).

Individual Differences

If task characteristics were the only aspects that played a crucial role in procrastination, people would arguably procrastinate to the same extent. Seemingly, that is not the case, hence there appear to be individual differences that also influence the tendency to procrastinate. Accordingly, research has made efforts to identify differences that are useful to explain procrastination (Schouwenburg & Lay, 1995; Van Eerde, 2003). Among these efforts, there is a general trend to locate trait procrastination to the structure of the Big-five- factor of personality (Costa & McCrae, 1992; Digman, 1990). The five factors consist of

Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism.

Each factor is in its turn built upon several underlying facets. Johnson and Bloom (1995) were among the first to investigate if there were any relationship between the five-factor model of personality and procrastination (interpreted through scores on the Adult Inventory of

Procrastination [AIP]). The study found that only neuroticism and conscientiousness from the five-factor model were significantly related to procrastination (Johnson & Bloom, 1995).

Subsequently, research has proceeded to replicate associations between procrastination and personality. Specifically, research has indicated that high self-control is the strongest negative predictor of procrastination among the facets of conscientiousness, whereas impulsivity PROCRASTINATION AS A FORM OF SELF-REGULATION FAILURE 19 positively correlates strongest with procrastination among the facets of neuroticism

(Schouwenburg & Lay, 1995; Van Eerde, 2003; Watson, 2001). Followingly, results from

Big-five-factor inventories derived from meta-analyses confirm that neuroticism and conscientiousness’s connection to procrastination appears to be primarily due to impulsivity and self-control, respectively (Steel, 2007; Van Eerde, 2003). Indeed, the core characteristic of self-regulation could arguably be described as impulse control (Heatherton & Wagner,

2011).

In 2009, Hofmann et al. proposed a dual-system perspective between impulse and self-control that may provide possible mechanisms for their separate roles impacting procrastination. Researchers (Zhang et al., 2019) have argued that two structurally different but interactive systems are responsible for impulsive versus self-controlled behavior, giving a possible way to divide each trait concerning its effects on procrastination. What these different concepts have in common is a general trend to posit that impulsivity is generated in a subcortical-dependent system, signaling the immediate pleasure or pain of current prospects.

Specifically, associated areas appear to be the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), amygdala, and nucleus accumbens (NAcc)/ventral striatum that play crucial roles in the processing of emotion and reward (Koob & Volkow, 2010; Volkow & Morales, 2015). However, self- control is exerted through prefrontal-dependent systems, signaling future prospects (Bechara,

2005; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Hofmann et al., 2009). Thus, people find themselves torn between their immediate impulses of hedonic fulfillment and long-term goals accompanied by restrictions.

A study conducted by Jimura, Chushak, and Braver (2013) found that individuals who made decisions of a more impulsive character displayed increased activation in the subcortical regions, specifically ventral striatum (including NAcc), during choice and anticipating rewards. Furthermore, individuals who made more patient decisions showed PROCRASTINATION AS A FORM OF SELF-REGULATION FAILURE 20 increased activation in anterior prefrontal cortex during both choice and waiting. Moreover, neuroimaging results indicate that impulsivity and procrastination are mutually associated with decreased gray matter volume of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) (Liu & Feng,

2017). Consistent with earlier findings, the prefrontal cortex, and mainly dlPFC, typically reflects the capacity of cognitive control to exert top-down signals to maximize long-term goals (Figner et al., 2010; Hare, Camerer, & Rangel, 2009; Miller, 2000). For instance, a study found that when dieters control themselves to make long-sighted decisions of rejecting to taste good-but-unhealthy food, there will be greater activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and dlPFC (Hare et al., 2009). On the contrary, when individuals display lower control ability to suppress food taste or appetite, they will be more likely to become obese and have smaller gray matter volumes in dlPFC (Brooks et al., 2013; Pannacciulli et al.,

2006). Regarding the neural structures’ involvement, these “systems” will be further elaborated in the third section referred to as neural mechanisms of self-regulation.

