ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol 18, No 3, pp 471± 488, 1997

TheLiberian con¯ ict andthe ECOWAS±UNpartnership

CLEMENT EADIBE

Theinternationalisation of theLiberian con¯ ict is aresultmainly of twofactors. The® rst is thebeleaguered attempt by Liberia’ s neighbours,acting under the aegisof theEconomic Community of WestAfrican States ( ECOWAS),toprevent theregional spread of thecon¯ ict through direct political and military interven- tion.1 Thesecond is thedecision by the United Nations (UN), followingthe euphoricreception of AnAgenda for Peace in1992, to demonstrate global supportfor ` theefforts of the people of Liberia to establish peace in their country’ .2 Thusinternationalised, the Liberian con¯ ict set thestage for an experimentin international politics. For the ® rst timeever, ` theUnited Nations wouldundertake a majorpeace-keeping operation with another organisation, in thiscase asubregionalorganisation¼ ’ . 3 TheLiberian case providesa useful empiricalbasis forevaluating the idea of task-sharing between the United Nationsand regional arrangementsÐ and by extension with the non- governmentalorganisations ( NGOs) discussedlater in this issueÐ in accordance withthe spirit of Article 33 of the UN Charter.Accordingly, this article evaluatesthe effectiveness of the ECOWAS±UNpartnershipin responding adequatelyto thecon¯ ict in Liberia,by answering three critical questions: what led to the ECOWAS±UNpartnershipin Liberia? What was thenature of the partnership?What lessons maybe drawn from this pioneering partnership?

ECOWAS failure andUN involvement TheUnited Nations was invitedto join the search-for-peace effort in Liberia only after ECOWAS hadfailed to make any appreciable progress towards con¯ ict resolution.According to David Wippman, attempts made in 1990 to place the Liberiancrisis onthe Security Council’ s agendafailed, ` inpart because of oppositionby CoÃted’ Ivoire,(and because the Council’ s members sharedthe US viewthat the problem should be solved by Africans’ . 4 Whatis theexplanation forthe organisation’ s changeof position on this matter? The ECOWAS volte-face re¯ected its beleaguered efforts to contain the Liberian con¯ ict through direct diplomaticand military intervention.

Clement Adibeis atthe Department of Political Science, DePaulUniversity, 2320North Kenmore Avenue, Chicago,IL 60614-3298,USA.

0143-6597/97/030471-18$7.00 Ó 1997Third World Quarterly 471 CLEMENT EADIBE

Thefailure of diplomaticintervention

ECOWAS didnot expect that its intervention in Liberia would be a long, drawn-outaffair. Rather, it envisaged a short,surgical ` policeaction’ . Indeed, thenature of thecon¯ ict itself suggested a seeminglysimple solution. After all, theimmediate cause ofthe problem was theguerrilla ` incursion’into Liberia’ s northernterritory by abandof rebels,numbering about a coupleof hundred` Gio tribesmen’ .5 Inthe view of the military rulers of Liberia’ s neighbours,most notablyNigeria, Sierra Leone and Guinea, the rebel incursions were an act of thuggerythat should have been repelled quite easily by the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL).Consequently, AFL’sfailureto contain these raids suggested a fundamentalweakness in the ability of the central government in Monrovia, headedby President Samuel Doe, to govern effectively. One solution would be toshore up theDoe regime through the provision of arms andammunition and, ifneedbe, military advisers. Indeed, Nigeria and the United States did precisely thatuntil it became obvious by the summer of1990 that the ` incursions’were notuncoordinated acts bysome `tribesmen’. Rather,the Doe government was facinga well-plannedmilitary rebellion led by an oppositionmilitia, the National PatrioticFront of Liberia ( NPFL),whichhad recruited massively from the ranks ofthe discontented throughout Liberia. 6 Withrebel forces occupyingtwo-thirds ofLiberia’ s territory,the Doe government helpless and reduced to tenuous controlof a fewperimeters around the presidential mansion, and the civilian survivorsof the con¯ ict ¯ eeingin large numbers to neighbouring countries, regionalattention turned to the feasibility of establishing a politico-military presencein Liberia. ECOWAS tookon the Liberian challenge barely ® vemonths after the initial outbreakof armed con¯ ict. At the outset the US was expectedto intervene, as thepatron of theLiberian state throughout much of itshistory. Washington was, however,preoccupied with changes in the international system causedby rapid politicalchanges in the former Soviet bloc. Many observers expected that early reportsemerging from West Africa in the middle of spring 1990 alleging that NPFL rebelswere trained and equipped by Libya would trigger strong US reaction,culminating in the direct military intervention advocated by European ambassadors. 7 Inmany ways Washington did react strongly, for the US soon beganconsultations with its African ` allies’with a viewto orchestrating a regionalresponse to the Libyan threat. However, the dynamics of the war changedquite sharply by the end of spring 1990 due to a series ofmassacres targetingforeign nationals in Liberia, by government and rebel forces alike. Washington’s responseto this development was todeploy forces toevacuate UScitizensand privileged foreigners residing in Liberia. Vocal Liberians, pan-Africanistsand the African press saw thisaction as aclearindication of the growingtrend towards the marginalisation of Africa by the West in general. In particular,the action was seen as proofof US insensitivityto the plight of Africans.If theworld had abandoned Africa because the Cold War had ended, theprescription was clear: Africamust act in thespirit of pan-Africanism to save oneof its own from self-destruction. Naturally, the Organization of African Unity (OAU)was lookedto for leadership. Not surprisingly, according to Chike 472 THE LIBERIAN CONFLICT AND THE ECOWAS±UN PARTNERSHIP

Akabogu,Africa’ s premierregional arrangement ` merelydusted up its Articles onnon-interference in the internal affairs ofmember-nations’ . 8 However,for the new OAU leadershipcomprising President Yoweri Museveni ofUganda as chairmanand former Tanzanian foreign minister, Salim Ahmed Salim,as secretary-general,the norm of non-interventiondid not apply to the sui generis characterof theLiberian con¯ ict. 9 Theirtactic was toapproachNigeria, thedominant West African state, to lead a regionalforce into Liberia within the frameworkof ECOWAS.GeneralIbrahim Babangida, Nigeria’ s militaryruler at thetime, seized on the opportunity not only to exercise statesmanship but also todivert national and international attention away from mounting socio- economicproblems and political abuses athome. As chairmanof ECOWAS, he conveneda meetingof ECOWAS headsof stateand government in Banjul in May 1990to discuss hisblueprint for the establishment of an ` ECOWAS Standing MediationCommittee [ SMC]tosettle disputes and con¯ ict situations within the Community’. 10 Thesummit accepted the proposal and constituted the member- ship of the SMC as follows:The Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria and Togo. 11 At itsinaugural meeting in July, the committee discussed the Liberian con¯ ict and agreedon a peaceplan with the following features: establishmentof an immediatecease-® re bythe warring parties; establishment and deployment of ECOWAS Cease® reMonitoringGroup ( ECOMOG)tomonitor the observance of the cease® re byall sides tothe con¯ ict; agreement by the parties to the establish- mentof an Interim Administration in Monrovia, pending the election of a substantivegovernment; and agreement by the parties to constitute a substantive governmentthrough nation-wide elections to be monitored by ECOMOG.12 Accordingto of® cial reports of the ministerial conference, there had been a substantialdisagreement between members ofthe SMC,ontheone hand, and the partiesto the con¯ ict, on the other, about key elements of the proposed peace plan.The issues indispute were: thedesirability and timing of a cease® re; the desirabilityand composition of an interim government; and the usefulness of deployinga regionalpeacekeeping force. 13 Theinability to ® ndcommon ground onthese issues ledeventually to the breakdown of talks between ECOWAS and Liberia’s warringparties over methods to resolve the con¯ ict peacefully. It was the way that ECOWAS reactedto its initial failure to negotiate a cease® re between thewarring factions that resulted in uncontrolled mayhem in Liberia. The problembegan with the frustration of theministers of the SMC withrebel leader CharlesTaylor, whom they viewed contemptuously as theprincipal cause of theirfailure in Banjul. According to the SMC Ministerialreport:

