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The Ukrainian Insurgent Army & The Ukrainian Insurgent Army & Operation Vistula: Poland, 1947 By Maciej Jonasz Ambush and two other Poles were dead. A an independent Ukraine, which long-time communist, Swierczewski they saw as rightfully including n 28 March 1947 a small was a protégé of Moscow. He wasn’t what were then parts of the Soviet convoy left the town of popular in Poland, since his policies Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia and above —The 14th SS Division unit patch. Sanok in the foothills of the went against nationalist aspirations. Romania. The OUN contained within O right — A close up of some 14th Bieszczady Mountains in southeastern Even so, he was a general, and his it the aforementioned UPA armed Waffen SS Ukrainian soldiers. Poland. It provided the escort for Gen. death was therefore of political wing. It had self-organized during Karol Swierczewski, the country’s dep- significance. It also served as the World War II to fight against both Defense Force (FDF) units were also uty defense minister, who was making beginning of an intensified military the Germans and the Soviets. The raised, giving the Warsaw government an inspection of army units. The Polish campaign, but one that’s gone largely UPA was known for ruthlessness and sufficient power to counterattack. Army was at the time engaged in con- unknown outside Eastern Europe. effectiveness, surviving as an armed The first major Polish counterinsur- ducting counterinsurgency operations insurgency even after the surrender gency operation took place between against the Ukrainian Insurgent Army Behind the Red Army of the Third Reich in May 1945. April and October 1946, under the (UPA in Ukrainian-language acronym). The UPA had its base area in headquarters of Operational Group Ukrainian Bids for Independence On the 27th he’d visited the head- After the Soviet Army fought its southeastern Poland, an ethnically Rzeszow, an ad hoc unit. In response, quarters of the 8th Infantry Division in way across Poland in 1945, combat mixed region with a large Ukrainian the OUN leadership sent out a direc- The collapse of Czarist Russia in 1917 brought the hope of independence to the Sanok, and the next morning departed continued in the rear areas. The minority. One reason for its continued tive for UPA units to go underground Ukrainians. A Ukrainian government was established in 1918, and it fought for independence for an outpost in Cisna. The convoy communists—both from the USSR existence after the German withdrawal and wait for a better political both against the Poles, who were staking claim to all lands with Polish populations, and was initially composed of three cars, and native Poles—cracked down on was, as the frontline moved west, climate—the then almost universally against the Bolsheviks, who wanted to extend their control over all Russia's former lands. though one of them soon broke down all potential political opposition. Soviet security troops moved with anticipated war between what would Poland itself was a newly formed (or reborn) country, emerging from the collapse of and the other two continued. As they One of those opposition groups it, leaving a vacuum. A wave of UPA become NATO and the Soviets—to the Central Powers at the end of World War I and the chaos of the Russian Civil War. passed the village of Jablonka, in a was the Organization of Ukrainian attacks, which Polish communist resume active operations. Accordingly, The Poles offered peace to the Ukrainians: they wanted them as allies against the new mountain valley, shots rang out. It was Nationalists (OUN), which then forces were too weak to counter, hit vil- the scale of violence decreased as the Soviet Union that was militantly pushing communism westward. The Poles offered to an ambush. The Poles jumped out of operated throughout the Ukraine as lages and police stations. After the war UPA limited itself to small attacks and equip a Ukrainian Army and help it secure an independent state with its capital in Kiev. their vehicles and returned fire against well as in other Eastern European ended and attention could be shifted raids to obtain money and supplies. The Ukrainians accepted that offer, and the Poles conducted a successful an enemy shooting from the tree line. countries with Ukrainian minorities. from the front, elements of Polish After a calm winter, however, the offensive that cleared the communists from large parts of the Ukraine and secured The fighting lasted over an hour The OUN had been founded Second Army deployed to the region UPA resumed major operations early Kiev. Even so, the Ukrainians failed to rally behind their new government and, and, when it died down, Swierczewski in 1929 to promote the creation of to reinforce the police, while Frontier in 1947. One of the first of those was without a strong local ally, the Poles had to withdraw in the face of a new communist the ambush that killed Swierczewski, counteroffensive. The Poles