Riding the Fourth Wave Cas Mudde

University of Georgia

From the SelectedWorks of Cas Mudde

Spring 2020

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons CC_BY International License.

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/cas_mudde/157/ Riding the fourth wave

Cas Mudde The role of business in far-right politics Spring 2020 | 297

n 8 October 2018, the editorial board of the US business newspaper, the Wall Street Journal (WSJ),officially endorsed Jair O Bolsonaro for the Brazilian presidential elections. Ignoring his long history of racist and sexist remarks, and dismissing concerns about his open flirts with military dictatorship –“he isn’t proposing to change the constitution, which constrains the military at home”–the editorial board declared the “Brazilian swamp drainer” the best option in the run-off. The WSJ’s endorsement was one of the most high-profile examples of the mainstreaming and normalisation of the far-right, which characterises what I have called the ‘fourth wave’ of far-right politics.1 While these processes extend far beyond the economic sphere (most notably into media and politics), big business plays an important role in this process – if only because it holds significant sway over both media and politics in many countries. After all, Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp, a global multi-billion media conglomerate, owns the Wall Street Journal. “big business is not so much a driver of the far- right, but rather a bandwagoner and enabler” The relationship between big business and far-right politics has long led to grandiose claims, despite relatively little systematic study into the matter. Many far-left activists and scholars see the contemporary far-right in a fairly similar way as the Communist International (‘Comintern’)2 saw fascism in the Interbellum, namely as “the open, terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinist and most imperialist elements of finance capital”.3 But the relationship of fascism and capitalism, as well as that of the far-right and big business, is much more complex than that.

1 Mudde C (2019) The Far-Right Today, Polity 2 An international organisation that advocated communism between 1919 and 1943. 3 In: Grifﬁn R (1998) International Fascism: Theories, Causes and the New Consensus, Arnold (p59).

I will discuss the relationship between the contemporary far-right and big business based on some examples from Europe and the Americas, which show that big business is not so much a driver of the far-right, but rather a bandwagoner and enabler. Before I get into this particularly complex relationship, however, I will discuss some key characteristics of the fourth wave of far-right politics. The next section highlights the heterogeneity of the contemporary far-right, while the following section discusses its changed role in contemporary politics.

THE EXTREME HETEROGENEITY OF THE FAR RIGHT The far-right has always been heterogeneous, even in the ‘fascist era’, when Italian fascism and German national socialism had very different interpretations of the character and importance of the nation, for example – not to speak of the various other proto-fascist movements, like the Romanian Iron Guard or the Spanish Falangists.4 The current heterogeneity is related to virtually every aspect of far-right politics, including ideology, mobilisation, and organisation.

“some radical-right parties and politicians openly ﬂirt with extreme-right ideas, like antisemitism, racism, and even military dictatorship”

The far-right includes all right-wing ideologies that are either against democracy or liberal democracy, where ‘right-wing’ refers to the idea that inequalities within societies are considered to be ‘natural’ and the state is not supposed to help overcome them. The extreme-right is opposed to democracy per se – ie popular sovereignty and majority rule – whereas the radical right accepts democracy, but rejects fundamental aspects of liberal democracy; notably, minority rights, pluralism, rule of law, and separation of powers. In the real world these differences are not always so clear-cut, however – in part because extreme-right groups might tone down their statements so as not to run afoul of the law. Most successful contemporary far-right groups are part of the populist radical right, which combines authoritarianism, nativism, and populism – think of parties like the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), the French National Rally

4 For an overview, see: Grifﬁn R (ed) (1995) Fascism, Oxford University Press.

(RN, previously National Front (NF)), or the Sweden Democrats (SD).5 However, some extreme-right parties are, or recently have been, represented in national parliaments too, such as the Greek Golden Dawn (CA) and Kotleba – People’s Party Our Slovakia (L’SNS). Moreover, some radical- right parties and politicians openly flirt with extreme-right ideas, like antisemitism, racism, and even military dictatorship – including Brazilian president Bolsonaro and US president Donald Trump. Diversity of opinion does not only extend to visions of democracy, however. There are many issues on which far-right groups don’t see eye to eye, including the economy, environment, and immigration. One particularly interesting issue is gender, which plays an increasingly prominent role in far-right politics.6 While almost all far-right groups oppose so-called ‘Feminazis’ and ‘gender ideology’, and consider women ‘the womb of the nation’, their views on gender roles differ significantly. Many see women exclusively as (future) mothers and do not want women to work outside of the household, while others actively support working women and mothers, although preferring women to take several years off to raise the children. These different views on gender are reflected in their leadership. Many far-right organisations still have male leaders who (try to) live up to traditional images of masculinity (like Bolsonaro and Trump), while other have male leaders who are breaking with the traditional masculine image (like Jimmie Âkesson, who took a break as SD leader to address “health issues”), or have female leaders (like Marine Le Pen). But this diversity is not just ideological. In terms the size and scope of organisations, we have far-right politicians without their own party (Bolsonaro, before he founded his own party in late 2019), with a non-far- right party (Trump), with a one-man party (Geert Wilders and the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV)), or with a mass party (Narendra Modi of the Indian People’s Party (BJP) which claims 180 million members). And while some far-right organisations are decades old and have survived their founder-leader and several political ups and downs (such as BJP and FPÖ), others are only a few years old, untested by political upheaval (such as Vox in Spain). Finally, some organisations would fit in a small living room, and are at best involved in local activism, while others count tens of thousands of members and can stage mass demonstrations. More extreme organisations tend to be smaller, but this is not always the case. The Indian