Itbecame clear [to] the Ministerial Meeting¼ that the NPFL was holdingon ® rmly toits initial position of demanding the departure of President Doe before it could considerany of theother essential issues. Indeed, the Committee gained the distinct impressionthat the NPFL hadopted for amilitarysolution. In the light of this, the MinisterialMeeting decided¼ to request that another course of actionbe considered tobring the Liberian crisis to a speedyand peaceful end. 14 Tothe surprise of many diplomatic observers, the ministerial conference pro- ceededwith the formation of aSub-Committeeon Defense Matters ` toconsider issues relatingto the military arm ofthe proposed ECOWAS MonitoringGroup 473 CLEMENT EADIBE

(ECOMOG)inLiberia’. 15 Afteronly two days of meetingin Freetown between 18 and20 July 1990, the sub-committee emerged with a blueprintof an ECOWAS militaryintervention force. In presenting the blueprint to the chairman of the ECOWAS summit,General Ibrahim Babangida, and the ministers urged their heads ofgovernment` tobring the Liberian crisis toa speedy andpeaceful end’ . 16 This callwas heededtwo weeks later when the leaders of the SMC states,meeting in Banjulbetween 6 and7 August,adopted Decision A/DEC.1/8/90,which con- tainsthe following elements of whatwould later be knownas the ECOWAS Peace Planfor Liberia: immediate cessation of hostilitiesby allfactions; the formation andimmediate deployment of ECOMOG toLiberia; generalised disarmament of thewarring parties by ECOMOG;anembargo on the importation and acquisition ofarms bythe warring parties in Liberia; the formation of an Interim Govern- mentof NationalUnity pending the conduct of generalelections; and establish- ingan atmosphere for the conduct of general and presidential elections in Liberia.17 Viewedfrom the perspective of diplomacy the ECOWAS Peace Planwas a recipefor disaster in Liberia.Very little negotiation took place between members of the SMC andthe factions in Liberia, particularly the NPFL whoseleader, CharlesTaylor, accused ECOWAS ofessentially handing him down a set of instructionsto roll back his forces fromMonrovia. De® ant and agitated, Taylor insistedthat the NPFL `tookup arms, gotrid of Doe, and took more than 95 percentof thecountry’ and so hadearned the right torule Liberia. 18 Againstthis claim, ECOWAS accusedTaylor of being` arrogantlyintransigent’ , anddeclared its intentionto proceedwith its Liberian initiative with or withoutthe support of the factions.19 Inthe words of thepresident of Guinea,one of theproponents of the Peace Plan:` Wedonotneed the permission of anyparty involved in thecon¯ ict toimplementthe decisions reached in Banjul. So, with or withoutthe agreement ofany of the parties, ECOWAS troopswill be in Liberia’ . 20 Why was ECOWAS so impatientwith the course of diplomacyin Liberia?Two factorsaccount for the organisation’ s diplomaticdebacle in Liberia. The ® rst is theorganisation’ s lackof experiencein thediplomacy of multilateral security. If, as is oftenthe case, foreignpolicy is are¯ection of domestic politics, there is nothingabout the domestic politics of the states ofthe SMCÐallunder various forms ofauthoritarianruleÐ to inspire con® dence in thesuccess ofdiplomacy. 21 Thesecond reason relates to calculations of self-interest by proponents of the ECOWAS peaceplan. This was coldlyexpressed by Obed Asamoah, Ghana’ s foreignminister: ` theLiberian situation¼ assumed internationaldimensions becauseseveral thousand Ghanaians, Nigerians and other nationals [had] been holedup in Liberia and [were] suffering because of the ® ghting’. Furthermore, heargued,the heavy economic toll of therefugee and humanitarian situation on Liberia’s neighboursmade rapid intervention by ECOWAS animperative that couldnot be accomplished by the grinding wheels of diplomacy.In echoing the Guineanpresident, Asamoah insisted that members of ECOWAS `donothave to lookat the interest of warring factions alone but also at the interests of the neighbouringcountries. So many countries have been saddled with refugees. Are theyto continue to carry this burden because one particular faction in Liberia wantsto carry out its ambition?’ 22 474 THE LIBERIAN CONFLICT AND THE ECOWAS±UN PARTNERSHIP

The ECOWAS diplomaticinitiative in Liberia was boundto fail even before it hadbegun. While ECOWAS was conveninga conferenceof Liberianexiles in The Gambiain the last week of August 1990 to elect an interim government, the factionsin Liberia were vowing to opposethe peace plan. The eventual selection ofAmos Sawyer, an exiled Marxist professor at the University of Liberia, to headthe interim government in Monrovia, served only to crystallise opposition to the ECOWAS plan.In what was describedas `asuddennew-found con® dence’ , evenSamuel Doe, the embattled president of Liberia, accused the ECOWAS leadershipof `meddlingin Liberia’ s internalaffairs’ ,justas the NPFL contended that `the ECOWAS discussionof an interim government showed complete and total disregardfor the constitution and sovereignty of Liberia’. 23 With ECOWAS bent on asingle-mindedeffort to push through its Liberian initiative, the NPFL warned that` iftherewas anyattempt at peacekeeping from any part of the world, [it] wouldnot allow that force to enter’ . 24 Thestage was nowset fora military showdownbetween ECOWAS andthe Liberian factions.

Thefailure of militaryintervention

Thespeed with which ECOMOG was constitutedand deployed suggests that the ECOWAS leadershipdid not give diplomacy a chance.At theirmeeting in August 1990in Bamako, the heads of government of the SMC states endorsedthe plan toestablish ECOMOG as theprincipal instrument for implementing the Liberian Peace Plan.The legal instruments establishing the force stipulated that ECOMOG becomposed of military contingents drawn from the member states ofthe SMC aswellas fromGuinea and Sierra Leone. It bestowed on the force commander thepower ` toconduct military operations for the purpose of monitoring the cease-® re,restoring law and order to createthe necessary conditionsfor free and fairelections to be held in Liberia’ . UnlikeUN resolutionsauthorising the establishmentof peacekeeping forces, the ECOWAS decisionleft the duration of the ECOMOG missionopen-ended: ECOMOG operations` shallcommence forthwith’ (thatis, 7 August1990) and ` shallremain in Liberia, if necessary, until the successful holdingof general elections and the installation of an elected government’. 25 Oneweek after the mission was authorised, ECOMOG forces drawnfrom Nigeria,Ghana, Guinea, The Gambia and Sierra Leone began to assemble at QueenElizabeth Quay in Freetown, Sierra Leone, for onward deployment in Monrovia.26 Underthe initial command of Ghanaian General Arnold Quainoo, ECOMOG troopslanded in Monrovia on 24August 1990, to commence what they dubbed OperationLiberty .27 Intheabsence of anyprior cease® re agreementwith thewarring factions, the West African forces came under® re as theycame ashorein Monrovia. According to an eye-witness account:

Onlanding, nothing had changed at the diplomatic level to raise bright hopes for ECOMOG inthe task ahead. And so, the force had to inch ahead against all the persistentodds. The ® erce® ghtingwe sensedon the high sea between the NPFL rebelsof Charles Taylor and the INPFL [IndependentNational Patriotic Forces of Liberia]forces of Prince Johnson did not subside. Even as seamen struggled to 475 CLEMENT EADIBE

anchorthe ships and off-load their contents, heavy gun® re cracked,interspersed withbooms from mortar,lasting for anhour. 28