defeated that Soviet invasion at the gates of Warsaw followed three days later by the in August 1920, but the Ukrainians had to be left conquered. The western region of annihilation of a 32-man FDF platoon. the Ukraine remained Polish, and the rest became a Soviet republic. Communist rule It was then the Warsaw government was harsh, with millions of Ukrainians killed, starved or deported to the gulag. made the decision to do whatever During the inter-war period, the OUN was created in Poland. There were some tentative was necessary to crush the nascent steps to work with the Germans when Hitler invaded the USSR in June 1941, but little was insurgency. Additional combat units accomplished due to the Nazi racial and resettlement policies. In 1943 the OUN formed were deployed to the region and a military wing, the UPA (Ukrayins’ka Povstans’ka Armiya—Ukrainian Insurgent Army). formed into Operational Group Wisla World War II in the Ukraine was effectively a free for all, as various political groups (Vistula). Plans were also laid to sought different ways to obtain independence, some of them with German support. For exam- root out the underground networks ple, several thousand Ukrainians joined the 14th Waffen SS Grenadier Division “Galicia.” that supplied the UPA with recruits, At the same time, the UPA continued to fight Soviet partisans and also attacked the local intelligence, sanctuary and supplies. ethnic-Polish civilian population, all with the intent to create a new Ukrainians-only state. The intent of Operation Vistula After the end of World War II the UPA remained underground, fighting both was to end the insurgency via the the Poles and the Soviets. The Soviets responded to the UPA in the Ukraine with a destruction of the insurgents’ support campaign of terror, including the commitment of a number of secret police divisions. network, followed by the annihilation The UPA hit back, killing thousands of communist officials and collaborators as well of all UPA combat units. The scheme of as Soviet troops. The UPA also received some outside assistance from the US Central maneuver called for three phases. The Intelligence Agency and British MI6. For a few years in the late 1940s, the western first involved deporting Ukrainians Ukraine was the most dangerous posting for Red Army forces within the USSR. and mixed Polish-Ukrainian families The Soviets proved too strong: their intelligence operations and political programs from the insurgent region for resettle- defeated the UPA, with the last active resistance dying out by the mid-1950s. The ment in other parts of Poland. The Ukrainian desire for independence was only realized in 1990 when the Soviet Union objective was to effectively eliminate collapsed, enabling its constituent republics to establish their own states. the UPA support structure, and in b 50 MODERN WAR 17 | MAY–JUN 2015 MODERN WAR 17 | MAY–JUN 2015 51 Phase 2 (June) With the experience of the first phase behind them, the Poles modi- fied their approach. Quick Reaction Forces (QRF) were established at division, brigade and battalion levels. Equipped with trucks and reinforced with armored vehicles and engineers, the QRF were to deploy as soon as the enemy was sighted by reconnaissance patrols. Those QRF were instructed to maintain contact at all cost, and to continue pursuit regardless of unit boundaries, in order to ensure Terrain The Bieszczady Mountains in the southeastern corner of Poland form some of the most difficult terrain in Two views of Ukrainian Insurgent Army Fighters. the country. While not particularly high (the tallest peak is 4,416 feet), they were heavily wooded. That made it difficult for large units to operate, while making it easy for small groups to hide. Further, the road network in the region was sparse and of poor quality, resulting in a large number of vehicle breakdowns that strained repair and maintenance services. On the other hand, the terrain also put stress on the insurgents via malnourishment, inadequate footwear and general exposure to the elements. Those things undermined morale and led to deser- tions, with prisoners then providing the Poles with valuable intelligence. b that way cause their military units fighters killed or captured and the While the deportations were A typical view within the Biesczcady Mountains. to lose effectiveness. At the same discovery of several arms caches. executed efficiently, only limited suc- time, reconnaissance and combat At the same time, deportations cess was attained in Vistula’s combat operations would take place to set of Ukrainians began. Areas along operations. That was partly due to the the stage for the next phase. the national border were slated for difficult terrain and partly to superior The second phase was to focus on total deportation, while those in the insurgent field craft, especially in the destruction of UPA main combat interior for total or partial, depend- regard to their ability to conceal units.
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