Emotion Regulation

Most forms of self-control involve to override one’s impulses or forcing the self to do something contrary to hedonistic tendencies. Indeed, it takes self-control to curb one’s temper, giving up drinking or other addictions, work on or persist despite a difficult task, to diet, save money, and so forth (Tice & Bratslavsky, 2000). In order to overcome procrastination of a task, one is required to overcome negative emotions related to the task, and resist temptations for the greater good. Thus, many researchers explain procrastination as a coping response for emotion-regulation (Sirois, 2014a; Sirois & Pychyl, 2013; Tice &

Bratslavsky, 2000; Wagner & Heatherton, 2014).

Research demonstrate that negative emotions might cause people to spend too much money, act aggressively, comfort themselves with alcohol, drugs, or food and fail to PROCRASTINATION AS A FORM OF SELF-REGULATION FAILURE 21 pursue meaningful life goals (Heatherton & Wagner, 2011). Particularly, negative emotional states are associated to relapse for several addictive behaviors such as overeating, drug, and alcohol addiction, to name a few (Koob & Volkow, 2016; Sinha & Jastreboff, 2013).

The impact negative emotions have on goal-directed behavior has drawn researchers’ attention for an extended period of time (Pychyl & Flett, 2012; Sinha, 2009; Tice

& Baumeister, 2000). As research suggests, the task-characteristic level defines that procrastination is more likely to happen when tasks are found aversive (task aversiveness)

(Ferrari & Scher, 2000; Pychyl, Lee, Thibodeau & Blunt, 2000). Thus, the more people dislike a task, the more they consider it effortful or anxiety-producing, the more they procrastinate. Supporting these suggestions, research has found consistent evidence suggesting that (particularly negative) emotions serve as a sensitive trigger for self-regulation failure (e.g., Heatherton & Wagner, 2011; LeMoult & Gotlib, 2019; Sinha, 2008).

For instance, Heatherton and Baumeister (1991) proposed a theory that dieters seem to hold a negative view of the self that is generally unpleasant (particularly regarding physical appearance). Of this matter, dieters may escape from these unpleasant feelings by restricting their cognitive attention due to the present moment, generating an ignorance of long-term implications and higher-order significance of their current actions. Consequently, escaping a discomforting self-awareness not only helps dieters to forget their unpleasant views of themselves, but also disengages their ability to make long-term decisions.

Followingly, when negative affect occupies attention, behavioral accounts suggest that this generates a weakened ability to inhibit behavior (Ward & Mann, 2000). Thus, engaging in appetitive behavior to reduce anxiety or comfort the self is therefore viewed as a form of coping response (Sinha, 2008; Sirois, 2014a).

Subsequently, procrastination may be mitigated if these negative emotions can be downregulated. Self-regulation might accomplish this by reappraising a negative task or PROCRASTINATION AS A FORM OF SELF-REGULATION FAILURE 22 suppressing negative emotions (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010). For instance, studies indicate that individuals who were instructed to consciously reduce negative emotion by suppressing or reappraising negative stimuli displayed activation in PFC, including dlPFC, and attenuation in emotional brain regions, such as the insula and amygdala (Ochsner et al.,

2004; Phan et al., 2005). In comparison to the regulatory strategy of suppressing emotions and behaviors accordingly, reappraisal appears to provide one of the most flexible and effective means of diminishing the negative impact of an unpleasant event (Gross, 2002; Gross, 2015;

Ochsner et al., 2004).

Temporal Motivation Theory

TMT presents a synthesis of traditional, well-established motivational formulations and includes time as a fundamental component (Steel, 2007). TMT describes how to determine task utility (motivation to do a task) based upon some fundamental task characteristics. According to TMT, utility increases when people have confidence in acquiring (i.e., expectancy) a desired outcome or reward (i.e., value). By definition, people pursue whatever behavior has the highest utility. Consistently, activities that are high in expectancy (E), and value (V), should be more desirable. Followingly, time is the ultimate denominator of the equation. Enjoyable activities that are within immediate realization (D), with a short delay, should be more highly valued. By contrast, motivation declines when there is a large amount of time before the reward is reached (i.e., delay), and when people are sensitive to delays (G) (Steel, 2007). The theory is mathematically formulated with the equation: Utility = E x V/ G x D

Temporal motivation theory explains procrastination in a way that compares utility among tasks at particular time points. Steel (2007) demonstrates TMT by hypothesizing a student who could procrastinate essay writing but engage in socializing. In PROCRASTINATION AS A FORM OF SELF-REGULATION FAILURE 23 his example, the student likes to socialize, but even more, he likes to get good grades. Despite this fact, the positive reward of socializing is within the immediate context, while the reward of writing is initially temporally distant. As a result, the engagement in essay writing becomes more likely only when the deadline is close.