ECOMOG forces foughttheir way into Liberia. To accomplisheven the most basic objectiveof establishing a footholdin Monrovia, ECOMOG hadto take on local forces thatthen controlled the entry point around the Freeport area ofMonrovia. Astheyconsolidated and widened their defence perimeter beyond their immedi- atecon® nes, ECOMOG forces pushed NPFL militiato the outskirts of Monrovia. Thismove produced three unpleasant consequences, which greatly imperilled the mission’s chancesof success. First,it unnecessarily escalated the con¯ ict by pittingthe ` peacekeepers’against one of the parties to the con¯ ict. Second, it diminishedthe presence and power of one of the local factions, thereby distortingthe correlation of forces inthe local arena. More to the point, by quicklydislodging NPFL militiafrom the positions that they had long occupied inMonrovia, ECOMOG forces arbitrarilyenhanced the presence of arivalmilitia, the INPFL.On9September,the INPFL tookmaximum advantage of theirenhanced pro®le to abduct and kill President Samuel Doe on the premises of ECOMOG headquarters. 29 Thirdand more signi® cantly, the view of ECOMOG as animpartial arbiterquickly eroded and was replacedby a widespreadperception within and outsideWest Africa that ECOMOG hadindeed become a factorin the Liberian con¯ict. This perception was furtherstrengthened by a series ofdeadly encoun- ters between ECOMOG forces andvarious Liberian factions from 1990 onwards. Withthe death of President Doe in circumstances that seriously undermined themilitary credibility of ECOMOG,GeneralBabangida and Flt Lt Jerry Rawlings ofGhana agreed in September to strengthen ECOMOG groundforces tothe level ofan effective ® ghtingarmy. Their objective was notto deter the warring factionsfrom launching further assaults on ECOMOG forces.Rather, it was to prepare ECOMOG forpeace-enforcement actions designed to restoreits prestige as acrediblemilitary force. To this end, ECOMOG strengthwas doubledfrom 3500 inAugustto 7000 soldiers by theend of September1990. Furthermore, ECOMOG was completelyreorganised to includeall three components of amodern® ghting force(army, navy and air force). Acrucialaspect of the reorganisation involved the replacement of Force CommanderGeneral QuainooÐ who was widelyperceived to be ` soft’on the warringmilitiaÐ with a moreaggressive commander, Nigerian General Joshua Dogonyaro.30 Theinstruction that was handeddown to the new force comman- derwas toensure the attrition of militia forces bystrictly enforcing a complete arms embargoon the warring parties in Liberia. It was reasonedthat such a measure would` preventarms andammunition [from] continuing to come into [sic] therebel forces, who were still not subscribing to a cease-® re’. 31 In October,General Dogonyaro launched a campaignto drive out local militia forces fromthe vicinity of Monroviainto Liberia’ s heartland.By thetime it was concludedin November, the ECOMOG assault,described as a`limitedoffensive’ , hadin¯ icted so muchcollateral damage on Monrovia as towarrant frantic calls bymanyindividuals and organisations, including Western diplomats sympathetic to ECOMOG,forGeneral Dogonyaro’ s replacement. 32 Inthe aftermath of this operation,the NPFL withdrewinto the safety of Gbarnga,a provincialtown in the 476 THE LIBERIAN CONFLICT AND THE ECOWAS±UN PARTNERSHIP middleof Liberia. In Monrovia, ECOMOG was ableto con® ne the remnants of INPFL forces andtheir leader, Prince Johnson, to asmallsector of thecity. It was inthe midst of the illusory peace and normalcy that prevailed in Liberia at the time that ECOMOG committedone of its most serious blunders. Againstthe stern opposition of the local militias, ECOMOG tookthe unpre- cedentedstep of installing an alternative government in MonroviaÐ the contro- versialInterim Government of National Unity ( IGNU),ledby Amos Sawyer. Lackingany basis oflocalsupport and widely ridiculed as apuppetof ECOWAS, IGNU becamea unitingforce for the leaders of disparate militia factions whose principaldesire was toassume thepresidency of Liberia. By1992 common opposition to IGNU and ECOMOG haddriven many Liberians to join the NPFL,nowbased in Gbarnga. Emboldened by the growing mass supportfor his movement and the widening rift between ECOWAS states overthe directionof the Liberian mission, Taylor launched ` OperationOctopus’ , which was awell-calculatedmilitary offensive designed to retake Monrovia. 33 To beat back the NPFL,theleadership of ECOWAS agreedto a substantialincrease in the forcestrength of ECOMOG to11 256soldiers, up 60%from 1990. By the time the attackwas repelledin January 1993, ECOMOG and the NPFL hadbecome so weakenedand exhausted that they both expressed a newwillingness to embrace adiplomaticsolution to the con¯ ict, but this time under the auspices of the UnitedNations. After a series ofmeetings that took place in Geneva at the instanceof the late President Felix Houphouet-Boign yofCo Ãted’ Ivoire, Liberia’s warringparties, ECOWAS, the OAU andthe United Nations agreed to a newpeace plan that was unveiledin Cotonou,in thesummer of1993.The new peaceplan called for the disarming of the warring factions and the replacement ofAmos Sawyer’ s IGNU witha collectiveCouncil of StateÐ the Liberian NationalTransitional Government ( LNTG).Thedeal also called for the demobilisationof the warring factions, as wellas theelection of a substantive governmentin a nation-widepoll. The real novelty of the Cotonou Agreement, however,lay in the establishment of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)tooversee the implementation of thepeace plan in conjunction withan expanded ECOMOG.

Thenature of the ECOMOG± UNOMIL partnership TheUnited Nations was invitedto step into the Liberian quagmire because of thepolitico-military stalemate encountered by ECOWAS.Althoughthe ECOWAS± UNalliancewas notborn out of any mutual enthusiasm for the potential complimentaritiesbetween the two organisations in thetask of con¯ict resolution inLiberia,the UN workedhard to laythe foundation for possible organisational interdependence.The UN Secretary-General’s reportof 9 September1993, on whichbasis theSecurity Council established UNOMIL throughResolution 866, was quiteemphatic about the teamwork that was expectedfrom ECOMOG and UNOMIL:

Sincethe role foreseen for UNOMIL isto monitor and verify the implementation of the[Cotonou] Agreement, its concept of operation necessarily must be parallel to 477 CLEMENT EADIBE