5 See: Mudde C (2007) Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, Cambridge University Press. 6 Mudde C (2019) The Far-Right Today, Polity

National Volunteer Organisation (RSS) is a Hindutva (Hindu nationalist) organisation claiming 5 to 6 million members, which has been banned several times in its almost 100-year history for terrorism.

MAINSTREAMING AND NORMALISATION In a 1998 article, the German political scientist Klaus von Beyme distinguished between “three waves of right-wing extremism in post-war Europe”.7 The first wave, roughly between 1945 and 1955, was characterised by small ‘neo-fascist’ groups, which mostly argued for amnesty and support for wartime collaborators and their families. The Italian Social Movement (MSI) was the only successful political party of this wave, being represented in the Italian parliament from 1948 until 1995, when they transformed into the National Alliance (AN). The second wave, roughly from 1955 to 1980, was defined by ‘right-wing populist’ flash parties, like the French Poujadists, which gained significant electoral success in one or two elections, before disappearing rapidly into political oblivion.

“Far-right parties scored on average just 1 per cent of the national vote in the 1980s, but they averaged 8 per cent in the 2010s” The third wave started in 1980 and saw the electoral breakthrough of radical-right parties like the FN and FPÖ, which focussed primarily on contemporary issues like immigration. These parties were (mostly) new organisations, with leaders untainted by the second world war, and challenged the political establishment from the outside. In most countries, the far-right was excluded from coalitions by so-called cordons sanitaires,8 and its leaders and members were treated as political pariahs. While some parties were able to establish some cracks in the cordon, only one far-right party entered a national coalition government in the late 20th century, the Northern League (LN) in Italy. Nevertheless, its far-right status was heavily debated – many saw it as a regionalist rather than nationalist party.9

7 Klaus von Beyme (1988) ‘Right-Wing Extremism in Postwar Europe’, West European Politics, 11(2):1–18. 8 Literally “sanitary cordon”–normally used to refer to a barrier to stop the spread of infectious diseases. Used here to mean (formal) agreements between political parties to exclude one or more parties from coalition governments. 9 See, for example: Giordano B (2000) ‘Italian Regionalism or ‘Padanian’ Nationalism – The Political Project of the Lega Nord in Italian Politics’, Political Geography, 19(4):445–471

The third wave came to an end at the turn of the century, in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, when a fourth wave started that is both qualitatively and quantitatively different. Most notably, the electoral and political success of the far-right grew signiﬁcantly. Far-right parties scored on average just 1 per cent of the national vote in the 1980s, but they averaged 8 per cent in the 2010s.10 And, although their average electoral support remains modest, some far-right parties score (well) over 25 per cent of the vote, and two far- right politicians have won presidential elections. Moreover, as far-right parties have seen their support grow, most established parties have seen their support shrink (if not plummet), which has given them disproportionate power within increasingly fragmented political systems. As politics shifted from socioeconomic to socio-cultural themes – in part because of the mainstream response to the 9/11 attacks – far-right parties have been able to set the political agenda. This means that other parties are not just discussing the favourite issues of the far-right – corruption, crime, immigration and integration, security – but they are increasingly adopting their frames too. This was further strengthened by the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, in which immigration and security became intertwined in an authoritarian and nativist narrative that dominated much of the mainstream media and politics.11 This has led to a mainstreaming of far-right politics, with far-right frames and issues now propagated by mainstream parties – from the British Conservatives to the Danish Social Democrats – and far- right parties Koalitionsfähig (acceptable for coalitions) throughout Europe.12

BIG BUSINESS AND THE FAR-RIGHT While big business generally preferred conservatives over fascists in the interwar period, many chose the side of the fascists in the struggle against fascism.13 They mainly became open supporters of fascism after the fascists came to power. From Hugo Boss to IG Farben, capitalists actively collaborated with fascist regimes. In many ways, the situation is not much

10 These averages are based on elections for the (lower house of the) national parliaments of EU member states (see Mudde 2019). 11 See: Mudde C (2019) ‘The 2019 EU Elections: Moving the Center’, Journal of Democracy, 30(4):20–34. 12 See, for example: Akkerman T, de Lange S L and Rooduijn M (eds) (2016) Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Into the Mainstream?, Routledge; de Lange S L (2012) ‘New Alliances: Why Mainstream Parties Govern With Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties’, Political Studies, 60(4):899–918. 13 See, for example: Levy C (1999) ‘Fascism, National Socialism and Conservatives in Europe, 1914–1945: Issues for Comparativists’, Contemporary European History, 8(1):97–126.

different in the postwar period. In fact, with very few notable exceptions, big business stayed away from the far-right in the ﬁrst three waves. Given that the far-right was mostly marginalised, there was little to gain and much to lose in supporting them. But, in the fourth wave, far-right parties and politicians have become mainstream, and big business has slowly but steadily changed its position.