Neural Mechanisms of Self-regulation

While research has made progress in identifying the factors that contribute to self-regulation failure, there is an increasing interest to identify how these aspects operate on a neural level (Heatherton & Wagner, 2011). Among these efforts, most studies have investigated how different forms of impulsive/appetitive behaviors function on a neural level.

Moreover, there exists a vast amount of research on executive functions and their neural associations as well as lesion studies that explain how certain behaviors of cognitive control become affected as a result of brain damage. Overall, the current research that exists is a combination of several different aspects that all show important associations with self- regulation failure. However, there are very few studies that have investigated the direct neural links on procrastination.

Top-down Control

Several different cortical regions have been implicated in self-regulation

(Heatherton, 2011; Heatherton & Wagner, 2011). PFC seems to support executive functions that are involved in several cognitive processes associated with self-regulation (Miller &

Cohen, 2001), often referred to as top-down control. Over the course of the centuries, research has progressively found evidence that damage to the PFC is followed by dramatic personality changes (Heatherton, 2011). Among these findings, most changes demonstrate disinhibited PROCRASTINATION AS A FORM OF SELF-REGULATION FAILURE 24 and often inappropriate behavior, sometimes also a lack of motivation, without any other observable cognitive impairment (Barrash, Tranel, & Anderson, 2000; Crews & Boettiger,

2009; Heatherton, 2011).

In particular, the three essential areas of PFC with importance to self-regulatory functioning are ventromedial PFC (vmPFC) (often also referred to as the orbitofrontal cortex

(OFC)), lateral PFC (lPFC), and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (Heatherton, 2011).

Regarding vmPFC, a significant amount of research demonstrates that patients seem unable to regulate certain behaviors such as socially, affective, or appetitive ones (Barrash et al., 2000;

Motzkin, Philippi, Wolf, Baskaya, & Koenigs, 2015). Essentially, these patients might become antisocial, aggressive, or make jokes inappropriately; engage in excessive overeating, or display hypersexuality. In a social context, deficits in this region of the brain often lead to a lacking ability to incorporate feedback in order to make appropriate behavioral choices. As a result, such behaviors often lead to social disinhibition and inappropriate approaching behaviors toward other people (Barrash et al., 2000; Heatherton, 2011). For instance, a study investigating personality disturbances among participants with bilateral ventromedial prefrontal lesion (PF-BVM), compared to participants also with prefrontal lesions but not bilateral ventromedial involvement (PF-NBVM) and non-prefrontal lesions (NPF), found that bilateral lesions in the ventromedial cortex were significantly associated with a number of personality disturbances. Specifically, these associations involved lack of persistence, lack of planning, inappropriate affect, poor frustration tolerance, lability and irritability, and social inappropriateness (Barrash et al., 2000).

In a more recent fMRI study, results indicated that vmPFC seems to play a crucial role in regulating amygdala activity (Motzkin et al., 2015). Specifically, the findings displayed that vmPFC lesions were associated with right amygdala reactivity to aversive stimuli along with increased resting state connectivity with the anterior temporal cortex. As PROCRASTINATION AS A FORM OF SELF-REGULATION FAILURE 25 the researchers concluded, these findings are of relevance to the neural circuitry models of emotion regulation and affective psychopathology (Motzkin et al., 2015). Moreover, they came to the conclusion that the role of vmPFC is not simply a topic of affective processing by regulation of negative stimuli through inhibition of the amygdala. Instead, vmPFC seems to serve as a multifaceted component that may include processes related to self-awareness and self-reflection (Koenigs & Grafman, 2009; Quin & Northoff, 2011), together with modulation of affect-related physiological responses and negative emotions. In sum, what appears to be common among several cases with damage to vmPFC includes a general dysregulation of social behavior together with a lacking ability to control primary physiological drives and emotions.