that of ECOMOG¼ UNOMIL wouldthus¼ deploy observer teams in concert with ECOMOG deployment,including border crossings, airports and seaports¼ [In short], UNOMIL and ECOMOG wouldcollaborate closely in their operations. 34 Forthese tasks, the UN Secretary-Generalrecommended a missioncomprising 303military observers. 35 Includedin this ® gurewere 41 teams composedof six observersper team, 25 militaryobservers based at the UNOMIL headquarters,and eightobservers at each of the four regional headquarters. An unspeci®ed number ofadministrative or support staff wererecommended for deployment to assist themilitary observers. Inaccepting the Secretary-General’ s recommendationon 22 December 1993, theSecurity Council widened the mandate of UNOMIL toinclude social recon- struction,a decisionthat may have been in¯ uenced by a precedentset in Somalia.According to Resolution 866, ` UNOMIL shallcomprise military observ- ers as wellas medical,engineering, communications, transportation and electoral components¼’ Its eight-itemmandate was noless extensivethan that of theUN Operationsin Somalia ( UNOSOM).Itincluded the veri® cation of compliance withthe peace agreement, judicial administration of violations, delivering humanitarianassistance, engineering local elections, rebuilding socioeconomic infrastructure,disarming and demobilising combatants and the like. However, notwithstandingthe expansion of the tasks ofthe proposed mission, Resolution 866maintained the maximum strength of 303 observers recommended for UNOMIL andaccepted a costceiling of $42.6 million for the seven-month durationof the mission. 36 Thesuccess of UNOMIL was inextricablylinked to the success oftheCotonou Agreement.Like previous agreements before it, however, the Cotonou Agree- mentcollapsed soon after it was signedwith much fanfare. Attempts to establish atransitionalgovernment in Monrovia were frustrated by persistent bickering overthe choice of membership. In the security arena, the disarmament pro- grammewhich called for the surrendering of all weapons and ammunition by the warringfactions to UNOMIL and ECOMOG forces failedmiserably. Not only were noprovisions made for the welfare and rehabilitation of the militia, many of whomwere child-soldiers, but UNOMIL alsofailed to attract the level of personnel andmaterial support necessary toundertake this assignment. Consequently, it resortedto relying on ECOMOG forinitiative as wellas logisticalsupport. Not surprisingly,therefore, UNOMIL quicklylost the trust of localfactions which had remainedwary of ECOMOG;italso lost any attraction for states willingto contributetheir forces tothemission. Indeed, by thespring of 1995, UNOMIL had shrunkfrom 303 observers drawn from 14 states to77 observers (see Table1). Oneyear later, all troop-contributin gAfricanstates, except Uganda, had with- drawntheir forces from UNOMIL,therebyleaving the mission moribund. Why did thishappen? Fromthe beginning, UNOMIL was notdesigned to be independent. UNOMIL was inextricablytied both to ECOMOG aswellas theCotonou Agreement of 1993.In thewords of the UN Secretary-General: Therole foreseen for theUnited Nations in the implementation of the Cotonou PeaceAgreement is predicatedon the assumption that the ECOMOG forcewill be in 478 THE LIBERIAN CONFLICT AND THE ECOWAS±UN PARTNERSHIP

TABLE 1 Compositionof UNOMIL, April 1995

Country TroopsObservers

Bangladesh 7 8 China ± 5 Czech Republic ± 6 Egypt ± 7 Guinea-Bissau ± 5 India ± 6 Jordan ± 9 Kenya 2 9 Malaysia ± 8 Pakistan ± 8 Uruguay ± 6 Total 9 77

Source: TheUnited Nations and the Situation inLiberia, New York:United Nations Depart- ment ofPublicInformation, April 1995, p 20.

apositionto performthe wide-ranging tasks entrusted to itbytheLiberian parties . TheUnited Nations has received the necessary assurances in this regard from ECOMOG.Nonethe less, I muststress that should the additional troops not be deployedor should some of ECOMOG’stroopsbe withdrawn prematurely, the successfulimplementation of the Peace Agreement would be in jeopardy. Obviously, withoutthe necessary support and cooperation of ECOMOG, UNOMIL willnot be able to successfully carry out its responsibilities in the peace process.Insuch an event¼ I mightbe obliged to recommend the withdrawal of UNOMIL.37

Noneof these conditions existed on the ground. The Cotonou Agreement failed shortlyafter it was initialled.Contrary to the letter and spirit of theAgreement, ECOMOG was unableto expand its forces partlybecause many of the African states wereunable to ful® l theirpledge to contribute troops for the mission. Worsestill, ECOMOG was substantiallydownsized because of ® nancialand domesticpolitical uncertainties in Nigeria and continuing concerns in Ghana aboutthe seriousness andgood faith of the parties to the Liberian dispute. Indeed,by June 1994 Nigeria had reduced its contribution to 6000 from 11 000 theprevious year. With the military temporarily out of power by this time in Nigeria,the civilian-led government of Ernest Shonekan was threateninga completepull-out from ECOMOG inorder to save thetenuous regime from the ®scal andpolitical burden of thebeleaguered operation. At thesame time,Ghana was completingthe phased reduction of its ECOMOG forceby 50%, with a promiseto end its participation by theend of 1994. By theend of 1993 ECOMOG `fatigue’was alreadyvisible in the key regional states thatwere sponsoring the mission.This situation was furtherworsened by the inability of the United 479 CLEMENT EADIBE

Nationsto deliver on its promise to render ® nancialand logistical assistance to thestates contributingto ECOMOG.38 Thematerial capacity and political will of ECOMOG states toundertake the tasks entrustedby the Cotonou Agreement eroded. Despitethe failure of theCotonou Agreement, the Security Council continued to extend UNOMIL periodically,even though the mission’ s tangibleutility had signi®cantly diminished over the years. Although largely unwritten, the present task of UNOMIL istoattemptto provide transparency to thepeace process mainly byitspresence, even without further material commitments to theLiberian peace process.39 Inthe two years sincethe collapse of theCotonou Agreement, UNOMIL has usedits ` goodof® ces’ toencourage efforts to reach new and promising agreementsbetween the warring factions in Liberia.This yielded the Akosombo Agreementof 1994 which, despite President Jerry Rawlings’widely acclaimed personalefforts and initiative, failed to bring lasting peace in Liberia. 40 The collapseof the Akosombo Agreement was quicklyfollowed by the rati® cation ofyet another agreement in Abuja, Nigeria, in August 1995. This agreement is largelythe product of political changes in Nigeria which brought about a fundamentalattitudinal and policy shift in favour of CharlesTaylor and the NPFL froma widelyisolated military regime in Abuja. 41 Thisnew agreement contained thetimetable for ending the Liberian con¯ ict shown in Table 2. Fora whileit seemed as thoughthe Abuja Agreement would guarantee the lastingpeace that had eluded previous conciliation efforts in Liberia. Within weeksof signingthe agreement, the thorny problem of constitutingthe six-mem- bercouncil of state was ®nallyresolved. The membership of the council includedthe leaders of themajor factions: Charles Taylor from the NPFL, Alhaji Kromahfrom the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO)andGeorge Boley from the Liberian Peace Council( LPC).42 Other

TABLE 2 Themajor provisions and timetable of the Abuja Agreement

Dates Descriptionof activities

26August1995 Cease® re takes effect throughoutLiberia 2September1995 Six-member collective presidency, the Council of State, constituted

16December 1995Disarmament beginswith the deployment of UNOMIL and ECOMOG forces interritories controlledby thefactional militias 30January1996 Disarmament anddemobilisation of combatantscompleted Spring 1996 Repatriationand resettlement ofrefugees andinternally displaced persons underway 20August1996 Presidential and general elections held throughout Liberia. The presidential election is notopen to thechairman oftheCouncil of State.However, other members ofthe Councilwishing to run for elective of®ces may doso provided they resigned their membershipthree monthsbefore the date ofelections

