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The Liberian Conflict and the ECOWAS- UN Partnership

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The Liberian Conflict and the ECOWAS- UN Partnership ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol 18, No 3, pp 471± 488, 1997 TheLiberian con¯ ict andthe ECOWAS±UNpartnership CLEMENT EADIBE Theinternationalisation of theLiberian con¯ ict is aresultmainly of twofactors. The® rst is thebeleaguered attempt by Liberia’ s neighbours,acting under the aegisof theEconomic Community of WestAfrican States ( ECOWAS),toprevent theregional spread of thecon¯ ict through direct political and military interven- tion.1 Thesecond is thedecision by the United Nations (UN), following the euphoricreception of AnAgenda for Peace in1992, to demonstrate global supportfor ` theefforts of the people of Liberia to establish peace in their country’ .2 Thusinternationalised, the Liberian con¯ ict set thestage for an experimentin international politics. For the ® rst timeever, ` theUnited Nations wouldundertake a majorpeace-keeping operation with another organisation, in thiscase asubregionalorganisation¼ ’ . 3 TheLiberian case providesa useful empiricalbasis forevaluating the idea of task-sharing between the United Nationsand regional arrangementsÐ and by extension with the non- governmentalorganisations ( NGOs) discussedlater in this issueÐ in accordance withthe spirit of Article 33 of the UN Charter. Accordingly, this article evaluatesthe effectiveness of the ECOWAS±UNpartnershipin responding adequatelyto thecon¯ ict in Liberia,by answering three critical questions: what led to the ECOWAS±UNpartnership in Liberia? What was thenature of the partnership?What lessons maybe drawn from this pioneering partnership? ECOWAS failure andUN involvement TheUnited Nations was invitedto join the search-for-peace effort in Liberia only after ECOWAS hadfailed to make any appreciable progress towards con¯ ict resolution.According to David Wippman, attempts made in 1990 to place the Liberiancrisis onthe Security Council’ s agendafailed, ` inpart because of oppositionby CoÃted’ Ivoire,(and because the Council’ s members sharedthe US viewthat the problem should be solved by Africans’ . 4 Whatis theexplanation forthe organisation’ s changeof position on this matter? The ECOWAS volte-face re¯ected its beleaguered efforts to contain the Liberian con¯ ict through direct diplomaticand military intervention. Clement Adibeis atthe Department of Political Science, DePaulUniversity, 2320North Kenmore Avenue, Chicago,IL 60614-3298,USA. 0143-6597/97/030471-18$7.00 Ó 1997Third World Quarterly 471 CLEMENT EADIBE Thefailure of diplomaticintervention ECOWAS didnot expect that its intervention in Liberia would be a long, drawn-outaffair. Rather, it envisaged a short,surgical ` policeaction’ . Indeed, thenature of thecon¯ ict itself suggested a seeminglysimple solution. After all, theimmediate cause ofthe problem was theguerrilla ` incursion’into Liberia’ s northernterritory by abandof rebels,numbering about a coupleof hundred` Gio tribesmen’ .5 Inthe view of the military rulers of Liberia’ s neighbours,most notablyNigeria, Sierra Leone and Guinea, the rebel incursions were an act of thuggerythat should have been repelled quite easily by the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL).Consequently, AFL’sfailureto contain these raids suggested a fundamentalweakness in the ability of the central government in Monrovia, headedby President Samuel Doe, to govern effectively. One solution would be toshore up theDoe regime through the provision of arms andammunition and, ifneedbe, military advisers. Indeed, Nigeria and the United States did precisely thatuntil it became obvious by the summer of1990 that the ` incursions’were notuncoordinated acts bysome `tribesmen’. Rather,the Doe government was facinga well-plannedmilitary rebellion led by an oppositionmilitia, the National PatrioticFront of Liberia ( NPFL),whichhad recruited massively from the ranks ofthe discontented throughout Liberia. 6 Withrebel forces occupyingtwo-thirds ofLiberia’ s territory,the Doe government helpless and reduced to tenuous controlof a fewperimeters around the presidential mansion, and the civilian survivorsof the con¯ ict ¯ eeingin large numbers to neighbouring countries, regionalattention turned to the feasibility of establishing a politico-military presencein Liberia. ECOWAS tookon the Liberian challenge barely ® vemonths after the initial outbreakof armed con¯ ict. At the outset the US was expectedto intervene, as thepatron of theLiberian state throughout much of itshistory. Washington was, however,preoccupied with changes in the international system causedby rapid politicalchanges in the former Soviet bloc. Many observers expected that early reportsemerging from West Africa in the middle of spring 1990 alleging that NPFL rebelswere trained and equipped by Libya would trigger strong US reaction,culminating in the direct military intervention advocated by European ambassadors. 