Another frontal region with significance to self-regulation involves the lateral regions of PFC (including both ventrolateral PFC (vlPFC) and dorsolateral PFC (dlPFC). By contrast to deficits affecting vmPFC function, patients with lateral PFC damage can manage behaviors such as following social norms, inhibiting inappropriate behaviors, and perceiving emotional cues. Instead, what appears to be the issue is considered around planning, attentional shifting, and initiating behaviors (Heatherton, 2011; Manes et al., 2002). In particular, complex behaviors requiring the maintenance of multiple goals simultaneously is affected. For instance, patients with lateral PFC lesions demonstrate difficulty when asked to perform tasks such as completing a shopping list (Shallice & Burgess, 1991).

In sum, several fMRI studies reveals that the prefrontal cortex, and especially the lateral PFC, appears to converge as a major neural substrate of executive performance

(Stuss, 2011; Yuan & Raz, 2014), whereas working memory is one of its crucial functions.

Last, the third region that is crucial for executive functions (and self-regulation) is the frontal region known as the anterior cingulate cortex, ACC. Rather than studies derived from neuropsychology, most of the knowledge around ACC function comes from neuroimaging PROCRASTINATION AS A FORM OF SELF-REGULATION FAILURE 26 and electrophysiological studies, suggesting that ACC is crucial to signal the need for cognitive control and associated with conflict monitoring (Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004;

Heatherton 2011). It is assumed that in response to conflict, ACC activation functions like an internal “alarm bell”. The ACC is proposed to trigger a further adjustment in cognitive control processes occurring in various regions of the PFC (Kerns et al., 2004; Kotabe & Hofmann,

2015).

When confronted with tasks that require one to override automatic responses, it often involves a sense of competition between the selected response and the one being overridden. The engagement of ACC under such circumstances is one of the most firmly established findings in cognitive neuroscience (Botvinick et al., 2004). Most frequent observations involve the Stroop task, in which relative ACC activation has been indicated in association with incongruent trials (MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger & Carter, 2000; Kerns et al.,

2004). In detail, when subjects are asked to perform the Stroop task, there is a greater conflict for incongruent trials (e.g., naming the color of a word printed in blue ink when the word is

“GREEN”) than for congruent trials (the word “GREEN” printed in green ink). When confronted with conflict- and error-related activity, overlapping regions within the ACC display activity (Kerns et al., 2004). Moreover, when the conflicting trial is occurring, subsequent engagement of control results in behavioral adjustment. By definitional terms, a behavioral adjustment in this context includes being faster on incongruent trials preceded by incongruent trials than on incongruent trials preceded by congruent trials. As a result of high conflict on incongruent trials, this subsequently leads to the recruitment of greater cognitive control on the following trial. Concerning the latter, subjects who performed the Stroop task and exhibited the greatest adjustment in behavior followed by conflicting trials also demonstrated increased activity in the dlPFC. This evidence proposed that the behavioral adjustment was mediated by PFC execution of control (Kerns et al., 2004). PROCRASTINATION AS A FORM OF SELF-REGULATION FAILURE 27

In summary, there is strong evidence that demonstrates how PFC is involved in various forms of executive function and self-regulation. Specifically, cortical regions such as vmPFC (including orbitofrontal cortex), lateral PFC, and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) all demonstrate several associations with self-regulation. Before making further analyses on how these ‘systems’ interact (resulting in either self-regulation or failure), we will first take a closer look at the neural structures engaged in reward, salience, and emotion as a way of unpacking the opposite foundation of bottom-up operations.

Bottom-up Control

While top-down control refers to a subset of prefrontal regions involved in cognitive control, the opposite system referred to as bottom-up control revolves around more impulsive, emotional, and automatic behaviors mainly associated with subcortical regions

(Bari & Robbins, 2013; Etkin, Büchel, & Gross 2015). Concerning emotional processing, multiple brain regions interact with each other. Emotion generation is associated with subcortical activity in the amygdala, the ventral striatum, along with the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and the insula (Buhle et al., 2014; Etkin et al., 2015; Ochsner, Silvers, &

Buhle, 2012). Moreover, as earlier noted in this paper, one of the core elements of self- regulation is impulse control. But how do impulses arise?