480 THE LIBERIAN CONFLICT AND THE ECOWAS±UN PARTNERSHIP members ofthe council were Professor WiltonSankawulo (Chairman), Chief TambaTaylor and Oscar Quiah(members). However, soon after it was consti- tuted,the collective presidency was plungedinto crisis as apowerstruggle ensuedbetween its members `overappointments to positions in government’ . 43 Worsestill, factional in-® ghting also broke out within ULIMO betweenAlhaji Kromahand Roosevelt Johnson, forcing the latter to form his own wing: (ULIMO-J).Bythe end of 1995,the tension had boiled over to encourage attacks on ECOMOG forces.On 28 December, elements of ULIMO-J ambushedNigerian ECOMOG forces attemptingto disarm the militias. This was followedby a heavy artillerybombardment of ECOMOG’sbase inthe provincial town of Tubmanburg indiamond-richBomi County. 44 Accordingto MaxSesay, the attack was caused bythecollapse of an` understandingbetween Nigerian soldiers and ULIMO-J over diamondmining areas’ controlledby Johnson’s forces. 45 Followingthis incident, tensionincreased and security deteriorated rapidly, leading to the inde® nite suspensionof the ongoing disarmament operation in the Liberian hinterland. InFebruary 1996 fresh clashes brokeout between rival factions over compet- ingclaims to territoriespreviously handed over to ECOMOG±UNOMIL as partof the disarmamentprocess. Ben Asante, a leadingcorrespondent for West Africa, attributesthe outbreak of renewed ® ghtingto the ` circumstantialincompetence’ of ECOMOG±UNOMIL peacekeepersin Liberia. 46 Thereturn to street ® ghtingin Monroviain April 1996 led to yet another round of refugee ¯ owand the subsequentevacuation of foreignnationals by US forces.The renewed violence was triggeredby thedecision of theCouncil of Stateto dismiss andsubsequently arrest RooseveltJohnson for his alleged responsibility for the violence that eruptedin December 1995. The spring disturbances were later quelled by reluctant ECOMOG forces aftermuch persuasion by Westerndiplomats. 47 Follow- ingthe end of thehostilities, a summer meetingwas calledby ECOWAS in Accra toprevent the complete collapse of the Abuja Agreement. On 17 August the leadersof Liberia’ s factionsagreed to ` arevisedversion of the Abuja Accord’ andappointed Ruth Perry to replace Sankawulo as thechair of the Council of State.48 Thekey elements of the revised Abuja Accord were: implementationof disarmamentand demobilisation by 31January1997; dissolution of allfactional militiaby the end of February 1997; general elections by 31 May 1997; and formationof a nationalgovernment by 15 June 1997. Fromall indications, the revised accord is workingas planned.The disarma- mentand demobilisation phase has proceededwithout any major hitches. What isevenmore striking is thatthe new accord is beingprogressively implemented inspite of the United Nations, not because of it. The parties have evolved a modusoperandi basedprimarily on the personal chemistry that exists between CharlesTaylor and General Sani Abacha, Nigeria’ s militaryruler. This was demonstratedby the recent wedding of Charles Taylor, which was attendedby themajor factional leaders and hosted by Nigeria’s foreignminister. Taylor, who has sinceemerged as GeneralAbacha’ s favourite,is highlyfavoured to win Liberia’s presidentialelections in the summer of1997.Should this happen, one mustask whysuch an outcome was preventedby seven years ofmultilateral intervention.What lessons, then, may be learned from this unusual exercise in multilateralpartnership and task-sharing? 481 CLEMENT EADIBE

Thelessons ofa failed partnership Fromthe beginning, the United Nations viewed its security partnership with ECOWAS as anexperiment. For ECOWAS,theLiberia project was the® rst ofits kindin two signi® cant ways. First, it was the® rst timethat the organisation wouldshift its focus away from its primary objective of enhancingregional trade relationstowards the uncharted waters of securityintegration. The legal steps for cooperationon militarymatters had been taken with the adoption of theDefense Protocolof 1978. Amid fears ofNigeriandomination, however, ECOWAS did not confronta securitydilemma until the outbreak of the Liberian con¯ ict in 1989. Second,and more signi® cantly, there was nohistory of task-sharing between ECOWAS andthe United Nations. In fact, like many African states sincethe failureof the United Nations Operation in the Congo ( ONUC)inthe 1960s, ECOWAS member-statesavoided UN involvementin their affairs. That the UN±ECOWAS partnershiptook place at all, given the circumstances of widespreadfears ofdominationand mistrust, is indicativeof progressin African diplomacy,in particular, and inter-institutional cooperation, in general. What lessons maybe learned from this experiment in institutional task-sharing betweenthe United Nations and regional arrangements? The West African experiencepoints to three crucial lessons: thecomplexity of the geopolitical environment;the nature of the command or authoritystructure; and the character ofinternational support.

Thefear of dominationand the necessity to steer clearof messy regional geopolitics

ECOWAS violatedthe cornerstone of every successful peacekeepingmissionÐ strictadherence to the principle of impartiality. Not only must peacekeepers be impartialin their dealings with all parties to a dispute,they must be perceived as such.In Liberia, ECOWAS displayeda completedisregard for this most fundamentaltenet. From the beginning the ECOWAS missionsuffered from justi®able concerns about the organisation’ s objectivityin the light of the credentialsof itssponsors, especially Nigeria and Ghana. In this regard, in West Africaand much of Africa, diplomacy has reallybeen about the politics of personality. 49 Inthe case ofLiberia, a complexweb of personal ties and `friendship’involving the principal actors in the con¯ ictÐ Samuel Doe, Charles Taylor,Ibrahim Babangida, Blaise Compaore ÂandJerry Rawlings,among others Ðposedenormous challenges to the presumption of impartiality by ECOWAS. Thecon¯ ict in Liberia was theconsequence of an organised effort to topple thecorrupt despotism of Master-Sergeant Doe. Exiled from Liberia, Charles Taylorand other leaders of therebellion had sought residence in various capitals inWest Africa and, as aconsequence,were very well known to various governmentof® cials. In one particular instance in the 1980s, the personal ties thathad developed between Charles TaylorÐ then resident in GhanaÐ and PresidentRawlings threatened diplomatic relations between Accra and Mon- rovia,with President Doe accusing Rawlings of ` supportingª dissidentsºseeking tooverthrow his regime’ . However,according to Byron Tarr, the once cosy 482 THE LIBERIAN CONFLICT AND THE ECOWAS±UN PARTNERSHIP relationshipwent sour, with Rawlings incarcerating Taylor in Accra. In 1987 Taylorrelocated to Burkina Faso wherehe was warmlywelcomed by Captain BlaiseCompaore Â,aswornadversary of Doe. 50 ButDoe was notwithout his own friendsin thesub-region. He andNigeria’ s GeneralIbrahim Babangida did little todisguise the depth of their mutual affection. In Liberia, Doe named a major highwayand a schoolat the University of Liberiaafter Ibrahim Babangida. The latter,using state resources, returned the favour by showering Doe with largesse. Giventhese personal networks, individual biases werecarried into the domain of statepolicy once armed con¯ ict broke out in Liberia. Taylor was backed unconditionallyby hislong-time friend, Blaise Compaore Â,theleader of Burkina Faso.Doe, on the other hand, sought and obtained the support of President Babangida.For his part, Flt Lt Jerry Rawlingsof Ghana had no particular reasons tosupport either Doe or Taylor.Like his Nigerian counterpart, however, Rawlingsdid not want to see Taylorassume thepresidency of Liberia,although hewas far less enthusiasticthan General Babangida about taking action to preventthe emergence of Charles Taylor as thepresident of Liberia. 51 Given thesecircumstances, ECOWAS merelybecame an institutional expression of these biases as soonas ittook on the Liberian mission. 52 Closelyrelated to the problem of ECOWAS’simpartialityin Liberia is the enigmaticrole of Nigeria, West Africa’ s presumed` hegemon’.53 The ECOWAS case inLiberia underlines the argument made in the theoretical literature that hegemonyis `Janus-faced’, withpositive as wellas negativesides. 54 Many studentsof West African politics agree that Nigeria, which was centralto the formationof ECOWAS,has beenthe political, military and ® nancialforce behind theorganisation’ s missionin Liberia. 55 Between1990 and 1996, successive Nigeriangovernments have spent in excess of$3 billionon the Liberian mission. Throughoutthe different phases ofthe Liberian mission, the Nigerian troop contributionto ECOMOG consistentlyaccounted for between 70% and 80% of the totalstrength of the force. With such a levelof commitment, few observers believethat ECOMOG couldhave been initiated without Nigeria. But,as signi®cant as itscontribution has beento the initiation and mainte- nanceof the mission, Nigeria has alsocontributed immensely to the problems that the ECOWAS missionin Liberia has encounteredover the years. The rigid positionadopted by the Nigerian government against Charles Taylor cost the Liberianmission the support of many ECOWAS states,especially the francophone members.Moderate states, such as Senegaland Togo, could not understand why GeneralBabangida had so much interest in who becameLiberia’ s presidentas aresultof the ECOWAS mediationefforts. 56 Accordingto oneSenegalese of® cial, `Taylor’s integrityis inseriousdoubt, but so is theintegrity of Nigerianleaders. Besides,if the process we[ie ECOWAS]are negotiatingproduces Taylor as Liberia’s leader,why should we notrespect that verdict?’ 57 Onseveraloccasions between1990 and 1994, even Ghana, Nigeria’ s strongestally in ECOWAS, expressedsimilar misgivings and threatened to pull out of ECOMOG because of GeneralBabangida’ s personalisationof the Liberian problem around Charles Taylor.How, then, did the UN respondto this acrimonious environment? Aswehave seen, the world organisation ® rmlyimmersed itself in the dirt of WestAfrica’ s politicsof hegemony by aligning itself so closelyto Nigeria and 483 CLEMENT EADIBE