7 Inmany ways Washington did react strongly, for the US soon beganconsultations with its African ` allies’with a viewto orchestrating a regionalresponse to the Libyan threat. However, the dynamics of the war changedquite sharply by the end of spring 1990 due to a series ofmassacres targetingforeign nationals in Liberia, by government and rebel forces alike. Washington’s responseto this development was todeploy forces toevacuate UScitizens and privileged foreigners residing in Liberia. Vocal Liberians, pan-Africanistsand the African press saw thisaction as aclearindication of the growingtrend towards the marginalisation of Africa by the West in general. In particular,the action was seen as proofof US insensitivity to the plight of Africans.If theworld had abandoned Africa because the Cold War had ended, theprescription was clear: Africamust act in thespirit of pan-Africanism to save oneof its own from self-destruction. Naturally, the Organization of African Unity (OAU)was lookedto for leadership. Not surprisingly, according to Chike 472 THE LIBERIAN CONFLICT AND THE ECOWAS±UN PARTNERSHIP Akabogu,Africa’ s premierregional arrangement ` merelydusted up its Articles onnon-interference in the internal affairs ofmember-nations’ . 8 However,for the new OAU leadershipcomprising President Yoweri Museveni ofUganda as chairmanand former Tanzanian foreign minister, Salim Ahmed Salim,as secretary-general,the norm of non-interventiondid not apply to the sui generis characterof theLiberian con¯ ict. 9 Theirtactic was toapproachNigeria, thedominant West African state, to lead a regionalforce into Liberia within the frameworkof ECOWAS.GeneralIbrahim Babangida, Nigeria’ s militaryruler at thetime, seized on the opportunity not only to exercise statesmanship but also todivert national and international attention away from mounting socio- economicproblems and political abuses athome. As chairmanof ECOWAS, he conveneda meetingof ECOWAS headsof stateand government in Banjul in May 1990to discuss hisblueprint for the establishment of an ` ECOWAS Standing MediationCommittee [ SMC]tosettle disputes and con¯ ict situations within the Community’. 10 Thesummit accepted the proposal and constituted the member- ship of the SMC as follows:The Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria and Togo. 11 At itsinaugural meeting in July, the committee discussed the Liberian con¯ ict and agreedon a peaceplan with the following features: establishmentof an immediatecease-® re bythe warring parties; establishment and deployment of ECOWAS Cease® reMonitoringGroup ( ECOMOG)tomonitor the observance of the cease® re byall sides tothe con¯ ict; agreement by the parties to the establish- mentof an Interim Administration in Monrovia, pending the election of a substantivegovernment; and agreement by the parties to constitute a substantive governmentthrough nation-wide elections to be monitored by ECOMOG.12 Accordingto of® cial reports of the ministerial conference, there had been a substantialdisagreement between members ofthe SMC,ontheone hand, and the partiesto the con¯ ict, on the other, about key elements of the proposed peace plan.The issues indispute were: thedesirability and timing of a cease® re; the desirabilityand composition of an interim government; and the usefulness of deployinga regionalpeacekeeping force. 13 Theinability to ® ndcommon ground onthese issues ledeventually to the breakdown of talks between ECOWAS and Liberia’s warringparties over methods to resolve the con¯ ict peacefully. It was the way that ECOWAS reactedto its initial failure to negotiate a cease® re between thewarring factions that resulted in uncontrolled mayhem in Liberia. The problembegan with the frustration of theministers of the SMC withrebel leader CharlesTaylor, whom they viewed contemptuously as theprincipal cause of theirfailure in Banjul. According to the SMC Ministerialreport: It becameclear [to] the Ministerial Meeting¼ that the NPFL was holdingon ® rmly toits initial position of demanding the departure of President Doe before it could considerany of theother essential issues. Indeed, the Committee gained the distinct impressionthat the NPFL hadopted for amilitarysolution. In the light of this, the MinisterialMeeting decided¼ to request that another course of actionbe considered tobring the Liberian crisis to a speedyand peaceful end. 14 Tothe surprise of many diplomatic observers, the ministerial conference pro- ceededwith the formation of aSub-Committeeon Defense Matters ` toconsider issues relatingto the military arm ofthe proposed ECOWAS MonitoringGroup 473 CLEMENT EADIBE (ECOMOG)inLiberia’. 15 Afteronly two days of meetingin Freetown between 18 and20 July 1990, the sub-committee emerged with a blueprintof an ECOWAS militaryintervention force. In presenting the blueprint to the chairman
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