Research indicates that stimuli associated with primary rewards may strengthen motivational influence by triggering “wanting” of the reward which ultimately activates the reward system (Berridge, 2004). Neural models of addiction have proposed that addiction- related cues may trigger addictive-seeking behaviors by increased activity in a complex brain system of reward areas, such as the ventral tegmental area (VTA), amygdala, nucleus accumbens (NAcc)/ventral striatum, orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), and ventral pallidum (Jentsch

& Taylor, 1999; Kalvias & Volkow, 2005; Koob & Volkow, 2010; Robinson & Berridge, PROCRASTINATION AS A FORM OF SELF-REGULATION FAILURE 28

2003). Moreover, addiction-related cue-activity has shown to increase the likelihood that the cued substance will be consumed (Heatherton & Wagner, 2011; Schacht et al., 2013). A general component of rewards (including drug abuse) is that they activate dopamine (DA) receptors in the mesolimbic dopamine system, particularly the NAcc (Haber & Knutson,

2010; Volkow & Morales, 2015). Hence, NAcc plays a crucial role in the processing of reward-related stimuli. Further, DA is involved in the fine-tuning of motor and cognitive function, regulation of reward and motivation, and modulation of salience attribution and attention (Baler & Volkow, 2006).

For instance, a meta-analysis regarding individuals with alcohol use disorders

(AUD) and heavy drinkers found that alcohol-related cues elicited activation of the ventral striatum. Assessments of AUD severity, drinking quantity and frequency, craving, and loss of control have most frequently been correlated with cue-elicited ventral striatum activation

(Schacht et al., 2013). Another study investigated how obese women compared to control subjects with a healthy-weight responded to food items with either high or low calories. The study indicated that obese women demonstrate greater activity in several regions hypothesized to mediate motivational effects such as the amygdala, NAcc, OFC, and ventral pallidum in response to high-calorie food items compared to the control subjects with a healthy-weight (Stoeckel et al., 2008).

With respect to the previous sections concerning how self-regulation failure can be explained as a form of emotion-regulation or regulation of appetitive behaviors, the next section aims to explain the neural basis of these behaviors.

Self-regulation Failure and its Neural Underpinnings

While procrastination as a phenomenon has received some attention from researchers, the underlying neural substrates of it are less established. Yet, as noted earlier in PROCRASTINATION AS A FORM OF SELF-REGULATION FAILURE 29 this paper, procrastination seems to rely upon several characteristics, such as an instant need to feel better in the present moment (e.g. rather than facing an aversive task), or giving in to temptations (rather than staying consistent with a long-term goal). Moreover, negative moods serve as an important trigger in self-regulation failure. As such, whether one is able to regulate one’s emotions and impulses appears to be crucial in procrastination, as well as having the ability to inhibit ‘hedonic fulfillment’ for the cost of future benefits.

Functional neuroimaging studies of self-regulation imply that self-regulation builds upon a balance between brain regions representing the emotion, salience and rewarding value of an impulse and prefrontal regions associated with executive functions and self- control (Heatherton & Wagner, 2011; Petersen & Posner, 2012). When this scale tips in favor of bottom-up impulses, owing to a failure to engage prefrontal areas or because of immediate strong impulses (e.g. the smell and sight of a freshly baked croissant for a dieter), then the likelihood of self-regulation failure increases (Heatherton & Wagner, 2011). From this standpoint, the following sections will present the neural underpinnings that serve to regulate such actions.