“The longer he is in power, the fewer big businesses and their leaders openly oppose Trump, who has also become the single most popular candidate among millionaires” One of the ﬁrst cases was Viktor Orbán and Fidesz in Hungary. After regaining power in 2010, Orbán quickly transformed Hungary into an illiberal democracy (or even a competitive authoritarian regime) and Fidesz into a far-right party. Although this included the de facto nationalisation of both the banking and media sectors, neither the European Union nor big business put up much of a ﬁght.14 In fact, many international companies did not just keep their businesses in Hungary; they expanded them. Of crucial importance here are German businesses, and the German car industry in particular, which has not just invested billions into the Hungarian economy, but also dissuaded German mainstream parties from sanctioning Orbán for his authoritarian and nativist policies.15 In the US, big business was certainly not a major factor in the 2016 shock victory of Donald Trump. While always more drawn towards the Republican Party than the Democratic Party, many businesses and businessmen preferred more stable and trusted names like Jeb Bush and Marco Rubio over the volatile Trump. But, as soon as he won the Republican primary, and particularly the presidential elections, money started to pour into his (re-)election campaign. Surrounding himself with a cabinet of capitalists, the markets soon embraced the new leader and the stock market, in particular, has responded enthusiastically. From CNBC to Fox Business, the media megaphones of big business are hailing Trump’s “economic achievements.” The longer he is in power, the fewer big businesses and their leaders openly oppose Trump, who has also become

14 See, for example: Magyar B (2016) Post-Communist Maﬁa State: The Case of Hungary, Central European University Press; Bozóki A (2011) ‘Occupy the State: The Orbán Regime in Hun- gary’, Debatte: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, 19(3):649–663. 15 Hopkins V (2018) ‘Hungary Ties Growth to Bumper of German Carmakers’, Financial Times

the single most popular candidate among millionaires, although in a head- to-head vote he would lose among millionaires to Joe Biden.16

“the far-right rarely upsets the economic order, at most putting some nationalist restrictions on globalised capitalism” Bolsonaro already had the support of signiﬁcant players in national and international big business before coming to power, including from the powerful Brazilian media, which is mostly linked to the country’s major companies. The World Economic Forum gave him a keynote slot at their 2019 Davos meeting, just after his inauguration, where he ingratiated himself even more by declaring Brazil “open for business”.17 A few months later, the Brazilian-American Chamber of Commerce chose Bolsonaro as its ‘person of the year’, but faced serious backlash from major US companies (like Delta Airlines and Bain & Co), which withdrew from the planned Person of the Year Awards gala dinner in New York City.18 Still, in Brazil itself, the business community seems largely happy with the new president, who has overseen signiﬁcant privatisations, eased monetary policies, and disregarded environmental concerns.19

CONCLUSION The 21st century is still young, but it has already shown to be different in one important regard: the role of far-right politics. After decades of marginalisation, far-right policies have become so mainstreamed and normalised that various mainstream parties are promoting them as their own. While the far-right remains an extremely heterogeneous phenomenon, and its political signiﬁcance differs radically between countries and regions, it has become a major player on the global scene, in particular because of its control of governments in Brazil, India and the US. The relationship between big business and the far-right remains complex. The idea, popular with the (far) left, that the two are in cahoots is too

16 Frank R (2019) ‘Trump Gains Support Among Millionaires But Would Lose To Biden in Head-To-Head, CNBC Survey Finds’, CNBC 17 Riley C (2019) ‘Jair Bolsonaro Says Brazil Is Open For Business’, CNN 18 Siegel R (2019) ‘Delta, Bain and the Financial Times Pull Out of Ceremony Honoring Brazil’s Far-Right President’, Washington Post 19 McDonald S B (2020) ‘Bolsonaro’s First Year: Balancing the Economy and Culture Wars’, Global Americans

simplistic. In general, big business prefers (neo)conservatives, who advance and defend its interests from within the system. As representatives – and proﬁteers – of the system, big business tends to be suspicious of political outsiders, particularly those promising to “break up the system”. They therefore tend to wait and see, hedging their bets as far-right parties and politicians become major players in the political system, but largely embracing them when they come to power. In response, the far-right rarely upsets the economic order, at most putting some nationalist restrictions on globalised capitalism. While not necessarily ideological brethren or political friends, they enter into a marriage of convenience, which, at least in the short term, beneﬁts both.

Cas Mudde is the Stanley Wade Shelton UGAF Professor in the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Georgia and Professor II at the Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX) at the University of Oslo. He is also a columnist at the Guardian (US) and tweets at @casmudde.