Perspectives
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66 December 2013 THE AFTERMATHS OF CRISES SAVINGS AND SAVINGS BANKS: ELEMENTS OF STABILITY IN TIMES OF CRISES? PERSPECTIVES THE AFTERMATHS OF CRISES SAVINGS AND SAVINGS BANKS: ELEMENTS OF STABILITY IN TIMES OF CRISES? Photo on cover: People queuing outside the premises of the Caisses d’Epargne in Paris, at the announcement of World War I. Source: Fédération Nationale des Caisses d’Epargne (France) The views expressed in this Perspectives are the responsibility of the author and are not to be regarded as representing the views of ESBG Members. The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of WSBI (World Savings and Retail Banking Institute) or ESBG (European Savings and Retail Banking Group). Neither WSBI nor ESBG guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The material in this publication is copyrighted. 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword 7 Introduction 9 Laure de Llamby The role of financial crises in history: Banking and debt crises since the 19th century 11 Johannes Bähr The impact of crises on savings banks institutions in the United Kingdom 29 Richard Roberts The impact of crises on the savings banks institutions in Germany 47 Paul Thomes The crisis and the French savings banks 63 Vincent Tournié The impact of crises on the Savings Banks Institutions in Italy 75 Giovanni Manghetti The savings bank crisis in Spain: when and how? 85 Pablo Martín-Aceña Banks and Crises: Sweden during 150 years 99 Mats Andersson Enrique Rodriguez 5 6 FOREWORD Dear reader, It seems as if the crisis affects the full range of our professional activities. We should of course not forget the heavy toll crises take on well-being and quality of life, but we should also consider them as opportunities to improve things. Regulators and supervisors are working alongside representatives of the industry to repair the damages caused by the worldwide financial crisis. They have done so after each of the various crises that are analyzed on the following pages. Does that mean that history is just the story of people making the same mistakes over and over? I don’t think so. The financial sector has become safer and stronger after every crisis, even if it is still not perfect. The papers in this publication have been written at the occasion of a workshop organized by ESBG, the European Savings and Retail Banking Group in May 2013. The main lobbying objective of our organization is to convince policymakers, regulators, supervisors and all other industry participants that a diversified sector, with a strong retail banking segment ultimately leads to a more stable sector. I hope that this publication gives you food for thought and wish you happy reading. Chris De Noose Managing Director ESBG 7 8 INTRODUCTION Laure de Llamby France’s savings banks, or Caisses d’Epargne, became cooperative banks in 1999. Their particular change of status has no equivalent in Europe. As cooperative banks, the Caisses have been able to maintain their individuality while being governed by ordinary law. The change has also allowed them to join the “family” of cooperatives, whose values they share, while promoting their special identity forged over nearly 200 years of history. The merit of this specific model is apparent during these troubled economic times: its values resonate perfectly with the concerns of the French people in these times of crisis. The Caisses are banks with a local presence; they promote regional development and support businesses in their community. Their strong sales activity enables them to meet the demands of all types of customers – individual, business or institutional – and offer solutions tailored to specific local needs. The Caisses’ longstanding commitment to society is as strong as ever. These savings banks have evolved to better meet today’s urgent needs. They now contribute more than EUR 20 million to support philanthropic causes and local projects and are the number one provider of social microcredit. Their motto, “l’Humain sera toujours une valeur sûre” (“People will always be a sound investment”), reflects the commitments they make to members and customers. An effective, efficient bank supporting regional economic development and social solidarity: this is the kind of bank the Caisses aim to be, and these are the two pillars from which they will address today’s challenges. 9 The French people have demonstrated that they support our approach. In 2012, they elected Caisse d’Epargne as their “favourite bank” and the bank “most useful to society”. Throughout their history, European savings banks have endured numerous challenges in the financial, economic, political, and social realms, from which they have frequently emerged stronger. In times of crises, they have revealed their resilience and value. In times of difficulty, they have shown their ability to adapt and innovate. In times of trouble, they have built and strengthened the trust of their customers. This trust is an honour and a responsibility for the savings banks in our various countries. This workshop provides an opportunity to highlight the various ways in which savings banks, according to their country of origin, have weathered major national and international shocks and emerged even stronger. Do they differ from so-called traditional banks in their approach to and management of these crises, the adjustments they made, and the solutions they found? In other words, can we define a crisis-proof savings bank model? And if so, can this tried-and-tested model offer one or more solutions to the current recession? May the following presentations shed light on these issues, and may the lessons from our past lead us to a promising future. 10 THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL CRISES IN HISTORY: BANKING AND DEBT CRISES SINCE THE 19TH CENTURY Johannes Bähr At a 2008 hearing before the American Congress, former Chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, called the unfolding financial crisis “a once-in-a-century credit tsunami”, meaning that the crisis hit people like a natural disaster.1 It is well known that a tsunami is almost totally unforeseeable, comes with very little warning and is completely unpredictable. And indeed crises of this nature cannot be accounted for in economic models. Warnings were given only by a few experts, which led to much criticism later and references to a “failure of academic economics”.2 But economic history was of great interest to economists; while they could not have predicted tsunamis, they should at least have provided insight into empirical experience. The best known publication on the history of financial crises was produced in 2009 by two prominent US economists, Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff. In their book This Time Is Different, a compendium of the financial crises of the last eight centuries, they list around 320 debt crises and more than 200 banking crises arranged by country.3 Reinhart and Rogoff have now come in for criticism due to errors in their data, but their figures provide impressive evidence that economic and financial crises are not at all unusual and have occurred throughout history. For economic historians this is nothing new, it is actually pretty obvious. 1 Scott Lanman/Steve Matthews, Greenspan Concedes to ‘Flaw’ in His Market Ideology. URL: http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news, 23.10.2008. 2 David C. Colander et al., The financial crisis and the systematic failure of academic economics, Kiel working paper No. 1489, Kiel 2009; Geoffrey M. Hodgson, The great crash of 2008 and the reform of economics, in: Cambridge Journal of Economics 2009, 33, pp. 1205-1221. 3 Carmen M. Reinhart/Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, Princeton 2009. 11 For them crises are a “normal part of the economic process” and essential because they correct the defective trends which occur with every structural change.4 Indeed, there are many indications that crises are the indicators and not the causes of defective trends; in a similar way to fever, which indi-cates an infection and helps eradicate it. Another reason for the success of Reinhart and Rogoff’s book was the evidence they provided to back up the widely held view that for centuries financial crises have followed more or less the same pattern. According to the authors, however well financial systems are regulated they cannot withstand the pressure created by greed and the irrational exuberance that leads to speculative bubbles.5 However, this approach does not take into account the fact that the causes and nature of financial crises over the last few centuries have changed radically time and again. Financial crises should be regarded as an integral part of economic development, and it is precisely for this reason that they change in line with that development. New causes, actors and mechanisms all emerge over time. For historians there is little point in counting up all the crises of the last two hundred years. It is much more useful to try and identify specific underlying patterns and the way they change. We can only learn lessons from the past if we take these changes into account. If we hide them, we end up simply playing unhistorical and unrealistic number games. To illustrate the point, let us take Reinhart and Rogoff’s finding that Spain has experienced thirteen cases of national bankruptcy, more than any other European state. Yet if we take a closer look at the data, it is clear that these debt crises are in no way related to the present. Out of the occasions on which the Spanish government’s coffers ran empty, not one occurred in the 20th century, while six date back to the 16th and 17th centuries and the rest to the 19th century.