Regulation of emotions. From a neuroimaging perspective, one of the best- studied forms of emotion regulation is reappraisal (Gross, 2015). Several meta-analyses

(Buhle et al., 2014; Diekhof, Geier, Falkai, & Gruber, 2011; Kalisch, 2009; Kohn et al., 2014) have demonstrated a fairly consistent set of findings. Less dependent on the context, a reappraisal of films, pictures, or autobiographical prompts engages dorsomedial, dorsolateral, and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, along with temporal and parietal cortex. Based upon the emotional context, this network serves to either up- or downregulate the elicited activity in emotion responding systems, such as the amygdala and ventral striatum (Gross, 2015). Hence, research on emotion regulation has converged on a top-down model in which neural activity PROCRASTINATION AS A FORM OF SELF-REGULATION FAILURE 30 in response to emotional value in the amygdala and associated limbic regions are downregulated by the lateral PFC (Dixon et al., 2017; Joorman & Stanton, 2016; Ochsner &

Gross, 2005). Moreover, Wager et al. (2008) found in their study that two independent pathways mediate frontal regulation of emotion: a frontal-striatal pathway is associated with successful regulation, while a frontal-amygdala pathway is associated with less successful regulation. More recently, Motzkin, Philippi, Wolf, Baskaya and Koenigs (2015) found that the vmPFC also plays a crucial role in the regulation of amygdala activity. In their fMRI- study, four patients with focal, bilateral vmPFC damage were compared to healthy subjects.

By contrast to the healthy comparison subjects, the patients with vmPFC lesions displayed potentiated amygdala responses to aversive images and elevated resting-state connectivity with anterior temporal cortex. As such, vmPFC serves as a crucial part of neural circuitry of emotion regulation.

It appears that negative emotions “deplete mental effort” that otherwise could be sufficient in goal-pursuit. For instance, a recent meta-analysis by Moran (2016) revealed that anxiety appears to restrict the capacity of working memory by competing with task-relevant processes. The meta-analysis of 177 samples (N=22,061 individuals) indicated that self- reported measures of anxiety are reliably related to poorer performance on measures of working memory capacity. This insight brings value to the connection between self-regulation and working memory. Concerning goal-pursuit, working memory can serve as a crucial component in the context of being able to self-regulate when necessary. Furthermore, negative emotions seem to affect this component by being related to poorer working memory capacity owing to negative affect (Moran, 2016).

In sum, consistent findings reveal that several subcortical regions engaged in reward and emotional processing show increased ‘bottom-up activity’ associated with failures to self-regulate. By contrast, reappraisal appears to be one of the most efficient forms of PROCRASTINATION AS A FORM OF SELF-REGULATION FAILURE 31 emotion-regulation which in turn engages frontal regions that work to down-regulate activity in subcortical regions.

Regulation of appetitive behaviors. In a similar vein, studies concerning

‘regulation of impulses’ share an inverse relationship between activity in the PFC and subcortical regions. Studies have investigated what happens when subjects are attempting to regulate their impulses to rewarding cues such as those displaying food, money, or drugs

(Heatherton & Wagner, 2011). For instance, when cocaine users are instructed to inhibit craving following drug-conditioned stimuli, metabolic activity decreases in the right NAcc and in the right medial OFC, as compared to baseline condition or in a condition without inhibition instruction (Aron, Robbins & Poldrack, 2014). Moreover, the decreases were also correlated with changes in the right inferior frontal cortex, a brain region crucial for inhibitory control, and associated with executive functions (Aron, Fletcher, Bullmore, Sahakian &

Robbins, 2003; Aron et al., 2014). One common pattern of self-regulation failure considers the case of “falling off the wagon”. For instance, this happens when chronic dieters and addicts fail by violating their diets, or by consuming the addictive substance, often referred to as lapse-activated consumption (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996). Demos, Heatherton, and

Kelley (2012) demonstrated that one reason why people may be prone to engage in unwanted behaviors is due to a heightened sensitivity to cues related to those behaviors. Thus, people may overeat because of hyperresponsiveness to food cues. Their study indicated that subjects who showed a heightened response in NAcc followed by food-related images were subsequently prone to weight gain 6 months later. The researchers concluded that these findings suggest that such heightened reward responsivity is associated with indulgence in overeating and may provide evidence for a neural mechanism associated with appetitive behaviors. PROCRASTINATION AS A FORM OF SELF-REGULATION FAILURE 32

Altogether, research reveals that neural underpinnings of self-regulation rely upon increased activity in regions of the PFC along with reduced cue-reactivity in regions associated with reward processing. In other words, top-down control shares common features of successful self-regulation and involvement of executive functions. Put simply, it’s an issue of competing motivations that either work to up- or downregulate the stimuli, subsequently leading to self-regulation (or failure).