ECOMOG.If ithas beendif® cult to distinguish between the UN and ECOMOG in Liberia,it is becausevery little effort was madeby UNOMIL toformulate an independentinitiative. The United Nations accepted the much-disputed ECOWAS Peace Planas theprincipal plank on which to pursue reconciliation in Liberia. 58 Whenthat agreement failed, the UN jumpedquickly to endorse the Cotonou, Akosomboand Abuja Agreements that were similarly ` destined’to failure.In all this,the UN was playingcatch-up, thereby raising questions about the world organisation’s initiativeand leadership in the vital area ofinternational peace andsecurity. The obvious lesson from Liberia, therefore, is that,if theUN must acceptthe invitation of regional organisations to intervene in regional con¯ icts followingthe exhaustion of local initiatives and options, the world body should investits resources intocrafting an alternative peace initiative rather than merely becominga rubberstamp for failed plans.

Thedysfunctional nature of parallel command structures Whateverits intended uses, theexistence of parallelauthority structures hampers theeffectiveness of ® eldoperations by blurring the hierarchy of command. In Liberia, UNOMIL and ECOMOG maintainedparallel command structures. This is especiallysurprising because the UN hadbeen invited because of the particular de®ciencies of the regional command structure. The weakness of UN deploy- mentsin the ® eldfrequently challenged the relative autonomy of theUN’ schain ofcommand,thus leaving the ECOWAS commandstructure as theonly real source ofauthority to which Liberia’ s warringfactions frequently referred. Conse- quently,the subordination of regional command structures to global authority was neitherattempted nor achieved by UNOMIL.Forthis particular reason, UNOMIL was essentiallyredundant in Liberia as aparticipantin the process of con¯ict resolution. The structural parallelism that characterised the command andcontrol apparatus of ECOWAS andthe UN inLiberia may be attributed to UNOMIL’sweak® nancialbase fromthe beginning of the mission or mere administrativeoversight at the UN Secretariat.Whatever the reason, however, theparallelism for the most part strengthened the position and signi® cance of Nigeria and ECOWAS andit served only to promote the idea and perception that theUnited Nations was eitherincapable of peace-enforcement actions or unwillingto undertake such tasks inLiberia. 59 Italso provided crucial evidence tosupportthe predictive logic of hegemonytheory present in othercases inthis issue (especiallyGeorgia), namely that the UN willtend to defer to regional powerswhen it is engagedin a partnershipwith regional organisations, es- peciallyin the security issue-area. 60

Thedesirability of politicalconditionalities for supportingregional security initiatives

The ECOWAS experiencein Liberiademonstrates the need for better judgement by theUnited Nations in approving or delegating security tasks toregional organi- sations.The issue is notwhether security tasks shouldbe devolved to regional arrangements.Rather, it is whatkinds of security tasks shouldbe devolved to 484 THE LIBERIAN CONFLICT AND THE ECOWAS±UN PARTNERSHIP whatkinds of regional institutions, and what conditions need be met by them. Insuch cases as Liberia,where the causes ofcon¯ ict are tobe located in the abuses ofdespotic regimes, the United Nations is obliged toensure that those states andorganisations that are authorisedto mediate such con¯ icts are themselvesfree fromthe menace of despotism. As Ofuatey-Kodjoehas argued: ¼thenotion that a groupof states headed by military dictatorships have the right tointervene in another state in order to establish a democraticregime is grotesque. Andthe notion that these states can in fact achieve that objective by theapplication ofoutside force may be only an exercise in wishful thinking. 61 InWest Africa, Nigeria’ s militaryrulers used Liberia as adress rehearsalfor theirelaborate scheme toconsolidate despotic rule in their own country. 62 Inconclusion, those looking for a modelof UNburden-sharingwith regional arrangementsshould be directedaway from ECOWAS andLiberia. At itsbest, the UNinvolvementin Liberia may be characterisedas indifferentand purposeless. Withthe majority of its forces `stranded’in their home countries because of logisticallapses, UNOMIL reliedtoo heavily on ECOMOG forces evenfor the most basictasks. This was thedirect consequence of thegross inadequacyof funding forthe mission. In 1994 when the Security Council authorised the mission, the secretariatestimated the cost of the operation at $36.4 million for the initial durationof seven months. However, according to MaxSesay, ` bythe end of that yearthe assessed contributionspaid by member-states¼ amounted to only $5.7 million’ .63 Itis hardlysurprising, therefore, that many Liberians were unaware ofa UNpresencein their country. The dismal performance of UNOMIL should dramatiseto the leadership of the United Nations the high cost of half-hearted measures relatingto the maintenance of international peace and security. The UNshouldre-evaluate the wisdom of authorising missions simply to create the impressionthat something signi® cant is beingdone in a desperateenvironment.

Notes 1 Establishedin 1975, ECOWAS is theprincipal regional economic grouping in West Africa. Its membership of16 statesÐ francophone, anglophone and lusophoneÐ makes itthe largest andby far themost complex sub-regionalorganisation in Africa. Its members are: Benin,Burkina Faso, Cape VerdeÂ,CoÃte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana,Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone andTogo. See SKBAsante, ThePolitical Economy of Regionalismin Africa: A Decade oftheEconomic Communityof West African States ( ECOWAS),New York:Praeger Publishers,1986; and C EAdibe,` ECOWAS incomparative perspective’ , inTimothy M Shaw& JuliusE Okolo(eds), ThePolitical Economy of Foreign Policy in ECOWAS,London:Macmillan, 1994, ch 11. 2 UNSecretary-General, Reportof the Secretary-General onLiberia ,UNSecurityCouncil document S/26422,9 September1993, p 11. 3 Ibid, p 4. 4 DavidWippman, ` Enforcingthe peace: ECOWAS andthe Liberian civil war’ ,inLori F Damrosch (ed), EnforcingRestraint: Collective Interventionin Internal Con¯ icts ,New York:Council on ForeignRelations, 1993,p 165.See alsoW Ofuatey-Kodjoe,` Regionalorganizations and the resolution of internalcon¯ ict: the ECOWAS interventionin Liberia’ , InternationalPeacekeeping ,Vol1, No 3, 1994, pp 261± 302. 5 AfricaResearch Bulletin ,15February 1990, p 9557.The implicit perjorativeness of this anthropological descriptionwas theresult of tensions that long characterised relationsamong Liberia’ s socioeconomic groupsÐGios, Mandingos, Manos, Krahns, Americo-Liberians. See JGusLiebenow, Liberia:The Evolution ofPrivilege ,Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press, 1969;Monday Akpan, ` Black imperialism: Americo- 485 CLEMENT EADIBE

