The Pogroms in Kyrgyzstan

THE POGROMS IN KYRGYZSTAN Asia Report N°193 – 23 August 2010 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. JUNE 1990 .......................................................................................................................... 3 III. 2010 ..................................................................................................................................... 4 A. REGIME CHANGE ......................................................................................................................... 4 B. THE SECURITY ORGANS: NEUTRAL OR HOSTILE? ........................................................................ 5 C. THE MAYOR OF OSH: “A QUITE DIFFICULT MAN” ....................................................................... 6 IV. MAY 2010 IN JALALABAD: THE WATERSHED ...................................................... 7 A. BATYROV AND RODINA ............................................................................................................... 8 B. THE TEYIT BURNINGS: A “RUBICON” IN ETHNIC RELATIONS ...................................................... 9 C. “THE SECURITY ORGANS DID NOT FORGIVE HIM” ..................................................................... 10 V. POGROMS ...................................................................................................................... 11 A. BEGINNINGS .............................................................................................................................. 11 B. A WELL-ORGANISED MOB ........................................................................................................ 11 C. CHEREMUSHKI ........................................................................................................................... 12 D. THE USE OF ARMOURED VEHICLES ............................................................................................ 13 E. WEAPONS SEIZURES AND DISTRIBUTION ................................................................................... 14 F. EXPLAINING THE VIOLENCE ....................................................................................................... 14 1. The official version .................................................................................................................... 14 2. Two narratives ........................................................................................................................... 15 VI. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS ...................................................................................... 17 A. THE BAKIYEV FAMILY ROLE ..................................................................................................... 17 B. WERE THE UZBEKS ARMED? ...................................................................................................... 18 VII. AFTERMATH ............................................................................................................... 18 A. THE HUMAN COST ..................................................................................................................... 18 1. Death toll .................................................................................................................................... 18 2. Destruction ................................................................................................................................. 18 3. Refugees ..................................................................................................................................... 19 B. REFERENDUM ............................................................................................................................ 19 VIII.THE INTERNATIONAL MOOD: SHADES OF PESSIMISM ............................... 20 A. THE U.S. AND RUSSIA: GRIM AND GRIMMER ............................................................................. 20 B. UZBEKISTAN: KARIMOV AS A MODERATE .................................................................................. 22 C. AN OPENING FOR JIHAD? ........................................................................................................... 23 IX. POLITICAL FALLOUT ................................................................................................ 24 A. THE BAKIYEV FAMILY: CRISIS MANAGEMENT .......................................................................... 24 B. WINNERS ................................................................................................................................... 25 C. TWO DAYS IN AUGUST: HUMILIATION FOR THE GOVERNMENT .................................................. 26 X. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 27 APPENDICES A. MAP OF KYRGYZSTAN ..................................................................................................................... 29 B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................... 30 C. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2007 ......................................................... 31 D. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................ 33 Asia Report N°193 23 August 2010 THE POGROMS IN KYRGYZSTAN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS An explosion of violence, destruction and looting in Though the government blames external elements, includ- southern Kyrgyzstan on 11-14 June 2010 killed many ing Islamic militants, the pogroms in fact involved many hundreds of people, mostly Uzbeks, destroyed over 2000 forces, from the remnants of the Bakiyev political ma- buildings, mostly homes, and deepened the gulf between chine to prominent mainstream politicians and organised the country’s ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. It was further crime, especially the narcotics trade. proof of the near total ineffectiveness of the provisional government that overthrew President Kurmanbek Baki- Most of the violence took place in Osh, Kyrgyzstan’s yev in April 2010, and is now trying to guide the country southern capital, with a less bloody outburst in and around to general elections in October. Given the government’s the region’s other main city, Jalalabad. The forces that slowness to address the causes and consequences of the stand behind the violence have not yet been fully identi- violence, the danger of another explosion is high. Even fied. This is unlikely to happen without an exhaustive and without one, the aftershocks of the looting, murder and professional international investigation. Certain things arson could seriously damage Kyrgyzstan’s ailing econ- are, however, clear. Although the profound belief in the omy, cause a significant outflow of ethnic Uzbeks and Uzbek community that the pogroms were a state-planned other minorities, and further destabilise the already fragile attack on them is not borne out by the facts, there are situation in Central Asia in general. The route back to strong indications that prominent political figures, par- stability will be long and difficult, not least because no ticularly in Osh city, were actively, perhaps decisively, reliable security or even monitoring force has been deployed involved. Most security forces in the region, who in Osh in the affected area. It should start with an internationally currently answer to local leaders rather than the capital, supported investigation into the pogroms, as visible an were slow to act or complicit in the violence. The pattern international police and diplomatic presence as possible of violence in Osh moreover suggests a coordinated strat- to discourage their recurrence, and close coordination on egy; it is unlikely the marauders were spontaneously effective rebuilding of towns and communities. responding to events. The criterion that guided looters in all the districts attacked was ethnic, not economic. June’s The most disturbing and dangerous consequence of the violence had been prefigured by serious ethnic and politi- violence is that the central government has now lost de cal tension in Jalalabad in May. At the time, however, facto control of the south. Melis Myrzakmatov, the mayor this was largely ignored by the central government and of Osh, a ruthless and resolute young nationalist leader, the international community. has emerged from the bloodshed with his political strength, and his extremist credentials, stronger than ever, Successive governments have failed to address ethnic and is now the south’s pivotal political figure. Given this, tensions in the south, or even admit their existence. Many there is a strong risk that any attempt at investigation or features of the 2010 violence strongly resemble the last even reconciliation will be subordinated to many politi- round of bloody ethnic clashes, in 1990. At that time cians’ desire to enlist his support for the October elections. there was no attempt to address the root causes of the The government seems reluctant to challenge this nation- problem, and the same phenomena burst to the surface in alist mood, which it clearly feels is popular within the an even more virulent form twenty years on. During the majority Kyrgyz community. If the south remains outside intervening two decades, state neglect and economic de- of central control, there

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