Discussion

This thesis aimed to obtain a deeper understanding of the mechanisms of procrastination, specifically investigating self-regulation failure and its relationship with executive functions and the neural underpinnings of self-regulation. Current research demonstrates evident correlations between self-regulation and executive functions (Dohle et al., 2018; Hofmann et al., 2012) that stimulate further analyses of how self-regulation operates on a cognitive and neural level (Diamond, 2013; Heatherton & Wagner, 2011; Zhang et al., 2019).

Research seems to agree that factors such as perceived aversiveness of the task

(Steel, 2007), as well as future outcomes together with a specific time frame, contribute to whether a task is vulnerable to procrastination (Zhang et al., 2019). Moreover, the person's expectancy about having the ability to perform the task at hand (self-efficacy) contributes to the engagement (Bandura & Locke, 2003; Steel, 2007). There is also evidence that some people tend to procrastinate more than others. Specifically, impulsiveness and self-control are the two main facets of personality traits associated with procrastination (Schouwenburg &

Lay, 1995; Steel, 2007; Van Eerde, 2003; Watson, 2001).

Both emotion regulation theories and Temporal Motivation Theory (TMT) provide potential explanations in order to understand why procrastination happens. PROCRASTINATION AS A FORM OF SELF-REGULATION FAILURE 33

Simultaneously, neuroimaging studies propose a fairly correlational association that helps to understand self-regulation failure on a neural basis. Top-down control mainly attributed to the

PFC display how executive functions operate on a neural level when accomplishing successful self-regulation. Specifically, vmPFC, lPFC, and ACC are the main areas of PFC with significance to self-regulatory functioning. The opposite appears to evolve when bottom- up control served by subcortical regions of reward and emotion influence behavioral outcomes, leading to self-regulation failure. Generally, the areas associated include the amygdala and the ventral striatum.

As earlier mentioned, individual differences, such as self-control and impulsiveness, are associated with procrastination. When reviewing neural mechanisms of regulating impulsive behaviors, most of the studies are related to regulating certain addictive or craving behaviors such as drugs, alcohol- and food consumption. These studies indicate that inhibiting rewarding cues subsequently decreases metabolic activity in the right NAcc, and the right medial OFC (Aron et al., 2014). Moreover, these decreases correlate with changes in the right inferior frontal cortex, a brain region that is crucial for inhibitory control and is associated with executive functions (Aron et al., 2003; Aron et al., 2014).

What appears to be an issue for anyone failing to self-regulate is the notion of how emotions and impulses interfere with the intended goal-pursuit. Whether one is capable of overcoming procrastination seems to be embedded in the aspect of regulating emotions and inhibiting rewarding impulses. When faced with a task that appears aversive or when the person holds low self-efficacy to the task at hand, negative emotions arise and become attached to the task. Subsequently, this leads to a coping response of postponing the task in order to regain emotional stability.

Initially noted at the beginning of this paper, addressing procrastination in a scientific context relies upon a definition of procrastination as a form of self-regulation PROCRASTINATION AS A FORM OF SELF-REGULATION FAILURE 34 failure. Searching for articles on procrastination in the scientific context only yields a small number of articles. Instead, self-regulation failure has been reviewed, which provides more content. To some extent, procrastination and self-regulation failure appear to overlap, but as procrastination is a form of self-regulation failure, there are probably more general features of self-regulation failure that are not associated with procrastination. Followingly, this makes the current field a bit vague, and referring to the neuroscientific context, self-regulation (and failure) has been studied in general, but the question remains if these general findings also address the more fine-grained topic of procrastination. Worth mentioning, some studies specifically refer to procrastination in neuroscientific context (e.g., Zhang, Wang, & Feng,