Liberianrule over the African peoplesof Liberia, 1841± 1964’ , CanadianJournal of African Studies , Vol 7,No 2, 1973, pp 217± 236; and Wippman, ` Enforcingthe peace’ ,pp160± 165. 6 See GaniYoroms, ` Regionalsecurity, collective defence andthe problem of peace initiativesin West Africa: the case of ECOMOG intheLiberian con¯ ict’ ,paperpresented at the17th Annual Conference of theNigerian Societyof International Affairs, Centre forDemocratic Studies,Abuja, Nigeria, 9± 11 December 1991; Ofuatey-Kodjoe,` Regionalorganizations and the resolution of internal con¯ ict’ ,pp268± 281; and Jinmi Adisa,` Nigeria in ECOMOG:politicalundercurrents and the burden of community spirit’ , SmallWars and Insurgencies ,Vol5, No 1, 1994, pp 83± 110. 7 See Newswatch (Lagos),14 May 1990; and Osisioma Nwolise,` Theinternationalisation of the Liberian crisis andits effects onWest Africa’ ,inMargaret Vogt(ed), TheLiberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold Attemptat Regional Peacekeeping ,Lagos:Gabumo Publishing, 1992, p 60. 8 See ChikeAkabogu, ` ECOWAS takes theinitiative’ , inVogt, TheLiberian Crisis and ECOMOG, p 73. 9 See Salim AhmedSalim’ sinterviewin West Africa (London),13± 19 August1990; and excerpts ofYoweri Museveni’s interviewwith the BBC in Contact:The Of® cialJournal of the Economic Community of West AfricanStates ,Vol2, No 3, 1990, p 8.One year later, Zimbabwe’ sPresidentRobert Mugabe further challengedthe sacrosanctity of the OAU’snon-interventionclause. He arguedthat ` theª domesticaffairsº of acountrymust mean affairs withina peaceful environment,but where thatpeaceful environmentis completelygone and the people are nolonger in a positionto exercise theirown sovereign authority¼ surely thetime wouldhave come foran intervention to occur’. Quotedin BenEphson, ` Rightto intervene’ , West Africa (London),4± 10 February 1991, p 141. 10 Contact,Vol2, No 3, November 1990, p 6.The Nigerian proposal was notwithout precedent in African diplomacy.When con¯ ict brokeout in 1980 between Libyan-backedrebel forces andtroops loyal to GoukouniWeddeye in Chad, Western diplomatssuccessfully urged Nigeria totake ona `leadership’role inconstituting and deploying an African peacekeepingforce inChad. Nigeria did,and African peacekeepers were deployedin Chadbetween 1981±82. Without the promised in¯ ow of technical,logistical and ® nancial support,the mission ¯ ounderedas Libyan-backedrebels overranthe positions of OAU peacekeepers and swept throughNjadmena toform a new government.For details, see AmaduSesay, ` Thelimits of peace-keepingby aregionalorganization: the OAU peace-keepingforce inChad’ , Con¯ict Quarterly , Winter 1992,pp 7± 26; and William JFoltz& HenryBienen (eds), Arms andthe African: Military In¯ uences on Africa’s InternationalRelations ,New Haven:Yale UniversityPress, 1985. 11 Duringits active years, between 1990±94, the SMC addedGuinea and Sierra LeoneÐtwo of Liberia’ s immediate neighboursÐas de facto members. 12 ECOWAS, FinalReport of the ECOWAS StandingMediation Committee MinisterialMeeting, Freetown, 5± 20 July 1990,ECW/SMC/FM/90/3/Rev.1,1990, pp 4± 5. 13 Ibid, pp 6±8. 14 Ibid, p 11. 15 Ibid, p 10. 16 Ibid,p11(emphasis added). 17 ECOWAS, DecisionA/ DEC.1/8/90 ,Lagos:The Economic Community of West African States,1990. See also People’s DailyGraphic (Accra), 3August1990, pp 2± 3. 18 Africa News,9±13 December 1991,p 8. 19 IbrahimBabangida, ` Theimperative features ofthe Nigerian foreign policy and the crisis inLiberia’ , Contact,Vol2, No 3, 1990, p 14. 20 Quoted in AfricaResearch Bulletin ,15September 1990, p 9802. 21 Inthis regard, see especially GIdang, Nigeria:Internal Policy and Foreign Policy ,Ibadan:University of IbadanPress, 1974;Stellan Lindqvist, LinkagesBetween Domestic andForeign Policy: The Record of Ghana,1957± 1966 ,Lund,Sweden: Studentlitteratur Lund, 1974; and Ofuatey-Kodjoe, ` Regionalorganiza- tionsand the resolution of internal con¯ ict’ ,pp261± 302. 22 Dr ObedAsamoah, quotedin the People’s DailyGraphic (Accra), 23August 1990, p 1.See alsoA Essuman-Johnson,` TheLiberian refugee problemand Ghana’ s responseto it’, LECIA Bulletin, Vol 2, No 1, 1992,pp 34± 40. 23 TheGuardian (Lagos),21 August 1990, p 1. 24 People’s DailyGraphic (Accra), 21July 1990, p 2. 25 ECOWAS, DecisionA/ DEC.1/8/90 ,Article II,p 4. 26 OnAugust 23 Togo,the ® fthmember ofthe SMC,announcedthat it would not contribute troops to ECOMOG because oftheabsence ofacease® re agreement between ECOWAS andLiberia’ s warringfactions. For details, see AfricaResearch Bulletin ,15September 1990, p 9801. 27 Fora detailedaccount of the military operation, see Nkem Agetua, OperationLiberty: The Story of Major GeneralJoshua Dogonyaro ,Lagos:Hona Communications, 1992; and Segun Aderiye, ` ECOMOG landing’ , in Vogt, TheLiberian Crisis and ECOMOG, pp 95±122. 28 SegunAderiye, ` ECOMOG landing’, p106. 29 TheGuardian (Lagos),14 September 1990, p 1,and 20 September 1990, p 1; SundayConcord (Lagos), 23 486 THE LIBERIAN CONFLICT AND THE ECOWAS±UN PARTNERSHIP