2016; Zhang et al., 2019). These articles show strong associations with currently argued findings in this thesis, whereas some findings also extend to argue for spontaneous neural activity in the parahippocampal gyrus (Zhang et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2019). In short, the parahippocampal gyrus is included in an extended network mediating people’s ability of episodic future thinking which serves to pre-experience future rewards through mental simulation (Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser, & Schacter 2009; Atance & O’Neill, 2001). Episodic future thinking has shown to be an effective way to counter impulsive behavior and decisions by adding weight on delayed benefits (Benoit, Gilbert, & Burgess, 2011; Daniel, Stanton, &

Epstein, 2013; Peters & Büchel, 2010). As earlier noted, research has found evidence that procrastinators display less consideration for the potential future outcomes of their behaviors

(Sirois, 2004), that they have difficulty delaying gratification (Ferrari & Emmons, 1995) and that they think less about the future (Sirois, 2014b; Specter & Ferrari, 2000). It is possible that the above-mentioned finding on parahippocampal activity could explain some parts of TMT on a more neural level, as most of the reviewed neuroscientific findings fail to bridge this gap.

Concerning the neuroscientific context, possibly this field could improve by being more selective in studies per se, in the more general field of self-regulation failure. PROCRASTINATION AS A FORM OF SELF-REGULATION FAILURE 35

Notably, most of the neuroscientific studies reviewed rely upon fMRI studies, which mainly refer to only a limited number of participants, given the advanced and costly procedure of the use of the instrument (Gazzaniga, Ivry & Mangun, 2014). As a consequence, it is indeed a topic of validity, whether or not the results of a limited group of people may transfer into the more general population. Given that fMRI is only an indirect measure of neural activity, one must interpret the results carefully since correlation does not imply causality per se (Turner, 2016). Neural processes are indeed complex, and particular activity can be challenging to specify given that general neural activity is always operating.

Followingly, this is indeed a challenge of the neuroscientific field, although fMRI has high temporal resolution (Gazzaniga et al., 2014).

Further, regarding the methods, most studies of procrastination and self- regulation failure are based upon self-reported measures that provide the participant to indicate on scales how statements such as “at the end of the day, I know I could have spent the time better” (item derived from the Irrational Procrastination Scale, Steel, 2010) corresponds with their perception of themselves. These measurements stand weak for several reasons, such as the individuals’ perceived standard. One participant might hold very high standard on what is possible to manage daily, leading to rating a low correspondence to such statements. On the other hand, another participant might hold low standards, and respond with a much higher score to such statements. Moreover, one may want to appear as an organized and structured person, thus answering to statements to be perceived likewise. These kinds of different self-reporting biases may influence scores on measurements. Hence, they should be taken into consideration.

Given the outlined review, it appears that self-regulation failure refers to a context that gives priority to short-term mood repair as opposed to future incentives. As individuals, emotions and impulses are an inevitable part of the human condition, but it PROCRASTINATION AS A FORM OF SELF-REGULATION FAILURE 36 appears that some people are better capable of regulating such influences than others. Briefly reviewing current findings, there seem to be some cognitive strategies that may facilitate successful coping responses. In order to remove the gap between intention and action, one needs to be able to down-regulate certain emotions or impulses when they tend to arise.

Studies reveal that cognitive components derived from mindfulness meditation appear to interact closely to constitute a process of enhanced self-regulation (Carver & Scheier, 2011;

Vohs & Baumeister, 2004), such as attention regulation and emotion regulation (Hölzel et al.,

2011). Another concept which this thesis already has touched upon is that emotion regulation in the form of reappraisal appears to influence successful self-regulation (Buhle et al., 2014).

When individuals are involved in cognitive reappraisal tasks, WM, selective attention, response inhibition and monitoring control processes are used (Buhle et al., 2014). Based upon these findings, it seems feasible that by reappraising any situation which one might find aversive or tempting (given that one is able to monitor oneself consciously), this might lead to outcomes in line with one's intended goals.

In conclusion, research has made progressive efforts in integrating current findings concerning procrastination as a form of self-regulation failure. Moreover, how it operates in a cognitive and neuroscientific context is indeed a challenging topic, and much more research is still needed in this field. To some extent, research has made considerable efforts to bridge the gap, but still, the field is in need of improvement. Although the task might be aversive, this should not be delayed.

PROCRASTINATION AS A FORM OF SELF-REGULATION FAILURE 37

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