September1990, p 7; The Punch (Ibadan),18 October1990, p 7; People’s DailyGraphic (Accra), 11May 1991, p 2. 30 Forinsight into the differing personalities of the two soldiers, see Agetua, OperationLiberty , ch 5±8; and JinmiAdisa, ` ECOMOG force commanders’ ,inVogt, TheLiberian Crisis and ECOMOG,pp237± 270. This created adiplomaticrow between Nigeria andGhana which was quicklyresolved to maintain the ECOMOG coalition. 31 Margaret Vogt,` Theproblems and challenges of peace-making:from peace-keeping to peace enforcement’ , in Vogt, TheLiberian Crisis and ECOMOG, p 155. 32 Ibid,pp155± 157; and Jinmi Adisa, ` ECOMOG force commanders’ ,pp237± 270. 33 West Africa (London),23± 29 August 1993, p 1484. 34 Reportof the Secretary-General onLiberia ,SecurityCouncil document S/ 26422,9 September1993, p 4. 35 Ibid,p5,para 18. 36 Reportof theSecretary-General onLiberia:Addendum ,UNSecurityCouncil document S/ 26422/Add.1,17 September1993, p 2. 37 Reportof the Secretary-General onLiberia ,UNSecurityCouncil document S/ 26422,9 September1993, para 39,p 10(emphasis added). 38 Ibid,p6,paras 23±24. See alsoUN SecurityCouncil document S/ 26200.As anexception, Senegal bene® ted substantiallyfrom US ®nancialand logistical support. In 1991 US supportfor Senegal’ s participationin ECOMOG included$42 million in debt-forgiveness; $15 million worth of military equipment; and a $1million directcash allocation.This made Senegalthe largest recipientof US aiddirectly related tothe ECOWAS operationin Liberia. The other recipients of US aidwere CoÃte d’Ivoire,$1 million; Ghana, Guinea and Sierra Leone,$0.5 million each; andThe Gambia, $0.25million. For details, see RobertMortimer, `Senegal’s roÃle in ECOMOG:thefrancophone dimension in the Liberian crisis’ , Journalof Modern African Studies,Vol34, No 2, 1996, p 297. 39 See Clement EAdibe, ManagingArms inPeace Processes: Liberia ,Geneva: UnitedNations, 1996, p 43; JohnMackinlay & AbiodunAlao, Liberia1994: ECOMOG and UNOMIL Responseto a ComplexEmergency , Occasional Paper#1, New York:United Nations University, 1995. 40 See UNSecurityCouncil document S/ 1994/1174,16 October 1994; and S/ 1995/7,5 January1995. 41 West Africa (London),25± 31 December 1995,and 1± 7 January1996, p 1993. 42 Ibid,25±31 December 1995;and 1± 7 January1996, p 1993. 43 Ibid,18±24 March 1996, pp 422± 423. 44 Ibid,22±28 January 1996, pp 97± 99. 45 MaxAhmadu Sesay, ` Politicsand society in post-war Liberia’ , Journalof Modern African Studies , Vol 34, No3, 1996, p 402.The economic basis ofthe frequent fractionalisation of Liberia’ s warringgroups is an importantelement inthe continuation of the con¯ ict. According to one report, Liberia’ s diamondexports between 1990±94 amounted to $300 million; timber earned $53million; and $27 million accrued fromthe exportof rubber.These revenueswent directly to the leader ofwhichever faction controlled the regions that generatedthe resources. Fordetails, see James Butty,` Bankrollingcon¯ ict’ , West Africa (London),8± 14 July1996, p 1067. 46 West Africa (London),22± 28 January 1996, p 98. 47 Accordingto Sesay’ saccount,this was made possibleby Nigeria’ sreversal ofits earlier instructionto `ECOMOG toremain neutraland to treat thematter as aninternal affair’ (`Politicsand society in post-war Liberia’, p404).The original instruction came inthe wake ofinternational, particularly US condemnation ofGeneral Abacha’ sregime inthe aftermath ofthe execution of Ken Saro-Wiwaand other human rights activistsin November 1995. By instructing ECOMOG forces towithhold action in Liberia in April 1996, General Abacha was sayingthat: ` Itis importantfor the United States torecognise the relevance of Nigeria¼ at least inthe West African subregion’( WashingtonTimes ,30January 1997). 48 Sesay,` Politicsand society in post-war Liberia’ , p405. 49 Fora theoreticaldiscussion of the impact ofpersonality on foreign policy, see Margaret GHermann, `The effects ofpersonal characteristics ofpolitical leaders onforeign policy’ , inMaurice East et al (eds), Why NationsAct: TheoreticalPerspectives forComparative Foreign Policy Studies ,BeverlyHills, CA: Sage Publications,1978, pp 49± 68; and Olajide Aluko (ed), TheForeign Policies of African States , London: Hodderand Stoughton, 1977. 50 SByronTarr, ` The ECOMOG initiativein Liberia: a Liberianperspective’ , Issue: AJournalof Opinion , Vol 21,Nos 1± 2, 1993, pp 79± 80. 51 Fora longtime, thiswas oneof the major sources oftension between Nigeria andGhana. For Nigeria, regime insecurity(which Rawlings has nowovercome) was thecrucial factor.Within the country’ s ruling militarycircles, Charles Taylor’s revoltand his successful recruitment ofa signi®cant numberof `disgruntled’nationals of other ECOWAS states, includingNigeria, was viewedas aforerunnerof ` thecoming anarchy’: a`carefullyorchestrated’ plan to ` destabilise’the entire West African subregion.In Lagos, suspicionswere rife thatTaylor’ s recruits includedsome militarypersonnel who had been declared `wanted persons’in Nigeria because oftheir alleged role in an unsuccessful coup attempt totopple the government 487 CLEMENT EADIBE

ofGeneral IbrahimBabangida in 1990. For this reason in particular, con® rmed reportsreaching Lagos of Libyansupport in terms oftraining and equipment quickly struck a raw nervein government and security circles, andhelped to elevate theLiberian crisis as anationalsecurity issue parexcellence forNigeria. 52 Thisdevelopment is notsurprising to critics ofregional organisations who have pointed to the danger of partisanshipthat may arise shouldregional organisations intervene in local con¯ icts inwhich they are familiar withthe actors andissues. See SNeil MacFarlane &ThomasG Weiss, `Regionalorganizations and regionalsecurity’ , SecurityStudies ,Vol2, No 1, 1992, pp 6± 37. 53 See Ademola Adeleke,` Thepolitics and diplomacy of peacekeeping in West Africa: the ECOWAS operation inLiberia’ , Journalof Modern African Studies ,Vol33, No 4, 1995, pp 569± 593. 54 Cf MancurOlson, TheLogic of Collective Action:Public Goods and the Theory of Groups ,Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press, 1965;Robert Keohane, ` Thetheory of hegemonic stability and changes in internationaleconomic regimes, 1967±1977’ , inOle Holsti et al (eds), Changein the International System , Boulder,CO: Westview Press, 1980;David Laitin, Hegemonyand Culture ,Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1986;and Duncan Snidal, ` Thelimits of hegemonic stability theory’ , InternationalOrganization , Vol 39,No 4, 1985, pp 579± 614. 55 See, amongothers, Gani J Yoroms,` ECOMOG andWest African regionalsecurity: a Nigerianperspective’ , Issue,Vol21, Nos 1± 2, 1993, pp 84± 91; Emmanuel Kwezi Aning, ManagingRegional Security in West Africa: ECOWAS, ECOMOG and Liberia,Copenhagen:Centre forDevelopment Research, WorkingPaper No 94.2,February, 1994; and E JohnInegbedion, ` ECOMOG incomparative perspective’ , inShaw & Okolo, The PoliticalEconomy of Foreign Policy in ECOWAS, ch 12. 56 Forthe francophone dimension of the ECOMOG mission,see Mortimer,` Senegal’s roÃle in ECOMOG’ , pp 293±306. 57 Author’s interview,Geneva, 3 May1995. The issue ofTaylor’ s integrityarose because hisbackground as afugitivefrom US justicehas beenwidely reported by the West African media. Taylor’s reputationin West Africa has alsosuffered signi® cantly from his public perception as acorrupt,power-hungry iconoclast who indulgesin cold-blooded murder. 58 See `Statements bythe President of the Security Council’ , 23January 1991 (Security Council document S/22133,23 January 1991; and S/ 23886,7 May1992), which endorsed the ECOWAS Peace Plan.See also SecurityCouncil Resolution 788 of 19 November1992, which globalised the contentious ECOWAS embargo onthe delivery of arms andammunition to Liberia’ s warringfactions. For a usefulcritique of UN `endorsement’, see AnthonyOfodile, ` Recent development:the legality of ECOWAS interventionin Liberia’, ColumbiaJournal of Transnational Law ,Vol32, No 2, 1994, pp 413± 416. 59 See James ECooper,` Thefate ofthe United States andLiberia is interwoven:now is thetime forhealing’ , TheLiberian Diaspora ,Vol3, No 11, 1993, pp 16± 18. 60 See RobertO Keohane& Lisa LMartin,` Thepromise of institutionalist theory’ , InternationalSecurity , Vol 20,Summer 1995,pp 39± 51. 61 Ofuatey-Kodjoe,` Regionalorganizations and the resolution of internal con¯ ict’ ,p295. 62 See Ofodile,` Recent development’, pp396± 402. 63 Sesay,` Politicsand society in post-warLiberia’ , p407.See alsoStephen Riley, ` Interventionin Liberia: too little,too partisan’ , TheWorld Today ,Vol49, No 3, 1993, pp 42± 43.

488